MAXIMS OF INTERPRETATION / RULES OF LANGUAGE LESSON 2

REDDENDO SINGULA SINGULIS

Reddendo singula singulis is a Latin term that means by referring each to each; referring each phrase or expression to its corresponding object. In simple words “reddendo singula singulis” means that when a list of words has a modifying phase at the end, the phrase refers only to the last. It is a rule of construction used usually in distributing property. Where there are general words of description, following a record of particular things, such general words are to be construed distributively, and if the general words will apply to some things and not to others, the general words are to be applied to those things to which they will, and not to those to which they will not apply; that is to say, each phrase, word or expression is to be referred to its suitable objects.

The best example of reddendo singula singulis is quoted from Wharton’s law Lexicon, “If anyone shall draw or load any sword or gun, the word draw is applied to sword only and the word load to gun only, the former verb to former noun and latter to latter, because it is impossible to load a sword or to draw a gun, and so of other applications of different sets of words to one another.” The reddendo singula singulis principle concerns the use of words distributively. Where a complex sentence has more than one subject, and more than one object, it may be the right construction to provide each to each, by reading the provision distributively and applying each object to its appropriate subject. A similar principle applies to verbs and their subjects, and to other parts of speech.

“Men and women may become members of fraternities and societies.” This can be interpreted as being gender-specific, thus men may become members of fraternities and women members of societies.

CASUS OMISSUS

This is an omission in a statute arising out of error or inadvertence in such a way as to leave out what appears to have been intended by the legislature. It occurs whenever a statutory provision fails to say something that presumably must have been said.

 

 

Cross described it as the inexplicable and probably inadvertent failure of the draughtsman to use words entirely apt to cover the instant case.

 

Hiding behind the theory of separation of powers, the courts are reluctant to fill the gaps, arguing that this is the prerogative of the legislature. The courts have consistently refused to fill the gap. In the following cases it was held:-

1.       Dadoo LTD v Krugersdorp Municipal Council 1920 AD 530 at 562. 

However it is unrealistic to maintain that courts never fill the gaps. See the following:-

2.       Van Heerden v Queen’s Hotel (Pty) Ltd 1973 (2) SA 14 (RAD) Beadle CJ said “courts are extremely loath to read into an Act words which are not there. They will only do so when not to do so will lead to an absurdity so glaring that it could never have been contemplated by the legislature”

3.       S v Mpofu 1979 (2) SA 255 (R) the court held that it would supply the missing words in a statute if there was clear evidence that the omission was a direct result of a printing error.

4.       Gubbay J commenting on Section 50 (2) of the 1969 Rhodesian Constitution said that it must have been in the compilation of the law-maker that the courts of the land would not be bound by a mere draughtsman’s or printer’s error, which could compel a court to make a manifest injustice either to the individual or the state.

 

It appears that the approach of the courts is that a cassus omissus must only be filled in two exceptional circumstances, namely:-

 

1.       To correct an obvious drafting or printing error, and

2.       To avoid glaring absurdity.

 

The legislature is presumed to have exhaustively enacted everything and therefore it is not for the courts to furnish omissions in the language of the statute. English law has several examples where the courts have filled the casus omissus to avoid the absurdity.

In the case of Adler v George 1964 (2) QB 7 the court was faced with Section 3 of the Official Secrets Act 1920 which provided that

”no person shall in the vicinity of any prohibited place obstruct any member of Her Majesty’s forces”

The accused was actually on a Norfolk airfield (a prohibited place) when he obstructed a member of Her Majesty’s forces. The question was whether the expression “in the vicinity of” include being “in” the place in question? Lord Parker CJ held that the literal meaning of vicinity is being near in space but he was satisfied that this was the case where no violence is done to the language by reading the words “in the vicinity of” as meaning “in or in the vicinity of.”

 

It is for the interpreter to construe and to attribute meaning to a statute and not to re-enact it. It is the province of the judge to expound the law, but not to make it. It professes to verbalise democratic values closely associated with trias politica. It is not for the interpreter or adjudicator to depart from or go beyond the clear words of statutory provision he construes. See the following cases

THE RULE OF RANK

This is a particular application of the maxim ‘noscitur a sociis.’ It is applied where a string of items of a certain level is followed by general words. Then it is presumed that the general words are not intended to include items of a higher rank. A statute which treats things or persons of an inferior rank cannot by any general words be extended to those of a superior.

Illustration:-

1.       Gregory v Fearn (1953) IWLR 974

The string of “tradesman, artificer, workman, labourer and other person whatsoever” was held not to include persons above artisan class.

2.       Casher v Holmes (1831) 2B & Ad 592

The string of “copper, brass and tin and all other metals” was not taken to include precious metals such as gold and silver.