1. Literal construction (Litera Legis)

This rule is also known as the Plain meaning rule. The first and foremost step in the course of interpretation is to examine the language and the literal meaning of the statute. The Courts are bound by the mandate of the Legislature and once it has expressed its intention in words which have a clear significance and meaning, the Court is precluded from speculating. If the provision is unambiguous and if from that provision the legislative intent is clear, the other rules of construction of statutes need not be called into aid. They are called into aid only when the legislative intention is not clear.

There should be no additions or substitution of words in the construction of statutes and in its interpretation. The primary rule is to interpret words as they are. It should be taken into note that the rule can be applied only when the meanings of the words are clear i.e. words should be simple so that the language is plain and only one meaning can be derived out of the statute.

Under this rule the judge considers what the statute actually says, rather than what it might mean. In order to achieve this, the judge will give the words in the statute a literal meaning, that is, their plain ordinary everyday meaning, even if the effect of this is to produce what might be considered as an otherwise unjust or undesirable outcome. The literal rule says that the intention of Parliament is best found in the ordinary and natural meaning of the words used. As the legislative democratic part of the state, Parliament must be taken to want to effect exactly what it says in its laws. If judges are permitted to give an obvious or non-literal meaning to the words of parliamentary law, then the will of Parliament, and thereby the people, is being contradicted. Lord Diplock once noted:

Where the meaning of the statutory words is plain and unambiguous it is not then for the judges to invent fancied ambiguities as an excuse for failing to give effect to its plain meaning because they consider the consequences for doing so would be inexpedient, or even unjust or immoral.

Duport Steel v Sirs (1980)

Understanding The Literal Rule

The literal rule may be understood subject to the following conditions –

1. Statute may itself provide a special meaning for a term, which is usually to be found in the interpretation section.
2. Technical words are given ordinary technical meaning if the statute has not specified any other.
3. Words will not be inserted by implication.
4. Words undergo shifts in meaning in course of time.
5. It should always be remembered that words acquire significance from their context.

When it is said that words are to be understood first in their natural ordinary and popular sense, it is meant that words must be ascribed that natural, ordinary or popular meaning which they have in relation to the subject matter with reference to which and the context in which they have been used in the Statute. In the statement of the rule, the epithets ‘natural, “ordinary”, “literal”, “grammatical” and “popular” are employed almost interchangeably to convey the same idea.

Example:

The R V Harris case (1836), where the defendant bit the nose off the victim. The statute stated the offence was ‘to stab or wound’. Under The Literal Rule, biting is not stabbing, cutting or wounding (implying the use of an instrument). The defendant was proven not guilty.

One example of this is the. In the London and North Eastern Railway v Berriman (1946) case a rail worker was killed whilst oiling a track; no ‘stopping man’ had been provided. Under statute, compensation is provided on death of workers ‘replacing or relaying’ track. The statute did not cover oiling and so compensation wasn’t given. This can undermine public confidence in the law.

It shall be an offence punishable by a fine of 50 pounds to sleep in a railway station. A waiting passenger slept at the railway station as the train was late. He was fined by the police officer. Passenger plead in the court that said law could not be implemented on passengers who were waiting for train at the station. Court rejected the plea and restrained itself to the literal meanings.

Master ordered his servant to bring mutton from the market. Servant brought 3 days old mutton from the market. When master argued, servant told him that he had never mentioned to not to bring the old mutton.

Whitely v Chappel (1868) LR 4 QB 147

A statute made it an offence 'to impersonate any person entitled to vote.' The defendant used the vote of a dead man. The statute relating to voting rights required a person to be living in order to be entitled to vote. 

Held:
The literal rule was applied and the defendant was thus acquitted.

Leas v. Secretary of the state

A blind person unable to walk

Criticism of This Rule

Opponents of the plain meaning rule claim that the rule rests on the erroneous assumption that words have a fixed meaning. In fact, words are imprecise, leading justices to impose their own prejudices to determine the meaning of a statute. However, since little else is offered as an alternative discretion-confining theory, plain meaning survives.

This is the oldest of the rules of construction and is still used today, primarily because judges may not legislate. As there is always the danger that a particular interpretation may be the equivalent of making law, some judges prefer to adhere to the law's literal wording.

No external aid Where words plain and unambiguous-

Where the words of a statute are plain, precise and unambiguous, the intention of the Legislature is to be gathered from the language of the statute itself and no external aid is admissible to construe those words. It is only where a statute is not exhaustive or where its language is ambiguous, uncertain, clouded or susceptible of more than one meaning or shades of meaning that the external aid may be looked into for the purpose of ascertaining the object which the Legislature had in view in using the words in question.