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The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War

Delhi – Bandung – Belgrade

Edited by
Nataša Mišković, Harald Fischer-Tiné and Nada Boškovska

The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War

The idea of non-alignment and peaceful coexistence was not new when Yugoslavia hosted the Belgrade Summit of the Non-Aligned in September 1961. Freedom activists from the colonies in Asia, Africa and South America had been discussing such issues for decades already, but this long-lasting context is usually forgotten in political and historical assessments of the Non-Aligned Movement.

This book puts the Non-Aligned Movement into its wider historical context and sheds light on the long-term connections and entanglements of the Afro-Asian world. It assembles scholars from different fields of research including Asian Studies, Eastern European and Southeast European History, Cold War Studies, Middle Eastern Studies and International Relations. In doing so, this volume looks back to the ideological beginnings of the concept of peaceful coexistence at the time of the anti-colonial movements, and at the multi-faceted challenges of foreign policy the former freedom fighters faced when they established their own decolonized states. It analyses the crucial role Yugoslav president Tito played in his determination to keep his country out of the blocs, and finally examines the main achievement of the Non-Aligned Movement: to give subordinate states of formerly subaltern peoples a voice in the international system.

An innovative look at the Non-Aligned Movement with a strong historical component, this book will be of great interest to academics working in the fields of international affairs, international history of the twentieth century, the Cold War, and race relations, as well as to scholars interested in Asian, African and Eastern European history.

Nataša Mišković is Swiss National Science Foundation Professor at the Institute of Middle Eastern Studies, University of Basel. Her research focus is on the shared history of the Balkans and the Middle East. Currently she is preparing a monograph on the personal relationship between Tito, Nehru and Nasser.

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Acknowledgements

This volume is the result of a truly interdisciplinary cooperation. The story of its making begins some time in 2006, when Nataša Mišković started working on her project about the political friendship between Tito, Nehru and Nasser and the founding of the Non-Aligned Movement. The project was carried out at the University of Zurich at the department for Eastern European History, chaired by Nada Boškovska, and was financed by the Swiss National Science Foundation.

Herself a specialist in southeastern European history, Nataša Mišković was inspired by Gayatri Chakravorti Spivak's demand for a change in perspective, and by Dipesh Chakrabarty's suggestion to provincialize Europe. She supported their claims all the more because the Balkans are so often looked at, from the Western and Middle European angle, as 'the "other" within', as Maria Todorova has put it so nicely.[1] In her endeavour to incorporate the Asian and the Middle Eastern perspective, Nataša Mišković set out on a fascinating journey into global history and diplomacy, which challenged national perceptions of the Cold War and the Third World as much as perceptions elaborating on a strictly defined hegemonial antagonism between Europe and Asia. Nada Pantelić mentored her through Tito's private archives in Belgrade. Dietmar Rothermund opened the doors of Delhi institutions for her, particularly the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library. The Serbian Ambassador to India at the time, Vuk Žugić, and his family welcomed her at their Chanakyapuri residence, where she witnessed diplomatic lifestyle and networking at first hand. Through this network, she found her way to Cairo, to Ivan Iveković, the last Yugoslav Ambassador to Egypt still living there as a scholar, and to the Swiss Embassy, which most kindly arranged her research contacts in Cairo.

At the end of her field research, Nataša Mišković wished to use the large network she had built up during the past years to organize an international conference. Nada Boškovska and Harald Fischer-Tiné agreed to host the conference jointly at the University of Zurich and at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH), directly across the Karl Schmid-Strasse in Zurich, in June 2011. Fischer-Tiné holds a chair in global history at the ETH but was trained in the history of South Asia. He wholeheartedly supported the organization of the conference as well as the ensuing book project, not least because it offered

a rare opportunity to fruitfully combine his own area of expertise – and that of younger researchers including Maria Framke and Carolien Stolte who work under his supervision – with more unfamiliar terrain. That the planning of the conference marked the cooperation of the 'gobal historians' at ETH with Nada Boškovska and her team at the University of Zurich has been one of the positive side-effects of this venture. Mridula Mukherjee, professor of history at the Jawaharlal Nehru University and for several years director of the NMML in New Delhi, acted as a fourth co-organizer. The concept of the conference, which was called 'The Cold War and the Postcolonial Moment: Prehistory, Aims and Achievements of the Non-Aligned Movement, 50 Years after Belgrade', aimed at bringing together scholars and diplomats specializing in the Non-Aligned Movement from all over the world, who look at the issue from various 'technical' angles, as area studies, diplomatic history, national history, international relations and politics, Cold War studies, global history and postcolonial studies. This concept proved most rewarding. Apart from the scholars present, a high-ranking representation of the Indian subcontinent matched the presence of the former Yugoslav Foreign Minister Budimir Lončar, and diplomats from Switzerland and former Yugoslavia. A closing diplomatic roundtable thus enabled the participants to catch a glimpse of the 'real' non-aligned experience.

Many people and institutions contributed to the success of the Zurich conference. The editors would like to take the opportunity to express their sincerest gratitude to them all. First and foremost, Mridula Mukherjee: without her unwavering support, neither the conference nor the preceding research project would have been so successful and so meaningful. Beatrice Schatzmann von Aesch, administrative assistant to Harald Fischer-Tiné, also contributed decisively to the success of this venture. Her office became the organizational headquarter of the event, and her dedicated efforts to solve all logistical problems concerned with the preparation of such a large-scale event were simply outstanding. Bhashyam Kasturi organized the participation of the Indian guests, although he had to cancel his own participation at the last minute. Vidwan Dasappa Keshava made the visit to Rietberg unforgettable. The Swiss National Science Foundation, the Swiss Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the North-South Centre ETHZ, the Swiss Academy of Humanities and Social Sciences, the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, the Zurich Hochschulstiftung, and the Zurich Universitätsverein ZUNIV generously supported the conference.

This volume comprises a selection of the papers given at the Zurich conference, combined with two additional pieces by Jovan Čavoški and Matthieu Rey. It represents the thematic focus of the conference, exploring the Eurasian or rather Asian-Mediterranean axis back into the beginning of the twentieth century, rather than extending into the decolonization of Africa and South America after 1960. Several members of Harald Fischer-Tiné's global history research unit at ETH Zürich have accompanied the long (and at times arduous) publication process with unstinting support: Vasudha Bharadwaj did an excellent job in editing the contributions written by non-native English speakers,

Judith Große and Janine Wilhelm were a great help in preparing the final draft of the manuscript for publication, and Miguel Kempf compiled the index. Finally, we should like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and Routledge Asian Studies and Dorothea Schaefter in particular for accepting the volume into their series.

The Editors
August 2013

Note

1 M. Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.



Nehru, Nasser and Tito at Brioni, July 1956

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Introduction

Nataša Mišković

What is non-alignment? Is it a political or a historical phenomenon? Is it a strategy of Third World countries during the Cold War, as the usual encyclopaedic definition goes? But if that is the case, what has Belgrade, the capital of a southeastern European state which no longer exists, got to do with it? Was it there that the Non-Aligned Movement was founded, or was it at the Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung? Moreover, why is almost all of the literature with this keyword dated from the 1980s or before? Research on non-alignment is indeed scarce, and if one looks for recent literature, one will not find it under this term but hidden within fields as diverse as Cold War studies, postcolonial studies, international history, race relations, or the histories of Yugoslavia and South Asia. This book aims to bring together the various scholarly discourses on non-alignment in an attempt to place this topic in its wider historical context and to integrate the diverse perspectives so as to permit a holistic review of the questions raised above.

The idea of non-alignment and the peaceful coexistence of nations was not new when Yugoslavia hosted the Belgrade Summit of September 1961, usually regarded as the beginning of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).[1] These issues had been discussed since the late nineteenth century within the network of the worldwide internationalist and anti-imperialist movement. In the context of the 'Age of Empire', covering, according to Eric Hobsbawm, the period between 1875 and 1914, this discussion turned around the domination of vast regions of the globe by a few powerful imperialist countries of the West. At that time, certain segments among the elites of the dominated and colonized peoples started to perceive their respective communities as nations. This was inspired not least by their dominators, who in the course of the nineteenth century had reorganized their empires as nation-states held together by common 'race' (or, in today's politically more correct expression, ethnicity), history, and/or language, introducing the concept of citizenship. The subordinate elites from the colonies, excluded from full citizenship in the imperial motherland particularly by race, demanded with growing persistence the right of their nations to self-determination, dreaming of peaceful coexistence between nations without alignment to a Great Power.[2]

Later, in the twentieth century, prominent leaders of the so-called Third World were part of this movement alongside European and American pacifists,

anti-imperialists and socialists, including exponents of the Russian Revolution such as, most prominently, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. After the February Revolution of 1917, the Bolsheviks demanded that the Provisional Government of Russia make unconditional peace based on the right of self-determination of nations; they aimed of course at triggering world revolution, but the postulation in itself was a worldwide novelty.[3] In 1920, communists from all over the world discussed how to overthrow imperialism, first in Moscow at the Second Comintern Congress, and later in Baku at the Congress of the Peoples of the East. Two diverging opinions emerged. One, claiming that an alliance between the workers' movement and the oppressed peoples of the colonies should bring about the socialist world revolution by force, was backed by Joseph Stalin.[4] The other, which was supported by Lenin, doubted that such an alliance would be strong enough to achieve its aims and recommended an alliance with the bourgeois opposition, namely the nationalist elites of the colonized countries.[5]

Neither the Western pacifist and anti-imperialist opposition nor the domestic elites in the colonies had any particular interest in a union with the communists at first. They put all their hopes in the US President Woodrow Wilson, who had mentioned the right of self-determination of peoples in his programmatic speech before the Congress in Washington in January 1918, in direct reaction to Lenin's postulate of the previous year.[6] They were bitterly disappointed, however, when the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 made no concessions to the Asian and African national movements, and when the newly founded League of Nations turned out to be more of an instrument designed to sustain the European Great Powers' control of the colonies than anything else.[7] As a consequence, they agreed to support the Brussels Conference against Imperialism of 1927, which was organized by the Comintern media specialist Willi Münzenberg and the similarly colourful South Asian, Germany-based communist Virendranath Chattophadhyaya, often referred to as Chatto.[8] They won the support of Nobel price winners Albert Einstein and Romain Rolland, who served as patrons of the Congress alongside the British theosophist and leader of the Labour Party, George Lansbury, and Soong Ching-Ling, the influential widow of the Kuomintang founder Sun Yat-Sen, who later became one of the highest-ranking leaders of the People's Republic of China. Jawaharlal Nehru, who was later labeled one of the three 'founder-fathers' of the NAM and who was at the time 38 years old, was present in Brussels as the fifth member of the Congress presidium and as the only delegate of the Indian National Congress. It was here that the future Indian Prime Minister made his first steps as an internationalist and met activists from the pacifist, Marxist and anti-colonial movements for the first time.[9] Apart from Soong (or Madame Sun Yat-Sen, as she was known at that time), Nehru made the acquaintance of Ahmed Sukarno and Mohammed Hatta from Indonesia, Hafiz Ramadan Bey from Egypt, Hadj-Ahmed Messali from Algeria, James La Guma and Josiah Gumeda from South Africa, and many others. Following the Congress, he accepted an invitation to the Soviet Union, where he travelled in November of the same year accompanied by his father.

Indian historian Iqbal Singh underlines the importance that this Congress and this visit had for Nehru's political formation as a future global leader. He attributes the persistent downplaying of these events in the literature to a widespread dislike among Nehru's biographers for linking his person with communism.[10] However, many of his later dealings cannot be properly assessed without taking into account these experiences. They concern his China policy and his reactions to the Cold War as much as his notions of how an agrarian society should be modernized. It was in Brussels that Nehru first encountered the idea of forming an 'Asiatic Federation', as he reported rather sceptically:

> An interesting feature of the Brussels Congress was the strong desire of the delegates from Asia that the beginnings should be made of some Asiatic federation. This was not due to any special feeling against Europe or America but to a drawing together of the Asiatic elements and a recognition of a common bond uniting them. This was specially noticeable in the delegates from the smaller countries: Indonesia, Korea, Persia, Syria and Egypt (which might be considered an Asiatic country for this purpose). The organisers of the Congress were rather suspicious of this Asiatic spirit and did not want to encourage it.… The Asiatic delegates met once and talked for two or three hours but nothing came of it. But the desire to do something remained.[11]

The delegates exchanged addresses, and the Indian National Congress from that time issued invitations to fraternal organizations to participate in its annual conventions, and from time to time sent reports and publications. The League against Imperialism, founded at the Brussels Congress, did not survive long. When at the end of the 1920s Stalin emerged victorious from the internal power struggle in the Soviet Communist Party, he implemented his policy of non-cooperation with non-socialist forces, and the Comintern stopped its support for the project.

World War II eventually sealed the fate of Europe's great imperial powers. Out of its ashes emerged new decolonized Asian states eager for integration into a new world order based on self-determination and the equality of nations. Non-alignment was India's primary goal and credo in foreign policy when South Asia gained independence from Britain on 14 August (Pakistan) and 15 August (India) 1947. Jawaharlal Nehru, the dominant designer of Indian foreign affairs, stated this resolutely on various occasions. In a message to the American magazine *The New Republic*, he declared as early as February 1947:

> Our policy is based on United Nations Charter and cooperation of all nations for peace, freedom and liberation of all suppressed peoples. We propose to avoid entanglement in any blocs or groups of Powers realising that only thus we can serve not only [the] cause of India but of world peace. This policy sometimes leads partisans of one group to imagine that we are supporting the other group. Every nation places its own interests first in developing its

> foreign policy. Fortunately India's interests coincide with peaceful foreign policy and cooperation with all other progressive nations.[12]

Nehru's subsequent explanation of this point is crucial for the understanding of his further initiatives, both in the Afro-Asian movement and in the NAM: he says that India 'is bound to play an increasing part in world affairs and all her weight will be thrown on the side of peace and social progress'.[13] In March 1947, he explained Indian foreign policy to the Legislative Assembly as follows: 'It has been repeatedly made clear that the Government pursues an independent foreign policy which, while seeking cooperation with the Great Powers, avoids entanglement in what is known as power politics.' According to former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, whether a state plays a role in international politics or not depends on the specific will of its political leaders.[14] Nehru here clearly showed his determination to play a role on the global stage, safeguarding India's independence and progress, willing to cooperate with but not submit to the Great Powers, and including a wish to contribute to world peace.

In this, Nehru counted on Asian solidarity. In March 1947, a few months before India's formal independence, he invited like-minded colleagues to an Asian Relations Conference to New Delhi. He opened the gathering with an emotional speech, full of hope for a bright Asian future:

> We stand at the end of an era and on the threshold of a new period of history. Standing on this watershed which divides two epochs of human history and endeavour, we can look back on our long past and look forward to the future that is taking shape before our eyes. Asia, after a long period of quiescence, has suddenly become important again in world affairs.… The idea of having an Asian Conference is not new and many have thought of it.… In this Conference and in this work here there are no leaders and no followers. All countries of Asia have to meet together on an equal basis in a common task and endeavour. It is fitting that India should play her part in this new phase of Asian development. Apart from the fact that India herself is emerging into freedom and independence, she is the natural centre and focal point of the many forces at work in Asia.[15]

Yet not everybody in Asia was pleased with Nehru's initiative or with his interpretation of India's role. In particular the Chinese government resented the fact that the conference organizers did not accept its wish to have Tibetan representatives treated as members of the Chinese delegation.[16] Nehru tried his best to avoid controversy in such matters. He took great care to establish friendly relations with India's future neighbours, especially with China, which has long but inaccessible borders with India, and with the giant Eurasian Soviet Union.[17] He furthermore wished to contribute substantially to the establishment of the United Nations: he delegated there his intimate friend and influential collaborator Krishna Menon and his sister Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, who served as President of

the General Assembly in 1948 and immediately after as the first Indian ambassador to Moscow. Apart from this, his government decided that India should remain a member of the Commonwealth of Nations. The Korean War of 1950 provided Nehru with the first opportunity to offer his services as an international mediator and to build up his global reputation. After the communist victory in China, he opted for the recognition of the new government in Beijing by the United Nations, but this was refused in deference to US wishes until 1971. Nonetheless, securing good neighbourly relations with rival China remained a chief goal of Nehru's foreign strategy during the next years.[18]

In 1954, Chinese Prime Minister Zhou En-Lai visited New Delhi. He and Nehru signed an agreement on Indo-Chinese cooperation, which formulated five principles of peaceful coexistence under the header 'Panchsheela'. This term alludes to the Buddhist philosophy on how to live a good life, similar to the ten commandments of the Old Testament. Ahmed Sukarno had used it in 1945 (as Pantjasila) to formulate the goals of the new Indonesian constitution, in his endeavour to transform this archipelago into a nation-state despite its ethnical, religious and ideological diversity. These three Asian leaders, Nehru, Zhou and Sukarno, were all influenced by Marxist ideology and yet were at the same time ardent nationalists. Zhou and Nehru were very aware that the term 'peaceful coexistence' originated in the socialist discourse; Nehru broodingly recorded in his Bandung notebook that it had first been introduced by Stalin in 1926:

> Co-existence – this a communist phrase especially 'peaceful co-existence'. first time used by Stalin in 1926. Inescapable conclusion: that communists mean something different.… Why use this phrase then? suggest a new phrase?[19]

By linking the notion of peaceful coexistence with the Buddhist concept of Panchsheela, they tried to give the former a specific Asian flavour. This goal is best expressed in the final communiqué of the Bandung Conference in April 1955, which ended with the Panchsheela, extended to ten rules and conjoined with an invocation of the Charter of the United Nations, under the title *Declaration on the Promotion of World Peace and Cooperation*.[20] The Bandung Conference gathered 29 Asian, Arab and African states, including the People's Republic of China, Pakistan, Turkey, both Vietnamese states, and Japan, and was driven by the enthusiasm to be rid of the colonial rulers and a feeling of 'coloured solidarity', as Itty Abraham puts it. The convention can also be assessed as the young Asian and African nations' attempt to organize themselves as the joint voice of the Third World. However, the emotionality of this event concealed the underlying differences in interpretations of the Panchsheela among participants. Sukarno, the host, who found himself in a politically weak position, most enjoyed the symbolism and his own importance in the project. Zhou used the Panchsheela to overcome China's isolation and to find allies in Asia and Africa, but China was a communist state that did not renounce its ultimate goals of regaining regional predominance and achieving world revolution. Nehru

finally introduced the Buddhism-inspired 'Five Principles' as a universal code of conduct in foreign affairs. This move was an expression of his striving to establish India as an independent power in Asia and of his wish to contribute to world peace, but at the same time it must be regarded as an indirect rebuke to the United Nations.[21]

To declare the end of colonialism and to conjure Afro-Asian solidarity was a significant symbolic act in the aftermath of World War II, but this declaration could not in itself secure an independent and prosperous future for the former colonies turned nation-states, nor could it gloss over the fundamentally diverging interests of these new states. Regional conflicts had a profound impact on the way Asian, Middle Eastern and African states reacted to the manoeuvres of the Great Powers as much in the 'Age of Empire' as during the Cold War. China's ideological quarrel with Moscow, which gained momentum after Stalin's death in March 1953 and even more after the crises in Poland and Hungary in 1956, enforced Zhou's initiatives to expand the Chinese zone of influence in Asia and Africa, among others mediating Nasser's arms deal with Czechoslovakia and supporting Sukarno in Indonesia. After Bandung, the leadership in Beijing tried to keep the 'Bandung spirit' alive by promoting sequel conferences and an Afro-Asian solidarity organization. But Chairman Mao declared that the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence applied only to socialist countries, and contrary to the new Soviet policy not to ideologically differing states.[22] The new Soviet chairman Nikita Khrushchev's activities to secure control of the socialist camp and to win over allies among the decolonized nations of Asia and Africa considerably influenced the course of events in the mid-1950s. His visit to India half a year after the Bandung Conference and the news of his historic speech at the end of the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party in February 1956, in which he condemned Stalin's crimes, confirmed Nehru in his conviction of the universal applicability of the Panchsheela, making him believe that it was possible to negotiate peace and disarmament with Moscow.

At the western end of Asia, the Middle East was deeply troubled by the founding of the state of Israel and the Arab defeat in the 1948 war. The Iraqi Prime Minister Nûrî al-Saîd, who remained loyal to the British mandatory power in order to keep his influence, hosted the signing of the Baghdad Treaty together with leaders of other traditionally Muslim, but not Arab, states, namely Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, to form a defence alliance within the NATO pact. They were opposed by Gamal Abdel Nasser, who after 1952 emerged as the charismatic leader of a strong Egypt, and who did not bend to the Western powers which denied him new weapons to recover Arab honour after 1948. Instead, Nasser turned to the socialist states for support, but without any intention to align. In an unprecedented *coup de main* in 1956, he succeeded in nationalizing the Suez Canal, taking it out of the hands of its British owners, and in securing the profits for the Egyptian treasury, which made him the hero of Arab nationalism and anti-imperialism.

Nehru was well aware of the limitations of Asian solidarity and of cooperation with the Great Powers. When he first met the Yugoslav president Josip Broz

Tito during the latter's first visit to India in autumn 1954, he realized the potential of an alliance with this peripheral European country on the intersection with Asia Minor. Tito was a charismatic man who matched Nehru in appeal and intelligence, though not in education. He had survived the tough Stalinist training as a Comintern agent in the 1930s and had led the Yugoslav partisan movement to victory against fascist Nazi German occupation during World War II, which gained him a lot of admiration especially in the West. His conflict with Stalin in 1948 had forced him to seek support in London and Washington. Stalin's death and Khrushchev's friendly approaches now enabled him to try a non-aligned policy which would help to keep Yugoslavia out of the Soviet bloc and liberate him from the pressure of signing the NATO pact, without dispensing with desparately needed financial support from both sides.

Tito seized the right moment to promote non-alignment and peaceful coexistence in a meeting with Nasser and Nehru on the Adriatic island of Brioni in July 1956, which he successfully staged as a press sensation. The trio, from then on celebrated as the 'fathers of NAM', interpreted non-alignment as active neutrality which did not keep quiet and passive in international politics, but strove to interfere and serve as mediators in the service of the UN Charter. All too soon, the dashing triumvirate was disillusioned in its fervour by the events following Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal and Khrushchev's handling of the Hungarian crisis.[23] It took them four years to risk another initiative – Nehru, already tired and more and more absorbed by the Indo-China border conflict, had to be persuaded by Tito and Nasser to join in. In 1960, together with Sukarno and Kwame Nkrumah from Ghana, they launched the Initiative of the Five during the Fifteenth UN General Assembly. In his speech to the Assembly, Tito identified disarmament and decolonization as the most pressing problems of the world 15 years after the end of World War II.[24] Sixteen new African states were admitted as members of the UN that year, and Tito decided to embark on a grand journey through Africa from February to April 1961 to promote non-alignment. He acted in direct competition to the Chinese, who tried to attach African states and freedom movements to their cause under the label of Afro-Asian solidarity, and against the background of the escalating Congo and Cuba crises.[25] His journey ended in Egypt, where he decided in accordance with Nasser, but rather precipitously and without first consulting Nehru, to host a summit of non-aligned heads of states and governments in Belgrade as early as September the same year.

The Belgrade Conference was a spectacular affair, matching Bandung in symbolic character – this time as a statement for disarmament, against an escalation of the Cold War. But its helplessness was demonstrated instantly, when Moscow had a nuclear bomb tested on the very day of the opening, for which Tito as the host asked for understanding – his foreign secretary Koča Popović, an able diplomat and Tito's loyal collaborator since partisan days, had not been consulted in this matter and felt deeply hurt by the discrediting.[26] Yet non-aligned summits were thereafter held roughly every three years. The number of participants grew quickly along the independence wave throughout the 1960s, and member states came to be known as the Non-Aligned Movement. The inclusion of Yugoslavia

gave the NAM a more global appeal that transcended the limits of 'coloured' Afro-Asian solidarity, and provided, in the person of Tito, a driving force willing to put his entire reputation at stake for this cause. Tito, on the other hand, found a perfect stage to play his role in world politics, and to defend at the same time his country's independence. His glamour added to the NAM's headlines in the world press, especially after the early deaths of Nehru and Nasser, and his determination prevented it from being undercut by the Soviet bloc. Yet the movement has survived until this day because of its main practical purpose: to act as a platform for the non-aligned caucus within the United Nations Security Council, and for the majority of states within the General Assembly. To give the Global South a joint voice, be it in the headlines of the media or in international organizations, can therefore be regarded as the main achievement of the NAM.

This wider historical context is suppressed in the usual assessments of the Non-Aligned Movement. The Cold War offers a generally accepted explanation of why this movement came into being just at the peak of the Cold War, and suggests that it lost its purpose after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Non-alignment is thus defined as a strategy of certain Third World states to counter the bipolarity of the Cold War.[27] The definition fits into a periodization which emphasizes decolonization after 1945 and the end of European hegemony, as suggested by Hobsbawm, and by Dietmar Rothermund in his *Routledge Companion to Decolonization*.[28] It also makes part of the 'fundamental hegemonic discourse' on the Cold War and the Third World, which Odd Arne Westad points out in his introduction to *The Global Cold War*.[29] The 'classical', Eurocentric interpretation of the phenomenon blurs the agency of Asian and African actors, in the present context as much as in the exemplary cases described by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak and Dipesh Chakrabarty in their key theoretical texts of Postcolonial Studies, *Can the Subaltern Speak?* and *Provincializing Europe*.[30] After all, Washington's and Moscow's rival missions of freedom and social justice in the territories of the newly decolonized states are astonishingly analogous to the European missions of civilization in the previous era.[31] Perceived from a southern perspective, northern domination shifted in the mid-twentieth century, but it did not end: European hegemony gave way to US–Soviet bipolarity, and direct rule and exploitation were replaced by ideological control and aid, along with growing economical exploitation through global private companies.[32]

The confusing disparity of the various scholarly fields involved in the study of non-alignment is clearly reflected in the variety of publications which might first be consulted by readers wishing to inform themselves on this topic. General overviews come from contemporary history, focusing on the Cold War. Odd Arne Westad's seminal *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* offers a global, anthropologically-informed approach to the history of the Cold War, whereas John Lewis Gaddis writes on *The Cold War* from the perspective of a superpower, the United States of America, and Jonathan Haslam explores *Russia's Cold War*, tackling the difficulties of restricted archive access and the multitude of languages involved. The volume *Connecting Histories: Decolonization and the Cold War in Southeast Asia*

1945–1962, by Christopher E. Goscha and Christian F. Ostermann, is one of the first to explore the history of Asia connecting the aspects of decolonization and the Cold War, focusing on Southeast Asia. The same holds true for Christopher Lee's volume *Making a World after Empire: The Bandung Moment and its Political Afterlives*, which puts a strong focus on developments in Africa. Lorenz Lüthi's and Svetozar Rajak's respective studies on Sino-Soviet and Soviet–Yugoslav relations offer profound analyses of archival material from these three countries concerning a crucial phase in the formation of NAM.[33]

International history offers a less detailed but temporally more extended approach. Vijay Prashad's *The Darker Nations: A People's History of the Third World* is an original attempt to write a political history of the Third World as a concept, or a project, not as a result of decolonization after the end of the Age of Empires. Paul Gordon Lauren's *Power and Prejudice: The Politics and Diplomacy of Racial Discrimination* is a pioneering and most influential work exploring the relations between power and race, migration and conflict. In *The Wilsonian Moment*, Erez Manela argues convincingly that disappointment among the colonies' indigenous elites over the shaping of the League of Nations triggered anti-colonial nationalism. Jörg Fisch's *Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Völker* analyses the right of self-determination of nations, while Mark Mazower explores the ideological roots of the United Nations as *No Enchanted Palace* between idealism, ideology and power politics. *The Routledge Companion to Decolonization* by our contributor Dietmar Rothermund offers essential information on the global context of decolonization, the rise of nationalist resistance movements, debates on neo-colonialism, and the legacy of colonialism in various fields.[34] Readers interested in India and Egypt will first dive into the vast literature on Nehru and his foreign policy or on Nasser and Arab nationalism respectively, whereas readers looking at the successor states of Yugoslavia face a strange break between the older literature from the socialist times and recent attempts to reassess Tito and his non-aligned foreign policy. Readers looking for research on the NAM in Africa will have to be patient. Attempts at exploring this key aspect are just beginning, emerging from the fields of race relations and African studies. Ryan M. Irwin's *Gordian Knot* explores how apartheid influenced discussions within the United Nations after its inclusion of newly independent African states in the 1960s. Jon Soske, on the other hand, examines through the racial prism the influence of the Indian diaspora in South Africa and of Gandhi's and Nehru's writings on African nationalism.[35]

This volume aims to bring together latest research from various fields studying non-alignment, in order to put it into its wider historical context and to shed light on long-term connections and entanglements in a global perspective, focusing on the Asian–Mediterranean axis. It assembles eight selected contributions from the conference 'The Cold War and the Postcolonial Moment: Prehistory, Aims and Achievements of the Non-Aligned Movement 50 Years after Belgrade', held at the University of Zurich and at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (Zurich) in June 2011, along with two chapters commissioned especially for this book. The book regards non-alignment as the negative aspect of

the concept of peaceful coexistence – or the other side of the same coin – deriving from the right of self-determination of peoples. The book recalls the ideological beginnings of this concept after World War I and the Russian Revolution, exploring the intertwinings between its socialist and anti-imperialist interpretations. It studies the multi-faceted exterior challenges that the leaders of anti-imperialist freedom movements faced when they established their own independent states, including the crucial role Yugoslav president Tito played in his determination to be a global leader, keeping his country out of the blocs. The book finally examines the main achievement of the Non-Aligned Movement: to give subordinate states of formerly subaltern peoples a voice in the international system. The contributors to this book bring together their diverse conversations in an attempt to analyse the overlaps and to extract their essence. Each approach highlights certain important aspects of the NAM, but a holistic, entangled assessment is only possible if these conversations are combined and the differing perspectives from various parts of the world integrated.

Structure of the book

The first chapter offers a historical overview by Dietmar Rothermund, the renowned specialist of South Asian History, who has been kind enough to turn his keynote speech into a chronologically organized assessment of the whole era, from 1946 to the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989. It comes from a contemporary witness who has closely followed Afro-Asian and non-aligned activities for almost six decades of his scholarly life. The following chapters are divided into three thematic sections, focusing first on Afro-Asian solidarity, second on Cold War entanglements, and third on specific strategies used by subaltern states to have an impact on daily global politics.

The first thematic section, on Afro-Asian solidarity, opens with Maria Framke's piece on India in the 1930s. She argues that the conflicts and political crises emanating from Europe in the interwar period significantly influenced Indian public opinion and debates not only on Indian nationalism but also on the country's future foreign policy and global alignments. She comes to the conclusion that the emergence of fascist Italy and National Socialist Germany as global powers and the concomitant disappointment with British foreign policy and the League of Nations brought forward a consensus among Indian nationalists to regard the formulation of a distinct Indian foreign policy as absolutely necessary. She also shows that Indian discussions about conflicts caused by fascist powers often contained the idea that cooperation between dependent or weaker nations was indispensable. Solidarity with the victims of fascism helped to formulate new arguments against colonial rule and racism in India and around the world. Global political developments prompted Indian political activists, along with the middle classes of Bombay and Calcutta, to develop alternative concepts such as the League of Asiatic and African Coloured Nations.

Carolien Stolte's chapter dovetails nicely with Framke's contribution inasmuch as it analyses an attempt at implementing such visions on the eve of Indian

independence, under the Provisional Government. Stolte demonstrates how the Asian Relations Conference held at New Delhi in March 1947 was rooted in visions of Asian unity that had held various elements of Indian civil society in their grip since the early 1920s. This conference was unique in several ways. It was a gathering of academic and cultural organizations. All issues pertaining to Asia, from the threat emanating from the incipient Cold War to issues of decolonization and Asian representation at the United Nations, were discussed in a non-political manner. Second, it was the only conference to invite representatives from all parts of Asia, including not only US-occupied Japan, but also the Central Asian Soviet republics. Stolte argues that in its set-up, the conference answered to the internationalist spirit of the interwar years rather than to the newly emerging constellations of decolonization and the Cold War. She makes it equally clear, however, that the latter were not without impact on the proceedings.

Itty Abraham problematizes race and racial thinking as they shaped international institutions and the worldviews of leaders from around the world before and during the period of decolonization. Glossed as civilization, the ubiquity of seeing the world in terms that foregrounded 'racial' difference was a feature common to the liberal western Great Powers as much as the newly independent ex-colonies of Asia and Africa. The first generation of Third World coalitions thus almost 'naturally' gravitated to political alliances built around racial similarity. 'Asia' and 'Africa' were assumed to be sufficient conditions for political formation, regardless of the many differences separating countries brought together under these continental labels. The events of the early postcolonial period showed unequivocally that race was an insufficient foundation on which to build political agreement. In his thoughtful intervention, Abraham reminds us that this was precisely the international context within which the Non-Aligned Movement first took shape and that it took its leaders some time to discover and work through issues of mutual agreement for themselves, without recourse to misleading assumptions uncritically derived from the apparent homologies of common history and race.

The second thematic section of the book sheds light on different aspects of Cold War entanglements. Lorenz Lüthi traces how the Cold War influenced, and almost dismantled, the Non-Alignment Movement in the period from the Belgrade Conference in 1961 to the Algiers Conference in 1973. He focuses primarily on the three central state-actors in the NAM – Yugoslavia, Egypt and India – and on three topics: the nuclear weapons race as a core problem of the superpower conflict, and the Indochina and Arab–Israeli conflicts as regional problems which predated the Cold War. Analysing these actors' positions in relation to these issues, argues that the NAM did not find its place in the international system and that in the period from 1961 to 1973 it was as much a participant in the Cold War as it was a victim.

Nataša Mišković presents a case study focusing on the correspondence between Tito and Nehru concerning the Soviet intervention in Hungary. She asks why Nehru, as a distinguished world advocate for peace, still approved of Tito's advice to accept the second Soviet invasion as the 'lesser evil', and why he confided in Tito against the strong criticisms of the Lok Sabha, the Indian House

of Commons, and the United Nations General Assembly. She also analyses how the two statesmen used their political scope to counter an extremely tense international situation. She argues that, apart from political interests, mutual confidence was a key component in the decision-making of these politicians, and that the personal ability or failure of individual statesmen may prove to have a far-reaching impact in critical conditions.

Amit Das Gupta's chapter examines the positions of non-aligned states towards the German question. This core Cold War issue had not been of immediate concern for the non-aligned countries. Yugoslavia aside, none of the member states was located in the neighbourhood of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) or the German Democratic Republic (GDR). Das Gupta argues that it was not the Non-Aligned keeping themselves busy with the German question but the two Germanies keeping the Non-Aligned busy with permanent allurements and threats connected with recognizing or not recognizing the GDR. The chapter follows a number of non-aligned states (Yugoslavia, India, Indonesia, Ghana, Egypt) in their efforts to appease Bonn in order not to lose economic support and, at the same time, to establish good relations with the USSR.

The final thematic section of the book deals with the NAM as an instrument for gaining a voice in the international system. Matthieu Rey explores the Arab discussion of the Bandung Conference, focusing on Iraq and Syria. Historiography has generally concentrated on Egypt, regarding Bandung as Gamal Abdel Nasser's first appearance on the global scene. Other Arab delegations present at Bandung remain surprisingly obscure in the literature. This chapter explores Bandung as a space of confrontation between the six Arab delegations, analysing their roles during the conference. First, it puts Bandung into the Arab context, exploring prior debates in the Arab League. Second, the chapter analyses the discussions and dealings within the Syrian and Iraqi delegations about the international status of their respective countries. Rey concludes with an attempt to define the main inter-Arab differences about Bandung, starting from the assumption that, from the Syrian point of view, Bandung was synonymous with non-alignment as a practical and political way to implement neutrality, whereas from the Iraqi point of view, Bandung was synonymous with the fight against colonization and did not imply any non-aligned position.

Jovan Čavoški looks at Yugoslavia as a relatively small and 'underdeveloped', though European, country which had great hopes for international solidarity against bloc politics and the arms race, and which hoped to benefit from an economic cooperation with similar states. He comments on the role this country played in international politics, drawing on a large variety of sources from Belgrade archives as much as from Asian institutions. His focus is on Tito's towering position in the NAM and the great effort he dedicated to preparing the ground for non-aligned conferences. It becomes apparent that Tito became a global leader and a most welcome guest in Third World countries, not least because he travelled there personally to make friends and to convince their leaders to attend.

Finally, Jürgen Dinkel's contribution examines the summits of the non-aligned countries between 1961 and 1983, regarding them as media events and

drawing on approaches that have rarely been used by scholars in international and global history: among others, performative studies, visual history and media theories. The chapter shows that the foreign policies of the non-aligned countries, shaped by their successful national liberation struggles, the Cold War and the foundation of the United Nations, represent also a direct reaction to the global revolution in mass communications. Conscious of their lack of military or economic 'hard power', the Non-Aligned tried to achieve their goals through increasingly symbolic performative actions such as summitry (visual) propaganda geared towards a global mass media, and the establishment of their own Non-Aligned News Agency Pool to influence an imagined 'world opinion' and to make their voice heard in international politics. Dinkel explores the dialectic which evolved between the media and the summits: the organizers using the media for their aims, and the media influencing the course of the summits and the worldwide perception of the Non-Aligned Movement.

The ten chapters of this book clearly demonstrate the agency of subaltern and/or decolonized states predominantly from the global south, but also from the fringes of Europe, in their endeavour to stand their ground, to fend off interference, and to have a say in a world system in which they participated but which was dominated by others. They highlight a longer *durée* than is typically covered by literature on the Cold War period or contemporary history. The first section of the book reassesses the hopes, good will and idealism which freedom movements entertained in their wish to do it better once they gained the power to change things. These hopes survive today in the formulations of the UN Charter, but are often perceived as frozen expressions of folklorism in an otherwise powerless organization – nobody has explored so far why this is so, apart from oral or written testimonials of senior NAM diplomats. Studies on internationalism that include the experience of imperialism, fascism and World War II are still very scarce, as are investigations of the Cold War which depart from a Western perspective. This is the merit of the second section of this book, which focuses on the perspective of non-aligned governments towards problems created by the Cold War, at the same time highlighting their disability and disillusion in the practical execution of their goals vis-à-vis dominating powers. The last section of the book explores various courses of action taken by decolonized states themselves, deciding on their policy, mobilizing new NAM members, and representing themselves to the world. The obvious limitations of this volume bring out the advantages of the editors' approach as much as its shortcomings. The combined effort of ten authors from different fields and areas cannot cover the whole topic, but merely demonstrate the fruitfulness of this approach. We firmly hope it may inspire others to continue.

Notes

1 See also N. Mišković, 'Wer erfand die Blockfreiheit? Überlegungen zur Verknüpfung von Osteuropäischer und Globalgeschichte', in J. Obertreis and M. Aust (eds), *Osteuropäische Geschichte und Globalgeschichte*, Stuttgart: Steiner, forthcoming.
2 One of the most inspiring thinkers about how ideas emanating from imperial Europe into colonized parts of the world interacted in these other places is D. Chakrabarty,

Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2000, in his preface to the 2007 edition.

3 H. Haumann, *Geschichte Russlands*, Munich and Zurich: Piper, 1996, pp. 461, 467–8, 513–14; J. Fisch, *Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Völker: Die Domestizierung einer Illusion*, Munich: Beck, 2010, pp. 144–8.

4 Stalin was at that time in charge of the nationalities question in Soviet Russia. See W. Leonhard, *Anmerkungen zu Stalin*, Berlin: Rowohlt, 2009; J. Baberowski, *Verbrannte Erde: Stalins Herrschaft der Gewalt*, Munich: Beck, 2012.

5 R. Pipes, *Communism: A Brief History*, London: 2001, cited here from the German edition: *Kommunismus*, Berlin: BVT, 2003, pp. 167–9; V. Prashad, *The Darker Nations: A People's History of the Third World*, New York and London: The New Press, 2007, pp. 20–1.

6 E. Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 6–7.

7 M. Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations*, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2009, pp. 194–5. Madeleine Herren assesses the League of Nations with more appreciation than Marc Mazower, underlining the fact that this modern and innovative structure anteceded global integration. M. Herren, *Internationale Organisationen seit 1865: Eine Globalgeschichte der internationalen Ordnung*, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2009, p. 55.

8 The papers of the League against Imperialism are with the International Institute of Social History. Catalogue available at: www.iisg.nl/archives/en/files/l/ARCH-00804full.php#N10D8D (accessed 7 August 2013). See also N. K. Barooah, *Chatto: The Life and Times of an Indian Anti-Imperialist in Europe*, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004, and K. K. Manjapra, *M. N. Roy: Marxism and Colonial Cosmopolitanism*, New Delhi and Abingdon: Routledge, 2010.

9 I. Singh, *Between Two Fires: Towards an Understanding of Jawaharlal Nehru's Foreign Policy*, vol. 1, New Delhi: Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, 1992, pp. 40–51.

10 Singh, *Between Two Fires*, vol. 1, p. 41.

11 Report to the All India Congress Committee, cited after Singh, *Between Two Fires*, vol. 1, p. 45.

12 National Archives of India, Ministry of External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations, File no. 470-FEA/47, pp. 18–19/c: 'Message to 'New Republic' (New York) sent from New Delhi, 10 February 1947', published in J. Nehru, *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru* [hereafter *SWJN*], New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 1972, vol. 2, p. 409.

13 Legislative Assembly Debates, Official Report, vol. II, 1947, 20 February 1947 to 5 March 1947, 1453–1456: 'Reply to N. G. Ranga in the Legislative Assembly on 4 March 1947', reproduced in *SWJN* 2, p. 429.

14 Recording of interview with Boutros Boutros-Ghali conducted by the author on 3 November 2009 in his office in Cairo.

15 Speech delivered at the plenary session of the Asian Relations Conference, New Delhi, 23 March 1947. Asian Relations Organization, *Asian Relations: Being a Report of the Proceedings*, New Delhi: Asian Relations Organization, 1948, pp. 20–7, cited in *SWJN* 2, pp. 503–9.

16 National Archives of India, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations, File no. 10(9)–NEF/47, p. 7/c: 'Telegram to K. P. S. Menon, 14 March 1947', cited in *SWJN* 2, p. 502.

17 Benjamin Zachariah writes that Krishna Menon met the Soviet official Molotov in Paris as early as 1946 to establish contacts with Moscow, but this initiative was not approved of in London. Unpublished paper delivered at the conference 'The Afro-Asian World, 1945–1975', Concordia University and McGill University, Montreal,

23 to 24 March 2012. The conflict with Pakistan followed special rules and was treated as a domestic problem, and therefore not in Nehru's domain of foreign affairs in general.

18 According to Nasser's confidant Mohammed Hassanein Heikal, Nehru extended courtesies to the Chinese during the Indochina Conference in Geneva that year, putting an airplane at Zhou's disposal. According to the same source, he also arranged Zhou's first meeting with the new Egyptian head of government Gamal Abdel Nasser, on a stop-over in Rangoon on their way to Bandung. M. Heikal, *Nasser: The Cairo Documents*, London: New English Library, 1972, cited here from the German translation, *Das Kairo Dossier: Aus den Geheimpapieren des Gamal Abdel Nasser*, Vienna: Molden, 1972, pp. 256–7.

19 Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, Subimal Dutt Papers, Speeches and Writings by Others 2, Notes of Jawaharlal Nehru during Afro-Asian Conference 1955, sheet 46. Apart from the two preparatory conferences in Colombo and Bogor, at which the Bandung Conference was organized, the socialist parties held their own conference in Rangoon in 1953, with a very similar agenda.

20 H. Sasse, *Die asiatisch-afrikanischen Staaten auf der Bandung-Konferenz*, Frankfurt am Main and Berlin: Alfred Metzner, 1958, pp. 66–75, especially pp. 74–5.

21 Mišković, 'Blockfreiheit', pp. 19–20. Regarding Chinese foreign policy in the first half of the 1950s see J. Chen, 'Bridging Revolution and Decolonization: The "Bandung" Discourse in China's Early Cold War Experience', in C. E. Goscha and C. F. Ostermann (eds), *Connecting Histories: Decolonization and the Cold War in Southeast Asia, 1945–1962*, Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Press, 2009, pp. 137–71, 153–4, 156; and L. M. Lüthi, *The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008. Regarding Sukarno see A. Vickers, *A History of Modern Indonesia*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 117ff., and Vickers's unpublished paper 'Sukarno', delivered at the conference 'The Afro-Asian World, 1945–1975', Concordia University and McGill University, Montreal, 23 to 24 March 2012. Regarding Nehru see B. Zachariah, *Nehru*, London and New York: Routledge, 2004, pp. 216–18, and W. Crocker, *Nehru: A Contemporary's Estimate*, Noida: Random, 2008.

22 Chen, *Bandung Discourse*, pp. 164–5.

23 See my chapter on the Hungarian crisis in this volume. On Yugoslavia's foreign policy see S. Rajak, *Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in the Early Cold War: Reconciliation, Comradeship, Confrontation, 1953–1957*, London and New York: Routledge, 2011; T. Jakovina, *Treća strana Hladnog rata* (The Third Side of the Cold War), Zagreb: Fraktura, 2011; D. Bogetić, *Nova strategija spoljne politike Jugoslavije 1956–1961* (The New Strategy of Yugoslavia's Foreign Policy, 1956–1961), Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2006; V. Petrović, *Titova lična diplomatija: Studije i dokumentarni prilozi* (Tito's Personal Diplomacy: Studies and Documents), Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2010; D. Bogetić and L. Dimić, *Beogradska konferencija nesvrstanih zemalja 1.–6. septembra 1961: Prilog istoriji Trećeg sveta* (The Belgrade Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, 1–6 September 1961), Belgrade: Zavod za udžbenike, 2013.

24 J. B. Tito, 'Govor na XV zasedanju Generalne skupštine Ujedinjenih nacija u Njujoku, 22. septembra 1960' (Speech at the Fifteenth Session of the UN General Assembly in New York, 22 September 1960), in J. B. Tito, *Jugoslavija u borbi za nezavisnost i nesvrstanost* (Yugoslavia in the Fight for Independence and Non-Alignment), Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1980, pp. 110–36. See also Petrović, *Titova lična diplomatija*, pp. 167–73.

25 Chen, 'Bridging Revolution', pp. 164–5; Petrović, *Titova lična diplomatija*, pp. 170–3.

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The era of non-alignment

Dietmar Rothermund

'Cold War' and 'Iron Curtain': the antecedents of non-alignment

The Non-Aligned Movement seemed to be a somewhat delayed reaction to the Cold War which started soon after World War II, but it had its antecedents in separate streams of independent foreign policies which then converged in 1956. Nehru had advocated a 'non-aligned' foreign policy for India in 1947, although he did not yet use that term to refer to it. Tito was eager to stress his independence from the Soviet Union and found in Nehru a sympathetic supporter of such a policy. When the Cold War loomed large, they intensified their contacts and then appealed to like-minded national leaders.

The term 'Cold War' was first used by George Orwell in October 1945.[1] At that time it was already apparent that the interests of the erstwhile allies, the USA and the Soviet Union, were diverging. The Soviet Union was very eager to consolidate its hold on the East European territories which it had occupied. It sheltered these territories behind an 'Iron Curtain'. Churchill had used this term first in a telegram to Truman on 12 May 1945, only a few days after World War II had ended in Europe.[2] Truman continued American cooperation with the Soviet Union and disregarded the warnings of the American diplomat George F. Kennan, who was stationed in Moscow at that time. Kennan was an expert on Soviet affairs who had been in Moscow in the 1930s, at the time of Stalin's brutal purges. Ever since that time, he had been suspicious of Stalin's expansionist intentions. In his famous 'long telegram' to Washington on 22 February 1946, he formulated his strategy of 'containment' of the Soviet Union. This caught the attention of important members of the American government who saw to it that Kennan was brought back to Washington, where he soon rose to prominence. He was encouraged by members of the government to publish the gist of his telegram anonymously ('X') in an article in *Foreign Affairs* in 1947.[3] It was Kennan's good luck that General George Marshall was appointed secretary of state in April 1947; Marshall then relied to a great extent on Kennan's advice. The Marshall Plan was a comprehensive measure which corresponded to Kennan's ideas. He had never thought of 'containment' in purely military terms as his successors did, as his strategy was conceived in a diplomatic and economic context.

On the Soviet side, Andrei Zhdanov matched Kennan's 'containment' with an aggressive ideology which greatly influenced Soviet policy in those early years of the Cold War.[4] He combined a strict adherence to historical materialism with Great Russian chauvinism. 'Zhdanovism' or 'Soviet patriotism' was rampant in those initial years of the Cold War. Zhdanov was close to Stalin and was even thought of as his potential successor. He was also perceived as an influential figure by observers abroad. *Time* magazine portrayed him on its cover on 9 December 1946. In September 1947 Zhdanov formulated his doctrine of the 'two camps' at the founding congress of the Cominform in Poland. The Comintern, which had been closed down in 1943, was re-established as Cominform with headquarters in Belgrade. But the Yugoslav leader, Marshall Tito, was not an obedient follower of Stalin and his days as host of Cominform were numbered before he had a chance to play this new role. Tito was the only leader of Eastern Europe who did not owe the liberation of his country to the Red Army. He had liberated Yugoslavia with his own partisans and was proud of his victory. Stalin broke with him in 1948 because he could not tolerate a rival in the communist camp. Zhdanov was eager to discipline Tito and would have even recommended military action against him.[5] But Zhdanov died on 31 August 1948 of a heart attack. With his death, his followers among the Soviet leaders were eclipsed and ideological fervour was reduced under the guidance of the more pedestrian *apparatchik* Georgi Malenkov, Zhdanov's rival.

The Cold War took a new turn with the victory of the Chinese communists in 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. The Berlin Blockade had been a trial of strength without military escalation. The Korean War was the first hot proxy war in the long period of the Cold War. It ended in a stalemate. Nehru made his mark at that time as a mediator, particularly with regard to the crucial question of the repatriation of prisoners of war. This greatly encouraged him in projecting his influence internationally in subsequent years.

The tensions between the two superpowers gave rise to the notion of a 'Third World' which stood apart from the American-led first world and the Soviet-led second world. The term 'Tiers Monde' was introduced by the French economist Alfred Sauvy in an article published in August 1952.[6] He referred to the exploited and neglected countries of the world, comparing them to the 'third estate' at the time of the French Revolution. Initially there was no specific political message conveyed by this term. But in the course of the struggle against the remnants of colonialism, a movement for Afro-Asian solidarity provided the 'Third World' with a political agenda.

The rise and fall of Afro-Asian solidarity

India's independence was the harbinger of the global process of decolonization. Nehru was particularly interested in the liberation of Asia and as interim prime minister of India invited leaders of several countries to an Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi in March 1947, even before India's independence could be celebrated.[7] In his address to the conference, Nehru emphasized that Asia had

been a zone of peace before the European imperialists had projected their conflicts into the continent. He hoped that after their departure, peace would return to Asia. This was in tune with his conviction that anti-imperialists would never fight each other. His assessment of India's relations with China was based on this assumption. Nehru could have used the platform provided by the Asian Relations Conference to make a plea for non-alignment, but surprisingly he did not even mention it.[8] Nehru then aided the Indonesian nationalists in their struggle against the Dutch. He was also one of the first to recognize communist China in 1949 and did not object when the Chinese occupied Tibet in 1950. In 1954 he concluded a treaty on Tibet with China which specified the Himalayan passes which would be open to traders from both sides. Unfortunately, no reference was made to the delimitation of the border. Nehru assumed that the Himalayan watershed constituted a natural border on which no discussion was required. This proved to be a fatal mistake. Instead of defining the border, Nehru inserted his 'five principles' (Panchsheela) into the treaty.[9] They referred to mutual respect, non-interference with the domestic affairs of the other country, peaceful coexistence, etc. Panchsheela became a 'Nehru Doctrine' which was frequently reiterated.

With all his trust in the good relations between anti-imperialists, Nehru was nevertheless uneasy about the future intentions of the Chinese and wanted to see to it that they joined the world community and pledged their adherence to his 'Doctrine' before others. The Afro-Asian Conference hosted by Sukarno in Bandung in 1955 seemed to be a perfect forum for this purpose. Nehru arranged that the Chinese premier Zhou En-Lai was invited to this conference.[10] Nasser also attended the conference shortly after coming to power in Egypt. In general, the attendance was limited to the heads of governments of sovereign states, though there were also some leaders of anti-colonial movements. Thus there were representatives of six African nations (Egypt, Sudan, Libya, Ethiopia, Liberia, Ghana) among the 26 nations present at Bandung.

In his address to the conference, Nehru referred to the importance of the 'unaligned area' of the world and said that any attempt at reducing this area would lead to war. This statement foreshadowed Nehru's subsequent support of the Non-Aligned Movement. Among those present in Bandung there were many representatives of 'aligned' nations. In fact, there was almost an even balance between aligned and non-aligned nations, and the aligned ones were much better at coordinating their statements. General Romulo of the Philippines did a good job of getting the pro-Western states together.[11] A future parting of the ways seemed inevitable, but during the Bandung Conference open conflicts were avoided and the conference was hailed as a great success by everybody concerned. It was a beacon of hope for all those who were still engaged in their freedom struggle against colonial rulers.

As a sequel to the Bandung Conference, the First Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Conference was held in Cairo at the end of December 1957. Whereas in Bandung representatives of sovereign nations hae been predominant, the conference in Cairo emphasized 'people's representatives' and gave importance to the

leaders of African freedom movements. A permanent secretariat of this new type of conference was established in Cairo. The Afro-Asian Solidarity Movement was in fact a communist front organization. After Bandung, the communist powers had recognized that they could attract fellow-travellers by supporting this movement. Nehru had seen through this and kept aloof from the movement. Nasser was also not taken in by it, but he decided to use the movement in his own political interest.[12] China's invasion of India in October 1962 then broke the back of Asian solidarity. Subsequent conferences on the model of the Bandung Conference suffered from the articulation of Indo-Chinese tensions, the more so as India sponsored the participation in such conferences of the Soviet Union, which was strenuously opposed by China. This conflict reached its climax with the aborted conference in Algiers in 1965. It was to be hosted by the Algerian President, Ahmed Ben Bella, who built a lavish conference centre for this purpose. Unfortunately he was overthrown by Houari Boumedienne before the conference could begin. Boumedienne and his foreign minister, Abdel Aziz Bouteflika, were willing to hold the conference nevertheless, but they faced a great deal of trouble.[13] Nasser insisted on Ben Bella's freedom and wanted to grant him asylum in Egypt. The Indian delegation took the lead in asking for a postponement of the conference. Several African nations also indicated that they would abstain from attending it. Finally it was postponed for good – and this seemed to be the end of Afro-Asian solidarity.[14] But the organization lingered on and conducted more or less irrelevant conferences in subsequent years. In the meantime the Non-Aligned Movement, which had slowly come into its own after the Bandung Conference, was going strong after Afro-Asian solidarity had disintegrated.

The context of the meeting of Tito, Nehru and Nasser, July 1956

The Non-Aligned Movement owed a great deal to the charisma and vision of its three co-founders, Tito, Nehru and Nasser. They represented three countries with rather different traditions. How did it happen that their interests converged and that they met in July 1956 in order to set the agenda for the Non-Aligned Movement? Tito had been under a cloud from 1948 to 1953, while Stalin lived. He then benefited from the de-Stalinization campaign initiated by Khrushchev in the spring of 1956. 'Titoism' was no longer considered to be a dangerous heresy in the communist camp. In 1955 Khrushchev admitted that Stalin's arrogance in his dealings with Tito had precipitated the conflict between the two leaders.[15] Tito could now claim to have been in the vanguard of a new type of communism from the start. The Cominform was dissolved by the leaders in Moscow. This removed another obstacle to good relations between Tito and the Soviet leaders. However, Tito's visit to Moscow in June 1956 articulated the differences of opinion which still existed. While Khrushchev spoke of the 'monolithic unity of socialist countries' and welcomed Tito's rejoining his camp, Tito stressed that his way was different from that of the Soviet leadership. His meeting with Nehru

and Nasser in July 1956 was held at an opportune moment. Tito was now free to stress his own preferences but was also in need of 'Third World' backing so as to enhance his newly won international position. He had cultivated Asian leaders for quite some time. In 1954 he had visited India and Burma (Myanmar).[16] Inviting Nasser and Nehru to Brioni in 1956 was thus the culmination of earlier efforts.

Nehru's willingness to accept Tito's invitation was similarly based on a strong interest to demonstrate an independent position in world affairs. The visit to India by Khrushchev and Bulganin in 1955 had ushered in a phase of Indo-Soviet friendship, but Nehru wished to counterbalance this by reaffirming his non-alignment. He had kept in touch with Tito from even earlier and had followed the developments in Yugoslavia with keen interest. Nasser had his own reasons for joining Tito and Nehru. He had made an arms deal with the Czechs but he was also interested in maintaining good relations with the Americans, from whom he expected aid for his pet project, the building of the Aswan Dam to control the floods of the Nile. Being in the company of Tito and Nehru enhanced Nasser's stature and could make him a more important partner for the USA.

The meeting of the triumvirate at Tito's seaside resort on the island of Brioni was a success. They agreed to sponsor non-alignment, a concept which also looked attractive to other African and Asian leaders. At the time, the convening of a major conference following this meeting at Brioni seemed likely, but then it took five years until the Belgrade Conference met in 1961. Why did it take so long? The international context which had favoured the meeting of July 1956 changed very abruptly soon after the leaders left it. Nehru accompanied Nasser on his flight to Cairo. On this flight Nasser told Nehru about the American denial of the aid for the Aswan Dam on which he had counted. He assured Nehru that he would now concentrate on smaller projects, and Nehru thought that this was a wise decision. He had no idea that Nasser would soon nationalize the Suez Canal and thus precipitate a major crisis. Nehru nevertheless supported Nasser to the hilt during this crisis. The British prime minister, Anthony Eden, saw in Nasser a new Hitler. Eden had resigned from Chamberlain's cabinet in 1938 as a protest against the British 'appeasement' of Hitler. He did not want to 'appease' Nasser and arrived at a secret plan with his French and Israeli colleagues. Nehru, who respected Eden, did not foresee Eden's action, which shocked him and which he then condemned very strongly. In this he was in good company, because President Eisenhower also condemned it and ultimately forced Eden into resigning. The Americans had not been informed of the military action of the British and French in collusion with the Israelis. Without American intervention, Nasser would have lost the war, but as it was he could triumph as the hero of the 'anti-imperialists' and of the Arabs in particular.

While the Suez Crisis took its course there were also momentous changes in the Soviet camp. Most countries in this camp were still ruled by Stalinist leaders. Soviet attempts to get rid of them had led to upheavals which the Soviet leaders could not tolerate. Titoism appeared to be a dangerous beacon of hope for the

new forces in those countries. Initially Khrushchev had supported Tito. In a speech at the Belgrade airport in 1955 Khrushchev had apologized for the exclusion of Yugoslavia from the Soviet-led bloc. When Tito visited Moscow in June 1956, he felt further encouraged by the recognition of Yugoslavia as a 'socialist country' outside the Soviet camp. He then advocated non-alignment very openly. This was noticed in Hungary and Poland, and Khrushchev felt the need to rein them in and to curb Tito's initiatives. In September 1956 Khrushchev suddenly flew to Belgrade and urged Tito to accompany him to Moscow, where other leaders were eager to crush the rebels who were raising their heads in Poland and Hungary. Tito returned from Moscow 'unconverted' and continued his support for the 'rebels'. In October the Polish leader, Władysław Gomułka, returned to power. He had been overthrown in 1948, being accused of right-wing heresy. Khrushchev and several other Soviet leaders flew to Warsaw, trying to prevent Gomułka's return to power, but their intervention was in vain and this added to Gomułka's stature.[17] Gomułka retained the primacy of the Communist Party in Poland and thus mended his fences with the Soviet leadership. Tito, however, resisted Soviet pressure, and this encouraged the Hungarian reformers. In Hungary, the Soviet leaders had seen to it that the Stalinist Mátyás Rákosi had to abdicate, but this removed the lid from a seething cauldron. In Hungary there was a movement not just against Stalinism but against communism in general. Imre Nagy had been prime minister from 1953 to 1955 when Rákosi was still secretary general of the party. As Nagy represented the liberal wing of the party, he was more popular than Rákosi, who saw to it that he was sacked as Nagy had also lost the support of the Soviet leadership. In October 1956 Nagy was reinstated, almost at the same time that Gomułka came back into power in Warsaw. But Nagy overstepped the limits set by the Soviet leaders. This the Soviets could not tolerate. The Hungarian Stalinists then urged the Soviet Union to intervene in Hungary in October 1956.

At this crucial juncture, the Suez Crisis and the Hungarian crisis converged. The governments of Great Britain, France and Israel held a secret meeting at Sèvres on 23 October 1956 and decided to attack Egypt while the Soviet Union was tied down by the events in Hungary. On 29 October 1956 Israel occupied the Sinai peninsula, while on 30 October the Soviet Union terminated its first military intervention in Hungary. The next day, Nagy announced withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and appealed to the United Nations, the USA and Great Britain for the recognition of Hungary as an independent neutral state. The fact that in 1955 the Soviet Union had agreed that Austria would become such an independent neutral state may have encouraged Nagy to stake his claim. Khrushchev felt compelled to launch another military intervention. He asked for the support of the other communist governments and made a secret air dash to Brioni on 1 November to get Tito's support too. Tito agreed, but also offered asylum to Nagy. Soviet troops entered Budapest again on 4 November and Nagy was given sanctuary in the Yugoslav embassy. Tito was now in a very embarrassing position. If he extradited Nagy to the Soviets he lost face and appeared to be a traitor, but if he resisted, he ran the risk of a Soviet invasion of Yugoslavia.

The Soviets then seemed to solve the problem by offering Nagy safe conduct once he left the embassy. Nagy agreed, but he was betrayed. He was arrested when he left the embassy. Two years later he was sentenced to death in a secret trial.[18] The liberal wave that began with de-Stalinization had ended in disaster.

The context in which the Brioni meeting of July 1956 took place had changed with a vengeance. The hopes of Tito, Nehru and Nasser were disappointed by the events of the months which followed their meeting. Tito was now blamed for the Hungarian revolution, and his relations with the Soviet Union were worse than ever before. Nehru was attacked by the opposition in India for his handling of the Hungarian problem. India had abstained from voting on the UN resolution against the Soviet intervention. Nehru's statements on Hungary were in striking contrast to his forthright reaction to the Suez Crisis. For the first time his foreign policy was criticized at home. Nasser could claim victory but it was not his own, as it was due to the American reaction to the British-French-Israeli conspiracy. For the time being, the three non-aligned leaders had no reason to pursue any further the initiative which they had taken in July 1956. Nehru assessed the new Soviet mood correctly in a talk with the German chancellor Konrad Adenauer in December 1956. Adenauer had asked him to use his influence with the Soviet Union and the United Nations to advocate German reunification. Nehru refused to do this, telling Adenauer that the events in Hungary had made the Soviets fear that their sphere of influence would shrink and that therefore they would not favour German reunification.[19] While this mood prevailed, diplomatic initiatives on the part of the non-aligned leaders were not welcome.

Developments in Africa were also not conducive to the joint efforts of Nehru, Nasser and Tito. A great wave of decolonization had swept through Africa in 1960, giving birth to a large number of newly independent states. Kwame Nkrumah, the president of Ghana, had hoped for the emergence of a United States of Africa, but instead of thinking of unity, the African states split into two groups which disagreed with each other. The main reason for this split was the Congo Crisis, which was due to the abrupt departure of the Belgians and their underhanded efforts at fostering the secession of Katanga, coveted for its rich mines. Prime minister Patrice Lumumba, a radical nationalist, was murdered with the help of a Belgian officer. He had been a friend of Nkrumah. Lumumba's deputy prime minister, Antoine Gizenga, then headed Lumumba's supporters and was favoured by the more radical African governments. They met in Casablanca in January 1961 to counteract a group of more conservative states, whose representatives had met in Brazzaville in December 1960 and who then met again in Monrovia in May 1961. The Casablanca Group supported Gizenga in the Congo, professed socialist ideas and stressed non-alignment, whereas the Monrovia Group was pro-Western. Tito and Nasser sided with the Casablanca Group and recognized the Gizenga regime. India, on the other hand, supported the efforts of the United Nations to restore a central government in the Congo and sent a large contingent of Blue Helmets to the Congo.[20] All this overshadowed the preparations for the Belgrade Conference, to which Tito invited several non-aligned nations in 1961.

The Belgrade Conference, September 1961

Just as the Bandung Conference had been preceded by a preparatory meeting in which the question of who should be invited was discussed at great length, the Belgrade Conference also called for such preparations. Nasser hosted such a preparatory conference in Cairo in June 1961. He and Tito were eager to hold a conference of the non-aligned, but Nehru was reluctant. Nasser and Tito finally decided to go ahead without him. They issued invitations on their own but added that Nehru had endorsed their decision. This was not true, but Nehru refrained from stating this. He had to go along after all.[21] How could one enact *Hamlet* without the Prince of Denmark? However, Nasser and Tito invited only 19 states while Nehru would have included many more. Africa was underrepresented; this was due to the Casablanca Group, led by Nasser and Nkrumah, who would not admit any members of the Monrovia Group to the conference. The divisions caused by the Congo Crisis thus influenced the very beginning of the movement of the non-aligned nations.

At the Belgrade Conference in September 1961, Kwame Nkrumah and Sukarno emerged as the most forceful speakers. They mainly harped on anti-colonialism in their emotional speeches. Nehru sounded cautious and tried to tone down the strident anti-imperialism of Nkrumah and Sukarno. He was more anxious about the threat to world peace indicated by the militant posture adopted by the Soviet Union at that time. Nehru also admonished the participants that 'the non-aligned should remain non-aligned among themselves'. In any case, most of the states represented at the Belgrade Conference were in no mood to form a new bloc. Only Sukarno's insistence on the importance of the 'newly emerging forces' seemed to indicate a tendency towards creating a new bloc. Perhaps Nehru had this in mind but did not want to single out Sukarno for criticism. George Kennan, who was at that time the American ambassador in Belgrade, followed the transactions of the non-aligned nations with keen interest. It may be that his reporting from Belgrade influenced Kennedy's secretary of state, Dean Rusk, who stated in November 1961 that the non-aligned 'will take points of view in particular questions which differ from ours.… But the test is whether they are determined to be independent, whether they are trying to live out their own lives'.[22] This was a far cry from the scorn poured on non-alignment by John Foster Dulles.

There was a sense of impending disaster at the time of the conference, as Khrushchev had backed the construction of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 and was conducting nuclear tests while the conference was in session. Khrushchev had met the young American president, John Kennedy, and thought of him as a political lightweight. This had encouraged him to adopt a tough posture in confronting the West. The Soviets admonished the non-aligned nations to combat 'Western intrigues' and to take a stand on the Berlin problem so as to ward off those intrigues. Berlin was discussed at the conference, but the final resolution admonished the parties concerned not to resort to the use of force to solve the German question or the problem of Berlin. The non-aligned nations also

condemned nuclear armament and asked for a prohibition of nuclear tests. Nehru visited Moscow immediately after the conference but refused to be considered as an emissary of the members of that conference. He did, however, act in consonance with the resolution of the conference when he pleaded with Khrushchev to refrain from further nuclear tests. Other matters specifically mentioned in the conference resolution were the right of Cuba to freely choose its political system and the admission of communist China to the United Nations. Decolonization and disarmament were highlighted. There was also a demand for a United Nations Capital Development Fund. This signalled the beginning of a series of economic activities which were sponsored by the non-aligned nations in subsequent years.

Nehru was caught on the horns of a dilemma when Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia visited India after the Belgrade Conference. Kaunda gave a lecture in New Delhi in which he accused Nehru of failing to set an example for African nationalists in Goa, where he tolerated Portuguese colonial rule. Kaunda surmised that Nehru intended to wait until the Africans put an end to Portuguese rule in Angola and Mozambique, after which Goa would fall into his lap like a ripe fruit. Having once more endorsed the struggle against colonialism in Belgrade, Nehru could not disregard this admonition; in December 1961 he did liberate Goa, for which he was strongly criticized by Western nations.

The Belgrade Conference was attended by the heads of 25 states and by observers from Bolivia, Brazil and Ecuador. Cuba was the only Latin American country officially represented at the conference. There were altogether 10 Asian and 11 African states among the participants. In view of the later expansion of the membership, which totalled 102 when the non-aligned nations met once more in Belgrade in 1989, this was a modest beginning. But the atmosphere of this first conference was charged with great enthusiasm. Many further initiatives emerged from it.

The quest for a second Belgrade Conference

Tito was very proud of having hosted the Belgrade Conference. Soon after this success he asked for a second conference to be held in the near future. Initially there was no response to this wish. But in October 1963, Mrs Sirimavo Bandaranaike, the prime minister of Ceylon (Sri Lanka), visited Nasser in Cairo and they agreed on the need for the convocation of a 'Second Belgrade' to be held in 1964. Their joint announcement soon found a good response among non-aligned nations. Sukarno was at that time vigorously pursuing the plan of a Second Bandung, and those who were not in favour of that plan tried to pre-empt it by opting for a Second Belgrade.[23] Whereas the first Belgrade Conference had been attended by representatives of only 25 nations and the majority of the new African states had been conspicuous by their absence, the second one was more inclusive. A preparatory conference was held in Colombo in March 1964. Mrs Bandaranaike was eager to get ahead with this plan, the more so as Nehru had indicated that India would gladly host the Second Belgrade if other nations asked

India to do so. As Mrs Bandaranaike had set the ball rolling with Nasser in October 1963, she resented India's initiative and wished to pre-empt it. In March 1964 Nehru was already very ill, and he died in May 1964. This greatly inhibited further Indian initiatives. At the Colombo meeting it was decided to hold the second conference in Cairo in October 1964 and to invite 65 nations altogether. Among them were all 32 members of the new Organisation of African Unity (OAU) which had been established in Addis Ababa in May 1963 and had then held its second summit in Cairo in July 1964. The OAU was dominated by the 'moderates' who rejected Nkrumah's ambitious plan of a United States of Africa. It also did not stress non-alignment, since several of its members had military alliances with their erstwhile colonial rulers. Inviting all members of the OAU to the Second Belgrade Conference was therefore more of a gesture towards Afro-Asian solidarity than a move towards a clear-cut position of non-alignment. Accordingly the Second Belgrade Conference in Cairo was more successful in pre-empting a Second Bandung than in strengthening non-alignment.

Nehru was missed very much by those assembled in Cairo. His humble successor Lal Bahadur Shastri could not fill the gap which was left by Nehru's absence. Moreover, the main point that Shastri made in Cairo concerned the imminent nuclear tests that China had just announced. Shastri asked the conference to pass a resolution requesting China to desist from these tests. He did not succeed, and the tests were conducted soon after the conference had adjourned. Most of the members of the conference must have realized that China would not listen to the non-aligned in any case.

The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) as a caucus in the United Nations

Holding the Cairo conference three years after the original Belgrade Conference set the pattern for convening such conferences regularly every three years. The transactions of these conferences were less important than the activities of the non-aligned in the United Nations, where they formed an influential caucus. The OAU could be regarded as a chapter of NAM after the 'inclusive' Cairo conference. The founding of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964 owed much to the pressure exerted by NAM. Its first secretary general was the noted Argentinian economist, Raul Prebisch, who had worked on the deteriorating terms of trade for raw materials provided by the periphery of the world community to its centre. UNCTAD tried to inspire some solidarity among the countries exporting raw materials so as to improve their terms of trade. The first UNCTAD conference in Geneva in June 1964 led to the establishment of the Group of 77 countries, which issued a joint declaration at that time asking for more remunerative prices for raw materials. This group included the non-aligned nations, which also sponsored the idea of a New International Economic Order (NIEO). This new order was first proclaimed by a declaration of the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1974 after it had been articulated in 1973 in Algiers, where President Boumedienne had hosted a meeting of the Group of 77 and then a

Non-Aligned Summit. NIEO was, of course, anathema to the developed countries of the West as it implied a regulation of commodity markets. The Group of 77 attracted additional members and finally included 131 nations, although it retained its original name. The new economic orientation of the Non-Aligned Movement certainly added a very important dimension to its position in world affairs. It gave a voice to the Global South.

Following the inclusion of the members of the OAU, the Africans took a more active part in formulating the policy of NAM. Thus President Nyerere of Tanzania stressed that non-alignment did not mean non-engagement. He mentioned this in the context of reactions to the Vietnam war. Three conferences of NAM were held in Africa: Cairo, Lusaka and Algiers. The fifth NAM summit was convened in Colombo, Sri Lanka, in 1976. Then followed a rather controversial summit in Havana, Cuba, in 1979. Tito had been against holding the conference in Cuba. He had earlier backed Castro, but by this time he considered him to be too close to the Soviet Union. For the same reason the USA also tried hard to dissuade the members of NAM from accepting Castro's invitation. But all this was to no avail. The meeting was held in Havana, and Castro stated that socialism – as practised by the Soviet Union – was the natural ally of the non-aligned. India and like-minded nations rejected this proposition.

The Soviet war in Afghanistan, December 1979 to February 1989

Only a few months after the Havana summit, the Soviet Union showed very clearly that it was not an ally of the non-aligned. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a member of NAM, shocked many non-aligned nations. India was particularly affected by this invasion because it had always had good relations with Afghanistan. On the other hand it had also been friendly with the Soviet Union, having signed an Indo-Soviet Friendship Pact in 1971. Indira Gandhi then adopted a cautious formula indicating that India 'deplored' the Soviet invasion, but did not condemn it.[24]

This was not the only shock for NAM. Its next summit had been scheduled for 1982 in Baghdad, Iraq, but the outbreak of the war between Iraq and Iran prevented this meeting. Iraq had attacked Iran in 1980 and the war lasted until 1988. India then took over and hosted the seventh summit of NAM in 1983. Indira Gandhi thus signalled India's renewed interest in NAM a year before her assassination. In addressing the meeting, she recalled her father's service to the movement, but she refrained from commenting on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan or on the Iraqi invasion of Iran. The eighth NAM Summit in Harare, Zimbabwe, in 1986 was the scene of a spectacular intervention by Ghadafi of Libya, who told the assembled heads of state that they were all aligned to some power or another and that he was the only non-aligned among them. He then proclaimed that this summit was a waste of time. Robert Mugabe, who hosted the conference, took him to task for these remarks. A more positive contribution came from President Mahathir Mohamad of Malaysia, who informed the

conference of his plan to establish a South Commission whose president would be Julius Nyerere. Manmohan Singh, the future Prime Minister of India, was the secretary general of the commission, which submitted its report in 1990.[25] A South Centre was established in Geneva as a permanent think tank following up the work of the South Commission.

The Soviet war in Afghanistan proved to be a glaring example of 'imperial overstretch'. In the beginning this was a war in defence of a communist regime which had a precarious hold on the fragmented Afghan nation. The country provided an ideal setting for guerrilla warfare, which was carried on by the Taliban (originally meaning disciples of Islamic religious schools). Many of them had studied in Pakistan, where President Zia ul Haq had patronized the schools which trained them. Since the religious taxes used for the support of these schools could only be spent on individual deserving pupils and not on the schools as such, the headmasters were motivated to enlist as many students as they could recruit. Zia also decreed that the religious degree offered by these schools would be equivalent to the secular MA degree. This became a source of frustration, as the knowledge acquired by these students did not qualify them for secular employment.[26] For many of them, warfare in Afghanistan remained the only 'career' open to them. In this context, 'Taliban' came to refer to a specific terrorist organization. American aid was initially of great help to the 'Taliban'. The Afghan war was the last and most devastating proxy war of the Cold War era – and it was lost by the Soviet Union. The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in February 1989 was the first of a series of events which led to the implosion of the Soviet Union.

At the ninth NAM summit convened once more in Belgrade in the autumn of 1989, the representatives of 102 nations could note with great satisfaction that peace had been restored in Afghanistan as well as in Iraq and Iran. They did not know that this summit was to be the last one of an era in which non-alignment was a meaningful political position. After the implosion of the Soviet Union, non-alignment did not make sense any longer, but NAM lingered on for a long time.

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the implosion of the Soviet Union

In 1961 the first NAM summit had taken place shortly after the construction of the Berlin Wall; the ninth NAM summit met a few weeks before the fall of that wall. In a way, the rise and fall of the Berlin Wall marked the beginning and the end of the era of non-alignment. Those who had built the wall had claimed that it was an 'anti-fascist protection wall', when in fact it was a prison wall for the people of East Germany. The prison was guarded by a Stalinist regime which had survived Khrushchev's de-Stalinization, but would not survive Gorbachev's perestroika. Gorbachev's decision not to use the Red Army for the support of the East German regime sealed its fate. Gorbachev did not realize that he was digging his own political grave by his reformist measures. He unwittingly promoted the rise of his rival, Boris Yeltsin, who became President of Russia, banned the Communist Party and

dissolved the Soviet Union in 1991. Only about two years passed from the fall of the Berlin Wall to the end of the Soviet Union.

The non-aligned nations could only watch this dramatic process with bated breath. It took them a long time to adjust to the new situation. They had always deplored the Cold War, but it had provided them with a reliable frame of reference which had suddenly vanished. Now they had to redefine their relations with the USA as the only remaining superpower. American assertiveness was demonstrated in the Gulf War which began in 1990. Ostensibly this war was started in defence of Kuwait, which had been invaded by Iraqi troops. But it seems that the USA had not warned Iraq about their plans to intervene. During the Iraq–Iran War from 1980 to 1988, they had strongly supported Iraq. In 1990 the American ambassador had informed Saddam Hussain that the USA had 'no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflict' between Iraq and Kuwait. Some commentators felt that the Americans had thus set a trap for Saddam Hussain, whom they wanted to cut down to size. Iraq had – like India – signed a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union, but it had openly condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and confirmed its adherence to NAM, whose summit it had wanted to host in 1982. Due to the decline of Soviet power, Saddam Hussein could not hope for any help from that side in 1990. This was an opportune moment for teaching him a lesson. 'Operation Desert Storm' achieved that objective. The NAM nations watched this encounter helplessly.

NAM after the Cold War

The first NAM summit after the end of the Cold War was held in Jakarta, Indonesia, in 1992. Here its members had the unpleasant task of deleting Yugoslavia from the list of members of NAM. Tito's state started to dissolve soon after the implosion of the Soviet Union in 1991. In a painful and still ongoing process, accompanied by four wars, Yugoslavia split into seven successor states, the independence of three of which is still under dispute (Bosnia, FYROM/Macedonia, Kosovo). Meanwhile, President Suharto, who hosted the conference, tried to define a new economic task for NAM. Since the members no longer had to contend with the Cold War, they saw themselves as representatives of the Global South in its encounter with the Global North. This became the theme of subsequent NAM summits which were convened in Cartagena, Colombia, in 1995, Durban, South Africa, in 1998, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in 2001, Havana, Cuba, in 2004 and Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt, in 2009. Although having only the status of an observer, Serbia campaigned to host the next summit in Belgrade in 2011 so as to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the first summit held there in 1961. Boris Tadić, President of Serbia, showed a keen interest in this, but he was criticized in his own country for wasting Serbia's resources on hosting a conference which was not at all related to its plans for the future. Serbia wants to join the European Union, and this is hardly compatible with a revival of its adherence to NAM. It also does not belong to the Global South, whose interests are represented by the members of NAM nowadays.

IBSA and BRICS: new coalitions in the twenty-first century

The twenty-first century witnessed the emergence of new coalitions which became more important than NAM. In contrast to NAM, which aimed at the inclusion of many nations, the new coalitions are selective. They contain few nations distinguished by their political and economic importance. IBSA was the first venture of this kind. India, Brazil and South Africa held their first summit meeting in 2006 in Brazil, after the foreign ministers of the three countries had signed the Brasilia Declaration in 2003. Subsequent summits were held in South Africa in 2007, in India in 2008, in Brazil in 2010, and in South Africa in 2011. In recent years, IBSA has to some extent been eclipsed by BRICS, which had started as BRIC, including only Brazil, Russia, India and China. The idea of this coalition – and the acronym representing it – was first suggested by Jim O'Neill, an investment banker of Goldman-Sachs, New York. The destruction of the World Trade Center on 11 September 2001 made him think about the future powers that could jointly replace the USA, which had so far dominated the world. It was a unique event in world history that an idea propagated by a banker was taken up by the countries concerned, which then met in Russia in 2009 for the first BRIC summit. Subsequent summits were held in Brazil in 2010 and in China in 2011. At this third summit South Africa joined the group, which changed its name to BRICS. Being part of IBSA, South Africa had successfully lobbied the members of BRIC so as to be admitted to the new club. Jim O'Neill did not like this new development. He felt that South Africa did not play in the same league as the other four, although he admitted that the addition made sense from a purely political point of view.

The recent statement of BRICS that the next head of the International Monetary Fund should not be a European but should instead be a well-qualified person from any nation of the world shows that this new coalition is prepared to use its political clout effectively. This is also true in other spheres of great political relevance. Climate change has become an issue at many international conferences in recent years and is a matter taken up by the new coalitions which have common interests in this field. On the one hand, they resist the pressure of the industrialized countries by maintaining that they must be permitted to catch up and cannot sacrifice their economic growth; on the other hand, they realize that climate change may seriously affect their own livelihoods. The positions adopted by the new coalitions in this field are of global importance. While the Cold War made non-alignment a crucial issue in the past, climate change has emerged as the challenge of the present and the future.

Notes

1 G. Orwell, 'You and the Atom Bomb', *Tribune*, 19 October 1945.
2 Churchill repeated this in a speech in Parliament, 16 August 1945. On 5 March 1946 he repeated the term in a lecture at Westminster College, USA, in the presence of President Truman: 'From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic an iron curtain has descended across the continent'.

3 G. Kennan ('X'), 'The Sources of Soviet Conduct', *Foreign Affairs*, 25 (4), 1947, pp. 566–82.
4 G. von Rauch, *A History of the Soviet Union*, New York: Praeger, 1957, p. 392.
5 Ibid., p. 409.
6 A. Sauvy, *L'Observateur*, 14 August 1952.
7 G. H. Jansen, *Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment*, London: Faber and Faber, 1966, p. 45.
8 Ibid., p. 54.
9 Ibid., p. 131.
10 Ibid., pp. 175–6.
11 Ibid., p. 192.
12 Ibid., p. 256.
13 Ibid., p. 394.
14 G. J. Pauker, 'The Rise and Fall of Afro-Asian Solidarity', *Asian Survey* 5, 1965, pp. 425–32.
15 Von Rauch, *History of the Soviet Union*, p. 437.
16 Jansen, *Afro-Asia*, p. 235.
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18 C. Békés, M. Byrne and J. M. Rainer (eds), *The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents*, Budapest and New York: CEU Press, 2002.
19 K. Adenauer, *Erinnerungen, 1955–1959*, Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1967, p. 239.
20 Jansen, *Afro-Asia*, pp. 274–7.
21 Ibid., p. 282.
22 Ibid., p. 247.
23 Ibid., p. 363.
24 H. Kulke and D. Rothermund, *A History of India*, 5th edn, London: Routledge, 2010, p. 279.
25 South Commission, *The Challenge to the South: The report of the South Commission*, London: Oxford University Press, 1990.
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Part I

Afro-Asian solidarity

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1 International events, national policy

The 1930s in India as a formative period for non-alignment

Maria Framke

The conflicts and political crises emanating from Europe in the interwar period constituted focal points in Indian public opinion and significantly influenced debates on foreign policy, global alignments and, not least, Indian nationalism. In particular, the emergence of Fascist Italy and National Socialist Germany as influential global powers pursuing expansionist goals and the perceived weakness, or rather goodwill, of the Western powers in dealing with their aggressions caused uneasiness among Indian nationalists.

When looking into the literature on India's foreign policy of the 1930s, one often detects a single name that is given the whole or at least major responsibility and credit for having shaped the standpoints of the Indian National Congress (INC). Jawaharlal Nehru is described as the leading voice in the INC; in comparison to most of his colleagues, he took a vital interest in global developments, and he became the advisor of the INC, even its leader, in dealing with international affairs.[1] Two reasons are usually given for the conjectured indifference of the other Congress politicians: first, their exclusive focus on the struggle for independence, and second, their lack of experience in foreign policy matters.[2] Although this chapter does not deny Nehru's decisive role in shaping the INC's foreign policy, it argues that international affairs, especially the policies of Fascist countries, were widely discussed during the 1930s not only within the Congress and the Congress Socialist Party (CSP), but also in the nationalist English press.[3] Alongside Reuter's messages, the nationalist newspapers and journals regularly, even daily, published reports, editorials, articles, and letters to editors on foreign policy, which were often contributed by Indian commentators who lived in Europe or had travelled there. Second, and even more importantly, by taking up the example of the Abyssinian war, this chapter will demonstrate that the discussion about international events created a consensus among the Indian nationalist public about the absolute necessity of formulating a distinct Indian foreign policy that already contained various elements of the post-independence policy of African-Asian solidarity and non-alignment.[4] Furthermore, this chapter highlights that Indian debates analysing the policies of the Western powers and the League of Nations in this conflict led to the development of counter-drafts, which displayed different ideas of collective security.

Several authors have argued that the basis for certain elements of independent India's foreign policy was already established in the interwar period, thereby underlining again Nehru's decisive role in shaping it.[5] Kris Manjapra, for instance, establishes a connection between the League against Imperialism and the Non-Aligned Movement. He stressed that the conference of the League in 1927 served as 'an archetype for the Bandung Conference, convened three decades later in 1955'[6] and that two of the participants, namely Nehru and Mohammad Hatta, not only attended the Bandung meeting but also were 'major forces behind the Non-Aligned Movement'.[7] Furthermore, T. A. Keenleyside has examined several aspects of Indian non-alignment that originated in the decades between World War I and World War II. According to him these elements are:

> (1) alienation from the foreign policies of Western states in general; (2) an ambivalent attitude towards the main international actors, the United States and the Soviet Union; (3) opposition to all blocs and military alliances … and (4) a belief in the moral superiority of the Indian approach to international affairs.[8]

As our analysis of the Indian nationalist engagement with the Abyssinian war will show, the first and the third aspect in particular were addressed in public discussions on the subcontinent. While the continuities are rightly emphasized, these debates contained at times slight variations and different emphases from the later non-aligned foreign policy due to the particular circumstances of the period such as the existence of fascism in Europe and its aggressive expansionism.

At the outset, the chapter provides an overview of the Abyssinian war and traces early Indian reactions. Subsequently, it analyses Indian nationalist criticism of first British foreign policy and then the League of Nations' measures in the conflict, and reveals how this critique helped to formulate new ideas about India's foreign policy and collective security.

The outbreak of the Abyssinian war and perceptions of it in India: early notions of Afro-Asian solidarity

The idea of conquering Abyssinia as an Italian colony was by no means new. In 1896 Italy had tried to conquer the African state, but failed in the battle of Adua. This old, but never really abandoned, foreign policy goal came again to the fore after the Fascists took over power in Italy. However, any concrete measures were deferred by the Fascist government until Italy's relations with Great Britain and France finally improved in 1934–1935. Both Western powers seemed now willing to concede to Italy's imperialist demands.[9] Exploiting a minor military incident on the Somali–Abyssinian border in December 1934, the Italian invasion of Abyssinia began on 3 October 1935. At this time, Abyssinia was one of last independent states of Africa. Since 1930, emperor Haile Selassie I had ruled

the country as a feudal monarchy. After seven months of fierce fighting, the Fascist regime won the war by capturing Abyssinia's capital Addis Ababa.[10] Italian military operations aiming at a final 'pacification' of the African country, however, continued until Abyssinia's liberation by the British army in 1941.[11]

The Italian aggression towards Abyssinia not only caused a severe international crisis, but also challenged the League of Nations in an unprecedented manner.[12] As Italy and Abyssinia were both members states of the League and were both involved in the war, the League of Nations had to intervene according to its constitution.[13] The Italian aggression broke a series of international treaties and at the same time disregarded the League's statutes.[14] As a member of the League, the Fascist country should normally have referred a dispute with another member state to arbitration (Article 13) or to examination by the council (Article 15). By ignoring these clauses, therefore, Mussolini's regime had committed an act of war against all members of the League (Article 16).[15] Against this background the Abyssinian emperor turned time and again to the League of Nations in the following months, albeit only with meagre success.[16] Although the League of Nations declared Italy to be the aggressor, the assembled community of states did little to solve the conflict in a quick way and on behalf of Abyssinia. After the conquest of Addis Ababa, all member states of the League with the exception of the Soviet Union recognized the annexation of Abyssinia within the following two years.

The invasion in October 1935 had been preceded by months of threats and preparations on Italy's part. This long prologue to what was to become for some scholars a 'forgotten genocide', for others the 'first major war of a fascist power',[17] had already been observed and discussed in India. These early comments focused on the previous relations between the two countries as well as on the interaction and status of different religious groups and on the Indian population in Abyssinia.[18] Furthermore, Indian authors discussed the Fascist regime's motives for expansion and dwelt upon explicitly articulated as well as presumed reasons for an Italian attack on the African country, such as economic interests or revanchist claims for Adua.[19] The most important topic of Indian debates before and during the war was, however, the question of Italy's self-proclaimed civilizing mission in North Africa.[20] The debate included arguments dealing with racist notions of white peoples' superiority as well as with the issue of slavery in Abyssinia.[21] Despite the fact that slavery still existed in Abyssinia on a large scale, the country had been admitted to the League of Nations in 1923. In 1924, the Abyssinian government introduced new laws which officially abandoned slavery, but it survived illegally. The historian Richard Pankhurst has estimated that up to one-sixth of the Abyssinian population was still enslaved in the 1930s.

The issue of slavery was taken up by the Fascist government in Italy to prove the point that Abyssinia needed to be 'civilized'.[22] Although the Indian commentators did not approve of slavery, they agreed that this problem needed to be settled internally, by the Abyssinians themselves. Any intervention from the Italian side, according to the editor of the *Bombay Chronicle*,[23] would introduce a new kind of slavery in Abyssinia, i.e. the slavery of imperialism.[24]

Against the background of their own experiences with the dubious 'blessings' of the British self-proclaimed civilizing mission, most Indian commentators rejected the Fascist claim of bringing civilization to Abyssinia, critically perceiving it as an excuse for an expansionist war.[25] Another editorial of the *Bombay Chronicle* in mid-August 1935, for example, repudiated Mussolini's claim of 'people of white nationalities being justified in attacking and destroying the national right and liberties of coloured and Oriental peoples'. It stated that the Fascist argumentation '[wa]s undoubtedly a challenge to the coloured peoples of the world and it [wa]s their duty at least to let him know that that challenge has not gone unnoticed'. The editor of the *Bombay Chronicle* furthermore pointed to the unfortunate situation of India, which in its present situation could not 'do anything by way of substantial help to Abyssinia'. The only support that India as a colonized country had to offer was its 'moral condemnation of Italy and [its] unconditional sympathy for Abyssinia'.[26] Although the argumentation in the article underlined India's dependent condition and helplessness in international politics, it also revealed the first signs of a more important demand, namely to be subjects and not objects in world politics. At the same time the article demonstrated an understanding of a common bond between African and Asian people. Both themes, Afro-Asian solidarity and the desire to be respected in international politics as an equal player, became important aspects for the formulation of the non-aligned policy in the 1950s.[27]

Finally, the editorial called upon the readers of the *Bombay Chronicle* to participate in a solidarity day for Abyssinia organized by the Congress Socialist Party. It urged every Indian to take part, even the non-Congress and non-socialist ones, by pointing to their common destiny as 'coloured' people.[28] This first solidarity day was held in different Indian towns on 1 September 1935.[29] At the meeting in Bombay the participants adopted a resolution that urged Indian business people not to sell military equipment to Italy.[30] Civil society debates and activities aiming to support Abyssinia also continued after the outbreak of the war. After the foundation of an Association Against the Italo-Abyssinian War in October 1935 in Bengal,[31] further solidarity days took place.[32] Moreover, editorials and readers' letters in the nationalist press not only discussed different ways to support Abyssinia, such as economic sanctions, financial contributions and medical assistance, but also reported practical initiatives.[33]

The early debates about Fascist Italy's claim to be on a civilizing mission continued to play a role during the war in Abyssinia and became instrumental in the development of ideas about the cooperation of 'weaker' or 'coloured' nations. Thus, on the one hand, the war led to discussions about Italy's atrocities in Abyssinia.[34] One the other hand, it entailed comparisons with the dependent situation of India.[35] While claiming to bring civilization to Abyssinia, the Fascist government did not hesitate to wage a cruel war on the African country by employing immensely destructive high-tech weapons during its aerial warfare as well as poison gas against civilians and humanitarian organizations.[36] Thus Italy's bombardment of several Red Cross Units received broad attention in India, and was addressed in a cartoon of January 1936 in the *Bombay Chronicle* (see Figure 1.1).



Figure 1.1 Cartoon by Radha, 'But 'tis a godlike work to civilise!' (source: *Bombay Chronicle*, 9 January 1936, p. 1).

The cartoon shows Mussolini as representative of the Italian army during an aerial attack on the Red Cross and the civilian population in Abyssinia.[37] The title of the cartoon, 'But 'tis a godlike work to civilise!', illustrated the hypocrisy of the Fascist regime that claimed to bring civilization to Abyssinia while contravening in an inhuman way all established international conventions. These contradictions between Italy's official claims and its real acts furthered strong feelings of solidarity with the victims of fascism, although one can also find Indian voices that opted for a neutral stance on India's part and held the opinion that their country should concentrate on its own problems first.[38]

Indian critique of British foreign policy

While wide sections of public opinion in India denounced the Italian aggression in Abyssinia and saw the Fascist country as responsible for the war, there were also many voices blaming Great Britain and its imperialist policy for the conflict.[39] By including Great Britain and thus the existing alternative models of European politics, these commentators placed the debates about fascism in a comparative perspective. Thus their engagement with fascism occurred often in a rather indirect way, since pertinent discussions included the themes of Britain's foreign policy and India's colonial situation. However, by linking the Abyssinian war, fascism and British imperialism, Indian authors, politicians and intellectuals began to formulate new arguments against imperialism in India and worldwide.

Jawaharlal Nehru, for instance, who had analysed the phenomenon of fascism since the mid-1920s and had thereby become an anti-fascist, pointed to that link during a press interview in early May 1936, after Italy had conquered the Abyssinian capital:

> I repudiate utterly the suggestion that imperialism has gone to Abyssinia, or come to India, for humanitarian motives or the spread of civilization. Imperialism goes to exploit and remains to exploit and the people under its heel sink materially and spiritually. Its true messengers in Abyssinia have been poison gas and liquid fire and they reveal its nature more than any argument. That is the foretaste of the civilization that it brings, and we in India, who suffer humiliation enough in our land, cannot permit the additional spiritual degradation of remaining silent when imperialism spreads its cruel wings and crushes other people.[40]

Nehru dismissed in this interview any ideas about civilizing missions and also equated the Fascist actions in Abyssinia with the imperialism of Great Britain in India. This argument became a leading motif in many resolutions of the INC and the CSP on foreign policy until the outbreak of World War II.[41] It was shared by Indian commentators in the press, who not only often described the Italian aggression as imperialist but also pointed repeatedly to the similarities in the Indian and Abyssinian experiences.[42] Thus, calling for Indian support for the

African country and bringing again to the fore the idea of Afro-Indian solidarity, the *Amrita Bazar Patrika* wrote in May 1936:

> Indians have had a bitter experience of the effects of western Imperialism. They have realised what it is to lose national freedom.… There is, therefore, a bond of sympathy between them and the unfortunate people of Abyssinia which is probably not witnessed in any other part of the world.[43]

Interestingly, the daily substantiated its plea for help by pointing to the common experiences with imperialism that India and Abyssinia shared.

Indian nationalist debates did not stop at comparing the imperialism of Fascist Italy and Great Britain. Indian sympathizers of the Fascist regime as well as its critics often attributed major responsibility to London for the attack on Abyssinia and for the outcome of the conflict, which ended officially with the Italian conquest of Addis Ababa in May 1936.[44] Two lines of argument can be identified in the Indian nationalist press. On the one hand, Indian commentators held the view that despite its rivalry with Italy, Great Britain would not take any action against the Fascist state because imperialist powers would always secure peace among themselves so as to perpetuate their colonial rule.[45] On the other hand, there were Indians who pointed to the existing rivalry between Italy and Great Britain in the Mediterranean, North African and Middle Eastern region and assumed that London's 'missing support' for Abyssinia originated from its own interests in the African country.[46] The well-known Indian 'expatriate patriot' Taraknath Das, for instance, characterized British politicians as hypocritical in the nationalist daily *Forward*. He argued that more than once Great Britain had approved Italian supremacy in Abyssinia in exchange for Italian support of its own international politics.[47] Das, who did not criticize Italy at all in this article, wrote in addition:

> The wrath of British statesmen against Italy and Signor Mussolini is unbounded at the present time, because Italy has stolen a march over the British in taking effective steps towards annexing Abyssinia, which the British themselves wished to do by their characteristic method of slow and careful penetration.[48]

British imperialist methods, not the expansionism of Fascist Italy, thus became for some authors the main focal point.

The critique of London's foreign policy towards Fascist ambitions was also expressed in a number of cartoons. One of them, entitled 'The Last Offering', was published in the *National Call* in March 1938, almost two years after the conquest of Addis Ababa (see Figure 1.2). It deals with the British betrayal of the system of collective security.[49]

In the cartoon one can see Mussolini depicted as a bloodthirsty deity[50] beheading his victims with the *fascis* (the symbol of fascism, the Roman axe that is attached to a bundle of wooden rods). Around his neck the deity is wearing a

Figure 1.2 Cartoon by B. Verma, 'The Last Offering' (source: *The National Call*, 2 March 1938, not paginated).

chain of skulls, and among them one can identify the head of Haile Selassie, the Abyssinian emperor. The British Prime minister Neville Chamberlain, dressed in an Indian Dhoti, bows to Mussolini and offers Great Britain to him as the last sacrifice. Both the American President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the French President Camille Chautemps watch the scene without intervening. On the floor one sees two more beheaded victims of the deity, which are Spain and China. Although China was not the victim of Fascist Italy but rather of Japan, it received a prominent place in the cartoon. This choice seems to be connected to the aim of the cartoonist to primarily criticize Great Britain's willingness to sacrifice the sovereignty of other states, and not Mussolini and his ambitions.

Disappointment with British foreign policy and the responsibility assigned to it also brought forward a consensus among nationalists that the formulation of a distinct Indian foreign policy was absolutely necessary. The INC took up the

initiative to formulate an independent Indian foreign policy.[51] During the annual meeting of the Congress in April 1936 in Lucknow, the INC decided to set up a Foreign Department 'with a view to create and maintain contacts with Indians overseas, and with international, national, labour and other organisations abroad with whom cooperation is possible and is likely to help in the cause of Indian freedom'.[52] Only two months later, the Foreign Department began to circulate a newsletter which reported regularly and in detail about international developments and publicized the official views of the INC in foreign policy matters.[53] The critical approach towards Britain's line of action during the Abyssinian war, and the consequently felt necessity to develop independent views, therefore not only led to an early institutionalization of Indian foreign policy but also resembled later strategies of non-alignment such as an alienation from the politics of the Western powers.

The League of Nations and alternative ideas of collective security

The Abyssinian war not only prompted recurrent criticism of British foreign policy in Indian nationalist debates, but also led to a permanent re-evaluation of the League of Nations and its system of collective security. The relations between the League of Nations and nationalist Indians had been complicated almost from the start, leading to a widespread distrust in India of the League's political aims.[54] During the Abyssinian war, Indian commentators in nationalist newspapers carefully watched the League's measures and became highly critical over the course of time.[55] In addition to their critique of potential concessions from the League of Nations to Italy, Indian commentators denounced the long response time from Geneva after the outbreak of the war.[56]

In the months that followed, Indian authors discussed time and again the question of why the League of Nations had failed to achieve its main purpose, namely to secure peace. They put forth three important motives. First, they invoked 'white, western' imperialism towards colonial dependent nations in Africa and Asia in general.[57] Second, Indian authors argued that competition among the Western powers and in particular between the geo-strategic interests of Great Britain and France was responsible for the failure of the League of Nations to secure peace. Since Western countries wanted to preserve their own territories and spheres of influence, they at times had to make concessions to imperialist competitors at the expense of weaker nations.[58] Third, Indian commentators held the view that the failure of the League of Nations was based on the provisions of the Paris Peace Treaties of 1919–1920. They believed that these treaties, which regulated the international order after World War I, rested on injustice from the outset.[59] Although the majority of commentators sympathized with Abyssinia in 1935–1936, their argumentation indirectly exculpated the ambitions of Fascist Italy, since their critique was directed most notably against the system of collective security created by Great Britain, France and the United States after World War I.

The increasing disillusion with the politics of the League of Nations is particularly visible in the writings of Jawaharlal Nehru. In a letter to the British politician Lord Lothian in January 1936, Nehru conceded that the League represented 'a vague and widespread sentiment in favour of world order and peace'.[60] However, at the same time he described it as an instrument 'of certain great powers who have no intention of giving up their privileged positions or their absolute sovereignty and who endeavour to utilise the League to make the world safe for themselves'.[61] Hence the League was, in Nehru's opinion, first and foremost a tool of the imperialist powers for maintaining the international status quo. Nehru's discontent with the Genevan body grew during the Abyssinian war. After becoming the president of the Indian National Congress, he denounced the policy of the League of Nations during a day of solidarity for Abyssinia that took place in May 1936 by saying:

> Anything more extraordinary than the weakness and helplessness of the League in the face of aggression by one of its members over another it would be hard to find.… The League may continue, as the dying continues for long, but no one can consider it as a means for enforcing collective security. The last effort of our present-day capitalist world to build up some kind of a world order and check has failed.[62]

Nehru did not expect any help for Abyssinia from the League, the former bearer of hope for peace and rapprochement. The League and its concept of collective security had failed, in his understanding. Therefore, in the view of Nehru and also of other Indian commentators, the Abyssinian war did not mark the beginning of the failure of the League but rather constituted the climax or endpoint in a series of events that had been perceived similarly in Indian debates. These events comprised the Japanese occupation of Manchuria, the policy of the League towards the Arab population in Palestine, the general armaments race, and Germany's withdrawal from the League of Nations.[63]

After the conquest of Addis Ababa in May 1936, the League lost all its remaining credibility and seemed to give no further hope for peace and international understanding. For many Indians who took part in the public debates, including the well-known economic professor K. T. Shah, and especially for such politicians as Jawaharlal Nehru, Khurshed Framji Nariman, and Subhas Chandra Bose, the idea of collective security that the League had stood for had failed.[64] Although for a few months the work of the League was marked by collective action such as implementation of sanctions against Italy,[65] their ineffectiveness and the League's silence in regard to the German occupation of the Rhineland in February 1936 contributed to the feeling that Geneva was not prepared to defend the status quo. It became evident that against the background of the individual interests of the nation-states, the League's system of collective security had served its time. Therefore the INC as well as the CSP denounced the policy of the League in various official party resolutions.[66]

Disappointment with the League of Nations' policies also found expression in debates about India's status in the League. Various authors pointed to nationalist India's helplessness in raising its voice in Geneva, thereby claiming that the current representatives in fact represented British opinion.[67] Thus as an important step en route to a self-determined foreign policy which would leave room for new cooperation initiatives and not be subject to imperialist British interests, India's withdrawal from the League of Nations was demanded.[68] Besides, disappointment with Great Britain and, more importantly, with the League led to the conviction that there should be a counter-network coordinating and expressing the interests of colonized countries, thus preparing the way for non-alignment. The Indian nationalist press and also politicians of the Congress and the CSP brought forward and discussed various alternative concepts of collective security, hoping that they could bring about a real cooperation between oppressed nations. The editors of the *Amrita Bazar Patrika* suggested in two articles that India should become the member of a 'League of oppressed Nations'.[69] By pointing to India's weak and dependent position, they declared in early May 1936:

> The fate of Abyssinia, however painful, is not without its lessons for those subject races who are at present groaning under Imperialist domination. To count on a change of heart in those who thrive on the exploitation of weaker peoples is worse than useless. It is madness to expect that they will let go their victims in a fit of repentance or compassion. To preach pacifism is only to strengthen the unscrupulous and the strong. Salvation, therefore, can come to the weaker races when they have not only developed the indomitable will to overcome all opposition, but joined hands with one another in forming a League of oppressed Nations bent on throwing off the Imperialist yoke.[70]

In the opinions of the editors, the betrayal of Abyssinia by the League of Nations made a new orientation of Indian interests inevitable. Cooperation with other dependant or weaker nations seemed indispensable in the spring of 1936.

The idea of collective security had not lost all its credibility among various politicians of the INC and the CSP. Indeed, there were, besides Subhas Chandra Bose, other politicians who doubted the value of international cooperation after the experiences of the Abyssinian war.[71] However, far more often the speeches and articles of INC politicians and the newsletter of the Foreign Department contained demands for a system of collective security, based upon freedom and equality, that would fight against imperialist interests.[72] The emphasis placed on the fight against imperialism often implied that the specific ideas had a rather exclusive character aimed primarily at colonial countries. The Bombay mayor and Congress politician Khurshed F. Nariman suggested as an alternative to the League of Nations the creation of a 'League of Asiatic and African coloured Nations' with the foremost task of building 'a United Coloured Front against Western Imperialist aggression'.[73] Likewise the Congress Socialists emphatically

favoured any cooperation of colonial countries. To publicize their criticism of the League of Nations and to mobilize their fellow Indians, the CSP organized an Anti-League Day that was supported by the nationalist press. The protest day took place in different Indian cities on 15 July 1936.[74] Thereafter, the participants of the Allahabad meeting adopted a resolution that not only deplored the inability of the League of Nations to provide for equity and peace for the colonial countries but also called upon colonized people to fight together with members of the working class for freedom and peace.[75]

Conclusion

After the official end of the Abyssinian war in May 1936, the second half of the 1930s continued to be marked by conflicts, aggressions, and the Western policy of appeasement.[76] Large numbers of the nationalist public in India followed international developments and continued to debate European foreign policies and Indian responses to them.[77] In these debates, they applied various ideas that had emerged in the broad discussions during the Abyssinian war.

The Indian nationalist engagement with this war, both from the INC/CSP and from the media, proved to be crucial for the development of a distinct Indian foreign policy and for an early institutionalization of certain elements characteristic of the Non-Aligned Movement. Such initiatives as the foundation of the Foreign Department of the INC, as well as the debates and cartoons in the nationalist press dealing with British responsibility for Fascist expansionism, have to be understood as expressions of an ever-increasing alienation from the foreign policy of Western states in the later 1930s, especially from that of Great Britain. Similarly, disappointment in the policy of the League of Nations and especially in its concept of collective security resulted in a deep-seated distrust of blocs and alliances pre-eminently based on power and not on equality. At the same time, however, the League's manoeuvring during the Abyssinian war contributed to the belief among Indian nationalists that the creation of an alternative network of collective security representing the interest of colonial countries and based on an Afro-Asian solidarity was inevitable. The establishment of such networks in later years which, for instance, became manifest in the Non-Alignment Movement in the 1950s was facilitated by existing global links between anti-colonial movements and, to a minor degree, with progressive Western politicians and intellectuals. Not only the League against Imperialism but also the creation of such institutions as the Foreign Department of the INC, which stayed in touch and exchanged information with cultural, peace, anti-imperialist, women's, labour and youth organizations, civil liberties unions and 'negro organizations', have to be understood as early role models and important preconditions.[78] Indian debates addressing ideas of anti-colonial solidarity and concepts of alternative collective security, as well as the engagement with international politics in the interwar period, thus exerted an influence on ideas of non-alignment that continued to last after India's independence in 1947.

Notes

1 D. Weidemann, 'Jawaharlal Nehru und der Machtantritt der Nationalsozialisten in Deutschland (1933–1935)', *asien afrika lateinamerika* 30 (5), 2002, pp. 389f.; B. Zachariah, *Nehru*, London and New York: Routledge, 2004, p. 155; B. Prasad, *The Origins of Indian Foreign Policy*, Calcutta: Bookland Private Limited, 1960, pp. 1 and 253.

2 Ibid., p. 389; J. M. Brown, *Nehru: A Political Life*, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2003, p. 244.

3 The Indian media landscape during the first decades of the twentieth century can be divided into three broad categories: in the English-language media, either (1) in British or (2) in Indian possession, and (3) in Indian-language newspapers and journals. While the English-language dailies and journals in British possession mainly supported the politics of British colonial rule, the media belonging to the other two categories often took a nationalist view and were close to the independence movement or were published by Congress politicians; N.-C. Schneider, *Zur Darstellung von 'Kultur' und 'kultureller Differenz' im indischen Mediensystem: Die indische Presse und die Repräsentation des Islams im Rahmen der Zivilrechtsdebatte, 1985–87 und 2003*, Berlin: Logos Verlag, 2005, pp. 89f.

4 Discussions in regard to the international scene gave rise to various concepts and ideas about future Indian foreign policy that did not necessarily precede elements of the post-1947 politics. Commentators suggested, for instance, a highly pragmatic stance in forming alliances with any helpful power, regardless of their ideological attitudes, in order to reach certain goals such as India's independence. Others demanded a concentration on India's problems first and asked their fellow countrymen to stay out of international politics; M. Framke, *Delhi – Rom – Berlin: Die indische Wahrnehmung von Faschismus und Nationalsozialismus, 1922–1939*, Darmstadt: WBG, 2013, pp. 237–301.

5 In this regard, Bipan Chandra, Mridula Mukherjee and Aditya Mukherjee reason that

> India's efforts to pursue an independent foreign policy was a highlight of post-1947 politics. A product of its long history and recent past, this policy was marked by a great deal of consistency and continuity. Despite revolutionary changes in the international situation, the broad parameters which were evolved during the freedom struggle and in the early years of independence still retain their validity. Jawaharlal Nehru stands as the architect of this not mean achievement.

B. Chandra, M. Mukherjee and A. Mukherjee, *India After Independence, 1947–2000*, New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2002, p. 149.

6 K. Manjapra, 'Communist Internationalism and Transcolonial Recognition', in S. Bose and K. Manjapra (eds), *Cosmopolitan Thought Zones: South Asia and the Global Circulation of Ideas*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, p. 168.

7 Ibid. Jürgen Dinkel argues in a similar way by analysing anti-colonial conferences and the League against Imperialism in the interwar period. He stresses the increase of networks of anti-colonial movements and their intensified global exchange, and concludes that the transnational solidarity envisaged in the League against Imperialism evolved, for many anti-colonial movements and newly decolonized governments in Africa and Asia, into a model for a possible solidarity organization emerging under completely changed international circumstances; J. Dinkel, 'Globalisierung des Widerstands: Antikoloniale Konferenzen und die "Liga gegen Imperialismus und für nationale Unabhängigkeit" 1927–1937', in S. Kunkel and C. Meyer (eds), *Aufbruch ins postkoloniale Zeitalter: Globalisierung und die aussereuropäische Welt in the 1920er und 1930er Jahren*, Frankfurt and New York: Campus Verlag, 2012, pp. 209–30.

8 T. A. Keenleyside, 'Prelude to Power: The Meaning of Non-Alignment before Indian Independence', *Pacific Affairs* 53 (3), 1980, p. 463.
9 B. Mantelli, *Kurze Geschichte des italienischen Faschismus*, Berlin: Verlag Klaus Wagenbach, 2004, pp. 105–7; A. A. Kallis, *Fascist Ideology: Territory and Expanisonism in Italy and Germany, 1922–1945*, London and New York: Routledge, 2000, p. 125; R. Pankhurst, *The Ethiopians: A History*, Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2001, pp. 188ff.
10 Mantelli, *Kurze Geschichte*, pp. 107–9; Pankhurst, *The Ethiopians*, pp. 223f. For a periodization of the Abyssinian war, see A. Mattioli, 'Ein vergessenes Schlüsselereignis der Weltkriegsepoche', in A.-W. Asserate and A. Mattioli (eds), *Der erste faschistische Vernichtungskrieg: Die italienische Aggression gegen Äthiopien 1935–1941*, Cologne: SH-Verlag, 2006, p. 9; M. Thöndl, 'Der Abessinienkrieg und das totalitäre Potential des Faschismus in Italienisch-Ostafrika (1935–1941)', *Quellen und Forschungen aus italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken* 87, 2007, 408f.
11 G. Brogini Künzi, *Italien und der Abessinienkrieg 1935/36: Kolonialkrieg oder Totaler Krieg?* Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2006, pp. 17f.
12 A. Mattioli, 'Das Versagen der Weltgemeinschaft', in A.-W. Asserate and A. Mattioli (eds), *Der erste faschistische Vernichtungskrieg: Die italienische Aggression gegen Äthiopien 1935–1941*, Cologne: SH-Verlag, 2006, p. 109.
13 F. Knipping (ed.), *Das System der Vereinten Nationen und seine Vorläufer*, vol. 2, Munich: C. H. Beck, 1996, p. 409.
14 Ibid., pp. 409ff.; A. Del Boca, 'Yperit-Regen: Der Giftgaskrieg', in A.-W. Asserate and A. Mattioli (eds), *Der erste faschistische Vernichtungskrieg: Die italienische Aggression gegen Äthiopien 1935–1941*, Cologne: SH-Verlag, 2006, p. 45.
15 Knipping, *Das System*, pp. 413–15.
16 Mattioli, 'Das Versagen', pp. 111f.
17 A. Mattioli, 'Der Abessinienkrieg in internationaler Perspektive', in G. Steinacher (ed.), *Zwischen Duce und Negus: Südtirol und der Abessinienkrieg 1935–1941*, Bolzano: Verlagsanstalt Athesia, 2006, pp. 257ff.; A. Mattioli, 'Entgrenzte Kriegsgewalt: Der italienische Giftgaseinsatz in Abessinien 1935–1936', *Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 51 (3) 2003, p. 312.
18 'Adowa: How Abyssinians Defeated Italy Forty Years Ago', *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, 15 September 1935, p. 17; A. C. Bose, 'Italo-Abyssinian Conflict', *Modern Review*, 58 (2), 1935, pp. 325–30; Kamaladevi, 'Italo-Abyssinian Tangle', *Congress Socialist*, 10 March 1935, pp. 7–8; From Our Own Correspondent, 'Our London Letter', *Bombay Chronicle*, 9 September 1935, p. 11.
19 For the motives of the Fascist regime, see Brogini Künzi, *Italien*, pp. 164ff.; Del Boca, 'Yperit-Regen', pp. 46f.; H. Larebo, 'Empire Building and its Limitations: Ethiopia (1935–1941)', in R. Ben-Ghiat and M. Fuller (eds), *Italian Colonialism*, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008, pp. 86f.; M. Dominioni, *Lo sfascio dell'impero: Gli italiani in Etiopia 1936–1941*, Rome and Bari: Laterza, 2008, pp. 7–10.
20 B. D. Chaturdevi, 'War Between Italy and Abyssinia: How it will Affect Indians', *The Leader*, 5 August 1935, p. 8; A. L. Simha, 'The Problem of Abyssinia', *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, 28 July 1935, p. 16; Editorial, 'Abyssinia and India', *Bombay Chronicle*, 13 August 1935, p. 6. In regard to the theme of the 'civilizing mission', see J. Osterhammel, *Europe, the 'West' and the Civilizing Mission*, London: German Historical Institute, 2006.
21 'Muslims in Abyssinia: Their Present Position', *Bombay Chronicle*, 22 July 1935, p. 10; 'Italy and Musalmans', *Bombay Chronicle*, 22 July 1935, p. 6. See also Brogini Künzi, *Italien*, pp. 164ff.; A. Iadarola, 'Ethiopia's Admission into the League of Nations: An Assessment of Motives', *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 8 (4), 1975, pp. 601–22.
22 The question of the abolition of slavery became a crucial marker of civilization in the first decades of the twentieth century in international debates: S. Elmer and C. Whyte,

'For Civilisation's Sake! Abolition in Nepal and Sierra Leone', in D. Hamilton, K. Hodgson and J. Quirk (eds), *Slavery, Memory and Identity: National Representations and Global Legacies*, London: Pickering & Chatto Ltd, 2012, pp. 45–62.

23 The *Bombay Chronicle* was founded by Pherozeshah Metha in Bombay in 1907 with the aim of popularizing the moderate nationalist ideas of both the Western-educated economic circles and the intelligentsia. Under the editorship of B. G. Horniman, who actively promoted Indian independence, the newspaper spread radical modernist views throughout the course of World War I and wielded a wide influence among public opinion in Bombay. Until 1930 the editors tried to balance the views of different sections within the Indian National Congress with the regional interests in Maharashtra. During this time the *Bombay Chronicle* became one of the most important English-language nationalist newspaper in Bombay Province, with a circulation of more than 10,000 copies in the mid-1920s. Under the editorship (1923–1949) of S. A. Brevli, who felt committed to Hindu–Muslim unity and socialist ideas, the *Bombay Chronicle* became a strong supporter of the Indian National Congress, albeit often with its own views. M. Israel, *Communications and Power: Propaganda and the Press in the Indian Nationalist Struggle, 1920–1947*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, pp. 216–45.

24 Editorial, 'Italy and Musalmans', *Bombay Chronicle*, 22 July 1935, p. 6.

25 In regard to the British 'civilizing mission' in India, see M. Mann, ' "Torchbearers Upon the Path of Progress": Britain's Ideology of a "Moral and Material Progress" in India, An Introductory Essay', in H. Fischer-Tiné and M. Mann (eds), *Colonialism as Civilizing Mission: Cultural Ideology in British India*, London: Anthem Press, 2004, pp. 1–26.

26 Editorial, 'Abyssinia and India', p. 6.

27 D. Rothermund, *Delhi, 15. August 1947: Das Ende kolonialer Herrschaft*, Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1998, p. 183.

28 Editorial, 'Abyssinia and India', p. 6.

29 'An Abyssinia Day', *Bombay Chronicle*, 31 July 1935, p. 8; Editorial, 'India and Abyssinia', *Bombay Chronicle*, 24 August 1935, p. 6.

30 'Abyssinia's Superhuman Task', *Bombay Chronicle*, 2 September 1935, p. 1.

31 Indo-GDR Friendship Society (ed.), *Anti-fascist Traditions of Bengal*, Calcutta: Indo-GDR Friendship Society, 1969, p. 31. The Association against Italo-Abyssinian War was founded during a protest meeting against the Italian aggression which took place in Calcutta on 27 October 1935. More than 60 different political organizations and unions participated in the meeting, among others the Congress Socialist Party Bengal, the Bengal Provincial Trade Union Congress, the Labour Party of Bengal and the Muslim Youth Council.

32 Editorial, 'Abyssinia Day', *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, 9 May 1936, p. 8; Editorial, 'India's Duty to Ethiopia', *Bombay Chronicle*, 6 May 1936, p. 6. Moreover, the Indian nationalist dailies reported on further solidarity meetings organized for example in Calcutta and Bombay in October 1935 (G. C. Majumdar, 'India & Abyssinian War', *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, 24 October 1935, p. 15; 'India's Sympathy with Abyssinia', *Bombay Chronicle*, 11 October 1935, p. 1).

33 Editorial, 'Wanted: Abyssinia Fund', *Bombay Chronicle*, 12 October 1935, p. 6; M. Karsondas, 'Reader's Letter: Italy's Aggression on Abyssinia', *Bombay Chronicle*, 24 August 1935, p. 8; B. Mehta, 'Threat to Abyssinia's Independence', *Bombay Chronicle*, 29 August 1935, p. 8; Framke, *Delhi*, pp. 249–57 and 274–7. Expressions of solidarity and initiatives to support Abyssinia were not confined to India, but were offered by different national and international organizations. On the Afro-American and African initiatives see: A. Sbacchi, *Legacy of Bitterness: Ethiopia and Fascist Italy, 1935–1941*, Lawrenceville NJ: The Red Sea Press, Inc., 1977, pp. 14ff.

34 Framke, *Delhi*, pp. 254–7.

35 Ibid., pp. 247–54.

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2 ‘The Asiatic hour’[1]

New perspectives on the Asian Relations Conference, New Delhi, 1947

Carolien Stolte

Convening Asia

> I bid you, whatever your creed, whatever your faith, whatever your tongue, remember that there is no birth, there is no death; we move onward, higher and higher, till we attain the stars. Who can hamper our ascent? Who will bid us and say, ‘halt, thus far and no further’? The birds have said: ‘Why do you cry for the moon?’ We do not cry for the moon. We pluck it from the skies and wear it upon the diadem of Asia’s freedom.[2]

On 23 March 1947, over 10,000 people streamed into the Purana Qila (Old Fort) of New Delhi. All had come to stand, in the words of Jawaharlal Nehru, ‘at the end of an era and on the threshold of a new period in history’.[3] Among them were over 200 delegates representing 28 Asian countries.[4] Getting them together had been a Herculean feat. Some delegates had travelled for over three weeks to reach New Delhi, using every means of transport known to man. A few had not made it on time; delegates from Korea and Outer Mongolia arrived several days into the proceedings, whereas the delegates from Kirghizia and Turkmenistan did not arrive until a day after the conference had ended. Moreover, New Delhi was ill-equipped to house such distinguished guests given the lack of passable hotels at that time; the wives of the organizing committee stepped in and housed delegates in their own homes. Even more extraordinarily, several delegates were put up in the houses that the Princely states kept in Delhi. Sarojini Naidu, the well-known and well-respected chairperson of the conference who spoke the words quoted above, had personally cajoled the local representatives of the maharajas of Baroda, Patiala and Jaipur into offering not only their properties, but also cars, drivers and petroleum.[5] Funds for the conference were raised largely by public subscription, and the Birlas, the Tatas and other well-known business houses also contributed. Perhaps these were the details that led Indian diplomat-turned-journalist G. H. Jansen to characterize the conference atmosphere as one of ‘innocent enthusiasm’.[6]

All this meant that India – still four-and-a-half months shy of attaining independence – was performed on the Asian stage by an unlikely group of actors: the patchwork of princely states, the sharply divided Indian National Congress, and

a diverse group of internationalist activists from across the political spectrum. They had united in a collective effort to showcase India as an important player in its regional environment, though the play was staged for India itself as much as for the rest of Asia. Still remembered today for its show of unity towards both those audiences, this performance was to be the conference's lasting achievement.[7]

But behind the scenes, all was not well. Nehru had wanted the conference to be an official gathering under the auspices of the Provisional Government. Liaquat Ali Khan, who held the Finance portfolio of the new cabinet, refused support and is said to have claimed that the conference was only meant for Nehru's 'personal glory'.[8] And while this ensured that the conference was not held on behalf of the Provisional Government, the Muslim League nonetheless boycotted the gathering as 'a thinly disguised attempt on the part of the Hindu Congress to boost itself politically as the prospective leader of Asiatic peoples'.[9] Again, Liaquat Ali Khan was the official government representative at the Muslim League meeting that decided upon the boycott. *Dawn*, a Muslim daily newspaper published from Delhi and Karachi, called upon Muslim Asia to see through India's 'imperialist designs'.[10] However, the most direct threat to the conference, at least initially, was the eruption of pre-Partition riots in Delhi. These threatened to (and some months later did) envelop the Purana Qila area, where workers of various religious and ethnic backgrounds were working on the venue. A further result of the riots was that the conference participants had to brave a curfew and a police cordon in order to attend. It is a testament to the Asianist enthusiasm among the public that 10,000 people attended the conference in spite of these concerns.

The conference had been called to assess the position of Asia in the postwar world, to exchange ideas on problems common to all Asian countries, and to study ways and means of promoting closer contacts between them.[11] To that end, 'Asia' was defined in its broadest possible sense: Egypt was welcome as a Middle Eastern country, and the Central Asian Soviet republics and US-occupied Japan were invited.[12] The conference was organized by the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA), a body which had been set up only three years earlier as a non-political, non-official institute for the study of international affairs. *Prima facie*, this meant that the Asian Relations Conference too would be a non-official gathering, composed of delegates from academic, cultural and other organizations, and many of the papers and speeches presented did indeed reflect this. This meant that Tibet, despite protestations from China, was also invited as a separate delegation.[13]

However, three things detracted from the Asian Relations Conference's credibility as a non-political conference. First, the non-political identity of the ICWA itself was questionable. The idea for the institute had been conceived at a wartime Pacific Relations Conference in Canada, which brought home the importance of having India represented at such key international events.[14] And although the Council's governing board was constitutionally required to 'be representative of the principal groups and interests in the country', the same constitution offered a loophole: 'to enable the Council to build up a reputation as an authoritative body … the Council would be glad to have officials among its

members … the knowledge and experience of many officials would be a great asset to the Council'.[15]

Second, the Asian Relations Conference was largely the brainchild of soon-to-be Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, and partly the fruit of his (and other Indian anti-imperialists') long efforts towards Asian cooperation, which had begun in earnest in the early 1920s. The conference was in part a reflection of their network, which included activists and anti-imperialists from all corners of Asia. The ICWA had left the door open for political participation despite its non-political exterior; every delegation was free to include 'government observers' – and the list of participants included 39 with such a status.[16]

Finally, with several Asian nations on the brink of independence and the widespread sense that decolonization was just around the corner, the conference adopted a forceful anti-imperialist stance. Despite incessant affirmations of the ancient bonds between Asian lands that had existed in pre-colonial times, the shared experience of European domination and the struggle for independence was the real common denominator at the Asian Relations Conference. Professions of anti-colonial solidarity dominated the conference proceedings. This was reinforced by uncertainty about the role of the decolonizing world in the newly established United Nations and about the first signs of new forms of domination in Asia, made evident by the US and Soviet occupations of Korea. Thus, despite the academic front presented by the ICWA, the Asian Relations Conference was not a non-political conference.

This chapter argues that the Asian Relations Conference should not be viewed exclusively as a post-war or early Cold War conference. There were strong continuities with the Asianist and anti-imperialist movements of the interwar period in terms of the participants and of the content of discussion. This chapter will consider the precedents of three of the five major conference themes by examining their roots in interwar Asianist initiatives. While the post-war world did have an impact on the discussions and the way in which they were interpreted by observers and the attending press, the rhetoric and thematic content of the discussion were much the same as in the interwar years. To treat the Asian Relations Conference as a post-war conference is chronologically correct, but historically false.

Reconsidering Cold War trajectories

Concrete plans for the Asian Relations Conference had materialized in the latter half of 1945 after the founding of the United Nations at San Francisco and subsequent fears that the United Nations trusteeships would prove similar to the mandate system of the League of Nations. Nehru advocated a Federation of Asian States, should the United Nations be ineffective. The Asian Relations Conference was to be the prelude to such Asian cooperation, but it was also a product of it: the idea to hold the Asian Relations Conference had arisen from a meeting of the Asian delegates to San Francisco. Journalist and politician Benegal Shiva Rao, a friend of Nehru and himself no stranger to the

internationalist activism of the interwar years, had attended this meeting and pitched the conference plan to Nehru. In May 1946, Nehru wrote to Aung San of Burma that the conference was intended to lay the foundations of 'some kind of Asian organization'.[17] By July, having received favorable reactions from Syria, Indonesia, Burma and Ceylon, Nehru was sending around fund-raising letters to enable the conference to be hosted in Delhi.[18]

As the responses started coming in, the conference appeared to be drawing around 30 Asian delegations. This was cause for apprehension in the world outside Asia, who feared 'an attempt to organize an Asian bloc'.[19] In response, Nehru affirmed that the conference would not 'be opposed in any way to America or the Soviet Union or any other power or group of powers'.[20] This juxtaposition of the US and the USSR is significant, for it shows early intent to remain aloof from this rivalry – long before the inception of the political projects leading to Bandung and Belgrade.

In maintaining that the conference charted its own course through the muddy waters of decolonizing Asia, this chapter seeks to connect to recent trends in the historiography of the Cold War. The old notion of an Asian vacuum waiting to be filled by one of the superpowers has been thoroughly challenged.[21] Two historiographical developments in particular are relevant to the present argument: first, the thesis that the global ideological struggle interacted with the rise of Asian nationalisms; and second, the argument that post-war developments should not be viewed as divorced from the larger processes of the twentieth century that preceded the war.[22] Indeed, a contextualization of the proceedings of the Asian Relations Conference would make any such separation untenable: 'Asia' at the Asian Relations Conference had an internal dynamic all its own, which was driven by longstanding concerns over foreign domination and lagging development rather than by the global bipolar division looming on the horizon. Tuong Vu puts this even more strongly, stating that indigenous processes in Asia had a critical *reverse* impact on the Cold War.[23]

There is much to be gained from a consideration of processes that had been set in motion before World War II. In the aftermath of World War I and the Bolshevik revolution, individuals and countries started to seek new approaches towards a world of greater justice and equality. In Asia, organizations such as the International Labour Organization and the Communist International inspired many with their models, as will be shown below. Anti-imperialist movements in Asia were intertwined with a myriad of political ideologies spanning from fascism to communism and everything in between.[24] In the latter case, one of its specifically Asian avatars was a great admiration for the advances made by the Soviet republics of Central Asia. As the sections below will demonstrate, 'Asia' at the Asian Relations Conference was presented as a continent with current problems and future trajectories that were different from those elsewhere, and rooted in a colonial past. The suggestion of a choice between two neatly demarcated ideologies would be rather reductive: ideas were appropriated and adapted to fit 'Asia'. The attempt was to foster unity in a decolonizing Asia, much like the pan-Asianist initiatives of the interwar years.[25] The next sections will explore

three themes that had been major interwar concerns which also rose to prominence at the Asian Relations Conference: Asian development; Asian cultural identities; and Asian women's emancipation.

Asian trajectories of development

Asianist platforms for developmental issues from the 1920s

It was a longstanding concern among Indian nationalist leaders that the country was socially and economically 'backward'.[26] The lack of industrialization on the one hand and of labour legislation on the other became more visible after the establishment of the International Labour Organization (ILO). India had been a founding member of the ILO through its participation in the Paris peace negotiations at which the League of Nations was founded. In order to represent India at the ILO, the existing trade unions in India federated into the All-India Trade Union Congress (AITUC), which selected workers' delegates to attend the yearly International Labour Conference in Geneva alongside government and employers' delegates. The ILO offered Indian trade union leaders an international platform to put forward their visions of reform. In this context, it is interesting to note that those visions of reform were not limited to issues of Indian labour – such as debt bondage and forced labour – but were framed in the context of Asian labour as a whole. Delegates were vocal in addressing the imperialist exploitation of Asia, and considered proportional Asian representation in international bodies a *conditio sine qua non* for improvement of labour conditions across the continent.[27]

These reformist trade union leaders sought to have 'Asia' speak with one voice at the annual International Labour Conference. To that end, an annual Asian Labour conference was to be convened, six weeks prior to the Geneva conference, to discuss the ILO agenda and formulate opinions which would have the whole weight of Asia behind them. The fact that 'Asia' at the ILO consisted only of India, Japan, China, Siam and Persia, of which the latter two were not at all inclined to present themselves as part of a disenfranchised Asia, was no deterrent to the employment of an Asianist idiom.[28] Neither was the fact that the Asiatic Labour Congress was only convened twice, or that, of the rest of Asia, only the Federation of Jewish Labour and the Ceylon Worker's Federation ever identified with the initiative.[29] Nevertheless, N. M. Joshi, AITUC leader and the main architect of this particular brand of 'labour Asianism', managed to propagate Asia at the ILO for most of the interwar years, aiming at once for inclusion in the international system of Geneva and for united Asian labour: '[we] are not inspired by any spirit of separation … [we] enable the workers of Asia to come into line with the workers of other parts of the world'.[30]

While the short-lived Asiatic Labour Congress thus remained firmly within the ambit of the ILO, other alternatives were considered within and outside of the trade union movement. Some saw the communist Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat, the Asian branch of the Red International of Trade Unions, as

showing faster and more fruitful ways forward.[31] They held that Asia suffered from the double yoke of imperialism and capitalism, and that the two should be fought simultaneously. They drew inspiration not from the Wilsonian Moment but from the Bolshevik Revolution.[32] But one alternative was admired by communists and non-communists alike: the developmental model of the Soviet Union, and especially its effects in Central Asia.

This admiration was far from limited to those revolutionaries who crossed the Pamirs to join the cadres of the Communist University of the Toilers of the East.[33] Nehru had made his first visit to the Soviet Union in 1927 and was 'profoundly impressed' with what he saw there.[34] The wider public too was exposed to the achievements of the Asian parts of the Soviet Union through publicized travel reports. M. R. Masani, for instance, an LSE graduate who would later be remembered as a staunch nationalist and liberal, reported that he had enjoyed his visit to Azerbaijan more than his visit to the United States. Of Baku he wrote ecstatically:

> This city, … in the vanguard of Soviet industrial advance, figuring prominently in the achievements of the Five Year Plans, has still hanging around it the mists of a romance of a different age. Nearby we saw also an old Zoroastrian fire-temple now in ruins.… I remembered how … Trotsky's sister said to me that even if the Soviet Revolution of 1917 had achieved nothing else, to her it would have been worthwhile for the emancipation it has achieved of the Russian women. How much greater and more miraculous have been the achievements of the Revolution for the women of the Tsar's Asiatic domains![35]

Such reports intensified as the Asian Relations Conference drew near. Although the Asian Soviet republics' position in most cartographies of Asia was tenuous, they were all invited and were used by the Indian media as examples of Asian 'backward' regions that had been uplifted through the great reforms of socialism, as the leftist journal *People's Age* reminded its readers: 'In Soviet Central Asia, peoples, backward, oppressed, nomadic a bare thirty years ago, are forging ahead to new miracles of Socialist reconstruction'.[36] One need not look at the fringes of the political spectrum for such statements. Socialism – if the definition was left vague enough – could mean many things to many different people. As Ben Zachariah has put it:

> The curious point here is that the mixing of liberal, illiberal, and socialist idioms in thinking about 'development' in India – aspects of which were later to be rationalized and dignified as 'non-alignment' and the 'third path' – was to be called 'socialism'.[37]

Visions for Asian development at the conference

The rhetoric of the commonality in Asian issues of labour, industrialization and development as well as admiration of the Soviet model continued prominently at

the Asian Relations Conference. Of the five roundtable groups, the third dealt with development, labour problems, and the 'transition from colonial to national economy'. These were the sessions in which the Soviet delegations, consisting of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, were most vocal. All emphasized their national independence and culture, meanwhile praising their industrialization, scientific institutions, equality of women and literacy:

> Before the Socialist Revolution [Azerbaijan] was one of the most backward corners of Asia.… The people of Azerbaijan have now received all those opportunities for the further development and enrichment of culture which progressive humanity has ever created. More than sixty scientific research institutions … using their own national language are now functioning in Azerbaijan, where before Soviet power there existed not a single [one].[38]

The Asian Relations Conference was a unique propaganda opportunity, and the delegates made sure that not a single moment was wasted. This was more obvious to some observers than others; the two observers from the Institute of Pacific Relations in the US, Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, reported after the conference that they had noted the Soviet propaganda but did not think it had been very effective:

> [They] assumed no aggressive part in any of the discussion groups. Upon request they gladly told of the achievements of their respective governments but their complacency precluded any admission of even the existence of such problems as were plaguing other countries of Asia.[39]

Gerald Packer, one of the conference's two Australian observers, simply remarked: 'The members of the various Soviet Republics obviously marked time on the Moscow line.'[40] G. H. Jansen, finally, was the most dismissive: 'The Soviet Central Asians [had their say] with such well-drilled unanimity that it is not surprising that they were never again invited.'[41] But he did think that they left their mark on the proceedings:

> The imaginary gap between the Asian republics and the rest of Asia proved wide: the delegates of the former gave a wholly laudatory picture of their conditions, while the latter were concerned as to how the prevailing unsatisfactory state of affairs could be improved. In consequence, the report is full of flattering references to the Soviet republics.[42]

By far the most continuity was evident in the discussion on labour problems, if only because it was chaired by N. M. Joshi. The discussion echoed the concerns which had been voiced at the ILO in the 1920s and 1930s. First, it was lamented that one Asian country had no knowledge whatsoever of workers' conditions in another. They had been cut off from their Asian co-workers by

imperial borders. At the same time, the imperialist countries had exploited Asia's resources and its workers, leaving the continent far less developed than the West. Second, the ILO was still considered the principal body in which the Asian voice should be heard, but in order to make it effective, more Asian nations should be allowed into the ILO. Their representation as it stood was rather unbalanced, and the fact that most of its labour legislation was targeted at Western industrial conditions meant that Asia could rarely adopt ILO conventions. This was a direct continuation of the goals of the Asiatic Labour Congress, with the notable change that the ILO's Asian Regional Conference, which had been one of the Asiatic Labour Congress's main goals, was finally realized six months after the Asian Relations Conference.

Asian cultural identities

Reclaiming Asia in interwar Bengal

The question of whether it was possible to speak of an 'Asian civilization' or an 'Asian culture' had emerged in the 1880s and became more prominent in the interwar years. Initially, there was a strong echo of pre-existing European orientalist stereotypes of a mystic, non-materialist and spiritual Asia.[43] This conception of Asia, often juxtaposed to a soulless, materialist West, remained popular throughout the interwar years. Of its proponents, Rabindranath Tagore stretched the concept furthest. He saw an Asian spirituality that encompassed not only Hindu and Buddhist areas, but all of Asia. Tagore lectured and published on Persia and the Middle East.[44] In 1932, he was invited to tour Iraq and Persia by Reza Shah Pahlavi. In Shiraz, he said: 'Asia is wide awake today, she is once more now to offer her spiritual gift to the world, the message of brotherhood, of freedom, of federation in the task of establishing peace and goodwill.'[45] In Iraq, he addressed a banquet given by King Faisal in Baghdad, rejoicing in the fact that 'in this machine-driven age', the king had invited a poet.

A very different and less inclusivist conception of Asia was espoused by a group of Calcutta-based scholars who united in 1926 as the Greater India Society. This group, and in particular its Paris-educated founders Kalidas Nag and P. C. Bagchi, stressed the role of ancient India in the cultural development of Asia. In order to stretch these trans-Asian connections, the society organized and participated in a variety of archaeological missions and cultural exchanges.[46] Within India, the thesis that India had been a hegemon and civilizational force in Asia supplied valuable ammunition to the anti-imperialist movement. The famous Indian historian and Greater India Society prominent R. C. Majumdar dedicated a two-volume monograph to the idea of 'ancient Indian colonies in the Far East', which was republished as recently as the 1990s.[47] Elsewhere in Asia, however, the quasi-imperialist undertones of a 'colonizing force' in Asia's midst was greeted with less enthusiasm.

While the Greater India Society did establish valuable contacts with academics elsewhere in Asia, they were more Asianist in rhetoric than practice; their

main dialogue was still with European academia. This was not the case for the Visva Bharati University established by Tagore. The school was a conscious repudiation of the system introduced in India by the British, and Tagore initially sought to realize the intrinsic values of ancient education in Asia. The school's aims and objectives were (and are): 'To bring into more intimate relation with one another, through patient study and research, the different cultures of the East on the basis of their underlying unity', and 'to approach the West from the standpoint of such a unity of the life and thought of Asia'.[48] The fact that Tagore had been the first Asian to win the Nobel Prize was a double blessing: it made his name famous throughout Asia, and it provided legitimacy to Visva Bharati. Though intra-Asian travel was often made impossible by visa refusals, Visva Bharati became a hub of Asian exchange.[49]

This was especially the case with the university's Cheena Bhavana (China House), which under the direction of resident Chinese scholar Tan Yun-Shan acquired funds and books from several Chinese institutions.[50] Tagore also helped Indian students to travel elsewhere in Asia, using his extensive contacts to find them placements and accommodation. In 1927, a Visva Bharati delegation toured Bali, which according to that group offered

> wonderful opportunities for coming into close contact with a most interesting phase of Colonial Hindu Culture among a people who are staunch believers in the faith of their fathers, are conscious of their Indian connection and are anxious to renew cultural relations.[51]

If this echoed the crypto-imperialist attitudes of some of the Greater India scholars, it did not deter at least three Javanese students from embarking to study at Santiniketan four years later.[52] In 1939, two Visva Bharati students, one of whom was Tagore's own grand-daughter, went to study Javanese dancing in Indonesia.[53] Finally, all academic circles in Bengal benefited from this academic mobility, which created a network of Asian artists and intellectuals which would prove invaluable when the Asian Relations Conference drew near.

The session on 'cultural problems' at the conference

The most striking continuity with these earlier views on the unity of Asia can be seen in the fourth of the five roundtable groups, which dealt with 'Asian art', 'Asian culture', 'Asian education' and related topics. Among those to prepare memoranda were Kalidas Nag, who wrote a detailed peace on the literary, artistic and cultural collaboration of the Asian nations; and Tan Yun-Shan, who wrote on 'Inter-Asian Cultural Cooperation'.[54] Tan Yun-Shan proposed in his paper the founding of 'All Asia Institutions for Asian Studies' in each Asian country; the exchange of professors and students among all the Asian countries; and the founding of All Asia Libraries and Museums and the interchange of books and journals.[55] The other papers in this topic group reflect a similar desire to bring out Asia's cultural commonalities: Trivikrama Narayan, a member of

the Archeological Society of South India, wrote on 'Aesthetic Traditions of the East'; S. Dutt, associated with India's *China Magazine*, wrote 'Chinese and Indian Culture: A Plea for Understanding'; R. C. Majumdar, of Greater India Society fame, wrote 'Cultural Problems of India and Indonesia'. Almost every paper advocated the establishment of one or more Asian Studies Institutes, Asian UNESCOs or Asian cultural exhibitions. There were also data papers familiarizing delegates with the cultures of Bhutan, Burma, Siam and the Philippines.

The most striking contribution, however, was by linguist Baburam Saxena, who advocated an 'Inter-Asian language' because 'The Biblical myth of the Tower of Babal [*sic*] imparts one important lesson: that the diversity of speech is a great factor of disintegration of peoples and that unity of language is a great cementing force'.[56] His rejection of English – the medium of the Asian Relations Conference – as a means of communication in Asia was strongly reminiscent of Tagore's educational vision that English was detrimental to the formation of Asian minds. In an elegant plea for the rejection of English as an imposed language, which 'both sentiment and reason would induce us to discard',[57] he manages, through a series of logical fallacies, to arrive at Hindi as the best option. At this point, the Soviet delegations pressed the conference to look at how Russia tackled the problem, for 'after the Revolution, the Government made it compulsory for people to learn their own language and Russian'.[58] The discussion stalled, and the final session report mentions the subsequent compromise that the study of Asian languages 'should be encouraged'; that there was 'need' for a neutral language (aimed directly at the suggestions for Russian and Hindi, both of which were perceived to carry risks of cultural imperialism); and that 'for the moment' English would be the best choice.[59]

The proceedings from the roundtable on cultural issues suggest uneasiness on the part of many delegates from Southeast Asia. One reason for this may have been the strong presence of former Greater India Society scholars and their academic legacy: their depiction of India as 'bringer of civilization' to the rest of Asia and as a country that had once had 'cultural colonies' was probably cause for concern. As one Burmese voiced his apprehensions, 'It was terrible to be ruled by a Western power, but it was even more so to be ruled by an Asian power'.[60] Though full of brotherly affirmations of Asian cultural unity, the section on Cultural Problems was one of the best attended but least successful parts of the conference. While all session reports conclude with consensus on the need for Asian cultural cooperation and centres of Asian learning, intra-Asian hegemonies were feared at least as much as outside ones.

Women's movements in Asia

The All Asia Women's Congress, 1931–1937

In the aftermath of India's inclusion in the League of Nations, organized international women's rights activism intensified. In 1919, a delegation of Indian

women headed by Sarojini Naidu had travelled to London to lobby for women's franchise on equal terms with men.[61] After the formation of several committees, in particular on the issues of the vote and women's education, the All-India Women's Conference (AIWC) held its first official session in January 1927. A year later, the AIWC was recognized on the Asian scene by an invitation to the Pan-Pacific Women's Conference in Honolulu.[62] A further impetus was provided by the International Congress of Women for Suffrage and Equal Citizenship in Berlin in 1930. This conference, which assembled women's delegates from 42 countries, brought to light several commonalities in the challenges facing Asian women. It was on the wings of the contacts made in Berlin that the AIWC took the lead in convening an All-Asia Women's Conference to see if these challenges could be met collectively.

The first All-Asia Women's Conference (AAWC) was convened from 19 to 24 January 1931. It was attended by delegates from Afghanistan, Burma, Ceylon, Japan and Persia[63] and was heralded as a 'New Dawn in the East'. The Rani of Mandi opened the conference with the following words:

> This is the first gathering of its kind in Asia. We meet to promote cultural unity among women of Asia to place at the services of humanity these qualities which are peculiar to our Oriental civilization: to stamp out those evils which have crept into our civilization; to pick out and adopt those qualities of civilization and culture which have elevated the West to a pinnacle of social and material prosperity; to benefit ourselves by exchange of experience in our respective countries; and lastly, to advance the cause of World Peace.[64]

Although the conference received ample congratulatory messages from women's organizations across the world, the gathering failed to make headlines. However, a Permanent Committee was set up, and it picked up momentum as the 1930s progressed. In 1932, the AAWC collaborated with the Oriental Women's Conference at Tehran.[65] Although attempts to convene a second AAWC session in Java fell through at the last moment, the AAWC Committee – which could boast of prominent women's rights activists such as Rameshwari Nehru, Sarojini Naidu, Hansa Mehta and Kamaladevi Chattopadhyay – gained valuable contacts.[66]

But the AAWC's finest hour was a conference not of its own making: its delegation to the 1935 conference of the International Alliance of Women for Suffrage and Equal Citizenship, convened in Istanbul, turned the gathering into an Asianist moment of significance. 'Asia' at Istanbul was more fully represented than it had been at Berlin, Lahore or Tehran, and the delegates – in particular Dhanvanti Rama Rao – made their presence felt. A stir in the attending press was caused by the collective Asian outrage at a black Jamaican delegate's exposition of the racial discrimination she faced.[67] The resulting collective statement by the Asian delegations was celebrated as 'indicative of the solidarity of Asiatic women's attitude against any assumption of racial superiority by any

nation'.[68] This time the press did take notice, and enthusiastically reported that 'Asiatic Womanhood was fully represented, demanded and was readily granted an equality of status and opportunity in trying to solve the problems which affect the womankind of all countries and nations'.[69]

However, the success of Istanbul was not to be repeated. When the Java conference was cancelled, ill-timed plans arose to hold the next session in Japan; it was tentatively scheduled for 1937, but the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war precluded any such meeting. Although the Japanese invitation was never retracted, the AAWC's contacts with Chinese women's rights activists as well as anti-Japanese boycotts across India made further cooperation with a Japanese organization impossible. This also spelled the end of the AAWC: the Permanent Committee was disbanded, although its members remained active in the All-India Women's Conference.

Roundtable on women and women's movements at the Asian Relations Conference

Despite the AAWC's premature demise, the AIWC did not stop its international activism. Work with the International Alliance of Women for Suffrage and Equal Citizenship continued unabated, as did work with the League of Nations committees on nationality and on the trafficking of women and children. As the Asian Relations Conference drew near, it was decided that the fifth of the round-table groups would deal exclusively with the position of women and women's movements. In making this roundtable a success, the contacts of the AIWC, and in particular the former members of the AAWC, proved decisive. The female members of the Indian delegation were almost all AIWC members, most of whom had been active in the AAWC. Among them were former AIWC president Lakshmibai Rajwade, Istanbul delegate Dhanvanti Rama Rao, Berlin delegate Sarojini Naidu, AIWC leader Hansa Mehta and prominent social reformer and AAWC leader Kamaladevi Chattopadhyaya.[70]

The female delegates from other Asian countries, too, echoed the earlier transregional contacts of Lahore, Tehran and Istanbul. These included women's delegations drawn from the All Ceylon Women's Conference Association, the Egyptian Feminist Union, the All-Indonesian Women's Congress, the Korea Women's Bureau and the Women's Association of Iran. All this had been no coincidence: Nehru's invitation to the national delegations had explicitly asked:

> I hope it will be possible to send at least one woman [*sic*] delegate from your country who will be able to assist the Conference by presenting the women's point of view on the various matters before the conference and, in particular, in the discussing of the status of women and women's movements in Asia which is one of the main topics suggested for the agenda.[71]

The roundtable on women and women's movements ran for two sessions. A third session was scheduled but was cancelled on the request of the female

delegates, who felt more would be gained from a general session on social service which did not limit itself to gender. This was in line with the prevailing atmosphere at the conference, in which female delegates and observers participated actively in all sessions, not just the fifth. As AIWC member Avibai Wadia reported:

> In this vast pattern of Asian renaissance, one of the most significant motifs was provided by the presence of many women delegates from various countries. Their presence was a sign of the times, but the manner in which they participated, actively and constructively, in discussions both inside and out of the groups, arrested the attention and demonstrated that a real awakening has come to Asia again after many centuries.[72]

One of the roundtable's points of consensus was that Asian women did not subscribe to a 'rigid feminist conception' whereby the acquisition of their rights would 'involve an anti-masculine stand'.[73] Participating delegates rejected this attitude, which they had encountered in international committees, and which they perceived as 'western' and 'curiously masculine itself'.[74] The discussions on the political, legal and economic status of women reaffirmed the goal of complete operative equality of the sexes, but there was also the conviction that such rights would be won in cooperation with men, and not in opposition to them.

In this sense, the roundtable discussion on women's movements fed into the larger conference themes of anti-imperialism and decolonization in Asia. The struggle for women's rights was identified with progressive forces working for a fully functioning, dynamic, and free society. In this way, the attainment of equal citizenship for all was conceptualized as an integral part of decolonization. Delegates from India, Egypt, Burma and the Philippines put this most forcefully: echoing earlier concepts of a relatively homogenous Asian civilization, they held that Asia's ancient traditions had always allotted a place for women's agency. But as Asia became enslaved, its societies had become 'petrified and uncreative' and the position of women had suffered accordingly. However, the holding of the Asian Relations Conference was cause for optimism, for 'where the impulse of regeneration has stirred the people, women too have shaken off their stupor'.[75]

Conclusion

> What will Asia do with her renaissance? Will she arm herself for battles to conquer, to annex and exploit, or rather, will she forge new weapons and re-fashion her armoury in accordance with ancient ideals, as soldiers of peace and missionaries of love?[76]

Giri Deshingkar has remarked of the Bandung Conference that

> Nehru found there an Asia that was sharply divided along ideological, in fact Cold War, lines. Nehru had long wanted to insulate decolonized Asia from European conflicts, but they were there in Bandung in a new avatar. No 'Asian sentiment' could be found across that divide.[77]

Its predecessor, the Asian Relations Conference at New Delhi, had convened a very different Asia. The Asian Relations Conference was replete with sentiments of Asian unity, Asian brotherhood and the common bonds between Asian regions past and present. Undercurrents of friction were carefully managed by the conference's chairmen and shrunk into insignificance compared to the general enthusiasm that the Asian Relations Conference produced.

In this sense, the Asian Relations Conference was the fruit of the long attempts towards Asian cooperation that had started in the early 1920s and were interrupted only by World War II. This chapter has argued that the conference was marked by a strong continuity of themes and participants from earlier Asian platforms. As such, the Asian Relations Conference had its roots in the Asianist enthusiasm of the interwar period much more than in the emerging Cold War, even if the prospect of decolonization and the establishment of the United Nations had initially prompted its holding. In some ways, the post-war constellation actually afforded a space where older themes could be reinvoked and reinvented: the rhetoric of the 'nuclear age' allowed for Asia to be set apart as 'peaceful', echoing older tropes of a spiritual Asia opposed to a materialist and war-mongering West. The presence of several Asian Soviet republics, too, was a continuation of earlier nationalist contacts. As the session on development demonstrated, both the drive for inclusion in international institutions such as the ILO and the quest for new models to fast-track industrial development were seen as prerequisites for Asia to play its part in the postwar world. Finally, the discussion on women's movements was a direct continuation of the themes raised earlier by the All Asia Women's Conference, which had argued for equality between the sexes on Asia's own terms and not as a derivative of western feminisms.

The Asian Relations Conference thus marked a crucial transitional period in Asian relations, in which old conversations were continued and new themes raised. As such, it may serve as a lens which renders visible the connections between the Asian internationalist and anti-imperialist movements of the interwar years, and the later meetings at Bandung and Belgrade. The Asian Relations Conference, much more so than its official intergovernmental successors, translated the concerns of prewar anti-imperialism to postwar decolonization, creating ways to think of Asia's place in the emerging international constellation. Rather than dismissing it for its lack of tangible results, the Asian Relations Conference should be seen as bringing those pre- and postwar worlds into conversation which each other.

Notes

1 Ba Maw, former premier of Burma, quoted in the *Bombay Chronicle*, 20 March 1947, p. 2.
2 Sarojini Naidu, Presidential Address, Asian Relations Organization, *Asian Relations: Being a Report of the Proceedings*, New Delhi: Asian Relations Organization, 1948 [hereafter *Proceedings*], p. 31.
3 Jawaharlal Nehru, Inaugural Address, *Proceedings*, p. 21.

4 Reports on the exact number of countries represented at the Asian Relations Conference differ, because several of the delegations did not yet represent independent states. There is also confusion as to the number of attendees – Indian scholars who had prepared discussion papers, for instance, were not included in the delegations but did take part in the proceedings. The same holds true for other Asian scholars already present in India. Finally, the numbers given by S. Saran differ from those in the official proceedings; this is because Saran did not include the Tajik delegation. S. Saran, *50 Years after the Asian Relations Conference*, New Delhi: Tibetan Parliamentary and Policy Research Centre, 1997, pp. 10–11.
5 Nehru Memorial Museum and Library [hereafter NMML], Oral History Project: L. C. Jain [who served as a student volunteer on the Asian Relations Conference reception committee] interviewed by A. Mukherjee, 10 April 2009.
6 G. H. Jansen, *Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment*, London: Faber & Faber, 1966, p. 53.
7 See, for instance, 'The Lost Heart of Asia', in *The Hindu*, as recently as 6 February 2010.
8 NMML, Oral History Project, Interview L. C. Jain.
9 'True Character of "Asian Conference" Exposed,' editorial, *Dawn*, 20 March 1947, p. 1.
10 See, for instance: 'Foreign Muslim Visitors to be Politically Doped', *Dawn*, 23 March 1947, p. 10; 'A Fraud on Asia', *Dawn*, 22 March 1947, p. 4.
11 ICWA, *Asia: A Souvenir Book issued by the Indian Council of World Affairs on the Occasion of the Asian Relations Conference New Delhi March 23–2 April 1947*, New Delhi: ICWA, 1947, p. 78.
12 The Japanese, however, did not attend, despite a strong press offensive in India geared towards the US to let Japanese delegates travel to the Asian Relations Conference. See, among others, 'Fly Jap Delegation to Delhi!' *Bombay Chronicle*, 27 March 1947, p. 1.
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3 Prolegomena to non-alignment

Race and the international system

Itty Abraham

India's decision to help found the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was far from obvious. Simply put, at a moment when its own national policy of non-alignment was proving extremely effective, why did it take on the additional burden, uncertainties, and costs of helping create a new coalition of states? Such a decision appears even more confounding when it comes on the heels of the first conference of newly independent Afro-Asian states, the Bandung Conference of 1955. In earlier work I have argued that India's investment in the creation of NAM should be understood in terms of the *failure* of Bandung, rather than its success as so many have assumed.[1] Bandung, in my view, showed Indian makers of foreign policy the limits of an international coalition composed of non-white states with little more in common than having recently extricated themselves from colonial rule. Their decision to join Yugoslavia and Egypt in founding the NAM came via a belated realization that a necessary starting point for an effective multi-national coalition was political agreement on fundamental principles. In this case, all three founding states were agreed that the greatest threat to global order and their own national security was the conflict between the superpowers.

This chapter explores this transition from a national policy of non-alignment to the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement from a very different vantage point. It seeks to shed new light on the complexion of the international system as it transformed from the beginning of the twentieth century through the long process of decolonization. I contend that the Non-Aligned Movement did not begin intending to be, but became, a historic effort by relative newcomers to the international system to transcend a foundational division of the international order they found themselves subject to, namely, the racial order of things. Moreover, I argue that although the Non-Aligned Movement's multi-racial leadership and identity marked a decisive break from one of the foundational markers of contemporary international intercourse, that outcome was an unintended *product* of the alliance and not its cause.

To make this argument is not to discount the practical reasons that dominated public discourse within Egypt, India Yugoslavia, as the respective leaders explained to their people why the non-aligned alternative to the existing division of the world was very much in their national interests. It does suggest, however,

that the multi-racial character of the countries that came together to call for the creation of a Non-Aligned Movement was an enormous resource in bolstering the non-aligned claim that their movement marked a progressive break with the past. Through the very novelty of an Arab, an Indian and a European jointly making claim to speak for the majority of the world, the Non-Aligned Movement effectively foregrounded, and began the process of transcending, the racism that had long been normalized as a mark of distinction within inter-state relations.[2] It exposed in new ways the illegitimacy of conventional justifications of empire, then still a characteristic feature of the international system, and made it far more difficult to justify support of official racial discrimination in white settler states, most notably South Africa. Acknowledging this epochal change, the prominent Oxford scholar Hedley Bull would remark that 'it is not now possible to unite the international community on any other basis than that of a clear repudiation of white supremacy'.[3]

The Non-Aligned Movement was an important symbolic harbinger of a better future for its times; its persistence over the decades that have followed, even in the wake of bitter disappointments over its less tangible achievements, are in no small measure a legacy of the progressive promise that it epitomized in the era of decolonization. This chapter seeks to examine the prehistory of the Non-Aligned Movement for what it tells us about an international order that this movement came to be defined against.

Rethinking the international

Making this argument begins from an alternative conceptualization of what is meant by the 'international'. This chapter understands the international as much more than that extra-domestic space where sovereign states interact. The international includes – and is produced by the interaction of – a variety of non-state transnational actors, from international civil society movements to multi-national corporations to specialized multilateral agencies. This means that the international is a dynamic, hierarchical and contested arena: it is in a state of constant emergence. While states seek an international space marked by order, closure and stasis, these objectives are continually undermined by insurgent ideas, actors and technologies that emerge from unlikely and unexpected sites. Such a conceptualization stands in marked contrast to the conventional view of the international held by political scientists.

Political scientists have long conceptualized the international in relation to 'levels of analysis'.[4] Such a formulation tacitly identifies with a governmentalized organization of territorial space by normalizing a discrete hierarchy of administrative units, from the smallest locality through the district and province, 'up' to the largest, the nation-state. In the level-of-analysis schema, the international is what lies beyond the nation-state level; for most political scientists this level is constituted through an unequal distribution of nation-states, the highest form of modern political organization.[5] By contrast, critical geographers prefer to identify boundaries between political spaces in terms of 'scales', a

formulation that makes it much easier to identify and explain the expression and mobility of power relations across state administrative 'levels'. Scales are made visible through the everyday functioning of practices, institutions, ideas and material flows. Scales are dynamic spatial relations, unlike the static territorial ontology of levels of analysis, and are best understood as 'emergent spatial relations' that are the 'provisional geographical resolutions of power struggles'.[6] Translating these insights into what we mean by the international scale takes the meaning of the international from a fixed stage on which states play to a zone of struggle produced by a process of conflict that seeks to shape and order it. Also lost in this translation is the privileged position of the nation-state, an entity that is now supplemented by a variety of 'international' actors including empires, transnational organizations and social movements.

A scalar reformulation is vital to understand the rapidly shifting shape of the international in the turbulent decades leading up to and following World War I. But before getting there, it is important to affirm that this argument does not propose that an international scale did not exist prior to this period. Far from it. An international scale can be identified from at least a century before, though of a size far smaller than it would become. However, this international scale was meaningful only to a small handful of states located in Europe and North America who regulated their mutual interactions in this space. For them, international intercourse was, in its most ideal form, framed through a succession of mutual relations and bonds variously deemed 'Peaces', 'Concerts' and 'Conventions'. These agreements sought to channel inter-state interactions into directions such that the frequency of war between states was reduced and such that, when war did occur, it was managed through rules that sought to reduce the devastation of combat, especially against civilians and non-belligerents.

The early international scale was founded in the aftermath of the decline of the authority of the Holy See, during a period when hundreds of semi-sovereign political entities in Europe began to be absorbed into larger bodies, when diplomatic texts began to shape memory, obligations and interactions between states, and when mercantile empires were giving way to direct and indirect forms of territorial rule over contiguous and overseas possessions.[7] Participants in the early international scale were far from uniform, a pattern that would continue well into the late twentieth century, and included more or less nationally constituted states such as Italy, Germany and the Scandinavian states, metropolitan representatives of global empires such as Britain or France, declining imperial monarchies such as the Austro-Hungarian empire, and rising immigrant settler republics such as the United States. From the middle of the nineteenth century, this international scale was also shaped by transnational entities of which the most prominent was probably the International Committee of the Red Cross, founded in 1863, as well as by the transnational power of domestic social movements such as the anti-slavery societies that successfully lobbied for the passing of the British Slavery Abolition Act of 1833.

This profusion of novel, contradictory and customary encounters that made up the international scale would be ordered and codified by the votaries of

so-called 'positive' international law, exemplified by the writing of such figures as the American Henry Wheaton, the Englishman John Westlake, and the German L. F. L. Oppenheim. This distinctive legal approach sought above all to regularize and regulate a limited international order by elevating sovereign states over other political entities, Euro-Americans over the 'coloured' races, and power over principle. Their objective was to establish firm boundaries around and to define the rules of the international system; their method was a process of vigorous intellectual justification of selective amnesia, racial exclusion, and subservience to the might of military force.[8] Ironically, their greatest influence would come just when the prevailing international order was on the cusp of radical change brought about by the immense human conflagrations of the early twentieth century, namely World War I and the social revolutions that led to the formation of Soviet Russia. It is also worth noting that dismantling, albeit partially, the common sense of the unequal and illiberal norms of positive international law would be among the most important projects taken on by the non-aligned countries and movement.[9]

If the international scale is best defined, at the *fin de siècle*, as a small and mutually reinforcing concert of Euro-American states, the walls surrounding this exclusive club soon began to crumble under the multiple onslaughts of transformative political events leading to the mass mobilization of subordinated people on a scale never seen before. One 'international' political event in particular stands out for its global impact. For the rest of the world, and especially Asia, the space lying beyond the domestic took on new meaning with the news of the Japanese naval victory over Russian forces at Port Arthur in 1905. Notwithstanding Japan's own desires to emulate Western imperial glory through mimicry, the event circulated as a racialized discourse: the first major victory of an Asian power over a Western one. The imputed meaning of this event gave heart to anti-colonialists and nationalists across Asia and beyond. It seemed clearly to imply that the power of European states was not without limits.[10] If the Japanese military victory was symbolic of future political change that was now actually imaginable, these feelings were more than complemented by social transformations taking place across Asia due to the impact of modern technologies that had brought imaginaries of the future into everyday tangible experience. In a few short decades, asphalted highways, electric trams, steel bridges, electric light, photographs and moving pictures, bicycle and motorcycle clubs, sewing machines, irrigation canals, modern sewage systems, new medicines for old diseases, microscopes and fingerprints, radio waves and telephone lines became familiar elements of the, especially, urban landscape in colonial societies. Each of these technologies brought with them aspects of a modern cosmopolitan habitus that made even the recent past appear hopelessly outmoded.[11] But also, for colonial societies familiar with the deployment of foreign technologies as 'the measure of man'[12] – instrumentally reinforcing the political and economic distance between colonizer and colonized – technologies of consumption coming from new sites, notably the United States and Japan, represented a modernity that was for the first time recognizably plural. Symbolically and materially,

colonial societies were experiencing the boundary between the domestic and the external altogether differently.

Such a reinscription of the domestic–foreign boundary meant that transformative change was not seen primarily as alien or threatening, although there is no question that particular domestic idioms of 'tradition' and aesthetic practice had to work overtime to come to terms with this invasion of experience.[13] This welcoming of the international was due additionally to the emergence of new languages of political freedom typically couched as nationalism, yet deeply inflected by the foreign. Benedict Anderson has reminded us how often foundational anti-colonial nationalist texts were initially written and disseminated from a location external to the object of liberation.[14] So many of the first generation of Third World nationalist ideologues – José Rizal, Sun Yat-Sen, Mohandas Gandhi, Jamal al-din Al-Afghani, to mention only a few of the best-known – would come of age politically overseas, and would find their overseas experience a vital resource in developing their critiques of colonial and imperial order. There were a number of reasons for these foreign epiphanies, including the opportunity of seeing the imperial racial order upended in various ways, the possibility of sharing and learning from stories, critiques and theories from other like-minded souls across colonial lines, and the forging of new alliances with people, movements and organizations dedicated to the emancipation of subjugated peoples and an end to imperialism. It also goes without saying that these encounters were predicated on new means and possibilities of long-distance travel.

The range of events and occasions that brought together people who had hitherto rarely had a chance to meet and discuss their common political fates was extraordinary. While the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 has long exemplified the moment when diplomacy was made subject to global public attention and even some scrutiny, it was hardly the only moment when non-state actors sought to draw international attention to their causes and plight. An incomplete list of contemporary meetings that explicitly rejected the existing world order would include the Universal Races Conference in London in 1911, the Congress of Peoples of the East, held in Baku in 1920, the Bierville Peace Conference of 1926, and the 1927 anti-colonial conference held in Brussels, which brought together 180 delegates from 34 countries and would lead to the formation of the Berlin-based League Against Imperialism.[15] Other anti-systemic meetings included the Pan-Asiatic Congresses (Nagasaki, 1926, and Shanghai, 1927), the All-Asia Education conference (Benares, 1930), the All-Asia Women's conference (Lahore, 1931), and the Pan-Asiatic Labour Congress (Colombo, 1934).[16] At these events, Asian anti-colonial nationalists were able to meet each other as well as supporters of their causes from Europe and the United States, which offered them the opportunity to develop critiques of imperialism that adopted an explicitly international scale. It was at Baku, for instance, that the Indian communist M. N. Roy first articulated his thesis on the dangers of supporting anti-colonial nationalism in opposition to the dominant Leninist line that saw bourgeois revolutions in the colonial world as potential tools in the global struggle against capitalism.[17]

As the scale, origins and content of cross-border flows increased and multiplied in the new century, the social and economic landscapes of colonial and metropolitan worlds began to change markedly. On the one hand, metropolitan advances in areas as different as botanical knowledge, public health, urban sanitation, disease eradication, criminology, anthropology, fingerprinting, pharmaceuticals, and even educational curricula had long been a product of monopolized relationships with colonies.[18] Western national consciousness itself could be seen as a product of the imperial encounter, as Hannah Arendt would suggest: 'The truth was that only far from home could a citizen of England, Germany or France be nothing but an Englishman, German, or Frenchman.'[19] On the other hand, imperial boundaries that had kept metropole from colony, and colonies from each other, now began to break down under the pressures of rapidly moving global capital and people and a flood of new ideas that spoke to the illegitimacy of political and social relationships hitherto considered unquestionable. If what it meant to be a Spanish Catholic had once been importantly shaped by the decisions of colonial administrators in South America, if the goods available in Indian shops were once almost entirely produced in Britain and its dependencies, if no small part of French scientific knowledge was once shaped by its explorations and scientists working in Indochina, none of these conditions were any longer obvious or true. The greatly diminished ability to keep empires and peoples quarantined would most vividly (and for some, disturbingly) be expressed by colonial soldiers from Africa and Asia fighting in Europe during World War I. The proximity of these subalterns to the local populations they were defending would lead inevitably to the violation of one of the greatest taboos of colonial order, namely, the sexual barrier between white women and black men.[20]

Along with the dissolution of older political, social and economic boundaries, and the increased movement of people, goods and ideas, a proliferation of new entities began to shape the new international scale. These included entirely new countries carved out of the defeated Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires, as well as novel spaces variously called protectorates, dependencies and territories, entities with considerably different degrees of formal and recognized sovereignty. Even as these emergent political formations came to be more visible and prominent, the victorious empires moved swiftly to expand, in some cases, and to consolidate, in other cases, their existing territorial possessions. Some empires may have been defeated, but the remaining others took steps to ensure their continued existence, including by offering a larger quotient of political rights and entitlements to their subjugated populations.[21] Empire was still, along with these other political entities, a characteristic feature of the new international scale, dependent on two 'new devices' for its perpetuation: 'race as a principle of the body politic, and … bureaucracy as a principle of foreign domination'.[22]

Also joining the still-familiar if constitutionally different political entities now shaping the international scale were a new set of institutions that emerged as a result of the formation of the League of Nations, the first genuinely transnational organization of states ever created.[23] In retrospect, the League may

have been less important for its failings as an institution devoted to promoting collective security and world peace, and valued more for the technical agencies created under its aegis, some of which are still part of the international landscape today. The International Labor Organization, the World Health Organization and the Food and Agriculture Organization would become transnational supplements to national government in the provision of basic services and social infrastructure by offering novel biopolitical standards and know-how in an effort to enable all populations to reach minimum standards of working dignity, nutrition and health.[24] Their experts and reports would influence and shape global standards and 'best practices' in these and other areas, often with a strong bias for state-run organizations (over the private sector) and influenced strongly by a humanitarian and non-capitalist ethos. Moreover, the staff of these organizations was not drawn solely from the Western world but also included personnel from the colonies and newly independent nation-states, even if often at different rates of emolument. A further set of transnational technical agencies offering international public goods through the standardization of railway track gauges; wireless communications, posts and telegraphs; civil aviation; and scientific terms, standards, and measurements continued to grow and become stronger during this period. An International Court of Justice was created at the Hague: while the Court, given its subordination to the states that created it, may have been relatively toothless in practice, it nonetheless remained a symbolic possibility of a transcendent liberalism where international criminal injustices would receive redress. Olympic Games and Nobel Prizes would each affirm the primacy of the nation-scale while also working to reinforce the idea of a scale beyond the state where national desires could receive expression.

Rather than imagined as an ontologically stable zone that borders the domestic 'level of analysis', the international scale should be understood as an emergent space marked by constant change. Such a view alters entirely the conventional historical narrative in the field of international relations that views the early twentieth century as a period of transition from the age of empire to the era of the nation-state. The decades-long process of the dissolution of most of the world's empires and the emergence of the nation-state as the pre-eminent political unit of our times cannot be reduced to a simple and misleading teleology of the replacement of one form of political organization by another, superior, one. What this alternative formulation highlights is the process of *struggle* between entrenched formations and new forces that led to uneven change on a global scale marked by the co-presence of semi-sovereign nations, states, empires, people, transnational institutions and corporations, and non-governmental agencies. This international system was marked by a congeries of hierarchies, where the unequal distribution of military force was a dominant condition determining unequal access to political voice, and where race continued to play its central part in creating and reinforcing structures of exclusion. Together, these entities and institutions jointly constituted a new international scale whose boundaries are still under stress.

Becoming a sovereign state

The pluralism and transformations characteristic of the new international scale stand in some contrast to the restrictions imposed on imaginable structures of political liberation available to the unfree peoples of the world. For multi-national and multi-territorial colonies such as India seeking to rid themselves of alien rule, the only option apparently before them was to become a sovereign and territorially delimited nation-state. Remarkably, there had been little discussion among Indian elites leading up to the transfer of power from the British regarding political alternatives other than the territorial state. Gandhi, characteristically, offered a vision of a state that while territorially bounded turned its back on most aspects of technological modernity and proposed instead a village-centred economy, an emphasis on cooperation rather than exchange, and an architecture of national politics that was highly decentralized.[25] Such a vision was clearly unacceptable to the highly modern elites manning the forefront of India's anti-colonial struggle: for them, the way to become free was inseparable from the need to remain free, and hence the conditions that had led to political subjugation were the first to be removed in any new political dispensation. What this meant in effect was reproducing the structures and conditions of 'strong' Western states, translated especially in terms of military power and technological self-reliance.[26]

It must also be appreciated that the freedom of the Indian *nation* was the primary focus of anti-colonial nationalism, not establishing the discrete borders of a territorially delimited state. The need adequately to fulfil both conditions, however, would create grave difficulties for the managers of what was to be politically sovereign India. The Indian nation had long been dispersed across the world, following the demands and incentives of colonial indenture policy, the global peregrinations of sailors, soldiers and business families, and the bureaucratic pilgrimages of colonial administrators across the far-flung territorial possessions of the British, French and Portuguese empires.[27] The conditions under which Indian indentured labour lived and worked was of great concern to many among the nationalist elite, approximating as it did conditions of a 'new slavery', as Hugh Tinker would come to call it.[28] These concerns called attention to the appalling state of racial governance in South Africa, Fiji, Mauritius, Malaya and the West Indies, where the majority of Indian indentured labourers were resident. Public anger at their treatment was expressed at the highest levels of colonial governance, and led, on more than one occasion, to rifts developing within the British Imperial Cabinet. London and Delhi speaking for indentured labour would be on one side, confronting planter interests and the white settler Dominions on the other.[29] Eventually the constant pressure from Delhi would lead to special agents of the Indian government being appointed to monitor the treatment of Indians overseas, over the protests of East African colonies and the self-ruled South African government. Overseas Indians would, in turn, repeatedly deploy their offshore locations as sites of resistance and support for the nationalist cause 'at home', causing much dismay among the intelligence officers tasked

with keeping an eye on potential subversives among the hundreds of students, intellectuals and revolutionaries living across the United States, Europe and Japan.[30] Yet in spite of these close relations, Indian leaders would inform this dispersed global diaspora that sovereignty meant the permanent exclusion of the diaspora from the Indian homeland. Overseas Indians should keep their distance from independent India in order to make it easier for the sovereign state to conform to the idealized norms of the territorial nation-state.

Political alternatives that did not reduce to a territorially bound state are not impossible to imagine. The newly formed state of Israel, for example, would offer Jews living in anywhere in the world a 'right of return' in 1948, effectively creating a form of political identity delinked from territory. Yet for a diaspora excluded from the homeland in order to consolidate a new nation-state, no greater irony could be imagined. Indian-ness, however inchoate it might have seemed in the territorial homeland with its profusion of languages, religions and customs, was far easier to acknowledge overseas. Indians could always be distinguished among the many minorities that inhabited the colonies and dominions of the British Empire. Yet there is no indication that either such easy identification or the history of diasporic support for Indian independence led to the discussion of new forms of citizenship or political entitlement among the elites tasked with coming up with a constitution for a sovereign Indian state. If anything, there was a tendency to eschew novelty in political architecture for reliance on the tried and true. The most startling example of this inability to go beyond reproducing the model of modern Western states was perhaps the call for the creation of an overseas Indian colony to replace former German possessions in East Africa as reparations for losses during World War I.[31]

Particular regional conditions reinforced the emphasis on dispensing with the 'problem' of the Indian diaspora. Starting with the Asian Relations Conference (1947) and continuing until the Bandung Conference in 1955, independent India explicitly reaffirmed its policy that it had cut ties with its overseas populations and that overseas Indians were now to see themselves as ethnic minorities within their current country of residence. The audience for these assertions were no longer the diaspora themselves, but rather the newly independent states of Southeast Asia. Polyglot, multi-national and multi-religious Burma, Ceylon and Malaya, in particular, all with sizeable and long-resident Indian minorities, sought assurances from independent India that the presence of these ethnic kin would not lead to interference in their domestic affairs. Given the perceived need to assuage these stated fears of an Indian fifth column in the interests of inter-Asian unity, any doubts about the need for the Indian state to continue to protect its overseas populations – ironically, a practice the colonial government took far more seriously – soon vanished. The Indian diaspora was denied any right of return, removing an obstacle to India's reproducing itself a territorially bounded state.

Racialized thinking underwrote the fears of India's Southeast Asian neighbours. The norm of national self-determination was built around the presumed unity of a race and its homeland as a necessary starting point for national

independence. Internalizing completely this new political logic, the new states of Asia could imagine no other future than the creation of a state in the image of a racially homogenous people. The problem was, their national script now went, that historical circumstances had imposed on them other ethnic nationals, notably Chinese and Indians. These sojourners would only be allowed to stay provided they accepted the limits of this political identity and agreed to live as permanent minorities within an ethnic-majoritarian political space. What was beyond question was the 'right' of the Burman, Malay and Sinhala majority to define the parameters of political life in the newly forged multi-ethnic postcolonial states of Asia. The murky genealogy of national self-determination in other words led directly to the creation of new states that institutionalized divisions between the ethnic citizen and the sojourning alien.

The power of the norm of national self-determination came first from the urgency of removing alien rule but also from the source of its initial articulation, the international system. Sovereign independence for countries emerging from centuries of political subjugation was never just a question of overthrowing an illegitimate political overlord. It was also, crucially, about being able to join an international society that was already in existence, dominated by existing and former imperial powers, whose favour or rejection would shape the futures of new states in fundamental ways. International recognition could not be counted on. There were no explicit criteria or conditions to meet in order to be recognized; there was also no alternative world system to join in case of rejection.

The historic exclusion of non-European states from international society had made 'recognition' the procedure by which new states gained legal personality and entry into this closed system. Anthony Anghie demonstrates that so-called positive international law was used to reshape global hierarchies to exclude non-Western nations.[32] Positive international law gained ascendancy by critiquing existing 'natural' law for not distinguishing between civilized and uncivilized political entities also for not privileging states as the only sources of public law. In their view, law could be made only by civilized entities and only states possessing such qualities could be admitted into international society. Some non-Western societies were dismissed because they did not have a legal system at all, at least not one that was recognizable to European eyes. Others that did have a codified legal system were rejected because their systems were so alien that no 'proper legal relations' could be imagined between them and Europeans. These arguments were sustained even when there was prior historical evidence of Europeans signing treaties with indigenous rulers, as C. H. Alexandrowicz has shown in great detail.[33]

A fundamental question was whether non-Western states could be deemed sovereign entities. This issue was of great concern to the positivists, as sovereignty was held up as a basic principle of European society and sovereign states were the only ones entitled to make law. Anghie notes that '[t]he general answer [held by positivists] was that sovereignty implied control over territory'.[34] This immediately excluded from consideration political formations that were nomadic or itinerant, or whose control over territory followed modes other than the

prevailing metaphor of territory as the state's body.[35] A system of partial recognition first emerged. As the prominent nineteenth-century positivist John Westlake would bluntly state, 'Our international society exercises the right of admitting outside states to parts of its international law without necessarily admitting them to the whole of it.'[36] This highlights the liminal condition of such states as Turkey, Siam, Japan and Persia, countries that were clearly sovereign and boasted of long civilizations, but were neither European nor colonized. European states recognized their independence, and even signed treaties with them, but stopped far short of including them as members of international society.

With the positivists, the threshold question was marked by the inter-twined concepts of race and civilization. International society was 'limited to the civilized and Christian people or to those of European origin'. The jurist William Hall would propose that recognition was incumbent on states being 'brought by increasing civilization within the realm of law'.[37] Non-European states, for all their prior participation in international intercourse for four centuries, were now deemed to be beyond public law because they lacked the prior enabling condition of civilization. In a remarkable feat of legal and logical legerdemain, the positivists split sovereignty from society. The standard of civilization was now applied to exclude states that in all 'other' respects were sovereign territorial entities ruled by laws. Thereby, 'positivist jurists [were] able to overcome the historical fact that non-European states had previously been regarded as sovereign'. The logic now went as follows. Rather than defining sovereignty as the primary measure through which states could be included in international society, membership of international society was restricted those who were deemed 'civilized'. But, lacking membership of international society, how could these states be considered fully sovereign? By this circular (il)logic, non-Western states were now excluded from international society because they were not sovereign. This manoeuvre consolidated the binary opposition of civilized and sovereign, uncivilized and un-sovereign.

Asian and African states that had managed to remain largely free of direct or complete political subordination during the nineteenth century, namely Persia, Siam, China, Liberia, Ethiopia, and what would later be Turkey, had only been able to do so at the expense of formal sovereignty. The doctrine of extra-territoriality was the most explicit condition that governed the recognition of non-European states as partial members of the international system. Extra-territoriality meant that municipal laws, customs and judicial regulations did not apply to most European citizens and Americans. These individuals, if accused of violating a law, were entitled to appear before a court governed by the rules of their home country, not the laws of the country in which these violations had occurred.[38] The price of admission to the international system, in other words, came with a loss of territorial sovereignty.

The Soviet Union was another cautionary tale for states seeking admission to the international system on their own terms. A country premised on the rejection of the prevailing system of states had little choice but to find ways of

accommodating the Great Powers, initially to preserve its revolution, and later to conduct everyday practices of international intercourse, namely trade and diplomacy. The US recognition of Taiwan (Formosa) rather than the People's Republic of China as the legitimate representative of the Chinese people at the United Nations, a glaring anomaly that lasted a quarter of a century, made all too clear that these were not singular aberrations consigned to the past but ongoing conditions that governed entry into the international system. Moreover, simply becoming a member of the UN offered no guarantee of attracting the capital and expertise that newly independent and usually poor countries with limited natural resources needed so badly in order to develop and grow. Only substantive recognition would enable that.

Postcolonial resistance

The first group of former colonies to achieve political independence after World War II thus had not only to overcome the problem of meeting the impossible structural conditions of the nation-state, as noted above, but also to meet the criterion of civilization, a term of art that positive international law had made into a malleable condition of permanent or partial inclusion. Political independence brought with it two competing tendencies with respect to the foreign policies of newly independent states. The first was the need to conform, by any means necessary, to the impossible standards of international recognition. The second was born of the historical humiliations of the past: the imperative of never again allowing relations of subjugation to dominate the newly sovereign state. This imperative would be expressed through the effort to stigmatize irrevocably imperialism and colonialism, as well as to create international norms that would make impossible familiar forms of international domination. Both material weakness and moral clarity would become characteristic features of the foreign policies of newly independent states.

Among the first actions of newly independent India was to elevate the struggle against racial injustice to a global scale. Even before becoming a fully sovereign state and faced with many material weaknesses, India would condemn the exclusionary racial practices of the apartheid state of South Africa in the United Nations, starting as early as 1946. India's persistent call for international sanctions to be applied to South Africa would leave Western nations in a quandary. They could not deny the legitimacy of the Indian case while they sought at the same time to protect their considerable investments – political and economic – in the apartheid state. Repeated efforts to sanction South Africa in the UN Security Council were blocked by parliamentary and other manoeuvres, directed by the United Kingdom and the United States.

One source of the power of India's appeals against injustice came from its expression in a universal idiom. This was not a demand for redressing wrongs done to India directly or a claim that its immediate national interests were being injured, precluding any response that parochial or self-serving measures were at stake. India spoke in defence of liberal values that needed to be applied

consistently across the world, regardless of location. It was this anomalous combination of universality and weakness that amplified India's voice, while at the same time giving it a reputation as a sanctimonious upstart among the discomfited Great Powers. India would move aggressively to delegitimize colonial and imperial actions in other domains as well, hosting a 19-country conference in Delhi to end the Dutch effort to retain its Indonesian colony in 1949. It would regularly denounce the practice of delaying freedom to colonies in the name of 'getting them ready' for sovereign independence, including during meetings of the British Commonwealth. India would get involved in issues far beyond its shores, in effect treating all of Asia as its backyard, successfully inserting its voice into negotiations over the futures of war-torn Korea and Indochina. In the mid-1950s, liberal India and the communist People's Republic of China would jointly frame a set of five basic principles, Panchsheela, to govern their mutual interactions, making it clear that differing ideological presumptions were not an absolute barrier to international agreement. They hoped to show by example that 'peaceful coexistence', for all its communist overtones, could be an effective means of questioning the inevitability of global conflict.

India was not alone in this regard. In the years following independence, the other members of the Colombo Powers, namely, Indonesia, Burma and Ceylon, also felt that making their voices heard – regardless of how few tanks they owned – was their sovereign prerogative and moral duty. The right to be heard was, as they saw it, one of the practical meanings of sovereignty. Moreover, the importance of the issues they were calling attention to, namely freedom from political and economic subjugation and the right to pursue national objectives on their own terms, were beyond question. Their common colonial experience was, initially, sufficient glue for these Asian countries to forge a joint position on issues that few other countries were willing to raise in spite of their obvious centrality to the international system as a whole.

The Bandung Conference would prove that a non-Western racial identity and a common historical experience were insufficient conditions on which to build a platform for international unity and progressive change. The racism that pervaded the contemporary international system had led to the easy assumption that non-Western countries shared enough in common to come together and to begin the process of articulating a more peaceful and just international order. At the same time, such a coalition of ex-colonial states heightened the fears of Western Great Powers (who knew a thing or two about this) that the coloured races were 'ganging up on them'. The United States in particular would make sure through its regional proxies – Lebanon, the Philippines, Thailand, Pakistan and Turkey – that this historic meeting would be riven by internal disagreement.[39] However, it must be noted, US actions only exaggerated already existing differences among the newly independent states of Afro-Asia. These included struggles over leadership of the group, the desire of radical leaders to demand reforms beyond (as seen by others) reasonable expectations, interpersonal animosities, and unresolved bilateral political disputes including the ongoing problem of overseas ethnic minorities. The intense

scrutiny of the conference by the world's media ensured that even the slightest misstep could be blown up into an international incident.[40] The conference was in such grave danger of ending inconclusively that Jawaharlal Nehru would spurn the suggestion by Ceylon's John Kotelawala to hold a rapid follow-up meeting, noting that among the greatest successes of the Bandung Conference was its barely-forged consensus. There was no guarantee, in other words, that this necessary outcome could be repeated ever again.[41]

The sobering lessons of Bandung began with the realization that the founding principles of a new world order would have to come from politics, not history. Countries needed first to forge agreement on what was wrong with the existing world system; a common historical experience could not provide the basis of agreement. Whatever solidarity a common anti-colonial struggle may once have engendered, it was no longer enough to ensure a joint front on other burning issues of the day. As the conference had effortlessly proved, a common racial heritage was no guarantee of consensus. For a country such as India, struggling to cope with hostile pressures from Pakistan, Indonesia and China, propinquity was the real problem. Seen in this light, the best thing about Egypt and Yugoslavia, other than the close political agreement among their respective leaders, was that they were far enough away from each other not to have any outstanding grievances. That each leader also represented (by the terms of contemporary understanding) a different race and civilization was an added benefit that had tremendous symbolic value. This troika could claim, far more legitimately than did the compromised Bandung Conference, to represent the weaker majority of the world. Bandung did lead to the Non-Aligned Movement, but in a manner exactly opposite to the way this succession is usually portrayed.

Conclusion

Decolonization did not come about because Western liberal states saw the errors of their ways. It was forced upon the Great Powers as the final event of a long history of struggle and sacrifice performed across the world going back at least a century. Beyond bruised national egos, decolonization was also, for the Great Powers, a challenge in managing this 'great transformation' in such a way that the existing international order was not substantially upended. Political sovereignty was meaningless in practice unless accepted by the existing international community, and hence international recognition became a crucial means of enforcing the status quo. The absolute need for newly independent countries to become full members of the international system was the stick that forced them to accept the existing terms of international order as a condition of entry. Thus we would see repeated assurances by the first generation of Third World international lawyers that they had no interest in seeking radical change; their critique of the prevailing order did not go beyond seeking to make international law more representative of global diversity.[42]

The unequal terms of entry and unjust conditions facing countries newly admitted to the international order did not resign them to political quiescence.

They continued to struggle for change on many fronts, and achieved particular success in stigmatizing imperial efforts to retain colonial possessions and to order domestic hierarchies on the basis of racial difference. Given their multiple material weaknesses, however, the most obvious postcolonial tactic for progressive change was international coalition-building in the hope that greater numbers would compensate for the lack of power. This moment was the clearest instance of the extent to which race structured contemporary global thought. The first generation of Third World coalitions 'naturally' gravitated to political alliances built around racial similarity. 'Asia' and 'Africa' were assumed to be sufficient conditions for political formation, regardless of the many differences dividing the countries brought together under these continental labels. The events of the early postcolonial period showed unequivocally that race was an insufficient foundation on which to build political agreement. Such a realization did not however come from enlightened analysis or auto-critique: it was a bitter lesson that followed from the practical difficulties of sustaining racial alliances, as the Bandung Conference showed most vividly. Racial homogeneity would turn out to be no substitute for the hard work of forging and sustaining agreement on basic political principles.

This chapter has sketched a vision of the international environment leading up to the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement. The meetings of Indian, Egyptian and Yugoslavian leaders from the mid-1950s onward did not (and could not) begin from assumed agreement on the basis of history or race. Their differences were, in retrospect, their greatest strength as they did not permit the luxury of easy assumptions, forcing the troika to work out explicitly to what extent they agreed over the political problems facing them and the world. That they had plenty to agree about given the uneven distribution of world power they all faced is not in question, nor is there any doubt that they were also willing to consider creating this movement for reasons of national self-interest. The point is that they had to discover and work through issues of mutual agreement for themselves, without recourse to misleading assumptions uncritically derived from the apparent homologies of common history and race. Once agreement had been forged, the multi-racial character of the non-aligned coalition became the most obvious sign that this novel grouping of states represented a global future, not a parochial past. Once this grouping was created, there could be no discursive recourse to the racism of the past. Its multi-racial symbolism is what made NAM the embodiment of the structural change that decolonization promised (and is also what produced widespread fears among supporters of the global status quo ante).

That said, the semiotics of the non-alignment movement should not be conflated with its politics. NAM may have captured the imagination of the world at its founding because it symbolized like little else the end of an international scale long structured through racial difference. It should not be forgotten, however, that what sustained this novel formation in its early years was political agreement that the greatest disruption to world order came from the demand to take sides in a global conflict that could lead to mutually assured destruction.

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Part II

Cold War entanglements

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4 The non-aligned

Apart from and still within the Cold War

Lorenz Lüthi

Although the Non-Aligned Movement tried to transcend the Cold War, its foundation in 1961 was triggered, and its first dozen years were shaped, by the superpower conflict.[1] The movement combined a diverse group of mostly African, Asian and Latin American countries, which shared anxieties over their lack of influence in international relations, over economic development, and over peace in general. Yet the great variety of individual national interests as well as the onset of Soviet–American détente in the early 1970s weakened the internal glue of the movement. Thus, after the inflated worldwide presence of the movement during its initial decade, it disappeared from a position of international influence rather quickly.

From the very beginning, the Non-Aligned Movement faced the problem of how to engage with the bipolar international system. On the one hand, as its name suggests, the movement was supposed to stand apart from the Cold War blocs; on the other, its very existence was about increasing the voice of its members in the Soviet–American discourse. Thus, the movement was a part of the Cold War, even if it did not want to be a participant. This inherent contradiction almost tore the movement apart during its first dozen years. Only after détente had helped to dampen the direct causes for these strains did the movement sail into less choppy waters. However, it thereby also lost much of its raison d'être.

In the period under discussion in this chapter, 1961–1973, the Cold War had not yet engulfed large parts of Asia, Africa, and Latin America; it was only over the course of the 1970s that it expanded into the Third World. In the 1960s, it was Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia that were the main theatres of the superpower struggle. Since another chapter in this volume concentrates on Germany, the focus here will be on the impact that nuclear issues, the Middle East and the Indochina conflict had on the Non-Aligned Movement. The nuclear antagonism between the superpowers, which had reached its peak during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, and the subsequent nuclear competition between China and India shaped the concerns of the movement from the very beginning. In the Middle East, as the superpowers lined up on either side of the Israeli–Arab divide in mid-1967, the movement sided with one of its founding members, Egypt, thereby putting into question the essence of non-alignment. And finally,

in East Asia, the anti-colonial reflexes of the movement led it astray toward support of North Vietnam and the emerging Pol Pot regime in Cambodia in the first half of the 1970s.

Despite the existence and accessibility of substantial archival holdings in several countries, the Non-Aligned Movement has not attracted much scholarly attention. The archives of the former Democratic Republic of Germany hold a great number of sources on the policies of various non-aligned countries and the Soviet Union. Documents from the archives of the former Yugoslavia shed light on discussions within the movement as well as its relations to the Middle East. The Chinese foreign ministry archive and the Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library contain important documents on nuclear issues. Czech, Bulgarian, Swiss and British archives provide otherwise unavailable information on a wide range of topics.

Nuclear weapons

The fear of a worldwide nuclear war was a paramount concern throughout the Cold War. The technical sophistication and economic resources needed to invent, build and maintain nuclear weapons, including their delivery systems, set great powers apart from small ones. After the United States in 1945, the Soviet Union tested its first nuclear device in 1949, the United Kingdom in 1952, France in 1960, and the People's Republic of China in 1964. Thus the creation of the Non-Aligned Movement occurred between the first successful tests by France and China.

The limitation of the nuclear arms race and of nuclear testing had become a major issue in the 1950s. Afro-Asian countries opposed nuclear weapons as racist arms that were used only against Asian people, as in the case of Japan in 1945 and in the case of nuclear threats in Korea in 1950.[2] Under international public pressure, the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom eventually agreed to talk about nuclear issues in 1958, without having defined what the final goal of their negotiations should be.[3]

At the fifteenth meeting of the United Nations General Assembly in New York in the autumn of 1960, African and neutral countries again called on the superpowers to disarm.[4] In their invitation letter to the first conference of the Non-Aligned Movement half a year later, Josip Broz Tito from Yugoslavia and Gamal Adbel Nasser from Egypt called on the 'non-aligned countries' to work for the 'safeguarding [of] peace in the world'.[5] During the preparatory meeting in Cairo in June 1961, however, nuclear weapons were not a major topic,[6] although the meeting's communiqué listed nuclear weapons and disarmament as areas of concern for the movement.[7]

Nuclear weapons appeared on the agenda of the movement shortly before the start of the First Non-Aligned conference in Belgrade on 1–6 September 1961. On 31 August, Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev publicly announced the resumption of nuclear testing.[8] He thereby unilaterally ended a test moratorium between the Soviet Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom that had

been in place for almost three years.[9] Only France had pierced the tranquility in nuclear testing with four atmospheric tests between February 1960 and April 1961.[10] On 27 August 1961, four days before the public announcement, Khrushchev explained his decision to abandon the moratorium; given that the United States and the United Kingdom allegedly could test their weapons through third countries like France while they formally adhered to an international test moratorium, the Soviet Union could not risk continuing to adhere by itself any longer.[11] Even if Khrushchev claimed that the impending Soviet tests were 'necessary in the interest of strength', they were in reality political tests without any military significance.[12] Khrushchev himself referred to the 50-megaton bomb that was to be tested as a 'sword of Damocles' that was dangling over 'the heads of the capitalists'.[13]

The announcement of the super-bomb test on 31 August, one day before the opening of the Belgrade conference, was an affront to the Non-Aligned Movement. To add insult to injury, Tito himself poured oil on the fire during his speech on 3 September by adopting Khrushchev's faulty reasoning of France being used by the United States and the United Kingdom for breaching the moratorium. The declaration issued by the conference on 6 September addressed disarmament only in points 15 and 16, calling it 'the most urgent task of mankind'.[14] However, the conference sent Jawaharlal Nehru and Kwame Nkrumah to Moscow with a letter of concern to Khrushchev, while a similar letter was carried to John F. Kennedy by Sukarno of Indonesia and Modibo Keïta from Mali.[15] In the talks, Khrushchev could not convince Nehru und Nkrumah of his position on the resumption of nuclear testing.[16]

The Soviet resumption of nuclear testing turned out to be a double boomerang for Khrushchev. Not only did it alienate the Non-Aligned Movement, but the Soviet super-bomb test a month later was also the last straw for the United States. In mid-November, the Kennedy administration published intelligence estimates of Soviet nuclear capabilities which revealed that the Soviet Union did not possess sufficient delivery systems to threaten the United States with a nuclear strike, to say nothing of a strike using the super-bomb.[17] By late 1961, the Soviet Union had neither credible nuclear deterrence capabilities against the United States nor a lot of sympathy within the Non-Aligned Movement.

Frustrated by the lack of progress in the nuclear disarmament talks and by the American decision in early 1962 to resume testing, the eight 'unaligned' members of the 17-nation UN disarmament conference in Geneva demanded, on 16 April, that the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union start serious negotiations on nuclear arms limitation.[18] Over the following summer, fears about a possible Chinese test led the Kennedy administration to propose a test ban treaty. Yet, unbeknownst to Washington, Moscow had already stopped its nuclear assistance to China by the late 1950s. However, the Soviet Union paid lip-service to the American proposals in 1961 because it had already embarked on the shipping of medium-range nuclear missiles to Cuba. The Missile Crisis in October 1962 not only brought the world close to nuclear war but also forced Khrushchev through a catharsis on the issue of nuclear war. The

Soviet leader eventually agreed to a Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which contained a weak non-proliferation clause that was implicitly directed against China, in mid-1963.[19] Yet this first nuclear arms limitation agreement received an almost universal welcome in the world. Within only few months, the vast majority of the non-nuclear powers acceded. Among the non-aligned, only Saudi Arabia, Guinea and Cambodia refused to do so.[20]

On 16 October 1964, less than one week after the declaration of the Second Non-Aligned conference, held in Cairo, had called for the destruction and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons,[21] China successfully tested its first nuclear device. It thereby became the world's fifth nuclear power. The timing, shortly after the end of the Cairo conference, was accidental. Yet the leaders of many Third World countries within and outside of the Non-Alignment Movement reacted with jubilation to the first 'Afro-Asian' bomb.[22]

The Chinese bomb test had a profound effect on two leading members of the Non-Aligned Movement, who just had signed a declaration to forgo any nuclear desires. During a visit of Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi in Cairo in early November, Nasser asked for nuclear assistance.[23] From early 1964, the Johnson administration had offered nuclear desalinization plants to both Israel and Egypt.[24] The US president believed that this would bring a possible nuclear arms race in the Middle East under outside control.[25] In the wake of the Chinese nuclear test in October 1964, Nasser turned to the Chinese leaders to escape US control of his country's own nascent nuclear program. Yet cooperation with China never materialized. By August 1965, Nasser had decided to invite the Soviet Union, China's sworn enemy, to the impending meeting of the Afro-Asian movement, which China had tried to control for some time. In the end, the prospect of nuclear aid from China was not enough to trump Nasser's disgust with Mao's political radicalism.[26]

India's reaction to the Chinese bomb test was similar to Egypt's, but for different reasons. Since the second Sino-Indian border war in October 1962, the relationship of the former friends had deteriorated. While, at the Cairo conference, India officially pushed for a tough non-proliferation treaty and an immediate ban on nuclear testing,[27] public opinion in the country shifted toward calls for a nuclear weapons program after the Chinese test. At the end of the year, Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri, who personally preferred to follow Nehru's policy on staying away from nuclear weapons, succumbed to public pressure when he agreed to a policy of keeping the option for nuclear weapons open. On 18 May 1974, India successfully tested its first nuclear device, becoming the world's sixth nuclear power.[28] Nuclear disarmament as a goal of the Non-Alignment Movement had suffered a major defeat.

The Arab–Israeli conflict

The Arab–Israeli antagonism was not, at its heart, a Cold War conflict. In 1956, both Washington and Moscow *supported* Cairo during the Suez Crisis. At the Belgrade conference in 1961, Egypt was impartial to either of the superpowers

because relations had soured with both. By the mid-1960s, Cairo was leaning toward Moscow.[29] It was the short war between Israel and three of its Arab neighbours in mid-1967, however, that turned the Arab–Israeli conflict into a superpower clash. Over the course of six days of fighting (5–11 June), Egypt broke relations with Israel's ally – the United States[30] – while the Soviet Union, followed by all East European members of the Warsaw Pact excluding Romania, terminated relations with Israel.[31]

In the Middle East crisis, Tito's Yugoslavia sided with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact from the very beginning. During the conflict, the Warsaw Pact members discussed their reaction in a hastily called and top secret 9 June conference, in which Tito participated as the head of the only non-member state.[32] Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union coordinated their policies in the immediate aftermath of the war; Nikolai Podgorny, the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, met Tito twice while travelling through Belgrade on the way to and from Cairo in late June.[33] In July and September, Yugoslavia and the Warsaw Pact members, except Romania, met in Budapest, Belgrade and Zagreb for talks on further military and diplomatic aid for Egypt.[34] More meetings followed in Moscow in early November and Warsaw in December.[35]

During a visit to India for the celebrations of Republic Day in January 1968, Tito conferred with the Chairman of the Soviet State Council Aleksei Kosygin and India's Prime Minister Indira Gandhi on the Middle East. According to a contemporaneous Soviet source, even the invitation of socialist states to a new non-aligned conference was discussed but left open.[36] Moscow could be content with its diplomatic rapprochement with the non-aligned, particularly after it had alienated the movement in 1961 with its nuclear policies.[37] However, Tito's pro-Soviet diplomacy threatened the very nature of the movement. If the socialist states suddenly were a part of non-alignment, how non-aligned would the movement still be?

Tito never had to face this question head-on, as Soviet actions destroyed the basis for cooperation within only half a year. On 21 August 1968, the Warsaw Pact intervened militarily in one of its member states, Czechoslovakia, with the goal to restore socialism there, or so the claim went.[38] The Warsaw Pact intervention, however, revealed the level of the disunity within the Non-Aligned Movement with regard to major issues in international relations.

Yugoslavia found itself in a small group of socialist countries, including China and Romania, which feared that they would be targets of what later became known as the Brezhnev Doctrine: Moscow's self-appropriated right to intervene in the internal affairs of other states if it saw the socialist order threatened there. Tito accused the Warsaw Pact of 'trampling the sovereignty of a socialist country with the feet'.[39] An East German analysis deplored that Yugoslavia compared the intervention in Czechoslovakia with the 'US aggression against the Vietnamese people and the Israeli aggression against the Arab people'.[40] As the Kremlin realized, however, the Yugoslav dissatisfaction with the Soviet Union was so deep that it threatened to turn the Non-Aligned Movement against the socialist world.[41] Moscow tried to mend fences by sending

foreign minister Andrei Gromyko to Belgrade for a week in early September in 1969, but to little avail.[42] An improvement of relations occurred only in 1971 and eventually with Tito's June 1972 visit to Moscow, when he received the Lenin Medal for his achievements in socialist world politics.[43]

On the day of the Warsaw Pact intervention, 21 August, India's Prime Minister Indira Gandhi expressed in parliament 'her profound concern' about the violation of 'the principle of non-interference … [which] constitutes the very basis of peaceful coexistence'. Although she mentioned that India had good relations with the socialist world, she concluded her report by 'giv[ing] expression to our anguish at the events in Czechoslovakia'.[44] India's agony, however, soon dissipated as the country's strategic needs moved to the forefront. When the Sino-Soviet border conflict turned bloody with military clashes in early March of 1969, Moscow and Delhi closed ranks against Beijing.[45] Yet the stiff policy which the Soviet Union embarked on towards China in the aftermath of the border clashes did not find adherents in India.[46] The events in Prague in August 1968 had reminded Delhi of Moscow's insensitive and unprincipled foreign policy.

While Tito and Indira Gandhi condemned the Warsaw Pact intervention, Nasser was caught on the wrong foot. Given the lack of progress toward any solution in the Middle East crisis in mid-1967, he had sought military and diplomatic assistance from the Soviet Union for a year.[47] Six weeks after his visit to Moscow in July 1968, Nasser found himself in the quicksand of Soviet foreign policy. Initially, Egypt supported the intervention in Czechoslovakia.[48] Yet as the international fallout from Moscow's intervention in Prague became obvious, Cairo fell silent.[49] For many Egyptians, the Soviet leaders had claimed to oppose imperialists following the June 1967 war, and then behaved just like them 14 months later.[50]

As Tito had taken the lead to realign the movement with the Warsaw Pact after June 1967, he again took the lead to separate it from the socialist world after August 1968. By January 1969, Belgrade had obtained the agreement of Delhi, Jakarta, Kabul, Addis Ababa and Cairo to call a consultative conference in the Yugoslav capital.[51] On 7 February, Tito announced this conference for the following summer.[52] After his gaffe of seeking a quasi-alliance with the socialist camp, Tito hoped to focus the movement on national liberation in the Third World, which in turn would keep Yugoslavia in the 'limelight' of the movement.[53] In the end, however, the consultative conference was a 'gathering of lesser men speaking with an uncertain voice', as British report mockingly pointed out. Nehru, Sukarno, Nkrumah – all had 'disappeared from the scene'. And Nasser, 'chastened' after the defeat the previous summer, did not attend.[54]

The final communiqué reflected the inner conflicts of the movement; some participants even criticized it immediately after its release. It endorsed the unspecified idea of a 'third-world summit meeting' and the 'full restoration of the rights of the Arab people of Palestine to their usurped land'.[55] The Belgrade consultative meeting had not turned out a show of unity as Tito may have hoped.[56]

The Middle East as a Cold War conflict did not play a major role during the Lusaka conference in September 1970 or the Algiers conference three years later. One reason for this development was related to events in the Middle East itself. Before the start of the Lusaka conference on 6 September, fighting erupted between radical Palestinian groups and the Jordanian army.[57] On the day of the conference's opening, a splinter group, the People's Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), hijacked four civilian airplanes in international airspace and eventually blew them up on an abandoned airfield in Jordan's desert. In the face of the crisis, Nasser did not even go to Lusaka. On 5 and 6 September he hosted an emergency meeting of the Arab League in Cairo which was supposed to find an end to the strife in Jordan.[58] After engaging in frantic diplomatic efforts for weeks, Nasser managed to get a Palestinian–Jordanian armistice agreement on 29 September 1970.[59] The following day, he suffered a fatal heart attack.[60]

Nasser's successor, Anwar Sadat, soon realized that he had to separate the Arab–Israeli conflict from the Cold War. The new Egyptian leader understood that Soviet policies in the Middle East were not conducive to the ultimate settlement of the Arab–Israeli conflict, as they cemented the status quo of continued belligerency.[61] In July 1972, a month after Tito had visited Moscow to receive his Lenin Medal, Sadat broke his country's friendship and military assistance treaty with the Soviet Union.[62] The Egyptian leader immediately informed US President Nixon about this development, hinting at his hope for an American diplomatic engagement in the Middle East.[63] Yet the diplomatic returns did not materialize as Sadat had hoped. Washington was too occupied with the final military and political struggles of the Vietnam War and the impending presidential election.[64]

Without any prospects for US diplomatic assistance, Sadat was caught in limbo between the deadlocked Arab–Israeli conflict, which he tried to solve, and the Cold War in Middle East, which he tried to exit. Eventually, he decided to go to war against Israel with purpose of forcing the Arab–Israeli conflict onto the international agenda,[65] while simultaneously mobilizing support from various international organizations outside of the Cold War order, such as the Organization of African States or the Organization of the Islamic Conference, for that endeavour. The goal was to generate diplomatic and economic pressure on the United States and Western Europe, to isolate Israel internationally before the planned October War, and to solidify post-conflict solidarity afterwards. As a Swiss embassy report from April 1973 asserted, Egypt's gamble on international solidarity was more likely to work this time than in 1967, when only a small number of states in the Third World were critical of Israel.[66] In this context the Fourth Non-Aligned Conference met in Algiers on 5–9 September, just a month before the start of the October War. During the gathering Sadat pursued a quiet diplomacy of mobilizing the Non-Aligned Movement for the impending showdown with Israel.[67]

Indeed, getting rid of the Cold War in the Middle East turned out to be a winning strategy for Sadat. While Washington and Moscow agreed on an international conference to solve the Middle East conflict after the October War, it

was American diplomacy between Egypt and Israel that helped untie the military entanglements that had existed since 1967 on the Sinai.[68] Ultimately, the Non-Aligned Movement did not help to solve even one aspect of the Middle East Crisis.

The Indochina conflict

The Non-Aligned Movement became involved in the Indochina conflict through membership of Cambodia, one of three countries of that region and the only member in the movement among them. At the time of the First Non-Aligned conference in Belgrade, the prospect of renewed war in Vietnam had already appeared like the portents of a massive summer storm on the horizon. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) had decided by 1959 to seek a military solution to its failed efforts at peaceful reunification, and the United States economically and militarily supported the recalcitrant regime in the south.[69] In neighbouring Laos, the royal government and a communist-inspired guerrilla force engaged in a civil war.[70]

It was in this context that Cambodia attended the Belgrade conference in 1961. Beforehand, it had carved out a stand of neutrality in international relations and thus gained membership in the Non-Aligned Movement.[71] However, neither Cambodia as a participant nor Indochina as a topic played a major role in Belgrade in 1961. The Second Non-Aligned Conference in Cairo occurred just a month after the Gulf of Tonkin Incident on 2 August 1964, which triggered the second Indochina war (the American Vietnam War, 1964–1973). In the wake of the incident, Cambodia's policy of neutrality and commitment to non-alignment wavered for the first time. The country's head of state, former king Norodom Sihanouk, in fact called for a conference of North Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia to discuss cooperation in the impending conflict against the United States and South Vietnam. In this context, he also decided not to attend the impending Cairo conference as a delegate himself.[72] Obviously, he was willing to engage more strongly with the aligned DRV than with the Non-Aligned Movement. Accusing the Republic of Vietnam, the US ally in South Vietnam, of bombing campaigns against neutral Cambodia, Phnom Penh in late October terminated relations with Washington and Saigon while recognizing Hanoi.[73]

In the following years, Sihanouk walked a fine line in keeping his country out of the war, cooperating with North Vietnam, Laos and China, and juggling the increasingly polarized situation at home. However, after the Tet Offensive in Vietnam in early 1968, which seemed to shift the focus of the war from the battlefield to the negotiation table, Sihanouk speculated about the impending end to the conflict.[74] This ostensible change in the situation required some strategic rethinking in the game of establishing or resuming diplomatic relations. In mid-April of 1969, Cambodia announced the restoration of its relationship with the United States.[75] To counterweigh the impression of moving towards the United States, Sihanouk decided to elevate the missions of the National Liberation Front (NLF), the DRV-sponsored guerrilla movement in South Vietnam, to the level

of full embassies.[76] Thereby, however, he discriminated against the government of the Republic of Vietnam in the south by recognizing its internal enemy.[77]

Sihanouk was in the end unable to balance the polarizing situation within his own country. In late March 1970, his own prime minister, Lon Nol, deposed him and then engaged in an openly pro-American policy.[78] With that, the Non-Aligned Movement faced the dilemma of what to do with Cambodian membership. Egypt early on announced that it would not recognize the new government as legitimate.[79] But what do to with Sihanouk, who still claimed to be the legal head of the Cambodian government?

After being deposed, the former king travelled into exile to Beijing.[80] On 5 May, Sihanouk formed a coalition government-in-exile together with the Khmer Rouge, the Cambodian communists, led by Pol Pot and waging a guerrilla war against Lon Nol.[81] In late May, he travelled to North Vietnam for a 'little summit' to discuss cooperation with China and unity among North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia-in-exile.[82] At this point, however, Sihanouk could no longer claim to be a follower of a policy of neutralism.

The Indochina conflict rattled the consultative conference of the Non-Aligned Movement in Dar es Salaam in mid-April 1970, which occurred just between Lon Nol's coup and Sihanouk's foundation of a government-in-exile. Lon Nol and Sihanouk both claimed the right of Cambodia's representation, and, to make things even more complicated, the pseudo-government of the NLF – the so-called Republic of South Vietnam (RSV) – requested full membership. The consultative conference came to the impracticable conclusion that the two Cambodian warring parties should agree on a joint delegation to the impending Lusaka conference.[83] But while the Lusaka conference in early September 1970 could only agree on observer status for RSV, it still could not decide on the Cambodian issue. Seven member states supported Lon Nol, and just seventeen Sihanouk – both far short of the majority.[84]

The Cambodian issue exploded at the foreign ministers' conference of the Non-Aligned Movement in Georgetown, Guyana, in early August 1972. The fracas occurred over a request by the RSV for full membership. A majority agreed, but five countries from that world region – Indonesia, Malaysia, Laos, Singapore and Burma – and another three African countries opposed the idea. When the chairman of the conference, Guyana's Foreign Minister Sonny Ramphal, prematurely announced that the conference had reached an agreement by consensus, the delegations of Indonesia, Malaysia and Laos protested violation of procedure and walked out of the conference.[85] With some of the staunchest supporters of Lon Nol's regime gone, the conference quickly decided to award Cambodia's representation to Sihanouk's exile government.[86] The first formal non-aligned conference in the Western hemisphere ended in turmoil and internal division.[87]

The issue of the representation of Cambodia plagued the preparations for the Algiers conference in the summer of 1973. The Paris agreements of January had terminated American participation in the Vietnam War. A month later, the warring parties in the Laotian civil war also agreed to end strife.[88] But civil war

in Cambodia continued, and Lon Nol could claim to have been in power for three years. He thus demanded in May the right to represent Cambodia in the Non-Aligned Movement.[89] Yet despite all of this, the Non-Aligned Movement decided to keep Cambodian representation with the exile government for the Algiers conference.[90]

This all raises the question why the Non-Alignment Movement gave up on its neutralism with regard to Indochina in August 1972. The exclusion of Lon Nol's pro-American government broke the movement's own approach to member states that underwent sudden, radical internal changes; Indonesia's authoritarian and pro-American government, for example, had not been expelled following the anti-communist right-wing coup in 1965. With the admission of the RSV in 1972, the members of the Non-Alignment Movement also broke with their decision from three years before not to admit any liberation movements. In any case, they had already contravened that very decision, at least in spirit, in 1969, just after it was taken, by granting a hearing to the Palestinian Liberation Organization.[91] The decisions of 1972 essentially symbolized a shift of opinion among the members states that mirrored changes in international public opinion; most of the world's countries had openly or implicitly sided with the anti-American cause in Indochina, which in reality was closely tied to the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. Unfortunately, this kind of anti-Americanism by the vast majority of the movement not only constituted a departure from the ideals of non-alignment in the Cold War but also legitimized, on an international plane, the authoritarian brand of Vietnamese communism and its totalitarian variation under Pol Pot, which was allied with Sihanouk's exile government in China.

Conclusion

In 1973, many of the Cold War problems that had plagued the Non-Aligned Movement either were disappearing quickly or had become less acute. Nuclear arms limitation had been enshrined in the SALT I agreement the same year. Sadat's policies had limited both Cold War and non-aligned influence in the Middle East in 1973 as well. And Indochina seemed to be on the road to a settlement, except for the member state Cambodia itself. Thus, the movement entered a phase in which it had to change its focus toward problems that concerned primarily the growing number of member states, such as economic development.[92]

The development arch from 1961 to 1973 was related to the inherent problems of the movement. The non-aligned were in general politically too disparate to develop the influence that they had hoped for in 1961. What did Yugoslavia share with Saudi Arabia, or Guinea with Indonesia? The charismatic personalities of Tito, Nasser and Nehru managed to compensate programmatic shortcomings in the early years. But even among the big three, there was no agreement on what the precise role of the movement in international relations should be. In any case, by 1973 only one of the big three remained in power, aged and beyond his prime.[93] The successors of the other two, although impressive in their own ways, lacked the charisma or the will to step into the large shoes left by their

predecessors. The fundamental problem remained that, beyond the claim that the non-aligned were just non-aligned, there was 'no real common ethos except a feeling of having been badly done by', as a British report noted in 1973.[94]

The weak internal glue among the non-aligned was severely stressed when leading member states were forced to decide between two opposite choices: the movement's stated goals or their own vital strategic interests. Faced with the nuclear-armed arch-enemy China, India jettisoned the 1964 promise not to seek nuclear weapons. Yugoslavia first tried to lead the Non-Aligned Movement into a pro-Arab alliance with the socialist world after mid-1967, but within little more than one year sacrificed its commitments to Egypt over perceived Soviet threats to its own security. And finally, Egypt itself came to see non-alignment in the early 1970s more as an instrument in its own national strategy than as a value in itself.

Internal weakness also was compounded by external stresses. First, Khrushchev's proclivity to use nuclear threats and carry out bomb tests in the superpower Cold War without thinking about collateral diplomatic damage imposed nuclear arms issues onto the Belgrade conference in 1961 on very short notice. The non-aligned rendered pressure on the nuclear powers to negotiate a Limited Nuclear Test Ban treaty in 1962. However, even some of the important members were not immune to the allure of nuclear weapons when their own strategic interests were concerned after the first successful Chinese A-bomb test in 1964. And second, in Indochina, the regional Cold War in East Asia imposed itself on the Non-Aligned Movement when Cambodia was drawn into the maelstrom of the second Vietnam War. The non-reflective application of anti-imperialism led to the representation of a membership country by a deposed king who made common cause with aligned countries and a wicked communist movement. Suspending Cambodian membership would have made more sense. In the end, in the period from 1961 to 1973 the Non-Aligned Movement was as much a participant in the Cold War as it was a victim.

Notes

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5 Between idealism and pragmatism

Tito, Nehru and the Hungarian crisis, 1956[1]

Nataša Mišković

1956 was a key year of the Cold War. In February, Nikita Khrushchev gave his famous Secret Speech at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). In June, uprisings in the Soviet satellite states of Poland and Hungary reached a first climax. On 19 July, on the Adriatic island of Brioni, Yugoslavia's president Josip Broz Tito, India's prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Egypt's president Gamal Abdel Nasser signed a joint statement 'on principles which should govern international relations', often referred to as the founding document of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).[2] One week later, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal without informing his two political mentors, Tito and Nehru. In October, Israeli, British and French troops attacked Egypt in retaliation, while the Red Army occupied Hungary, suppressing the popular uprising led by Imre Nagy. Both these military invasions challenged the signatories of the Brioni statement in a particular way. Nasser needed Nehru's and Tito's support in the Suez Crisis, and Tito was involved in the Hungarian events. In his attempt to reintegrate Yugoslavia into the socialist camp, Khrushchev made Tito complicit in the second invasion, but at the same time, Imre Nagy sought asylum in the Yugoslav embassy in Budapest. The credibility of all three promoters of non-alignment was at stake.

Both events have been researched intensely within the fields of area studies and Cold War history, but the Indian and Yugoslav perspectives have never been examined in relation to each other. This chapter studies the Hungarian crisis through the prism of Tito's and Nehru's correspondence, which is particularly revealing because the crisis put the two statesmen's declared joint aims of active neutrality to the test, and therefore highlights new aspects of both this particular event and the beginnings of the Non-Aligned Movement. This case study is part of a large research project exploring the relationship between Tito, Nehru and Nasser and the founding of the Non-Aligned Movement, based on archival research at the Museum for Yugoslav History (Muzej istorije Jugoslavije) in Belgrade and the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library in New Delhi.[3] It focuses on the two statesmen's scope of action during a tense geopolitical situation, highlighting the importance of trust between the political leaders as well as their balancing between idealism and pragmatism at the peak of an acute crisis.

The chapter starts with an analysis of Nehru's, Tito's and Khrushchev's understanding of the principles of peaceful coexistence, a concept which they all claimed to honour. In this context, the Brioni Declaration is interpreted as a test-run for Tito and Nehru, who wanted to find out about their possibilities as mediators between the two blocs of the Cold War. The second section recounts the Hungarian uprising, the Yugoslav entanglements in it, and Nehru's efforts to understand the situation. The third and last section explores Tito's and Nehru's crisis management during the peak of the crisis, in November 1956, on the basis of their correspondence.

Nehru, Tito, Khrushchev and the five principles of peaceful coexistence

Panchsheela

Stalin's death in March 1953 opened up a power struggle within the Soviet leadership, which was anxiously observed on the international political scene, but poorly understood. Nikita Khrushchev had taken hold as the new Secretary General of the CPSU by summer, announcing a 'New Course' as early as June 1953. However, the consolidation of his power within the party leadership and in the member states of the socialist camp was his first aim. The president of the UN General Assembly, Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, asked for Tito's opinion on this matter during her visit to Yugoslavia in July 1954. The Marshal dryly stated that the United States of America was actually the bigger threat to world peace but that 'expansion was inherent in Soviet communism'.[4] One year later – and one month after the signing of the Warsaw Pact on 15 April 1955 – Nikita Khrushchev visited Yugoslavia. The trip was a political sensation, topped only by the Soviet leader's speech upon his arrival at Belgrade airport: it was an apology for Stalin's expulsion of Yugoslavia from the communist camp in 1948.

In November of the same year, together with Prime Minister Nikolai A. Bulganin, Khrushchev travelled to India for the first time.[5] A member of the British Commonwealth, the Indian Union had long been denounced as a part of the Western bloc by the Soviets. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru then proved his independence during the Korean War and was among the first to recognize the new communist government of China. Nehru configured India as a leading Asian power and wished to settle relations with its potentially dangerous neighbour and rival to the north. Celebrating Asian unity and independence, on 29 April 1954 he and Mao's Foreign Minister Zhou En-Lai signed a 'Declaration on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence'. This demanded, in the relations between Asian nations, first, mutual respect for sovereignty and integrity; second, non-aggression; third, mutual respect and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states; fourth, the promotion of political and economic cooperation on an equal basis; and fifth, the promotion of peaceful coexistence on both bilateral and international levels. These principles refer originally to a Buddhist concept of five rules of behaviour, known under the Sanskrit term 'Panchsheela', similar

to the ten commandments of the Old Testament.[6] Nehru and Zhou based their idea of a decolonized, anti-imperialist, free Asia of the future on this concept.[7]

Nehru knew that Stalin had used the term 'peaceful coexistence' as early as the 1920s. He took care to draw a line between the Stalinist use of the term and his own concept, adding an Asian, Buddhist flavour to it.[8] Believing ardently in Asian solidarity after the liberation from colonial masters, he hoped to have found a way to contain China at the same time. The Panchsheela was incorporated as a backbone to the Bandung Declaration of April 1955. During this conference, Nehru acted as main sponsor, inviting China's Zhou En-Lai and Egypt's young president Gamal Abdel Nasser to the Afro-Asian congregation. However, Zhou and Mao never took the Panchsheela literally, as Nehru did in Gandhian tradition. The Chinese promoted it as a guide to relations between socialist states but used it as a means to promote Chinese hegemony in the region.[9] In view of this, they must have recommended Panchsheela to Khrushchev as well.

Nehru interpreted the visit of the Soviet leaders as a huge political success that confirmed his foreign policy. Half a year after Bandung, he believed that they took seriously his efforts to promote world peace. In his public speech in honour of Khrushchev and Bulganin in Delhi on 19 November 1955, he explained his foreign policy to the local Hindi-speaking public as follows:

> When we claim to have friendly relations with the whole world, it is obvious that our foremost duty is to be friendly towards our immediate neighbours. In this connection, we reached an agreement with China which solved some of our problems. The principle of *Panch Shila* accepted at that time is gradually gaining wider recognition. Mr Bulganin referred to that just now. The fundamental principles are non-interference in one another's affairs, non-aggression, mutual harmony and tolerance and friendship with one another. This was the concept accepted at the Bandung Conference by nearly thirty nations. I am very happy that such a country like the Soviet Union has also accepted them and I am sure that if the world follows these principles, most of its problems would be solved. The root of conflict between nations will be weakened.[10]

At the end of 1955, Nehru was inclined to trust Khrushchev and to overlook differences between India and the Soviet Union in the interpretation of peaceful coexistence. On the other hand, the United States and the European powers irritated Nehru a great deal. The Americans supported India's arch-rival Pakistan, and declined to sell weapons to his ally Gamal Abdel Nasser.[11] At the time of the Soviet visit to Delhi, the British met in Baghdad with Pakistani, Turkish and Iranian delegations in order to sign a new defence treaty. Nehru's interest in Tito was mainly due to his need to find a competent consultant who would advise him on how to treat the Soviet Union.[12]

In the meantime, total isolation within the socialist camp from 1948 onwards created enormous political, military and economic problems for Yugoslavia and forced it to approach the West.[13] There, the Yugoslav difficulties at first met with

incredulity and distrust: only one year earlier, Yugoslavia had rejected the option to join the Marshall plan. After some hesitation, the United States decided to build up Yugoslavia as a socialist model state outside the communist camp, and offered extensive financial support. The country was to join the North Atlantic Pact in due course. A few days before Stalin's death, Tito signed the Balkan Treaty together with NATO member states Greece and Turkey, but the alliance never worked because of the emerging Cyprus crisis. Thanks to Khrushchev's 'New Course', Yugoslavia no longer depended on US favour, and Tito swiftly switched to a policy of equidistance from the two blocs, searching for new allies.[14] The term in the United Nations Security Council starting in autumn 1949 now opened excellent opportunities for Yugoslav diplomats to search for allies outside of Europe. Yugoslavia's partner in the Security Council was India: Pandit's visit to Yugoslavia may be considered as a direct result of this cooperation.[15] Tito wanted to approach Nehru in order to re-establish contacts with the Chinese communists. The Indian prime minister had just signed the friendship agreement with Zhou En-Lai and was to meet Mao in autumn 1954. Tito's initiative was a success. He set out for his first grand journey to Asia in November 1954, and in January 1955, he finally established diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China.[16]

In New Delhi, Tito spent long hours in discussion with Nehru and ended his stay in the capital with the signing of the Panchsheela. Nehru proudly declared in his letter of 24 December 1954 to his Chief Ministers that for the first time, a country from Europe had signed his Five Principles:

> Then there was the visit of Marshal Tito, President of Yugoslavia. Apart from the many functions that took place, I spent many long hours with him in discussing international and other affairs. The result of these discussions was the joint statement which we issued and which you must have seen. This statement is entirely in line with our foreign policy and I am sure that it will help the cause of peace. Some countries in Asia have already expressed themselves more or less in line with this policy. But this is the first instance when a European country also accepted this policy fully. You will particularly notice three points in this statement. The first is our repudiation of a passive neutral role in world affairs. We work actively and positively for a policy of peace and co-operation. Secondly, we have made it clear that we do not believe in working for the creation of a third bloc or third force. Thirdly, the five principles have been repeated and confirmed. Marshal Tito received a very warm welcome in both Bombay and Delhi, and no doubt, he will be welcomed in the other parts of India where he goes.[17]

Both statesmen declared that their countries intended to remain neutral between the two blocs, reserving for themselves an active right to protest and intervene, but stated that they did not intend to form a third bloc. The latter was to become a key difference between the two politicians, which particularly showed during the preparations for the Belgrade Conference in 1961: Nehru wished to maintain

maximum liberty of action for India, whereas Tito's interest in creating an organized structure was twofold, personally as a Marxist-Leninist, and politically because Yugoslavia was in too weak a position to play a role outside a bloc. The Five Principles of Coexistence were of course nothing new to Tito, who had been formed by the Leninist-Stalinist discourse since the 1920s.[18]

Tito and Nehru obviously, if unexpectedly, found highly interesting interlocutors in each other. Both were exceptional, charismatic statesmen striving to remain in power and fulfil their missions of independence. Tito was impressed by the academically trained aristocrat of Kashmiri descent, and Nehru equally fascinated by the famous war hero from the Balkans who proved so easy to talk to.[19] Half a year after Tito's journey to India, Nehru returned the visit and delivered an enthusiastic report about his experiences in Yugoslavia.[20] Three weeks later, Nehru sent the Marshal the first letter of a correspondence that was to last until the former's death in May 1964. Tito's appraisal of the Soviet situation, conveyed to the British through Nehru, had proved most helpful in the negotiations during the Four Power Conference of July 1955 in Geneva. Nehru was excited about the possibilities that his idea of active neutrality offered:

> Our conversations during my visit to Yugoslavia were very helpful to me in having clearer ideas about the international situation. Your intimate knowledge of the European situation was particularly helpful, more especially after my visit to the Soviet Union. When I went to England afterwards I had long talks with Sir Antony Eden and Macmillan and gave them my assessment of the situation, more especially in regard to the Soviet Union and the coming Four Power Conference. In doing so, your views proved very helpful.
>
> After the Four Power Conference Macmillan said that the assessment of the Russian situation that I had given him had proved amazingly correct and this had helped them greatly in their talks at Geneva.[21]

By the summer of 1955, Tito and Nehru had therefore built a relationship based on trust and started to collaborate. The geopolitical situation was shifting due to Khrushchev's new foreign policy. In this constellation, Tito's intimate knowledge of the Soviet system evolved as an asset which would improve his international standing. To both, Nehru's Panchsheela emerged as a means to keep the two blocs at a distance. Offering themselves as mediators, they aimed at balancing their countries' positions in the bipolar world.

The Brioni Statement as a test-run

At the beginning of 1956, Khrushchev felt safe enough to break the silence about Stalin's crimes and faults. In February, at the CPSU's Twentieth Congress, he spoke about different paths to socialism and declared that the Soviet Union's intention was to coexist peacefully with other countries. Khrushchev's sensational speech spread quickly within and outside the Soviet Union and nurtured

the hopes of reformist groups that he really meant what he said.[22] The Yugoslavs felt reassured that their 'Third Way' was a valuable alternative on the path to socialism, and finally managed to re-establish relations with other Eastern European countries. Contacts became especially close with Poland and Hungary, where reformist powers fought for influence both within the party and in government. During a tripartite meeting between Tito, Nehru and Egyptian president Nasser at Tito's summer residence of Brioni in July 1956, Khrushchev's 'New Course' and the latest developments in the bipolar power struggle were the main topics. The Indian proceedings highlight Nehru's hopes for political détente and his confidence in Tito's influence in Moscow. The Yugoslav president was just back from a three-week trip to the Soviet Union:

> Jawaharlal Nehru: I am quite sure that the visit of President Tito to the Soviet Union has wider significance for the world and that it has helped to widen the outlook of the Soviet leaders and people. The process of change there has been going on for the last year and it has affected, step by step, their approach to various questions. When they came to India, Khrushchev and Bulganin repeatedly said to me that they had to change their opinions very much about India and that they had been misinformed. India was the first non-Communist, though friendly, country which they had visited. They could see that even those who did not agree with them can be friendly.[23]

Yugoslav diplomacy was equally convinced of Khrushchev's declarations of friendship and the seriousness of the Soviet reforms. The Yugoslav foreign office wrote about the quality of Indo-Soviet relations:

> After Nehru's visit to the Soviet Union last summer, Indo-Soviet relations, which had been friendly before, developed further in this spirit, on the basis of the principle of active [sic] coexistence, which had been laid down in the joint declaration at the occasion of Nehru's stay in Moscow. These relations were further enhanced by the visit of Bulganin and Khrushchev to India at the end of last year. For India, this visit was of exceptional importance as the first one of such a representative delegation from a Great Power. In fact, it represents the approval of India's independent, peace-building policy and was one of its biggest successes so far.[24]

Tito, Nehru and Nasser now decided to take Khrushchev literally and to declare their expectations to the four powers of the Geneva Conference the year before, as an act of active neutrality. They formulated a statement which emphasized their mutual agreement, demanding first, equality among nations according to the principles of peaceful coexistence; second, an end to the bipolar world; and third, worldwide disarmament. The Yugoslav organizers made sure that international media journalists had access to place and text in order to spread the information in the world news, accompanied by aptly chosen visual coverage.[25]

The Brioni Statement is generally regarded as the beginning of the Non-Aligned Movement, and the picture of the three signatories has become an icon, a symbol of the movement. The statement in itself was a reaction to the actual global situation: an announcement to defy bondage to one of the blocs and the nuclear armament of the world. Unlike most European countries, Yugoslavia, India and Egypt were neither defeated nor bound by the results of World War II, and all three leaders were backed by strong support at home. Tito, Nehru and Nasser were keen on keeping their countries independent. They demanded relations with the Great Powers based on equality, and tried to use their countries' geopolitical significance to their advantage; to sink into oblivion was no option to them. The 'similarity in their approach to international questions', i.e. how they phrased their policy of active neutrality in the statement, 'contributed to some extent towards the lessening of international tension and to the development of relations between nations based on equality', thus enhancing the importance of the United Nations and offering an alternative to joining a bloc.[26]

The first difficulties in keeping the balance between the blocs arose almost immediately, on the journey home from Brioni. Nasser, who took Nehru with him as far as Cairo, received a long-awaited answer from Washington regarding his Aswan Dam project, the core piece of his industrialization programme. It was negative: the Americans, who had already declined to furnish Egypt with weapons, refused to finance this highly ambitious and risky project. Nasser, tense, made a speedy decision without informing either Tito or Nehru: on 26 July 1956, he nationalized the Suez Canal in a surprise coup in order to provide the funds for his programme by appropriating the profitable channel on Egyptian soil from the hands of the mostly British owners, a popular action which was to make him the hero of the Arabs.[27] Two days later, Nehru wrote to Tito: 'A difficult and embarrassing situation has been created which is likely to add to international tensions. I should like to have your views on situation created.'[28] Tito replied on 2 August:

> According to my opinion, the whole question, although very serious, is not as dramatic as some people would like to present it. The main thing now is not to be nervous. I believe there is a possibility to act in a calming way upon both sides.[29]

Nehru offered himself as a mediator, advised Nasser to invoke the United Nations and helped to arrange an international conference in London to solve the crisis. But British Prime Minister Antony Eden took Nasser's action as a personal offense and declined his support. In the beginning of October, UN mediators suggested a plan that Britain had to accept against Eden's wishes. On 23 October 1956, Eden secretly met his French and Israeli counterparts in the French Château de Sèvres to decide on a totally different plan, to recapture Suez with military force. At the same time, demonstrations and riots in Poland and Hungary started to peak, the situation especially in Hungary being on the verge of major escalation. On 24 October, Soviet troops marched into Budapest. Five

days later, an alliance of British, French and Israeli troops attacked Suez. Tito's and Nehru's plans ended in disaster, and the two statesmen were about to lose their credibility.

The Hungarian Revolution, 1956[30]

Chronology

The political developments in Hungary between 1953 and 1956 were a direct result of Soviet party turbulences and reforms after Stalin's death. Khrushchev replaced the Stalinist prime minister and chairman of the Hungarian Workers' Party (HWP), Mátyás Rákosi, with Imre Nagy, a loyal agricultural specialist. During his first reign, Nagy gained a lot of popularity with reforms and his will to reinvestigate the political show trials from his predecessor's era. Rákosi was still a member of the party leadership, which caused serious tensions. He used a moment in early 1955, when the Stalinist wing of the CPSU had the upper hand, to denounce his rival in Moscow. In April Nagy was deposed from office, and in December he was excluded from the party. Back in power, Rákosi cancelled all of Nagy's reforms.

After the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in February, the opposition within the HWP re-emerged powerfully, with a seriously ill Imre Nagy as their implicit leader. Following the anti-communist riots in the Polish town of Poznań in June 1956, the HWP Central Committee banned the opposition and accused Nagy of enemy propaganda. Moscow felt the need to intervene and sent an emissary to arrange a new cabinet. Rákosi was replaced by his right hand Ernő Gerő, and János Kádár, once imprisoned by Rákosi, became a new member. But the situation did not calm down, even after the rehabilitation of László Rajk, a popular victim of the show trials. During the public funeral of Rajk and fellow victims on 6 October 1956, around 60,000 demonstrators convened in Budapest's city centre. A week later, Nagy was readmitted to the HWP.

However, the demonstrations were not to be stopped. Tension came to a peak when mass rallies in Poland enforced a political change, which on 20 October brought Władysław Gomułka to power. Students of the Budapest Technical Highschool, on strike, set up a list of claims which demanded a new government under the leadership of Nagy and the evacuation of all Soviet troops from Hungary. On the next day, 23 October, revolution broke out in Hungary. Hundreds of thousands of Budapest citizens were in the streets and called for Nagy. When he finally appeared but only apparently to calm down the masses, the crowd reacted with disappointment and anger. Stalin's statue at Városliget was pulled down, and rioters managed to occupy the main radio building. The party leadership did not know what to do, until Gerő called Moscow asking for help. The next morning, a half-heartedly reshuffled government announced a state of emergency, declaring the riots as 'the work of counterrevolutionary, fascist forces' and announcing the impending arrival of the Red Army.[31] Soviet troops based in Hungary marched into Budapest the same day. It took them several

days to suppress the rebellion, which had spread through the whole country in the meantime. The Red Army retreated in course of a cease-fire on 28 October, and Nagy was installed as the new Prime Minister. Announcing the new governmental programme on 30 October, he declared the end of one-party rule.

Despite this sensational announcement, the rebellion continued. Due to propaganda distributed via Radio Free Europe and flyers, oppositional groups expected Western powers to intervene. Such hopes were unfounded. The CIA had neither a base nor reliable agents in Hungary, and intervened in order to provoke, but without the leading hand of the Washington government, which was blocked because of presidential elections.[32] Britain and France on the other hand were involved in the Suez attack. Western demeanour thus added to the escalation without genuine involvement. The day after Nagy's declaration, the Soviet politbureau decided to send the Red Army back to Budapest. Realizing his desperate situation, Nagy went ahead and declared Hungary's neutrality and withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, asking the United Nations and the Four Powers for help. This provoked another break within the HWP. Cabinet members János Kádár and Ferenc Münnich secretly left for Moscow. In the early hours of 4 November, the Red Army occupied Budapest for the second time. At half past five in the morning, Nagy declared on the radio that Soviet troops were attacking the capital 'with the obvious intention of overthrowing the lawful, democratic, Hungarian Government. Our troops are fighting. The Government is in its place. I inform the people of the country and world public opinion of this.'[33] Immediately afterwards, he fled to the Yugoslav Embassy with a group of followers. In Moscow at the same time, Kádár and Münnich started talks about a Hungarian countergovernment. By 7 November, the Red Army was in control of the situation and escorted Kádár to the Budapest parliament building, where he took his oath and restored the pre-23 October order.

Yugoslav entanglements[34]

With Khrushchev's 1955 apology for the expulsion of Yugoslavia in 1948, anti-Yugoslav propaganda in the communist media had been immediately replaced with reports about the Yugoslav 'Third Way'. These reports were met with keen interest among reformist circles, especially in Hungary, which quickly established friendly relations with Yugoslav intellectuals and diplomats.[35] On his visit to the Soviet Union in June 1956, Tito succeeded in getting his own version of the joint declaration signed, stating that the CPSU and the Yugoslav League of Communists were equal, and that Yugoslavia was a socialist country even if outside the socialist camp.[36] He returned home very self-assured to meet Nasser and Nehru at Brioni, but Khrushchev was not happy with the results of this visit. In a closed meeting with the leaders of the socialist camp convened directly after Tito's departure, he called the Moscow Declaration with Tito a mere tactical move. Svetozar Rajak sees a turning point, where reconciliation in Soviet-Yugoslav relations once again tipped over into confrontation.[37]

Perceiving the cooler Russian breeze so soon after Tito's visit, the Yugoslavs believed they had found the reason in the Stalinist hardliners Molotov, Voroshilov and Suslov criticizing Khrushchev.[38] Completely misinterpreting Moscow's aims, namely to win back control over Poland, Hungary and Yugoslavia, Belgrade enforced explicit backing for the oppositional movements in Poland and Hungary by the Yugoslav state media in order to show support for the Soviet chairman. Khrushchev, who had succeeded in getting Gomułka back into line, but not Nagy or Tito, required the latter to visit again in September 1956 for a joint holiday on the Crimea. As if by coincidence, the Hungarian party officials Gerő, Kádár and István Hidas were there as well.[39] The atmosphere was tense. The Hungarians seemed not to realize the seriousness of their country's condition, Tito insisted on equidistance, and Khrushchev believed Tito was secretly plotting with the Hungarians behind his back.[40]

The Soviet invasion of 24 October was censured harshly by the Yugoslav leadership, which offered help to Budapest. This attitude changed only when Nagy announced the end of the one-party system on 30 October, and his intention to quit the Warsaw Pact on 1 November. To Tito, a multi-party system equalled the abandoning of the road to socialism.[41] He was also receiving reports about anti-communist and anti-Jewish assaults, even lynching, and about far-right exiles who were arrested after their illegal crossing of the border. Tito concluded that Nagy could not control the situation and that he was being used by circles aiming at counter-revolution. He worried about Yugoslavia's long border with Hungary and about the country's large Hungarian minority in Vojvodina. He consequently alerted the Yugoslav People's Army and welcomed Khrushchev's announcement of a secret visit, much to the latter's surprise.

Much has been written about Khrushchev's and Georgy Malenkov's secret nocturnal visit to Brioni between 2 and 3 November 1956. No proceedings exist, but Tito ordered the Yugoslav ambassador to Moscow to write down a memorandum; Veljko Mićunović was the only one present besides the two Russians, Tito, and Tito's close collaborators Edvard Kardelj and Aleksandar Ranković.[42] Svetozar Rajak has elaborated on the differences between the Soviet and the Yugoslav interpretations of the meeting. Khrushchev, in his memoirs, talks about the cordial welcome by Tito, saying that the Yugoslav President instantly approved of the military intervention. Mićunović, on the other hand, mentions that Khrushchev was emotionally agitated when he entered Tito's residence. He immediately started to talk about atrocities committed by counter-revolutionaries in Hungary, stating that the Czechs, Romanians, Bulgarians and Chinese sanctioned the interventions, but that no decision had resulted from talks with the Polish.[43] Tito suggested that the Hungarian workers' councils should be encouraged to take responsibility, but Khrushchev insisted on decisive action both for external and internal reasons. The Yugoslavs realized that the army leadership was pressurizing Khrushchev and that military action was imminent, though they were not told when exactly.[44] Mićunović suggests in his diaries that the differing opinions were obvious, and that despite the fact that the Soviets' decision had been taken, they did not want to part in disagreement. The Yugoslavs started to

discuss accompanying political measures instead. Khrushchev was relieved and talked about the composition of the future Hungarian government. Given the choice between János Kádár and Ferenc Münnich, the Yugoslavs suggested that Kádár was the more acceptable for the Hungarian public. A last major topic was Nagy and what was to become of him. Both parties agreed that he had to be isolated and the counter-revolutionary turn of events denounced in order to reduce resistance. The Yugoslavs agreed to use influence with Nagy and other cabinet members in contact with Belgrade. They also mentioned that one cabinet member, Zoltán Szántó, had already approached their embassy regarding political asylum. However, they did not know how much time was left for negotiation, as Khrushchev and Malenkov said nothing about the planned start of the military intervention.[45]

Edvard Kardelj immediately informed the Soviet ambassador about Nagy's flight to the Yugoslav embassy in Budapest, confirming the promise to try and persuade Nagy to resign. Soviet reactions were harsh. The Yugoslav embassy in Budapest was put under surveillance; talks were refused. Moscow demanded that Nagy and his followers in the embassy be surrendered to the Soviet military authorities at once.[46] A day later, Khrushchev telegraphed Tito euphorically that the counter-revolution in Hungary was subdued and that Moscow expected Belgrade's cooperation. In his reply, Tito asked permission to transfer Nagy and his group to Yugoslavia unharmed.[47] A tank fired at the Yugoslav embassy in Budapest that day, killing the third secretary Milenko Milovanov. The Yugoslavs were shocked and believed it to be a warning from Moscow.[48] During the following days, the situation grew even more tense when the British–French–Israeli alliance attacked Egypt and the Soviet President Bulganin, in response, threatened to use the atomic bomb. On 7 November, Khrushchev told Tito to extradite Nagy and his group immediately; otherwise Moscow would assume that the Yugoslavs were counter-revolutionaries.[49]

Nehru's persistence

Nehru was convinced that after the experience of two world wars and decolonization, the United Nations would guarantee peace in the world in the future. His own international image as Mahatma Gandhi's pupil and heir earned him a lot of fan mail from the whole world. In the second half of 1956, a significant part of this mail concerned Hungary. Nehru was not really interested. He trusted his personal relations and experiences with the Soviet leaders and therefore informed his Secretary General and the Foreign Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 12 October that he was 'convinced that any attempt at coercion or, indeed, any active campaign will be injurious. Certain changes are taking place … which will, I hope, gradually liberalize conditions in these countries'.[50] On the eve of the second Soviet invasion, he wrote to his ambassador in Moscow, K. P. S. Menon, that he was receiving 'large numbers' of messages from Hungarians, adding that he had no idea what was going on there:

> Reports from and about Hungary are confusing, but it appears quite clear that there has been powerful and widespread national uprising there against Soviet forces and interference. Also that there has been large-scale killing on both sides.… We were under impression that Soviet forces were being withdrawn and some kind of stable government in Hungary would gradually emerge and restore peace. Latest reports are that additional Soviet forces are going to Hungary and Premier Nagy has even protested to United Nations.[51]

Two days later, he expressed his distress about the developments in Hungary, which proved that some promoters of the Panchsheela did not mean what they had signed. Wishing to prevent any escalation in a dangerous situation and to protect his scope of action as a mediator, he gave orders to avoid any criticism of the Soviet Union.[52] He went as far as to control President Rajendra Prasad's speech prepared for a banquet in honour of Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie, asking 'Rajendra Babu' to leave out an allusion to 'armed intervention by other powers'.[53] On the same day, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution censuring the Soviet military intervention and charging the Secretary General to investigate, wherein India abstained from voting. The United States as the initiators of the resolution expressed their astonishment at India's differing assessments of the cases in Suez and Hungary, especially in view of Nehru's Panchsheela.

In a cable to the ambassador in Washington, G. L. Mehta, Nehru explained that he had expected a development similar to that in Poland: that the Soviet troops would eventually retreat. He could not understand why the Soviets had changed their strategy. In Egypt, on the other hand, the case for him was 'absolutely clear and there [wa]s no doubt about it'.[54] That day, Nehru expressed his exasperation openly in a very emotional speech during the opening of the Ninth UNESCO General Assembly in New Delhi, renouncing his belief in a new and better world:

> We see today in Egypt as well as in Hungary both human dignity and freedom outraged and the force of modern arms used to suppress peoples and to gain political objectives. Old colonial methods, which we had thought, in our ignorance, belonged to a more unenlightened age, are revived and practised.… Many of the countries in Asia laid down a set of Five Principles which we call *Panchsheel*, for the governance of international relations and for peaceful coexistence of nations, without interference with each other, so that each nation and people might grow according to their own genius and in cooperation with others.… We see now that those Five Principles are also mere words without meaning to some countries who claim the right of deciding problems by superior might.[55]

On 8 and 9 November, the UN General Assembly adopted three further resolutions. India supported only one of these: Austria's suggestion to offer utmost help to the Hungarian people. The Indian delegation abstained from voting on

the US proposition to ask the USSR to refrain from actions against the Hungarian people. It refused to support the so-called Five Powers Resolution for free elections in Hungary under the supervision of the United Nations.[56] The reasons for the refusal were domestic in nature: in the Kashmir conflict, Nehru had been delaying a plebiscite under UN auspices since the cease-fire of 1948, for fear that the territory would be lost for India. In his letter of 14 November to his sister Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, who was the Indian High Commissioner in London, and to the Indian ambassador in Washington, Nehru wrote, replying to Western criticisms about Indian voting in the United Nations:

> It seems to me that there is much misapprehension and to some extent deliberate distortion of what India did in Security Council. India expressed clearly her distress at Russian troops coming in and asked for their withdrawal. Also said that people of Hungary should decide their own future without outside intervention. But we were and are entirely opposed to elections being held there under UN auspices. This was not only unconstitutional but dangerous precedent for other countries. Apart from this it could only have led to major war.
>
> Hungary's case is important and deserves all help but it seems to me that every effort is being made by some Western countries, taking the name of Hungary, to push aside Egypt's case and to try to rehabilitate England and France and their aggression in Egypt. We have to resist this.[57]

With his policy regarding Hungary, Nehru put his authority and prestige at risk. It may be argued, however, that because of his refusal to accuse Moscow and side with the Western bloc, he remained a beacon of hope to petitioners from Hungary, who continued to approach him for advocacy in Imre Nagy's and the reformist opposition's case.[58]

Tito's and Nehru's crisis management

During the Hungarian and Suez crises, Nehru and Tito were in constant contact. The Indian ambassador to Yugoslavia, Rajeshwar Dayal, approached the Belgrade government on 4 November to make inquiries and was immediately received by the Yugoslav special commissioner for Hungary, Dobrivoje Vidić.[59] Tito wrote a four-page letter to Nehru dated 7 November, explaining his position.[60] Denouncing the Franco-British-Israeli attack on Egypt as an imperialistic assault exploiting the unrest in Hungary to achieve colonialistic aims, he worried that the present situation was dangerously near to provoking another world war. He reported on his talks with Khrushchev during his vacation on the Crimea in September, saying that the Soviet leader had been open to the Yugoslav reasoning on independence and equality. Despite existing differences, the Soviets were thinking about these problems, which surely could not be solved from one day to the next. Gomułka's capability and popularity had eased the crisis in Poland, but in Hungary, the situation had escalated just because of the Soviet reluctance to interfere:

> in Hungary, precisely because of the enormous mistakes of the regime, and even crimes under the leadership of Rakosi, as well as because of the inability of the new leadership headed by Gerő and Hegedüs who followed the same Rakosi line, enormous exasperation and spontaneous revolt of not only the ordinary citizens but of the workers as well, broke out.[61]

According to Tito, counter-revolutionaries had started to exploit this situation by acting provocatively:

> I am inclined to believe that the provocation had come from those elements who, in the tide of the masses, used the situation in order to provoke an armed conflict with the Soviet troops.… The elements which for many years were under the influence of Western propaganda and were financed by certain circles in the West, increasingly gained the upperhand in the streets, and the coalition government, which was created with Imre Nagy at its head, had no influence whatsoever on the course of events in the streets. Then there started a horrible hunt on those who were conspicuous in any way, or held various official positions at the time of Rakosi. People were killed in the streets, in the houses, they were hanged on the lamp-posts; in one word, a real hell was created. Imre Nagy and his Government, increasingly under the influence of the anticommunist elements and out of fear from the Russians, continuously made various vacillating gestures, inviting hastily the West to help, proclaiming neutrality overnight, demanding immediately the recall of the Warsaw Pact and the withdrawal of the Soviet troops, etc. Today it is clear to us that if things developed further so chaotically, then, under the leadership of reactionary elements from within the country and those which infiltrated from the West, the darkest reaction, and even stronger mass persecution would have developed.[62]

Tito's analysis seems sound: ten years after it ended, World War II was still a fresh memory, and fear of a possible return of the far-right opposition comprehensible. Tito and Nehru knew perfectly well the patterns through which peaceful demonstrations turned into violent ones, and how political adversaries used them for their aims. But whereas Nehru, by 7 November, seemed confused and worried about the Soviet action, Tito still demonstrated belief in Khrushchev's government: as tragic and harmful as the intervention was, he said in his letter, it would offer a chance to Hungary to end the bloodshed. If the Russians had ever learned from their history, they would withdraw their army as soon as the situation had calmed down. Tito closed his message with the reassuring words that even now, the Yugoslavs would do everything in their power to influence the Soviet leadership in a positive way, according to the principles of their foreign policy.[63]

Tito, however, remained silent on two issues. He said nothing about the nocturnal meeting with Khrushchev a few days earlier, and he did not mention that Nagy was in the Yugoslav embassy in Budapest. This must have been due to the

fact that he still believed himself in accordance with Moscow at the moment that he sent the letter. But this was to change on the same day, when he received the aforementioned cable from Moscow that Imre Nagy was to be handed over to Kádár's government at once.[64] Khrushchev ranted that Nagy was a traitor who would use the asylum in Yugoslavia to rally counter-revolutionary elements against the socialist cause, and that Tito's request was nothing but a proof of his hidden cooperation with Nagy.[65] In parallel, communist media attacks against Yugoslavia started again. The Belgrade leadership, angry and upset, succeeded in calming down Moscow, and started direct negotiations with Kádár in Budapest. But Tito now decided to make his irritation public. On 11 November, in Pula, he gave one of the most important speeches of his presidency, addressed to regional party members and army officers and published a few days later in the party paper *Borba*.[66]

Nehru received Tito's speech as a telegram and read it shortly before his own address to the Indian House of Commons, the Lok Sabha, on 20 November.[67] Tito fiercely denounced Nagy's failure, but otherwise the speech did not differ much from the letter of 7 November in that it accept the second invasion as a necessary evil, mentioning neither Khrushchev's nocturnal visit nor Nagy's asylum in the Yugoslav embassy:

> Could this have been prevented? If the Nagy government had been more energetic, if it had not faltered, if it had acted with decision against anarchy and the murdering of communists by reactionary elements, if it had withstood reaction, and so on, perhaps things would have gone in the right direction, and perhaps the Soviet troops would not have intervened. But what did Nagy do? He called the people to weapons against the Soviet Army and invited the Western countries to interfere.
>
> In the West, this intervention was exploited to a great extent. The imperialists, who only waited to attack Egypt, exploited it. They attacked exactly during this phase of the Hungarian tragedy, thinking that the Soviet Union was much too busy to intervene.… The question now arises whether the Soviet intervention was necessary? The first intervention was not necessary. The first intervention, which occurred on Gerő's invitation, was absolutely wrong.
>
> Prior to talking about the second intervention of the Soviet troops I must state that the situation in Hungary deteriorated in such a way … that horrible killings, a horrible civil war in which socialism would have been buried and which would have led to a Third World War, became foreseeable. The reason is that the Soviet government would have accepted neither the interference of the West nor the return of the Horthy people and the old reaction.… The first one is a catastrophe, the second one an evil. If this evil saves socialism in Hungary, then we can tell – even if being against interference – that the second Soviet intervention was useful.[68]

The speech implied a clear criticism of Soviet policy and established some distance: even if Nagy was responsible for leading Hungary to the brink of a civil

war, the CPSU had failed to act in time with less drastic measures. Nehru, on reading the speech, cabled to Krishna Menon that 'this is fairly correct estimate of situation in Budapest', but 'I doubt if Marshal Tito's appraisal of necessity of second army's entry and large-scale attack is correct'.[69] Still hoping that his trust in the Soviet leadership was justified and wishing to keep doors open, he instructed his envoy in Budapest, M. A. Rahman, to avoid any behaviour which might cause the impression of interference. News from Budapest was confusing, as it looked as if Kádár had tried in vain to gain the people's support. Nehru wanted to convince Moscow to enable a visit of UN observers in Hungary, and waited for a fast and smooth withdrawal of the Soviet troops.[70] He followed Tito's assessment at least partially when he decided to abstain from condemning the Soviet invasion explicitly. For internal reasons, he did not want elections under UN auspices.

However, Nehru failed to convince his critics in the West and at home of the correctness of his appraisal; they accused him of silently supporting the second invasion.[71] Pressure on him grew and he even had to defend himself in parliament. There, his former companion in the freedom struggle and president of the Praja Socialist Party, Jivatram B. Kripalani, accused him of betraying Gandhi's ideals, saying that there was no reason to vote in the United Nations alongside Yugoslavia, which was just scared of the Soviet Union. In his response on 20 November, Nehru fiercely defended Tito and Yugoslavia, pointing out that nothing was less justified than to accuse this country and its leadership of cowardice:

> Yugoslavia, for the last so many years, has stood up against the Soviet Union at great risk, tremendous risk, and stood up by its principles. Lately, in the course of a year or two, some of the barriers between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union have been removed, removed chiefly by the Soviet Union, not by Yugoslavia except that Yugoslavia agreed to the removal.… The result is, the leaders of Yugoslavia, more especially, the President of Yugoslavia, Marshal Tito, are in a better position to make appraisal of the situation. You may or may not agree, that is a different matter. But, it comes from persons of great ability and great experience. Because, experience is not a question of high principles sitting there, but of knowing and trying to get what is in the back of the mind of the other party. So, we value them very much. I am free to confess that we have, to some extent, been guided by their appraisal of the European situation.[72]

Nehru also dismissed demands from delegates not to recognize Kádár's government. This was a pragmatic decision which he explained with the principle of non-interference, pointing out that Hungary was certainly not the only country not fully independent in its voting in the United Nations General Assembly.[73] On the following day, 21 November, Nehru heard for the first time that Nagy was at the Yugoslav embassy. His ambassador to Moscow, K. P. S. Menon, reported about tensions within the Soviet leadership and between Moscow and Belgrade.

He was also informed about negotiations between Nagy, Kádár and the Hungarian Workers' Union, and that the Union hoped for his mediation. Rumours on deportations of youth and acts of revenge committed by the secret police made him feel desperate.[74]

On that day, India launched a resolution jointly with Indonesia and Ceylon, asking Kádár to receive the UN Secretary General in Budapest and to post UN observers in Hungary. Nehru took care to address a letter to Soviet Prime Minister Bulganin explaining that the resolution sponsored by India, Ceylon and Indonesia did not imply any condemnation and that it acknowledged Hungary's sovereignty. The reception of the UN Secretary General and the observers by the Hungarian government would ease the worldwide concern about the situation in that country.[75] In a second letter addressed to János Kádár, Nehru pointed to the friendly spirit which carried India's initiative concerning Hungary, saying that it would be received very ill by the world if the UN officers were not permitted into the country.[76] Nehru also wrote to Tito that day, informing him about his letters to Bulganin and Kádár and asking him to use his influence in order to implement the UN resolution. He thanked him for the Pula speech, saying that he always welcomed his appraisal as he was 'in a position to have correct information', but avoiding any comment as to whether he agreed or not: the aim was 'to avert a catastrophe'.[77]

On this day, 22 November, the Nagy affair culminated. After several rounds of negotiations between 19 and 21 November, the Yugoslav special envoy Dobrivoje Vidić had secured a guarantee from Kádár's government that Nagy and his followers at the Yugoslav embassy were free to go home.[78] But the coach transfering the Hungarian group to their houses on 22 November was siezed by the Soviet Secret Service, and Nagy and his followers arrested and deported to Romania. The Yugoslavs suspected – correctly, as the historical investigation proved decades later – that Kádár had known the Soviet plans and supported them. Tito felt totally deceived and discredited. The whole story looked like a put-up affair, making his loss of face in the West complete. Six days later, Tito wrote to Nehru about his frustration, anger and worry. He feared that the Soviets would invade Yugoslavia too: Tvrtko Jakovina points out that the key question of Yugoslav foreign policy always remained whether a Soviet assault on Belgrade would be enough to provoke Washington into retaliation.[79] Tito's concern about the loss of face vis-à-vis the West is all the more understandable keeping in mind that the economic survival of the country depended on financial aid from the United States. His disappointment about Khrushchev's contemptuous handling of the Nagy affair was acute:

> What does this act, which occurred with full knowledge of the Soviet government, represent in itself? When we informed the Soviet government that we had granted Nagy asylum in the Yugoslav embassy and that in our opinion, we had to grant him this asylum according to our Constitution and to our international obligations, and when we asked for no interference with Nagy's transfer to Yugoslavia, we received a very harsh answer that we had

> to hand over Nagy and that he should go to Romania. This answer embittered us dreadfully. Firstly, it is an expression of distrust towards our country, secondly, they do not care about our international obligations and our Constitution at all, and thirdly, they do not care in the least how the international public will judge on Yugoslavia in this matter.[80]

Tito had to accept that he could do nothing against the will of the Soviet government and that his political success of the past 12 months was worthless now. He also knew that Kádár could not resist Soviet wishes. Nevertheless, he insisted on Yugoslav independence. The dialogue should not be interrupted, the United Nations had to restrain itself, a return to Stalinist times had to be prevented.

Hoping that Nehru was still in a position to do something, he asked, in the same letter of 28 November, for his advocacy:

> I am sorry for Kádár, I believe him to be a honest person, but I am aware that he is powerless, and I know that the reasons for this are on the other side. I should wish, Mister President, if you believe that this will not cause you trouble, to have your support in this struggle which we are fighting right now, in whatever form it may be. I am afraid that if the Soviet leadership continues in this way, which reminds of past Stalinist methods, it will lose its reputation not only in Europe, but especially in Asia, of course in India in the first place, not to talk about Yugoslavia. I will see to it that they take this into consideration. We will insist on discussing this in a manner as peaceful and as constructive as possible, in order not to give reason for further aggravation, but I also have to say that we will stick to our principles in all international questions, as in our relations.[81]

Nehru consulted his close collaborator Krishna Menon. In view of Nagy's deportation, the United Nations was now obliged to denounce the Soviet Union and Kádár's government, which would again be detrimental to the prospects for international peace. Nehru shared Tito's outrage about Nagy's abduction in vioation of the guarantee by the Hungarian government: the Russians had done wrong and lost all their reputation, as had the Hungarians. He also mentioned discussions with Zhou En-Lai in this matter, pointing out how much their opinions differed. All the same, Zhou had promised to enquire about a possible visit by the UN Secretary-General in Budapest.[82] Nehru answered Tito's letter immediately and expressed his disappointment:

> The Hungarian situation has also had a very bad effect on the position in Egypt. All the strong feeling against Anglo-French aggression is now being turned against the Soviet Union.
>
> We have tried our utmost both in Budapest and Moscow to induce the Governments there to permit United Nations Secretary-General Hammarskjoeld to visit Budapest as well as, later, United Nations observers. In spite of every effort of ours, this has been refused again. This will have very bad

> reactions in United Nations where a strong Resolution is likely to be passed by a great majority against the Soviet Union.… In regard to Nagy's arrest and deportation, I quite agree with you that that was utterly wrong and a breach of international conventions. We shall say this when occasion arises.… Our primary object has not been to condemn but to help in finding a way out of this dreadful situation. I must confess that I am greatly disappointed, but I shall continue our efforts for peace, whatever happens. With sincere regards, Jawaharlal Nehru.[83]

This is the last exchange of opinion dealing with Nagy between Tito and Nehru. Later letters cover the Middle East and the constant Soviet economic pressure on Yugoslavia.[84]

Moscow forced Kádár to impose severe punishment on the Hungarian insurgents, and the first execution took place as early as 15 December. The secret trial against Imre Nagy started in February 1958. On 16 June 1958, he was executed in a Budapest prison and buried in an unmarked grave. Nehru, who received the news four days later during a holiday, instructed Foreign Secretary Subimal Dutt to declare India's sorrow, but to refrain from condemnation. He admitted that against all his hopes, Moscow's and Beijing's positions had hardened, and that his influence in Moscow and Budapest had vanished. In a message to K. P. S. Menon, the ambassador in Moscow, he gloomily stated that the Western powers shared the responsibility for giving away the chance for a peace conference during the Soviet thaw, and that hope for real peace was over for the present generation.[85] Hungary remained on the UN agenda until the end of 1962, when the United States secretly arranged to remove it as soon as Kádár enacted an amnesty for the prosecuted.

Conclusion

Khrushchev's de-Stalinization policy, as expressed in his speeches at Belgrade airport in 1955 and at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in February 1956, nurtured worldwide hopes for an end of the Cold War. It broadened the scope of action for countries that were dependent on the Soviet Union, letting them believe that Moscow would be willing to accept national variants on the path to socialism. Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, who perceived his country as an independent Asian power, saw his role as a peace mediator between the Eastern and Western blocs, true to the vision of his mentor, the Mahatma Gandhi. Nehru found an ally in Yugoslav President Tito, who equally wished to keep his country out of the blocs and who could provide him with insider knowledge on the Soviet Union. For Nehru, Tito's signing of the Panchsheela meant the international breakthrough of his political vision. The strategic win–win situation between the two statesmen enhanced their mutual appreciation. They both needed peace to build up their countries after traumatic periods of war and foreign rule: Nehru a secular Indian union after the partition of the British Raj, and Tito a socialist federal Yugoslavia.

Nehru admired Tito's courage in opposing Stalin and choosing an independent 'Third Way'. He trusted him as much as he did his appraisal of European politics and let this guide him; he probably did not take into consideration how much the Yugoslavs feared a Soviet intervention by the end of 1956. The case of Hungary analysed here shows how much Nehru valued an independent opinion, guided by his principles while remaining within the scope of political realism. He also kept loyal to Tito and Yugoslavia.

Tito and Nehru were both deceived in their belief in Khrushchev's sincerity. They seem to have been a little bit too self-assured to perceive the chairman's desire for control, a misjudgement for which they both payed dearly by losing face before the world. Nehru failed to judge the Hungarian and Suez crises using equal standards because of his trust in his personal relations and his self-importance, and for domestic reasons. Tito thought himself senior within the hierarchy of the communist camp and believed his support would help to stabilize Khrushchev's position. The Yugoslav mixture of trust and fear then allowed the Soviets to outwit Belgrade in the Nagy affair.

In contrast, Khrushchev did not trust Tito. He had failed to woo the Marshal back into the camp, and Tito proved to be a calamity by tempting reformist comrades to opt for a 'Third Way'. When Tito granted asylum to Imre Nagy, Khrushchev was convinced that the two were plotting against Moscow. Threats aimed at Yugoslavia were to be taken very seriously, especially against the background of the ongoing Suez Crisis. By November 1956, Tito was therefore under heavy pressure. He had failed to convince the Soviet chairman of his loyalty and feared a repetition of the menaces of 1948. Interpreting the contradictionary signs emanating from Moscow as those of an internal power struggle, he challenged the Kremlin with his speech in Pula, criticizing staff decisions and belated reactions with regard to Hungary. To observers outside the communist discourse, this looked like sanctioning the second invasion. After Nagy's abduction, Tito had to accept that his cause in Moscow was lost and that he needed Nehru's support to re-establish the fragile balance that had enabled him to keep his country independent and his rule safe. Both Tito and Nehru now realized how limited their scope of influence was without the cooperation of the superpowers, in spite of Bandung and Brioni.

Notes

1 This chapter is an abridged version of an article written in German and published in *Südost-Forschungen* 72, 2013.
2 Arhiv Jugoslavije [hereafter AJ], Titov fond, KPR I–3–c: 'Joint Statement by the President of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, the President of the Republic of Egypt and the Prime Minister of India'.
3 In the meantime, Tito's papers have been incorporated into the Archive of Yugoslavia (Arhiv Jugoslavije), also in Belgrade.
4 Nehru Memorial Museum and Library [hereafter NMML], Papers of Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, III Instalment, Speeches no. 9, 'Speech by VL Pandit on her impression after her visit to Yugoslavia, 23.7.1954'.

5 Nehru visited Moscow in June 1955 during his journey through Eastern Europe, which also took him to Yugoslavia for the first time. He had stayed in the Soviet Union once already with his father in the 1920s.
6 These rules encompass: do not kill, do not steal, do not lie, no sexual deviations, keep a sober mind.
7 See the Introduction to this volume.
8 In his notes at the Bandung Conference, Nehru noted that Stalin used the term explicitly in the 1920s, and that a differentiation was needed to Panchsheela. NMML, Subimal Dutt Papers, Speeches and Writings by Others, file 2, fol. 46, 'Notes of Jawaharlal Nehru during Afro-Asian Conference 1955'. See the Introduction to this volume.
9 See L. Lüthi, *The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008, p. 57. Nehru was to pay dearly for his trust. The Zhou–Nehru agreement was to become the starting point of a series of misunderstandings, which led to the ultimate failure of his China policy and to the defeat in the Indo-China Border Conflict of 1962. See also J. Bandyopadhyaya, *The Making of India's Foreign Policy: Determinants, Institutions, Processes and Personalities*, 3rd revised edn, New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 2003, pp. 231–40; J. Chen, 'Bridging Revolution and Decolonization: The "Bandung Discourse" in China's Early Cold War Experience', in C. E. Goscha and C. F. Ostermann (eds), *Connecting Histories: Decolonization and the Cold War in South East Asia, 1945–1962*, Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2009, pp. 137–71, 152–4; J. Chen, *Mao's China and the Cold War*, Chapel Hill: North Carolina University Press, 2001; and J. Čavoški, *Jugoslavija i kinesko-indijski konflikt 1959–1962* (Yugoslavia and the Sino-Indian Conflict, 1959–1962), Belgrade: INIS, 2009.
10 NMML, All India Radio tapes, 'Speech at a Civic Reception at Ramlila Maidan in Honour of Nikolai Aleksandrovich Bulganin, the Soviet Prime Minister, and Nikita Sergiyevich Khrushchev, the First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Delhi, 19 November 1955'; original in Hindi, translated into English and published in J. Nehru, *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru* [hereafter *SWJN*], 2nd series, vol. 31, New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 2002, pp. 299–300.
11 Nasser wanted to build up his army in order to keep up with Israel, but American conditions on selling arms to Egypt were unpalatable. Egyptian contacts with socialist states to buy weapons had already started under the previous government. See M. H. Heikal, *Nasser: The Cairo Documents*, London: New English Library, 1972, pp. 41–74, and G. Laron, 'Cutting the Gordian Knot: The Post-WWII Egyptian Quest for Arms and the 1955 Czechoslovak Arms Deal', CWIHP Working Paper 55, 2007.
12 The first Indian contacts with Yugoslavia at governmental level took place during the United Nations General Assembly in Paris 1948. Nehru's sister Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, the new president of the assembly, had great difficulty as an ambassador to Moscow and first suggested that her brother meet with Yugoslav delegate Aleš Bebler. See N. Mišković, 'The Pre-History of the Non-Aligned Movement: India's First Contacts with the Communist Yugoslavia 1948–1950', *India Quarterly* 65/2, 2009, pp. 185–200.
13 See Mišković, 'Pre-History', pp. 193–4; B. Heuser, *Western 'Containment' Policies in the Cold War: The Yugoslav Case, 1948–1953*, London and New York: Routledge, 1989, pp. 68–70, 81–3; L. M. Lees, *Keeping Tito Afloat: The United States, Yugoslavia and the Cold War*, University Park: Pennsylvania University Press, 1997; and J. Perović, 'The Tito-Stalin Split: Reassessment in Light of New Evidence', *Journal of Cold War Studies* 9 (2), 2007, pp. 32–63.
14 S. Rajak, *Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in the Early Cold War: Reconciliation, Comradeship, Confrontation, 1953–1957*, London and New York: Routledge, 2010, p. 73. See also P. Simić, *Tito: Fenomen 20. veka* (Tito: Phenomenon of the Twentieth Century), 3rd revised edn, Belgrade: Službeni glasnik, 2011.

15 Mišković, 'Pre-History', pp. 193–8. See also J. Čavoški, 'Overstepping the Balkan Boundaries: The Lesser Known History of Yugoslavia's Early Relations with Asian Countries (New Evidence from Yugoslav/Serbian archives)', *Cold War History*, 2011, pp. 1–21. An earlier version in Serbian by Čavoški is 'Zaboravljena epizoda: Jugoslovensko-kineski odnosi 1947. godine' (A Forgotten Episode: Sino-Yugoslav Relations 1947), *Tokovi istorije* 4, 2006, pp. 183–99.

16 The Chinese communists held the CPY in high esteem until the break-up with Stalin. The Yugoslavs then hoped the CCP would help them overcome the conflict with Moscow. Čavoški, 'Overstepping', pp. 10–11. See also a report of the Indian Foreign Ministry from June 1958: NMML, Subimal Dutt Papers, Subject file 99, fol. 104, 'Secret: China and the Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute, Historical Division, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, 5 June 1958'.

17 Santiniketan, 24 December 1954, cited in J. Nehru, *Letters to Chief Ministers*, vol. 4, ed. by G. Parthasarathi, Oxford and New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1988, p. 106.

18 Among other examples, Tito talked about a General Council of Democratic Powers striving to prevent war and securing peaceful coexistence in a talk with an Indian and a Chinese communist in 1947. AJ, Titov fond, KMJ I–2-c/2, fol. 7–8, cited after Čavoški, 'Zaboravljena epizoda' (earlier version of Čavoški, 'Overstepping'), pp. 197–8.

19 My forthcoming book, *Freedom and Friendship: Tito, Nehru, Nasser and the Founding of the Non-Aligned Movement*, explores the personal relationship between Tito, Nehru and Nasser on the basis of interviews, biographies, correspondence, and analyses of their collaboration during meetings and important political events. See also S. Casey and J. Wright (eds), *Mental Maps in the Early Cold War 1945–1968*, Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.

20 Nehru's visit to Yugoslavia from 30 June to 7 July 1955 was part of a long journey through the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries which took place shortly after the Bandung Conference. See Nehru's report at NMML, 'Confidential: The Prime Minister's Visit to the Soviet Union and Other Countries (June–July 1955): New Delhi, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 1955'.

21 AJ, Titov fond, KPR I–1/360, fol. 1, 'Message from Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru to His Excellency President Josip Broz Tito, dated New Delhi, July 28, 1955'. The first letter of the Nehru–Tito correspondence dates from 28 July 1955, the last from 7 March 1964. The letters are part of Tito's and Nehru's papers in Belgrade and New Delhi respectively (see p.114 and p.133, note 3). Some of Nehru's letters to Tito are published in *SWJN*. The Geneva Conference of 18 July 1955 was to relieve international tension. The President of the US, the prime ministers of the UK, France and the Soviet Union, their foreign ministers, and the chairman of the CPSU (Khrushchev) were participants.

22 Lüthi, *Sino-Soviet Split*, p. 49. Among others, the American intelligence service (CIA) quickly got hold of the text and distributed it intensively via Radio Free Europe. See T. Weiner, *CIA: Legacy of Ashes – The History of the CIA*, London: Allen Lane, 2007, pp. 123–30.

23 NMML, V. K. Krishna Menon Papers: 'Proceedings of a Conference between Nehru, the Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito and the Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser held at the island of Vanga, Brioni, on 18 July 1956'; cited in *SWJN* 34, p. 297.

24 AJ, Titov fond, KPR I–3–c: 'Strogo poverljivo: Političke informacije, Informacije o Indiji (juli 1955–juli 1956)' (Highly Confidential: Political Information, Information on India, July 1955 to July 1956), fol. 4, 'Državni sekretarijat za inostrane poslove, juli 1956. godine' (State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs, July 1956); all translations from Serbo-Croatian are by the author.

25 The role of the media in the Cold War is still underresearched. As for Brioni, Tvrtko Jakovina mentions that 160 journalists awaited the end of the talks between Tito, Nehru and Nasser. T. Jakovina, *Treća strana Hladnog rata* (The Third Side of the

Cold War), Zagreb: Fraktura, 2011, p. 39. See also the chapter by Jürgen Dinkel in this volume.

26 AJ, Titov fond, KPR I–3–c, 'Trojni sastanak Tito–Naser–Nehru, Brioni 18. i 19. VII.1956' (Tripartite Meeting Tito–Nasser–Nehru, Brioni, 18 and 19 July 1956), 'Joint statement by the President of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, the President of the Republic of Egypt and the Prime Minister of India, Brioni, 19th July 1956'. Research has often interpreted Brioni as a new direction in Nehru's foreign policy, abandoning Afro-Asian cooperation. Indian diplomats highlight the parallelism of several strategic tracks. See R. Sikri, *Challenge and Strategy: Rethinking India's Foreign Policy*, New Delhi, 2009, and his paper 'The Idea of "Tilt" in India's Foreign Policy – the Nehru years' given at the conference 'The Cold War and the Postcolonial Moment', Zurich, 4 June 2011.

27 M. H. Heikal, *Cutting the Lion's Tail: Suez Through Egyptian Eyes*, London: André Deutsch, 1986; S. C. Smith, *Reassessing Suez 1956: New Perspectives on the Crisis and its Aftermath*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008; S. Aburish, *Nasser: The Last Arab*, London: Duckworth, 2004; P. G. Vatikiotis, *The History of Modern Egypt: From Muhammad Ali to Mubarak*, London: Weidenfels and Nicolson, 1991; A. Dawisha, *Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003, pp. 160–85.

28 AJ, Titov fond, KPR I–1/363, fol. 1, 'Message dated the 28th July, 1956, from Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru to His Excellency Marshal Josip Broz-Tito, President of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia'. See also *SWJN* 34, p. 323.

29 AJ, Titov fond, KPR I–1/363, fol. 7, 'Poruka od 1 avgusta 1956 Predsednika FNR Jugoslavije Josipa Broz-Tita Njegovoj Ekselenciji Jawaharlal Nehru-u, premijeru indiske vlade' (Message from the President of the Federal Peoples' Republic of Yugoslavia Josip Broz Tito to his Excellency Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of the Indian Government, 1 August 1956).

30 The Hungarian Revolution is a large research field in itself. See, among others, C. Békés, M. Byrne and J. M. Rainer (eds), *The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents*, Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2002; G. Litván and J. M. Bak (eds), *Die Ungarische Revolution 1956: Reform – Aufstand – Vergeltung*, Vienna: Passagen Verlag, 1994; R. Kipke (ed.), *Ungarn 1956: Zur Geschichte einer gescheiterten Volkserhebung*, Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2006; J. M. Rainer, *Imre Nagy: Vom Parteisoldaten zu Märtyrer des ungarischen Volksaufstands: Eine politische Biographie 1896–1958*, Paderborn: Schöningh, 2006; G. Alföldy, *Ungarn 1956: Aufstand, Revolution, Freiheitskampf*, Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag C. Winter, 1997. Regarding Soviet–Hungarian relations, see A. S. Stykalin, 'The Hungarian Crisis of 1956: The Soviet Role in the Light of New Archival Documents', *Cold War History* 2/1, 2001, pp. 113–44; L. Borhi, 'Empire by Coercion: The Soviet Union and Hungary in the 1950s', *Cold War History* 1/2, 2001, pp. 47–72; J. C. Granville, *The First Domino: International Decision Making during the Hungarian Crisis of 1956*, College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2004. See also the website of the Budapest Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, www.rev.hu/portal/page/portal/rev/aktualitasok (accessed 3 January 2011).

31 Litván and Bak, *Die ungarische Revolution*, pp. 70–2.

32 See Békés, Byrne and Rainer, *1956*, document 105, pp. 464–84; Granville, *First Domino*, pp. 164–6; Weiner, *Legacy of Ashes*, note 130, pp. 570–1.

33 Békés, Byrne and Rainer, *1956*, document 82, p. 383.

34 See J. C. Granville, 'Tito and the "Nagy Affair" in 1956', *East European Quarterly* 32 (1), 1998, pp. 23–55; Đ. Tripković, 'Jugoslavija i pitanje azila Imre Nađa' (Yugoslavia and the Question of Asylum for Imre Nagy), *Istorija 20. veka* 15, 1997, pp. 61–73; L. J. Gibianskij, 'N. S. Hruščev, J. Broz Tito i vengerskij krizis 1956 g.' (N. S. Khrushchev, J. Broz Tito and the Hungarian Crisis, 1956), *Novaja i novejšaja istorija* 1, 1999, pp. 10–29; A. S. Stykalin, 'Soviet-Yugoslav Relations and the Case

of Imre Nagy', *Cold War History* 5/1, 2005, pp. 3–22; L. Bíró, 'Die Sowjetunion und die jugoslawisch-ungarischen Beziehungen', in W. Mueller and M. Portmann (eds), *Osteuropa vom Weltkrieg bis zur Wende*, Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie, 2007, pp. 241–56; J. Juhász, 'Savremena mađarska istoriografija o Jugoslaviji' (Contemporary Hungarian Historiography on Yugoslavia), *Tokovi istorije* 1, 2010, pp. 169–84.

35 Granville, *Nagy Affair*, p. 27.

36 The Soviet Union for the first time signed an agreement with another communist country on the basis of equality. Rajak, *Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union*, pp. 160–1.

37 Ibid., p. 161. See also Stykalin, *Soviet-Yugoslav Relations*, p. 5; Békés, Byrne and Rainer, *1956*, document 11, pp. 116–18, and document 14, pp. 136–42.

38 Rajak, *Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union*, p. 163.

39 S. N. Khrushchev, *Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower*, translated from Russian by Shirley Benson, University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000, pp. 172, 185. See also D. Bogetić, 'Saradnja Jugoslavije sa zapadnim silama u vreme normalizacije njenih odnosa sa socijalističkim lagerom 1956. godine' (Yugoslavia's Cooperation with the Western Powers during the Normalization of Relations with the Socialist Camp, 1956), *Istorija 20. veka* 2, 2005, pp. 113–29, p. 125.

40 Khrushchev, *Nikita Khrushchev*, p. 173; V. Mićunović, *Moskovske godine 1956/1958* (Moscow Years 1956/1958), Zagreb: SN Liber, 1977.

41 Simić, *Tito*, p. 261. Simić refers to speeches reprinted in two editions in several volumes on Tito's sayings, compiled after his death without full references by the Institut za savremenu istoriju in Belgrade, and printed in the state publishing houses of all Yugoslav republics in the 1980s: J. Broz Tito, *Autobiografska kazivanja* (Autobiographical Sayings), 2 vols, Belgrade: Narodna knjiga, 1982, and J. Broz Tito, *O partiji i ulozi komunista* (On the Party and the Role of the Communists), 4 vols, Belgrade: Narodna knjiga, 1984.

42 AJ, Titov fond, KPR, SSSR, 1956, I-5-V, 'Memorandum razgovora druga Tita, A. Rankovića, E. Kardelja and V. Mićunovića sa N. S. Hruščevom i G. M. Malenkovom u noći od 2. do 3. novembra 1956 (sastavljeno sledećeg jutra, 3. novembra sa sećanja, od Mićunovića, na Titov zahtev)' (Memorandum of Talk between Comrades Tito, A. Ranković, E. Kardelj and V. Mićunović with N. S. Khrushchev and G. M. Malenkov during the Night of 2 to 3 November 1956, Compiled the next Morning, 3 November, from Memory, by Mićunović, on Tito's Demand), cited in Rajak, *Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union*, pp. 174–5. See also the reminiscences of this meeting by Mićunović, *Moskovske godine*, pp. 156–64, and Khrushchev, *Nikita Khrushchev*, pp. 199–202.

43 Rajak, *Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union*, p. 174. Earlier that day, the Soviet chairman had met Kádár and Ferenc Münnich in Moscow, and then travelled to Brest and Bucharest for consultations with party leaders from Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Bulgaria.

44 Rajak, *Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union*, p. 174; Mićunović, *Moskovske godine*, p. 161.

45 Rajak, *Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union*, p. 175, Mićunović, *Moskovske godine*, pp. 160–1; Granville, *Nagy Affair*, pp. 32–8.

46 Békés, Byrne and Rainer, *1956*, document 85, p. 387.

47 Rajak, *Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union*, p. 179.

48 Békés, Byrne and Rainer, *1956*, p. 394, footnotes 81 and 83. The Yugoslavs never believed the Soviet investigation report which claimed it had been a ricochet.

49 Békés, Byrne and Rainer, *1956*, document 90, pp. 395–7.

50 Nehru Memorial Fund [hereafter NMF], JN Collection, 'Note to N. R. Pillai, Secretary General, and Foreign Secretary, MEA, 12 October 1956', published in *SWJN* 35, pp. 450–1.

51 NMF, JN Collection, 'Cable to K. P. S. Menon, 2 November 1956', published in *SWJN* 35, pp. 451–2.
52 NMF, JN Collection, 'Cable to K. P. S. Menon, New Delhi, 4 November 1956', published in *SWJN* 35, p. 455.
53 NMF, JN Collection, 'To Rajendra Prasad, 6 November 1956', published in *SWJN* 35, p. 458.
54 NMF, JN Collection, 'Cable to G. L. Mehta, New Delhi, 5 November 1956', published in *SWJN* 35, p. 456.
55 NMML, All India Radio tapes, 'Address at the Inauguration of the Ninth General Session of the UNESCO Conference, New Delhi, 5 November 1956', transcribed and published in *SWJN* 35, pp. 537–41, 539–40.
56 See also Nehru's 'Cable to V. K. Krishna Menon, dictated from Kolkata, for onward transmission from New Delhi', 11 November 1956, at NMML, V. K. Krishna Menon Papers, published in *SWJN* 35, pp. 459–60.
57 NMF, JN Collection, 'Cable to G. L. Mehta and Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, New Delhi, 15 November 1956', published in *SWJN* 35, p. 462. Nehru writes 'Security Council', but he means the Special Meetings of the UN General Assembly on 4, 8 and 9 November 1956. Ibid., note 6.
58 See for example the petition of 19 November 1956 signed by a large number of organizations, among others the Association of Hungarian journalists MUOSZ, the Hungarian Writer's Association, the Hungarian Peasant's Association; Békés, Byrne and Rainer, *1956*, p. xlv.
59 Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Political Archive, 1956, F50/Mađarska V–418445: 'Memorandum of Conversation between D. Vidić and the Indian Ambassador in Belgrade (Dayal), 4 November 1956', cited in Rajak, *Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union*, p. 176, note 129.
60 AJ, Titov fond, KPR I-1/364, fol. 3–6, English translation fol. 7–11: 'Pretsednik Republike Njegovoj Ekcelenciji Džavaharlalu Nehru-u, Predsjedniku Indiske vlade, Brioni, 7. novembra 1956' (The President of the Republic to His Excellency Jawaharlal Nehru, President of the Indian Government, Brioni, 7 November 1956).
61 Ibid., fol. 9.
62 Ibid., fol. 9–10. Regarding Western propaganda see Békés, Byrne and Rainer, *1956*, document 3, pp. 34–53, documents 6, 7, 8, pp. 66–105; and Granville, *The First Domino*, pp. 158–60.
63 AJ, Titov fond, KPR I-1/364, fol. 3–6, English translation fol. 7–11: 'Pretsednik Republike Njegovoj Ekcelenciji Džavaharlalu Nehru-u, Predsjedniku Indiske vlade, Brioni, 7. novembra 1956' (The President of the Republic to His Excellency Jawaharlal Nehru, president of the Indian government, Brioni, 7 November 1956), fol. 11.
64 Tripković, 'Jugoslavija i pitanje azila', p. 65.
65 Ibid., and Rajak, *Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union*, p. 179.
66 Edited in J. Broz Tito, *Govori i članci* (Speeches and Articles), vol. 11, Zagreb, 1959, pp. 219–40. The speech was published in *Borba* on 16 December. An English translation of the full speech is reprinted in Békés, Byrne and Rainer, *1956*, document 96, pp. 418–31.
67 *SWJN* 35, p. 377.
68 Tito, *Govori*, pp. 227–9.
69 NMML, Subimal Dutt Papers, 'Cable to V. K. Krishna Menon, New Delhi, 20 November 1956', published in *SWJN* 35, pp. 469–71, p. 470.
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71 *SWJN* 35, p. 462, notes 2, 3, and Rajak, *Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union*, p. 176.
72 *Lok Sabha Debates* vol. 9, part II, columns 570–600, reprinted in *SWJN* 35, pp. 368–88, 375–6.

73 Ibid. See also NMML, V. K. Krishna Menon Papers, and JN Collection: 'Cable to V. K. Krishna Menon, New Delhi, 21 November 1956', published in *SWJN* 35, pp. 472–3.
74 NMML, V. K. Krishna Menon Papers, and NMF, JN Collection, 'Cable to V. K. Krishna Menon, New Delhi, 21 November 1956', published in *SWJN* 35, pp. 471, 474. See also Békés, Byrne and Rainer, *1956*, pp. 392–3, Document no. 89: 'Notes from the CPSU CC Presidium Meeting Reflecting a CPSU Leadership Split, 6 November 1956'.
75 NMF, JN Collection, 'Message to N. A. Bulganin, New Delhi, 22 November 1956', published in *SWJN* 35, pp. 474–6.
76 NMF, JN Collection, 'Message to János Kádár, New Delhi, 22 November 1956', published in *SWJN* 35, pp. 476–7. In an internal message, Nehru made clear that a Hungarian refusal to receive the UN officers would be understood as a confirmation of ongoing deportations. NMF: JN collection, 'Cable to J. N. Khosla, New Delhi, 22 November 1956', published in *SWJN* 35, p. 477.
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79 Jakovina, *Treća strana*, p. 34.
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6 The non-aligned and the German question

Amit Das Gupta

Non-alignment is a negative term. To pursue a non-aligned foreign policy basically means not to join a military alliance. Otherwise the term has never been defined properly. This is even truer for a possible positive definition.[1] What the non-aligned nations had in common was the claim for full sovereignty, including the full freedom of decision in foreign affairs. This was based on the right of self-determination, a term introduced by the Soviets and the Americans towards the end of World War I and becoming more and more influential in the interwar period. This did not mean, however, that the individual foreign policies of non-aligned nations had much in common. Throughout the 1950s and the 1960s, in their attempts to cooperate, they focused on the fight against colonialism and tried to define their position in the context of the Cold War, or rather towards the US and the Soviet Union. Thereby they came in contact with the two Germanies, each belonging to one of the antagonist blocs. In the years until 1961, Germany – next to East and Southeast Asia – was a hotspot of the Cold War. The two Berlin crises and other disputes were believed to have the potential to trigger another world war, this time nuclear. And though in the aftermath of the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 the status quo of two German states was confirmed and tensions in Central Europe lessened, the German question still stood central in the global conflict between the two rival blocs. In the very early years of the Cold War the non-aligned nations had been asked by the two superpowers to position themselves, but from the mid-1950s onwards, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) themselves pursued a German–German Cold War in the developing countries of Africa and Asia.[2] The non-aligned had no genuine interest in that question, but they faced permanent enticements and thinly veiled threats with regard to recognizing or not recognizing the GDR. The West German claim for sole representation of all Germans and the East German claim to be a second, non-fascist and therefore better Germany were central to the self-image of both the governments in Bonn and Berlin.

This chapter first investigates which policies on Germany pursued by individual non-aligned countries – over the period as a whole or at certain moments – had an influential role in this 'group'. The chapter then focuses on the attempts to find a somewhat coordinated policy on Germany among the non-aligned states

at the conferences at Belgrade, Cairo and Lusaka. It will be seen that only a very few governments were able to pursue a consistent policy on Germany to their own benefit. Many, however, failed to profit as much as they might have from the German–German cold war, be it politically, financially or militarily. Trying to find a balance among domestic concerns, economic needs, obligations in foreign policy and sympathies for one of the Germanies was an impossible task. A third category of non-aligned nations behaved so unpredictably that they ran into problems with both Bonn and East Berlin, which mostly meant the Soviet Union. Altogether the inevitable lack of experience in international diplomacy contributed to the fact that neither the Non-Aligned Movement nor most of the non-aligned states found a stand towards the German question that was either credible or profitable.

This chapter is in part based on studies of the policy on Germany of individual non-aligned countries: the cases of Egypt, India and Yugoslavia have been investigated intensely already. Otherwise this chapter is mostly based on archival work in the German foreign ministry. Inevitably this gives the German perspectives more weight than those of their counterparts. With most of the archives of these countries not accessible, there was, however, no alternative.

With the exception of Yugoslavia, none of the non-aligned had been directly affected by German warfare until 1945. As Germany had lost its colonial territories after World War I, the fight against colonialism was directed against other European powers. Generally speaking, this resulted in the vast majority of the non-aligned nations not having a position towards the German question when they became independent. Had they applied the principles they were fighting for in Africa and Asia, the FRG most likely would have enjoyed full-fledged support: there could be no doubt that the Soviets had installed a puppet regime in East Berlin and that the East Germans were being denied the right of self-determination. The West German claim that only the federal government was representing the will of the people and that it was therefore also speaking for the Germans in East Germany found approval from this perspective. In fact, general sympathies for Bonn's case were visible in most leaders in the non-aligned world. Besides, supporting West Germany was not only morally unquestionable but also politically and financially profitable. Understanding non-alignment as equidistance from the two blocs, which is not a necessary definition of that term but which quickly became common however, demanded equidistance to the two Germanies, too. The less non-alignment was based on right or wrong and the more it was orientated towards power and influence, the more difficult it proved to find and maintain a credible position towards the German question.

The early years had been much easier. After the two Germanies had come into being in 1949, only the FRG showed the features of a sovereign state. With the GDR's membership in the Warsaw Pact in 1955, the Soviet Union demonstrated that it opted against reunification and for the continuing existence of a second German state. Until then there had not been much to choose between the Germanies, and the Western powers had exercised influence to make sure the neutral and non-aligned countries would establish diplomatic relations with West

Germany only.[3] East Berlin, which followed a relentless strategy of either full recognition or no relations at all,[4] was rewarded by not being represented outside the communist world. Trade relations of minor importance did not change the picture. It was the federal government under Adenauer itself which willy-nilly made contacts with the East German Ulbricht regime an option. The chancellor's famous trip to Moscow in September 1955 led to the opening of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. What was meant to widen the room in which to manoeuvre for West German diplomacy resulted in the precedent of two German embassies in Moscow. Bonn's explanation that the Soviet Union – as one of the victorious powers of World War II with responsibilities for Germany as a whole and for Berlin – would form an exception could hardly convince the rest of the world. It would have seemed only natural for the non-aligned nations therefore to follow the example of the Soviets.

This is why in late 1955 the FRG introduced the so-called Hallstein Doctrine: it stated that the recognition of the GDR by a third state would be understood as an unfriendly act causing measures up to the cessation of diplomatic relations. As aligned nations had long since taken sides, this was a doctrine meant for the neutral and non-aligned countries. Despite the fact that the ongoing existence of the GDR was once again confirmed by the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961, the Hallstein Doctrine remained powerful until West Germany itself finally accepted realities and came to terms with the East with the German–German Basic Treaty of 21 December 1972. In 1961 Bonn still had a number of advantages on its side; in 1955, it had established diplomatic relations with all newly independent states in Africa and Asia, whereas the GDR had none. The economic miracle had made West Germany an important trade partner and a major donor for developing countries. This economic strength guaranteed the FRG global influence it could use for its partners in the non-aligned world. Besides, Bonn in general enjoyed support from the US, the strongest power worldwide in terms of both hard and soft power. The Soviet Union, by contrast, was not only less influential altogether but tended to slow down East German initiatives, sensing conflicts with Soviet interests and too much independence.

The case of Yugoslavia proved that Bonn was serious about its campaign to keep the GDR isolated internationally. When Belgrade recognized the latter in October 1957, the FRG terminated diplomatic relations, restoring them only a decade later. The same happened with Cuba in 1963.[5] Even an upgrade of East Germany below the threshold of full recognition, for instance in the form of admitting a consulate general as Ceylon did in 1964, lead to a cessation of aid.[6] Bonn was strong enough to punish single countries which tried to overcome the Hallstein Doctrine. What might have changed the constellation fundamentally was a joint recognition of the GDR by a number of influential non-aligned countries. The first such attempt came with the meeting of Presidents Gamal Abdel Nasser and Josip Broz Tito with Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru on the Yugoslav island Brioni in summer 1956. While the Yugoslav leader, with some support from his Egyptian colleague, wished to include a paragraph mentioning the existence of two German states in the joint communiqué, the Indian prime

minister, who had just arrived from a state visit to the FRG, not only refused this endeavour, but even enforced a sentence that unification should be based on the will of the German people.[7] It remains an open question whether a joint initiative of the three leading non-aligned politicians would have been successful. Anyway, from there on, Bonn feared that the joint action of African and Asian countries would make the Hallstein Doctrine obsolete. These fears culminated around the Belgrade conference, when the absence of West German diplomats in Yugoslavia coincided with the construction of the Berlin Wall a few days before the opening of the conference, which made the outcome incalculable. The conferences at Cairo and Lusaka aroused lesser fears and found the FRG much better prepared.

At Belgrade a number of non-aligned countries played an influential role as far as the German question was concerned. Some of them could offer longer-lasting experience in handling the two Germanies. Others were keen to maintain or alter the current state of affairs, hoping to gain some profits. Those key players were, in alphabetical order: Egypt, Ghana, India, Indonesia and Yugoslavia. Before the chapter turns towards the conference itself, the policies on Germany of those countries will be investigated.

Yugoslavia

Yugoslavia was the first non-aligned country to cross the Rubicon by recognizing the GDR on 15 October 1957. Relations between Belgrade and Bonn had been good until then: as recently as 10 March 1956 an agreement on economic cooperation had been signed. Yugoslavia was to receive DM240 million, with the West Germans tacitly expecting the ongoing non-recognition of the GDR in return.[8] Political and economic pressure from the Soviet Union, however, made Tito change his mind. The Kremlin calculated that the Yugoslav step might trigger a wave of recognitions, making the Hallstein Doctrine obsolete. And Belgrade itself expected a rather mild reaction from Bonn: the West German ambassador Georg von Pfleiderer had signalled a flexible attitude on the part of his government. Besides, the recognition was announced immediately after elections to the Federal Parliament. It seemed unlikely that Adenauer would be able to take a forceful decision at that moment. The chancellor, however, less concerned with the consequences of the claim for sole representation than with the effects of the Sputnik shock, wanted to demonstrate steadfastness and broke off diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia on 19 October 1957.[9]

The message was clearly heard in the non-aligned world, but Belgrade's recognition of the GDR turned out to be an isolated step. Nehru, for instance, immediately made it known that he had no intention to follow Tito's example.[10] He thought the recognition would rather increase tensions and was embarrassed that Belgrade had tried to create the impression that India was consulted beforehand.[11] Ironically, Bonn's counterstroke made other non-aligned leaders manoeuvre even more cautiously in their contacts with the GDR, but it hardly hit Yugoslavia itself: the West German embassy in Belgrade was closed for good,

but the consulate general in Zagreb continued to function normally. Trade relations even flourished, as the FRG urgently needed bauxite and other raw materials. Therefore negotiations for a return to normalcy took place, but failed in 1959.[12] Tito thus had good reason to advise his colleagues that the West German reaction towards recognition of the GDR might be severe initially, but in the long run would hardly have any negative effects, especially financially. This was the standpoint he promoted at the conferences at Belgrade[13] and, less emphatically, at Cairo.[14] It seems likely that Tito willingly ignored the rather unique value of Yugoslavia for the FRG as the only European socialist country outside the Warsaw Pact – which made a complete break unlikely – and tried to overcome isolation by proselytizing.

Indonesia

Indonesia responded to Tito's advice. Under the leadership of Ahmed Sukarno, the country pursued a nominal non-aligned foreign policy, which in fact was characterized by close relations with the Soviet Union.[15] The bloody fight against the Dutch colonial power had been wholeheartedly supported by Moscow, and so were the Indonesian claims for West Irian, the last remainder of the Netherland's colonial empire until 1962. Sailing in the wake of the Soviet Union, the GDR quickly established a rather high status in Indonesia. The trade mission had been transformed into a consulate general in 1960, and the latter's rights had been further extended in 1962. The West Germans, of course, were aware of the importance of Indonesia as well and tried their best to stop it from further drifting towards the communist bloc. Their heavy investments in economic and cultural relations[16] paid off so well that in 1963, a full recognition of the GDR by Jakarta remained out of the question for the time being. Federal President Heinrich Lübke won Sukarno for a public statement on 2 November that year, declaring support for unification and the German right of self-determination.[17] The late, but decisive, US support for Indonesia's claims for West Irian further helped to secure a not too anti-Western stand for the country. Indonesia's high ambitions on the international scene, however, together with provocative statements from Foreign Minister Subandrio, made perspectives not fully calculable. Subandrio – hinting at the Yugoslav experiences – publicly claimed a number of times that even if the recognition of the GDR might lead to the cessation of relations with the FRG, this finally would mean no more than a symbolic act. At the Belgrade conference, Sukarno demanded the acceptance of the fact of the existence of two German states. In a number of communiqués with socialist countries, he fully supported the Soviet stand towards the German question: recognition of the GDR and the Oder-Neisse border with Poland together with a free city of West Berlin.[18] In summer 1964, however, before the opening of the Cairo conference, Bonn was assured this would not happen again.[19] The final end of ambiguity came only with a fundamental change of Indonesia's domestic affairs: in the course of a leftist attempt to overthrow the government in 1965, General Suharto, a reliable friend of the West for the years to come, took over.

The change in Indonesia's policy on Germany could be seen clearly at the Lusaka conference: Chancellor Brandt counted on Suharto to prevent discussions of the German question.[20]

India

Of all the non-aligned countries, New Delhi had the longest-lasting experience with the German question, which dated back to the time prior to independence. British India had in 1945 been invited to open a military mission in occupied Berlin to profit from German reparations as a reward for its wartime engagement. This mission was located in the British sector of the city and remained there when it was inherited by independent India. One could say that the latter was born with a Western position on the German question. As soon as the Allies established their High Commission in Bonn in autumn 1949, India opened an office there as well.[21] Besides, Nehru developed a strong interest in cooperating with Western Germany: the combination of economic strength and political weakness made it an ideal partner for India's industrialization programme. The FRG was expected to help in return for money, but without political strings attached. Actually New Delhi was sounding out East Berlin as well, but the Ulbricht administration did not dare to respond properly during Stalin's lifetime, given Stalin's characterization of Nehru as a lackey of imperialism.[22] Thus in 1951 India opened an embassy at Bonn only. A general open-mindedness towards the second German state was, however, manifested in a trade agreement with East Berlin in 1954, the first that a non-socialist government had ever signed with the East Germans.[23] The period 1955–1956 saw a minister from the GDR as well as one from the FRG in New Delhi, and Nehru visited Bonn. With the West Germans holding the upper hand, an intensive German–German propaganda battle developed in India, believed to be the key country among the non-aligned in deciding the fate of the Hallstein Doctrine. In 1959 the Indo-Chinese border conflict led to skirmishes, and Nehru turned to the Soviet Union hoping for moderation. In that context, the German quarrels became a pain in the neck. The Prime Minister publicly declared on 3 December that he did not see any will for a compromise which meant that no one was after unification. Massive criticism from the FRG and other Western donors, who just had formed the Aid India Consortium to allow development to proceed, resulted in a quick pull-back.[24] The Indian government did not find a policy which would combine sympathies for a democratic West Germany with an adaptation to realities, and thus tried to avoid any further statement, as Nehru had already advised in 1952.[25] After the defeat in the border war with the PRC, in order to receive military and financial aid Nehru promised to abstain from any comments to the detriment of the FRG,[26] and he as well as his successors mostly kept to the promise, with lip-service in Indo-Soviet communiqués forming the exception. Even when the erosion of the Hallstein Doctrine became evident in the late 1960s, Indira Gandhi waited almost until the very last moment before she recognized the GDR in October 1972.[27]

Egypt

Egypt's approach in general was far less scrupulous. The traditional strong German stand in the Arab world had been inherited by the FRG and it must be said cynically that the holocaust deepened the sympathies.[28] Adenauer's offer to take over the financing of the Aswan Dam when the US had pulled out was not accepted because of an even better Soviet offer, but was seen as a proof of friendship.[29] German technicians working at Heluan to develop short-range missiles for Egypt were highly welcome and tacitly supported by the West German government.[30] President Nasser, however, was well aware that it was the German–German competition that guaranteed maximum profits from both sides. Therefore he never intended to side with either of the opponents completely. Even the massive crisis in 1965 fitted that pattern. Eager to please the Soviets in order to stimulate support from that side, Egypt invited the head of the East Berlin government, Walter Ulbricht, for something that came close to an official state visit. It was Ulbricht's first and last trip outside the socialist bloc, and Nasser justified the invitation by making public secret West German arms deliveries to Israel, about which in fact he had known for a long time. Bonn reacted by recognizing Israel, whereupon Egypt and a number of Arab states froze their relations with West Germany. Cairo, however, neither broke diplomatic relations with West Germany nor opened those with East Germany.[31] The balance had changed remarkably, but neither Bonn nor East Berlin had reached their goals completely. The Egyptian decision to recognize the GDR in 1969 was taken under considerations of overriding importance: after the disaster of the Six-Day War the Soviet Union greatly increased its influence in the Middle East, and paying tribute to this by upgrading its satellite seemed to be a minor price, especially as Cambodia and other Asian countries had done so already.[32]

Ghana

Ghana, the only Black African country observed here, forms a rather special case by having pursued an erratic policy on Germany. Even before the former Gold Coast became independent on 6 March 1957, good relations with the FRG had been established with the opening of a consulate in May 1956.[33] The West German ambassador Stein had easy access to President Kwame Nkrumah and there seemed to be no reason to worry against the background of the altogether pro-Western policy of the new country.[34] In 1959 the picture had changed, with the Soviet bloc trying to attract Accra. In early 1960 Bonn learned that Nkrumah intended to visit the GDR if he was also invited by the FRG.[35] The West German Foreign Office therefore strongly recommended a quick extension of the volume of aid as a countermove.[36] These tactics proved to be efficient,[37] and until early 1961 Bonn could count Nkrumah among those who had no intention to challenge the Hallstein Doctrine. His major preoccupation was the unity of Africa, with himself in a leading role.[38]

However, Nkrumah's six-month visit to the Soviet Union, its satellite states, and the People's Republic of China turned the tides. The leaders in the Kremlin understood well that the ambitious African leader had hardly any knowledge about the situation in Central Europe and could easily be manipulated for their purposes.[39] The warm welcome, loans worth around US$100 million,[40] and the prospect of playing a central role in international affairs by taking the lead in the German question made an enthusiastic Nkrumah fully support the Soviet stand towards the German question in a number of public statements.[41] Having spent a few hours on an unofficial visit to the GDR,[42] he came to Belgrade with the declared intent of moving his colleagues towards a fundamental change in their policies on Germany. Together with Tito, he supported a paragraph in the joint communiqué mentioning the existence of two German states and even a joint recognition of the GDR.[43] Travelling to Moscow with Nehru immediately after the Belgrade conference in order to communicate the results to the Soviet leaders, he represented the rather radical group among the non-aligned. The West Germans, when consulting Ghana's foreign minister and other members of the cabinet about the backgrounds for Nkrumah's change of mind, learned that no one in Accra had any idea as the president took little interest in informing those at home.[44] He regarded foreign policy as his private domain and took no notice of the pro-FRG views of his aides.[45]

In the years following, Nkrumah's enthusiasm cooled down. Against the background of Ghana's strong dependence on Western aid, it seemed unwise to stand against the vital interest of one of the major donors.[46] Still there were such gestures as Foreign Minister Botsio's visit to the GDR in 1964 and hostile press reports against the FRG, justified by the alleged cooperation of West Germany with South Africa and Portugal. Besides, Nkrumah kept on propagating the extravagant view that German unification was not prevented by East Berlin or Moscow but by the incompatibility of capitalism and socialism.[47] Bonn, however, put pressure on Accra and made it clear that all this inevitably influenced the federal government's willingness to undertake long-term commitments in the economic field.[48] This had some effect: in the forefront of the Cairo Conference in 1964, the GDR noticed with disappointment that Ghana might follow if others pushed through a move for joint recognition of East Germany, but would not take any initiative.[49] Nkrumah's statements on the German question were seen as a step back, behind the position taken at Belgrade.[50] In 1965, with a proposed visit to Bonn, the president seemed to drift even further westwards.[51] Things turned even worse from an East German perspective when Nkrumah was toppled on 24 February 1966 and the new government under General Joseph Arthur Ankrah immediately closed the GDR trade mission. All members were sent home,[52] and a member of the secret service was arrested.[53] To get the agent set free the Ulbricht administration even took hostages among the Ghanaian diplomats and students in East Berlin.[54] Never before had an East German mission abroad been completely closed formally,[55] though it continued to function de facto.[56] A trade mission was reopened only in autumn 1969.[57]

The Belgrade Conference, September 1961

It seemed that the main outcome of the Belgrade Conference had been decided at the pre-conference at Cairo from 5 to 12 June 1961, as happened with the later conferences at Cairo and Lusaka. India, with superior diplomacy and much experience in organizing such major international events, took care that the list of the countries invited was extensive: the larger the number of participants, the less the chance for radical or one-sided statements at Belgrade.[58] Ghana and Yugoslavia in early 1961 had asked for the inclusion of revolutionary movements in North Africa[59] and for the German question to be put on the agenda of the main conference. Both initiatives were turned down.[60] Nasser[61] and Nehru[62] had no interest in creating even more tensions in Central Europe, as this might have further diverted attention and resources from the problems of the developing world. The decision of the pre-conference that all resolutions and declarations at Belgrade needed unanimity guaranteed them a sort of veto right.[63] The Indian Prime Minister hoped for support from Sukarno as well, inviting him for a stop-over on his way to the conference to harmonize positions.[64] The Indonesian president, however, refused.[65]

The FRG had good reason to believe that the Belgrade conference would not create major trouble. Over the preceding months Bonn had contacted the heads of participating states. Most replies confirmed they would not change their policies on Germany. The others formed only a small minority. The construction of the Berlin Wall on 13 August 1961, however, changed the picture completely. The West Germans were not prepared with any immediate major diplomatic initiative besides a hastily-put-together *aide-memoire* from the chancellor to other heads of government.[66] East Berlin, by contrast, sent high-ranking emissaries to the capitals of important non-aligned countries.[67] To make things worse at Belgrade, though not at the conference itself, on the one hand East German observers were present with a large and active delegation; on the other hand, due to the termination of diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia there was only a small West German trade union delegation. Naturally the events in Berlin propelled the German question high on the agenda. Whereas Yugoslavia harshly criticized the wall,[68] Nehru in the days ahead of the conference came up with a number of statements that seriously disturbed Bonn. First, he demanded free access to West Berlin and called the GDR merely a geographical fact. As driving forces for the crisis, however, he saw mutual anxiety and fears of a revival of German militarism. The next day he mentioned India's trade relations with the East German government: de facto, India would recognize the latter. On 23 August Nehru said that India would treat the GDR de facto 'as a sovereign, independent country, which we recognize'. Only a war could overcome the German–Polish border. Free access towards West Berlin was not based on any treaty but 'a concession from the Soviet authorities'.[69] Two days later he corrected this last, false statement. To the disappointment of West Germans, it took him until 28 August and the receipt of a letter from a friend, Berlin's mayor Willy Brandt, to mention the humanitarian and moral aspects of the wall.[70]

When the conference opened, however, Nehru had been enlightened by Western diplomats and had changed his mind. The final communiqué, only in its very last paragraphs, mentions the German question, treating it in a completely fair-minded way and asking for a non-violent solution. None of the West German positions was challenged here, but still in Bonn there was some discontent. Though this had not been written into the communiqué, there had been a general consensus among the participants about the existence of two German states.[71] Thus instead of condemning an inhuman act, the non-aligned – like the rest of the world besides the FRG itself – had accepted realities. And it had become known that it had taken Egypt and India much energy to prevent a sharp statement in favour of the GDR sponsored by Ghana and Yugoslavia.[72] Nasser had mobilized Arab participants and hinted at West German aid and its sympathies in the Middle East conflicts. Nehru had been engaged in an endless succession of private sessions to convince others that any partisan statement would further fuel the tensions.[73] In the committee formulating the final communiqué his main aid, Minister of Defence Krishna Menon, had prevented any provocative paragraph by simple obstruction.[74] The disappointment in East Berlin was massive: the regime had hoped the Berlin Wall would solve internal and external problems simultaneously. The outcome of the Belgrade Conference, however – 'singularly unproductive of concrete results'[75] – left the German question where it had been before: unresolved.

Cairo Summit, October 1964

From 23 to 28 March 1964, at the pre-conference at Colombo, it became clear that the Cairo Conference would bring no change. This time Ceylon and Yugoslavia[76] together were the driving force behind a joint recognition of the GDR. The ambitious but naïve Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike had positively responded to East German overtures to allow a consulate general. GDR diplomats had promised that West German reactions would not be too harsh and that aid would most likely increase to counterbalance the East German influence.[77] Since Ceylon had followed a nationalization policy in recent years, most Western countries had terminated aid and closed their embassies. Together with the Canadians, the West Germans functioned as the West's last bastion on that island[78] and therefore were likely to come under massive pressure from their allies to retain a presence there.

When Zanzibar after a coup d'état surprisingly recognized the GDR on 29 January 1964 without a harsh response from the FRG, it seemed Ceylon would have a free hand as well. It turned out, however, that Bonn well understood what was at risk. The GDR actually had nothing else in mind but upgrading its status. It took no genuine interest in Ceylon,[79] which it intended to use as a showcase for the real target of its diplomacy, India. If East Berlin could claim such a success in India's backyard, India might be more easily convinced to follow suit. This was the reason[80] that Bonn immediately terminated aid to Ceylon on 19 February 1964.[81] It did not help Colombo that Ceylon could hint at seven other

GDR consulates, in for example Cairo, Damascus and Djakarta.[82] And the duped Bandaranaike government learned that the GDR was not able to compensate financially.[83] Escaping isolation had been Yugoslavia's motivation to push for joint recognition at Belgrade – now Ceylon had the same in mind.[84] At the pre-conference, however, they found no positive response.[85] Nkrumah made it known he would only follow if others did the job. And Sukarno in 1963 had given his word to Federal President Lübke he would support reunification and the right of self-determination. As Bonn had prepared other governments in advance as well,[86] the German question did not appear on the agenda of the Cairo conference at all. After Bandaranaike lost the elections in Ceylon in March 1965, the new government under Prime Minister Dudley Senanayake forced the GDR consulate general to reduce its personnel to a minimum.[87]

At the main conference at Cairo from 5 to 10 October the West German observers enjoyed the advantage of diplomatic representation in Egypt, whereas the East Germans had difficulties in winning direct influence on the negotiations. While Tito still talked about the existence of two Germanies,[88] and Cuba, backed by Mali, Guinea and Ghana, insisted on discussing the German question, they were stopped by Nasser and by Nehru's successor Lal Bahadur Shastri. With the situation in Indochina being a main topic of the conference, both warned that the support of unification in Vietnam in the name of self-determination could not be contrasted with a statement ignoring the right of self-determination for the German people. This would mean double standards.[89] The final outcome was a paragraph in which the non-aligned declared their general support for the unification of all divided nations. Germany was not mentioned with a single word.[90] Once again the GDR felt dropped by its friends, whereas the FRG could feel assured that a joint recognition of the GDR was not to be expected in the near future.

Lusaka Summit 1970

The six long years from Cairo to Lusaka saw a slow erosion of the Hallstein Doctrine. The Middle East crisis mentioned above led to an upgrade of the GDR in the Arab world. The resumption of West German–Yugoslav relations in 1968[91] further reduced the credibility of the doctrine, though Bonn's partners in the non-aligned world confirmed they would not change their policies on Germany. In 1969 with Cambodia recognizing the GDR and most Arab governments following suit,[92] it seemed the West German claim for sole representation would come to an end quickly. In late 1969, however, a new federal government under Chancellor Willy Brandt and Foreign Minister Walter Scheel wanted to overcome the deadlock by coming to terms with the Soviet Union and its neighbours in the east, including the GDR, via accepting post-war realities. The Hallstein Doctrine was succeeded by the Scheel Doctrine, asking third countries to postpone the full recognition of the GDR until the two Germanies had signed a basic treaty regulating their relationship.[93] The doctrine was mostly accepted because of the long-established and profitable relationships of many non-aligned countries with the FRG together with the immense credibility the new chancellor enjoyed worldwide. For the same

reasons the Neue Ostpolitik quickly lead to a breakthrough in West German–Soviet relations resulting in the Moscow Treaty from 12 August 1970, the keystone of a whole system of treaties with Poland (7 December 1970), the GDR (21 December 1972) and Czechoslovakia (11 December 1973).

When the Lusaka Conference opened on 8 September 1970, the Moscow Treaty had already been signed. Again the FRG had prepared the field: Zambia for example, the host, stood in favour of Bonn. The FRG had opened a consulate even prior to Zambia's independence[94] – a common method to counterbalance any attempts from the GDR.[95] President Kaunda had been forced to make clear his stand at the time of independence. Bonn asked that no official GDR delegation be invited for the celebrations of independence, but the Zambian cabinet opted for a seemingly solomonic decision: both Germanies would be invited – the FRG with an official delegation, the GDR with an unofficial representative.[96] The West German response was to combine the offer of diplomatic relations with aid together with a warning to not recognize the GDR.[97] Kaunda saw this as an attempt to bribe him personally[98] plus an attempt to interfere in Zambia's sovereignty. Therefore the West German present of six ambulance cars was refused.[99] The East Germans created their own blunder: Kaunda had been approached by a German asking him for permission to open an embassy. Only after independence did it turn out to have been a representative of the GDR, who came back to the earlier 'admission'. Kaunda, feeling betrayed, abrogated.[100] Though only a West German embassy was opened, in 1967 it was followed by a GDR trade mission.

The Zambian foreign ministry signalled that it might reconsider its policy on Germany in summer 1969.[101] The president himself, however, understood the West German engagement to be sincere.[102] Therefore at the conference he took care that nothing would be discussed to the disadvantage of his friends in Bonn. Being among the most influential of the Black African leaders, the following year he indicated that Zambia would not recognize the GDR before the two Germanies had come to terms themselves.[103] In September 1971, after the GDR had supported a newly established opposition party against Kaunda, the trade mission was even closed.[104]

The FRG's second proven friend was Indonesia's Suharto, who came to visit Bonn on his way to Lusaka. He, too, gave his word to support Brandt's initiatives towards the eastern bloc.[105] By April, India already had made clear it would not stand in the way of the new eastern policy with a premature recognition of the GDR.[106] The non-aligned had in any case agreed ahead of the conference that they should no longer attempt to moderate between the two blocs. It was no surprise that a joint recognition of the GDR was not discussed at all: some had taken that step already, and others were ready to wait until the Germanies came to terms themselves. Nevertheless a bizarre debate about the Moscow Treaty came up, with some speakers believing it might create new tensions. They hinted at the German–Soviet Treaty of Rapallo of 1922 and the Hitler–Stalin Pact of 1939, fearing the 1970 treaty would again be to the detriment of the countries of Eastern Central Europe.[107] The conference altogether, however, expressed its support for the new course of the FRG.

Conclusion

Virtually every non-aligned country got involved in the German question. The individual attempts to manoeuvre between the two Germanies and the two blocs were manifold, most of them not worthy to be called strategies. Some of the heads of the newly created states saw a chance to gain advantages from the German–German rivalry, politically or financially, and successfully pursued an assertive policy playing off one Germany against the other. Many, permanently or for a while, took a clear stand in favour of one side hoping to be rewarded – often to be disappointed, as there was more invested in uncertain than certain candidates. All of them were inexperienced in international affairs. The German question was complicated and kept an army of diplomats, lawyers, historians and politicians busy over decades. For many of the non-aligned leaders it turned out to be much too demanding to be understood in all its aspects. Whatever policy on Germany was pursued, with the exception of Yugoslavia the non-aligned had neither a genuine interest in the German question nor any genuine knowledge. Overlooking the traps, overplaying their cards, striving for a global role or simply being amazingly naive, more than a few became easy victims of propaganda and manipulation.

The personnel, energy and money invested by the two Germanies, not to forget their allies, was immense, because both Bonn and East Berlin believed the non-aligned could decide the outcome of the German–German Cold War. Therefore the slow erosion of the West German position in the non-aligned world contributed strongly to the final rethinking in Bonn, resulting in the treaties with the Eastern European neighbours. The hopes and fears that the non-aligned as a whole (or an overwhelming majority of them in a coordinated attempt) could recognize the GDR were irrational to some extent, given the consideration set out at the beginning of this chapter: the non-aligned knew what they did not want to be – that is, aligned. Even here, given the prominent example of Cuba, it must be questioned whether they succeeded. In any case, they hardly ever developed an idea of what they were in a positive sense. As it proved impossible to find a consensus on central questions at the conferences at Belgrade, Cairo and Lusaka, it was even more unlikely they would ever agree on a joint policy on Germany. Typically, at none of the Afro-Asian conferences during the 1950s had the topic ever been discussed. 1961 formed the exception to the rule, with the construction of the Berlin Wall a few weeks before the conference opened in the capital of the only European non-aligned country. It was that one incalculable historical moment when a certain momentum could have wiped away all diplomatic preparations. It has to be noted, however, that even the GDR, taking the initiative on 13 August 1961, saw the link between the two events as a mere coincidence and therefore could not make full use of it. Had the non-aligned ever formed a group or a movement, there might have been a chance. In spite of having that possible potential, however, they never came that far, remaining a non-group instead of a third bloc. Proving powerless in questions far more relevant for recently decolonized countries, it would have been an irony of history if those countries had had a serious impact on a topic genuinely irrelevant for almost all of them.

Notes

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Part III

A voice in the international system

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7 ‘Fighting colonialism’ versus ‘non-alignment’

Two Arab points of view on the Bandung Conference

Matthieu Rey

It has been generally argued that the Bandung Conference strengthened the Non-Aligned Movement. Each of the eight Arab countries sent a delegation to this conference, which consisted of 29 delegations in total.[1] The joint Arab attendance suggests that the Arab countries fully supported the resolution of the conference, which declared non-alignment as a key position in international relations. Moreover, Arab countries were part of the dynamics that made the conference significant. This can be linked to three trends that appeared in the aftermath of World War II. First of all, the two Great Powers were involved in a conflict over territorial dominance. This battle began in Iran and most of the Arab countries were interested in the Iranian affair.[2] Second, part of Asia became independent at the same time as some of the Arab countries. And finally, in the post-independence period, countries shared common problems such as development and international alliances, and consequently tried to promote a new practice in international relations and alliances.

Due to these aspects, the Bandung Conference has been perceived as the cause of non-alignment in the Arab countries. This assessment is certainly correct for the Egyptian – and best-known – position, but is it true for the other Arab countries?[3] Iraqi and Syrian points of view may contradict this conclusion. Indeed, it is generally admitted that, through the conference, Nasser’s stature as a leader of the Third World began to rise. He was seen as a new hero similar to Tito or Nehru, who stood against the colonial powers.[4] As a consequence, contemporary analysis and studies thereafter insist on the Egyptian point of view, which defended the line of ‘positive neutrality’ in foreign affairs. As most of the research on the Arab world focused on Egypt, a great part of the historiography concluded that the Arabs were, globally, in favour of non-alignment. This might be explained by two factors. First of all, Nasser broke the implicit Arab alliance with Western countries in the aftermath of the conference by buying weapons from the Eastern side. Then, the Suez Crisis that followed a year after the conference demonstrated that Nasser was the hero fighting against imperialism and that most of the Arab countries supported him.[5] By studying the other Arab delegations, we can see that their involvement and their positions shed a new light on the conference and its impact on the Non-Aligned Movement. The Bandung Conference was interpreted divergently by the different Arab delegations,

depending on their own strategy. I will argue that the conference became an arena of negotiation that was used as a substitute for the other Arab institutions and that two antagonistic points of view were crystallized there.

At the Bandung Conference, Nasser and Nehru appeared to define a new way of practicing foreign policy in which neutrality was a key point. Neutrality appeared in the Arab political vocabulary in the late 1940s, in the context of foreign policy.[6] It meant that countries refused to vote in favour of Western policy and chose to abstain in UN debates. The question of neutrality has mainly been studied as one of the topics of the Cold War.[7] Malcolm Kerr introduced it to explain the division between progressive and conservative countries.[8] Nevertheless, Malcolm Kerr's essay does not shed light on how neutrality became a part of the progressive discourse. Elie Podeh wrote on alliance and leadership in the Middle East, successfully demonstrating that the Baghdad Pact set off the tensions between the countries.[9] However, he did not explore the link between the long tradition of Iraqi support for Arab nationalism and the break from it.[10] Other studies focused mostly on the relations between the Great Powers and the Arab countries.[11] In these, neutrality became a new item of vocabulary targeted against the West, but its role in inter-Arab dialogue is not well understood. All these former studies provided the background for my research on the Bandung Conference, as they have not considered how this conference became a substitute for Arab dialogues and how it was an arena for negotiation.

Iraq and Syria are two interesting case studies. Both countries came into existence after World War I and were ruled under the Mandate system. Consequently, their policies after independence, from 1932 onwards in Iraq and from 1946 in Syria, were deeply influenced by France and Great Britain. Both countries featured ethnic and religious diversity. Equally, both were affected by the consequences of the Palestine war in 1948. However, both countries remain understudied. Syrian foreign policy, last explored by Patrick Seale's *Struggle for Syria*, has mainly been discussed in relation to the USSR or the United States.[12] Except for that by Hanna Batatu, most of the studies on Iraq focus on a broader history.[13] Apart from a small number of scholars from the Iraqi school, Iraqi foreign policy receives little attention.[14] The national reconfiguration of foreign policy after independence and the political dynamics between Arab countries remain to be investigated. In this chapter, I depart from the assumption that the Bandung Conference can be interpreted as an arena of discussion about the different meanings of Arab nationalism, and therefore as a place in which Arab countries fought among each other over the correct definition of anti-colonialism. As Michael Barnett remarks, the Bandung Conference was a part of inter-Arab dialogue.[15]

Iraqi and Syrian struggles against colonialism

In Colombo, invitations to join the Bandung Conference were sent to the participants. Both the Syrian and the Iraqi governments were invited. This choice is easy to understand. In 1954, both countries were known for their fight against

colonialism and both had demonstrated their ability to achieve independence. Indeed, Iraq was one of the first countries to free itself from the British Empire in 1932, four years before Egypt and fifteen years before India. It became one of the main voices in the Arab world in defence of both Arab and other countries. For example, it asserted that Syria should become independent.[16] In 1945, its delegation in the United Nations voiced the right of every population to decide their own policy.[17] From the time of its independence, some Iraqi politicians defended Arabism as a constituent part of the regime's legitimacy and as the true answer to nations.[18] On several occasions, Faisal I[19] declared that Iraq belonged to the Arab nation and stated that his father, Hussein, had revolted against the Ottomans in order to build a united country.[20] From this point of view, Arab nationalism and fighting colonialism became synonymous in the Iraqi vocabulary. When Iraq became independent in 1932, as one of the first among the future Arab countries, it could claim to be the voice of the Arabs. This changed during World War II when Great Britain occupied Iraq for the second time in 1941 and brought back the Regent 'Abd al-Ilâh and some of the Iraqi ministers.[21] Iraqi politicians could no longer present themselves as fighting colonialism, but early Iraqi independence remained important in official discourse.

The case of Syria was different. At the end of World War II, the French government intended to conclude a treaty with the Syrian authorities that would allow the former to have some advantages in military and economic matters.[22] However, as independence had been promised since 1941, tensions grew. At the same time, Syria became a member of both the newly established Arab League and the United Nations. Syrian independence was a key issue in the Arab negotiations that created the League.[23] In May 1945, the French ordered a relief of their troops, which led to a Syrian uprising in several provinces and towns. The French retaliated by bombing Damascus, leaving behind serious damage and prompting the Americans and the British to intervene. Independence, officially proclaimed on 17 April 1946, was the result of a symbolic Syrian victory over the French and prevented Syria from being bound by a treaty with France, as was the case in Iraq or Transjordan. Consequently, Syria appeared as the first truly independent Arab country in the region. Syrian politicians – noticeably Shukrî al-Quwwatlî, the President of the Republic[24] – described this victory as the first step towards Arab independence; i.e. from their point of view, Syrian foreign policy had to liberate different Arab countries from colonial power and subsequently lead to their unification in a single Arab nation-state. Both these positions had an impact on the image of Syria and Iraq in the world: they became a symbol for the fight against European and imperialist powers. In both cases, independence was linked to a specific position vis-à-vis Arab nationalism.

The Bandung Conference was one in a series of global (in the case of the United Nations) and regional endeavours to reorganize the world order after World War II; the founding of the United Nations made the Arabs feel that they needed to organize themselves as a specific group within it. It is important to understand this process and its consequences for Syria and Iraq. Both countries had belonged to the United Nations since its creation in 1945. The Iraqi

government sent Fâdil al-Jamâlî to San Francisco. It was the first time that a young Shiite politician had held this kind of responsibility.[25] The Syrian government deliberated and decided that important representatives of the state had to participate in the San Francisco Conference. The Syrian delegation was led by Fâris al-Khûrî, at that time the president of the parliament and one of the most prominent Syrian nationalists. The Syrian situation explained this choice: independence had been promised but not yet granted, and San Francisco seemed to be an opportunity to rally support for the country. The number of Arab countries in the United Nations was substantial compared to other areas. With five Middle Eastern delegations, Arab issues quickly gained importance at the UN conference.[26] Three subjects were brought to discussion in the General Assembly: Lebanon-Syria, Palestine and Libya. In each case, talks centred around the future of these territories. Two of them, Lebanon–Syria and Palestine, were under French and British mandate, and the third was an Italian colony. The debates revolved around the question of whether to grant these territories independence or to establish an international mandate. The Syrian and Lebanese issues remained specific, as their delegates defended themselves. From 1944 to 1947, Arab delegates focused mainly on the Palestinian issue in order to claim Palestine as an Arab territory. Although the aim here is not to discuss the end of the mandate in Palestine, nor the 1948 war,[27] this topic nevertheless brought the Arab countries together. An Arab bloc appeared in the United Nations.[28] This bloc, in which Iraq played an important role, also brought the Arab countries closer to other Asian nations. Indeed, this union was strengthened as Arab countries denounced Dutch repression and supported Asian causes such as Indonesian independence.[29] The Arab bloc assembled in the United Nations was dominated by the Iraqi, Egyptian and Saudi delegations. They intended to promote equality between nations and fight any kind of foreign domination. In 1947, they attacked the UN position on the Palestinian issue as contradicting the United Nations charter and spoke up against the emerging Cold War power conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Defining Arab foreign policy and the struggle for Arab identity: the centrality of the Arab League

It is not possible to understand discussions between Arab countries at the Bandung Conference without taking into consideration the Arab League. First of all, its general secretaries represented Arab countries in the preliminary meeting in which Asian and African countries brought up the issue of neutrality or non-alignment.[30] Then, negotiations between Arab countries took place during the Arab League meeting. Therefore, it is necessary to understand the process of the building and discussing of this institution. In 1941, Nuri al-Said, the Iraqi president of the ministers' council, suggested that Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria form a federation. He tried to persuade Egypt to join the project. From Nuri al-Said's point of view, following the Arab revolution,[31] war was an opportunity to unify the Arab nations, with Iraq leading this union. Nevertheless, the goal was

more important than leadership, and consequently Nuri al-Said managed to come closer to Saudi Arabia and Egypt. In 1942, neither of them was in favour of this plan, but this changed in 1943. Mustafâ al-Nahhas, the Egyptian prime minister, wanted to prove that he was an Arab nationalist and began to promote the idea of the League.[32] However, he wished Egypt to lead it and rejected any Iraqi quest for leadership. The Saudis on the other hand insisted on a guarantee of sovereignty for each individual state.

Finally, Great Britain supported the idea of Arab unification. Between 1943 and 1944, negotiations took place in Cairo. Nuri al-Said preferred the unification of Arab countries (including Saudi Arabia and Egypt) over Iraqi leadership and complied with Egyptian wishes.[33] The Arab League therefore was born, with the agreement that each state would retain its sovereignty and that Egypt would nominate the general secretary. In the early years of its creation, the Arab League established itself as a forum in which Arab politicians debated and defined the norms of what Arabism should be. Iraq and Syria were members of the Arab League but also belonged to several international unions, including the Muslim conference which met once a year. Nevertheless, these other conferences did not impact Iraqi and Syrian international commitment to Arab League resolutions.

In short, the Arab League came to be the main platform for Arab countries to debate core regional issues. After the independence of Syria, Lebanon and Transjordan, delegations focused on the Palestine dossier. To deal with current issues, the Arab League created several departments. For example, in June 1946, the political committee was introduced to resolve important crises.[34] The Syrian and Iraqi governments shared a belief that their foreign policy should be coordinated through the Arab League. In Iraq, every royal speech inaugurating a new cabinet stressed that the government wished to strengthen Arab links through the League and in accordance with its Pact. In the aftermath of the Palestine defeat, the League had to decide on several Arab problems concerning the equilibrium between the countries. As Sayyîd `Abd al-`Al shows, its general secretary was deeply involved in the recognition of the new Syrian government after the coup by Husnî al-Za'îm.[35] His role indicated a shift from Iraq to Egypt at the helm of Arab affairs. If the Iraqi government were to agree on an Egyptian candidate for the post of general secretary, the candidate would have to be neutral. But in this case he developed his own policy that was close to the Egyptian one, with the result that the Iraqi government denounced it. Polarization between Iraq and Egypt on regional issues in the Arab League became more and more marked. Their conflict focused around Arab problems, not on world issues, and deepened in 1949, when Iraq and Syria planned their unification.[36] A second coup a few months after the Husnî al-Za`îm coup in Syria turned Syrian inclinations in favour of Iraq and against Egypt. Syrian politicians supported a new policy to unify Iraq and Syria but failed to get backup from the militaries. In December 1949, a third coup took place, culminating in a stalemate between Iraq and Egypt in the 'struggle for Syria'. The Iraqi president of council met his Egyptian counterpart a few days before the Arab League meeting of January 1950, and together

they declared their intention not to intervene in Syrian affairs within the next five years.[37] In 1950, Iraq was thus one of the most influential voices in the Arab arena, trying to rally others for its cause, whereas Syria was more the stage for this power struggle.

Shift in the inter-Arab dialogue

At the beginning of the 1950s, three developments affected Arab foreign policy and changed the inter-Arab dialogues. The first was linked with arms supply and the lack of modern equipment. The Palestine defeat had exposed the need to modernize the armies, and most of the leaders viewed the defeat as being a result of the inequality between the strengths of the Arab and Israel armies. The second was linked to the question of economic development. States started to intervene in private industry and transport in order to maximize their resources and to encourage industrialization and an expansion of national production. For example, the Syrian government declared that it was necessary to fight backwardness in order to achieve real independence, and that it was crucial to secure sufficient resources of one's own in order to escape Western pressure.[38] These two demands were linked in political discourse and can be regarded as a direct reaction to Cold War interference on the domestic scene. President Harry Truman, during his State of the Union Address in 1949, declared that the United States would provide military and financial support as well as technical assistance to the countries fighting communism.[39] Even if the Syrian and the Iraqi government responded differently to this call,[40] the two issues got entangled from this time forward.

The third change dealt with communism and the Cold War. Their impact on Iraq and Syria were different. In Iraq, the fight against communism can be traced back to the 1930s.[41] During World War II, this policy had been briefly interrupted due to the Soviet commitment to the Allies. After the war, the Iraqi government issued new laws prohibiting any kind of communist activity. In the eyes of Iraqi authorities, the Soviet vote in favour of the partition of Palestine in 1948 affirmed the link between Zionism and communism. The Cold War deeply influenced both internal and external political discourse in Iraq. Cabinet programmes claimed to be fighting communism from the inside and requested help from Western countries against the Soviet threat. And yet the Iraqi communists managed to increase their importance during the 1940s and 1950s.[42] In the mid-1950s, they grew into one of the strongest political parties opposing the monarchy. In Syria, communism had not been very popular after World War II. Many politicians denounced it as atheism and imperialism. However, due to internal military weakness and the global fear of another world war, Syrians opened up channels with the Soviets.[43]

In June 1950, the Arab countries split on the question of sending peace forces during the Korean War. The United States wished the United Nations to send such forces, which was tantamount to arresting the advance of the North Korean troops. Egypt refused to vote in favour of this resolution, whereas Iraq did.[44]

Most contemporary commentaries suggested that the Egyptian choice depended on British policy. It seems however that for the first time, many Arab intellectuals and politicians regarded neutrality as the right option in foreign policy affairs. Again, Syria is an interesting case. Most of the progressive groups supported Egypt's choice, regarding neutrality as the only way to fight colonialism. Basically, they asserted that Arabs should not get involved in a war between two parts of the same nation (Korea) while their own land, Palestine, remained occupied. They also believed that a third world war would take place in the Middle East, since nobody wanted to sell them weapons.[45] Consequently, they refused to participate in a war which seemed to be an American one. On the other hand, Iraq, through its minister of foreign affairs and prime minister[46] Tawfîq al-Suwaydî, claimed to support the Western side against Communism. From the government's point of view, this was a strategy to bargain for some help from Great Britain and the United States. At the beginning of the 1950s, a deep split existed between Syria and Iraq in international issues.

Even when Arab governments focused on international issues, their main concerns were Arab affairs. At the beginning of the 1950s, Arab League meetings and resolutions became a regular affair. Every February and October, delegates met in Cairo. The main points of discussion fell into four subject areas.[47] The first dealt with the consequences of the creation of Israel, wherein two questions had to be answered: could the League welcome a Palestinian delegation and, consequently, could a Palestinian state be recognized? And how would the Arab countries defend themselves in the event of an Israeli attack? Proposed solutions differed widely. The first crisis occurred when Transjordan annexed the West Bank, which was denounced by the Syrians as a Transjordan conquest over Palestine. Iraqi and Lebanese delegations tried to mediate and a *modus vivendi* was established in May 1950.[48] The second and third crises occurred over the attacks on the Jordanian and Syrian borders by the Israeli army.[49] In both cases Iraq offered help. The second subject discussed in the Arab League was inter-Arab relations. Economic and cultural ties were deepened in order to strengthen Arab unity. The third subject was regional and international crises. The political committee mainly focused on the Iranian and Korean crises. The fourth and last point dealt with relations between Arab and Western countries. Several countries, among them Egypt and Libya, tried to renegotiate some treaty that maintained foreign occupation.[50] The Arab League tried to exert some pressure on the Great Powers, but usually without success. Nevertheless, the Arab League meetings soon provided the main venue to bring up regional issues.

Between 1950 and 1954, the balance between the regional powers shifted. It is not the goal of this chapter to study the histories of the different countries; however, keeping in mind the main trends will shed light on the context within which they participated in the Bandung conference. Syria had remained stable for almost four years after the three coups in 1949. Adîb al-Shîshaklî ruled the country under a military regime. His foreign policy was oriented towards a preference for the Syrian national state rather than an Arab Union and came to be known as Syrianist.[51] The balance among the Arabs was deeply affected by the coup of the Free

Officers in Egypt in 1952. For almost four subsequent years, the new Egyptian authorities did not intervene in regional conflicts or Arab issues at all. Their main aim was British withdrawal from Egypt and the unity of the River Nile. Only at the beginning of 1954, a new declaration was signed announcing British departure. One of the key countries within the region, therefore, was absorbed with inner affairs for years. On the other hand, Iraq tried to define its position as a mediator between the Great Powers and Arab countries in order to maintain the implicit alliance between them.[52] In October 1951, Nuri al-Said offered his services to Great Britain to help negotiate with Egypt. `Alî Jawdat al-Ayyubî, Prime Minister in 1950, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs Jamâlî, suggested mediating between Lebanon and Syria and then between Jordan and Syria.[53] In both cases, Iraqi politicians tried to demonstrate that Iraq had an important role in securing and bringing the Arab countries closer. This position was reinforced as a consequence of Egyptian weakness. In 1954, however, the balance tilted.

By the time of the Colombo conference, on 28 April 1954, three significant changes had taken place in the Middle East which affected the regional balance of power as much as the national prestige of each country. In Egypt, Gamâl `Abd al-Nasser had won the power struggle against Mohammed Naguib. He quickly signed an agreement with London announcing British withdrawal. The Egyptian government then evolved a new foreign policy towards the Arab countries.[54] In the Arab League meeting, the Egyptian delegation called for closer ties with Afro-Asian countries, and 'neutrality' became, for the first time, an Egyptian topic of debate.[55] In Syria, the Shishakli regime was overthrown and the struggle over the country's future structure resumed. It was unclear what line of thinking would be adopted by the new government. The progressive parties continued to advocate neutrality. Akram al-Hawrânî,[56] for example, focused his speeches on neutrality during his electoral campaign in Syria.[57] However, he gradually changed the meaning of the term. At the beginning of the 1950s, to be neutral, according to him, meant to abstain, neither agree nor disagree. In Hawrânî's discourse, this approach was a tool in the fight against colonialism, in which neutrality and neutralism (the defence of neutrality as the key message of a programme) became prominent.[58] For the progressives, this position was synonymous with a rejection of any kind of agreement with Western countries, which they considered a colonial power. To them it seemed that under any agreement, Western powers would want to keep their influence and control over their non-Western sovereignty.

Nevertheless, in the Syrian political realm, foreign affairs were part of broader debates, and many arguments were made both in favour of and against a Western alliance. Syrian discussions thus reflected regional debates about new paths in foreign affairs. In Iraq, two new policies were implemented in early 1954. Iraqi Prime Minister Fâdil al-Jamâlî defended a rapprochement between Afro-Asian countries and Iraq, with Iraq leading Arab and Muslim countries to join hands with other Asian and African countries. At the same time, he initiated the building of an alliance between Western countries and regional powers.[59] From his point of view, Iraq could become the centre of a network of alliances

founded on different grounds of solidarity. Iraq was a member of the Arab League, but due to its Muslim identity, it could get closer to Iran, Pakistan and Turkey. As a liberal country, finally, it could ask for help from Great Britain or the United States.

This background may explain a great deal of the misunderstanding about the Bandung Conference. At the time of the conference in April 1955, although most of the Arab countries were invited, the Middle East itself was divided by military and economic alliances. In February 1955, Iraq and Turkey announced that a new pact would be signed in the following months. Its purpose was to create a military alliance involving the United States and Great Britain. Thus the Baghdad Pact was born. Immediate reactions were furious. Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria denounced the Iraqi desertion of the military pact under the auspices of the Arab League. Arab countries had been committed to a common defence until this pact. When Iraq decided to agree with Turkey and Iran, this was perceived as treason against the Arabs. Three different positions were taken. From the Egyptian angle, after the Sarsank meeting between Nuri al-Said and Salih al-Salem, Iraq committed to not participating in an alliance. The Baghdad declaration was a watershed. From the Saudi angle, any alliance led by Iraq could strengthen Hashemite power and its influence in the region, while the Hashemites were the Saudis' main enemy. From the Syrian point of view, tensions grew between different political sides. However, Prime Minister Fâris al-Khûrî declared that his government would not sign any kind of international agreement.[60] On the other hand, Syrian opponents of the Baghdad Pact supported an Arab initiative to counteract it. In March 1955, representatives of Saudi Arabia, Syria and Egypt met in Cairo to discuss a new military pact between them. However, nothing was ratified before the Bandung Conference. On 15 April 1955, Khâlid Al-`Azm prepared a draft for the military and economic union that he wanted Saudi Arabia and Egypt to agree on during the Bandung Conference.[61] Under these circumstances, the Arab League, which had been thus far an arena for negotiations, saw new norms of national sovereignty and Arab nationalism being defined. The Arab League could no longer be a neutral space for debate.

Iraq and Syria at the Bandung Conference

On 18 April 1955, the Iraqi and Syrian delegations reached Bandung. The former was led by Fâdil al-Jamâlî, the foreign minister of Nuri al-Said's government, and the latter by Khâlid al-`Azm, the minister of foreign affairs.[62] Khâlid al-`Azm's journey to Bandung was a kind of discovery of the Third World. On his way, he stopped in Pakistan and India in order to establish new diplomatic links.[63] Fâdil al-Jamâlî did the same.[64] Khâlid al-`Azm was very much impressed by the opening ceremony at the conference: all the delegations paraded through the main mall towards the conference hall, and the size of the representations demonstrated the strength of these countries. As at most conferences, backstage was the location for meeting and discussion. Delegations met and agreed on the protocol for the conference. As Indonesia welcomed the conference, all the

delegates agreed to Nasser's suggestion that the head of the Indonesian delegation, as the host, be elected president.

On 19 April 1954, Jamâlî spoke for the Iraqi delegation.

> As far as my country is concerned, we feel that there are three international forces in the world today that disturb peace and harmony and that need to be handled with realism and determination. The first is what we might call old-time colonialism which has been gradually crumbling since the end of World War I.… Unfortunately, colonialism is still well entrenched in many parts of the world. The people of North Africa, including those of Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco, are still under the French yoke, and no amount of local sacrifices and world opinion seems to influence the French to move more rapidly in recognizing the rights of these people to independence and freedom.… A typical example of old outworn colonial policy is shown in South Africa where color prejudice and superiority of the white man has led to discrimination against the Indians and natives, and to the segregation of the so-called colored people.… The second disturbing force in the world is that of Zionism. Zionism is certainly the last chapter in the book of old colonialism. It is one of the blackest and darkest chapters in human history. It is the worst offspring of imperialism, for imperialism as practised so far includes occupation, partition, subjugation and moral disintegration of lands and peoples which are ruled by it.… The third force that is causing unrest in the world at large today is Communism. Communism is a one-sided materialistic religion. It denies God and the spiritual heritage of mankind.[65]

According to this speech, the key issue was fighting colonialism. Jamâlî alluded to the North African and Palestinian situation to denounce Western domination. Then, he started to criticize communism as another form of imperialism and declared himself to be sceptical about the Chinese position.[66] Indeed, there was a Chinese delegation present in Bandung headed by Zhou En-Lai, who made his first appearance as Prime Minister of the People's Republic of China, but there was no delegation from the Soviet Union. From Jamâlî's point of view, the Bandung meeting brought together all the decolonized countries that needed to help one another.[67] He concluded that three forces disturbed peace: colonialism, communism and Zionism.

Khâlid al-`Azm, according to protocol, spoke during the afternoon of 19 April. His arguments were similar to the Egyptian ones:[68]

> Should a third war be waged, there would be no victors and vanquished. Those in the right or in the wrong, those in the offensive and in the defensive would be all exterminated.… No stronger nation should have the right of dominating her or interfering in her own affairs. All our public affairs, whether internal or external, are strictly our own. We, as small nations, refuse to be led this way or the other.… This is how we understand co-existence and according to this understanding, we do not recognize any

> need for adhering to any political blocs or military pacts.… There can be no peace with imperialism, aggression, and lack of freedom … [Israel is] a pocket left behind the line of imperialism in its desperate retreat.[69]

His focus was on the danger of the arms race and of nuclear war. From his point of view, the main concern of the new independent countries was the danger of a new world war, in which the Third World would be used as a battlefield. He then moved to the criticism of colonialism and imperialism, concluding that the underdeveloped countries needed to strengthen cultural and economic ties.

According to Lucien Febvre,[70] political behaviour can be measured by taking into consideration the values a person fights for. His priorities may lead him to agree or disagree on different matters. Comparing the Bandung speeches of Jamâlî and `Azm, three key issues can be isolated: the position towards communism, fear of another world war, and the meaning of colonialism. From Jamâlî's point of view, colonialism was the main problem, and it could be argued that all types of domination might qualify as such. According to him, communism was a new form of colonialism, whereas alliance with Western countries could preserve independence and sovereignty. As a consequence, he envisaged a possible third world war as a conflict between liberal and communist sides – and he preferred the former. In contrast to this, Khâlid al-`Azm considered that another war was the main danger. The African, Arab and Asian countries therefore had to fight their weakness, which stemmed from a lack of solidarity. For him, communism was not the main enemy, whereas he identified the Western countries as colonialist powers. Consequently, he adopted neutrality as the founding principle of non-alignment.[71] These two speeches demonstrate differing points of view at the Bandung Conference, which may be considered as a turning point.

The Bandung Conference was an arena for cross-regional meeting between Asian, African and Arab leaders. Fâdil al-Jamâlî highlights that Bandung provided ample opportunity for private conversation between most of the leaders. He met the Pakistani and Indian representatives and tried to improve relations with these countries.[72] It was also an important moment in Arab relations as it was the last time that Iraqis and Egyptians discussed matters before the revolution of 1958. Jamâlî approached Nasser, who refused any kind of Iraqi intervention in Syria and told him bluntly: 'Dr Jamali, hands off Syria!'[73] The Iraqi delegation was isolated from most of the Arab countries: Jordanians and Iraqis did not cooperate, and dialogue between Syrians and Iraqis was at a standstill.[74] According to Fâdil al-Jamâlî, Khâlid al-`Azm's purpose in Bandung was to defend the integrity and unity of Syria against any kind of domination. However, during the conference `Azm decided to get closer to Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Private meetings took place in Nasser's residence in order to define the main riders of the military alliance. The three countries obviously intended to counteract the Baghdad Pact. At that point, the Bandung conference served as a kind of substitute for the Arab League to negotiate norms of the dialogue between Arab countries. It also provided a junction between inter-Arab discussions and wider international relations. To be in favour of neutrality meant to oppose alliances

with the West, and therefore Syria or Egypt belonged to the 'neutralist' side. Delegations that had agreed to sign the Baghdad Pact because they perceived communism as a new imperialism formed the opposing group.

The Bandung Conference was also an important occasion to talk about cultural and economic cooperation. Sharing similar problems in terms of development, and working on similar solutions, Iraq and Syria clearly belonged to the Third World. Nevertheless, Jamâlî's and `Azm's opinions differed widely, and they did not involve themselves in the work of the economic and cultural committee with the same level of enthusiasm. Fâdil al-Jamâlî argued in the Cultural Committee that colonialism destroys national culture:

> The Asian-African Conference takes note of the fact that the existence of colonialism in many parts of Asia and Africa, in whatever form it may be, not only prevents cultural cooperation but also suppresses the national cultures of the people. Some colonial powers denied basic rights to their colonized peoples in the sphere of education and culture, which hampered the development of their personality and also prevented cultural intercourse with other Asian and African peoples. This is particularly true in the case of Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco, where the basic rights of the people to study their own language and culture had been suppressed. Similar discrimination had been practiced against African and colored peoples in some parts of the Continent of Africa. The Conference feels that these policies amount to a denial of the fundamental rights, impede cultural advancement in this region and also hamper cultural cooperation on the wider international plane. The Conference condemned such a denial of fundamental rights in the sphere of education and culture in some parts of Asia and Africa by this and other forms of cultural suppression. In particular, the Conference condemned racialism as a means of cultural suppression.[75]

`Azm on the other hand participated in the economic committee, in which he encouraged ideas of economic cooperation and technical assistance that might improve the links between countries of the global South. His vision of development was highly technocratic.

Two practices can be seen here. For Jamâlî, fighting colonialism required the mobilization of all means against it. Thus, he evolved a cultural solution in answer to Western domination and suggested that Islam as a practice and a cultural basis might protect Arab countries from any kind of imperialism. From Azm's point of view, colonialism and economic and technological backwardness were deeply linked.[76] Development could save the country from any further domination.

Coming back from the conference, building common sense

A broader Arab consensus about the conference and its declaration was not established during the conference. From the Iraqi point of view, the Bandung Conference was synonymous with fighting against all kinds of colonialism. The

Iraqi delegation used the conference as a platform to challenge French domination in the Maghreb, putting the Algerian war on the agenda. According to Jamâlî, it was at Bandung that Zionism was, for the first time, denounced as a colonial ideology. Also, in sending a delegation to Bandung, the Iraqi government demonstrated to the home public that it actively defended the Arab struggle and 'Arabism'. It focused on three messages, which were discussed in the local newspapers: first, that Israel and Zionism were the main enemy of the Arab nation; second, that Iraq claimed the independence of the whole Arab territory and was ready to fight through diplomatic means against Great Powers such as France; and finally, that this conference took its place within the broader policy of Iraq as a means of mediating between the Great Powers and Muslim countries as a way to counteract any kind of communist influence. The newspaper reports reveal a misunderstanding about the Bandung declaration. *Al-Zamân*, for example, stressed at the beginning of the conference that it should be considered as 'an important event in a dangerous war'.[77] It concluded on 25 April that 'Jamâlî agreed with Nehru on neutrality',[78] without explaining what this neutrality meant. In fact, Jamâlî agreed with Nehru that war was the main danger for Third World countries, but he nevertheless disagreed or at least did not provide an answer on international alliances. On the other hand, *Al-Bilad*, which had been founded by a moderate opponent, discussed in detail the new position of Iraq after Bandung.[79] It insisted on Iraqi isolation.

These conclusions, however, were quickly forgotten. On 3 May 1955, the Iraqi Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs declared that Hanabiya, the last British airbase, must be given back to Iraqi control. Colonial domination over Iraq ended.[80] In the same week, the Turkish and Iraqi governments discussed the question of Syria. They implemented the first operation against Syria in order to change the government. In other words, they planned a coup! In summer 1955, Iraqi authorities decided that their strategic interests in the region forced them to intervene in a neighbouring neutral country, and used the Baghdad Pact provisions to achieve this aim. At the same time, they ostensibly honoured and implemented the Bandung Declaration, denouncing French operations in Maghreb. That this was a contradiction did not occur to them.

When Khâlid al-`Azm came back to Syria, the internal political situation was troubled. On 22 April 1955, Colonel Mâlkî had been murdered at a Damascus stadium. His assassination by a soldier belonging to the Syrian Social National Party reopened political fights in Syria. Against this background, the Bandung declarations were integrated into the progressive discourse as a tool against the so-called conservative parties or groups. Officers and politicians closed ranks, fearing plots and attacks from their Arab neighbours, while a radicalization took place in the political discourse. Khâlid al-`Azm introduced the conclusions of the conference. All the newspapers claimed that Bandung was a victory for the Arabs, in other words, that it supported the fight against Israel. For example, an *al-Ayyâm* headline on 22 April 1955 read, 'New victory in favour of real independence of the Arab nation'. Progressive newspapers welcomed the neutralist line that had been drawn during the conference, but pointed to the division

within the Third World and denounced countries that had entered into alliances with Western states.[81] At the beginning of May 1955, it seemed that foreign policy was an important aspect of internal competition. Equivalences were drawn between groups and ideas. Progressive parties tried to obtain the monopoly on the 'Bandung message' as a synonym for neutralism as Nasser defined it. On the opposite side, liberal politicians favouring a rapprochement with Iraq ignored the Bandung declaration. They sought an alliance with Iraq in order to come to power, and to fight communism and progressive dangers. As Iraqi defenders were defeated, the meaning of Bandung was consolidated in the Syrian political competition.

On 7 May 1955, Khâlid al-`Azm spoke in front of the legislative committee for foreign affairs, concluding that he had managed to help the progressive fight.[82] However, he failed to gain total support from the members of the committee. During the summer of 1955, the government of Sabri al-Assali was dismissed, and Khâlid al-`Azm ran in the presidential election. He failed and Shukrî al-Quwwatlî, who was supported by Egypt, was elected. At this moment, the Bandung conference became a symbol for the progressive groups and the Syrian parties who favoured an alliance with Egypt. Consequently, in Syrian discourse, the Bandung conference became a synonym for the advent of positive neutralism in foreign affairs.

It may be concluded that the Bandung Conference took place at the crossroads of several dynamics. On the one hand, it seemed to be the natural consequence of a process which linked Arab and Asian countries. Bandung was a place where Arab leaders discussed and tried to define the norms for common foreign affairs. On the other hand, this conference took place at a moment when rivalries between the Arab states were escalating. Before, Arab dialogue had been an affair of the Arab League. This was no longer possible due to the division between Iraq and Egypt, and the Hashemite powers and Syria or Saudi Arabia. Consequently, such debates were now transferred to the conference. These fights also revealed some changes in the definition of Arab nationalism and colonialism. In both cases, Syrian and Iraqi delegations defended national sovereignty as the supreme value. From the Iraqi point of view, this meant keeping invasion at bay, whereas from the Syrian point of view, it was a defence against alliance with the Western countries. Despite a shared aversion to Zionism and Israel, they disagreed on communism, armed struggle, and measures against a prospective third world war. At the beginning of 1956, the Arab League met in Cairo. Nasser had signed a treaty with Czechoslovakia to obtain arms supplies four months earlier. The Iraqi delegation intended to convert the other Arab countries to the Baghdad Pact. Nevertheless, the Arab delegations condemned the Iraqi path towards what seemed to be a new colonialism and congratulated Nasser for freeing Egypt from Western domination. At this meeting, the Arab League decided to credit the Bandung Declaration.[83] Consequently, the Syrian interpretation, following the Egyptian one, became hegemonic over the Arab nations, whereas the Iraqi point of view disappeared. Bandung became the symbol of Arab preference for positive neutrality.

Notes

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3 M. Colombe, *Orient arabe et non-engagement, Neutralisme positif et lutte contre l'influence occidentale 1955–1958: La politique de non-engagement et ses limites*, Paris: Publication orientaliste de France, 1973; K. Ampiah, *The Political and Morale Imperatives of the Bandung Conference of 1955: The Reactions of the US, the UK and Japan*, Singapore: Ed. Didier Millet, 2005, pp. 2–3.
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5 G. Corm, *Le Proche-Orient éclaté, 1956–1991*, Paris: Folio, 1991, p. 26; R. Louis and R. Owen (eds), *Suez 1956: The Crisis and its Consequences*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989.
6 *Al-hîâd*, 'neutrality' in Arabic, was first used in internal policy to describe non-intervention from the government or the administration in the election. Its meaning then changed and dealt with foreign affairs.
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14 A. A. Kâzim `Abd, *Dawr al-'irâq al-siyâssî fi jâma`a al- duwal al-`arabiyya* (The Political Role of Iraq in the Arab League), Amman: Maktaba al-râ'id, 2007; M. al-Rûsân, *Al-`irâq wa qadiyâ al-sharq al-`arabî al-qawmiyya 1941–1958* (Iraq and Nationalist Middle East Issues 1941–1958), Beirut: Mu'assasat al-`arabiyya lil-dirâsât wa al-nashar, 1979.
15 M. Barnett, *Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1998.
16 Kâzim `Abd, *Dawr*, pp. 22–3.
17 Interview, `Abbâs al-Jamâlî, 7 February 2011.
18 Eric Davies proves that two general ideologies built Iraqi national identity. On the one hand, some politicians – mainly the Sherifian officers who supported Faisal – asserted that Iraq was part of the Arab nations as the great majority of the country

was Arab (excluding the Kurds). On the other hand, some intellectuals and politicians pointed out that Iraq was unique in view of the Shia and Sunni groups who lived there. Iraqi governments, under British mandate, chose the Arab identity against the Iraqist one, as most of the Iraqists were against the new king and the British. E. Davies, *Memories of State, Politics, History, and Collective Identity in Modern Iraq,* Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005; P. J. Luizard, *La formation de l'Irak contemporaine: Le rôle politique des oulémas à la fin de la domination ottomane et au moment de la création de l'État irakien*, Paris: CNRS, 2002, pp. 423–89.

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27 H. Laurens, *La question de Palestine*, vol. 3, Paris: Fayard, 2007.

28 R. Macdonald, *The League of Arab States: A Study in the Dynamics of the Regional Organization*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965, p. 15.

29 *Al-Iqza*, July 1947.

30 O. Guitard, *Bandoung et le réveil des peuples colonisés*, Paris: Presse Universitaire Française, 1969.

31 Nuri as Said was involved in the Arab uprising during World War I against the Ottoman Empire. From his point of view, this was to be the first step in the Arab revolution which would mean the unification of all Arab regions under a Hashemite crown. Nevertheless, these consequences were not realized after World War I.

32 Gomaa, *Foundation*, p. 161.

33 'L'Irak et la politique arabe', 23 February 1945, carton 24, Généralités 1944–1952, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, La Courneuve.

34 Kâzim `Abd, *Dawr*, pp. 78–9.

35 S. `Abd al–`Al, *Al-inqilâbât al-`askariyya fî sûriyâ, 1949–1954* (Military Coups in Syria, 1949–1954), Cairo: Maktaba madbûlî, 2007.

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38 Majlis al-niyâbi al-sûrî (Syrian Assembly of Deputies), *Mudhakkarât al-niyâbiyya al-sûriyya* (Reports of the Syrian Assembly), 1950, Fourteenth Session, 13 February.

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47 M. Iqbal Ansari, *The Arab League 1945–1955*, Aligarh: Institute of Islamic Studies, 1965, pp. 47–50, 60–80, 102–6.
48 *Alif Bâ'*, 9 May 1950.
49 File S 0168–0001–2, Archives of the United Nations, New York.
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52 Louis, *British Empire*.
53 A. Jawdat, *Dhikrîât, 1900–1958* (Memoirs, 1900–1958), Beirut, 1967, p. 393.
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55 J. Jankowski, *Nasser's Egypt, Arab Nationalism, and the United Arab Republic,* Boulder CO: Lynne Riener Publishers, 2002, p. 57.
56 Akram al-Hawrânî was known as a progressive Syrian deputy in the 1940s who strongly defended peasants movements and their demands. He was also deeply involving in fighting in favour of Arabism.
57 A. al-Hawrânî, *Mudhakarat Akram Hawrânî* (Memoirs of Akram al-Hawrani), Cairo: Maktaba al-Madbûlî, 2000, 1660.
58 Lesch, *Syria*, p. 62.
59 Podeh, *Quest*, pp. 79–82.
60 'Déclaration ministérielle', 2 November 1954, carton 520, Syrie 1953–1958, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, La Courneuve.
61 *Alif Bâ'*, 15 April 1955.
62 K. al-`Azm, *Mudhakarrât Khâlid al-`Azm* (Memoirs of Khâlid al-`Azm), Beirut: Dar al-mutahhîda lilnashar, 2003, pp. 366–86. Jamâlî also wrote several texts on his participation. In accordance with his son, `Abbâs al-Jamâlî (interview, 8 February 2011, Amman), Fâdhil Jamâlî was deeply affected by the general point of view on the conference, and tried to correct it.
63 Al-`Azm, *Mudhakârrat Khâlid*, pp. 368–9.
64 Differences between the two were evident in their respective diplomatic careers. International relations was not a new topic for Jamâlî, who had been in the foreign ministry for many years and had served as a member of United Nations Iraqi delegations, whereas Khâlid al-`Azm had been a Syrian representative in Paris but did not know African or Asian countries.
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68 Nasser expressed gratitude for Indonesian invitation and then claimed to represent the Arab League. He first recalled the Revolution principles of 1952 based on equality and democracy. He defended economic reform as the best path towards world peace. Then, he pointed out the rights of the Palestinian and North African peoples, and denounced the hypocrisy of Western countries towards imperialism. He pointed out that the struggle between East and West threatened peace. http://nasser.bibalex.org/Speeches/browser.aspx?SID=339&lang=fr.
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8 Between Great Powers and Third World neutralists

Yugoslavia and the Belgrade Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement, 1961[1]

Jovan Čavoški

The formation of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was closely interconnected with the evolution of Yugoslavia's relations with different Third World countries during the first two decades of the Cold War. Yugoslavia's proactive foreign policy and Belgrade's rapidly developing political and economic ties with a plethora of leading Third World neutralist or non-aligned countries (India, Indonesia, Burma, Egypt, Ghana) directly contributed to the shaping – and later, the institutionalization – of a foreign policy alternative that sought to position newly independent countries between the dominant superpower blocs. During the 1950s and early 1960s, the towering figure of the Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito and his independent approach to international politics galvanized the non-aligned world into convening the formative conference of the NAM in Belgrade in September 1961. This conference was one of the watershed moments in the recent history of the Third World, often portrayed as standing side by side with other significant conferences of its time, seeking a more prominent role for the small and postcolonial nations inside the forums of the UN.[2]

Using newly declassified documents from the Serbian, American, Chinese, Russian and Indian archives, as well as some recent research on Yugoslavia's non-alignment and the conference itself, this chapter will try to reconstruct Yugoslavia's efforts to organize the non-aligned world, convene this meeting, and balance its relations with the Great Powers and developing countries.[3] As we shall see throughout this chapter, Yugoslavia's non-aligned foreign policy and the Belgrade Conference itself were being closely monitored by the United States, the Soviet Union and China. All these outside actors continuously tried to influence the course and the outcome of the events, while different non-aligned nations sought to balance their specific interests with pressing global demands for peace, stability and economic development. By carefully analysing mutual interdependence between the Great Powers and non-aligned nations, this chapter will follow the concept of *pericentrism*, according to which small powers exerted much more influence both on superpowers and inside the Cold War system than has been acknowledged by earlier scholarship.[4]

The years considered here represented a period when all around the postcolonial world important regional powers (India, Indonesia, Egypt, Ghana etc.) and national leaders (Nehru, Sukarno, Nasser, Nkrumah etc.) were embracing middle-of-the road neutralist policies that were supposed to guarantee their independence from previous colonial masters and shape a new future for their nations through sustainable development. In essence, different interpretations notwithstanding, neutralism means the advocacy of the policy of non-alignment or non-involvement vis-à-vis the superpower blocs, military alliances, and an attempt to mediate conflicts between states, while preserving political independence and sovereignty. Simultaneously, these kinds of policies kept these states out of the direct superpower confrontation.[5]

Sources of the policy of global non-alignment (neutralism) can be found in the immediate results of the process of decolonization and in the attempts of the decolonized nations to overcome economic backwardness. Their non-aligned policy was marked by the outright rejection of any bloc divisions and power politics in world affairs that might jeopardize the independence of small nations and equally threaten world peace. Any association with the two existing camps meant the obvious denial of their sovereign rights for these countries and direct encroachment on their independent internal and foreign policies by the Great Powers. Particular interests or regional specifics of different non-aligned nations sometimes put barriers before any joint action, but the necessity to act and to be heard in relevant international forums as well as their insistence on the right to equal representation in solving international problems was never called into question by any of these nations.[6]

Like the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung in April 1955, which was the harbinger of new winds enveloping newly liberated nations, thus clearly stating their rising voice in the world arena, the meeting of the non-aligned heads of state in Belgrade in 1961 heralded the formation of the international organization that was supposed to represent the demands and aspirations of many developing nations regarding the issues of mutual respect, equal treatment, and cooperation. At the same time, these nations strongly and actively advocated some of the pressing issues of their times including world peace, international dialogue, non-bloc policies, economic development, and disarmament. The meeting in Belgrade did not produce any immediate effects on the relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States, since the world was still to face the most acute phase of the superpower competition during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Nevertheless, it only confirmed for the participating countries that any kind of international gathering that offered concrete solutions to the universal problems beyond their respective regions and promoted joint discussion and actions among non-aligned nations was very important for their international standing. All these factors directly contributed to the strengthening of their independence and elevated their standing in the world arena. Non-alignment became a synonym for the global involvement of these states.[7] What was then firmly promoted in Belgrade as the underlining principle of non-alignment – no military or political alliances with the Great Powers or any kind of association with either of the two

blocs – clearly implied an active role for the non-aligned countries in international affairs according to the principles of peaceful coexistence and full political independence.[8]

Unlike the non-alignment of many Third World countries, Yugoslavia's non-alignment was not the result of any anti-colonial struggle but the direct outcome of the inter-bloc policy dynamics of the Cold War. After World War II, the new regime in Belgrade, inspired by its own authentic communist revolution, early became interested in the revolutionary process in the colonial world, although its assessments were still made along strict ideological lines.[9] However, the unexpected Tito–Stalin split in 1948 compelled the Yugoslav leadership to undertake a new foreign policy course, particularly inside the UN, which was less ideological and more realistic, active and flexible in its projections, especially with regards to the Western bloc and some Asian and African nations (India and Egypt).[10] This meant that Yugoslavia decided to hold high the founding principles of the UN as a guarantee of independence for small nations and a shield against interference by the Great Powers in their internal affairs, as was the case with the conflict between Yugoslavia and the whole socialist camp. Active cooperation with all international actors, based on widely accepted principles of independence and mutual respect no matter the size of the country; firm rejection of bloc divisions; as well as continuous struggle for a world of free and equal nations became the highlight of Yugoslavia's foreign policy engagement in the international forums. This kind of active cooperation in the UN with such countries as India, Egypt or Burma stemmed from the general similarity of views they shared regarding certain crucial world issues (the Korean War, colonialism, poverty and development, disarmament, foreign interference, etc.).

In the early 1950s, while facing constant military threat from the Soviet bloc, Yugoslavia undertook a course of rapprochement with Western powers, simultaneously expanding political, economic and military ties with the United States and its NATO allies, particularly with Greece and Turkey through the Balkan Pact of 1953–1954. Nevertheless, this move never evolved into a radical shift in Belgrade's foreign policy orientation, and Josip Broz Tito was never ready to initiate total alignment with the West. Stalin's death and the gradual lessening of tensions with Moscow made space for seeking a truly non-aligned position in world affairs.[11] In addition, during that period Yugoslavia was actively establishing contacts with India, Burma and Egypt, all pioneers of non-alignment, forging close cooperation in all fields including the military one, which brought Belgrade under close scrutiny in Asia and the Middle East.[12] This was still not Tito's leapfrogging into the non-aligned world, but Yugoslavia's active and principled policy on all fronts impressed both Burma and India and made way for these two countries to invite Tito for an official visit from December 1954 to January 1955.[13] This visit became the milestone in Yugoslavia's relations with non-aligned countries when the Yugoslav President, after his meetings with Jawaharlal Nehru, with the Burmese prime minister U Nu and, on his way back, with Gamal Abdel Nasser, underwent 'an intellectual

catharsis … through which Tito got rid of his Balkan selfishness and Eurocentric horizons and over night he had become a citizen of the world and a world leader'.[14] The similarity of political views that Tito witnessed in Asia left a lasting impression on his ideas and this began to substantially influence his internal and foreign policies.[15]

This official visit to India and Burma and a brief stop-over in Egypt clearly introduced an era of Tito as a globe-trotting communist statesman who was as active and present in world affairs as the Great Powers, forging strong ties on all sides. This status eventually made him a global factor in the issues preoccupying the non-aligned world. He became the acceptable face of a European among 'darker nations'. As one Indian diplomat duly noted, Tito became 'the first great European statesman who came to Asia not as a representative of colonizers, but as a great friend of Asian nations'.[16] In fact, the strength of Yugoslavia's appeal among non-aligned countries stemmed from the fact that it was

> a small country which is vigorously modernizing itself, it provides a model for economic development … it has followed a policy of non-alignment while obtaining economic aid from both East and West … and economic and technical aid from Yugoslavia allows them [the non-aligned countries] to minimize entanglement with the major blocs.[17]

Since Yugoslavia, like many other developing countries, had limited demographic, political, economic and military potential, the essence of non-alignment according to Tito was marked by the continuous struggle against the conditions that bred war (bloc politics, spheres of influence, the arms race) through lasting concentration of all peace-loving forces in order to secure international peace and stability. In this effort both Great Powers and small nations shared the same collective responsibility for the destiny of the world.[18] Tito sought a reduction of Cold War rivalries and the broadening of the political base of non-alignment by encompassing a growing number of newly independent countries, thus enhancing wider international solidarity against the general setting of the Cold War. However, at the same time his dedication to the policy of non-alignment was dictated by his desire not only to provide safe surroundings for his country on the international scene, but also to promote Yugoslavia's leading political and economic position among those nations who rejected Great Power domination. Non-alignment was the direct expression of Tito's intention to become one of the leading world statesmen, mediator between the blocs and the non-bloc factors, a diplomatic channel between the developed and the underdeveloped countries.

However, we should also not forget that these were the times when peaceful coexistence was the slogan of the day, particularly in the relationship between China, India and Burma when high-level visits were exchanged between these three countries. Principles of peaceful coexistence became for Tito the main point of redefinition of Yugoslavia's role in international affairs. However, what he advocated was 'not a sort of passive co-existence, but an active cooperation

and a peaceful and agreed settlement of different problems, as well as the removal of all elements liable to impede a broad cooperation between states, large and small'.[19] As both Tito and Nehru concluded in their joint communiqué in December 1954, 'the necessity of peaceful co-existence' was presented 'not merely as an alternative, but as an imperative' in international affairs, while the policy of non-alignment was defined as a 'positive, active, and constructive policy seeking to lead to collective peace', thus promoting the idea of collective security as a firm basis for the stability of the existing world order.[20]

In addition, during his first meeting with Nasser in February 1955, Tito emphasized the obvious benefit of cooperation between 'underdeveloped and small' nations: 'I think that the benefit lies in the fact that they can supplement each other in economy, while politically they can act together in the world'.[21] Besides, he also considered security issues in Europe and Asia to be closely interconnected as never before, thus directly influencing the destiny of small countries in different regions since any future war between the two blocs 'would initially consume small countries'. He therefore argued that all these countries should be 'against bloc divisions that represent the danger of war'.[22] After these two meetings, not only were Tito's views in many ways influenced by his hosts, but also he left a lasting imprint on the political considerations of his newly established allies.

The Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung ushered in the era of summits of Third World leaders as a means of stating their positions and presenting their claims during the Cold War. This was the first time when the leaders of formerly colonized nations demonstrated their outright ability to seriously discuss international problems and offer concrete solutions for them, especially inside the UN forums. In addition, these states increased their demands for total decolonization and racial equality while actively promoting economic and cultural cooperation between themselves, thus politically galvanizing the whole of the Third World. However, factors such as the poorly defined geographical framework of this conference and regional isolationism, the presence of both aligned and non-aligned countries, the lack of any coherent principles that could bridge the gap among different participants, and divisive political ideas about the Asian–African majority and 'white' minority in world politics limited the worldwide impact of this meeting and directly influenced the shaky destiny of the so-called Afro-Asian Movement.[23] It soon became evident that the independent and constructive approach of Third World neutralists to outstanding international issues, based on the principles of active peaceful coexistence and clear non-adherence to any military alliances and the maintaining of equal distance from both blocs, offered a viable formula for their active participation in world affairs. 'This policy of maintaining good relations with both sides is the only viable policy to safeguard independence. It is very dangerous for small countries just to lean to one side', Tito again advised his Egyptian counterparts.[24]

The regional exclusiveness of the Bandung model signalled to the Yugoslav leadership that the non-aligned world should be brought together over much more concrete issues and principles than just geographical location or shared

suffering under the colonial yoke. The struggle for peace and stability against tensions and conflicts and the promotion of mutual cooperation and development were efforts which demanded putting together a much broader international coalition that just Asia and Africa. The general concept of non-alignment largely surpassed the narrow geographical divisions of these two continents. Therefore, on the eve of the conference the Yugoslav ambassador in India was advised to tell Nehru that 'the need [exists] to initiate wide, constructive actions, not only in Asia, but also in the world in general, that could practically curb the pretensions of leading powers to impose solutions … along the rigid lines of bloc divisions' and the Yugoslav Foreign Secretariat suggested that after Bandung a similar event had to be organized 'encompassing countries of Europe, America etc.'.[25] Nevertheless, Tito himself, other Yugoslav officials, and the wider public eagerly endorsed the whole concept of the Bandung conference as the watershed moment in the history of the Third World, and they readily acknowledged the similarity of views between the conference's final communiqué and the official stance promoted in Belgrade.[26]

However, the Bandung conference also brought to the surface divergent motives of the different participants regarding the future of similar events. While Indonesia, China and even Egypt were very much interested in convening the next Afro-Asian conference as soon as possible, thus elevating their prestige in world affairs, India was very much against it, depicting similar events as an unnecessary mechanism for the exchange of views.[27] Even though Yugoslavia supported India's attitude against any regionally based conferences in which it could not participate, nevertheless Tito's efforts in the years to come aimed at bridging the gap between what Bandung represented and what Belgrade would become, while continuously reconciling many existing differences between these countries. One author correctly concluded: 'More than any other country, Yugoslavia helped to make of Bandung a prologue to political action rather than a footnote to futility'.[28] Tito understood well that by forging strong bilateral ties with different non-aligned countries, acting as a global mediator in the realm of peaceful coexistence, advocating independence from both blocs, and promoting the influence that small countries could have on the delicate balance of power of the Cold War, he was gradually laying foundations for a new international organization based on the universal principles of peaceful coexistence and non-alignment.[29]

For Tito the concept of active peaceful coexistence had its immediate foreign policy implications, more than just internal ones:

> Coexistence should be understood not as just subsisting of nations and states one next to the other, but as international relations based on new, modern principles that enable most vibrant, peaceful activity among states and different social systems.… It represents lasting norms and principles that should dominate the international affairs in the present epoch.[30]

Therefore, Tito dedicated the bulk of his attention to winning over to his side the most important leaders of the Third World before organizing any new

international conferences. Creating the 'active core' of the non-aligned world together with Nehru and Nasser, as well as later with Sukarno, became the centrepiece of his strategy. Although the summit of three leaders on the Brioni isles in July 1956 suffered from small misunderstandings marked by Nehru's reluctance, Nasser's excessive eagerness and Tito's desire to strike a balance between his guests, still this meeting brought closer the official stances of Yugoslavia, India and Egypt and they took an identical position on a number of international issues (disarmament, China, Algeria, Palestine). A new model for the exchange of views on crucial problems between the three countries was ultimately set up.[31] In the end, this proved very effective during the Suez and Hungarian crisis. Soon other leaders including Sihanouk and Sukarno readily joined the Brioni statement. In a certain respect, this small summit, by promoting new means of cooperation between non-bloc factors, paved the way for the Belgrade Conference five years later. The Brioni summit became the 'Third World's Yalta'.[32]

Yugoslavia's increased activity among Third World countries and the open insistence on non-alignment with both camps started to raise eyebrows both in the West and in the East. At that time it was already becoming evident that many Third World leaders basically trusted Tito's judgment and substantially followed his advice, whereby he exerted much influence on their policies; this was a worrisome prospect indeed for the interests of both blocs.[33] During Tito's visit to India and Burma, Western countries expressed their worries that Tito and Nehru would set up a 'third bloc' of neutral countries as an overt challenge to the two existing ones.[34] These reservations, among other things, would ultimately lead to the cancellation of US military aid to Yugoslavia in December 1957. On the other hand, even though the socialist camp attempted to utilize Tito's gains among non-aligned states through normalization of relations with Belgrade, the renewed ideological conflict between the two sides that erupted in April 1958 increased Soviet and Chinese fears that the Yugoslav leader was really trying to 'sever relations between Afro-Asian and socialist countries … foment discord between [them] … fight Soviet and Chinese influence', while setting up a new bloc in order to 'undermine China's new Bandung conference'.[35]

Accusations by both camps about the formation of the 'third bloc' overshadowed many Yugoslav initiatives until the Belgrade conference, but fortunately during these conflicting times Yugoslavia enjoyed the open or tacit support and understanding of crucial non-aligned states (India, Indonesia, Burma, Egypt, Ethiopia).[36] Tito never nurtured the idea of setting up another bloc of neutralist countries, not only because this would meet strong opposition from Nehru and Nasser but also because it would be contrary to the basic principles of non-alignment. On one of his visits he stated:

> Some say we want to set up the 'third bloc'. Of course, this is absolutely ridiculous.… Our only intention is to strengthen our friendly ties and find possibilities to expand not only bilateral cooperation, but also international cooperation.… We consider that there are enough conditions to achieve

> this, since we have so many common views with these [non-aligned] countries.[37]

Nevertheless, suffering from the constant pressure exercised by both blocs while the Cold War was getting into another phase of 'hot' confrontation, Tito did toy with the idea of organizing a conference of non-aligned nations that would deal with the pressing issues of nuclear disarmament, East–West relations, lessening of tensions etc.; such a gathering would also have been complementary to the Soviet proposal for a summit between the Great Powers and neutralist states.[38] However, Tito's idea met rejection from Nehru, as did the Ceylon initiative to convene the Afro-Asian economic conference. On the other hand, Sukarno was always eager for another Bandung-like conference where he could play the central role, but Nehru's opposition and Tito's preoccupation with his complex relationship with the Sino-Soviet bloc also put this initiative on temporary hold.[39] In addition, when Egypt's relations with the Soviet Union were put on ice over Iraq in early 1959, Nasser made a new proposal for a non-aligned conference that was readily accepted by Tito and Sukarno. However, Nehru refrained again from such meetings on the grounds that they would 'demonstrate disunity among these countries' and only suggested enhancing consultations between these four leaders.[40] He was still not ready to decisively join hands with other non-aligned leaders. India's almost-Great Power status among non-aligned countries and Nehru's desire to deal with the superpowers directly, without the meddling of other non-aligned states or through large conferences, brought forward the need to intensify action among Afro-Asian countries in order to force Indian officials into compliance with any future initiatives of Yugoslavia, Egypt and Indonesia.[41] This would become one of the major challenges during the preparations for the Belgrade Conference.

At that time, all leading non-aligned countries were facing deteriorating relations with the major world powers while the crisis in the relations between the two blocs was placing serious obstacles in the way of any meaningful compromise for the preservation of international stability. The need for joint action inside the non-aligned camp was felt more than ever. The Fifteenth Session of the UN General Assembly offered a valuable opportunity to Tito, Nasser, Nehru, Sukarno and Nkrumah to present to the world public their proposals for the solution of pressing international issues, and to renew their appeal to the Soviet and American leaders to reinitiate their direct dialogue in the midst of a direct collision course between the two sides within the UN. The international press dubbed this joint initiative as the onset of the 'neutralist or third bloc' in the UN, which heralded new developments in the year to come.[42] Even though diplomatic manoeuvres by representatives of Western powers forced five sponsors to ultimately withdraw their resolution due to some procedural matters, this attempt was still a significant moral and political victory on the side of the neutrals.[43] While Tito and Nasser at first acted as the driving force of this initiative, with Nehru still lagging behind due to his well-known reservations, the seriousness of the international situation compelled all five

non-aligned countries to close ranks and act in a concerted manner.[44] In essence, this endeavour clearly demonstrated that the major non-aligned nations were ready to assume the responsible role of global mediator in matters of peace and security, while some leaders even considered international conditions to be ripe for convening a new neutralist conference. In one of his statements in New York, Tito said: 'At this General Assembly I remain convinced that the non-aligned forces are becoming more numerous, unified and aware of the danger threatening mankind.… They have become a factor the great powers must take into account'.[45]

The events in New York clearly indicated to the Yugoslav leadership that there was enough political potential to forge a united front between different non-aligned countries with regard to certain outstanding global issues. Whenever faced with a major crisis in international relations or under pressure from different great powers, Tito always opted for a comprehensive exchange of views and consultations with leading Third World nations as means of diffusing international tensions. This was the case in 1958–1959 when Tito, bullied by the Sino-Soviet bloc, went on a long trip to a number of Asian and African countries – Indonesia, Burma, India, Ceylon, Ethiopia, Sudan and the United Arab Republic (UAR) – seeking support and consensus on a number of crucial issues.[46] In early 1961 he found a new target group among West and North African nations and was motivated to demonstrate Yugoslavia's sincere efforts to help these nations with his country's entire strength and capabilities.[47] In mid-February, Tito undertook a two-month cruise around Africa during which he paid official visits to a number of countries (Ghana, Togo, Liberia, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, Tunisia and the UAR), among which were some pioneers of non-alignment in that region (Ghana, Guinea, Mali, UAR), though others were still reluctant to join this unofficial group while mostly leaning to the side of the West. Those were dangerous times when the crises in Congo (Lumumba's assassination), Algeria, Laos and Cuba (Bay of Pigs invasion) and around Berlin were still raging, thus tangling the basic issues of peace and cooperation among different nations. Concerted efforts for the peaceful settlement of all conflicts were more necessary than ever.

Tito left deliberations on any new joint initiative of the non-aligned countries to be discussed with the leaders of Morocco, Tunisia and the UAR. However, in West Africa, he concentrated his efforts on promoting comprehensive political and economic cooperation between Yugoslavia and these nations, with the aim of helping Africa overcome its backwardness and establishing strong bilateral ties as a precondition for any future multilateral undertaking that could be based on 'the active unity of African nations in their struggle to liquidate colonialism'.[48] Using his personal charm and political astuteness, Tito managed to bring closer to his position many African countries that were nurturing close relationships with either of the two blocs, thereby making way for his country to expand its influence into this part of the world.[49] Therefore, his visit to Africa came under the closest scrutiny by a number of Great Powers, a fact that pointed to the active foreign interference during preparations for the Belgrade Conference.

In the meantime, American officials were growing suspicious about Yugoslavia's efforts among underdeveloped nations, particularly in Africa. They saw Tito's voyage as a means of exporting his brand of socialism, which could, together with his non-aligned foreign policy, become harmful to Western interests, being less intrusive than the Soviet Union and China.[50] On the other hand, Soviet diplomats expressed their worries that some African nations might turn to Yugoslavia for technical assistance, thus avoiding making economic deals with the socialist camp. They feared that 'Yugoslav revisionism' would become the African nations' way of constructing socialism, creating a 'third force' in world politics that might hamper Soviet efforts in Africa.[51] In addition, China was very sensitive about any Yugoslav activities among Third World neutrals, always suspecting 'Tito's clique' of some conspiracy. They reluctantly had to acknowledge that the Yugoslav president enjoyed a more widespread and solemn reception in some African countries than high-profile Soviet or Chinese delegations, and that his political and economic influence among the ruling elites had increased considerably.[52]

However, one of Tito's driving motives for this long voyage was the idea of organizing a summit conference of the non-aligned leaders, right on the eve of the Sixteenth UN General Assembly. The intention was that all these nations would reach a consensus on a number of substantial issues such as the preservation of peace, the end of colonialism, disarmament, a nuclear test ban, a new role for the UN, etc., and would present this united resolution to both superpowers as the clear voice of one-third of humanity. Their overwhelming majority in the UN forums could also prove decisive for any future undertakings. At the beginning, only Tito and Nasser knew about this new initiative, while Sukarno still contemplated a second Bandung and Nehru concentrated his attention on strengthening India's influence among Arab and African countries vis-à-vis China.[53] While Nasser was still feeling the pulse of India and Indonesia regarding similar events, Tito, during his talks with Nkrumah, for the first time publicly brought forward the idea of a conference of non-aligned nations where Ghana would also participate as a sponsor country. Nkrumah became interested in this proposal, but he refused to discuss it in detail.[54] In the meantime, Nehru and Nasser briefly met in Cairo to exchange views on a number of issues, including this new conference of the non-aligned. The Indian prime minister remained reserved over such initiatives, labelling them premature and unnecessary, but he did not reject them altogether. He was still more for the promotion of direct dialogue between the superpowers, suggesting that any non-aligned conference might only bring to the surface inherent differences between these countries. In fact, there was still enough room for Nasser and Tito to win over Nehru and foil his intentions. Indian officials were convinced that this whole undertaking was the result of a deliberate Yugoslav initiative, almost like a conspiracy with Cairo, which stood against the Indonesian proposal for an Afro-Asian meeting.[55]

While Nehru was still holding on to his reservations, slowly evolving towards an Indian sponsorship of any future conference, Sukarno on the other hand

eagerly picked up this idea and started to promote it as the prelude to his grand Afro-Asian Conference that was supposed to become the central meeting of the major Third World countries. Indonesian diplomacy started pushing for a two-track policy regarding these two potential meetings. Sukarno's plans were to hold the non-aligned conference in the near future in Europe on some concrete issues, such as Algeria or West Irian, while the new Afro-Asian Conference would be closely interconnected with the next session of the UN General Assembly and would represent his grand contribution to world affairs.[56] In this effort, Jakarta enjoyed full support from China, which viewed the new Afro-Asian Conference as a means to 'demonstrate its good will and intentions, thus getting closer to the Afro-Asian countries, isolating India, and blocking Moscow's penetration'. When in early April the Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi visited Indonesia, both sides called for the immediate convening of the Afro-Asian Conference.[57] This initiative sounded the alarm both in Yugoslavia and in India, two countries which could suffer the most if Beijing took under its auspices any future Third World conferences and isolated them. The Yugoslav ambassador in India, Dušan Kveder, therefore suggested close coordination with the Indian leadership, even through open discussion on issues that divided the two sides, in order to promote closer bilateral cooperation and understanding over certain key issues, particularly with regard to China's policies.[58]

Confronted with Nehru's well-known implacability and Sukarno's active push for an Afro-Asian meeting that would not include Yugoslavia as a European country, Tito decided to openly discuss with his African counterparts the issue of a future non-aligned conference and to try to enlist their active support. During his talks with the Moroccan king Hassan II he called for a conference that might 'assist the recovery of the UN, so they [the non-aligned countries] could play a positive role in the future'. At this summit, 'acute problems could be discussed in order to prepare a joint standpoint and develop joint action in the UN' on the eve of the Sixteenth UN General Assembly, thus avoiding disunity among the non-aligned. King Hassan II eagerly accepted Tito's idea and further elaborated Morocco's commitment to such action as a means to confront the predatory influence of developed countries on Asian and African nations:

> Underdeveloped and uncommitted countries should help each other not only through bilateral cooperation, but on a multilateral base … in order to provide their cooperation with a firm basis. Therefore, I concur with your opinion about the conference of uncommitted countries where ministers of economics, education and other portfolios should also participate … in order to reconsider all possibilities for cooperation and reach concrete conclusions.[59]

However, there were also other leaders who were not so eager to support such claims, often stressing those factors that divided non-aligned countries and promoted their isolationism and economic dependence. Tito continuously

emphasized that 'due to the present international situation, the arms race and the existence of two blocs, uncommitted countries' role has increased', as they 'represent the soul of mankind, a reminder, and a grand moral factor'. 'All together, coordinated, assenting, through joint action and with everything else we posses, we can do a lot … while the great powers would have to take into account the uncommitted countries, reconsider their position', said the Yugoslav president to his Tunisian hosts. On the other hand, President Habib Bourguiba expressed his deep doubts over the inherent potential of those nations that were not truly non-aligned but were merely accommodating their economic interests with one of the two blocs.[60] Nevertheless, when Tunisia faced French intervention over the status of Bizerte in July, Bourguiba readily joined the preparations for the Belgrade Conference despite the fact he had not initially been invited.

Essentially, what galvanized Tito's and Nasser's initiative was Nkrumah's sudden decision to endorse any future non-aligned summit which had far more prospects for joint action than the potential Afro-Asian Conference.[61] Therefore when Tito met Nasser, both leaders agreed to hold a broad conference of all non-aligned nations at the Sixteenth UN General Assembly, 'since the stance of these countries holds considerable weight in international relations … and they have to come forward all together'. The two leaders also reached a consensus that a comprehensive preparatory meeting should be held, with a preliminary list of participants already prepared, while the bulk of future efforts should be devoted to enlisting Nehru's support for such a meeting. Both Tito and Nasser concluded that Nehru's initiative to jointly condemn the Bay of Pigs invasion should be used to put additional pressure on him to stand behind their proposal for a non-aligned conference that would address all crisis issues, not just separate ones. Yugoslav and Egyptian officials agreed to dispatch a separate letter to the heads of state of 21 non-aligned countries, inviting them to the preparatory meeting in Cairo and explaining the character and criteria of the future conference. Sukarno readily stood behind their initiative, as the possibility for the organization of the Afro-Asian Conference he so desperately strived for was low.[62] Nehru's reservations notwithstanding, the open invitation to the forthcoming meeting and the strong willingness of many countries to participate forced India's hand to join this call and become one of the co-sponsors. However, the Indian side also demanded that strict criteria for participation and the future conference agenda must be established, strongly insisting on the extension of the list of invited countries.[63]

The decision to organize a preparatory meeting as the prelude to a broad conference of non-aligned countries had an adverse impact on the great powers. Any independent action by these countries 'frustrates Soviet efforts [to] induce active collaboration between non-aligned states and the Soviet bloc', since many Third World leaders were considered the reserve force of the socialist camp.[64] Officially Moscow was still unaware of the future format for this conference, but the Soviets were very agitated by the fact that Tito and Nasser were leading the way and not Sukarno, which prompted them to 'unmask the Western conspiracy'

and to criticize through some participating countries (Cuba) 'the anti-imperialist and anti-colonial character of this meeting'.[65] On the other hand, because Tito's initiative postponed any Afro-Asian conference for a certain period, political circles in Beijing were convinced that Yugoslavia was attempting to lead neutralist countries, creating the 'third bloc' as the counterweight to the Sino-Soviet alliance, setting up a joint axis with India against China, and fomenting discord among Afro-Asian nations and with the socialist camp. Therefore, it was decided in Beijing to directly attack Yugoslavia, unmask Indian duplicity and fight Tito's and Nehru's intentions to control this new conference.[66] Although China also attempted, to no avail, to participate in the forthcoming non-aligned conference through a proxy in Jakarta, thus turning this meeting again into something resembling Bandung, officials in Beijing and Moscow insisted that the divisive character of the forthcoming event could ultimately 'split the united front of peace-loving forces … by separating people from the socialist camp'.[67] The United States, on the other hand, decided to assume a 'friendly and relaxed' attitude to the non-aligned conference, and persuade some friendly neutrals to participate and support India's position as a firm guarantee that radicals would not take over this meeting and try to set up a neutralist bloc leaning towards the Soviet Union. However, the American press was not very positively disposed towards this new non-aligned conference, often labelling it as a 'pro-communist' event.[68]

The preparatory meeting in Cairo in early June was not dedicated to organizational matters only. Since it was convened on the level of foreign ministers, it was also used to establish a minimal consensus between different participating countries on key international issues. Furthermore, following an Indonesian initiative, five basic principles of non-alignment were established as criteria for any participation. These principles implied independent foreign policy based on principles of peaceful coexistence, support for national liberation, no foreign military bases on the country's territory, abstention from military alliances or pacts concluded with one of the blocs, and, if a country was a member of any regional military alliances, this alliance was not to be concluded within the context of Great Power rivalries. In addition, despite Cuban and Guinean protests over the future meeting place but with strong backing from Indonesia and the UAR, it was decided to hold the summit in Belgrade in early September. This decision was a major recognition of Yugoslavia's outstanding role in the non-aligned world.[69]

However, this preparatory meeting was also marked by a harsh confrontation between India on one side and Cuba, Ghana, Guinea and Mali on the other over the issue of extending the invitation to as many Third World countries as possible, with Congo's participation as the stumbling-block.[70] In fact, India was confronted with the unpleasant fact that its influence among Afro-Asian countries was not as strong as previously believed. As the Yugoslav Foreign Secretariat pointed out, China's presence was already tangible while New Delhi 'demonstrated total unfamiliarity with Afro-Asian problems and surprising inability to adjust', thus losing a lot of credibility in the eyes of these nations

while pursuing the policy of 'non-alignment towards the non-aligned'.[71] Although Yugoslavia could not abide by the Indian proposal for the broad participation of different countries (Yugoslavia supported Congo's attendance), nevertheless Yugoslav officials were well aware that 'India's and Nehru's presence at the Belgrade Conference has positive meaning … contributing to the prestige and significance of this whole action'. Therefore, Tito took a personal initiative to talk Nehru into coming to Belgrade, thus promoting close bilateral cooperation and the joint contribution of both countries to the success of the meeting. Enlisting India's full participation at the Belgrade Conference became one of the most difficult tasks for Tito and Yugoslav diplomacy, since until the very last moment it was not clear whether Nehru would personally attend this event, whether India would accept the conference agenda and its conclusions, whether they would attempt to organize their own group at the conference (India, Burma, Cambodia, Nepal, Lebanon), etc.[72]

While Tito and Nasser put the bulk of their efforts into endeavouring to overcome Nehru's reservations, less attention was devoted to the proposals of the third conference sponsor, Sukarno. Even though preparations for the Belgrade Conference were already well under way, Indonesia did not totally abandon its own initiative for a second Bandung. Sukarno decided, for the time being, to put his weight behind the conference of non-aligned countries only because 'its success would only help organization of Bandung'. Indonesia enjoyed China's strong backing and Jakarta was ready to convene a new Bandung 'even without India's participation'.[73] Beijing adopted a pragmatic attitude, concentrating on behind-the-scenes work to unmask Yugoslavia's 'false anti-imperialist and anti-colonial credentials', but to do so in a way that would not further alienate other neutralist nations. Therefore, in spite of China's clear disapproval of the Belgrade Conference, Mao Zedong advised Sukarno to attend this meeting and actively defend Indonesia's and China's position.[74] The Chinese leadership would even formally send a greeting telegram to the Belgrade Conference intended for Asian, African and Latin American countries – thus ignoring Yugoslavia, a European country – as a sign of China's more accommodating approach to ongoing processes among Third World nations. In the end, although Tito, Nasser and Nehru finally managed to find common ground for their joint action, Sukarno felt sidelined and overshadowed in Belgrade by these three leaders; this ultimately had a profound effect on him and triggered a political backlash. After Belgrade he decided to use all his forces to push for the second Bandung as an adequate arena for his anti-imperialist stance, which would eventually bring him to the side of China and set him at odds with other major non-aligned countries.[75]

Yugoslavia was also caught between the US and the Soviet Union's conflicting policies over the question of Germany and the status of Berlin, particularly after the erection of the Berlin Wall in August. This event complicated Tito's relationship with both superpowers, especially taking into account Yugoslavia's firm reservations regarding German unification and possible rearmament.[76] In order to strike a balance in his relations with Moscow

and Washington, Tito attempted to clarify Yugoslavia's position regarding the forthcoming conference to the visiting US under-Secretary of state Chester Bowles shortly after he had dispatched his state secretary for foreign affairs, Koča Popović, to Moscow to reach some kind of understanding with the Soviet leadership on critical outstanding international issues.[77] However, even though Moscow would later take a much more positive stance towards the Belgrade Conference, Khrushchev still decided to resume nuclear tests on the opening day of the meeting, thus casting a long shadow over Tito's grand international debut.[78] In addition, many Latin American countries that had initially intended to attend the non-aligned conference, at least as observers, were actively dissuaded by the US from doing so, although sometimes not blatantly and directly, despite the fact that Cuba would then be the only participant from that region. This policy even resulted in the resignation of the Brazilian President Jânio Quadros, despite the fact that his country eventually participated as an observer together with Bolivia and Ecuador.[79] In fact, Yugoslavia was very much interested in having a wider presence of different Latin American countries as a counterweight to Cuban radicalism, but Washington was reluctant to allow such developments.

The Belgrade Conference took place from 1 to 6 September 1961 with 25 fully participating and three observer countries. Even though this was a heterogeneous conference with countries from very diverse regions, an unexpectedly high level of mutual agreement was reached on a number of issues incuding the condemnation of colonialism, the arms race and the use of force, while strong support was rendered to the liberation struggles in Algeria, Angola, Congo and Palestine. Furthermore, Tito's initiative to invite two representatives of Congo, Cyrille Adoula and Antoine Gizenga, to join them in Belgrade was backed by Nkrumah, Sukarno and Nasser, while Yugoslavia and Ghana decided to officially recognize the Provisional Government of Algeria which was already present at the conference, possible diplomatic conflict with France notwithstanding.[80] These two decisions really proved Yugoslavia's strong anti-colonial credentials. Moreover, consensus was also reached on the issue of a significant expansion of certain UN bodies, particularly the economic ones, with more representatives from developing countries and increased economic and technical assistance to be rendered through the UN. The Soviet proposal to replace the position of the UN Secretary-General with three representatives from the East, the West and the Third World was also flatly rejected.[81] In essence, the conference participants, through active Yugoslav mediation, managed to reach agreement on all key international issues.

Without any doubt, Tito succeeded in getting the international limelight during the conference proceedings, imposing himself as the central figure of this event. This was particularly when it came to his famous speech on 3 September. Unlike some Afro-Asian leaders who took a more conciliatory line in their appearances, Tito unexpectedly showed a rather radical approach. To the majority of observers, his actions seemed like non-alignment with a strong pro-Soviet tilt. When referring to the problems of colonialism, the Berlin crisis or the question of Germany, he used quite strong words, directly criticizing Western

policies regarding these issues, particularly the support to the 'reactionary circles' in West Germany, while he praised the Soviet initiative for a two-state solution as the first serious attempt to resolve the German problem. When it came to the Soviet resumption of nuclear tests, unlike Nehru, Nasser, Sukarno or Nkrumah, who expressed their deepest regret for such a move, Tito demonstrated his full understanding of the Soviet decision and even indicted France for its earlier nuclear tests in the Sahara as a deliberate provocation.[82] This part of Tito's speech acted as a bombshell, igniting a full diplomatic conflagration.

US ambassador George Kennan, present at the conference, was very unpleasantly surprised by Tito's blatant endorsement of Soviet arguments, as well as what he saw as unsubstantiated criticism of the United States and its allies. Some high Yugoslav officials privately attempted to explain Tito's unexpected position as his desire to support Khrushchev in any way possible, since the Soviet leader was under extreme pressure in the Kremlin for not taking a hard line over Berlin and the arms race. This was how the Yugoslav leadership understood the outcome of Tito's last meeting with the Soviet ambassador, but the Americans were convinced that this sudden change was, indeed, the direct result of Soviet meddling during the previous few days.[83] Nehru tried to convince Kennan that it was just 'Tito's instinct to agree with Khrushchev on foreign policy and past accidents and misfortunes in his relations with West and East Germany play a part', but this could not disperse US doubts over Tito's future course.[84] Even though Washington wanted to act cautiously in order not to stir negative reactions in Yugoslavia and among non-aligned countries, it decided to express its open consternation about Yugoslavia's performance at the conference and to introduce certain punitive measures regarding technical assistance, Most Favored Nation status, and wheat sales to Belgrade. The negative Western response also spilled over to other non-aligned countries inlcuding India, Egypt and Ghana, which were on the receiving end of some Yugoslav initiatives and were now selected by the West as a target group to forcefully isolate Belgrade and hinder any cooperation between them.[85]

On the other hand, Moscow was very pleased with the conference proceedings, which fully confirmed Tito's anti-imperialist credentials. We now know that a high-profile member of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, Bobodzhan Gafurov, was sent to Belgrade to observe the conference, meet with the Yugoslav leadership and determine the conditions for a fundamental improvement of bilateral relations. According to his impressions, Yugoslavia was a reliable socialist country, standing close to the Soviet Union on many issues, while Tito performed far better at the conference than Nehru or Nasser.[86] However, startled by the outcome of his speech, very soon Tito was to indicate to his Soviet counterparts that his speech did not announce his return to the socialist camp but was only the result of certain similarities between the Yugoslav and Soviet positions on Berlin, colonialism and disarmament. Therefore, in the aftermath, he openly invited Khrushchev to end nuclear tests, since he had already made his point that the West was also to blame for the continuation of nuclear tests, and suggested to both superpowers that they open a new round of negotiations on strategic issues.[87] Tito's

clarification did not please Moscow at all, his previous pro-Soviet leanings notwithstanding, because it demonstrated the continued firmness of his middle-of-the road political course. A new political campaign against Yugoslavia was launched again inside the CPSU.

Tito's political agenda was to make sure that the Belgrade Conference became a trigger for the permanent and organized joint action of all non-aligned countries. His preliminary idea was not to set up a new organization, although this conference eventually became the founding meeting of the NAM, but to formulate a long-term global strategy for all these countries in order to specify their place in the existing world order. Therefore, he wanted to move beyond the current political issues and deal with the larger picture of the role these countries should exercise inside the Cold War framework. During his 'infamous' speech, Tito also offered some constructive proposals for two international conferences on disarmament and world economics which were later endorsed by the UN and ultimately led to the setting up of UNCTAD.[88] However, unlike Tito, leaders such as Nehru were more interested in dealing with the current dangerous situation in the world and acting as honest brokers, promoting dialogue between the Great Powers. They were less inclined to devote their attention to some as yet unclear issues about the future political or economic role of so many diverse developing countries.[89] Nevertheless, both approaches finally gained the upper hand when they were used to formulate the final documents of the Belgrade Conference: the final declaration reflected Yugoslavia's position, and the statement on the danger of war and the appeal for peace was closer to India's views. It was also decided by the participants that selected non-aligned leaders would hand in this appeal to both Kennedy and Khrushchev – Sukarno and Keita went to Washington, while Nehru and Nkrumah travelled to Moscow – as an incentive to restart the international dialogue.[90]

This conference was not the true birthplace of the NAM, as it took a few years more to formally set up such an organization, but the 'spirit of Belgrade' and the decisions taken at this gathering undoubtedly represented the emergence of a global alternative to bloc divisions in world politics. Even more important, this gathering helped shape the political consciousness of the developing nations, and demonstrated that through joint action they could strengthen their international position and influence the delicate balance of forces of the Cold War. Similar events only confirmed the Third World's growing awareness that it could get out of the colonial quagmire and reinvent its role in international affairs. At the same time, as we saw, these events directly influenced the actions of three major world powers, which only proves the assumptions of pericentrism about the active interaction between the big and small players in the global Cold War. It took a lot of effort and political haggling to give concrete meaning to such a new correlation of forces inside the Cold War equation, and Yugoslavia exercised decisive impact on the destiny of the strategy of non-alignment. As one author wisely said, 'Tito's ideas fell on receptive ears; he struck the right note with the right audience at the right moment in time'.[91] This was particularly the case with the Belgrade Conference and the evolution of the NAM.

Notes

1 The author would like to thank Dongfang Lishi Xuehui for their ongoing support for his research on Chinese and Third World issues during the Cold War.
2 See V. Prashad, *The Darker Nations: A People's History of the Third World*, New York: New Press, 2007, pp. 95–104.
3 On recent research of Yugoslavia's non-alignment and the Belgrade conference see L. Dimić and D. Bogetić, *Beogradska konferencija: Jugoslavija i počeci organizovanja neangažovanih zemalja* (The Belgrade Conference: Yugoslavia and the Beginnings of the Organizing of Non-Aligned Countries), Belgrade: Zavod za udžbenike, 2013; D. Bogetić, *Nova strategija spoljne politike Jugoslavije 1956–1961* (The New Strategy of Yugoslavia's Foreign Policy, 1956–1961), Belgrade: ISI, 2006; J. Čavoški, *Jugoslavija i kinesko-indijski konflikt 1959–1962* (Yugoslavia and the Sino-Indian Conflict, 1959–1962), Belgrade: INIS, 2009.
4 On pericentrism see T. Smith, 'New Bottles for New Wine: A Pericentric Framework for the Study of the Cold War', *Diplomatic History* 24 (4), 2000, pp. 567–91.
5 On the foreign policy semantics of 'non-alignment', 'neutralism' and 'positive neutrality' see K. E. Babaa and C. V. Crabb, Jr., 'Non-Alignment as a Diplomatic and Ideological Credo', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 362, 1965, pp. 6–17.
6 For more on the evolution of the foreign policy strategy of non-alignment see L. Mates, *Nesvrstanost: Teorija i savremena praksa* (Non-Alignment: Theory and Contemporary Practice), Belgrade: IMPP, 1970, pp. 97–122.
7 See R. Petković, *Nesvrstanost: Nezavisan, vanblokovski i globalni faktor u međunarodnim odnosima* (Non-Alignment: An Independent Global Factor Outside the Blocs in International Relations), Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 1981, pp. 9–39.
8 See N. Choucri, 'The Non-Alignment of Afro-Asian States: Policy, Perception, and Behavior', *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 2 (1), 1969, pp. 4–6.
9 On Yugoslavia's early contacts with Asian countries see J. Čavoški, 'Overstepping the Balkan Boundaries: The Lesser Known History of Yugoslavia's Early Relations with Asian Countries', *Cold War History* 11 (4), 2011, pp. 557–77.
10 See J. Jovanović, *Jugoslavija u Ujedinjenim nacijama 1945–1953* (Yugoslavia in the United Nations, 1945–1953), Belgrade: ISI, 1985, pp. 49–50; A. Z. Rubinstein, *Yugoslavia and the Non-Aligned World*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970, pp. 33–4.
11 For more on relations with the West in this period see D. Bogetić, *Jugoslavija i Zapad 1952–1955: Jugoslovensko približavanje NATO-u* (Yugoslavia and the West 1952–1955: The Yugoslav Rapprochement to NATO), Belgrade: Službeni list SRJ, 2000; L. M. Lees, *Keeping Tito Afloat: The United States, Yugoslavia, and the Cold War*, University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997; I. Laković, *Zapadna vojna pomoć Jugoslaviji 1951–1958* (Western Military Aid to Yugoslavia, 1951–1958), Podgorica: IICG, 2006.
12 See J. Čavoški, 'Arming Non-Alignment: Yugoslavia's Relations with Burma and the Cold War in Asia, 1950–1955', CWIHP Working Paper 61, Washington, DC, 2010.
13 On Tito's visit to India and Burma see Čavoški, *Jugoslavija i kinesko-indijski konflikt*, pp. 53–73.
14 D. Bekić, *Jugoslavija u Hladnom ratu: Odnosi sa velikim silama 1949–1955* (Yugoslavia in the Cold War: Relations with the Great Powers, 1949–1955), Zagreb: Globus, 1988, p. 674.
15 'Monthly Report of the Embassy of India in Belgrade for the Period ending 28 February 1955', National Archives of India, Ministry of External Affairs [hereafter MEA], F 62 – R&I/55(s).
16 'Notes of Conversation at the Dinner given by the Attaché of the French Embassy in Burma', 23 November 1954, Diplomatic Archives of the Serbian Ministry of Foreign

Affairs [hereafter DASMIP], Political Archives [hereafter PA], 1955, folder [hereafter f-]9, document 41835.

17 'Outlook for Yugoslavia – NIE 15–61', 23 May 1961, in National Intelligence Council, *Yugoslavia – From 'National Communism' to National Collapse: US Intelligence Community Estimative Products on Yugoslavia, 1948–1990*, Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 2006, p. 264.

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9 ‘To grab the headlines in the world press’[1]

Non-aligned summits as media events

Jürgen Dinkel

The foreign policy of the politically, economically and militarily weak non-aligned countries is often described as a reaction to the Cold War and the foundation of the United Nations as well as a consequence of their successful national liberation struggles.[2] However, the policy of non-aligned countries was also a response to the global revolution in mass communications.[3] Lacking hard power in military or economic terms, the non-aligned countries tried to achieve their foreign policy aims through increasingly symbolic performative actions, such as summitry, (visual) propaganda geared towards a global mass media, and the establishment of their own Non-Aligned News Agency Pool to influence an assumed ‘world opinion’ and make their voice heard in international politics.

The important role that mass media played at non-aligned summits had, in turn, profound consequences for these summits. The organizers had to provide additional press centres, technical equipment and accommodation for up to 2,000 journalists, and organize press conferences and information bulletins. Furthermore they had to ensure that the non-aligned countries appeared as a unified group speaking with one voice, and that *their* message was conveyed.

This chapter will examine the dialectic relationship between the media and the summits. On the one hand, the conference organizers dealt with the demands of the mass media and tried to use them to exert political pressure simultaneously at local and international levels. On the other hand, the mass media influenced both the organization and the course of the summits. It even had a considerable impact on their results, significantly shaping the international perception of the Non-Aligned Movement. This intensive interdependence between the summits and the mass media raises three questions. Why did so many journalists attend the conferences? How did the conference participants deal with the demands of the mass media? And how did the mass media, in turn, influence the non-aligned summits? To answer these questions, I will focus on the similarities between anti-colonial and non-aligned summits, and highlight six different aspects: (1) the intentions of the conference participants; (2) the attendance of politicians and journalists; (3) the provision of a communication infrastructure; (4) the conference message and the summit as the message; (5) the attempts to secure the ‘right’ message; and (6) the significance of the media for international politics.

The intentions of the conference participants

The strategy of instrumentalizing 'world opinion' for one's own internal and external political aims was not solely a characteristic of the non-aligned summits. Since the late nineteenth century, the attention of the mass media as well as the public became increasingly important for political actors.[4] Journalists even adopted the role of political actors.[5] Furthermore, the strategic influencing of public opinion was deeply rooted in the tradition of anti-colonial movements.[6] Usually acting from a position of political and military weakness, anti-colonial movements participated in anti-colonial conferences in order to popularize their aims, disseminate their political programs and engage in networking. Thus the World Congress of Oppressed Peoples in Brussels decided in 1927 that the worldwide collection and distribution of information concerning anti-colonial struggles in various colonies by means of conferences, demonstrations and exhibitions was one of the main aims of the newly founded League against Imperialism and for National Independence.[7] Mohammed Hatta, the future foreign minister of Indonesia, even declared propaganda to be the most important function of the League, while Nehru tried to convince the Indian National Congress to associate with the League, stating that

> among the advantages are the opportunities to keep in touch with many Asiatic and other countries with problems not dissimilar to ours, and the use of the League as a very efficient means of propaganda and publicity. There is no doubt that the League can and intends to carry propaganda on a big scale. We have discussed the question of foreign propaganda for a long time in the Indian Congress but for various reasons nothing much has been done or could be done. Modern publicity and propaganda require vast sums of money which we certainly could not spare. But if we take advantage of another organisation to do this work for us without spending much money or energy over it, there seems to be no reason why we should not avail ourselves of it.[8]

The desire to be seen and heard in international politics was also one of the chief arguments of the governments of Indonesia, Burma, Pakistan, India and Ceylon for organizing the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung. In March of 1955, Nehru told the Indian parliament that he could not say what the Afro-Asian Conference would do, 'because countries coming there have different policies, different outlooks, sometimes opposing policies'.[9] But, he continued, 'the mere fact of its meeting is important … [a]s the sign and symbol of … the emergence of Asia'.[10] Similarly Ceylon's Prime Minister John Kotelawala declared that 'it was time the united voice of Asia was heard in the councils of the world whose destinies had hitherto tended to be controlled almost entirely from another direction'.[11]

The ambition to publicize their own political interests was also a motivating factor for governments to participate in the summits of non-aligned countries. In Belgrade in 1961, the prime minister of Burma, U Nu, declared that the conference was important because 'the whole world has its eyes on Belgrade

today'.[12] Additionally, conference participation and mass media were particularly important for small countries and microstates. Asked why Trinidad and Tobago attended the non-aligned summit in Cairo in 1964, the country's foreign minister replied that it was because 'Trinidad has difficulty in making its views heard'.[13] However, the charismatic leaders of big states were also keen to appear in media headlines. Gamal Abdel Nasser even advocated 'the pooling of a big force of world public opinion'[14] against the policy of racial discrimination. And in 1986 Robert Mugabe, as chairman of the NAM, described the conference as an international sounding board, reminding the participants that the movement had provided them with a platform to air their views and to speak through the voice of the movement.[15]

To conclude, many heads of state or government attended the non-aligned conferences in person, as it was an opportunity to be seen and heard in national and international politics. Lacking hard power in military or economic terms, the non-aligned countries and their charismatic leaders tried to achieve their domestic projects of nation-building and their foreign policy aims, including maximization of their respective countries' positions in regional and global contexts, through increasingly symbolic performative actions geared towards the populations of their own states and an assumed 'world opinion'.

Attendance of journalists and diplomats

The conference organizers and participants undertook a wide range of activities to ensure that journalists and diplomats would give broad coverage to their conferences. They advertised the conferences in leading newspapers to attract journalists who attended either out of political conviction or on behalf of news agencies.[16] The *New York Times* correspondent Paul Hofmann described the Belgrade conference and the gathering of non-aligned leaders as a 'paradise for cameramen' and 'a photographers and cartoonists' dream'.[17] Furthermore the conference organizers invited diplomats and ambassadors. In addition to political advisors, most governments also brought their own journalists. Information ministers and correspondents of leading national newspapers were often part of the respective delegations.[18]

Consequently, journalists attended the non-aligned summits in great numbers: 1,016 newspapermen were accredited for the Belgrade Conference, 690 of which came from 53 different countries, not counting Yugoslavia.[19] Further, approximately 1,000 to 2,000 journalists attended each subsequent non-aligned summit.[20] This in turn meant that the conference organizers had to provide for an adequate communication infrastructure.

Communication infrastructure

Unlike other international organizations, the Non-Aligned Movement has never had either headquarters or secretariat. Therefore high-ranking ministers generally supervised the planning and organization of the conferences.[21] The conference

secretariat organized accommodation, workplaces and material for typists and camera teams. In Belgrade it arranged free rooms for journalists in student residence halls, and in Colombo it rented the buildings of the German Friedrich-Ebert Foundation to provide journalists with more working space. It also provided new typewriters, copiers and teletypers and set up additional radio and TV stations.[22] Each host country established new communication channels and improved old ones, both within the country and beyond its borders.[23] In addition to these technical improvements, the organizers arranged to have the various speeches and documents translated. At least four official conference languages were used: English, French, Spanish and Arabic.[24] Egypt sent 60 translators to Belgrade to ensure the transmission of the conference into the Arabic world. Belgrade was the first international non-Arab conference with Arabic as an official conference language. In addition, the Yugoslavian government asked all students with foreign language skills to assist the foreign guests as city guides.[25] Twelve years later in New Delhi, the organizers hired 217 simultaneous interpreters.[26] The conference secretariat also regularly hired well-trained translators, mainly from the United Nations.[27]

As a result of the institutionalization of the Non-Aligned Movement, the conference organization became more professional during the 1970s. Most important in this regard was the establishment of the Non-Aligned News Agency Pool in 1976. Founded with the aim of decolonizing the international information and media sector and qualifying journalists from non-aligned countries, it rapidly developed into an impressive news network. Only a few years after the pool was started, over one hundred news agencies were participating, with news of the pool even appearing on the ticker-tapes at the United Nations since 1982. Furthermore, the non-aligned countries established an economic information service called the Eco-Pool, as well as a Broadcasting Organization within the Non-Aligned Movement (BONAC). Thus, at least theoretically, all members and accredited journalists at the United Nations had access to news from the non-aligned world.[28] However, the conference organizers did not merely provide technical assistance. They also arranged official and unofficial meetings between politicians and journalists. Press conferences formed an integral part of every non-aligned summit. There were also numerous opportunities for participants to get in touch with each other during session breaks and in the foyer of the conference building, and the unscheduled part of the program usually afforded a wide range of opportunities for making contacts.[29] In Belgrade, Marshal Tito and his wife invited about 2,000 politicians and observers to dinner, and in Colombo and New Delhi the conference opened with inaugural ceremonies.[30]

To sum up, the conference organizers went to great lengths to ensure broad coverage by the world media, which raises the question: what was the message that they were so keen to transmit to a global audience?

Providing a message

Scholars have already examined the resolutions and declarations of the various non-aligned summits, convincingly arguing that colonial and racial oppressions

were the prime focus throughout the 1950s and 1960s. During the 1970s, the summits dealt increasingly with economic and cultural issues and further argued for a policy based on the right of self-determination, the acceptance of state sovereignty, and peaceful coexistence.[31]

In order to understand the meaning of the non-aligned summits in their contemporary context, however, it does not do to focus solely on the conference resolutions. First, conference declarations were not legally binding. On the contrary, nearly every country inserted some reservations in the declarations. During the Conference of Foreign Ministers in Belgrade in 1978, 37 governments put forth nearly 250 reservations, while six countries (Bhutan, Nepal, Peru, Singapore, Zaire and Cambodia) even 'tabled a blanket reservation on the paragraphs which may be incompatible with their policies'.[32] Second, the length of the resolutions ranged from less than 4,000 words in the Belgrade Declaration up to about 56,000 words – the equivalent of 140 book pages – in Havana in 1979, which was incompatible with the demands of mass media. Moreover, there was the question of who read these resolutions.[33] Besides that, in most cases the official conference declaration was published on the last conference day or, as was the case in Lusaka, a few days after the official end of the conference, when most visiting journalists had already left the country.[34] Hence, in order to understand the full meaning of the conferences, it also seems important to analyse the various speeches including their narratives and metaphors, symbols and actions during the conference. In short, I argue first that the conference proceedings themselves delivered the message and were therefore staged for the mass media. Second, I maintain that every summit had more than *one* central message. Instead, each conference transmitted at least five main messages through its symbols, actions and resolutions, inter alia, to various audiences on which all non-aligned countries could agree and which provided the NAM with unity.

First and foremost, the conference participants were keen to present themselves as legitimate representatives of their states. Therefore all summits started with greetings at the airport. The hoisting of national flags symbolized their status as representatives of sovereign states. What usually followed was a motorcade through the city streets in front of cameras and inhabitants. In Colombo, the government even declared a public holiday to enable the population of its capital to watch the pageantry.[35] And a week before the opening of the Harare summit in 1986, M. Nyagumbo, leader of the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front, asked the other party members to mobilize and organize people for the upcoming summit with the following words: 'Every Zimbabwean must be a true ambassador for Zimbabwe at the coming occasion.'[36] The conferences opened with public speeches, fireworks and a (state) dinner to demonstrate the importance of the participants. However, it must also be noted that beyond the official proceedings, the conference provided a wide range of opportunities for every delegation to pose as the legitimate government of a sovereign nation-state. Every host country offered guided tours through the conference city and to famous buildings and places. Exhibitions and brochures about the history, economy and culture of the respective state were also part of each summit.[37]

Additionally some delegations organized movie screenings about their countries and handed out traditional gifts to other participants and observers.[38] Also, the renovation of houses and streets, the renaming of streets, the building of conference halls and hotels, and the staging of the conference as a global event in itself transmitted a message.[39] Blinded by racial prejudices, observers from both the East and the West were often of the opinion that the host countries of these summits, such as Indonesia, Zambia, Algeria or Sri Lanka, were still not able to organize an international conference with several thousand participants.[40] Against this background, the very fact that the conference took place naturally demonstrated the opposite and made clear that the non-aligned countries and especially the conference host were both willing and able to participate in international politics.

A second major theme of each conference was the plea for world peace, disarmament and security. The non-aligned countries opposed the development of military blocs, the attempts of the super powers to compartmentalize the world into spheres of influence, the arms race, and military interventions. The only exceptions to these demands were wars of self-determination and independence in existing colonies. The non-aligned countries explicitly supported these struggles.[41] All things considered, however, the non-aligned governments had little leverage in these debates and therefore tried to influence world politics through increasingly performative and symbolic actions. First of all they represented themselves as a 'moral force' or the 'conscience of mankind' and tried to gain leverage by means of a higher moral position, the common argument being that their summits demonstrated that it was possible for states with different political, economic and cultural backgrounds to coexist and confer peacefully.[42] In Belgrade, banners in several languages covered the streets between the airport and the conference buildings,[43] displaying the slogan: 'The Beograd conference a manifestation of the policy of peace'.[44] Furthermore, the participants decided to present two official emissaries to the eyes of the world: Nehru and Nkrumah were sent to Moscow, and Keita and Sukarno to Washington, to directly communicate their 'Statement on the Danger of War and an Appeal for Peace'[45] to the Kremlin and the White House. The peace dove appeared in the official conference emblem in the 1970s and has been depicted in every emblem that followed. Motivated by worldwide peace movements, Indira Gandhi even declared in her opening statement at the seventh non-aligned summit in New Delhi in 1983: 'The desire for peace is universal even within countries which themselves produce nuclear weapons and in those where they are deployed. The Non-Aligned Movement is history's biggest peace movement.'[46]

Equally important as the topic of peace was the self-portrayal of the NAM as an anti-colonial movement. On the one hand, in many Asian and African countries nationalism and the nation-state were built around an anti-colonial identity, and non-aligned leaders quickly learned that the answer to domestic challenges lay partially in the proclamation of an anti-colonial policy. To put it in other words: for governments on a quest for legitimacy it was necessary to act as anti-colonialist at least rhetorically, and the non-aligned summits provided an

excellent platform to act and be seen as an anti-colonialist regime.[47] On the other hand, the abstract notion of the 'colonial experience' of all non-aligned countries and the agitation against colonial rule created coherence in the NAM by emphasizing what was to be rejected. Therefore anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism, anti-racism, anti-discrimination and anti-apartheid functioned as political catchwords during the summits and provided the NAM with unity.[48] References to the anti-colonial struggle can therefore be found in nearly all actions, symbols and speeches during the conferences. Every summit opened with a minute of silence, inter alia, 'dedicated to world peace, the hope of mankind, and to all who gave their lives so that people may be free and independent'.[49] Later the NAM officially remembered and honoured its 'founding fathers', who, besides Nehru, Nasser, Nkrumah, Sukarno and Tito, included a wide range of anti-colonial activists such as S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, Patrice Lumumba, Eduardo Mondlane, Amilcar Cabral and Salvador Allende.[50] In 1986 in Harare, the participants commemorated the victims of the Soweto uprising in South Africa.[51]

The decision regarding the conference venue was always influenced by the aim of directing the attention of the mass media to colonial problems. This became especially apparent during the selection of Lusaka, Harare and Luanda as conference venues.[52] More important in this regard was the *de jure* recognition of anti-colonial movements as legitimate governments during several summits. In Belgrade, the Algerian National Liberation Front received recognition as the legitimate government of Algeria from several countries including Yugoslavia.[53] During the Algiers summit in 1975, anti-colonial movements even gained observer status like other sovereign states.[54] Additionally, the NAM established a number of solidarity funds to support the struggle of a wide range of African anti-colonial movements, as well as countries which opposed South Africa, which had a profound public impact.[55]

The fight against economic oppression and the plea for intensified South–South cooperation have also been major themes of non-aligned summits since the 1970s.[56] For the first time in 1972, an 'Action Programme for Economic Co-operation' was passed at the Foreign Ministers' Conference in Georgetown. The Algiers summit of 1973 confirmed this decision and, in addition to the 'Political Declaration', integrated an 'Economic Declaration' into the conference resolutions, highlighting the importance of these parts of the conference.[57] In 1975, the Lima Foreign Ministers' Conference decided to establish an economic information center. In 1972, the non-aligned countries also started to organize meetings with international experts and politicians to popularize the legitimacy of their economic demands. Between 1979 and 1983, 47 meetings were held.[58] Furthermore, the establishment of solidarity funds such as the AFRICA Fund, combining political and economic demands, symbolized the will of non-aligned countries for an intensified economic cooperation.[59]

The last main message of non-aligned summits was their plea for unity and solidarity between all non-aligned states. United actions against a common enemy were often linked to the creation of new group identities. Thus the League

against Imperialism and for National Independence was founded in 1927 by anti-colonial activists in Brussels. The participants of the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung in 1955 adopted a resolution with the title 'Asia-Africa speaks from Bandung'[60] to demonstrate their unity. Also, the organizers of the non-aligned summits tried to avoid controversial issues; instead they focused on common problems to emphasize their solidarity. Therefore every anti-colonial conference beginning in the interwar period ended with a group picture, demonstrating the unity and friendship between the different non-aligned governments. In Belgrade, the participants even planted trees in the Park of Friendship to give visible expression to this solidarity.[61] In the 1970s, primarily during the process of institutionalization, the term 'Non-Aligned Movement' appeared and became associated with the idea of 'membership' in the movement, an indicator for a sense of corporate identity.[62] The NAM further underlined its coherence with the establishment of an official spokesman, the President or Chairman of the NAM. The sense of a common identity also appears in various speeches held on non-aligned summits. In the 1970s, participants often described the NAM as a growing family on a long and hard road with the aim of fighting colonialism and imperialism.[63] The official conference emblem was used to transmit the messages of the NAM and to demonstrate its unity. In Colombo in 1976, it included all five main messages of the NAM: the striving for self-determination, economic development, peace and security, and solidarity, and the denial of all forms of colonialism and imperialism (see Figure 9.1).

Figure 9.1 Emblem of the fifth non-aligned summit (source: *Daily Mirror*, 4 June 1976).

Additionally, and to underline the meaning of this emblem, it was described as follows:

> The emblem embodies the ideals of the Non-Aligned Movement. 1. To establish, maintain and ensure a lasting peace in the world – the white Dove, the traditional symbol of peace is therefore depicted on the emblem. 2. Non-Aligned movement also supports the struggle for freedom from Colonialism and imperialism – the hands with the broken chains represent the breakup of Colonial Empires and freedom for their peoples. 3. The map of the World broadly depicts the Third World. 4. The Unity and solidarity of the Non-Aligned group is shown in the hands grasped in friendship across the world. 5. The rising sun is symbolic of the dawn of a new era for the Third World.[64]

A closer look at the emblem not only shows the special visual language of the Non-Aligned Movement in the 1970s, it also convincingly demonstrates that it was possible to include several messages in one emblem and one conference. Along with the non-binding resolutions, this 'openness' of the conference to many symbolic and performative actions and a wide range of messages had, in turn, profound consequences for the attractiveness of each summit and the policy of non-alignment. Although a government may not have been able to identify with all of the political demands or messages of the conference, it could at least identify with a few of them, making the conferences attractive for many governments in the Global South. On the other hand the flexibility of the term non-alignment and the fuzziness of the conference messages made it difficult for the participants to ensure that they and their political demands appeared united and consistent in the world press.

Securing the right message

The challenge for the conference organizers and participants to get their messages into the headlines of the world press was enormous. To put it simply, they used two strategies to meet this challenge. On the one hand, they tried to control the activities of the journalists and the information that was given to them. Complaints from observers about strict accreditation procedures are a recurrent theme in conference reports.[65] The conference organizers published counter-statements in the press,[66] denied accreditation, and expelled journalists.[67] In Lusaka in 1970, the Zambian police even arrested reporters from South Africa, Germany, Great Britain and the United States.[68] On the other hand, the conference organizers worked hard to provide journalists with information they wanted to see published, for instance by giving press interviews[69] and by distributing printed versions of their speeches,[70] or other informative material including brochures and press kits.[71] Another option was the printing of memorial stamps and coins. Usually they depicted the 'founding fathers' of the Non-Aligned Movement, the white dove, or the place where the particular conference was taking place.[72]

The distribution of these stamps was much wider than one would expect at first glance. The stamps were inter alia advertised by stamp collectors in the *New York Times*.[73] The League against Imperialism and the Non-Aligned Movement even tried to publish and establish their own news journals. However, the *Anti-Imperialist Review* in 1928 and *The Non-Aligned World* from 1981 and 1984 did not succeed; neither did the Non-Aligned News Agency Pool.

But these attempts at controlling media coverage also demonstrate the organizers' limitations. On the one hand, unexpected events and scandals involving individual participants consistently grabbed the attention of the mass media, distracting them from the 'actual' conference message. The refusal of the non-aligned countries to allow the Congolese prime minister Tshombe to participate and to speak for the Congo in Cairo 1964, the imprisonment of journalists in Lusaka, or the actions and speeches of Gadhafi in the 1980s are examples.[74] On the other hand, other actors on the stage of international politics were also interested in the output and the media coverage of the conferences, and therefore tried to influence the organization and messages of the summits. Before the Bandung Conference, the GDR and the FDR, as well as the British Foreign Office and the State Department, had already prepared guidelines and recommendations for diplomats and journalists on how they should influence the conference's outcome.[75] Likewise, during the 1960s, the two Germanies kept the non-aligned busy with allurements and threats apropos the recognition of the GDR. Both sides sent well-briefed journalists, and diplomats camouflaged as journalists, to the summits, showed films and provided other journalists and diplomats with their arguments.[76] But it was not only the two Germanies that saw the non-aligned summits as events where it was necessary to promote their own policy aims. The People's Republic of China, the United States and many other governments also tried to influence the outcomes of the conferences. In 1976, the British Foreign Office even compiled a brochure – based on the experiences of various journalists and diplomats who had already attended non-aligned summits – bearing the title: 'How to Attend a Conference Without Being a Delegate'.[77] Against this background, the question arises: why does media coverage matter in international politics?

Matters of media for international politics

The conferences gained wide attention in the mass media. According to Regina Mulay, four Indian newspapers – *The Times of India*, *The Hindu (Madras)*, the *Indian Express* and *the Patriot* – and four American newspapers – the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, the *Los Angeles Times* and *The Christian Science Monitor* – together published 177,265 words about the Belgrade Conference in a period which covered seven pre-summit days, the actual duration of the summit and seven post-summit days. Subsequent summits did not achieve such an enormous level of coverage, but the numbers still ranged between 92,259 words during the Lusaka summit and 154,288 words during the Havana summit.[78] During the 1980s and 1990s, media coverage decreased, but nevertheless, the

summits still attracted attention in the mass media. During the seventh non-aligned summit in New Delhi, 4.1 million copies of speeches, resolutions and other information materials were distributed, reporters of 297 foreign broadcasting agencies transmitted 11,515 minutes to 44 countries, and TV stations of about 50 countries made broadcasts.[79] The numbers of the Delhi summit also convincingly demonstrated the importance of the meetings for the domestic policy of the host country. The four Indian newspapers alone covered the Delhi summit with 624,633 words.[80]

This enormous media coverage and the attention it generated made the conferences and the conference messages important for political actors. The non-aligned summits were an event where new elites from Asian and African countries attained representation and were integrated into the world community as legitimate governments. Furthermore, the participants could demonstrate to their own populations that they were accepted as legitimate governments in an international environment. The national press often focused particularly on this point.[81] The summits also provided a space for the creation and manifestation of new group identities among postcolonial elites under headings such as 'Third World', 'Developing Countries' or in this case 'Non-Alignment'.[82] At the same time, the conferences influenced social movements, NGOs and left-wing parties which expected conference support for political and social change.[83] Finally, according to Jan Eckel, power in international relations was among other things a question of prestige.[84] From the very beginning, the international press and the foreign service in Germany, Great Britain and the United States, for example, had observers at non-aligned summits. Their policy towards non-aligned countries took into account the criticisms voiced at the various meetings because these threatened to undermine the legitimacy of their policies. In their view, publicized denunciations, aimed at influencing 'world opinion', could damage their authority and be a liability in an intensive ideological struggle during the Cold War. For this reason governments tried to avoid this public criticism, either by making concessions to the main conference allowance or by influencing the proceedings and how things were reported.[85]

In short, non-aligned policies and non-aligned summits mattered. They affected the legitimacy of politicians, governments and politics. In this sense, the symbolic struggles within the non-aligned summits before the eyes of an imagined world opinion did have manifest consequences for world politics.

To conclude, I would like to situate the non-aligned summits within the broader history of decolonization. The intentions of the conference organizers in seizing the headlines in the world press, the invitations to journalists, the provision of technical and organizational assistance, the assorted actions, symbols and speeches, and the worldwide reporting all point to the deep significance of non-aligned summits as media events. For a few weeks, governments of politically and economically weak states could, first and foremost, make themselves heard and seen in international politics. This function continues to be one of the few points on which all non-aligned countries agree, as evidenced by the fact that this loose supranational coalition of non-aligned states was able to celebrate its

fiftieth anniversary in 2011. Second, the non-aligned summits convincingly confirm Raymond F. Betts' assumption that decolonization was as much a symbolic and verbal contest as a set of physical struggles, set as frequently in a conference hall in a major city as on battleground in the countryside.[86]

Notes

1 Empirical research for this chapter was done in the National Archives, Kew [hereafter TNA], the National Archives and Records Administration, Washington [hereafter NARA], the United Nations Archives and Record Management Section, New York [hereafter UNA], the Arhiv Jugoslavije Belgrade [hereafter AJ] and the Politische Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes Berlin [hereafter PAAA]. PAAA, B 11 639, Letter from the Embassy of the German Federal Republic in Jakarta to the German Foreign Service in Berlin, 5 December 1955.

2 See K. S. Tassin, ' "Lift up your Head, my Brother": Nationalism and the Genesis of the Non-Aligned Movement', *Journal of Third World Studies* 23 (1), 2006; P. Willets, *The Non-Aligned Movement: The Origins of a Third World Alliance*, London and New York: Frances Pinter, 1978; V. Matthies, *Die Blockfreien: Ursprünge, Entwicklung, Konzeptionen*, Opladen: Leske+Budrich, 1985; L. Mates, *Es begann in Belgrad: Zwanzig Jahre Blockfreiheit*, Percha am Starnberger See: R. S. Schulz, 1982; A. W. Singham and S. Hune, *Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments*, Westport: Lawrence Hill, 1986; R. L. Jackson, *The Non-Aligned, the UN, and the Superpowers*, New York: Praeger, 1986.

3 See F. Bösch, *Mediengeschichte: Vom asiatischen Buchdruck zum Fernsehen*, Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2011; K. Arnold, C. Classen, S. Kinnebrock, E. Lersch and H.-U. Wagner (eds), *Von der Politisierung der Medien zur Medialisierung des Politischen? Zum Verhältnis von Medien, Öffentlichkeiten und Politik im 20. Jahrhundert*, Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 2010; U. Daniel and A. Schildt (eds), *Massenmedien im Europa des 20. Jahrhunderts*, Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 2010.

4 See J. Paulmann, *Pomp und Politik: Monarchenbegegnungen in Europa zwischen Ancien Régime und Erstem Weltkrieg*, Paderborn, Munich, Vienna and Zurich: Schöningh, 2000; J. Paulmann, *Auswärtige Repräsentationen: Deutsche Kulturdiplomatie nach 1945*, Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 2005; K. Osgood, *Total Cold War: Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad*, Lawrence KS: University of Kansas Press, 2006.

5 See F. Bösch and D. Geppert (eds), *Journalists as Political Actors: Transfers and Interactions between Britain and Germany since the late 19th Century*, Augsburg: Wißner-Verlag, 2008.

6 See E. Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007; M. Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post–Cold War Era*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.

7 See Liga gegen Imperialismus und für nationale Unabhängigkeit, *Das Flammenzeichen vom Palais Egmont: Offizielles Protokoll des Kongresses gegen koloniale Unterdrückung und Imperialismus Brüssel, 10.-15. Februar 1927*, Berlin: Neuer Deutscher Verlag, 1927, p. 228.

8 S. Gopal (ed.), *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru: 1889–1964*, New Delhi, 1972, reprinted 1980, pp. 286f.

9 India, House of the People, Lok Sabha Debates, vol. II, no. 30, 31.3.195, New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat, p. 3889.

10 Ibid., pp. 3888f.

11 J. Mackie, *Bandung 1955: Non-Alignment and Afro-Asian Solidarity*, Singapore: Editions Didier Millet, 2005, p. 54.
12 S. Vujović (ed.), *The Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, Belgrade, 1–6 September 1961*, Belgrade: Jugoslavija 1961, p. 71.
13 NARA, RG 59, Box 1829, Folder Neutralism 9–1–1964, Letter from the American Embassy in Port of Spain, 10 September 1964.
14 Vujović, *Conference of Heads of State*, p. 41.
15 See D. Ingram, 'Mugabe: Breathing New Life into NAM', *Daily News* (Harare), 13 September 1986.
16 See R. Wright (ed.), *Black Power: Three Books from Exile: Black Power; The Color Curtain; and White Man, Listen! Richard Wright with an Introduction by Cornel West*, New York, 2008, pp. 437–40, 494–502; *New York Times*, 10 August 1973.
17 P. Hofmann, 'Conference is a Triumph for Tito and a Paradise for Cameramen', *New York Times*, 2 September 1961.
18 See AJ, KPR, I-4-a, 1–2. Box 201, summary of registered journalists, August 1961.
19 See PAAA, B 12 894, p. 103, Press-Release Nr. 16, p. 2.
20 For example, 1,262 journalists attended the Algiers summit (1973); see TNA, FCO 93/8, Report 'Forth Non-Aligned Summit Conference in Algiers', 1 October 1973. About 600 foreign correspondents attended the Colombo summit (1976); see PAAA, Zwischenarchiv, 102081, Conference-Report, 1 September 1976. 1,733 journalists and about 400 camera operators attended the New Delhi summit (1983); see *Reports on the Activities of various Ministries/Departments: Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries New Delhi – March 1983*, New Delhi, 1984, pp. 29, 56. About 2,500 journalists attended the Belgrade summit (1989); see UNA, S-1024–0177–03, Report: The Non-Aligned Summit, New Orientation and Possible Implications, 2 October 1989.
21 See W. M. Karunadasa, *Sri Lanka and Non-Alignment: A Study of Foreign Policy from 1948 to 1982*, Dehiwala: Image Lanka Publ., 1997, p. 310f.; *Reports on the Activities of various Ministries/Departments*.
22 See PAAA, Zwischenarchiv 101261, Report of the German Embassy in Colombo: Non-Aligned Summit in Colombo, 20 October 1975.
23 See AJ, KPR, I-4-a, 1–2, Box 201, Report 'Izveštaj o izvršenim primemama za rad Beogradske konferencija', 25 August 1961; PAAA, Zwischenarchiv 101261, Report of the German Embassy in Colombo: Non-Aligned Summit in Colombo, 20 October 1975.
24 See Information Department, *The Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries (Cairo, 5th October 1964)*, Cairo, 1964, p. 5.
25 See UNA, S-0502–0005–19, Belgrade prepares for Summit Meeting, 10 July 1961.
26 See *Reports on the Activities of various Ministries/Departments*, p. 5.
27 See PAAA, Zwischenarchiv 103080, Asia Features Report, 24 March 1976; UNA, S-0913–0019–03, Agreement between Cuba and the UN, 18 April 1979.
28 See J. Dinkel, 'Dekolonisierung und Weltnachrichtenordnung: Der Nachrichtenpool bündnisfreier Staaten (1976–1992)', in F. Bösch and P. Hoeres (ed.), *Aussenpolitik im Medienzeitalter: Vom späten 19. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart*, Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2013, pp. 211–31.
29 See Vujović, *Conference of Heads of State*, pp. 352f.
30 See PAAA, B 12 933a, Press Release TANJUG 3 September 1961; '"Bright" Opening to Summit', *Times of India*, 15 August 1976; *Reports on the Activities of various Ministries/Departments*, pp. 2ff.
31 See O. Jankowitsch, K. P. Sauvant and J. Weber (eds), *The Third World without Superpowers*, Dobbs Ferry NY: Oceana Publ., 1978.
32 G. Janson, 'Will they Guard the Ramparts?', *The Illustrated Weekly of India* 104, no. 9, 1983, p. 9.

33 Ibid.; AJ, KPR, I-4-a, 9, Box 208, Conference Report Josip Djerdja, 10 September 1970.
34 See NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Subject Numeric Files, 1970–73, Political and Defense, Pol 8 9/10/70 to Pol 11/1/70, Box 1967, Folder Pol 8 9/11/70, American Embassy in Lusaka to State Department, 12 September 1970.
35 See ' "Bright" opening to Summit'; generally on this point see S. Derix, *Bebilderte Politik: Staatsbesuche in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949–1990*, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2009.
36 M. Nyagumbo, 'Ansprache von M. Nyagumbo (amtierender Politischer Kommissar des Politbüros der ZANU/PF) am 28.8.1986', in G. Baumhögger and K. Hemstedt (eds), *Die Gipfelkonferenz der Blockfreien (Harare 1986)*, Hamburg, 1987, p. 126.
37 See PAAA, B 12 895, Conference de Belgrade, no. 2, Belgrade 1961, p. 16 ' "Bright" opening to Summit'; *Reports on the Activities of various Ministries/Departments*, p. 77.
38 See PAAA, B 36, Bd. 91, Planning Memorandum, 31 July 1964; PAAA, B 36, Bd. 62, Conference Report, 25 September 1964; PAAA, AV Neues Amt 11.617, Letter to the Ambassador Karl-Heinz Wever 2 July 1970.
39 See AJ, KPR, I-4-a, 1–2, Box 1–2, Reports from 7 July 1961 and 18 July 1961; Mackie, 'Bandung 1955', p. 24.
40 See PAAA, Zwischenarchiv 103080, Report from Dr. Schattenmann, 1 September 1976; PAAA, MfAA, C 510/72, pp. 23, 42, Report, 23 July 1970 and 20 August 1970; K. Ampiah, *The Political and Moral Imperatives of the Bandung Conference of 1955: The Reactions of the US, UK and Japan*, Kent: Global Oriental, 2007; Jackson, *The Non-Aligned*, pp. 81f.
41 See Singham and Hune, 'Non-Alignment', pp. 15–19.
42 See Vujović, *The Conference of Heads of State*, pp. 25, 30, 44, 51, 53, 77, 92.
43 See AJ, KPR, I-4-a, 1–2, Box 201, Proposals for Messages.
44 See NARA, 263.1672, Belgrade 1961; NARA, RG 59, Entry A1 5440, Box 1, F Non-Aligned Conference – 1973 FBIS Reports, pp. 61, 116.
45 Vujović, *The Conference of Heads of State*, p. 252.
46 Indira Gandhi, *Address by Shrimati Indira Gandhi Prime Minister of India at the Inaugural Session of the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, New Delhi, 7 March 1983*, Delhi, 1983, p. 9.
47 See Tassin, ' "Lift up your Head, my Brother" '.
48 See J. Eckel, 'Human Rights and Decolonization: New Perspectives and Open Questions', *Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarism and Development* 1 (1), 2010, p. 115.
49 See Vujović, *The Conference of Heads of State*, p. 346.
50 Jankowitsch, Sauvant and Weber (eds), *The Third World without Superpowers*, vol. 2, p. 881.
51 See 'Une minute de silence à la mémoire des victimes de Soweto', *El Moudjahid* (Algiers), 5 September 1986.
52 See 'Comment: The Real Achievements', *The Financial Gazette* (Harare), 12 September 1986.
53 See PAAA, B 12 893a, Tanjug, 5 September 1961.
54 See UNA, S-0972–0002–04, Letter from Ismat T. Kittani to Secretary-General, 16 August 1972.
55 See K. Fritsche, 'Ergebnisse der achten Gipfelkonferenz der Blockfreien in Harare', in G. Baumhögger and A. Hemstedt (eds), *Die Gipfelkonferenz der Blockfreien (Harare 1986)*, Hamburg, 1987, pp. 8ff., 210.
56 See O. Jankowitsch and K. P. Sauvant, 'The Evolution of the Non-Aligned Movement into a Pressure Group for the Establishment of the New International Economic Order: Prepared for delivery at the XVII Annual Convention of the International Studies association, Toronto, 25–29 February 1976'.

57 See Jankowitsch *et al*. (eds), *The Third World without Superpowers*, vol. 1, pp. 214, 227.
58 See Matthies, *Die Blockfreien*, p. 63.
59 See Fritsche, 'Ergebnisse', pp. 8ff., 210.
60 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Indonesia (ed.), *Asia-Africa Speaks from Bandung*, Jakarta, 1955.
61 See Vujović, *The Conference of Heads of State*, p. 355.
62 See P. Willets, *The Non-Aligned in Havana: Documents of the Sixth Summit Conference and an Analysis of their Significance for the Global Political System*, London: Frances Pinter, 1981, p. 4.
63 See *Addresses Delivered At The Sixth Conference Of Heads Of State Or Government Of Non-Aligned Countries: Havana, 3–9 September 1979*, Havana, 1980, pp. 4, 344, 352, 465.
64 See emblem of the fifth non-aligned summit (Figure 9.1), *Daily Mirror*, 4 June 1976.
65 See PAAA, AV Neues Amt 11.617, German Embassy Lusaka to Bundespresseamt, 21 August 1970; PAAA, Zwischenarchiv 113970, Report: Non-Aligned Summit Georgetown, 2 August 1972; PAAA, Zwischenarchiv 102081, Conference-Report, 1 September 1976.
66 See *Borba*, 5 September 1961; 'Cheap Criticism', *The Sunday Mail* (Harare), 7 September 1986; 'West Uneasy after Colombo Meet', *Indian Express*, 25 August 1976.
67 See 'Deux journalistes sud-africains priés de quitter Hararé', *Fraternité Matin* (Abidjan), 2 September 1986.
68 See PAAA, AV Neues Amt 11.617, Letter Wever to Auswärtige Amt, 8 September 1970; 'Zambia frees eight newsmen', *Guardian*, 9 September 1970. Stanley Meisler, 'Zambia Jails Newsman it Welcomed for Summit', *Washington Post*, 6 September 1970; 'Korrespondenten in Sambia verhaftet: Deutscher Journalist wieder freigelassen – Visabehörden haben versagt', *FAZ*, 9 September 1970.
69 See *Reports on the Activities of various Ministries/Departments*, p. 55. During the Seventh Summit in New Delhi the organizers transcribed 22 press briefings and 16 press conferences.
70 See J. K. Nyerere, 'Non-Alignment in the 1970s: Opening Address given on Monday, 13th April, 1970 by Julius K. Nyerere, President of the United Republic of Tanzania; Preparatory Meeting of the Non-Aligned Countries, Dar es Salaam, 13th–17th April, 1970'.
71 *Reports on the Activities of various Ministries/Departments*, pp. 30, 57f.; in Delhi in 1983 nearly 40,000 prints of 258 selected negatives were released by the Photo Unit during the Summit, as well as three Documentations.
72 See PAAA, B 12 895, Conference de Belgrade, Nr. 2, Belgrade 1961, p. 16.
73 See *New York Times*, 5 September 1961.
74 See TNA, FO 371/176646, Conference Report, 16 October 1964; PAAA, AV Neues Amt 11.617, Letter Wever to Auswärtige Amt, 8 September 1970; Baumhögger and Hemstedt (eds), *Die Gipfelkonferenz der Blockfreien*.
75 See PAAA, MfAA, A 9623, Report 27 January 1955; PAAA, B 11, Bd. 638, Letter from H. Allardt, 26 January 1955; Ampiah, *Political and Moral Imperatives*.
76 See PAAA, B 12 893 a, Memorandum of Konrad Adenauer; AA, B 36, Bd. 91, Planning Memorandum, 31 July 1964; PAAA, B 36, Bd. 62, Conference Report, 25 September 1964; PAAA, AV Neues Amt 11.617, Letter to Ambassador Karl-Heinz Wever, 2 July 1970; PAAA, AV Neues Amt 11.617, Letter Bundespresseamt to Embassy in Lusaka, 17 August 1970.
77 TNA, FCO 58/983, Memorandum: Non-Aligned Conference: Modus Operandi – How to attend a Conference without being a Delegate, 20 December 1976.
78 See Regina Mulay, *Mass Media, International Relations and Non-Alignment*, New Dehli, 1987, pp. 40f., 387.

79 See *Reports on the Activities of various Ministries/Departments*.
80 See Mulay, *Mass Media*, p. 387.
81 See AA, Zwischenarchiv 103080, Press Review, 20 August 1976.
82 Generally on this point see D. Maul, *Human Rights, Development and Decolonization: The International Labour Organization 1940–1970*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, pp. 7–11.
83 See A. Bakočević, 'Political Parties and Movements and the Policy and Movements of Non-Alignment', in Institute of International Politics and Economics and Review of International Affairs (ed.), *Non-Alignment in the Eighties: International Round table, Petrovaradin, Yugoslavia 28–31 August 1981*, Belgrade, 1982; C. Olejniczak, *Die Dritte-Welt-Bewegung in Deutschland: Konzeptionelle und organisatorische Strukturmerkmale einer neuen sozialen Bewegung*, Wiesbaden: Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag, 1999.
84 See Eckel, 'Human Rights and Decolonization', p. 126.
85 See NARA, RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Entry A1 1587-M, Box 50, Folder Belgrade Conference 1961, Memorandum: 'Pros and Cons of a Message from President Kennedy', 25 August 1961; PAAA, B 12 893a, Conference-Report, 27 September 1961; UNA, S-0502–0005–19, Nonaligned States called Third Bloc, 12 August 1961; TNA, FO 371/16684, Report: 'Neutralism: The Role of the Uncommited Nations in the Cold War', 30 January 1961; FCO 49/836, Planning Paper, 2 February 1979; FCO, 49/837, 'The Non-Aligned Movement' July 1979; Ampiah, *Political and Moral Imperatives*; A. Lane, 'Third World Neutralism and British Cold War Strategy, 1960–62', *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 14 (3), 2003.
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