

Pakistan Agriculture Extension History By Mr. Allah Dad Khan Visiting Professor Agriculture Extension Education and Communication AUP

<p>The Village Cooperative Movement 1950</p>	<p>Cooperative movement started in the early 50s under the aegis of the Cooperative Department. It proposes that all farmers in every village be united under the umbrella of the village cooperative societies, choose their own management committees, and find the means of their development on a cooperative basis. The primary thrust of this movement is to educate member farmers about new technologies and to arrange farm-input delivery on soft-term credit. However, the experience suggests that the cooperative movement has not been able to achieve a consistent success. Some places where local leadership and cooperative department staff have been sincere and effective, it has achieved good results. It has proven a good source of farm input supply and technology transfer to the small farmers at village level.</p>
	<p>It came on scene in 1959 it was designed to bring the elements of community development and p development together, especially at the local level. The government administrative and developn were organized into five levels. The lowest tier was a union council, a group of villages comprisi village councilors. On an average, such a union council covered a population of 8,000. The coun out social and economic development work in their respective areas. The problems that the union tried to solve were related to education, infrastructure, agriculture and sanitation. The BDs went in developing awareness and local leadership among the rural masses but the change in the Gove 1970 saw the abolition of the BDS and the introduction of a new rural development approach - t Rural Development Program (IRDPA).</p>
<p>Village-AID programme 1953-62</p>	<p>The Village Agricultural and Industrial Development Program (Village-AID) 1953-1962 The Village-AID program began in Pakistan in 1952, a little after independence, with substantial USAID and Ford Foundation. This program sought to bring about all-round development of the through organizing village councils, building roads, digging wells, construc ting schools, and dis improved agricultural technology. This program achieved a good deal of success in the beginnin became a victim of departmental jealousies and political change in the country. With the aboliio Village-AID program in 1961, rural development became a part of the Basic Democracies Syste</p> <p>The idea of "community development" - development through community based village organ on popular participation - was much in vogue in the early 1950s, and was introduced in India as between the local (elected) councils and government departments. In Pakistan, after the visit of a Pakistani government officials to the United States to study the rural extension work in 1951, it to adapt the American extension model to the conditions in Pakistan with the financial assistance from the United States. It was suggested that Pakistan needed an organized effort t various needs of the villagers; to identify things that villagers needed, and to bring the dif building government departments together to meet the needs. All of these ideas were packa Village Agricultural and Industrial development (V-AID) Program in 1953. The officially stated</p>

	<p>the V-AID Program were to:</p> <p>Increase the output of agriculture and village industries for higher rural incomes. Provide more health care centers, and other social and recreational facilities. The V-AID organization was placed under the control of appointed government officials, as Development Officers, Supervisors, and Specialists, who were to direct and supervise the work of the front-line Village AID workers. In each district villages were organized into Development Areas to be administered by a Development Officer. The Development Officer was supported by Supervisors and Specialists drawn from different provincial departments (Agriculture, Horticulture, Husbandry, Health and Education) to assist the villagers to do their self-help work. The activities of the Program were;</p> <p>Improvement in crop and livestock production. Building roads, bridges, culverts, schools, and drains. Planting trees. And removing health hazards.</p> <p>The village councils were appointed and not elected by the villagers. The most important link between the government organization and villagers in each Development Area was the Village AID worker, a multipurpose extension agent trained for one year in a government V-AID training institute. Each Village AID worker was expected to supervise 5-7 villages, or there were about 30 Village-AID workers in each Development Area. The Village-AID worker was supposed to act as a guide, philosopher and friend to the villagers and his functions included education, organization, motivation, formation of all-weather village councils, modernization of agriculture, improvement in health facilities, building roads, bridges, and drains, arranging marketing and generating self-help.</p>
<p>Rural Works Programme 1963-73</p>	<p>Rural Works Programme 1963-1973</p> <p>The Rural Works Programme (RWP) had its origins in a pilot project for community development undertaken by the late Akhter Hameed Khan as Director of the Pakistan Academy for Rural Development (PARAD) in Comilla (now in Bangladesh). He experimented with a pilot project in which government officials completed capital works, link roads, subsoil drainage channels, etc. to promote agricultural growth and provide rural employment. The basic purpose of the project in Comilla was to assess the capability of the village people, basic democracies, and government officials to undertake sizable development programs in their respective areas. Another purpose was the working out of the procedure for implementation and maintenance of the projects. By the middle of 1961, the pilot project had demonstrated that the basic democracies institutions and government officials were capable of executing the program. The officially announced objectives of the RWP were to: Provide increased employment in rural areas on local projects not requiring large investments; Ensure that benefits can be easily recognized by the workers.</p> <p>Create infrastructure such as roads, bridges, irrigation channels, etc. in rural areas.</p> <p>Create an effective nucleus of planning and development at the local (Union Council) level to reach the increasing segment of the population in the development effort.</p> <p>Mobilize human and financial resources for the implementation of local projects through</p>

	voluntary labor. .
Local Government & Rural Development Department (LG&RDD), 1978-1979	<p>Local Government & Rural Development Department (LG&RDD), 1978</p> <p>In 1978-79 Local Government and Rural Development Department was established by integrating Peoples Works Program and Integrated Rural Development Program. Since 1978, Local Government and Rural Development Department is working for socio-economic uplift of rural population (88%) of Jammu & Kashmir. Besides the Annual Development Program, LG&RDD is also working as a department for implantation of many projects funded by international agencies/donors, such as IDA, UNICEF, FAO, Asian Development Bank etc.) for socio-economic uplift of rural population by providing basic facilities and rural infrastructure. LG&RDD is responsible for:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> To prepare and implement development programs for rural areas. To uplift socio-economic condition of rural masses. To implement Annual Development Program donor assisted projects as agreed by Government of Jammu & Kashmir. To promote and utilize local resources. To mobilize and organize rural masses for participatory rural development.
Peoples Works Programme 1972-1983	In 1972, the initiative was renamed the Peoples Works Programme and placed under the Federal Ministry of Finance and Planning, where it remained until 1983. Prior to 1972, the Peoples Works Programme, which was concurrent with the Integrated Rural Development Programme (1972-80), included road construction, school buildings, small irrigation dams, drinking water facilities and other physical infrastructure, although in many cases, other necessary inputs and services were not provided.
Integrated Rural Development	<p>iv. Integrated Rural Development Program (IRDP)</p> <p>In early 1970, once again due to the change of political scenario and the problems with the previous development strategies, the government decided to try a new development approach - - the IRDP. The Development of agriculture was the central force behind this program. Moreover, the IRDP was a subsidiary of the Agriculture Department, its leadership was heavily drawn from the agricultural graduates and all frontline workers recruited to run this program were agricultural graduates. On the other hand, the Government Department controlled rural development funds. This dichotomy in modus operandi resulted in ample tension between the two agencies, but also created frustration among the workers of the newly launched program. The IRDP staff, using their professional skills, started a campaign to increase agricultural productivity, which had a tremendous impact on crop yields. One of the principal objectives was to integrate the functioning of various line departments and facilitate farm service delivery to farmers at one point. This coordinating role could not be accomplished successfully for hard departmental reasons. Subsequently, in 1978, the IRDP was subsumed into the Local government Department and turned into a routine bureaucratic agency.</p>
Inputs at farmers doorsteps approach	In an effort to improve agricultural productivity during the latter years of the IRDP, the government employed extension personnel to deliver agricultural inputs such as improved seed, fertilizer, and pesticide to farmers. The government provided substantial subsidies to the farmers in an effort to encourage the use of inputs deemed essential for increasing agricultural production (Government of Punjab, n.d.). The extension personnel succeeded in popularising the use of agricultural inputs,

	<p>resulting in a significant increase in agricultural production (Axinn and Thorat, 1972). Thus, ‘For first time crop production [grew] about 6 or more per cent per year, which is a very, very high rate’ (Gustav, n.d.: 6). Although there was an increase in agricultural production, this approach nevertheless had the unintended consequence of turning extension workers from agents of change into sellers of agricultural inputs (Government of Punjab, n.d.), and the highly specific assignment left them little time to carry out educational programmes for the farmers. The approach proved costly and ultimately paved the way for the privatization of agricultural inputs and phasing out of subsidies borne by the Government (Government of Punjab, n.d.)</p> <p>The Inputs at Farmers’ Doorsteps approach was replaced in 1978 with a new system of extension called the Training and Visit system. In summary, the early agricultural programmes in Pakistan sought to stimulate agricultural production yet failed to bring about any substantive change due to, rigid centralisation, excessive departmentalisation, and, of course, the self-serving and manipulation played by many politicians (Hussain n.d.). On the other hand, there was a positive lesson from these efforts – the need to de-politicise the task of developing agriculture. Thus, agricultural extension was separated from the notion of ‘community development’ while the work of input marketing was left to the private sector, leaving the Department of Agriculture (extension wing) free to concentrate on the delivery of extension services to the farmers. The implementation of the government’s most recent extension strategy, the Training and Visit system, marked an effort to reform and improve the effectiveness of extension services in Pakistan, but it met with limited success. Faced with continued difficulties in improving agricultural productivity due to budget constraints, the government has actively encouraged the participation of the private sector in the provision of agricultural services and extension.</p>
	<p>T and V System</p> <p>The T and V system followed the Village-AID programme and the Inputs at the Farmers’ Doorstep Approach and was implemented in two stages with financial assistance from the World Bank. According to Benor, Harrison and Baxter (1984: 9), T and V is:</p> <p>A professional system of extension based on frequently updated training of extension workers and regular field visits...provides an organisational structure and detailed mode of operation that ensures that extension agents visit farmers regularly and transmit messages relevant to production needs; problems faced by farmers are quickly fed back to specialists and research for solution or further investigation.</p> <p>T and V provides for a two-step flow of information – from contact farmers to the farming community (Van Den Ban and Hawkins, 1996; Blackenburg, 1984). Within the T and V system, field extension personnel are relieved of non-extension duties such as selling seeds, pesticides and other agricultural inputs. This enables them to concentrate their efforts on informing and educating the farmer about best farming practices, from</p>

	<p>crop husbandry to plant protection. Of course, in Pakistan the shift away from the public provision of inputs such as pesticides was also influenced by modifications of the Import-Substitution policy, financial constraints, and market reforms. Now, for example,</p>
	<p>T and V System</p> <p>The T and V system followed the Village-AID programme and the Inputs at the Farmers' Doorstep Approach and was implemented in two stages with financial assistance from the World Bank. According to Benor, Harrison and Baxter (1984: 9), T and V is:</p> <p>A professional system of extension based on frequently updated training of extension workers and regular field visits...provides an organisational structure and detailed mode of operation that ensures that extension agents visit farmers regularly and transmit messages relevant to production needs; problems faced by farmers are quickly fed back to specialists and research for solution or further investigation.</p> <p>T and V provides for a two-step flow of information – from contact farmers to the farming community (Van Den Ban and Hawkins, 1996; Blackenburg, 1984). Within the T and V system, field extension personnel are relieved of non-extension duties such as selling seeds, pesticides and other agricultural inputs. This enables them to concentrate their efforts on informing and educating the farmer about best farming practices, from crop husbandry to plant protection. Of course, in Pakistan the shift away from the public provision of inputs such as pesticides was also influenced by modifications of the Import-Substitution policy, financial constraints, and market reforms. Now, for example, about 20 agrochemical companies have developed their own pesticide formulation facilities, mostly with technical assistance from their foreign principals. Imports of pesticides have increased 57% from 1990 to 1996, while imports of the active ingredients of these chemicals with the introduction of local 'generic' brands rose 23% (Saarcnet, 2000).</p>
	<p>Working of T and V System in Pakistan</p> <p>According to the Government of Punjab (1987: 2), the aim of agricultural extension is 'achieving improvement in agricultural production through better coordination [and] education of the farming community to adopt the latest technology'. The following comprise the primary objectives of the T and V system (Government of Punjab,</p>

	<p>1987: 3–4):</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. establish demonstration plots in each Union Council by each Field Assistant (FA) (under the supervision of the AO or Agricultural Officer) in each cropping season (rabi and kharif) to demonstrate the latest technologies; 2. improve the mobility of the extension staff by providing bicycles for FAs, motorcycles for AOs, and four-wheel drive vehicles for upper-level supervisory staff; and, 3. strengthen the in-service and on-the-job training for FAs. <p>The farm families in the jurisdiction of an extension worker (FA) are divided into eight groups of about equal size with approximately 10% of each group selected as contact farmers (Government of Punjab, 1987). For example, if the total number of farm families in an extension worker's territory is 640, these will be divided into eight groups of equal size with 80 farm families in each group. Eight farmers (10% of each group) constitute that FA's contact farmers. However, there is no hard and fast rule determining the number of contact farmers. This depends, among other things, on a worker's mobility, the density of population in the area, the types and diversity of crops, the types of farming systems, etc. On average, the number of contact farmers in a group varies from eight to ten. Extension workers are obliged to pay eight visits to contact farmers during a fortnight; two days each are fixed for training and extra visits or office work. In addition to providing technical advice and information to contact farmers, the FAs and AOs organise and present group activities such as Farmers' Day exhibitions and demonstration fields. Theoretically, the programme appears sound but still it does not yield the desired results.</p>
	<p>Credibility of public sector extension in Pakistan</p> <p>The T and V system replaced conventional extension in an effort to improve and enhance the performance of public sector extension (Government of Punjab, n.d.; Ahmad, Davidson and Ali, 2000). Unfortunately, the T and V system also failed to yield the expected results (Khan, Sharif and Sarwar, 1984; Ahmad, 1999). Instead, it further exacerbated the hierarchical tendencies of centralised management and top-down planning (Antholt, 1994). Moreover, T and V placed more emphasis on operational procedure than in getting</p>

message across to farmers (Van Den Ban and Hawkins, 1996). Nayman (1990: 72) reported that: In Pakistan, bureaucrats appreciated T and V, because the pattern of internal communication in the Department of Agriculture is asymmetrical (geared to control rather than to create understanding) and top to bottom. The public sector's T and V system was predicated on the central premise of contact farmers conveying information received from extension agents to neighbouring farmers (Ruttan, 1996). When this was put into practice, however, it soon became apparent that the selection of contact farmers was biased toward the large resource-rich farmers, those better positioned to adopt new technologies (Sofranko, Khan and Morgan, 1988; Ahmad, 1999). In fact, Rolling (1982), promoting the cause of small farmers, argued that, at least initially, the local landed elite of the past simply became the contact farmers of T and V. Like its predecessors, T and V has been plagued by poor performance. Khan, Sharif and Sarwar (1984) reported that T and V failed to create any lasting improvements in agricultural production. According to a study conducted by Ahmad (1992) on the effectiveness of the public sector in the Punjab's Lahore District (the central headquarters of extension), nearly 85% of the farmers had little faith in the work of public agricultural extension. Of greater concern was the fact that 80% of farmers were not even acquainted with the Agricultural Officers of their area. With the National Commission on Agriculture's conclusion that 'extension services have not improved in quality over the years and despite heavy expenditures, the benefits to the farmers have been minimal' (Government of Pakistan, 1988), the government recommended the involvement of the private sector in agricultural extension. Given the overall lack of success of the T and V system in diffusing agricultural information to farmers throughout Pakistan, the Ministry of Agriculture changed its extension strategies in 1999. While not abandoning the T and V system per se, it modified it significantly. No longer are contact farmers used as the information conduit in the extension system. Instead of focusing on individual farmers, the public sector now deploys its agents to organise group meetings as its preferred method for disseminating information, reasoning that

	<p>group meetings attract and reach more farmers who can in turn function as ‘contact farmers’. While this is certainly an important first step in refashioning extension activities, it still does not ensure that those in need of information and assistance receive it.</p>
<p>The emergence of private sector extension in Pakistan</p>	<p>Although involved in extension activities since the 1980s, the private corporate sector – national and multinational agricultural input supply agencies – is now entrusted with the responsibility of supplying agricultural inputs to farmers (Government of Punjab, n.d.). According to the National Commission on Agriculture, the transition from subsistence to commercial agricultural in Pakistan will only be possible with the active participation of the private corporate sector (Government of Pakistan, 1988). Furthermore, the Commission adamantly encouraged the participation of the private sector in the process of agricultural development by making recommendations to the Government such as:</p> <p>The traditional role of the private corporate sector in providing material agricultural inputs and services needs to be strengthened and expanded to cover newly emerging needs such as specialised cultivation operations, spraying, and harvesting and to provide total package services rather than single inputs (Government of Pakistan, 1988: 423).</p> <p>In light of the recommendations forwarded by the Commission, international agricultural input supply agencies such as Novartis (better known as Ciba, the name used throughout this paper), Bayer, Hoechst and Huntsman began taking part in extension work as well as selling agricultural inputs. Currently, Ciba provides farmers with a total package of plant protection and has recently become the leading international agrochemical firm in Pakistan with 22% of the pesticide market (local ‘generic’ companies claim to control 60%).</p> <p>The opening up of agricultural extension has had major impacts in Pakistan, not the least of which is the dismantling of the Government monopoly on delivering services and extension to farmers. Public is now just one among many service and extension providers. In the push towards privatisation, not only have private business firms such as Ciba entered into extension, but also a multitude of NGOs (e.g., Agha Khan Rural Support Programme, National Rural Support Scheme, and Punjab Rural Support Scheme), and farmers’ cooperatives (e.g., Saltland Water Users Association).</p> <p>While providing farmers with an array of choice and services, there is a very real danger of information</p>

	<p>overload and conflicting advice, as there is little or no coordination between the various deliverers of extension.</p>
Private Extension services	<p><i>Emergence of private sector in agricultural extension</i></p> <p>Until recently, the role of the private sector has remained minimal, though it has been growing in recent decades. The active engagement of private sector in agricultural extension began after 1988, when the National Commission on Agriculture recommended to the government that "...the traditional role of the private corporate sector in providing material agricultural inputs and services needs to be strengthened and expanded to cover newly emerging needs such as specialised cultivation operations, spraying, and to provide total package services rather than single inputs..." (Government of Pakistan, 1988). In light of the commission's recommendations, Multinationals such as Novartis (better known as Bayer, Hoechst and Huntsman) began taking part in extension work as well as selling agricultural inputs. Currently, Ciba provides farmers with a total package of plant protection and has recently become an international agrochemical firm in Pakistan with 22% of the pesticide market (local 'generic' companies claim to control 60%). Their interest in providing extension services comes simply from their agricultural "marketing strategy" of selling the product and extension services as one package. This has brought a "vested interest" into private sector driven extension services.</p> <p>Notwithstanding, the opening up of agricultural extension has had major impacts in Pakistan, notably the dismantling of the Government monopoly on delivering services and extension to farmers. Public extension is now one among many extension and service providers, although they remain</p>
	<p><i>The Five-Point Special Development Programme (1985-88)</i></p> <p>Under the Prime Minister's Five Points Programme, 700 thousands jobs were to be created during the period which will have a market impact on the domestic un-employment situation. For creating the rural development, possibility for creating self employment opportunities based on cottage industry and small Enterprises based on On-Farm income generating activities needs to be explored and envisaged in a strategic way.</p>
	<p><i>Peoples Programme (1989-90)</i></p>
	<p><i>Tameer-e-Watan Program/People's Programme (1991-99).</i></p>
	<p><i>The Social Action Programmes (SAP) I (1992-93 to 1995-96) and II (1998-99 to 2003-04) were designed to expand access to basic services for the poor, particularly education and health services for women and girls, and improve service quality; these were intended to include involvement of NGOs, the private sector and community participation to build political consensus and ensure bureaucratic support. Delays in funding and other implementation problems hampered SAP-I, particularly federal programs for population welfare and health.1</i></p> <p><i>SAP-II had a greater focus on technical and vocational education and on improvements in the quality of service delivery. Implementation of SAP was decentralized to the provincial and district levels for the majority of relevant expenditures, consistent with the government's devolution policies formally adopted in 2001.</i></p>

	<p>Pakistan launched SAP in 1993-94. This program, which was heavily funded by the Pakistani go and international bodies like the World Bank, aimed to address a number of Pakistanis' basic nee not being met. In particular, primary education, basic health care, population welfare and rural w and sanitation. SAP covered all Pakistani government primary schools.</p> <p>Eighty percent of the program's finances were met by the government. The remaining 20 percent expected to be provided by outside agencies. Some of these major donors included the World Ba Asian Development Bank, the government of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.</p> <p>There are mixed reviews of the real success of SAP in Pakistan. In recent interviews, the SAP ou indicators have been seen as positive. Through this program, the primary school participation rat from 67 percent to 71 percent for boys and from 36 percent to 43 percent for girls. The increase spending in SAP sectors from 1.7 percent of Pakistan's GDP in 1992-93 to 2.2 percent of GDP in was a crucial factor in bringing about these achievements.</p>
	<p><i>The Khushal Pakistan Program (Pakistan Welfare Program, January 2000 to June 2002) provided Rs 36 billion during this period for small-scale public works schemes (Rs. 0.05 million to Rs. 5 million per scheme in rural areas and Rs. 0.05 million to Rs. 8 million per scheme in urban areas). The Tameer-e-Pakistan programme (TPP), a federal program begun in February 2003 which was later renamed the Khushal Pakistan Programme-I (KPP-I), initially provided Rs 5 million in 2003-04 to each Member of the National Assembly (MNA) for local development schemes. The amount per MNA has increased over time, and the total budget equaled Rs 4.42 billion in 2005-2006.</i></p>
<p>Devolution plan On 14th August 2001</p>	<p><i>In Pakistan, strengthening the functions of and empowering with more authority to the elected people representatives, the current government announced its devolution plan on August 14, 2001. According to the plan, functions of all service delivery line departments including agricultural extension were transferred from provinces to the newly elected district governments. The introduction of devolution plan is one of the efforts that government has made to introduce drastic changes and to provide bloodline to the existing setup. The plan helps in reducing the bureaucratic impediments and providing people better access to the resources in all the public service departments.</i></p> <p><i>Closer to the pattern of US county agricultural extension, under new setup each district of Pakistan is managing its agricultural extension activities where the functions of all sister organizations such as water management, fisheries, livestock, soil conservation, forestry, etc; are put under one manager called as Executive District Officer of Agriculture (EDO). The designation of Deputy Director Agriculture (DDA) has also been changed as District Officer Agriculture (DOA) who now works under the Executive District Officer Agriculture (EDO). The EDO reports to the District Coordination Officer (DCO) who is answerable to the elected District Nazim (administrator) whereas the line departments</i></p>

provide the technical backstopping and monitor the cross-district agricultural development projects. Annex-II exhibits the current District Extension Network of one of the provinces of Pakistan - - Punjab.

The provincial agriculture extension set-up in the form of Directorate General of Agriculture Extension continues to work and coordinates with the District Extension Services and provide technical support. DG Agriculture Extension retains the subjects of Agricultural Training and Information, Adaptive Research, Inservice Training, Plant Protection and Quality Control, Agricultural Planning and Statistics, and Coordination.