Evidence may be given of facts in issue and relevant facts:

Evidence may be given in any suit or proceeding of the existence or non-existence of every fact in issue and of such other facts as are hereinafter declared to be relevant and of ho others.  
Explanation: This Article shall not enable any person to give evidence of a fact, which he is disentitled to prove by any provision of the law for the time being in force relating to Civil Procedure.  
Illustrations: 

(a) A is tried for the murder of B by boating him with a club with the intention of causing his death.  
At A's trial the following facts are in issue: — A's beating B with the club;  
A's causing B's death by such beating;  
A's Intention to cause B's death.  
(b) A suitor does not bring with him and have in readiness for production at the first hearing of the case a bond on which he relies. This Article does not enable him to produce the bond or prove its contents at a subsequent stage of the proceedings, otherwise than in accordance with the conditions prescribed by the law for the time being in force relating to Civil Procedure. 

Relevancy of facts forming part of same transaction:

Facts, which though not in issue, are so connected with a fact in issue as to form part of the same transaction, are relevant whether they occurred at the same time and place or at different times and places.  
Illustrations:

(a) A is accused of the murder of B by beating him. Whatever was said or done by A or B or the by-slanders at the beating, or, so shortly before or after it as to form part of the transaction, is a relevant fact.  
(b) A is accused of waging war against Pakistan by taking part in an armed insurrection in which property is destroyed/ troops are attacked, and goals are broken open. The occurrence of these facts is relevant, as forming part of the general transaction, though A may not have been present at all of them.  
(c) A sues B for a libel contained in a letter forming part of a correspondence. Letters between the parties relating to the subject out of which the libel arose, and forming part of the correspondence in which it Is contained, are relevant facts, though they do not contain the libel itself.  
(d) The question is, whether certain goods ordered from B were delivered to A. The goods were delivered to several intermediate persons successively. Each delivery is a relevant fact.  

Facts which are the occasion, cause or effect of facts in issue:

Facts which are the occasion, cause or effect, immediate or otherwise, of relevant facts, or facts in issue, or which constitute the state of things under which they happened, or which afforded an opportunity for their occurrence or transaction, are relevant.  
Illustrations

(a) The question is, whether A robbed B.  
The facts that, shortly before the robbery, B went to a fair with money in his possession, and that he showed it or mentioned the fact that he had it, to third person, are relevant.  
(b) The question is whether A murdered B.  
Marks on the ground, produced by a struggle at or near the place where the murder was committed, are relevant facts.  
(c) The question is whether A poisoned B.  
The state of B's health before the symptoms ascribed to poison, and habits of B. known to A, which afforded an opportunity for the administration of poison, are relevant facts.  

Motive, preparation and, previous or subsequent conduct:

(1) Any fact is relevant which shows or constitutes a motive or preparation for any fact in issue or relevant fact.  
(2) The conduct of any party, or of any agent to any party, to any suit or proceeding, in reference to such suit or proceeding, or in reference to any fact in issue therein or relevant thereto, and the conduct of any person an offence against whom is the subject of any proceeding, is relevant, if such conduct influences or is influenced by any fact in issue or relevant fact, and whether it was previous or subsequent thereto.  
Explanation 1: The word "conduct" in this clause does not include statements, unless those statements accompany and explain acts other than statements but this explanation is not to affect the relevancy of statements under any other Article of this Order.  
Explanation 2: When the conduct of any person is relevant, any statement made to him or in his presence and hearing, which affects such conduct, is relevant.  
Illustrations:

(a) A is tried for the murder of B.  
The facts that A murdered C, that B knew that A had murdered C and that B had tried to extort money from A by threatening to make his knowledge public, are relevant.  
(b) A sues B upon a bond for the payment of money. B denies the making of the bond.  
The fact that, at the time when the bond was alleged to be made, B required money for a particular purpose is relevant.  
(c) A is tried for the murder of B by poison the fact that, before the death of B. A procured poison similar to that, which was administered to B, is relevant.  
(d) The question is whether a certain document is the will of A.  
The facts that not long before the date of the alleged will A made inquiry into matters to which the provisions of the alleged will relate, that he consulted advocates in reference to making the will, and that he caused drafts of other wills to be prepared of which he did not approve, are relevant.  
(e) A is accused of a crime.  
The facts that either before or at the time of, or after the alleged crime, A provided evidence which would tend to give to the facts of the case an appearance favourable to himself, or that he destroyed or concealed evidence or prevented the presence or procured the absence of persons who might have been witnesses, or suborned persons to give false evidence respecting it, are relevant.  
(f) The question is whether A robbed B. 
The facts that, after B was robbed. C said in A's presence:  
"the Police are coming to look for the man who robbed B", and that immediately afterwards A ran away, are relevant.  
(g) The question is whether A owes B rupees 10,000.  
The facts that A asked C to fend him money, and that D said to C in A's presence and hearing: "I advise you not to trust A, for he owes B 10,000 rupees", and that A went away without making any answer are relevant facts.  
(h) The question is, whether A committed a crime.  
The fact that A absconded after receiving a fetter warning him that inquiry was being made for the criminal, and the contents of the letter are relevant.  
(i) A is accused of a crime.  
The fact that, after the commission of the alleged crime he absconded, or was in possession of property or the proceeds of property acquired by the crime, or attempted to conceal things which were or might have been used in committing it, are relevant.  
(j) The question is whether A was ravished.  
The facts that shortly after the alleged rape, she made a complaint relating to the crime, the circumstances under which, and the terms in which, the complaint was made are relevant.  
The fact that, without making a complaint, she said, that she had been ravished is not relevant as conduct under this Article though it may be relevant as a dying declaration under Article 49, paragraph (1), or as corroborative evidence under Article 153.  
(k) The question is, whether A was robbed.  
The fact that, soon after the alleged robbery, he made a complaint relating to the offence, the circumstances under which, and the terms in which, the complaint was made, are relevant.  
The fact that he said he had been robbed without making any complaint, is not relevant, as conduct under this Article, though it may be relevant, as a dying declaration under Article 46, paragraph (1). or as corroborative evidence under Article 153.

DOCTRINE OF RES GESTAE:

Res Gestae is a Latin word which means “things done.” This is the rule of law of evidence and is an exception to hearsay rule of evidence that hearsay evidence is not admissible. It is a spontaneous declaration made by a person immediately after an event and before the mind has an opportunity to conjure a false story. It represents an exception to the hearsay rule. Res gestae is a concept which as a matter of principle is employed in the English system of administration of criminal justice under the name of "res gestae". In our system of administration of justice, Article 19 of Qanun­-e-Shahadat, 1984 corresponding to section 6 of the Evidence Act of 1872, is an enacted provision of law under which statement made immediately after the occurrence under the influence of occurrence in order to characterize it and connecting therewith would be admissible under this article as "res gestae" evidence[1]. According to Wigmore, a frequent application of the phrase has been to the Hearsay Exception for spontaneous exclamations, i.e. statements made during or after an affray, a collision, or the like, used to prove the facts asserted in the statement. [3] 

This Exception had its earliest illustration in Lord Holt’s ruling in Thompson v. Trevanion, in 1693; so that the doctrine may be said to have been recognized before the phrase ‘res gestae’ came into use. Nevertheless, the development of this doctrine did not begin until after Aveson v. Kinnaird, in 1805, when the phrase in question had begun to be freely used in connection with it; and only since the middle of the 1800s has it been possible to say that this Exception was firmly established.[3]

This principle is based on the experience that, under certain external circumstances of physical shock, a stress of nervous excitement may be produced which stills the reflective faculties and removes their control, so that the utterance which then occurs is a spontaneous and sincere response to the actual sensations and perceptions already produced by the external shock. Since this utterance is made under the immediate and uncontrolled domination of the sensed, and during the brief period when considerations of self-interest could not have been brought fully to bear by reasoned reflection, the utterance may be taken as particularly trustworthy (or, at least, as lacking the usual grounds of untrustworthiness), and thus as expressing the real tenor of the speaker’s belief as to the facts just observed by him; and may therefore be received as testimony to those facts.[4]

In Babulal vs W.I.T Ltd.[5] it was observed that the statement of law in section 6 of the Evidence Act is usually known as Res Gestae. The literal meaning of the word “res” is “everything that may form an object of rights and includes an object, subject matter or status.”[6] Res Gestae has been described as a term of protean significance and that there have been many definitions of the term. No evidential problem is as shrouded in doubt and confusion[7] as is Res Gestae. The rule as to admissibility of evidence known as the Res Gestae rule has been declared to be incapable of any precise definition and it has been applied to so many different and unrelated situations that it has been said that the difficulty of formulating a description of Res Gestae which will serve all circumstances seems insurmountable.[8] In America an attempted definition of res gestae is that it consists of the ‘circumstances, facts and declarations’ which grow out of the main fact, are contemporaneous with it, and serve to illustrate its character.[9]

The principle has been explained by LORD NORMAND in Teper v. Reginam, 1952, 2 All ER 447, 449 : 1952 AC 480:-

“Nevertheless the rule (Hearsay) admits of certain carefully safe-guarded and limited exceptions, one of which is that the words may be proved when they form part of the res gestae……….. It appears to rest ultimately on two propositions---that human utterance is both a fact and a means of communication, and that human action may be so interwoven with words that the significance of the action cannot be understood without the correlative words and the dissociation of the words from the action would impede the discovery of truth.”[10]

In Prem Chand Versus State (NCT of Delhi), it was held that the principle of law embodied in this section enunciates the rule that declarations which are contemporaneous or almost contemporaneous with the transaction in issue i.e. the interval between two being so short and there being no opportunity for fabrication, such a declaration would be admissible as res gestae.[11]

In understanding the nature of the res gestae exception to hearsay and the manner in which it must be construed in individual cases by the Judiciary, it is important to rely repeatedly on the underlying consideration that is often overlooked – the reliability of the statement.[12]

The res gestae embraces not only the actual facts of the transaction and the circumstances surrounding it, but the matters immediately antecedent to and having a direct causal connection with it, as well as acts immediately following it and so closely connected with it as to form in reality a part of the occurrence.” J. McKnight, State v. Fouquette, 221 P.2d 404, 416-417 (Nev. 1950).[13]

The rationale in making certain statement on fact admissible under Section 6 of the Evidence Act is on account of the spontaneity and immediacy of such statement or fact in relation to the fact in issue. But, it is necessary that such fact or statement must be part of the same transaction. In other words, such statement must have been made contemporaneous with the acts which constitute the offence or atleast immediately thereafter. But, if there was an interval, however slight it may be, which was sufficient enough for fabrication then the statement is not part of res gestae.[14]

Contemporaneous utterances have been described in Gurdev Singh, Balwinder Kumar, Angrej Singh, Bachittar Singh Versus UOI & Ors. 2014(2) SLR 675, that Statements made by a person to a third person soon after an incident, but with no gap of time are akin to contemporaneous utterances and are admissible as res gestae evidence through the deposition of the one who heard the utterance. Statements made after some gap which cease to be res gestae are hearsay evidence and thus inadmissible as per the law of evidence.

In Chhotka v. State, AIR 1958 Calcutta 482[15] it was held that the requirement of Section 6 is that the statement must have been made contemporaneously with the act or immediately after it and not at such an interval of time as to make it a narrative of past events or to allow time for fabrication.

A more flexible understanding of res gestae as an exception to the hearsay rule was formulated by the Judicial Committee in 1952. Carefully carving out this exception, it seemed easy enough to characterise statements as falling within the res gestae on the basis of two fundamental principles. First, the proposition that human utterances are facts just as actions are, and secondly, ‘that human action may be so interwoven with words that the significance of the action cannot be understood without the correlative words, and the dissociation of the words from the action would impede the discovery of truth.’ In this case, the statement of a bystander was rejected on the grounds that it was highly prejudicial to the accused and that there was no other evidence supporting the culpability of the accused. Though the res gestae exception was broadly construed, the statement was excluded in this case for these reasons.[16]

One of the leading decisions in relation to the res gestae exception is that of the Privy Council in Ratten v. The Queen, which dealt with the admissibility of the statement of a telephone operator who received a call from the deceased minutes before she was allegedly murdered by her husband. The Council characterised the statement as original evidence of ‘verbal facts’, as opposed to hearsay evidence, as the object of admitting the statement was not to establish the truth of the statement made, but merely to establish the fact that it was made. The following observation was made:

“Words spoken are facts just as much as any other action by a human being. If the speaking of the words is a relevant fact, a witness may give evidence that they were spoken. A question of hearsay only arises when the words spoken are relied on "testimonially," i.e., as establishing some fact narrated by the words.”[17]

Following the decision of the Privy Council in Ratten’s Case, the law on this point was consolidated decisively in the celebrated case of R v. Andrews. Lord Ackner of the House of Lords exhaustively dealt with this exception, moving away from the simple question of whether the statement was a fact to be admitted as original evidence, to the more complex one of whether the truth of the statement relayed could be admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule, and by what justification. This issue was of considerable significance as the statement of the victim was one which, if admitted, would disclose the identities of his assailants. The House of Lords found itself compelled to effectively demarcate the boundaries of the exception in response to the question posed by the Defence: ‘If such hearsay is so admissible, how wide can the material events go before becoming inadmissible?’[18]

Ultimately, Lord Ackner identified certain criteria to be considered by a Trial Court judge in determining whether hearsay statements shall be admissible for the purpose of establishing the truth of the facts asserted by them. The chief consideration was whether there was a possibility of concoction or distortion. Other rules framed stemmed from this pivotal test, and included a consideration of the circumstances in which the statement was made and a flexible determination of whether it was sufficiently spontaneous. Most importantly, in disregarding time as the primary factor justifying the res gestae exception, Lord Ackner recognised that concoction and distortion can be determined regardless of whether the statement was formally part of the transaction.[19]

Evidence in criminal cases is still required to comply with Common Law standards that have been incorporated into statutory provisions operating today. Although it was impossible to envisage any settled, universally acceptable test to adjudge whether hearsay be admissible on the basis of the principle of res gestae, the Courts in England have made a laudable attempt to identify the nature of this exception.[20]

The test for applying the rule of res gestae is that the statement should be spontaneous and should form part of the same transaction ruling out any possibility of concoction.[21]

The declarations are admitted when they appear to have been made under the immediate influence of some principal transaction, relevant to the issue, and are so connected with it as to characterize or explain it. It should appear that they were made without premeditation or artifice, and without a view to the consequences; that they are the spontaneous utterances, natural result of the act they characterize or elucidate.[22] The declaration must be calculated to unfold the nature and quality of the facts which they are intended to explain; they must so harmonise with those facts as to form one transaction. There must be a transaction of which they are considered a part; they must be concomitant with the principal act, and so connected with it as to be regarded as the result and consequence of co-existing motives.[23]

Declarations that do not satisfy this test are rejected as hearsay. Res gestae is an ambiguous and elastic expression and as Phipson says “led to confusion and gave rise to at least four conflicting conceptions, e.g. (i) one which applies the term res gestae to the main fact in relation to its constitutent details; (ii) one which applies it to the details of such fact merely; (iii) one which applies it to the ‘surrounding circumstances’ of some central fact, called, in contradistinction, the principal fact; and (iv) one which applies it to the total whole composed of both principal fact and surrounding circumstances.[24]

In Kailash Chandrakar and another Versus State of Madhya Pradesh (Now Chhattisgarh),[25] it was held that to form a particular statement as a part of the same transaction or of the same incident or just contemporary to the incident so as to make it reasonably certain that the speaker is still under stress of excitement in respect of the transaction are facts to be considered. The principle is that it should be so intimately connected with the fact in issue as to be a spontaneous utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion or a spontaneous reaction thereof and there being no opportunity for deliberately fabricating the statement. In other words, the statement which is a part of res gestae does not narrate a past event, but it is the event itself speaking through a person thus excluding the possibility of any design behind it.[26]

Despite its intuitive appeal, Wigmore’s notion that a person would not have time to think up a lie before making an excited utterance in response to a startling event is not borne out by psychological research. The time required to craft a lie is slight--sometimes only a matter of seconds.[27] It was asserted that the difference in reaction time between deceptive and sincere responses is negligible. The excited utterance exception, which tolerates more than a thirty-minute gap between the event and the utterance, allows more than sufficient time for planning a false report. Psychological studies support this observation and indicate that the difference between the time of cognition and the time when the declarant may begin to fabricate is so small that it is often impossible to measure without instruments.[28]

The testimony of children is often the subject of excited utterance debate.[29] Usually whenever there is a time gap, the transaction is said to end and any statement which do not form part of the transaction is inadmissible. However in cases of children this rule is relaxed. The rationale for expanding the exception for children emphasizes how children cope with stress because their statements are often made well after events occur at the first safe opportunity to speak.[30]In Uttam Singh vs State of Madhya Pradesh[31] the child witness was sleeping with the deceased father at the relevant time of incident and was awakened by the sound of the fatal blow of the axe on the neck of the deceased. Seeing it, the child shouted to his mother for help by naming the accused as assailant. On hearing the sounds the mother and sisters of the child and other witnesses gathered at the spot. This evidence washeld to be admissible as a part of the same transaction as such shout was the natural and probable as per the facts of the case. In this case if child witness failed to reacton the spot but spoke later, it could still be admissible under sec. 6.

The res gestae doctrine has often been criticised. According to PROFESSOR STONE, “no evidential problem is so shrouded in doubt and confusion.”[32] It was the opinion of PROFESSOR WIGMORE[33] that the rule is not only useless but also harmful. It is useless because every part of it is covered by some other rule, for example, declarations as to the state of mind or health. It is harmful because it causes confusion about the limitations of the other rules. The precise limits of res gestae are themselves not easy to define. Facts differ so that no fixed principle can be laid down as to the matters that will form parts of a transaction.

To conclude, we can say that some of the cases bearing upon this topic exhibit diversity of the opinion, but the following points appear to have been fairly settled:-

1) The declarations (oral or written) must relate to the act which is in issue or relevant thereto; they are not admissible merely because they accompany an act. Moreover the declarations must relate to and explain the fact they accompany, and not independent facts previous or subsequent thereto [Agassiz v. London Tramways Co.] unless such facts are part of a transaction which is continuous.

2) The declarations must be substantially contemporaneous with the fact and not merely the narrative of a past. [Thompson v. Trevanion; R v. Christie; Teper v. R, 1952, 2 All ER 447].

3) The declaration and the act may be by the same person, or they may be by different persons, e.g, the declarations of the victim, assailant and by-standers.[34]

[1]. SAMEEULLAH KHAN versus THE STATE and another (2000 P Cr. L J 769 Peshawar).

[2]. Wigmore J. H. (1940), WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, Vol.VI, 3rd Edn. LITTLE, BROWN AND COMPANY, pp1764-1768.

[3]. Wigmore J. H. (1940), WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, Vol.VI, 3rd Edn. LITTLE, BROWN AND COMPANY, p.1768.

[4]. Wigmore J. H. (1940), WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, Vol.VI, 3rd Edn. LITTLE, BROWN AND COMPANY, p.1747. see also Accord: 1916, Perry v. Haritos, 100 Conn. 476, 124 Atl. 44 (Wheeler, C.J., quote the above text with approval).

[5]. 1956 INDLAW CAL 105.

[6]. Escorts Farms Ltd vs Commissioner Kumaon Division 2004 INDLAW SC 1157.

[7]. Julius Stone, Res Gesta Raegitata, Vol. 55 The Law Quarterly Review, p. 66.

[8]. 31 A CJS 978.

[9]. Pinney v jones, 1894, 42 Am SR 209.

[10]. Sarkar S.C., (2014) S.6, SARKAR LAW OF EVIDENCE, vol.I, 18th Edn., LexisNexis, p.288.

[11]. 2014(5) AD(Delhi) 352.

[12]. http://www.lawteacher.net/.../the-doctrine-of-res-gestae... (Accessed on 07/01/2015).

[13]. http://www.law.cornell.edu/.../%5Bfield_short_title-raw... (Accessed on 07/01/2015).

[14]. Sarkar S.C., (2014) S.6, SARKAR LAW OF EVIDENCE, vol.I, 18th Edn., LexisNexis, p.286.

[15]. See also Pratapsingh and another Versus State of M.P. (1971 CriLJ 172).

[16]. http://www.lawteacher.net/.../the-doctrine-of-res-gestae... (Accessed on 07/01/2015).

[17]. http://www.lawteacher.net/.../the-doctrine-of-res-gestae...(Accessed on 07/01/2015).

[18]. http://www.lawteacher.net/.../the-doctrine-of-res-gestae...(Accessed on 07/01/2015).

[19]. http://www.lawteacher.net/.../the-doctrine-of-res-gestae...(Accessed on 07/01/2015).

[20]. http://www.lawteacher.net/.../the-doctrine-of-res-gestae... (Accessed on 07/01/2015).

[21]. Javed Alam v. Sate of Chhattisgarh, (2009) 6 SCC 450(455)

[22]. Jones Ev Civil, s.344: see Noor Md v Imtiaz, A 1940 O 130.

[23]. Jones, s.348 citing People v. Vernon, 35 Cal 49 and other American cases.

[24]. Sarkar S.C., (2014) S.6, SARKAR LAW OF EVIDENCE, vol.I, 18th Edn., LexisNexis, p.287.

[25]. 2014(135) AIC 553, CHHATTISGARH HIGH COURT.

[27]. See Robert M. Hutchins & Donald Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence, 28 Column. L. Rev. 432, 437 (1928)

[28]. See Robert M. Hutchins & Donald Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence, 28 Column. L. Rev. 437 (1928)

[29]. See generally Lucy S. McGough, Child Witnesses: Fragile Voices in the American Legal System 126-88 (1994) (discussing the relationship between hearsay and child witnesses in both civil and criminal contexts); Nancy Walker Perry & Lawrence S. Wrightsman, The Child Witness: Legal Issues and Dilemmas 169-73 (1991) (discussing the challenges courts face with respect to hearsay rulings when dealing with child witnesses).

[30]. See Commonwealth vs Di Monte, 692 N.E.2d 45, 50 (Mass. 1998) (“Our affirmance of a judge’s admission of a statement to a physician from a child some five hours after she had been scalded is an outer limit in our cases thus far.”); see also Commonwealth vs Hardy, 716 N.E.2d 109, 114 n.7 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999) (noting children’s statements are given “special consideration” for excited utterances).

[31]. 2002 INDLAW MP 79

[32]. Dr. AVTAR SINGH, (2009), Chap. 2, RELEVANCY OF FACTS, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, 9TH Edn. CENTERAL LAW PUBLICATOINS, Fane Road, Lahore, pp.47-48

[33]. Wigmore J. H. (1940), WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, Vol.VI, 3rd Edn. LITTLE, BROWN AND COMPANY, p.1767 (see also Dr. AVTAR SINGH, (2009), Chap. 2, RELEVANCY OF FACTS, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, 9TH Edn. CENTERAL LAW PUBLICATOINS, Fane Road, Lahore, pp.47-48).

[34]. Sarkar S.C., (2014) S.6, SARKAR LAW OF EVIDENCE, vol.I, 18th Edn., LexisNexis, pp.293-294.