

a foreign language in which they are less proficient than their native tongue.

foreign language processing difficulties Problems associated with learning a foreign language, such as taking more time to respond and experiencing cognitive difficulties while processing information.

gestures Movements of the body, usually the hands, that are generally reflective of thought or feeling.

intercultural communication The exchange of knowledge, ideas, thoughts, concepts, and emotions among people of different cultural backgrounds.

intracultural communication Communication that occurs among people of the same cultural background.

lexicon The words contained in a language, the vocabulary.

messages The meanings that encoders intend to convey and decoders interpret.

mindfulness A strategy to improve intercultural communication that allows people to be conscious of their own habits, mental scripts, and cultural expectations concerning communication.

minority group–affiliation hypothesis The hypothesis that immigrant bilinguals will tend to self-identify as members of an ethnic minority group and adopt the behavioral stereotypes of the majority culture about their minority as their own when they are operating in the language associated with their minority group.

morphemes The smallest and most basic units of meaning in a language.

nonverbal behaviors All the behaviors, other than words, that occur during communication, including facial expressions; movements and gestures of hands, arms, and legs; posture; vocal characteristics such as pitch, rate, intonation, and silence; interpersonal space; touching behaviors; and gaze and visual attention.

phonemes The smallest and most basic units of sound in a language.

phonology The system of rules governing how words should sound (pronunciation, “accent”) in a given language.

pragmatics The system of rules governing how language is used and understood in given social contexts.

regulators Nonverbal behaviors we engage in to regulate the flow of speech during a conversation.

Sapir–Whorf hypothesis The proposition that speakers of different languages think differently, and that they do so because of the differences in their languages. Also referred to as *linguistic relativity*.

semantics What words mean.

signals The specific words and behaviors that are sent during communication.

syntax and grammar The system of rules governing word forms and how words should be strung together to form meaningful utterances.

uncertainty reduction One of the major goals of initial intercultural encounters—to reduce the level of uncertainty and anxiety that one feels when attempting to decode intercultural messages.




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11

Culture, Self, and Personality

Although culture is generally considered a macrolevel construct, it operates both on the social level and on the personal and individual level, as discussed in Chapter 1. All of us operate in our worlds as individual agents of culture, bringing our implicit, underlying psychological culture to every situation, context, and interaction. We bring this culture to school, work, and meetings with our friends and family. It is a basic part of our selves.

Because culture plays such a major role in shaping our sense of self and identity, it has a pervasive influence on all our behaviors across all contexts. It is imperative that we go beyond the material presented in Chapter 1 that defined culture and examine how culture comes to play such a dominant role in shaping our core sense of self. Then we can explore how that sense of self, fundamentally interrelated with culture, affects our feelings, our thinking, and our motivations. Our sense of self, also known as *self-concept* or *self-construal*, is an important guide to understanding our own behavior as well as understanding and predicting the behavior of others.

In the first part of this chapter, we examine the importance of the concept of self in explaining cultural differences in behaviors and psychological traits. We will explore some examples of different cultural conceptualizations of self, uncovering the consequences of these different conceptualizations for different aspects of behavior. We will also review some of the most recent work on culture and self that challenges previous assumptions about their relationship. We will also discuss the relevant and timely topic of bicultural identity, a topic that has gained importance because of the increasing number of people in all societies who are multicultural. In the second part of the chapter, we will examine

a concept closely related to the self—namely, personality. This is one of the most important and widely studied areas in cross-cultural psychology. Our initial review of how culture contributes to our concepts of self will provide a foundation for understanding the relationship between culture and personality.

Culture and Concepts of Self

One of the most powerful and pervasive concepts in the social sciences is the **self-concept**. Scholars have wondered and written about the “self” for many years. We may not consciously think about our self very much, yet how we understand or construe our sense of self is intimately and fundamentally tied to how we understand the world around us and our relationships with others in that world. Whether conscious or not, our concept of self is an integral and important part of our lives.

Think about some descriptions of yourself. You may believe you are an optimist or a pessimist, extroverted or introverted. We use these labels as shorthand descriptions to characterize ourselves. Suppose a young woman tells you she is “sociable.” An array of underlying meanings is attached to this one-word description. Descriptive labels such as this usually imply (1) that we have this attribute within us, just as we possess other attributes such as abilities, rights, or interests; (2) that our past actions, feelings, or thoughts have close connections with this attribute; and (3) that our future actions, plans, feelings, or thoughts will be controlled or guided by this attribute and can be predicted more or less accurately by it. In short, if someone describes herself as “sociable,” we know that her concept of self is rooted in, and supported and reinforced by, a rich repertoire of specific information concerning her own actions, thoughts, feelings, motives, and plans. The concept of her self as “sociable” may be central to her self-definition, enjoying a special status as a salient identity (Stryker, 1986) or self-schema (Markus, 1977).

A sense of self is critically important and integral to determining our own thoughts, feelings, and actions, and to how we view the world and ourselves and others in that world, including our relationships with other people, places, things, and events. In short, our sense of self is at the core of our being, unconsciously and automatically influencing our every thought, action, and feeling. Each individual carries and uses these internal attributes to guide his or her thoughts and actions in different social situations. A noted anthropologist, Clifford Geertz (1975), described the self as “a bounded, unique, more or less integrated motivational and cognitive universe, a dynamic center of awareness, emotion, judgment, and action organized into a distinctive whole and set contrastively both against other such wholes and against a social and natural background” (p. 48).

These assumptions about the meaning and importance of self are especially relevant within an American psychological framework that is rooted in an individualistic way of thinking. In an individualistic culture, the self is seen as a bounded entity consisting of a number of internal attributes, including needs,

abilities, motives, and rights. As people grow up within a certain cultural milieu, that cultural milieu shapes, bounds, and molds their sense of self so that the self-concept “makes sense” within that cultural milieu. If self-concepts are important integrators and organizers of all our psychological traits, characteristics, and behaviors, and if culture shapes and molds our sense of self, then we can conclude that culture shapes and molds our behaviors, thoughts, and feelings indirectly via our self-concepts.

Because cultures differ, it follows that different cultures produce different self-concepts in their members, and these different self-concepts, in turn, influence all other aspects of individual behaviors. That is, what people actually mean and understand as the self differs dramatically from one culture to another. The sense of self we define in a predominantly individualistic American culture is not necessarily the same sense of self as that defined by other cultures, especially collectivistic ones. These differences in self-concepts occur because different cultures are associated with different systems of rules of living, and exist within different social and economic environments and natural habitats. The different demands that cultures place on individual members mean that individuals integrate, synthesize, and coordinate their worlds differently. In short, they have fundamentally different self-concepts.

Just as our own sense of self has a powerful influence on our lives, so the sense of self of people in other cultures influences their lives just as profoundly. Our self-concepts may be totally different from those of another culture. Yet we do not often think about these differences because we are not very aware of our own sense of self and how much it influences our behavior. “Self” is an important, abstract concept that helps us understand much of our psychological composition. But because it is an abstract concept, we are not always cognizant of its influence on ourselves, let alone on others. We only see these differences in the clashes that occur when people with different senses of self interact.

By raising the possibility that your own concept of self may not make much intuitive sense to people of other cultures, we don’t want to imply that students or experts in social psychology from other cultures fail to understand the notion of self as a theoretical concept in social psychology. To the contrary, they certainly can and do understand “self” as a theoretical construct. Yet the nature of their understanding is very different from that of Americans. People from other cultural backgrounds may understand Western concepts of self in the same way many Americans understand four-dimensional space. That is, they may understand the concept on a theoretical or cognitive level but have almost no experiential basis for that understanding. They don’t feel that understanding emotionally.

Markus and Kitayama (1991b) used these notions to describe two fundamentally different senses of self, contrasting the Western or individualistic construal of self as an independent, separate entity with a composite construal of self more common in many non-Western, collectivistic cultures, in which the individual is viewed as inherently connected or interdependent with others and inseparable from a social context. They illustrated how these divergent forms of self are tied to differences in what people notice and think about, what they feel,

and what motivates them (Markus & Kitayama, 1991b). Of course, all cultures cannot be pigeonholed into one of these two categories, but we can use these categories by way of example to highlight the relationship among culture, self, and psychology. However, we need to apply them flexibly if we are to understand different cultures and, more important, different people on their own bases rather than forcing them into conceptual categories based on theory alone.

An Example of Different Cultural Conceptualizations of Self: Independent and Interdependent Selves

An Independent Construal of Self


In the United States, standing out and asserting yourself is a virtue: “The squeaky wheel gets the grease.” American politicians routinely credit their success to self-confidence, trusting their instincts, and the ability to make decisions and stick by them. In many individualistic cultures like ours, there is a strong belief in the separateness of individuals. The normative task in these cultures is to maintain the independence of the individual as a separate, self-contained entity.

In American society, many of us have been socialized to be unique, to express ourselves, to realize and actualize the inner self, and to promote our personal goals. These are the tasks the culture provides for its members. These cultural tasks have been designed and selected throughout history to encourage the independence of each separate self. With this set of cultural tasks, our sense of self-worth or self-esteem takes on a particular form. When individuals successfully carry out these cultural tasks, they feel satisfied with themselves, and self-esteem increases accordingly. Under this **independent construal of self**, individuals focus on personal, internal attributes—individual ability, intelligence, personality traits, goals, or preferences—expressing them in public and verifying and confirming them in private through social comparison. This independent construal of self is illustrated graphically in Figure 11.1a. Self is a bounded entity, clearly separated from relevant others. Note that there is no overlap between the self and others. Furthermore, the most salient self-relevant information (indicated by bold Xs) relates to attributes thought to be stable, constant, and intrinsic to the self, such as abilities, goals, and rights.

An Interdependent Construal of Self

Many non-Western, collectivistic cultures neither assume nor value overt separateness. Instead, these cultures emphasize what may be called the “fundamental connectedness of human beings.” The primary normative task is to fit in and maintain the interdependence among individuals. Individuals in these cultures are socialized to adjust themselves to an attendant relationship or a group to which they belong, to read one another’s minds, to be sympathetic, to occupy and play their assigned roles, and to engage in appropriate actions. These cul-

Figure 11.1 (a) Independent construal of self; (b) interdependent construal of self



Source: "Culture and the Self: Implications for Cognition, Emotion, and Motivation," by H. Markus and S. Kitayama, 1991. *Psychological Review*, 98, pp. 224–253. Copyright © 1991 American Psychological Association. Reprinted by permission of the authors.

tural tasks have been designed and selected throughout history to encourage the interdependence of the self with others.

Given this construal of the self, self-worth, satisfaction, and self-esteem can have very different characteristics from those familiar to us. The self-esteem of those with interdependent construals of the self may depend primarily on whether they can fit in and be part of a relevant ongoing relationship. Under this construal of self, individuals focus on their interdependent status with other people and strive to meet or even create duties, obligations, and social responsibilities. The most salient aspect of conscious experience is intersubjective, rooted in finely tuned interpersonal relationships. The **interdependent construal of self** is illustrated graphically in Figure 11.1b. The self is unbounded, flexible, and contingent on context. Note the substantial overlapping between the self and relevant others. The most salient aspects of the self (shown by bold Xs) are defined in relationships—that is, those features of the self related to and inseparable from specific social contexts. This does not mean that those with interdependent selves do not have any knowledge of their internal attributes, such as personality traits, abilities, and attitudes. They clearly do. However, these internal attributes are relatively less salient in consciousness and thus are unlikely to be the primary concerns in thinking, feeling, and acting.

Because of their collectivistic nature, many Asian cultures foster interdependent construals of self. In these cultures, if you stand out, you will most likely be punished: "The nail that sticks up shall get pounded down." In Japan, for example, political rhetoric sounds very different from that in the United States. A former vice prime minister of Japan once said that in his 30-year career in national politics, he had given the most importance and priority to interpersonal relations. Similarly, "politics of harmony" was the sound bite a former Japanese prime minister used to characterize his regime in the 1980s.

Of course, considerable variations on independent versus interdependent construals of the self can occur within a single culture. People of different ethnicities within a culture, for example, may have different tendencies with regard to independent versus interdependent self-construals. Men and women may have different self-construals. Even within ethnic and gender groups, considerable variation in self-construals may, and often does, occur (Gilligan, 1982; Joseph, Markus, & Tafarodi, 1992). These intracultural differences are also important when considering cultural differences. In this chapter, we will describe general tendencies associated with independent and interdependent self-construals, acknowledging the limitations in representation within groups.

Consequences for Cognition, Motivation, and Emotion

Different concepts of self between cultures contribute to substantial cross-cultural differences in a variety of areas and behaviors. In this section, we will show how the two construals of the self affect our thinking, our feelings, and our behaviors. Cognitive, emotional, and motivational processes can vary dramatically with the construal of the self shared by a cultural group, and these variations have major implications for behavior.

Consequences for self-perception. Different construals of self have different consequences for how we perceive ourselves. With an independent construal of self, one's internal attributes such as abilities or personality traits are the most salient self-relevant information. These internal attributes should be relatively less salient for those with interdependent selves, who are more likely to think about the self in particular social relationships (for example, "me" with family members, "me" with my boyfriend) or in specific contexts ("me" in school, "me" at work).

Several studies (Bond & Tak-Sing, 1983; Shweder & Bourne, 1984) have supported these notions. In these studies, subjects wrote down as many of their own characteristics as possible. Subjects typically generated several types of responses. One response type was the abstract, personality-trait description of the self, such as "I am sociable." Another response type was the situation-specific self-description, such as "I am usually sociable with my close friends." Consistent with our knowledge of independent and interdependent selves, these studies show that American subjects tend to generate a greater number of abstract traits than do Asian subjects. These findings confirm that people with an independent construal of self view their own internal attributes, such as abilities or personality traits, as the most salient self-relevant information. Internal attributes are relatively less salient for those with interdependent selves, who are more likely to think about the self in particular social relationships or contexts.

These findings, of course, do not mean that Americans have more knowledge about themselves than Asians do, or vice versa. Because the most salient

information about self for the interdependent selves is context-specific, these individuals generally find it difficult or unnatural to state anything in abstract, noncontextual terms. Instead, those with interdependent selves are culture bound to define themselves in relation to context.

Consistent with this analysis, Triandis and colleagues (see Triandis, 1989, for a review) have shown that individuals from interdependent cultures (for example, China, Japan, and Korea) generate many more social categories, relationships, and groups to which they belong. Indeed, in a study done in the People's Republic of China, as many as 80% of all the responses given to the self-description task were about their memberships in a variety of different groups. Dhawan, Roseman, Naidu, Komilla, and Rettek (1995) reported similar tendencies in self-perception in a study comparing American and North Indian participants.

Another study by Bochner (1994) compared self-perception statements made by Malaysian, Australian, and British participants. The responses were coded according to whether they were idiocentric (individualistic), allocentric (collectivistic), or group self-references, and weighted according to the order in which they were reported. As predicted, Malaysians produced more group and fewer idiocentric references. This is a strong indication that specific relationships are very important for self-definition in this culture. The data also indicated that cultural variations in self-concept are not categorically different across cultures; that is, all people seem to identify themselves according to both personal attributes and group membership. Rather, what differentiates among people in different cultures is the relative salience of either type of self-reference when describing oneself.

The studies cited so far suggest that interdependent selves find it difficult to describe themselves in terms of abstract internal attributes; that is, they find it artificial and unnatural to make abstract statements such as "I am sociable" without specifying a relevant context. Whether a person is sociable or not depends on the specific situation. If this interpretation is correct, then interdependent people should be comfortable describing themselves in terms of abstract internal attributes once a context has been specified.

Cousins (1989) has provided evidence to support this analysis. He used the Twenty Statements Test to ask American and Japanese respondents to write down who they were in various specific social situations (for example, at home, in school, or at work). This instruction supposedly helped respondents to picture a concrete social situation, including who was there and what was being done to whom. Once the context was specified, the Japanese respondents actually generated a greater number of abstract internal attributes (for example, I am hardworking, I am trustworthy, I am lazy) than did the Americans. American respondents tended to qualify their descriptions (I am more or less sociable at work, I am sometimes optimistic at home). It was as if they were saying "This is how I am at work, but don't assume that this is the way I am everywhere." With this more contextualized task, the Americans may have felt awkward providing self-descriptions because their self-definitions typically are not qualified by specific situations.

Consequences for social explanation. Self-construals also serve as a **cognitive template** for interpreting the behaviors of other people. (This process is related to the material on cultural differences in attributions in Chapter 14.) Those with independent selves assume that other people will also have a set of relatively stable internal attributes such as personality traits, attitudes, or abilities. As a result, when they observe another person's behavior, they draw inferences about the actor's internal state or disposition that supposedly underlies and even caused that behavior.

Research done primarily in the United States supports these claims. For example, when subjects read an essay supporting Fidel Castro in Cuba (Jones & Harris, 1967), they inferred that the author must have a favorable attitude toward Castro. Furthermore, such dispositional inferences occur even when obvious situational constraints are present. The subjects in this study inferred a pro-Castro attitude even when they were explicitly told that the person was assigned to write a pro-Castro essay and no choice was given. The subjects ignored these situational constraints and erroneously drew inferences about the author's disposition. This bias toward inference about the actor's disposition even in the presence of very obvious situational constraints has been termed **fundamental attribution error** (Ross, 1977).

Fundamental attribution error may not be as robust or pervasive, however, among people of interdependent cultures, who share assumptions about the self that are very different from those in Western cultures. This self-construal includes the recognition that what an individual does is contingent on and guided by situational factors. These individuals are more inclined to explain another's behavior in terms of the situational forces impinging on the person rather than internal predispositions.

J. G. Miller (1984) examined patterns of social explanation in Americans and Hindu Indians. Both Hindu and American respondents were asked to describe someone they knew well who either did something good for another person or did something bad to another person. After describing such a person, the respondents were asked to explain why the person committed that good or bad act. American respondents typically explained the person's behavior in terms of general dispositions (for example, "She is very irresponsible"). The Hindus, however, were much less likely to offer dispositional explanations. Instead, they tended to provide explanations in terms of the actor's duties, social roles, and other situation-specific factors (see also Shweder & Bourne, 1984).

Fortunately, Miller (1984) collected data from people of different social classes and educational attainment and showed that the Indian tendency toward situation-specific explanations did not depend on these factors. Thus, it is very unlikely that the situational, context-specific thinking common among Indians was due to an inability to reason abstractly. Instead, the context-specific reasoning common in India seems to be due primarily to the cultural assumption of interdependence that is very salient in the Hindu culture. Given the interdependent construal of self, the most reasonable assumption to be made in explaining another's behavior is that this behavior is very much constrained and directed by situation-specific factors. A later study by Miller

(1994) found that these differences in self-construals were linked to cultural differences in duty-centered (Hindu culture) versus individual-centered (American culture) moral codes.

Consequences for achievement motivation. Western literature on motivation has long assumed that motivations are internal to the actor. A person's motives to achieve, affiliate, or dominate are salient and important features of the internal self—features that direct and energize overt behaviors. With an alternative, interdependent self-construal, however, social behaviors are guided by expectations of relevant others, felt obligations to others, or the sense of duty to an important group to which one belongs. This point is best illustrated by achievement motivation.

Achievement motivation refers to a desire for excellence. Such a desire, in this broad sense, is found quite widely across cultures (Maehr & Nicholls, 1980). In the current literature, however, desire for excellence has been conceptualized in a somewhat more specific manner—as individually or personally based rather than socially or interpersonally rooted. In two classic works in this area (Atkinson, 1964; McClelland, 1961), the desire for excellence is closely linked with an individual's tendency to push him- or herself ahead and actively strive for and seek individual successes. This notion of achievement, in fact, is congruent with the independent construal of the self widely shared in Western culture.

From an alternative, interdependent frame of reference, however, excellence may be sought to achieve broader social goals. These social forms of achievement motivation are more prevalent among those with an interdependent construal of the self. Interdependent selves have ever-important concerns that revolve around fully realizing the individual's connectedness with others. Thus, the nature of achievement motivation in these groups is quite different from that among those with independent construals of the self.

Yang (1982) distinguished between two forms of achievement motivation: individually oriented and socially oriented (compare Maehr & Nicholls, 1980). Individually oriented achievement is commonly found in Western cultures such as the United States. It is for the sake of "me" personally that the individual strives to achieve. In Chinese society, however, socially oriented achievement is much more common. According to this form of achievement, the individual strives to achieve for the sake of relevant others such as family members. A Chinese student, for example, may work hard to gain admission to a prestigious university and then eventually to a top company. Behaviorally, there may be no difference between this Chinese individual and an American who also strives to succeed both in school and at work. In the Chinese case, however, the ultimate goal may not be advancement of his or her personal career but rather a goal that is more collective or interdependent in character. Interdependent goals may include enhancing his or her family's social standing, meeting a felt expectation of family members, or satisfying his or her sense of obligation or indebtedness to the parents who have made enormous sacrifices to raise and support the student. In other words, the Chinese student's desire to achieve is

much more socially rooted and does not necessarily reflect his or her desire to advance the quality or standing of “me” personally.

Supporting this notion, Bond (1986) assessed levels of various motivations among Chinese individuals and found that the Chinese show higher levels of socially oriented rather than individually oriented achievement motivation. Yu (1974) reported that the strength of the achievement motive in China is positively related to familism and **filial piety**. In fact, filial piety is a major social construct in many cultures influenced by Confucian and Buddhist teachings and philosophy, which tend to be more collectivistic than individualistic. In such cultures, those most strongly motivated to excel also take most seriously their duties and obligations to family members, especially to parents.


A similar observation has been reported in Japan. K. Doi (1982, 1985) asked Japanese college students 30 questions measuring tendencies to persevere and pursue excellence (achievement tendency). An additional 30 questions measured desires to care for and be cared for by others (affiliation tendency). The results suggested a very close association between achievement motivation and affiliation, with those high in achievement also high in affiliation. These findings are in stark contrast to many Western findings, which indicate that these two dimensions of motivation are typically unrelated (for example, Atkinson, 1964). Both the Chinese study and the Japanese study indicate that achievement in those cultures is closely related to people’s social orientation of being connected and interdependent with important others in their lives. Other researchers report that the motivation to achieve includes a combination of *both* social (loyalty to family and larger society) and self (self-realization) factors in other cultures, such as Turkey (Phalet & Claeys, 1993). Thus, the roots of achievement motivation—predominantly self, predominantly social, or a combination of self and social factors—may differ dramatically across cultures.

Consequences for self-enhancement. One of the main ways in which people maintain their self-esteem is through **self-enhancement**. Self-enhancement refers to a collection of psychological processes by which individuals reinforce or enhance their self-esteem. People all over the world, regardless of culture or gender, are motivated to positively affirm themselves; however, the way they do so varies, depending on the specific cultural background and context within which they live. For example, at least in the United States, people tend to exhibit a **self-serving bias**: They attribute good deeds and successes to their own internal attributes, but attribute bad deeds or failures to external factors (Bradley, 1978). For example, if you receive a good grade in class, you are more inclined to say that you earned that good grade because of hard work or because you are intelligent. In other words, you attribute the cause of the good grade to something internal to you. If you receive a bad grade, however, you are more inclined to say that the teacher didn’t do a good job teaching the material, or there were too many things going on in your life during the semester that prevented you from putting enough effort into the class. In other words, you attribute the cause of the bad grade to something external to you.

Another method for enhancing self-esteem, in the United States, is the **false uniqueness effect**. Wylie (1979) found that American adults typically consider themselves to be more intelligent and more attractive than average. This effect appears to be stronger for males than for females in the United States (Joseph et al., 1992). In a national survey of American students, Myers (1987) found that 70% of the students thought they were above average in leadership ability; with respect to the ability to get along with others, 0% thought they were below average, and 60% thought they were in the top 10%. These type of studies clearly show that there is a tendency to view oneself and one's ability and traits more positively in comparison to others, at least in the United States.

Early studies of the self-serving bias and the false uniqueness effect in countries and cultures outside the United States demonstrated that these biases did not exist. For example, when Japanese students were asked to rate themselves in comparison to others on a number of abilities and traits, they claimed that about 50% of students would be better than they are (see Figure 11.2; Markus & Kitayama, 1991a; Markus, Mullally, & Kitayama, 1997). In other words, the false uniqueness effect was nonexistent in this sample. Furthermore, Japanese

Figure 11.2 Estimates of the percentage of people who are better than oneself in three categories of behavior in three categories of behavior



Source: Data from H. R. Markus and S. Kitayama, "Cultural Variation in Self-Concept." In G. R. Goethals and J. Strauss (Eds.), *Multidisciplinary Perspectives on the Self* (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1991).

participants are more likely to say that successful things have occurred because of good luck or effort; and failures have occurred because of insufficient abilities (Shikanai, 1978).

Similar results have been found in many other cross-cultural studies (see review in Matsumoto, 2001). Subsequently, many psychologists came to believe that people of other cultures did not engage in self-enhancement to boost their self-esteem. But more recent evidence has clearly demonstrated that people of other cultures do indeed enhance their self-esteem; they just do it differently. For example, Japanese participants who don't exhibit self-serving bias or false uniqueness effect still show evidence of engaging in self-enhancement processes, at least implicitly. For example, when asked to select a letter from a pair of letters that they like better, they almost always choose the letter that is in their names (Kitayama & Karasawa, 1997). People from many other countries and cultures also show this partiality to letters that are in their name, suggesting an implicit, less obvious method of self-enhancement. Finally, although self-enhancement may not occur in other cultures when people are asked to focus on their own individual traits and attributes, when people are asked about relational and community-related traits, self-enhancement does indeed take place (Kurman, 2001). Thus, it appears that people of all cultures engage in self-enhancement in order to bolster, enhance, or maintain their self-esteem, but that the manner and form in which this is accomplished varies greatly across different cultures. The underlying psychological need or motive to enhance one's sense of self, therefore, is probably a universal process; the ways in which it occurs, however, depends on the specific culture.

Consequences for the social connotation of emotion. Emotions can be classified into those that encourage independence of the self from others and those that encourage interdependence with others (Kitayama, Markus, & Matsumoto, 1995). Some emotions, such as pride or feelings of superiority, occur when you have accomplished your own goals or desires or have confirmed desirable inner attributes, such as intelligence and wealth. The experience of these emotions tends to verify those inner attributes. Similarly, some negative emotions, such as anger or frustration, result primarily when your own internal attributes, such as goals or desires, are blocked or interfered with. In both cases, your inner attributes are made salient and contrasted against the relevant social context. These emotions tend to separate or disengage the self from social relationships and to promote the perceived independence of the self from those relationships. Kitayama et al. have called these types of emotions **socially disengaged emotions**.

Other positive emotions, such as friendly feelings and feelings of respect, result from being part of a close, more or less communal, relationship. Once experienced, they further encourage this interpersonal bond. Some types of negative emotions, such as feelings of indebtedness or guilt, act in a similar manner. These emotions typically result from failure to participate successfully in an interdependent relationship or from doing some harm to the relationship.

They motivate the individual to restore harmony in the relationship by compensating for the harm done or repaying the debt. These behaviors further engage and assimilate the self in the relationship and enhance the perceived interdependence of the self with relevant others. These emotions can be called **socially engaged emotions**.

All people experience both types of emotions, but people with interdependent self-construals may experience them differently from people with independent self-construals. Socially engaged emotions may be more intense and internalized for interdependent selves, whereas those with independent self-construals may experience socially disengaged emotions more intensely and internally.

Consequences of social connotation and indigenous emotions. Although many emotions are common across cultures, others are unique to particular cultures (Russell, 1991). Such culture-specific emotions are called **indigenous emotions**. Several anthropological studies have suggested that the socially engaged emotions just described are salient in some non-Western cultures to a degree that is unheard of in the West. Lutz (1988), who studied the emotions of people in the Micronesian atoll of Ifaluk, found that an emotion known as *fago* is central to this culture. According to Lutz, *fago* can be roughly described as a combination of compassion, love, and sadness. This emotion is likely to motivate helping behaviors and to create and enhance close interpersonal relationships. In our terminology, *fago* is a highly socially engaged emotion. A contrasting emotion, *ker*, described as a combination of happiness and excitement, is perceived as “dangerous, socially disruptive” (p. 145). Ifaluk people regard *ker* as a highly socially disengaged emotion.

A similar analysis has been applied to another non-Western culture. T. Doi (1973) has suggested that the emotion *amae* is pivotal in understanding the Japanese culture. *Amae* refers to a desire or expectation for others' indulgence, benevolence, or favor. According to Doi, its prototypic form can be found in the mother–infant relationship, whereby the infant feels a desire for “dependency” on the mother and the mother provides unconditional care and love to the infant. This prototype is subsequently elaborated to an adult form of *amae*, which is much more differentiated and sophisticated and is applicable to nonkin relationships, such as work relationships between a supervisor and his or her subordinates. Subordinates may feel *amae* toward the supervisor for his or her favor and benevolence. Reciprocal feelings on the part of the supervisor increase and consolidate the affectionate bond between them. A lack of reciprocation can lead to negative emotions on both sides. As in the Ifaluk concept of *fago*, social engagement seems to define this emotion for the Japanese culture.

These anthropological studies fit well with the two construals of the self described here. For people with interdependent self-construals, public and intersubjective aspects of the self are elaborated in conscious experience; for those with independent selves, private and more subjective aspects are highlighted.


Compare Figures 11.1 and 11.2. Because social connotation is a relatively public and intersubjective aspect of emotion, it is especially salient in the emotional experience of non-Western, interdependent people in collectivistic cultures. By contrast, in Western, individualistic cultures that foster an independent sense of self, the more internal, private aspects of emotion, such as good and bad feelings or moods, may be more salient (Kleinman, 1988). This is true even though people of individualistic cultures recognize the social connotations of different emotions.

Consequences for happiness. *Happiness* refers to the most generic, unqualified state of feeling good. Terms such as *relaxed*, *elated*, and *calm* are used to describe this generic positive state. People across cultures share the general notion of happiness as defined in this way (Wierzbicka, 1986). However, the specific circumstances of happiness, and the meanings attached to it, depend crucially on the construal of the self as independent or as interdependent. Evidence suggests that people experience this unqualified good feeling when they have successfully accomplished the cultural task of either independence or interdependence.

Kitayama, Markus, Kurokawa, and Negishi (1993) asked both Japanese and American college undergraduates to report how frequently they experienced different emotions, including three types of positive emotions. Some terms used to describe the emotions were generic, such as *relaxed*, *elated*, and *calm*. Others had more specific social connotations, either socially engaged (such as *friendly feelings*, *feelings of respect*) or disengaged (*pride*, *feelings of superiority*). An interesting cross-cultural difference emerged when correlations among these three types of emotions were examined (see Figure 11.3). For the American students, generic positive emotions were associated primarily with the socially disengaged emotions. That is, those who experienced the emotions that signal success in cultural tasks of *independence* (socially disengaged emotions such as pride) were most likely to feel “generally good.” This pattern was completely reversed among the Japanese students. Those who experienced the emotions that signal success in cultural tasks of *interdependence* (socially engaged emotions such as friendly feelings) were most likely to feel “generally good.”

A more recent study by the same authors (Kitayama, Markus, & Kurokawa, 2000) has replicated these results, with “good feelings” associated with a higher frequency of socially engaged positive emotions in Japan, but a higher frequency of socially disengaged positive emotions in the United States. Furthermore, they found that Americans reported a significantly higher frequency of experiencing positive emotions than negative emotions, and that Japanese reported a higher frequency of experiencing socially engaged emotions than socially disengaged emotions. The exact meanings or connotations of “feeling good” are shaped through culture and are linked very closely with the cultural imperatives of independence (in the United States) and interdependence (in Japan).

Figure 11.3 Cultural differences in the correlation between general positive feelings and socially engaged versus disengaged emotions in the United States and Japan



Source: Data from S. Kitayama, H. R. Markus, M. Kurokawa, and K. Negishi, *Social Orientation of Emotions: Cross-Cultural Evidence and Implications* (unpublished manuscript, University of Oregon, 1993).

Critical Evaluation of the Analysis of Independent and Interdependent Selves

As described earlier in this chapter, there is little doubt that culture influences our sense of self which, in turn, affects many other aspects of our psychological characteristics and behaviors. The work of Markus and Kitayama (1991b) reviewed here has been very influential in the field. It offers a prime example of how self-concepts may differ across cultures and provides a conceptual framework within which to understand the influence of culture on self. Their approach has the additional advantage of synthesizing and integrating a wide variety of cross-cultural research findings related to self-perceptions, social explanations, motivation, and emotion. The notions of independent versus interdependent self-construals make intuitive sense, permitting their easy acceptance in cross-cultural as well as mainstream psychology.

A scholarly evaluation of their theory, however—or any theory, for that matter—must go beyond merely asking whether or not it “makes sense” and

whether or not the outcomes predicted by the theory occur. A more difficult, and more needed, level of analysis is to examine the assumptions underlying the theory and provide direct evidence in support of those assumptions. Without such support, it cannot be known in any true sense whether the predicted outcomes (as in self-perception) are occurring because of the theoretical framework (independent versus interdependent selves) or because of some other factors. That is, the framework needs to be supported in and of itself, rather than through its predicted outcomes.

For example, studies comparing Asians and Americans were used to support the notion of independent versus interdependent self-construals. However, when differences between these groups are attributed to different self-construals, and these self-construals are related to individualism and collectivism, at least two major assumptions are being made: (1) that Asians have interdependent self-construals, whereas Americans have independent self-construals; and (2) that Asians are collectivistic and Americans are individualistic. Without ascertaining empirically that these two assumptions are valid, it is impossible to assert that the observed differences are due to cultural differences of self-construals, and not to other differences such as geography, social class, or diet. The only way to address these concerns is to examine them empirically.

One of the hindrances to research examining the first assumption has been the lack of a psychometrically valid and reliable way to measure self-construals on the individual level. However, Singelis and his colleagues (Singelis, 1994; Singelis & Sharkey, 1995) have developed such a measure, and have used it in two studies testing self-construals of people of different ethnic groups at the University of Hawaii. In both studies, they found that Asian Americans were more interdependent than European Americans, and European Americans were more independent than Asian Americans. These findings are consistent with Markus and Kitayama's claims concerning Asian and non-Asian differences in self-construal, albeit among ethnic groups within the United States. However, in another study using the same scale with American and Japanese nationals (Carter & Dinnel, 1997), the Japanese were found to be more independent than the Americans. Studies on other cultural groups report no differences in independent versus interdependent self-responses (Watkins & Regmi, 1996), questioning the generalizability of that assumption.

A recent study by Dabul, Bernal, and Knight (1995) provides another interesting twist on these findings. These researchers conducted open-ended interviews calling for self-descriptors from Mexican and Anglo American adolescents. When total scores derived from coding were used, they found that Mexican Americans described themselves more allocentrically than did Anglo Americans, whereas idiocentric self-descriptors were more important for Anglo Americans. When these scores were corrected for frequency of usage, however, the differences disappeared. Not only do these findings raise further questions about the validity of the assumption, they also highlight the possible influence of different methods of research and data analysis on the findings.

The second assumption—that Asians are collectivistic and Americans are individualistic—also has major problems. As described in Chapter 1, a host of measurement techniques are now available to assess individualistic and collectivistic tendencies on the individual level. These measures have been used quite extensively over the past few years, and their results generally do not support the stereotype of Asian, and particularly Japanese, collectivism. For example, when Matsumoto, Weissman, and colleagues (1997) measured IC tendencies using their IC Interpersonal Assessment Inventory, they found that Americans were more collectivistic than Japanese. In a follow-up study, Matsumoto, Kudoh, and Takeuchi (1996) showed that within Japan, older working adults (average age 40) were more collectivistic than Japanese university undergraduates, suggesting that the stereotype of Japanese collectivism may have been appropriate in the past but is questionable today (see Matsumoto, 2002).

Carter and Dinnel (1997) have reported similar findings. They administered Yamaguchi's (1994) collectivism scale, Triandis's collectivistic values index (Triandis et al., 1990), Singelis's (1994) self-construal scale, and a host of individual and collective self-esteem measures to American and Japanese participants. Contrary to their expectations, they found that collectivism was more characteristic of Americans than Japanese, and that independent self-construals were more characteristic of Japanese than Americans (contrary to Singelis's findings on Asian Americans versus European Americans). Carter and Dinnel (1997) found no difference between the Americans and Japanese on collective self-esteem.

In yet another study, Kashima and colleagues (1995) administered a number of collectivism and allocentrism scales to participants in Australia, mainland United States, Hawaii, Japan, and Korea. Koreans and Japanese did score higher than mainland Americans and Australians on collectivism, whereas the latter scored higher on scales related to agency and assertiveness. These findings are consistent with previous notions of cultural differences among these groups. However, on a scale measuring interpersonal relatedness, mainland American women scored highest, followed by Australian women, Hawaiian women, Korean men, Hawaiian men, Australian men, and mainland American men. Unexpectedly, Japanese men and women scored lowest on this scale.

Recently, Takano and Osaka (1997) reviewed ten other studies comparing Americans and Japanese on individualism–collectivism measures. They reported that two studies on conformity and five questionnaire studies found no differences between samples from the two countries. Two experimental studies on cooperation and one questionnaire study found that Japanese were more individualistic than Americans. The only study that found Japanese respondents to be more collectivistic than Americans was Hofstede's (1980) original study (described in Chapter 1), in which individualism was defined without a collectivistic component.

Oyserman, Coon, and Kimmelmeier's (2002) recent meta-analysis of 83 empirical studies of individualism and collectivism tested whether European Americans (U.S. and Canadian) were indeed more individualistic and less

collectivistic compared to individuals from other countries and within the United States. Their results demonstrated that European Americans were, in general, more individualistic and less collectivistic than, for instance, Chinese, Taiwanese, Indians, and Asian Americans. However, European Americans were not more individualistic than African Americans or Latinos, and not less collectivistic than Japanese or Koreans.

Taken together, these studies highlight the difficulty of accepting the validity of the two assumptions underlying Markus and Kitayama's (1991b) conceptual framework regarding independent versus interdependent self-construals. Matsumoto's (1999) critique of Markus and Kitayama's (1991b) assumptions of East–West differences points out that most studies concerning self-construals are flawed because the nature of the self-construals is not measured directly but simply presumed (see also Bond & Tedeschi, 2001), and those studies that have included measures of independent and interdependent self-construals or individualism–collectivism do not actually provide support for hypothesized cultural differences on these dimensions. Aside from the studies cited in this section, the most crucial test of these assumptions would be a simultaneous assessment of IC tendencies on the group level and self-construals on the individual level within the same participants in the same study. Without such an assessment, we cannot assert with any confidence that these proposed factors, and no others, influenced the data outcome. This study, unfortunately, does not exist.

Where does this leave us? We believe that Markus and Kitayama's (1991b) original conception of independent versus interdependent self-construals is an important one that has made a major contribution to the field, increasing our awareness of the influence of culture on self and thus on individual behaviors. We agree with the notion of independent versus interdependent self-construals, but strongly believe that it is incumbent on its proponents to test the crucial underlying assumptions. It may be that these types of self-construals do exist but their underlying bases are related to something other than individualism and collectivism. Future research needs to elucidate this matter more directly.

Beyond Independent and Interdependent Self-Construals: Interrelated and Isolated Self-Concepts

Actually, the concept of independent versus interdependent selves is not unlike other dualities of self and human nature proposed throughout the history of psychology, including Freud's (1930/1961) union with others versus egoistic happiness, Angyal's (1951) surrender and autonomy, Balint's (1959) ocnophilic and philobatic tendencies, Bakan's (1966) communion and agency, Bowen's (1966) togetherness and individuality, Bowlby's (1969) attachment

and separation, Franz and White's (1985) individuation and attachment, Stewart and Malley's (1987) interpersonal relatedness and self-definition, and Slavin and Kriegman's (1992) mutualistic and individualistic urges (all cited in Guisinger & Blatt, 1994). Many theorists, including Doi (1973), Kim and Berry (1993), Heelas and Lock (1981) and, more recently, Singelis (2000), have noted the difference between conceptualization of self in mainstream American psychology and in other cultures. Sampson (1988) has referred to the sense of self in mainstream approaches as *self-contained individualism*, contrasting it with what he termed *ensembled individualism*, in which the boundary between self and others is less sharply drawn and others are part of oneself.

Guisinger and Blatt (1994) suggest that mainstream American psychology has traditionally emphasized self-development, stressing autonomy, independence, and identity over the development of interpersonal relatedness. They also suggest, however, that evolutionary pressures of natural selection have fostered two basic developmental approaches—one involving self-definition as described in mainstream psychology, the other focusing on the development of interpersonal relatedness. They cite evidence from observational research as well as social biology to support their claims that cooperation, altruism, and reciprocation are aspects of self-development equally as important as autonomy and individual definition. Moreover, they suggest that these dual developmental processes are not mutually exclusive, as they are often depicted. Rather, they are fundamentally and basically intertwined, with the development of a mature sense of self in one aspect depending, in part, on the development of a mature self in the other.

More recently, Niedenthal and Beike (1997) have carried these concepts a step further, proposing the existence of both interrelated and isolated self-concepts. Whereas previous theories of self distinguished different types of self on the level of personality, motivation, and culture, their view focuses on the level of cognitive representation. Specifically, they suggest that “some concepts derive their meaning through mental links to concepts of other people, whereas other concepts of self have an intrinsic or cognitively isolated characterization” (p. 108). Like Guisinger and Blatt (1994), they suggest that these concepts exist not as dichotomies, but rather as interrelated dualities. Referring mainly to the cognitive structures characteristic of these two tendencies, Niedenthal and Beike (1997) suggest that individuals represent the self with a variety of more or less interrelated structures at the same time, and that one person can have separate interrelated and isolated self-concepts in the same domain. Likewise, Kagitcibasi (1996a, 1996b) proposes an integrative synthesis of the self that is both individuated and, at the same time, relational.

These recent developments in notions of self, incorporating issues of relatedness into mainstream conceptions of autonomy and individuality in a coherent system of dualism, have many far-reaching implications for our understanding of culture and self. If these dualities coexist, cultures may emphasize both types of self-construal rather than only one. Moreover, the relative importance of one sense of self may differ in different contexts, and cultures may

influence these relativities as well. Future research needs to examine the simultaneous duality of these aspects of self across contexts and cultures to create a clearer picture of the relationship between culture and self, and of how culture influences individual behaviors via self.

Multicultural Identities

The term *cultural identity* refers to individuals' psychological membership in a distinct culture. As culture is a psychological construct—a shared system of rules—it is conceivable that people have not just a single cultural identity but, in some circumstances, two or more such identities. These multicultural identities are becoming increasingly commonplace in today's world, with borders between cultural groups becoming less rigid, increased communication and interaction among people of different cultural groups, and more intercultural marriages. If culture is defined as a psychological construct, the existence of multicultural identities suggests the existence of multiple psychocultural systems of representations in the minds of multicultural individuals.

In fact, a small but important number of studies have begun to document the existence of such multiple psychological systems in multicultural individuals. Oyserman (1993), for example, conducted four studies testing Arab and Jewish Israeli students in Israel. Although social, collectivistic types of identities had long been considered central to many cultures of that region, Oyserman suggested that these cultures would include considerable individualistic aspects as well, given the history of the region and the influence of the British. In her studies, participants completed a battery of tests, including assessments of individualism, collectivism, public and private self-focus, and intergroup conflicts. Across all four studies, the results indicated that individualism as a worldview was related to private aspects of the self and to distinguishing between self and others, while collectivism was related to social identities, public aspects of the self, and increased awareness of intergroup conflict. Both cultural groups endorsed both types of cultural tendencies, suggesting that members of these groups use both individualistic and collectivistic worldviews in organizing perceptions of self and others.

Another study by Oyserman and her colleagues (Oyserman, Gant, & Ager, 1995) also supported the existence of multiple concepts of self. In this study, the researchers examined the effects of multiple, contextualized concepts of the self on school persistence in European American and African American youths. They found that different self-concepts were predictive of achievement-related strategies for European Americans and African Americans. More important, balance between different achievement-related self-construals predicted school achievement, especially for African American males.

Other studies have documented a *cultural reaffirmation* effect among multicultural individuals living in multicultural societies. For example, Kosmitzki (1996) examined monocultural and bicultural Germans and Americans, who made trait-attribute ratings of themselves, their native cultural group, and their adoptive cultural group. Compared with monoculturals, bicultural individuals

identified more closely with their native culture, evaluated it more positively, and evaluated the two cultures as less similar to each other. In short, the bicultural individuals appeared to endorse even more traditional values associated with their native culture than did native monocultural individuals in those native cultures.

This curious finding is well supported in other studies. For example, Matsumoto, Weissman, and colleagues (1997) compared ratings of collectivistic tendencies in interpersonal interactions of Japanese Americans with those of Japanese nationals in Japan. They found that the Japanese Americans were more collectivistic than the Japanese nationals in the native culture. A study comparing Korean Americans and Korean nationals on the same measure (Lee, 1995) found similar results. Sociological studies involving immigrants to the United States, including China, Japan, Korea, and the Philippines, also suggest that the immigrant groups in the United States from other Asia-Pacific countries appear to be more traditional than the native cultures from which they came (for example, Takaki, 1998). Anecdotally, strong cultural traditions, customs, heritage, and language seem to continue among Chinese American immigrant populations throughout the United States.

What may account for such findings? We would speculate that when immigrant groups arrive in the United States, they bring with them the culture of their native group at that time. As they are immersed within a multicultural society, the stress of multicultural life in a different world contributes to the cultural reaffirmation effect, as documented by Kosmitzki (1996) and others. The immigrant group thus crystallizes its sense of culture—the one they brought with them at the time—and it is this psychological culture that is communicated across generations of immigrant groups. As time passes, the native culture itself may undergo change, but the immigrant group continues to transmit the original cultural system they brought with them. After some time, if you compare the immigrant group with the native cultural group, you will find that the immigrant group actually conforms more to the original cultural stereotype than does the native group, because the immigrant culture has crystallized while the native culture has changed. Thus, while individual members of immigrant groups often grow up with multicultural identities, the identity of their native culture is often one of long-standing tradition and heritage.

Summary

Culture is a macrolevel social construct that identifies the characteristics and attributes we share with others. But culture also influences the very core nature of our beings as individuals. Because culture shapes and colors our experiences, behaviors, attitudes, and feelings, it helps mold our fundamental sense of self—our self-concept, self-construals, and self-identities. Culture influences these core aspects of our sense of self, and we carry these self-construals with us in all aspects of life. Whether at work, at school, having fun, or interacting with other people, we take our culture and our culture-bound sense of self with us. These self-construals help us understand the world around us and others in

it, and guide us and our behaviors in ways we are not always aware of. Because culture influences core aspects of the self, we need to understand its importance and pervasiveness. An awareness of how our fundamental concepts of self may contrast sharply with other cultures' concept of self will help us appreciate and understand why people from other cultures may be motivated to feel, think, and behave in ways that may differ from ours.

We now turn to a topic that is closely related to the self—studies on the relationship between culture and personality.

Culture and Personality

One of the most important and widely studied areas in cross-cultural psychology is personality. Anthropologists, psychologists, and other social scientists have long been interested in the “national character” of people of different cultures, and the extent to which personality as we know it in North American psychology is similar or different in other cultures. Indeed, the search for the underlying bases of individual differences, which serve as the backbone of understanding personality, shares a close conceptual and empirical connection with culture in any cultural milieu.

In this section, we first discuss the various approaches that scholars have used to understand the relationship between culture and personality. Then, we review major cross-cultural research on personality over the past few decades, highlighting important similarities and differences in those findings. In particular, we will review research on the Five Factor Model (FFM), which suggests that five personality dimensions are universal to all humans. We discuss the measurement of personality across cultures, as well as the use of some personality scales to assess psychopathology across cultures. We also discuss indigenous approaches to personality, and some of the research that has been conducted in this area. Although culture-specific aspects of personality and universal notions of personality may seem contradictory, we will seek ways of understanding their mutual coexistence and conceptualizing and studying their duality.

Defining Personality

The first thing we need to do is define what we mean by personality. In psychology, **personality** is generally considered to be a set of relatively enduring behavioral and cognitive characteristics, traits, or predispositions that people take with them to different situations, contexts, and interactions with others, and that contribute to differences among individuals.

In North American psychology, personality is generally based on stability and consistency across contexts, situations, and interactions. This notion of personality has a long tradition in European and North American psychology. The psychoanalytic work of Freud and the neoanalytic approaches of Jung and Adler share this definition of personality. The humanistic approach of Maslow and Rogers, the trait approach of Allport, the behavioral approach of Skinner,

and the cognitive approach of Rotter, Bandura, and Mischel also share this notion. Although these approaches differ in their conceptions of how personality develops, they are consistent in their basic notion of personality as stable and enduring across contexts and situations. Most scholars, even in cross-cultural psychology, adopt this or similar definitions of personality when studying it across cultures.

Cross-Cultural Approaches to the Study and Understanding of Personality

Over the course of the 20th century, several different approaches and methods have been used to elucidate the relationship between culture and personality. Some of the earliest contributions to our understanding of this relationship came from anthropologists who were interested in human psychology within their anthropological discipline. Through mostly ethnographic fieldwork, these individuals—such as Margaret Mead, Edward Sapir, Weston Labarre, and Ruth Benedict—developed ideas and theories about culture and personality that served as a basis for cross-cultural comparison of personalities and today's cultural psychology (see review in Piker, 1998). Although many cultural and psychological anthropologists recognize the important contributions of biologically innate factors to personality and psychology, the main thrust of the anthropological contribution is its view of personality as culturally specific, formed by the unique forces each culture deals with in its milieu. The anthropological view of personality, therefore, attributes more importance to the learning of psychological mechanisms and personality in the environment through cultural practices than to biological and evolutionary factors.

Whereas psychological anthropology made major contributions in the first half of the 20th century, the second half was dominated by the cross-cultural psychological approach (see review by Church & Lonner, 1998). This approach generally views personality as something discrete and separate from culture, and as a dependent variable in research. Thus, two or more cultures are treated as independent variables, and they are compared on some personality traits or dimensions. In contrast to the cultural or psychological anthropological approach, the cross-cultural approach tends to see personality as an *etic* or universal phenomenon that is equivalently relevant and meaningful in the cultures being compared. To the extent that personality does exhibit universal aspects, how did they originate? Two separate but not mutually exclusive possibilities are (1) the existence of biologically innate and evolutionarily adaptive factors that create genetic predispositions to certain types of personality traits and (2) the possibility of culture-constant learning principles and processes (see also the discussion by MacDonald, 1998).

Cross-cultural research on personality, however, has also been concerned with the discovery of culture-specific personality traits, characteristics, and patterns. Cross-cultural psychologists describe culture-specific **indigenous personalities** as constellations of personality traits and characteristics found only in a specific culture (for more information, see reviews by Ho, 1998, and

Diaz-Loving, 1998). These types of studies, though psychological in nature, are heavily influenced in approach and understanding by the anthropological view of culture and personality.

Another approach to understanding the relationship between culture and personality that has emerged in recent years is known as *cultural psychology* (for example, Shweder, 1979a, 1979b, 1980, 1991, 2000; Markus & Kitayama, 1998). This approach sees culture and personality not as separate entities, but as a mutually constituted system in which each creates and maintains the other.

The cultural perspective assumes that psychological processes, in this case the nature of functioning of personality, are not just influenced by culture but are thoroughly culturally constituted. In turn, the cultural perspective assumes that personalities behaving in concert create the culture. Culture and personality are most productively analyzed together as a dynamic of mutual constitution . . . ; one cannot be reduced to the other. . . . A cultural psychological approach does not automatically assume that all behavior can be explained with the same set of categories and dimensions and first asks whether a given dimension, concept, or category is meaningful and how it is used in a given cultural context. (Markus & Kitayama, 1998, p. 66)

The cultural psychological viewpoint has been heavily influenced by the cultural anthropologists, as well as by the cross-cultural work on indigenous psychologies (see Kim, 2001) and personalities. It is inherently antithetical to the cross-cultural psychological search for universals and rejects the possibility of biological and genetic mechanisms underlying universality. Instead, it suggests that just as no two cultures are alike, the personalities that comprise those cultures should be fundamentally different because of the mutual constitution of culture and personality within each cultural milieu.

The tension between the cross-cultural psychology school and the cultural psychology school, in terms of universality versus culture-specificity in personality, can be seen in the literature reviewed in this chapter. Although considerable evidence points to the universality of some aspects of personality, a considerable amount of evidence also documents the existence of indigenous personalities, as well as cultural differences in supposedly etic personality domains. How to make sense of this all is perhaps the greatest challenge facing this area of cross-cultural psychology in the near future. Some theorists, such as Church (2000), have taken up this challenge by arguing for an integrated *cultural trait psychology* that incorporates both cross-cultural psychology and cultural psychology in studies of personality.

Cross-Cultural Research on Personality

For many years, one of the most common and popular methods of examining the relationship between culture and personality has been cross-cultural research.

In this approach, researchers take samples of individuals from two or more cultures, administer a personality scale, and compare the responses between groups. Cross-cultural differences in the personality measure are then interpreted with respect to differences in the values, behaviors, and practices observed in the cultures being compared.

This approach, though simple in concept, has provided a wealth of useful and interesting information about cultural similarities and differences in personality. In this section, we will review and discuss some of the major findings.

Locus of Control

One of the most widely studied personality concepts across cultures is **locus of control**. This concept was developed by Rotter (1954, 1966), who suggested that people differ in how much control they believe they have over their behavior and their relationship with their environment and with others. According to this schema, locus of control can be perceived as either internal or external to the individual. People with an internal locus of control see their behavior and relationships with others as dependent on their own behavior. Believing that your grades are mostly dependent on how much effort you put into study is an example of internal locus of control. People with an external locus of control see their behavior and relationships with the environment and others as contingent upon forces outside themselves and beyond their control. If you believed your grades were mostly dependent on luck, the teacher's benevolence, or the ease of the tests, you would be exemplifying an external locus of control.

Research examining locus of control has shown both similarities and differences across cultures. In general, Americans often appear to have higher internal locus of control scores, whereas non-Americans tend to have higher external locus of control scores. A number of studies have found this pattern in comparisons of Americans with Asians, especially Chinese and Japanese (for example, Hamid, 1994; see also, however, Spadone, 1992, for a nonfinding in an American–Thai comparison). Lee and Dengerink (1992) found higher internal locus of control scores among Americans than Swedes, and Munro (1979) found that Americans had higher internal locus of control scores than participants in Zambia and Zimbabwe (then Rhodesia). In a review of cross-cultural studies on locus of control, Dyal (1984) concluded that European Americans appear to be characterized by a more internal locus of control than African Americans. Locus of control differences have also been documented in children; Paguio, Robinson, Skeen, and Deal (1987), for example, showed that American children had higher internal locus of control scores than Filipino and Brazilian children.

These findings have often been interpreted as reflecting the American culture's focus on individuality, separateness, and uniqueness, in contrast to a more balanced view of interdependence among individuals and between individuals and natural and supernatural forces found in many other cultures. People of non-American cultures may be more likely to see the causes of events and behaviors in sources that are external to themselves, such as fate, luck,

supernatural forces, or relationships with others. Americans, however, prefer to take more personal responsibility for events and situations, and view themselves as having more personal control over such events.

Although such interpretations are interesting and provocative, they still leave some gaps to be filled. For example, they do not account for such phenomena as self-serving bias or defensive attributions, in which Americans tend to place the responsibility for negative events on others, not themselves (see the earlier section in this chapter on self-enhancement). Also, some researchers have suggested that locus of control is really a multifaceted construct spanning many different domains—academic achievement, work, interpersonal relationships, and so on—and that separate assessments of each of these domains are necessary to make meaningful comparisons on this construct. Finally, Smith, Dugan, and Trompenaars (1997), in their 14-country study of locus of control and affectivity, found some cross-national differences in locus of control, but larger differences by gender and status across countries. Thus, the search for cross-cultural differences may obscure larger differences based on other social constructs. Future research needs to address all these concerns to further elucidate the nature of cultural influences on locus of control.

Self-Esteem

A number of studies have examined the construct of self-esteem and the related construct of self-worth. Research in the United States has repeatedly shown that European Americans have a pervasive tendency to maintain their feelings of self-esteem and self-worth. Concepts such as self-serving bias, defensive attributions, and illusory optimism have been invoked as mechanisms of self-enhancement among European Americans. These particular self-enhancing mechanisms are not generally found in other groups, especially Asians (see review by Diener & Diener, 1995). Some researchers even suggest that Asians, such as Chinese and particularly Japanese, are more attuned to negative than positive self-evaluations, in both private and public settings (Kitayama, Matsumoto, Markus, & Norasakkunkit, 1997; Leung, 1996).

Cross-cultural studies lend support to these differences in self-esteem across cultures. Wood, Hillman, and Sawilowsky (1995), for example, found that American adolescents had significantly higher self-esteem scores than their Indian counterparts. Americans also report higher self-esteem scores than Japanese or Chinese (Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999). Studies with children have also found differences in Asian versus European countries on individual self-esteem. Chan's (2000) study of 1,303 children compared Anglo and Chinese children in Britain and Chinese children in Hong Kong. As predicted, he found that Hong Kong Chinese children reported significantly lower levels of self-esteem than did Anglo British children. Interestingly, Chinese British children reported higher levels of self-esteem than did those in Hong Kong, and did not significantly differ on levels of self-esteem from their Anglo British peers, suggesting acculturation to the host society's more individualistic norms. In contrast, several studies in North America have found

that Asian Americans still report lower self-esteem scores than European Americans (Crocker & Lawrence, 1999; Mintz & Kashubeck, 1999; Porter & Washington, 1993). Radford, Mann, Ohta, and Nakane (1993), comparing self-esteem related to decision making in Australian and Japanese students, found that Australians had higher self-esteem scores than did the Japanese.

The higher self-esteem scores of British children compared to Hong Kong children and Australians compared to Japanese suggests that self-esteem may be related to individualism, rather than specific to American culture. If self-esteem is related to individualism and collectivism, then perhaps individualism fosters a certain type of self-esteem—one that is often measured in psychological research—whereas collectivism fosters a different type of self-esteem. Tafarodi and Swann (1996) tested this “cultural trade-off” hypothesis in a study of Chinese and American college students. They hypothesized that highly collectivistic cultures promote the development of global self-esteem, which is reflected in generalized self-liking, while at the same time challenging the development of another dimension of self-esteem, reflected in generalized self-competence; individualistic cultures, they hypothesized, foster the opposite tendencies. As predicted, they found that the Chinese were lower in self-competence but higher in self-liking than the Americans. These findings support the notion that self-esteem may have multiple facets, and that different cultural milieus either support or challenge the development of different facets.

This notion also received some support in a recent study by Kitayama and Karasawa (1997). This study examined implicit rather than explicit self-esteem in a sample of Japanese individuals by examining their preference for certain Japanese alphabetical letters and numbers over others. The results indicated that letters included in one’s own name and numbers corresponding to the month and day of one’s birth were significantly better liked than other letters and numbers. The authors interpreted these findings to suggest a dimension of self-esteem that may be fostered in a collectivistic cultural milieu, but not necessarily within an individualistic one.

These recent studies suggest the importance of delineating different aspects of self-esteem and then investigating how different cultural frameworks encourage or discourage those various aspects. This line of research raises the possibility that the need for self-esteem is a universal one across humans, but that its exact behavioral and psychological manifestations may differ depending on cultural context. Future research has a rather large job in documenting and elaborating on these ideas.

The Eysenck Personality Scales

One of the most commonly used personality scales in the cross-cultural literature is the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (EPQ). It measures three different personality traits: tough-mindedness (known in the EPQ as Psychoticism), emotionality (known in the EPQ as Neuroticism), and Extroversion. It also contains a Lying or Social Desirability Scale designed to determine the degree to which respondents may be providing false or inaccurate responses. Over the

past few decades, the EPQ has been standardized and used in cross-cultural research in a number of different countries, including Nigeria, Japan, Greece, Yugoslavia, Brazil, France, and others (see review in Eysenck & Chan, 1982). A junior version, developed for use with children, has been used in Spain, New Zealand, Hungary, Japan, and other countries.

The numerous cross-cultural studies involving the EPQ have produced a number of interesting cross-cultural findings. Eysenck and Chan (1982), for example, administered the adult and junior versions of the EPQ to adults and children in Hong Kong and England. They found that adults in Hong Kong scored higher on Psychoticism and Social Desirability and lower on Extroversion than did British adults. Children in Hong Kong scored higher on Social Desirability and lower on Extroversion and Neuroticism than British children. Eysenck and colleagues have found various other differences in comparisons of Romanian and English adults (Eysenck, Baban, Derevenco, & Pitariu, 1989), Danish and English children (Nyborg, Eysenck, & Kroll, 1982), Iranian and English children (Eysenck, Makaremi, & Barrett, 1994), and Egyptian and English children (Eysenck & Abdel-Khalek, 1989).

The goal of most of the published studies involving the EPQ has been validation of the measure for use in cross-cultural research in the countries and cultures in which the tests have been administered. These studies have provided the field with a measure that apparently “works” in a variety of cross-cultural contexts, measuring aspects of personality that are generally considered universal to all humans. However, these studies lack a consistent interpretation of the nature and causes of cultural differences when they occur. While providing a wealth of findings documenting cross-cultural differences, they tell us little about what cultural factors contribute to these differences. Are cross-cultural differences related to stable dimensions of cultural variation, such as individualism versus collectivism, or status/power differentiation? We don’t know. A major goal of future research in this area, therefore, should be the generation and testing of viable hypotheses concerning the reasons and processes behind these differences and similarities.

Other Miscellaneous Studies

A number of other studies provide interesting glimpses into the nature of cultural influences on other aspects of personality. Several studies, for example, have reported cultural differences in the personality construct known as *self-monitoring*. This construct has been described as “self-observation and self-control guided by situational cues to social appropriateness” (Snyder, 1974, p. 526). People of individualistic cultures tend to have higher scores on self-monitoring than do people of collectivistic cultures (for example, Gudykunst, Gao, Nishida, Bond, et al., 1989; Gudykunst, Yang, & Nishida, 1987).

In another interesting study, Yamaguchi, Kuhlman, and Sugimori (1995) examined the personality correlates of allocentric (collectivistic) tendencies in individualistic and collectivistic cultures. These researchers administered a collectivism scale to participants in the United States, Korea, and Japan, and mea-

sured individual differences in the degree to which the participants exhibited allocentrism—that is, personally held collectivistic values (see Chapter 1). They also measured affiliative tendency, sensitivity to rejection, and need for uniqueness. The results indicated that individuals who scored higher on allocentrism also scored higher on affiliation and sensitivity to rejection, but lower on need for uniqueness; these relationships held in all three countries. The researchers explained their findings by suggesting that allocentric individuals are more concerned with rewards and punishments from ingroup members, and thus have less need to be unique, than those with greater idiocentric tendencies.

Cross-cultural differences have also been reported in studies on authoritarianism and rigidity involving Iranian respondents (Mehryar, 1970); on Cattell's 16 Personality Factors (PF) with Amish respondents (Wittmer, 1971); on the Maudsley Personality Inventory and the Manifest Anxiety Scale with Hindu Indians (De & Singh, 1972); on value systems among Australians and Chinese (Feather, 1986); on cognitive styles and field dependence in Mexican, African, and European American children (Figueroa, 1980); on spirituality (from a motivational/trait perspective) in Christian, Hindu, and Muslim Indians (Piedmont & Leach, 2002); and on authoritarianism in German and American adolescents (Lederer, 1982).

Summary and Evaluation

Although the bulk of the research documents cross-cultural differences in the various domains of personality that have been tested, the very fact that these personality dimensions have been measured across cultures could be taken as some kind of evidence for their universality. That is, the cultures studied are similar in that they share the same personality dimensions, even though they differ in where they fall along these dimensions.

To be sure, the mere fact that personality scales have been translated and used in cross-cultural research is not sufficient evidence that the personality domains they measure are indeed equivalent in those cultures. In fact, when this type of research is conducted, one of the researchers' primary concerns is whether the personality scales used in the study can validly and reliably measure meaningful dimensions of personality in all the cultures studied. As discussed in Chapter 2, the equivalence of a measure in terms of its meaning to all cultures concerned, as well as its psychometric validity and reliability, is of prime concern in cross-cultural research if the results are to be considered valid, meaningful, and useful.

Indeed, a common practice in many of the earlier cross-cultural studies on personality was to take a personality scale that had been developed in one country or culture—most often the United States—and simply translate it and use it in another culture. In effect, the researchers simply assumed that the personality dimension measured by that scale was equivalent between the two cultures, and that the method of measuring that dimension was psychometrically valid and reliable. Thus, many studies imposed an assumed etic construct upon the cultures studied (Church & Lonner, 1998). Realistically, however, one cannot

safely conclude that the personality dimensions represented by an imposed etic are equivalently and meaningfully represented in all cultures included in a study.

Many of the more recent studies in this area have been sensitive to this issue, and researchers have taken steps to assure some degree of psychometric equivalence across cultures in their measures of personality. In their study of the EPQ in Hong Kong and England, for example, Eysenck and Chan (1982) included only those items that were common to scoring keys derived separately in both cultures, thus ensuring some comparability in the scale scores used in their comparison. Likewise, Tafarodi and Swann (1996) tested the cross-cultural equivalence in their measure of self-esteem by conducting a confirmatory factor analysis on the items measured in their scales in both cultures before testing for differences. In testing for cultural differences in locus of control, Hamid (1994) back-translated his measures, administered both original and translated measures to bilinguals, and assessed the parallel forms correlation of the two questionnaires before using them in the main study. Munro (1979) established equivalence in the factor structures of his locus of control questionnaires before testing for cultural differences between blacks and whites in Africa, and Smith, Dugan, and Trompenaars (1997) conducted a pancultural factor analysis on their locus of control measure before testing for differences. This procedure allowed them to derive scale scores after eliminating individual and cultural differences in the ratings of the individual items included in the scale.

Support for the notion that cross-cultural comparisons of personality are meaningful comes from other sources as well. First, the findings derived from many of these studies “make sense”; that is, they are interpretable to a large degree and match predictions based on what we might reasonably expect based on our knowledge of culture and its probable influence on personality. Findings that were uninterpretable based on available knowledge of the cultures tested would raise questions about the psychometric validity of the scales being used. That many studies provide interpretable findings, however, suggests that the scales do measure something that is meaningful.

Another source of support comes from the data analyses used to compare cultures. Although significant differences in mean values reflect between-culture differences in averages, they do not necessarily reflect the degree of overlap among individuals within the samples comprising the various cultures in the comparison. In most cases, the degree of individual variation is many times larger than the degree of difference between cultures. Analysis of such effects would surely lead one to suspect a considerable degree of individual similarity in the personality constructs being measured (see Matsumoto, 2001, for a critique and discussion of the usefulness of cultural differences on mean scores and effect sizes).

A final source of support for the notion that many of the personality scales used in previous cross-cultural studies are valid comes from recent studies investigating the possible link between genetics and personality. Indeed, an increasing number of studies in recent years have begun to show that personality has some direct relationship to genes (for example, Berman, Ozkaragoz, Young,

& Noble, 2002; Brummett et al., 2003; Eley, 1997; Jang, McCrae, Angleitner, Riemann, & Livesley, 1998; Joensson et al., 2003; Riemann, Angleitner, & Strelau, 1997; Saudino, 1997). To the extent that genetic and biological factors contribute to personality, they provide the basis on which stability in personality can be conceptualized, measured, and studied not only across individuals within a culture, but across cultures as well. Should such stability exist, and if this stability is related to biological factors that are in turn related to evolutionary factors and adaptive functions, it supports the argument that some aspects of personality may indeed be universal. This argument does not preclude the possibility of cultural specificity in some aspects of personality, in the manifestations of personality, or even in the emergence and existence of indigenous personalities; it merely suggests that some aspects of personality may be universal to all humans.

Culture and the Five Factor Model of Personality

The Five Factor Model (FFM) of personality is a conceptual model built around five distinct and basic personality dimensions that appear to be universal for all humans. The five dimensions are Extroversion, Neuroticism, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Openness.

The FFM was conceived after a number of writers noticed the similarities in the personality dimensions that had emerged across many studies, both within and between cultures. Most notably, support for the FFM arose out of factor analyses of trait adjectives from the English lexicon that were descriptive of self and others (Juni, 1996). The factors that emerged from these types of analyses were similar to dimensions found in the analysis of questionnaire scales operationalizing personality. Further inquiry across cultures, using both factor analysis of descriptive trait adjectives in different languages and personality dimensions measured by different personality questionnaires, lent further support to the FFM. Eysenck's (1983) many studies using the EPQ, for example, provided much support for Extroversion and Neuroticism as stable, universal personality scales. In early studies of the FFM, those factors were reported in German (Amelang & Borkenau, 1982), Dutch (De Raad, Hendriks, & Hofstee, 1992), French (Rolland, 1993), Japanese, Chinese, and Filipino samples (Bond, 1979; Bond, Nakazato, & Shiraishi, 1975; Guthrie & Bennett, 1971; all cited in McCrae, Costa, Del-Pilar, & Rolland, 1998).

Cross-cultural research of the past decade on the validity of the FFM in different countries and cultures has continued to support claims of universality. De Fruyt and Mervielde (1998), for example, confirmed the validity of the FFM in the Dutch language, Trull and Geary (1997) confirmed its validity in Chinese, and Benet-Martinez and John (2000) in Castilian Spanish. De Raad, Perugini, and Szirmak (1997) reported support for the FFM in Dutch, Italian, Hungarian, American English, and German; Hofstee, Kiers, De Raad, Goldberg et al. (1997) also provided support for the FFM in Dutch, American English, and German. McCrae, Costa, and Yik (1996) provided support for the FFM in

the Chinese personality structure, and Digman and Shmelyov (1996) documented its utility in Russia. Other studies have documented its validity in other countries and cultures, including Italy (Caprara, Barbaranelli, & Comrey, 1995; Caprara & Perugini, 1994); Australia and South Africa (Heaven, Connors, & Stones, 1994); Hong Kong (Ng, Cooper, & Chandler, 1998); Canada, Finland, Poland, and Germany (Paunonen, Jackson, Trzebinski, & Forsterling, 1992); Germany, Portugal, Israel, China, Korea, and Japan (McCrae & Costa, 1997); the Philippines (Katigbak, Church, Guanzon-Lapena, Carlota, & Del Pilar, 2002); Muslim Malaysia (Mastor, Jin, & Cooper, 2000) and others (McCrae, 2001; also see review in McCrae et al., 1998). Collectively, these studies provide convincing and substantial evidence to support the claim that the FFM—consisting of Extroversion, Neuroticism, Openness, Conscientiousness, and Agreeableness—represents a universal taxonomy of personality that is applicable to all humans.

The universality of the FFM suggests that all humans share a similar personality structure that can be characterized by the five traits or dimensions that comprise the FFM. To explain this universality, some writers (for example, MacDonald, 1998) have suggested an evolutionary approach. This approach posits a universality both of human interests and in the neurophysiological mechanisms underlying trait variation. Personality structure is viewed as a universal psychological mechanism, a product of natural selection that serves both social and nonsocial functions in problem solving and environmental adaptation. Based on this theory, one would expect to find similar systems in animals that serve similar adaptive functions, and one would expect personality systems to be organized within the brain as discrete neurophysiological systems.

In this view, traits such as Conscientiousness (emotional stability), Neuroticism (affect intensity), and the other components of the FFM are considered to reflect stable variations in systems that serve critical adaptive functions. Conscientiousness, for example, may help individuals to monitor the environment for dangers and impending punishments, and to persevere in tasks that are not intrinsically rewarding (MacDonald, 1998). Affect intensity, measured by Neuroticism, is adaptive in that it helps mobilize behavioral resources by moderating arousal in situations requiring approach or avoidance.


According to MacDonald (1991, 1998), this evolutionary approach suggests a hierarchical model in which “behavior related to personality occurs at several levels based ultimately on the motivating aspects of evolved personality systems” (p. 130). In this model, humans possess evolved motive dispositions—for example, intimacy, safety—which are serviced by a universal set of personality dispositions that help individuals achieve their affective goals by managing personal and environmental resources. This resource management leads to concerns, projects, and tasks, which in turn lead to specific action units or behaviors through which the individual achieves the goals specified by the evolved motive dispositions (see Figure 11.4).

Note that this model—and the assumptions about universality of the FFM made by McCrae and Costa and others (for example, McCrae & Costa, 1997)—does not minimize the importance of cultural and individual variability. Cul-

Figure 11.4 Hierarchical model of motivation showing relationships between domain-specific and domain-general mechanisms

Level 1	EVOLVED MOTIVE DISPOSITIONS (Domain-Specific Mechanisms)
Level 2	PERSONAL STRIVINGS (Direct Psychological Effects of Domain-Specific Mechanisms)
Level 3	CONCERNS, PROJECTS, TASKS (Utilize Domain-General Mechanisms)
Level 4	SPECIFIC ACTION UNITS (Utilize Domain-General Mechanisms)

EXAMPLE:



Source: From L. Pervin (Ed.), *Goal Concepts in Personality and Social Psychology*, 1989. Reprinted by permission of Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

ture can substantially influence personality through the resources, social structures, and social systems available in a specific environment to help achieve goals. Culture can therefore influence mean levels of personality, and values about the various personality traits. Culture is “undeniably relevant in the development of characteristics and adaptations that guide the expression of personality in thoughts, feelings, and behaviors” (McCrae et al., 1998). Culture defines context and provides differential meaning to the components of context, including who is involved, what is happening, where it is occurring, and the like. Culture, therefore, plays a substantial role in producing the specific behavioral manifestations—the specific action units—that individuals will engage in to achieve what may be universal affective goals. A universal personality structure, however, is considered to be the mechanism by which such goals are achieved through a balance and interaction with culture.

The utility of the approach offered by the FFM, along with its underlying concept of a universal personality structure, continues to receive considerable support in the literature. Recent research has shown that the FFM can predict variations in behavior within individuals in longitudinal studies (Borkenau & Ostendorf, 1998) and is stable across different instruments and observers (McCrae & Costa, 1987). Some recent evidence even suggests that the FFM may apply to nonhuman primates as well. King and Figueredo (1997) presented 43

trait adjectives with representative items from the FFM to zoo trainers who work with chimpanzees in 12 different zoos. The trainers were asked to describe the chimpanzees in terms of the adjectives provided. The results showed no differences between the zoos, and the interrater reliability among the raters was high. Factor analysis of the ratings produced six factors, five of which corresponded to the FFM; the sixth corresponded to dominance. Of course, the findings from this study are not conclusive. A conservative interpretation would be that they merely indicate that human raters use their implicit theories of personality to rate nonhumans. Taken in conjunction with the growing literature concerning the relationship between biological and genetic factors and personality, however, they suggest that the FFM may be indicative of a universal personality structure that may be applicable not only to humans but also to non-human primates and perhaps other mammals as well (McCrae et al., 1998).

The Measurement of Personality across Cultures

One of the most serious issues in all cross-cultural research on personality is whether or not personality can be measured reliably and validly across different cultures. If methods of assessing personality are not reliable or valid across cultures, then the results of research using these methods cannot be trusted to give accurate portrayals of personality similarities or differences across cultures.

Most personality measures used in cross-cultural research were originally developed in a single language and single culture, and validated in that language and culture. The psychometric evidence typically used to demonstrate a measure's reliability and validity in a single culture involves examination of internal, test-retest, and parallel forms reliabilities, convergent and predictive validities, and replicability of the factor structures that comprise the various scales of the test. To obtain all these types of psychometric evidence for the reliability and validity of a test, researchers must literally spend years conducting countless studies addressing each of these specific concerns. The best measures of personality—as well as all other psychological constructs—have this degree of psychometric evidence backing them.

To validate personality measures cross-culturally requires similar psychometric evidence from all cultures in which the test is to be used. In the strictest sense, therefore, researchers interested in cross-cultural studies on personality should select instruments that have been demonstrated to have acceptable psychometric properties. This is a far cry from merely selecting a test that seems to be interesting and translating it for use in another culture. At the very least, equivalence of its psychometric properties should be established empirically, not assumed or ignored.

Data addressing the psychometric evidence necessary to validate a test in a target culture would provide the safest avenue by which such equivalence can be demonstrated. If such data exist, they can be used to support contentions concerning psychometric equivalence. Even if those data do not offer a high degree of support (reliability coefficients are lower, or factor structures are not

exactly equivalent), that does not necessarily mean that the test as a whole is not equivalent. There are, in fact, multiple alternative explanations of why such data may not be as strong in the target culture as in the culture in which the test was originally developed. Paunonen and Ashton (1998) outline and describe ten such possible interpretations, ranging from poor test translation and response style issues to different analytic methods. Thus, if a test is examined in another culture for its psychometric properties and the data are not as strong as they were in the original culture, each of these possibilities should be examined before concluding that the test is not psychometrically valid or reliable. In many cases, the problem may be minor and fixable.

Given these criteria, how have the various personality tests used in cross-cultural research fared? Paunonen and Ashton (1998) have reviewed the data concerning the California Psychological Inventory, the Comrey Personality Scales, the 16 Personality Factors Questionnaire, the Pavlovian Temperament Survey, the Personality Research Form, and the Nonverbal Personality Questionnaire. After reviewing each test's reliability, convergent validity, predictive validity, and factor structure invariance, these writers conclude that "(a) structured tests of personality can readily be adapted for use in a wide variety of cultures, and (b) there is an organization to many Western-derived personality traits that appears to be universal, or at least general to many of the world's cultures" (p. 165). Clearly, this conclusion is consonant with the notion of personality structure as universal in humans. Other recent studies (for example, Benet-Martinez & John, 1998) have also provided evidence for the psychometric equivalence of measures of the Five Factor Model. These data provide some degree of reassurance that the cross-cultural studies reviewed in this chapter have measured personality in psychometrically acceptable ways.

Culture and Indigenous Personalities

As stated earlier in the chapter, indigenous personalities are conceptualizations of personality developed in a particular culture that are specific and relevant only to that culture. In general, not only are the concepts of personality rooted in and derived from the particular cultural group under question, but the methodologies used to test and examine those concepts are also particular to that culture. Thus, in contrast to much of the research described so far, in which standardized personality measures are used to assess personality dimensions, studies of indigenous personalities often use their own nonstandardized methodologies.

Over the years, many scientists have been interested in indigenous conceptions of personality, and have described many different personality constructs considered to exist only in specific cultures. Berry and colleagues (1992) examined three such indigenous personality concepts, each of which is fundamentally different from American or Western concepts. The African model of personality, for example, views personality as consisting of three layers, each representing a different aspect of the person. The first layer, found at the core

of the person and personality, embodies a spiritual principle; the second layer involves a psychological vitality principle; the third layer involves a physiological vitality principle. The body forms the outer framework that houses all these layers of the person. In addition, family lineage and community affect different core aspects of the African personality (Sow, 1977, 1978, cited in Berry et al., 1992; see also Vontress, 1991).

Doi (1973) has postulated *amae* as a core concept of the Japanese personality. The root of this word means “sweet,” and loosely translated, *amae* refers to the passive, childlike dependence of one person on another. It is said to be rooted in mother–child relationships. According to Doi, all Japanese relationships can be characterized by *amae*, which serves as a fundamental building block of Japanese culture and personality. This fundamental interrelationship between higher- and lower-status people in Japan serves as a major component not only of individual psychology but of interpersonal relationships, and it does so in ways that are difficult to grasp from a North American individualistic point of view.

Early work in this area produced findings of many other personality constructs thought to be culture-specific. Such constructs have included the national character or personality of Arab culture (Beit-Hallahmi, 1972), North Alaskan Eskimos (Hippler, 1974), the Japanese (Sakamoto & Miura, 1976), the Fulani of Nigeria (Lott & Hart, 1977), the Iulus of Palamalai (Narayanan & Ganesan, 1978), Samoans (Holmes, Tallman, & Jantz, 1978), South African Indians (Heaven & Rajab, 1983), and the Ibo of Nigeria (Akin-Ogundeji, 1988). Researchers using standardized personality tests have found that scales derived from such tests are not fully adequate to describe personality in some cultures, such as India (Narayanan, Menon, & Levine, 1995) and the Philippines (Church, Katigbak, & Reyes, 1996; Church, Reyes, Katigbak, & Grimm, 1997).

Indigenous personality measures—that is, measures developed for use in a particular culture—give us further ideas and insights about the nature of indigenous psychologies and personalities. Cheung and Leung (1998), for example, reviewed three measures of personality developed for use in Chinese cultures. Of them, the Chinese Personality Assessment Inventory (CPAI) most resembles the standardized personality measures familiar to Americans and Europeans. Factor analyses of its items, however, produced four major scales: Dependability, Chinese Tradition, Social Potency, and Individualism. Although there is some overlap between the concepts underlying these scales and the FFM, there are also clear discrepancies (such as Chinese Tradition). It seems that some aspects of personality that are relevant and important to Chinese culture are probably not captured in traditional personality measures that assess the Big Five.

Other indigenous personality descriptions from various cultures include the Korean concept of *cheong* (human affection; Choi, Kim, & Choi, 1993); the Indian concept of *hishkama karma* (detachment; Sinha, 1993); the Chinese concept of *ren qin* (relationship orientation; Cheung et al., 1996); the Mexican concept of *simpatia* (avoidance of conflict; Triandis, Marin, Lisansky, & Betancourt, 1984); and the Filipino concepts of *pagkikipagkapwa* (shared iden-

tity), *pakikiramdam* (sensitivity, empathy), and *pakikisama* (going along with others; Enriquez, 1992) (all cited in Church, 2000, p. 654).

Clearly, this line of research suggests that not all aspects of personality in the various cultures of the world can be adequately defined and measured by concepts and traits such as those described in the FFM. Indeed, much of the work on indigenous psychology and personality has provided fuel for those who subscribe to the cultural psychology school—the view that culture and personality are mutually constituted. In this view, it makes no sense to consider personality as a universal construct; instead, it makes more sense to understand each culture's personalities as they exist and have developed within that culture.

The cultural psychology viewpoint rejects the notion of a universal organization to personality that may have genetic, biological, and evolutionary components. Its proponents argue that the research supporting universality and its possible biological substrates may be contaminated by the methods used. These methods, the argument goes, have been developed in American or European research laboratories by American or European researchers; because of this cultural bias, the findings support the FFM as a default by-product of the methods. Indigenous approaches, it is claimed, are immune from such bias because their methods are centered around concepts and practices that are local to the culture being studied (see, however, the replication of the FFM using nontraditional methods of assessing taxonomies of trait adjectives in multiple languages; De Raad, Perugini, Hrebickova, & Szarota, 1998).

Is there a middle ground? We believe there is. In the past, scientists interested in cross-cultural psychology have tended to think about universal and culture-specific aspects of psychological phenomena—personality, emotion, language, and the like—as mutually exclusive, dichotomous categories. Thus, personality is either universal or indigenous. A better and more fruitful approach might be to consider the question not of whether personality is universal or indigenous, but rather how personality is both universal and culture-specific. It is entirely possible that some aspects of personality may be organized in a universal fashion, either because of biological or genetic factors or because of culture-constant learning and responses to the environment. The fact that some aspects of personality may be organized universally, however, does not necessarily argue against the possibility that other aspects of personality may be culturally unique. It may be these culturally unique aspects that give personality its own special flavor in each specific cultural milieu, and allow researchers the possibility of studying aspects of personality that they might not observe in other cultures. Thus, a more beneficial way of understanding the relationship between culture and personality may be to see indigenous and universal aspects of personality as two sides of the same coin, rather than as mutually exclusive. If we come to understand the relationship between culture and personality (and biology, for that matter) in ways that allow for the coexistence of universality and indigenization, then we can tackle the problem of exactly how to conceptualize and study this coexistence.



Conclusion

In this chapter, we have discussed the major approaches to understanding and studying the relationship between culture, self, and personality, and have examined many different types of studies on this topic. Cross-cultural studies have shown that cultures differ considerably in their conceptualizations of the self. It has been argued that people from Western, individualistic cultures tend to view and value the self from an independent perspective in which self is a separate entity, not bound to the specific context. In contrast, those from non-Western, collectivistic cultures view and value the self from a more interdependent perspective, in which self is connected to and inseparable from the specific context and relationship. Research has shown that adopting these different senses of self has consequences for our cognitions, motivations, and emotions—affecting, for instance, our self-perceptions, achievement motivations, and feelings of happiness. Future research needs to investigate how different construals of self can exist simultaneously across contexts and cultures to clarify the relationship between culture and self, and how culture influences individual characteristics and behaviors via self.

Cross-cultural studies of personality dimensions have shown many ways in which cultures may differ in mean levels of personality. More recent research on the organization of personality, however, suggests that the Five Factor Model—a constellation of personality traits comprising Neuroticism, Extroversion, Openness, Conscientiousness, and Agreeableness—may be universal to all humans. Some research has also provided support for the existence of these factors in nonhuman primates. Research on indigenous approaches to personality, however, have demonstrated culturally specific aspects of personality that cannot be accounted for by the FFM. These two seemingly disparate sets of findings suggest a conflict in our understanding of the relationship between culture and personality, represented by the cross-cultural psychology versus cultural psychology schools of thought. We have suggested that these two seemingly opposing viewpoints need not be seen as mutually exclusive; rather, it may be more beneficial to view them as different, coexisting aspects of personality. The challenge for future research is to capture this coexistence, examining the relative degree of contribution of biological and cultural factors in the development and organization of personality.

In our quest to understand the relationship among culture, self, and personality, one of the biggest issues we will need to tackle concerns the influence of context, and the effects of context on that understanding. As we have seen, context is a major dimension of culture (Hall, 1966). High-context cultures place little value on cross-context consistency, allowing (and necessitating) behaviors and cognitions that differ according to context or situation. Low-context cultures, in contrast, discourage cross-context differences, emphasizing instead consistency and stability across contexts. American culture is relatively low-context, emphasizing stability. It is only within this type of cultural context that we can even conceive of personality as a set of enduring characteristics with stability and consistency across cultures. Thus, a person in this cultural

context should exhibit similar personality characteristics despite considerable differences in context.

It is relatively easy to demonstrate the existence of context specificity effects in assessments of personality. In one study, participants were randomly assigned to fill out a personality test under several conditions (Schmit, Ryan, Stierwalt, & Powell, 1995). The personality test was the NEO Five Factor Inventory (Costa & McCrae, 1989). One group completed the measure in the usual way with general directions. Another group completed the measure as if they were applying for a customer service representative job in a department store, a job they really wanted. Even with this simple context manipulation, an analysis of the data indicated that students' responses differed substantially under the two conditions. Compared to students in the general condition, participants in the work-related condition gave significantly lower ratings on neuroticism and significantly higher ratings on extroversion, agreeableness, and conscientiousness. Thus, context specificity in personality assessment can be obtained with American participants as well, further challenging our traditional notions of personality, and the very definition of personality. Ultimately, these concerns need to be addressed in future work as well.



Glossary

achievement motivation A desire for excellence.

cognitive template A logical framework that serves as the basis for understanding ourselves and others.

false uniqueness effect The tendency for individuals to underestimate the commonality of desirable traits and to overestimate their uniqueness.

filial piety A sense of duty and obligation to family members, especially parents. This sense is especially strong in Asian and other collectivistic cultures.

fundamental attribution error A tendency to explain the behaviors of others using internal attributions but to explain one's own behaviors using external attributions.

independent construal of self A sense of self that views the self as a bounded entity, clearly separated from relevant others.

indigenous emotions Emotions relatively specific to particular cultures.

indigenous personalities Conceptualizations of personality developed in a particular culture

that are specific and relevant only to that culture.

interdependent construal of self A sense of self that views the self as unbounded, flexible, and contingent on context. This sense of self is based on a principle of the fundamental connectedness among people.

locus of control People's attributions of control over their behaviors and relationships as internal or external to themselves. People with an internal locus of control see their behavior and relationships with others as dependent on their own behavior. People with an external locus of control see their behavior and relationships as contingent upon forces outside themselves and beyond their control.

personality A set of relatively enduring behavioral and cognitive characteristics, traits, or predispositions that people take with them to different situations, contexts, and interactions with others, and that contribute to differences among individuals.

self-concept The way in which we understand or construe our sense of self or being.