

# **Making a Difference: Allison's Three Models of Foreign Policy Analysis**

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## 1. Introduction:

It seems to me that understanding Foreign policy requires at least basic if not extensive knowledge on what is going on around the world. Foreign policy making is rather tedious and complex task. Its loose point in one aspect might bring huge adverse effect thereby leading the policy to a failure stage. Not all results yielded by foreign policy remain straight forward; neither has it survived without critiques. To put foreign policy in the simplest term and as a field of study, "it is the study of the process, effects, causes, or outputs of foreign policy decision-making in either a comparative or case-specific manner"<sup>1</sup>. Indeed foreign policy is the outcome of the efforts made by humans like us but those in power. "The underlying and often implicit argument theorizes that human beings, acting as a group or within a group, compose and cause change in international politics"<sup>2</sup>.

This paper revolves around Allison's three models of foreign policy analysis in his book 'Essence of Decision Making: Explaining Cuban Missile Crisis'. Not only the paper serves as explaining what these models are for, also includes the comparative study of three models. Allison offers us with three different windows to look at and analyse any foreign policy. Looking into foreign policy with these offered windows; one can get different answers to the same question. This is what I call a peculiar nature Allison has gifted to the analysts of foreign policy. Allison with this peculiar writing-contribution was "often praised for its realistic and intuitively appealing description"<sup>3</sup> by all foreign policy analysts as well as the political activists and leaders. However, scholars also criticized his model for "its complexity and lack of explanatory power"<sup>4</sup>. All models are based on different levels of analysis and we must use all three models to obtain a complete treatment of any policy case. Each model should be understood as a snapshot that captures only part of a total complex picture<sup>5</sup>.

Beginning with Allison's three models: Rational Actor Model: Model I; Organisational Behaviour Model: Model II; Governmental politics Model: Model III, and explaining what these models are, this paper steps further to explain how good or how bad these models are. In addition to this, the paper also accumulates criticisms and appreciations of these models from other scholars. With brief mentioning of the advantages and disadvantages Allison offers through these models, devotes tiny part of this paper to understand how realistic these models are. Final, but not the least, part will be

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<sup>1</sup> Retrieved from <http://www.foreignpolicyanalysis.org/> (accessed date 10/04/2011).

<sup>2</sup> Retrieved from <http://www.foreignpolicyanalysis.org/> (accessed date 10/04/2011).

<sup>3</sup> Jones C.M., 2008, p.2

<sup>4</sup> Jones C.M., 2008, p.2

<sup>5</sup> Retrieved from [http://www.psi305.cankaya.edu.tr/uploads/files/FPMModelsAllison\(1\).pdf](http://www.psi305.cankaya.edu.tr/uploads/files/FPMModelsAllison(1).pdf) (accessed date 10/04/2011).

the conclusion where I will assemble all results and outcomes to bring the whole essay together plus my own thoughts about the model.

## 2. Model I: Rational Actor Model

Rational Actor Model (RAM) is one of the first of Allison's frameworks of foreign policy analysis introduced and elaborated in *Essence* with the real reference to the Cuban Missile Crisis during 1962. When *Essence* was first published in 1971, RAM became the trademark of Allison. "The attempt to explain international events by recounting the aims and calculations of nations or governments is the trademark of the Rational Actor Model"<sup>6</sup>. Rational Actor Model oscillates between decision and choice where "decision presupposes a decider and a choice among alternatives with reference to some goal". Human beings act in rationality with certain policy concepts and as to Allison, "policy means realisation in a number of particular instances of any agent's objectives. These concepts identify phenomena as actions performed by purposeful agents. This identification involves a simple extension to the governments of the pervasive everyday assumption that what human beings do is at least 'intendedly rational'."<sup>7</sup> Not only in foreign policy analysis, Allison's this model has also been in use and formulated in other fields as Allison himself puts in: "a rigorous model of this concept of rational action has been formulated in economics, decision and game theory."<sup>8</sup>

Now, let's look at the core concepts established under this model which comprises four core concepts: *Goals & objectives*; *Alternatives*; *Consequences*; and *Choice*. *Goals and objectives* refer to "the interest and values of the agent are translated into a payoff or utility or preference function, which represents the desirability or utility of alternative sets of consequences. Ranks all possible sets of consequences in terms of her or his values and objectives - number of side effects"<sup>9</sup>.

Second core concept '*alternatives*' is explained that "the rational agent must choose among a set of alternatives displayed before her or him in a particular situation". It further takes its alternative choice for the output of the decision. However, there could be several sets of implied decisions a decision tree may give. Third core concepts being *Consequences* which further takes rational actors to consider that "to each alternative is attached a set of consequences or outcomes of choice that will ensue if that particular alternative is chosen"<sup>10</sup>. Since this model is a sort of game of selecting all possible choices, Choice is the fourth or the final concept which is neither easy to make nor a

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<sup>6</sup> Allison G. & Zelikow P. 1999; p.13

<sup>7</sup> Allison G. & Zelikow P. 1999; p.16-17

<sup>8</sup> Allison G. & Zelikow P. 1999; p.17

<sup>9</sup> Allison G. & Zelikow P. 1999; p.18

<sup>10</sup> Allison G. & Zelikow P. 1999; p.18

straightforward. The choice in this model is explained explicitly. To put an Allison's version in terms of choice-rationality, "rational choice consists simply of selecting that alternative whose consequences ranks highest in the decision maker's payoff function; value maximizing choice within special constraints<sup>11</sup>". Rationality in RAM has high value and it refers to consistent behaviour of an actor in the game. In RAM, "the assumption of rationality also provides explanatory power"<sup>12</sup>.

As explained earlier, in most cases, states' actions can be explained or predicted in terms of the objective situations it faces and passes through, combined with aforementioned four variable concepts. The bitter truth is that such rational actors may come across a vivid decision problem. It is even further clarified "a major findings of game theorists' analysts of complex choices is that they are unpredictable"<sup>13</sup>.

Explanation of RAM, Allison also introduced paradigm where he formulated four components, the first of which is 'basic units of analysis'. Which seeks to explain "governmental actions as a choice: happenings in foreign affairs are conceived as actions chosen by the nation or a national government and that "governments select the action that will maximize strategic goals and objectives"<sup>14</sup>.

Organizing concepts split into three factors: unified national actor in which 'the nation or government, conceived as a rational, unitary decision maker, is the agent'; the problem in which 'action is chosen in response to the strategic situation the actor faces- threats and opportunities arising in the international market place move the nation to act'; and action as rational choice which again includes four core concepts of the model- objectives, options, consequences and choice.

A third key component of the paradigm refers to "dominant interference pattern" where nations or representatives' performed action "must have been selected as the value maximizing means for achieving the actor's objectives"<sup>15</sup>. It spirals further with next component –'the general propositions: increased and decreased in the perceived cost' emphasizing the importance of being serious about the logic of explanation<sup>16</sup>.

Final components Allison offers is Evidence which tells us about "the details of behaviour, statements of government officials, and government papers are then marshalled in such a way that

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<sup>11</sup> Allison G. & Zelikow P. 1999; p.18

<sup>12</sup> Allison G. & Zelikow P. 1999; p.19

<sup>13</sup> Allison G. & Zelikow P. 1999; p. 23

<sup>14</sup> Allison G. & Zelikow P. 1999; p. 23

<sup>15</sup> Allison G. & Zelikow P. 1999; p.24

<sup>16</sup> Allison G. & Zelikow P. 1999; p.25

a coherent picture of the value-maximizing choice (from the view of the agent) emerges. The analyst himself puts in the place of the nation or government".<sup>17</sup>

Allison has provided us with this model a glimpse of illustrations that are "widely used in thinking about government behaviour and international relations"<sup>18</sup>. Very simple form and task of the RAM is to "link purpose and action". As Allison himself declares: "If I know an actor's objective, I have a major clue to his likely action. By observing the behaviour and considering what the actor's objective might be, when I identify an objective that is advanced effectively by the action, I have a strong hypothesis about why he did whatever he did. In this hyper-simple form, the danger of tautology is evident. Recall children's explanations of behaviour: "he did it because he wanted to". If the only evidence of what he did, the two statements are empirically equivalent"<sup>19</sup>."

Objectives, calculations, choices, threats, opportunities are the key words, weighing all pros and cons and taking up value-maximizing option regard the major formula in RAM Allison employs. This is how United States did in the Cuban Missile Crisis choosing Blockade, Ultimatum, Air Strike and Quarantine; among others: weighing all pros and cons and choosing the options that served the US's value-maximizing choice. Allison at the end of the model summarizes: "the full RAM includes not only objectives but also calculations about a situation in which the actor finds himself. This context presents threats and opportunities that the agent packages as option with pros and cons. The actor chooses the alternative that best advances his interests. Thus in explaining what an agent did or, in making bets about what he is likely to do, an analyst must consider not only the actor's objectives but also the options he identifies, the costs and benefits he estimates to follow from each option, and his readiness and reluctance to take risks"<sup>20</sup>.

### **3. Model II: Organisational Behaviour Model**

Organizational behaviour model is Allison's second of three models in Essence employed to explain the October 1962 confrontation between the United States and Soviet Union. This model explains extensively how organisation behaves and makes decision and how these decisions are implemented. In accord with this model, foreign policy is the output of organisation's behaviour.

Organisations provide us the things which we do not otherwise. Model stresses that the less it matters who you are in any organization, the better are the organizations' decisions and recommends letting the organizations perform reliably. Organizations make an individual replaceable as much as possible using its 'standard operating procedures' (SOPs). Organizations

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<sup>17</sup> Allison G. & Zelikow P. 1999; p.25

<sup>18</sup> Allison G. & Zelikow P. 1999; p.26

<sup>19</sup> Allison G. & Zelikow P. 1999; p.49

<sup>20</sup> Allison G. & Zelikow P. 1999; p.49

function in accord with their pre-established routines. Organizations and their programs and standard operating procedures do not change significantly over time and so organisations do not change dramatically and if they change, they change either due to 'budgetary fist' or 'budgetary famine' or due to 'dramatic performance failure'. The most important understanding is that the organization has its own cultures that lead it to either no change or a slow change. Furthermore, Allison advocates that organisations learn slow, change slow, act slow, and even innovations in organizations are slow. Let's recall Allison here: "But organizations do change. Learning occurs gradually, over time; Dramatic organizational change occurs in response to major disasters. Both learning and change is influenced by existing organizational capabilities and procedures"<sup>21</sup>.

Organizational behaviour model reflects constraints that organisations place on decision makers' choices. Assuming that goals and objectives are well established, the model limits choices based on standard operating procedures. Acknowledging that each organization has a charter detailing its function/mission, several programs are developed to carry out missions. The organization's performance is dependent on budget and financial funding. Any organizations' SOPs enhance efficiency and performance thereby 'satisficing rather than optimizing'<sup>22</sup>

Allison discusses about the behaviour of government and explains that "Governmental behaviour can usefully be summarized as action chosen by a unitary, rational decision maker: centrally controlled, completely informed, and value maximizing"<sup>23</sup>. Not only the behaviour of government needs coordination, "behaviour of large numbers of individual must be coordinated. Coordination requires SOPs: rules according to which things are done. It requires established programs"<sup>24</sup>.

Government is not only the leaders or political leaders or actors, as Allison puts in: "A government consists of existing organizations, each with a fixed set of SOPs and programs"<sup>25</sup>. The behaviour of these organizations- and consequently of the government- relevant to an issue in any particular instance is therefore determined primarily by routines established prior to the instance.

Allison's three basic answers to 'Why organizations? And why organize?' are worth including while explaining what this model exactly refers to.

- 1<sup>st</sup>: Organizations are collections of human beings arranged systematically for harmonious or united action.

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<sup>21</sup> Allison G. & Zelikow P. 1999;p.144

<sup>22</sup> Retrieved from [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Essence\\_of\\_Decision#The\\_.22Rational\\_Actor.22\\_Model](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Essence_of_Decision#The_.22Rational_Actor.22_Model)  
(Accessed date:2011-04-14)

<sup>23</sup> Allison G. & Zelikow P. 1999;p.143

<sup>24</sup> Allison G. & Zelikow P. 1999;p.143

<sup>25</sup> Allison G. & Zelikow P. 1999;p.145

- 2<sup>nd</sup>: organizations create capabilities for achieving humanly chosen purposes and performing tasks that would otherwise be impossible.
- 3<sup>rd</sup>: existing organizations and their programs and routines constrain behaviour<sup>26</sup>. Allison's use of an example of Chinese restaurant reveals its clarity.

Allison further explains this model using "Capsule review: Organizational behaviour paradigm"<sup>27</sup>. He proposes 'Basic units of analysis: Governmental Action as Organizational output' which illustrates that "the happenings of international politics are output of organizational processes in three critical senses: 1<sup>st</sup>-actual occurrences are organizational output e.g. American military intervention in the Persian gulf. 2<sup>nd</sup>: Existing organizational capacities for employing present physical assets constitute the range of effective choice open to government leaders confronted with any problem. 3<sup>rd</sup>: Organizational output structures the situation within the narrow constraints of which leaders must make their decisions about an issue. Outputs raise the problem, provide the information, and take the initial steps that colour the face of the issue that is turned to the leaders"<sup>28</sup>.

Let us now unfold the organizing concepts in this model. The model considers organizational actors "not a monolithic nation or government but rather a constellation of loosely allied organizations on top of which government leaders sit"<sup>29</sup>. Factored problems and Fractionated power: Surveillance of the multiple facets of foreign affairs requires that problem be cut up and parcelled out to various organizations<sup>30</sup>. Since every organisation has its own mission, organizational mission is another concept here. Allison's explanation here is "whether missions are stated more formally or more vaguely, many organizations, especially businesses. Have an explicit, brief mission statement that seeks to define for their members and customers what businesses they are in and what they seek to accomplish"<sup>31</sup>. Action as organizational output as another concept whose "feature is its programmed character and behaviour of pre-established routines whose output production is characterized by Objectives, sequential attention to objectives, SOPs, Programs and repertoires, uncertainty avoidance, problem directed search, organizational learning and change-Budgetary feast, famine and Dramatic performance failures"<sup>32</sup>.

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<sup>26</sup> Ibid; p.145

<sup>27</sup> Ibid; p.163

<sup>28</sup> Ibid; p.164

<sup>29</sup> Ibid; p.165

<sup>30</sup> Ibid; p.166

<sup>31</sup> Allison G. & Zelikow P. 1999;p.167

<sup>32</sup> Ibid; p.168-172



Also, model claims that central coordination and control is key to governmental action that “requires decentralization of responsibility and power”<sup>33</sup> and that “decisions of government leaders sit atop conglomerate of organizations”<sup>34</sup>. So, the government is not any black box.

Towards ‘dominant interference pattern’, Allison claims: “There is a marginal or no different on the actions and performance of an organization’s yesterday with its actions and performance today, and will be the same tomorrow. At any given time t, organization’s behaviour in time t-1, t and t+1 will be almost the same with marginal different if any”<sup>35</sup>.

Further, Allison assigns eight general propositions in this model that are as follows<sup>36</sup> with two additional “specific propositions: Deterrence and Force posture”<sup>37</sup>.

1. Existing organized capabilities influence government choice
2. Organizational priorities shape organizational implementation
3. Implementation reflects previously established routines
4. Leaders neglect calculations of administrative feasibility at their peril
5. Limited flexibility and incremental change
6. Long-range planning
7. Imperialism
8. Directed change

Concluding with ‘Evidence’<sup>38</sup>, Essence declares the ability of an individual to analyse and organization provided that an individual has full “understanding organizational tendencies, their routines and SOPs, one can fruitfully analyse an organization”<sup>39</sup>.

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<sup>33</sup> Ibid; p.172

<sup>34</sup> Ibid; p.174

<sup>35</sup> Ibid; p.175

<sup>36</sup> Ibid; p.176-182

<sup>37</sup> Ibid; p.182-183

<sup>38</sup> Ibid; p.185

<sup>39</sup> Ibid; p.185

#### 4. Model III: Governmental Politics Model

The third of the three models Allison introduces is Governmental Politics Model. This model views the actions of government as political resultants. Allison outlines that the emergence of these resultants is from the foreign policy process feature of competitive game, "where multiple players with different policy preferences struggle, compete, and bargain over the substance and conduct of policy"<sup>40</sup>. As the name itself includes politics which is none other than a game where anything is possible that can take place in no time. Unlike Rational actor model and organizational behaviour model, this model considers decision as the output of the game played by governmental leaders.

This model is proposed to explain why a particular formal governmental decision was made, or why one pattern of governmental behaviour emerged, it is necessary to identify the games and players, to display the coalitions, bargains and compromises, and to convey some feel for the confusion.

Allison in Action-channel explains as who is involved is in the game and will have his/her say in the decision making process; and who is not involved in the decision making process is out of the game and will have no effect. So, who plays and who does not depend on who is involved in action channel. Power has an impact on outcome. It seeks to get the answer of who fought with whom, who conspired with whom, and who won against whom. Politics is the bargaining along regular circuits among players positioned hierarchically within the government. The model illustrates some basic assumptions. These assumptions are: whatever happens on the ground are the outcomes of the resultant, there is no single utility function and no single decision by a single rational choice as found in RAM: Model I. Rather pulling, hauling, and pushing keeps going as the key components of politics, and those who have more power will win and have their say in the decision making process. Substantial saying is that it is rare that one group of people get their way. It is because separate institutions indeed do share power and presidential power is considered as the power to persuade. According to this model, the power struggle in the decision making process takes place within the regulatory framework. This model also indicates that the group processes in decision making with in the form of principal agents, participants, stake, and face of issues.

As Allison outlines the basic unit of analysis in each model in his essence, he considers the key individual decision-makers as the basic units of analysis. To further suffice, key individuals hold critical positions and hence they have great influence in deciding on organizational action. Since these players may be like-minded and/or unlike minded, they carry differing perceptions and priorities and hence the real game for power struggle begins where hauling, pulling, and pushing and several other cues begin. Again, these key individual or key players also hold differing organizational

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<sup>40</sup> Jones C.M. 2008, p.6

positions and commitments, bargaining also kicks in. Allison employs a quote here, “where you stand depends where you sit”. As bargaining goes on, compromise is the end-result of bargaining. At the point of compromise, the result is the selection of first alternatives that has the support of a key group of individuals.

As the dominant inference pattern, Allison claims that “model III’s explanatory power is achieved by displaying the game- the action-channel, the positions, their preferences, and the pulling and hauling- as a resultant, the action in question”<sup>41</sup>. In any games, the result is always there, so remains true in the game this model considers. After the game is over the curiosity is who won the game and here this model attempts to clarify the details of the game that made the triumph possible. This model claimed by Allison, “tries not to neglect the sharp differences, misunderstandings, and foul-ups that contributed to what was actually done”<sup>42</sup>.

This model incorporates more than twenty detailed assumptions, organising concepts, general and specific propositions. Organizing concepts of the model as Allison claims have four divisions. In all these, the explanations are based on who plays the game, what are their priorities and preferences, goals and interests, stake and stand, deadlines and axes of issues, players’ impact on issues, type of game and its action channel, rule of the game, and action as politically resultant<sup>43</sup>. With general and specific propositions<sup>44</sup>, Allison lists out more than 20 explained bullet-points where he focuses on the outcome of the game as a resultant.

## **5. Comparison of Model I, II & III: Mapping Similarities & the Differences**

This section of the paper attempts to make a brief comparison of the aforementioned three models envisaged by Allison. All three models have their separate themes that give us different answers to the same question of a particular crisis. Starting from Rational Actor Model, considering government as a monolithic block where a single actor by weighing all possible options picks up one among others that best serves his interest and meets his target. It supposes that the actor is a rational and that such actor always makes a rational decision. Basing its units of analysis at the governmental action as a choice, the foreign policy making is central to one actor. Organizational behaviour model rejects that the government is a monolithic block, rather considers foreign policy making is the outcome of many different organizations’ collaborative effort. We have here clear distinction between these two models when we look at the theme of each. The third model claimed as Governmental Politics model also rejects the concept of government as a monolithic block and

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<sup>41</sup>Allison G. & Zelikow P. 1999;p.304-305

<sup>42</sup> Ibid; p.305

<sup>43</sup> Ibid; p.296-305

<sup>44</sup> Ibid; See p. 305-312

presumes that national government is composed of players and that the foreign policy making is the game performed by these players. The output of the game between these players is the result of bargaining. It showcases that the game is merely for power struggle with the clear hypothesis that the powerful players get more support and finally wins the game. Also, it raises “WHO” concept and attempts to specify the details of who is in and how it influences. There are major differences in the units of analysis each model considers. Of all discussions Allison conducts in *Essence*, Model II & III have some similar grounds. The table below distinguishes these differences in brief.

Models	Rational Actor	Organizational Behaviour	Governmental politics
<b>Theme</b>	<p><b>National government is a monolithic block: single actor</b></p> <p><b>Rational behaviour of</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Value-maximizing</li> <li>• Weighing pros &amp; cons</li> <li>•</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• National Government is combination of Organization: Not a monolithic block</li> <li>• Organizational context and its pressures seek to get to know “HOW?”</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The national government is composed of key players.</li> <li>• Action as a result of bargaining. Thus, “WHO is in?”</li> </ul>
<b>Units of Analysis</b>	<p><b>Governmental action as a choice</b></p> <p>-Choice taken from all available options</p>	Action as organizational output.	An action seen as a political “resultant”- end-result of bargaining is compromise.
<b>Key Concepts</b>	<p><b>Governmental action as a choice</b></p> <p>-Choice taken from all available options</p>	Standard operating procedures (SOPs): show-case and guiding principle; factored problems; bounded rationality.	Stakeholders; power; position in “game”; action channels; excess of pulling and hauling
<b>Pattern of Inference</b>	Forecasts organisation’s goals based on observed, supposedly rational actions	Predict organizations’ actions based on their existing SOPs. What it did yesterday is very likely to be done tomorrow.	Stakeholders; power; position in “game”; action channels: struggle for power. More power, huge influence.

## 6. Appreciations & Criticisms: Strengths & Weaknesses

Strength of Allison’s three models, according to Berstein is that it provides “an alternative ways of analysing events and of seeing and emphasizing different assumptions were operating”<sup>45</sup>. However, Berstein criticizes *Essence*’s basic problem indicating “whether the Cuban missile crisis was a good subject for a test case study”<sup>46</sup> which envisages the three models of foreign policy analysis.

<sup>45</sup> Berstein, 2000, p.139

<sup>46</sup> Berstein, 2000, p.142

Andrew Farkas found the assumption of rational choice model problematic. Since the rational actor model assumes that decision makers act rationally, Andrew argues that the “the empirical results from psychology, as well as case studies of foreign policy decisions, show that humans rarely act as if they are rational”<sup>47</sup>. However, the importance and strength of this model “has been clear to casual students of political science” and that “in nearly every journal dealing with foreign policy studies or international relations, one encounters rational choice model”<sup>48</sup>. Strong empirical support for this model is that “this approach has generated a number of important insights about international politics”<sup>49</sup>.

In advantageous part of the Rational Actor Model, it stresses interaction among states. Especially in crisis when one state has a little or no information about its enemy, time constraints will be a huge problem for complex evaluation as Model II and III requires. At this point, the model I helps a lot to act as necessary to tackle any unforeseen crisis. The disadvantage is that the result acted upon using this model is unpredictable and uncertainty of the forthcoming events may lead to complete disaster in its foreign policy.

Allison’s second model strongly keeps its basis on “the way things are done around here”<sup>50</sup>. The use of Pentagon as an organization and its function in reference to Allison’s explanation of the Cuban missile crisis and model II, has been “a good example of an organization whose culture is difficult to change per se”<sup>51</sup>. The strengths of this model are profoundly deep. As the model claims, policy making process is the actions of organisational output. In any decision making, many organisations take part and will have their say. However, different organisations perform according to their own established norms and routines. Weakness of the model is in line with the bounded rationality as the model claims that organisations have bounded rationality, which is not true at all times.

Using Model II, the government emphasizes all available options in constraining circumstances and allows for decentralization using factored problems and fractional power. This is the real advantage of the model which eventually gets the goal achieved. Further, any crisis management and foreign policy making is not possible from one man, and so many organisations indeed get involved. This model thus highlights important domestic political influences on foreign policy decision making. Disadvantage of the model is that it takes a lengthy time to get things done and policy formulated. In constrained time, this model stays paused.

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<sup>47</sup> Farkas, Andrew, p.343

<sup>48</sup> Farkas, A., 1996, p.343

<sup>49</sup> Farkas, A. 1996, p.343

<sup>50</sup> Ripley, B., 2008, p.22-25

<sup>51</sup> Ibid, p. 24

Talking about model III's strengths and weaknesses and/or praised for and criticized against, Krasner claimed that "decision makers often do not stand where they sit. Sometimes they are not sitting anywhere. This is clearly illustrated by the positions taken by members of the ExComm during the Cuban missile crisis which Allison elucidates at some point"<sup>52</sup>. Further, Miles' Law – "where you stand depends where you sit"<sup>53</sup>- "is an oft-quoted proposition associated with this piece of Allison's model III, argues Jones"<sup>54</sup>. This is because, according to Jones, the final government decision is not the product of a single rational choice where a unified body of decision makers systematically pursues a coherent set of national objectives. His "but rather" spirals in support of Allison's phrase: "politics is the mechanism of choice. Each player pulls and hauls with the power at his or her discretion for outcomes that will advance his or her conception of national, organizational, group and personal interests"<sup>55</sup>.

Bender and Hammond argued that "Model III is too thick. It incorporates so many variables that it is an analytical kitchen sink. Nothing of possible relevance appears to be excluded"<sup>56</sup>. "Critics complained that governmental politics model ignores the importance of personal background, personal goals, general mind-sets, and past experiences"<sup>57</sup>. Model III is "too closely tied to the American political system, raising questions about the extent of its cross-national applicability"<sup>58</sup>. According to Michaud, "Allison does not provide a means for knowing how political games affect policy outcomes"<sup>59</sup>.

Since this model adds important detail about domestic politics, consensus among key political leaders in the government and other key players can be advantageous. Not all foreign policy that we have been through are rational and this model explains why policy sometimes appears to be irrational. Pulling, hauling and struggle for power leads to irrational policy in politics. Model III gives this explanation and this is one of its advantages. Here lies again its disadvantage which is that the game by key players sometimes results no output, which is disastrous.

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<sup>52</sup> Krasner, 1972, p. 165

<sup>53</sup> Miles, 1978, p. 399-403

<sup>54</sup> Jones C.M., 2008, p.7

<sup>55</sup> Allison, 1971 p. 171

<sup>56</sup> Bender & Hammond, 1992; p.318)

<sup>57</sup> Jones, C.M., 2008, p. 11

<sup>58</sup> Caldwell, 1977; p.94

<sup>59</sup> Michaud, 2002, p.272

## 7. Conclusion

Objectives, calculations, choices, threats, opportunities are the key words, weighing all pros and cons and taking up value-maximizing option regard the major formula in RAM Allison employs. This is how United States did in the Cuban Missile Crisis choosing Blockade, Ultimatum, Air Strike and Quarantine; among others: weighing all pros and cons and choosing the options that served the US's value-maximising choice. This model is alive with several critiques and shortcomings. The main weakness of this model as seen throughout the literature is that it considers governmental action as a black box. Using this model, however, we get answers to any question related to crisis or foreign policy as quickly as possible. I would argue thus that this model is straight forward and will give only one possible answer to a question, and one explanation of the scene. Analysis with this model is rather easier than the other two.

Organisational Behaviour Model claims that central coordination and control is key to governmental action that "requires decentralization of responsibility and power"<sup>60</sup> and that "decisions of government leaders sit atop conglomerate of organizations"<sup>61</sup>. So, the government is not any black box according to this model and it distinguishes Model II from Model I. "the way things are done around here"<sup>62</sup>. The use of Pentagon as an organization and its function in reference to Allison's explanation of the Cuban missile crisis and model II, is seen as a good example of an organization whose culture is difficult to change.

Model III is proposed to explain why a particular formal governmental decision was made, or why one pattern of governmental behaviour emerged, it is necessary to identify the games and players, to display the coalitions, bargains and compromises, and to convey some feel for the confusion. This model refers more to game theory where decision makers are players and policy making process requires a game to be played between. It suggests governmental actions as the political resultant. Any policy is the resultant of power struggle between the key players. Since this model adds important detail about domestic politics, consensus among key political leaders in the government and other key players can be advantageous.

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<sup>60</sup> Allison G. & Zelikow P. 1999;p.172

<sup>61</sup> Ibid; p.174

<sup>62</sup> Ripley, B., 2008, p.22-25

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