

**M.Sc.  
PAKISTAN STUDIES**

**STUDY GUIDE TO  
ACCOMPANY READER**

# **GENESIS OF PAKISTAN MOVEMENT**

**PS 538**

**DEPARTMENT OF PAKISTAN STUDIES,  
FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES & HUMANITIES,  
ALLAMA IQBAL OPEN UNIVERSITY,  
ISLAMABAD**

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## PART ONE: ORGANISATION OF THE COURSE

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### 1. Structure of the Course

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- The course has been structured to make it as easy as possible for you to do the required work. Like a half credit course, this course consists of nine blocks, but of unequal length. Ideally one block is a student work of 12–16 hours. Since the course work of one block will include studying the prescribed reading material and carrying out various self-learning questions, and as the length of the blocks is unequal we have calculated how much time you are required to spend on each block. You will find this in the time table. We expect you to finish the work within the allocated time. (See Section 1.5)
- We have organised this course to enable you to acquire the skill of self-learning. You will find a course description at the end of this part which will provide you an overall view of the course. For each block an introduction is given to help you have a feel of the major themes discussed in the prescribed reading material. Major and minor themes are listed along with the prescribed reading material.
- Each prescribed reading is compulsory for successful completion of the course. These readings have been compiled in form of a 'Reader' developed specially for this course. This Study Guide is based on the 'Reader'.
- We expect you to do your study in the suggested manner given in "*How to Use Reading Material*" (for detail please see Section 2).
- For this course, 'Fortnightly Tutorials' are arranged in University's Regional Study Centres. The Tutorial provide facilities to meet with one another and to have individual discussions with the 'Course Guide'. These Tutorials are not formal 'lectures' given in a formal University, rather they are meant to be utilized for group and individual discussions with the Course Guide to facilitate you to undertake part of your learning together. So before going to attend a Tutorial prepare yourself to discuss the prescribed course material. (For detail see section 5 '*How to Attend the Tutorial*').
- After completing the study of first 4 blocks the Assignment No. 1 is due, (for details about Assignments, see Section 3). Second Assignment is due after the completion of course work of the next 3 blocks. Last 2 blocks will be covered in the final examination along with the first 7 blocks.

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## 2. How to Use Reading Material

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- As this is a 'distance education' course, we have organised the required course work in the following manner to help you in evolving a self-learning process in absence of 'formal class room teaching'.
  - (i) A detailed course description.
  - (ii) Introduction to each block.
  - (iii) The major theme of the block is divided into sub-themes (minor themes), which are listed along with Compulsory Readings. A list of Suggested Readings is given at the end of each block.
  - (iv) Compulsory Readings have been compiled and edited in form of a 'Reader' in the same manner. These are listed in this Study Guide.
  - (v) After listing 'Compulsory Readings', we have given you few Self-Learning Questions on each topic or theme. These questions are not only meant to facilitate you in understanding the required readings but also to provide you an opportunity to assess yourself as to how far you have learned.
  - (vi) To help you in answering the Self-Learning Questions (SLQs) points to note are given. These points will not only lead you to a better understanding but will also suggest a direction in which we expect you to think and analyse. You can, of course, think of many more points.
  - (vii) Although you choose your own way of studying the required reading material, you are advised to follow the steps which are shown in the study chart that follows (Section 3).

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### 3. Study Chart

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- STEP 1 ► For clear identification of your reading material thoroughly read Description of the Course and Introduction to the Block
- STEP 2 ► Read carefully the way the Reading Material is to be used (2)
- STEP 3 ► Complete the first quick reading of your required study material as organised in the 'Reader'
- STEP 4 ► Carefully make the 2nd reading and note down some of the points you were not able to fully understand
- STEP 5 ► Carry out the self-learning questions with the help of your study material (Reader)
- STEP 6 ► Revise your notes. There is every likelihood that many of those points which you did not previously understand become clearer to you now during the process of carrying out self-learning questions
- STEP 7 ► Preparation for the Tutorials, i.e., note down the points for discussion with other members of your group and with your Course Guide
- STEP 8 ► Make a third and final reading of your study material. (Students are advised to also keep in view the home work assignments which they are supposed to complete in relation to each block.)

## 4. Time Table

Course Description = 1 hour									
	Block - 1	Block - 2	Block - 3	Block - 4	Block - 5	Block - 6	Block - 7	Block - 8	Block - 9
Reading Introduction	20 minutes	30 minutes	20 minutes	35 minutes	25 minutes	20 minutes	20 minutes	25 minutes	35 minutes
Studying Compulsory Readings	5-6 hours	3-5 hours	2-3 hours	5-6 hours	3-4 hours	6-7 hours	6-8 hours	7-8 hours	8-10 hours
Self-Learning Questions	5-7 hours	3-4 hours	3-4 hours	3-5 hours	4-5 hours	4-6 hours	4-6 hours	3-4 hours	6-7 hours
Preparation of the Tutorial	2-3 hours	1-2 hours	1-1½ hours	1-2 hours	1-1½ hours	1½-2½ hours	2-3 hours	2-3 hours	3-4 hours

Total hours of study:

Maximum = 140 hours

Minimum = 108 hours

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## 5. How to Attend a Tutorial

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Before attending a Tutorial you are required to prepare yourself in the following manner to get maximum utilization.

The first Tutorial is 'Introductory Tutorial', for which you are required to do the following work.

STEP 1 ► Go through part of the Study Guide which includes:

- (i) Organisation of the course
- (ii) Structure of the Programme
- (iii) How to use Reading Material
- (iv) Assessment

STEP 2 ► Read carefully Course Description 2-3 times to have a better understanding of the course. It will give you an overview of the whole course. Make notes of those points which you have not fully understood or wish to discuss with your Course Guide.

In Tutorials 2-9, you will complete course work consists of 9 Study Blocks. The way we have arranged these Tutorials, will give you an opportunity to discuss one block in one Tutorial.

STEP 3 ► Read Introduction to the 'block', and make notes of the themes, major as well as minor, around which the block is constructed.

STEP 4 ► Study "Compulsory Readings" in the manner they are prescribed in "How to Use Reading Material." You will find them in the 'Reader' in the same way. Make note of the points you are not able to fully understand and wish to discuss with your Course Guide.

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## 6. Assessment

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For each course the registered student will be assessed as follows:

- (1) Assignments (continuous assessment). See details as given below.
- (2) Final Examination. A three-hour written examination will take place at the end of the semester.

The conditions to qualify each component are given below:

- (i) A minimum of 40% in each assignment (Total number of assignments for this course is 2).
- (ii) A minimum of 33% in the final written examination.
- (iii) An aggregate of 40% of both the components i.e. assignments and final examination.
- (iv) To take final examination the student has to pass Assignment

component.

The grade will be determined as following:

40% – 54%	C
55% – 69%	B
70% or above	A

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## 7. Assignments

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- Assignments are those written exercises which you are required to complete at your own home or place of work after having studied different parts of the prescribed reading material; within the scheduled period of study. (Please see the Schedule). These readings are compulsory. There is no way you can by-pass them. You can of course complement them with other standard works of your own choice. But you must utilize them in your answer – consciously and clearly. For this course you will receive two assignments which we expect you to complete within the study period.
- This is a compulsory course work and its successful completion will make you eligible to take final examination at the end of the semester.
- To complete your course work successfully, you are provided with tutorial support, so that you can discuss your academic problems in Tutorial meetings. (See Section 1.5).
- After completing the assignment you will send it to the Course Guide whose name is already notified to you for assessment and necessary guidance. Your Guide will return it after marking and providing you academic guidance and supervision.
- To qualify each assignment, you have to obtain a minimum of 40% marks.

## COURSE DESCRIPTION

Although writers have offered a number of starting points on the road to Pakistan, ranging from the Arab conquest of Sind in 711 A.D. to the Uprising of 1857, it seems more plausible to argue that the Pakistan Movement started with the proceedings and ultimate adoption of the Lahore Resolution in the now famous session of the All-India Muslim League held on March 22–24, 1940. In his presidential address on March 22 to an enthusiastic, responsive gathering of nearly 100,000 Muslims drawn from all parts of India, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah declared that the only way the Indian Muslims could free themselves both from the British Raj and the imminent Hindu rule was to have their "own homelands, their territory and their state." The Muslims could not accept any system of government which must necessarily result in a Hindu majority government. The differences between the Hindus and the Muslims, he stressed, were "fundamental" and "deep-rooted", and there was no way the two communities "at any time be expected to transform themselves into one nation merely by means of subjecting them to a democratic constitution and holding them forcibly together by unnatural and artificial methods of British Parliamentary Statute". The experience of the past clearly showed that it was "inconceivable that the fiat or the will of a government so constituted can ever command a willing and loyal obedience throughout the subcontinent by various nationalities except by means of armed force behind it."

Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah indeed went on to claim that the problem in India was not "inter-communal." It was an "international" problem, involving two nations — Hindus and Muslims. The Muslims were not a "minority". They were "a nation according to any definition of the nation," and they had, like all other free nations, the right to self-determination. The difficulty with the Hindu leaders, he lamented, was that they failed to understand the "real nature of Islam and Hinduism." Highlighting the different and indeed diametrically opposed nature of the two religions, their social orders and historical developments, he emphasized,

*They are not religions in the strict sense of the word, but are, in fact, different and distinct social orders, and it is a dream that Hindus and Muslims can ever evolve a common nationality, . . . Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs, literatures. They neither intermarry nor inter-dine together and, indeed, they belong to two different civilizations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions. Their aspect on life and of life are different. It is clear that Hindus and Muslims derive their inspiration from different sources of*

*history. They have different epics, different heroes, and different episodes. Very often the hero of one is a foe of the other and, likewise, their victories and defeats overlap. To yoke together two such nations under a single state, one as a numerical minority and the other as a majority, must lead to growing discontent and final destruction of any fabric that may be so built up for the government of such a state.*

The partition of the Indian subcontinent, thus, the Quaid pointed out, was the only way the Muslims could secure and promote their own faith, ideals, culture and traditions. In the process, he hoped, the perennial conflict between the Hindus and Muslims would be resolved, leading ultimately to the cherished goal of peace and freedom for all, Hindus as well as Muslims. The Muslim League fully endorsed the Quaid's viewpoint on March 23, and in a resolution adopted on March 24, demanded a separate homeland for the Muslims.

The Quaid's solution, stipulated in the Lahore Resolution, taking apart 'the old world' and putting together the new bold one had an irresistible appeal for the Muslim masses. Facing agony and frustration at the hands of the Hindus, the promise of their own, separate homeland not only provided them "a reassuring anchor" in a climate of turbulence and uncertainty but also gave them "a sense of purpose and worth" which they were fast losing in the face of India's advance towards self government, with its inherent bias towards the majority community. A separate state was required to enable the Muslims to live their lives according to their own faith, their own way of life. This was the main thrust of the movement for Pakistan, an independent, sovereign state in South Asia.

The Pakistan Movement was no ordinary movement. Nor was it a movement started in a fit of anger or in flurry. It was a well-considered movement. Both logic and experience were behind it. The purpose of this course, indeed, is to highlight this logic and experience. How did the movement for Pakistan start? What was its rationale? Why did the Indian Muslims who had lived with Hindus for centuries in the subcontinent felt compelled to charter their own separate course, leading ultimately to the creation of a separate Muslim state of Pakistan? Who were the principal leaders of the Muslims? How did they struggle to protect and secure Muslim interests in India before they got convinced that the only way they could save Muslims from their present predicament was to have their own homeland? What was the Hindu attitude towards the Muslims and their specific interests? How did the system of representative government introduced by the British in India affect the Muslim interests? How did the Muslims respond to it, and how did the system ultimately fail to satisfy their legitimate demands and interests? How did Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah and Allama Iqbal break from "Indian nationalism" and merge as the fiercest champions of Muslim nationalism? How did Quaid-i-Azam organize the Indian Muslims under the banner of the Muslim League? How did he finally wrest the initiative from the British (and the Hindus) and forced them to concede the demand for Pakistan if they did not wish to leave the Indian subcontinent in civil war and bloodshed? These, and many more related issues and concerns, are the subject of this Course.

For the purposes of analytical clarity and convenience the Course has been



divided into nine self-sufficient, but interrelated Blocks, moving into a progressive order. Block 1 deals with the cataclysmic events of 1857 and the role played by Syed Ahmad Khan in reviving the Muslim fortunes. The failure of the Uprising of 1857 had a severe effect on the Muslims. For one, the British considered them as their arch enemies, who had converted a "sepoys mutiny" into a "political conspiracy aimed at the extinction of the British Raj". And secondly, and more importantly, their substitution of English for Persian and Western education for traditional curricula dispossessed the Muslims of their positions of influence and authority in the country. The doors of civil and military services as well as all professions were closed to them. The British indeed put a seal on the decline of the Muslims in all walks of life. To compound their difficulties, Hindu-Muslim relations, in spite of all the fervour generated during the Uprising, had touched its lowest ebb. Religio-cultural differences, together with communal instinct on the one hand contending with an instinct for communal separateness on the other, nurtured by centuries of contact and conflict, had left the two communities badly divided. Different responses of the Hindus and the Muslims to the British presence politically, socially and economically in fact went on to affect radically the final outcome of events in India's modern history. While the Hindus welcomed the change of "masters", and reconciled themselves with the new rulers without much hesitation, the Muslims proclaimed a sort of war against the British. In their reluctance to accept the new situation, the Muslims indeed triggered off the traditions of Shah Wali-Allah and Sayyid Ahmed Bareilvi of resistance to the concentration of power in non-Muslim hands, resulting in the Uprising of 1857.

This new and unprecedented situation brought Syed Ahmad Khan (1819-98) to the fore of the Muslim politics, to save them from the imminent threat to their survival as a community. Syed Ahmad Khan pursued a three-pronged strategy. First, he strived to reconcile the Muslims to the British rule. He was convinced that the Muslims had no choice but to cooperate with the British if they did not wish to be left out in government services and professions. The lives and properties of the Muslims were safe under the British and no restrictions were placed on their religious freedom. *Jihad* was incumbent on the Muslims only if they were denied peace and could not practice their religion without the fear of persecution. Since none of these conditions prevailed in India, Syed Ahmad Khan argued, it was obligatory for the Muslims to be 'loyal' to the British rulers. Indeed, with the ultimate failure of the Uprising and the reprisals that followed there was no other way to recover except by cooperating with the British.

Secondly, Syed Ahmad Khan wanted the Muslim community to take to Western education. Hindus had already taken advantage of the new system of education. Muslims, he insisted, must not lag behind. The connection between education and government was too obvious for Syed Ahmad Khan to ignore. In emphasizing the need for Western education, however, Syed Ahmad Khan was by no means suggesting that Muslims should ignore their traditional subjects. What he tried to stress was that Muslims should acquire Western education in addition to traditional learning.

Finally, Syed Ahmad Khan wanted the Muslims to realize that they had

their own special interests, which must be secured and promoted through their own efforts and their own exclusive channels. He refused to accept the Congress claim that India was "one nation," and that the Congress had the right to speak on behalf of this "nation." The founders of the Indian National Congress, he lamented, did not take into consideration the fact that, "India is inhabited by different nationalities." Indian people professed different religions, spoke different languages, their ways of life and customs were different, their attitude to history and historical traditions was different. There was no one nation in India. This also explained to a large extent why Syed Ahmad Khan opposed the introduction of Western representative system of government in India, pure and simple. Based on the "majority" principle, the system was bound to reflect the domination of the Hindus, the majority community, over the Muslims. Hindus would obtain four times as many votes as Muslims because their population was four times as large. "It would be like a game of dice", Syed Ahmad Khan reckoned, "in which one man had four dice and the other only one." These and other related concerns, became the focal point of Syed Ahmad Khan's efforts to mobilize the Indian Muslims in the crucial post-1857 period.

Block 2 proceeds further with the role of Syed Ahmad Khan's successors in promoting the Muslim cause, the effects of the Partition of Bengal in 1905, the Simla Deputation of 1906, and the founding of the All-India Muslim League the same year. The Urdu-Hindi controversy that began in Syed Ahmad Khan's time became one of the prime tests for his successors. In April 1900, Sir Anthony MacDonnell, the Lieutenant-Governor of the U.P., issued an order stating that Hindi written in the Nagri script would enjoy equal status with Urdu as the language of courts as well as in recruitment to government jobs except in a purely English-demanding position. This came as a rude shock to the Muslims. But then, fortunately, Nawab Mohsin-ul-Mulk, Secretary of the Aligarh College, moved quickly to launch a movement for the protection of Urdu as the official language of the province. He even established an Urdu Defence Association for the purpose. Although the Muslim leaders failed to get the government change its policy as long as MacDonnell was at the helm of affairs, things brightened up with his departure. Sir James La Touche, the new governor, responded favourably to the Muslim campaign, and did not insist on the strict implementation of the new policy. This was no mean achievement.

Syed Ahmad Khan's successors made two further successful moves aimed to serve the Muslim cause. First, they arranged a deputation of leading representatives of the community to call on the Viceroy on October 1, 1906, to demand more equitable representation in the political system of the country. Secondly, they founded the All-India Muslim League as an exclusive political organization of the Indian Muslims. But before we proceed to examine the nature and objectives of these very important developments, it will be in the fitness of the things to take into account yet another development, the Partition of Bengal which not only affected the Muslim interests considerably, but also preceded these developments in time.

In 1905, the British partitioned the unwieldy province of Bengal. The

Dacca, Rajshahi and Chittagong Divisions (excluding the Darjeeling district) and the district of Malda were separated from it and united with Assam were reconstituted into a new province of Eastern Bengal and Assam. The Muslims came to form an overwhelming majority, nearly two-third of the population.

While the authors of the Partition, Lord Curzon and other British officials insisted that the partition scheme was no more than an administrative device to tackle the administrative problem of a huge province (with an area of 189,000 square miles and a population of 80 millions), the Hindus hastened to describe it as a policy of 'divide and rule', a ploy to arrest the growth of "Indian nationalism".

Nothing could be farther from the truth, and for a number of reasons: (1) The Partition was meant not to divide Hindus and Muslims — only Bengal province. The new province of 31 million still had 1/3 of its population comprising Hindus. The remainder of Bengal with some 50 million was a Hindu-dominated province; (2) There was no definite sense of solidarity between the Hindus and the Muslims in the first place. The Muslims in Bengal were too disorganized and backward to really count in the political life of Bengal, which was safely in the hands of the Hindus; (3) Even after the announcement of the Partition, clearly to the benefit of the Muslims, the Muslim opinion was divided on the issue. At first even the Muslim Nawab of Dacca moved a resolution against the Partition of Bengal at 22nd Congress session. In fact, it was the Partition rather than the prospect of Partition which later on formulated and developed Muslim opinion against antipartition agitation launched by the Hindus; (4) Even if one were to concede for the sake of argument that the Partition of Bengal was a "deliberate" move on part of the British government to sow the seeds of conflict between the Hindus and the Muslims, the question still arises, why did not the Hindus move to put forward "an alternative scheme" to satisfy legitimate grievances of Muslims? After all, Partition meant a great relief to the Bengali Muslims.

The fact of the matter was that the Hindus felt agitated because the new province of East Bengal threatened their dominance in public service and professions. Trade coming to Calcutta would go to Chittagong, and Calcutta lawyers would lose their clientele to Dacca, the capital and legal centre of the new province. The agitation indeed came to suffer in the end for want of purity and honesty of purpose. By the end of 1910 it was virtually dead. But then the British government had its own plans. In order to facilitate a warm welcome to King George V in India, the government did not hesitate to annul the Partition in 1911. On December 12, King George V himself announced the annulment of Partition of Bengal, leaving the Muslims sullen and disillusioned with the British attitude.

The Muslims, however, had had some solace in the British response to the Simla Deputation of 1906. Led by the Aga Khan, the Deputation consisting of 36 members, waited on the Viceroy, Lord Minto, on October 1, 1906. The thrust of the Muslim demand was that the position of the Muslim community should not be estimated on its numerical strength alone, but in terms of its historical importance in the country. The Deputation pointed out that the representative institutions introduced by the British in India were not appropriate and

suitable to Indian conditions. The Muslims were a distinct community, with their own special interests. It was therefore necessary that the Muslim community should be granted separate electorates, to elect their own representatives through their exclusive Muslim constituencies, and that too commensurate not only with their numbers but also with the value of their contribution to the defence of the empire.

Although the Hindus, particularly the Hindu press of Calcutta, subsequently state a violent campaign against the sponsors of this Deputation and their demands, the fact of the matter was that the Muslim demands were based on genuine complaints about the system of government, resting on the majority principle. Results of the elections of 1893 were a complete disappointment for the Muslims. The Muslims failed to make any gains out of these elections both in the legislatures and municipalities. Even some Hindu leaders, such as Gokhale, conceded that Muslim apprehensions regarding their future could not be summarily dismissed. If the Hindus had been a minority, they would not have reacted differently. Yet, it was after lot of hectic activity, and particularly after the unrelenting campaign launched by Syed Ameer Ali in London to mobilize parliamentary and public support over the issue of separate electorates that the British government finally agreed to include the principle of separate electorates in the constitutional reforms of 1909.

The favourable response to the Simla Deputation helped the Muslim leaders in directing their attention to the immediate establishment of a political organization of their own, to defend and promote their own special interests. So far, the Muslims, under the influence of Syed Ahmad Khan had shunned formal political activity. But now the changed conditions of India, particularly in the context of anticipated constitutional advance under the Act of 1909, and growing Hindu-Muslim chasm, forced the Muslims to found the All-India Muslim League on December 30, 1906. The first step towards the founding of a separate Muslim political organization was taken at Lucknow in the middle of September 1906, when the Simla Deputation was meeting to prepare its brief. It was decided that an All-India Muslim political organization should be established at the next annual meeting of the Muhammadan Educational Conference. The matter was again discussed at Simla in October 1906 by the members of the Deputation. It was decided finally to settle the aims and objectives of the proposed organization after the conclusion of the annual session of the Muhammadan Educational Conference in the last week of December. In accordance with the decisions taken at Lucknow and Simla a meeting of the delegates to the Conference and of other prominent Muslims was held at Dacca on December 30, 1906. Nawab Viqar-ul-Mulk, a colleague and follower of Syed Ahmad Khan presided. A resolution proposed by Khwaja Salimullah, Nawab of Dacca, and seconded by Hakim Ajmal Khan was unanimously adopted, and the long awaited political organization was founded under the name of the All-India Muslim League. One of its most important objectives clearly was: "to protect and advance the political rights and interests of the Mussalmans of India . . ." This new found interest and identity got further impetus in subsequent developments ranging from the granting of

principle of separate electorates in the 1909 Act to the annulment of the Partition of Bengal in 1911 to the Lucknow Pact of 1916. Block 3 focusses on this clearly discernible growth of Muslim political identity.

As indicated the Simla Deputation had demanded in their address presented to the Viceroy that representatives on all elected bodies — local, provincial and imperial — should be elected by the Muslim voters alone. The Viceroy had agreed to communicate the demand to the Secretary of State. The latter agreed to the principle that the Muslims needed special representation in the councils but did not favour a separate Muslim electorate. Instead, he proposed that there should be a fixed number of seats for each community to be filled by means of mixed electoral college composed of members of different communities in proportion to their numerical strength in a given electoral area. The Muslims did not agree. They insisted that Muslim seats in the councils should be filled only by Muslim electorates. In January, 1909 a deputation of Muslim leaders headed by Syed Ameer Ali impressed upon the Secretary of State the terrible implications of the mixed electoral colleges as far they concerned the Muslims. Syed Ameer Ali's continued efforts in mobilizing parliamentary and public support on the issue finally forced the British government to agree to separate Muslim electorates.

A very important feature of the Act of 1909, was, in fact, the introduction of separate electorate for the Muslims. Some seats were reserved in each council, except that of the Punjab, to be filled exclusively by Muslim voters. The Muslims could of course take part in the elections for general seats and thereby enhance their representation. Other salient feature of the Act of 1909 was that the number of seats on the councils were increased considerably. An official majority was retained in the Imperial Legislative Council, but small non-official majorities were conceded to the provinces with a considerable number of elected members. The scope of activities of the new councils was considerably enlarged. Members could discuss budgetary proposals, and could also ask questions and move resolutions on issues of public concern. The Act however left the control of the government firmly in the hands of bureaucracy. Councils were subject to government control. Yet, the Act of 1909 was a considerable advance over the Act of 1892. It introduced for the first time the principle of election side by side with that of nomination.

While the Muslims gained legally and constitutionally a great deal in the grant of separate electorates under the Act of 1909, the annulment of the Partition of Bengal in 1911, left them disenchanted with the British rule. They saw the annulment a clear instance of concession to the militant Hindu agitation against the partition of the province. The annulment of the Partition of Bengal, however, was not the only cause of Muslim discontent. A number of developments ranging from the government refusal to raise the M.A.O. College, Aligarh, to the status of a University to the Cawnpore Mosque tragedy to the attitude of the British towards the Turkish Empire during the course of Balkan wars in 1912-13, agitated the Muslim community. The Muslims were indeed convinced that their problems were the result of the consciously laid out British policy to crush the Muslims inside as well as outside India. Thus an anti-British sentiment

to make a united demand on the system. In November 1916, as the President of the Lucknow session of the League (Quaid-i-Azam) Jinnah moved the Muslim League and the Congress to draft a scheme of reforms acceptable to both organizations. The scheme, better known as the Lucknow Pact, besides other things, gave Muslims a number of concessions. Two of these need special mention. One, Congress accepted the system of separate electorates granted by the British in the Act of 1909. Not only that it conceded separate electorates to the Muslims in the provinces, such as the Punjab and the Central Provinces, where they did not exist previously. And, two, the Muslims were given 'weightage' in Muslim-minority provinces. This was the first political settlement between the Hindus and the Muslims. (Quaid-i-Azam) Jinnah, for his keen efforts in bringing the two communities together on one platform and for making this settlement possible, was hailed as the "Ambassador of Unity."

But this was not to be the only occasion the Hindus and Muslims were to join hands. They were to work in concert soon in the Khilafat-non-Cooperation Movement, though without the Quaid at the centre of the stage. The Quaid was of course not indifferent to the fate of the Khilafat nor was he unmindful of the Muslim sentiment on the issue. He simply could not agree to the non-cooperation method suggested by Gandhi, without a well-thought out plan and preparation. The turn of events were soon to prove him right — causing not only severe setback to the Khilafat Movement but to this experiment with Hindu-Muslim unity itself. But before we proceed with a discussion of the Khilafat Movement and its failure to realize its ostensible objectives, let us first turn to the Act of 1919 which, in a way, set the stage for Hindu-Muslim cooperation against the British. The Act of 1919, the Khilafat Movement, and the growth of Hindu-Muslim Communal Movements in its aftermath are indeed the subject matter of Block 4.

The main feature of the 1919 Act was a new system of government, called 'dyarchy' introduced in the provinces of British India. The essence of the system was the division of administration of the province into two separate areas, namely, the "Reserved" and the "Transferred". The Reserved subjects were to be administered by the provincial governor with the help of executive councillors, responsible to the Government of India. The subjects were quite important and included, land revenue, irrigation, justice, finance, police, jails etc. But still a host of subjects of equal importance to the public at large were included in the "Transferred" list, such as, local self-government, public health, sanitation, education, public works, agriculture, etc. This meant transferring of powers and responsibility to the Indian hands to a considerable extent, a significant development since the British took control of India after the 1857 Uprising. The size of provincial legislative councils was also enlarged. Direct elections were introduced. Separate electorates for the Muslims were confirmed.

The actual working of the system of government, however, turned out to be far from satisfactory. The division of responsibilities into the "Reserved" and "Transferred" areas proved to be a real problem. Education, for instance was a "Transferred" subject, but European and Anglo-Indian education was placed in

the "Reserved" list. The provincial governors did not behave like constitutional heads, acting on the advice of the ministers. They overruled their ministers frequently, and thus frustrated all chances of the development of responsible government in the provinces. The resignation or removal of a minister did not affect his colleagues. It was, therefore, correctly said that there were ministers but without a sense of ministerial responsibility. Thus, despite the advance under the 1919 Act, there was little development in the process of transfer of responsibility to the Indian hands. A number of events, such as, the passage of the Rowlatt Act, the Jallianwala Bagh tragedy, and above all the Khilafat question made the whole exercise all the more disconcerting. Indian Muslims were constrained to launch the Khilafat Movement in 1919, as Maulana Mohamed Ali, its principal leader put it, "not for aggression, not even for the defence of Turkey, but for the defence of our Faith". But since the institution of Khilafat rested in Turkey, the Indian Muslims felt obliged to demand and secure the safety and survival of the Turkish Empire in the first place. Maulana Mohamed Ali, therefore demanded: "The Khilafat shall be preserved, that there shall be no Christian mandate over any part of the Island of Arabia, and that the Khalifa shall remain, as before the war, the Warden of the Holy Places".

Indian Muslim concern with the fate of the Turkish Empire was clear from the moment Italy attacked Tripoli in October 1911. The Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913 caused deep convulsions among the Indian Muslims. Within a year of the breaking out of the Balkan war, they organized a medical mission for the Turkish Army. Turkish Empire was the greatest Muslim empire, and its ruler, the Khalifa (Caliph) was the defender of their faith. When Turks, despite their sentiments and entreaties, joined the war on the side of Germany, the Indian Muslim stood up for the safety of the Turkish Empire and the institution of Khilafat, vested in the Khalifa.

Interestingly, the British authorities in India understood the significance and importance of the Khilafat to the Muslims. They, in fact, exploited more than once the attachment of the Indian Muslims to the Khalifa to mobilize support for their rule in India. The Viceroy therefore at the very outset did not hesitate to hold out an assurance to the Muslims that their feelings will be "given the fullest representation," and that no effort will be "spared, no stone left unturned, to place before those, with whom the decision will rest the plea of Indian Mussalmans for the most favourable possible treatment of Turkey." In actual fact, however, these assurances were being violated even at the time they were being given as the British troops were already on the move in Mesopotamia.

Maulana Mohamed Ali and other Indian Muslim leaders therefore saw it fit to mobilize public opinion to make sure that the assurances given to them by the British government were honoured once the war was over. They decided to constitute the Khilafat Committee, and thus launched a country-wide Khilafat Movement. In the process, they did not hesitate to seek the support of the Hindus. A number of developments, as indicated above, had already taken place forcing the Muslims to reject the old policy of "loyalism", and seek cooperation and understanding with the Hindus. Hindus, too, on their part needed the support of the Muslims and for a number of reasons. More importantly, they needed

the Muslim support in order to remedy the "Punjab wrongs", the situation in the Punjab after the Jallianwala massacre, and to put maximum pressure on the British authorities to concede 'responsible government' to India. Nothing could express the Hindu need to cooperate with Muslims more than Mr. Gandhi's support to the Khilafat Movement.

The Movement attained massive support in no time. The leaders of the Movement went on a whirlwind tour of the country mobilizing support all over. They developed a network of alliances and support ranging from religious centres, educational institutions to social, political groups and interests. They established close links with seminaries at Deopand, Nadva, and, of course, Farangi Mahal of Mian Abdul Bari. Aligarh also became one of the important centres of the Khilafat activities. Students came out of the Government-aided schools and colleges, and lawyers boycotted the courts. Many thousands of Indians — Hindus and Muslims — courted arrest. A new dimension was soon added to the Movement by the religious edict issued by the leaders that India had become *Dar-al-Harb*, suggesting that it was incumbent upon Muslims to migrate to a *Dar-al-Islam*, an Islamic country. Thousands of Muslims responded to this edict and left India for Afghanistan — only to be refused entry resulting in much hardship and hundreds of deaths on the way back home.

But, in spite of these sufferings and sacrifices, a number of events caused serious setback to the Movement. The most important development was the Moplah Rebellion of 1921, creating a feeling of bitterness and hostility between the Hindus and the Muslims. This was followed by the Chauri Chaura incident where an unruly mob set fire to a police station and burnt twenty-two policemen who at that time were inside the building. Gandhi called off the Movement, leaving the Muslims bewildered. This Movement was peaceful generally and there were only a few incidents where violence was resorted to. The Movement received a further setback a few months later when on November 21, 1922, the Turkish parliament decided to separate the Khilafat from the Sultanate. The fate of the Khilafat was, however, sealed by Mustafa Kamal Ataturk on March 3, 1924, who sent the Khalifa, Abdul Majid, into exile and abolished the institution of Khilafat. The Khilafat Movement, however, continued to linger on for a while but the wind out of its sails was taken out by the Turkish decision.

The petering out of the Khilafat Movement deeply affected the Hindu-Muslim relations. There were continuous Hindu-Muslim riots during the next few years — resulting in the loss of many a lives on both sides. The alarming increase in the number of riots was encouraged further by the Hindu movements of Shuddhi and Sangathan, meant to convert all Muslims to Hinduism and to organize the Hindus against the Muslims. The two organizations indeed professed to work for the complete annihilation of Islam in the sub-continent. In such a tense atmosphere communal riots sparked off on trifles. Serious riots were reported from one or other part of the country almost every day. The spirit behind the Hindu-Muslim unity of the Khilafat days had long been dead and forgotten. The turn of events, however, had impressed upon the Muslims the need to give up the idea that they could depend on the Hindus to secure their political inter-



ests. They had come to reckon that the Hindus would not hesitate to leave them in political wilderness if it suited their purposes. Their only hope lay in relying upon their own inherent strength, and working out a separate political platform for themselves. Expressed in the 1924 revival of the Muslim League, Delhi Muslim Proposals of 1927, reactions to the Simon Commission Report of 1930 and the Nehru Report of 1928, and the formulation of Jinnah's 'Fourteen Points' of 1929, Muslims indeed did make much progress on that account. Block 5 dwells upon this aspect of Muslim politics.

The All-India Muslim League had been pushed into the background during the Khilafat struggle. Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah was now convinced that the only way the Muslims could secure their political interests in the country in the changed circumstances was to revitalize the League platform. This was important, the Quaid believed, to identify, articulate and express the Muslim interests as well as to persuade the Congress to see the validity of those interests and to accept them as a basis of cooperation between Hindus and Muslims in the common cause of Indian freedom. He revived the Muslim League in May 1924. A session was held at Lahore which was attended, among others, by Maulana Mohamed Ali, Dr. Ansari, Dr. Kitchlew, and other Khilafatists. The Quaid presided. He was the new leader. Although some of the Khilafatists were "indignant at the prospect of the leadership slipping out of their hands . . . they had no solution for the new situation. Jinnah at the head of the All-India Muslim League seemed to be more suited to take up the challenge."

On March 20, 1927, Quaid-i-Azam moved to call a meeting of representative Muslim leaders to take stock of the situation and to suggest a way out of their present difficulties. After a lengthy discussion the Muslim leaders agreed to renounce separate electorates on behalf of the Muslims if the Hindus agree, *inter alia*, to the separation of Sind from Bombay Presidency, political reforms in the N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan as in any other province in India (under the 1919 Act), proportion of representation in the Punjab and Bengal in accordance with their population, and one-third representation in the central legislature. To agree to surrender separate electorates in spite of the opposition of a strong section of its own community, led by Sir Mohammad Shafi, was a gesture of good will and accommodation on part of the Muslims. The Congress, however, in spite of its early favourable response to the Muslim demands, refused to reciprocate the sentiment. All-parties Conference convened on May 19 rejected the Muslim Proposals. The Conference, however, agreed to constitute a special committee under the chairmanship of Motilal Nehru to "consider and examine the principle of the constitution for India". Though this move meant the resumption of Hindu-Muslim talks on the future of India, it cannot be denied that Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah's "bold and patriotic initiative" was squandered away.

In November 1927 the British Government announced the appointment of a constitutional Commission headed by Sir John Simon to examine the pace of constitutional advance in India. The appointment of such a commission had been provided in the 1919 Act. This Commission consisting of seven members (all white) failed to find favour with the Congress and the League faction led by

Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah. The Quaid was still keen to work with the Congress, and its constitutional Committee headed by Motilal Nehru. Other faction of the League, led by Sir Mohammad Shafi, cooperated with the League in the hope that its recommendations would be favourable. The Report, published in two volumes in 1930, recommended the abolition of 'Dyarchy', setting up of a federal system of government with maximum autonomy for the provinces, and continuation of the principle separate electorate. However, it did not accept the Muslims demands of raising the N.W.F.P. to the status of a full fledged province, statutory majorities in the Punjab and Bengal, and one-third representation at the centre. The Commission also postponed consideration of the Muslim demand for the separation of Sind from Bombay till its financial implications were fully examined.

But the Muslims were treated no differently by the Nehru Report, indeed more cruelly. The Nehru Report repudiated the principle of separate electorates accepted by the Congress under the Lucknow Pact of 1916. The Muslim demand for reservation of seats in the Punjab and Bengal legislatures was dismissed as opposed to "the principles on which responsible government rests". The Muslims were to get proportional representation in the Central Legislature and not one-third of representation, as suggested in the Delhi Muslim Proposal of March 1927. Though it was conceded in theory that the form of government will be federal, in actual fact, the residuary and other substantial powers were transferred to the central government. Muslims could not have been hurt more. Quaid-i-Azam was really disappointed. But, a great champion of Hindu-Muslim unity that he was, he still went to the All-Parties Convention held in Calcutta in the last week of December, 1928 to propose amendments to the report to help make them acceptable to the Muslims. He fervently pleaded for "statesmanship" and referring to the cases of Canada and Egypt pointed out that "the minorities are always afraid of majorities. The majorities are apt to be tyrannical and oppressive and particularly religious majorities and the minorities therefore have a right to be absolutely secured . . ." But to no avail. The Hindus were adamant, especially the Hindu Mahasaba. Gandhi remained indifferent. The result was that the Convention turned down Quaid-i-Azam's demands. The Quaid called it "the parting of the ways", and proceeded to draft his now famous "Fourteen Points", insisting that no scheme for the future constitution of India will be acceptable to the Muslims until and unless the provisions embodied in these Points were accepted by the Hindu majority community.

The thrust of these 'Fourteen Points' clearly was to secure the autonomy of the provinces in a federal setting with maximum number of provinces secured for the Muslims. The Quaid insisted on Muslim majorities in the Punjab, Bengal and North-West Frontier Province. He wanted a new province of Sind, separated from the Bombay Presidency. He demanded reforms in the N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan on the same footing as in other provinces. Uniform measure of autonomy shall be granted to all provinces. The idea was to strengthen provinces, especially the Muslim provinces, against the imminent Hindu domination at the centre. This was a position different, radically different, from the position taken in the Delhi Muslim Proposals. While in those Proposals, the Quaid had endeavoured to

represent both Hindu and Muslim demands, the 'Fourteen Points' were clearly the work of Muslim interests. Quaid-i-Azam had increasingly come to speak for the Muslim community. Muslims had indeed come to speak more clearly and emphatically about their fate in a situation that was fast pushing them to the periphery of the system. With every advance towards the so-called 'responsible government' Hindus were becoming more and more aware of the fact that the system was on their side. They were the natural heirs to the British Raj. Muslims no longer mattered much. Muslims too had come to recognise their predicament in a system inherently biased against them. This was reflected most clearly in Allama Iqbal's Allahabad address of 1930, and subsequent discussions during the Round Table Conference held in London in 1930-32, the Muslim reaction to the Communal Award, and the Act of 1935. Block 6 concentrates upon these very important developments, affecting the Indian politics in general and the Muslim politics in particular.

Allama Iqbal's Allahabad address deserves special mention, because it contributed to the growth of Muslim nationalism in the subcontinent which ultimately led to the demand for Pakistan in March 1940. In a highly well-informed and philosophical address, Allama Iqbal surveyed the political situation of India and dismissed the notion of a united Indian nation in which the various communities had to submerge their cultural, communal identities. The problem affected the Muslims most because they were a 'minority' in India. As a minority they could hardly hope to see Islam as a principle of solidarity in national political life. Islam, Allama Iqbal pointed out, was "an ideal plus some kind of polity", and thus was "not prepared to compromise with any other law regulating human society". Was it possible, he went on to ask, "to retain Islam an ethical ideal and reject it as a polity in favour of national politics in which religious attitude is not permitted to play any part?" The answer was obviously in the negative for Islam, he forcefully stated,

*is not mere experience in the sense of a purely biological event, happening inside the experiment and necessitating no reactions on his social environment. It is individual experience creative of a social order. Its immediate outcome is the fundamental of a polity with implicit legal concepts whose civic significance cannot be belittled merely because their origin is revelational. The religious idea of Islam, therefore, is organically related to the social order which it has created. The rejection of the one will eventually involve the rejection of the other. Therefore, the construction of a polity on national lines, if it means a displacement of Islamic principles of solidarity, is simply unthinkable to a Muslim.*

Islam in India, in fact, Allama Iqbal claimed, made the Indian Muslims something more than a community, a religious community. They were a 'nation'. Indeed, he argued, they "are the only people who can fitly be described as a nation in the modern sense of the words." The Hindus, though ahead of the Muslims in all walks of life, "have not yet been able to achieve the kind of homogeneity which is necessary for a nation, and which Islam has given you as a free gift." Allama Iqbal, thus, proposed that the Punjab, North-West Frontier Pro-

vince, Sind and Baluchistan be amalgamated into a single state. The "formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim State", he concluded, "appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims, at least of North-West India."

On their part, however, the British Government convened a Round Table Conference at London to discuss the political and communal problems which held three sessions in 1930, 1931, and 1932. The Congress refused to participate in the first session, though it agreed to participate in the second session with Gandhi as its only spokesman. But Gandhi proved to be its chief wrecker. Not only he opposed the Muslim demand for statutory majorities in the Punjab and Bengal, he went on to oppose the maintenance of Muslim separate electorates, a matter of prime concern to the Muslims ever since its recognition by the British and the Congress in 1916. To complicate the matters further Gandhi refused to work for a genuine federation, with maximum autonomy to the provinces. All that he could promise on behalf of the Congress was that: "The residuary powers shall vest in the federating units, unless [sic] on further examination, it is found to be against the best interests of India". The result was tedious and inconclusive negotiations forcing the British in the end to come out with their own solution of the problem. On August 16, 1932 the British Prime Minister Ramsay Macdonald, announced the so-called 'Communal Award'.

Although the Communal Award conceded the Muslim demand for separate electorates, it failed to oblige the Muslims on other issues. The Award turned down the Muslim demand for statutory majorities in the Punjab and Bengal. The Award took no concrete decision on distributing powers between the centre and province on genuine federal lines. Muslim demand that residuary powers should be vested in the provinces was not accepted. Not surprisingly, then, the constitutional advance in the Act of 1935, based essentially on the proceedings of the Round Table Conference, failed to carry Muslim support and approval.

The Act of 1935 in fact promoted a federation with a strong unitary bias. The Act not only empowered the centre to legislate the 'Federal' list of subjects, but, also the 'Concurrent' list if it so desired. In addition the Act failed to protect the autonomy of the provinces. Ministerial functions were still restricted by "safeguards" placed in the hands of the governors. To further restrict the scope of the ministerial responsibility, the Act placed the governors under the 'superintendence' and 'general control' of the Governor-General. Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah could clearly see that the Act was "devoid of all the basic and essential elements and fundamental requirements which are necessary to form any federation". The Muslims were not prepared to submit to a central government dominated by the Hindu majority community. They had a fear based on the results of the available evidence of the working of the representative system of government in India for nearly a century. They realized that they were a "permanent minority", and could not hope for turning the majority rule in the opposite direction. The more they saw the powers vested in the centre the more they feared that it must necessarily in practice favour the Hindus who formed the bulk of the population. The Congress rule of the provinces in 1937-39 proved the point beyond any shadow of doubt. The Muslims were now convinced that there was no place for them in

the Indian Sun. They had been considering various partition schemes from time to time. But now, they realized, the time had come to make their destiny "safe and inalienable". On March 23, 1940 they formulated the idea of a separate homeland for the Muslims at the Lahore session of the League. Muslim anxieties and apprehensions in a system inherently pitted against them could find no other solution than the clear division of India into Muslim and Hindu majority areas. Block 7 attempts to explore these developments, concentrating in particular on the Congress rule of 1937-39, various partition schemes, and finally the Lahore Resolution.

If the Act of 1935 proposed in theory a system of government with a unitary bias, the Congress, during its two and a half years of rule in the provinces (1937-39), left no doubt about it in anyone's mind. It insisted on the formation of one-party cabinets in the provinces, taking upon itself the mantle of national authority in order to prove its claim to be the successor to the British Raj. Not only it rejected League's moves at coalition-making but openly flouted the reservation and safeguards written into provincial constitutions. The Muslims felt that the Congress attitude was nothing short of an attempt at Hindu domination. Attempts with Gandhi's blessings, to force Sanskritized Hindi and to remould the educational system particularly in the primary stage of education through *Vidya-mandir* scheme further showed to them that the idea was to obliterate Muslim culture in India and to prepare "a generation which would cease to be Muslim in thought, character and action". The "fear of the future" that weighed heavily on the Muslim mind since the introduction of British parliamentary institutions in India now showed to Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah and other Muslim leaders that Gandhi, Congress, and the Hindu majority were aiming to establish Hindu Raj in India.

One sure indicator of this fear of the future was the rapidity with which the Indian Muslims had devised schemes — zonal schemes, partition schemes — to get rid of the Hindu-dominated centre. The Lahore Resolution was in fact a logical and historical extension of this consciousness. However, the Resolution differed from the early schemes in two very important respects. First, the early schemes were generally regional, territorial solutions within the all-India setup. Lahore Resolution demanded the partition of India, complete and full. Quaid-i-Azam clearly recognized the inherent difficulties in the regional solutions. He wanted to make the Muslim destiny completely safe. Secondly, and more importantly, the Lahore Resolution had an ideological basis much in line with Allama Iqbal's Allahabad Address of 1930. It promised the Muslims an opportunity to develop to the fullest their "spiritual, cultural, economic, social and political life" in a way they thought "best" and in consonance with their own "ideal" and according to the "genius" of their people.

The Resolution, proposed on March 23, and adopted on March 24, 1940 resolved that the partition of India should be "designed on the following basic principles, *viz.* that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted, with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority as in

the North-Western and Eastern zones of India should be grouped to constitute independent states in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign". As to the fate of Muslim minorities left behind in India, the Resolution suggested that, "adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards shall be specifically provided in the constitution for them and other minorities for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights and interests in consultation with them". Quaid-i-Azam was not unmindful of the fact that "the Mussalmans, wherever they are in a minority cannot improve their position under a united India or under one central government". Whatever happens, he reckoned, "they would remain a minority". The question for the Muslim minorities in Hindu India, he, therefore, suggested, is "whether the entire Muslim India of 90,000,000 should be subjected to a Hindu majority Raj or whether at least 60,000,000 of Mussalmans residing in the areas where they form a majority should have their own homeland and thereby have an opportunity to develop their spiritual, cultural, economic and political life in accordance with their own genius and shape their own future destiny . . . ." Quaid-i-Azam was convinced that a separate Muslim homeland was "not only a practicable goal but the only goal if you want to save Islam from complete annihilation in this country".

But this was not to be an easy undertaking. While the idea of a separate Muslim homeland brought to the majority of the Muslims a sense of identity and purpose, it caused, consternation to the other two parties involved in the Indian situation, the Hindus and the British. The Hindus could not contenance the "vivisection" of India. The Hindus, whether they belonged to the Hindu Mahasabha or the Indian National Congress, had always considered the territorial integrity of India as the very essence of "Hinduism". As Rajendra Prasad, one of the prominent leaders of the Congress and its future President of India, described it: "It cannot be denied that irrespective of who rules and what were the administrative or political divisions of the country, Hindus have never conceived of India as comprising anything less than what we regard as India today." The British, on their part, could not agree to the undoing of their most trumpeted achievement in India, the state-building. The very idea of Pakistan, thus, wrote one British writer, "stirred distaste in British governing circles". That their entire work should end in the division of the subcontinent into separate countries was "not something which sincere British officials in India could contemplate without abhorrence". To complicate the matters further, there were the so-called "nationalist Muslims" who insisted that "history would never forgive us if we agree to partition". Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah, thus, had to make the most of his leadership abilities and skills at two levels, rather simultaneously. He had to organize the Indian Muslims under the banner of the League as well to enter into negotiations with the British (more so with the British — because they were the *de facto* rulers of the country as well) and the Congress over the issue of Pakistan. Block 8 deals with the efforts to organize the Indian Muslims under the banner of the League. Block 9 proceeds further.

Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah planned a strategy comprising four major elements. First, he initiated the task of reorganizing the League to make room for the new

entrants, particularly those who were moved by the Pakistan ideal, and thus appeared more than willing to join the League and serve its cause. He gave it a new organizational set up, opening up new avenues of association and participation within the League. The result was that the League came to represent not only the "traditional" groups like the landlords, nawabs, and other titled gentry but also the 'modern' educated, urban middle classes, merchant-industrialists, traders, bankers, professionals, as well as the *Ulema*. Indeed, it had come to transform itself into an Indian Muslim nationalist organization. Secondly, Quaid-i-Azam moved to seek the support of strong provincial leaders of the Muslim-majority provinces. This was by no means an easy task. The provincial leaders were reluctant to yield to the control of the centre. But with lot of patience, hard work and direct appeal to the masses over the demand for Pakistan he was able to bring the provincial leaders under the effective control of the All-India Muslim League.

Thirdly, Quaid-i-Azam launched a mass mobilization campaign to reach all groups and sections of the Muslims society. Some segments of the society not only responded enthusiastically to the promise held out by the Pakistan idea but also took it upon themselves to carry the message to the masses. They were, (1) the students (2) the *Ulema*, *pirs sajjadanashins*, and (3) the women. They were the ones who went on to serve and promote the cause of the League with enthusiasm, single-hearted allegiance, and dedication. Finally, Quaid-i-Azam made the most of his efforts to organize the Muslims behind the banner of the League by taking full advantage of the acts of omission and commission committed by the British and the Congress during the war years. The Congress provided him the most momentous opportunity by resigning its ministries in reaction to the decision of the British Government in 1939 to declare war on behalf of India and thus leaving the political field entirely to the League. Quaid-i-Azam hastened to install League ministries in its place, especially in the Muslim-majority provinces, such as Assam, Bengal and the NWFP. The Punjab was already under the League-Unionist coalition. The war itself provided the Quaid an ideal opportunity to mobilize support for the League. The British, in view of the Congress attitude during the war, were virtually left with no choice but to woo the non-Congress parties in the country, especially the League, the second largest party. This of course, did not mean that the Quaid was willing to acquiesce in the British war effort. He would have nothing to do with it unless the British in turn were prepared to offer the Muslims "their real voice and share in the Government of the country". On August 8, 1940 the British Government were constrained to state publically that they "could not contemplate the transfer of their present responsibilities for the peace and welfare of India to any system of Government whose authority is directly denied by large and powerful elements in India's national life".

Although the Quaid did not accept the August Offer as it did not address itself directly and sufficiently to the League demands, as the later events were to demonstrate, the die was cast. Henceforth, no move could be made at the centre without League influencing the course of events. The Cripps Mission (1942), Simla Conference (1945), and the Cabinet Mission (1946) discussions went on to

confirm the unassailable position of the League. Muslim League was the party as far as the Muslims were concerned. By the end of 1946 it stood as the "sole representative body of Muslim India", having now all the Muslim seats in the central assembly. In the provincial assemblies it was able to secure overwhelming majority of Muslim seats. In all, it was able to secure 460 of the 533 Muslim seats in the central and provincial assembly elections. In terms of the percentages of the votes polled, League was able to manage 86.7 per cent of the total Muslim votes cast in the elections to the central assembly and 74.7 per cent in the provincial assemblies. This was a remarkable achievement over the paltry 4.4 per cent it had polled in the 1937 elections. Quaid-i-Azam himself was elated. "Now the only thing I can say", he declared at League Legislators Convention held in Delhi on April 7-9, 1946, "is this: I do not think there is any power or any authority that can prevent us from achieving our cherished goal of Pakistan . . . I am confident that we shall march on from victory to victory until we have Pakistan".

Organization of the Indian Muslims, under the banner of the League, however, as indicated above, was the fulfillment of half of the Quaid's mission. He had also to make the British and the Hindus concede the demand for Pakistan. He had to secure the partition of the Indian sub-continent, and thus Pakistan's creation. Block 9 discusses this crucial aspect of the struggle for Pakistan, emphasizing in particular, the constitutional discussions at the centre, i.e., the Cripps Proposals, Gandhi-Jinnah Talks (1944), Simla Conference, Cabinet Mission Plan, the formation of Interim Government (1946-47), and finally the Partition Plan of June 3, 1947.

Cripps came to India in March 1942. He was known for his sympathies with the Congress and its leadership, particularly Jawaharlal Nehru. The constitutional proposals which he carried from London were published soon after his arrival. They stated that the British will help create "a new Indian Union" after the war. It was suggested however that if any province of British India was not prepared to accept the new constitution or the present constitutional set-up, the British Government will be prepared to grant such "non-acceding provinces" the same status as that of the Indian Union. Apparently it was a great concession to the Muslim sentiment on the subject. The Muslims had already rejected the Indian Union. Lahore Resolution clearly stipulated a separate homeland for the Muslims. But there was a catch. Both Muslims and Hindus of a given province had to decide on non-accession. The Muslims alone were not given the right of option. The League, given the Hindu opposition to the Muslim demand could not possibly secure majority support in the Punjab and Bengal. The Quaid, thus, rejected the proposals without much hesitation: "So far as the Pakistan demand is not agreed to", he declared, "we cannot agree to any present adjustment which will in any way militate against or prejudice the Pakistan demand".

The next important initiative on the constitutional problem of India was Gandhi-Jinnah Talks. In May 1944, Gandhi sought negotiations with the Quaid. The ground for the meeting was prepared by C. Rajagopalachari, a leading member of the Congress. But these talks proved fruitless. The two leaders saw the



problem from very different angles. Gandhi wanted the Muslims to abandon their demand till the withdrawal of the British. The Quaid, on the other hand, demanded that he should "accept the fundamentals of the Lahore Resolution and proceed to settle details". One of the main outcome of these Talks in fact was that the Quaid made it abundantly clear to all concerned that no interim solution of the constitutional problem could be agreed upon unless the principle of Pakistan was conceded first. Unfortunately, the Viceroy, Lord Wavell, missed the point, and paid the price in the failure of the Simla Conference of 1945.

The Quaid told the Viceroy on the very first day of the Conference that the League "would not agree to any constitution except on the fundamental principle of Pakistan". Though the conference in the end concerned itself primarily with the interim arrangement, i.e., the composition of the Viceroy's expanded Executive Council for the war period, the implications of the Quaid's demand for an exclusive right to nominate its Muslim members were absolutely clear. The long-term and interim arrangements were inexorably linked. As he put it, we know that this interim or provisional arrangement will have a way of settling down for an unlimited period and all the forces in the proposed Executive plus the known policy of the British Government and Lord Wavell's strong inclination for a united India, would completely jeopardize us . . . ." The Quaid thus rejected the Viceroy's proposals. He could not agree to compromise the principle of Pakistan for the sake of a doubtful advantage in the provisional scheme of things. The Simla Conference, however, marked a breakwater in Indian political history as far as the Pakistan issue was concerned. Pakistan issue emerged as the issue of the day. The League won the 1945-46 elections on the Pakistan issue.

After the elections, the British Government sent a mission of three Cabinet Ministers, Pethick-Lawrence, Stafford Cripps and A. V. Alexander to India to bring about an agreement on the future constitution of India. The Mission reached India in March 1946. They brought no concrete proposals, but after a series of inconclusive interviews and discussions with the Indian political leaders, decided to formulate and announce their own plan. Announced on May 16, the main thrust of the plan was to offer India a three-tiered constitutional structure in which provinces were grouped to form "sections" and to determine themselves what subjects would be under the jurisdiction of their respective sectional governments. Section A comprised the provinces of Madras, Bombay, United Provinces, Bihar, Central Provinces, and Orissa. Section B included the provinces of the Punjab, NWFP and Sind. Section C was to consist of the provinces of Bengal and Assam. The three sections of the Constituent Assembly had to come together along with representatives of the Indian States to settle the Union Constitution after the provincial constitution had been formed. Once the Union Constitution had come into force, the provinces could "opt out" of their group. The Mission also stressed the importance of setting up an Interim Government immediately with the support of major political parties. The Plan was thus divided into two parts: a long-term plan and a short-term plan. The two plans were interdependent and were to be accepted or rejected as a whole. It was further made clear that if either of the two parties refused to join the Interim Government, the Viceroy would seek the help of other parties to form the government.

The Mission was sure that the Congress would accept the Plan. Its members were equally sure that the Muslim League would outrightly reject it. But contrary to their expectations, the League accepted the plan in the hope that it would ultimately pave the way for the achievement of Pakistan. The Congress, on the other hand, accepted the long-term plan but refused to join the Interim Government. The Mission was thus committed to ask the League to form the government. The British were lost. But there was no way they could agree to hand over the reigns of government to the League. They went back on their "plighted word". The League withdrew its earlier acceptance, and decided to resort to 'direct action' to achieve Pakistan. The League's rejection of the Cabinet Mission Plan, and the decision to resort to 'direct action' marked virtually the end of any prospect of united India in the ensuing struggle for the transfer of power to the Indian hands. The Quaid refused to attend the Hindu-dominated Constituent Assembly, in spite of the fact that he eventually agreed in October 1946 to join the Interim Government at the centre.

The Muslim League, of course joined the Government "as sentinels which would watch Muslim interests in the day-to-day administration of government". The idea was to "resist every attempt which would directly or indirectly militate or prejudice our demand for Pakistan". The Interim Government thus merely helped to serve and accentuate the bitterness between the Hindus and Muslims on the one hand and the League and the Congress on the other.

On February 20, 1947, Attlee, the British Prime Minister, was constrained to announce in the Parliament that the "present state of uncertainty is fraught with danger and cannot be indefinitely prolonged". Mountbatten was appointed the new Viceroy for the purposes of "transferring to Indian hands responsibility for the government of British India in a manner that will best ensure the future happiness and prosperity of India . . ." How far Mountbatten succeeded in this task was another matter. June 3, 1947 Plan, and the subsequent partition of the two Muslim-majority provinces of the Punjab and Bengal and the unfair and injudicious demarcation of their boundaries speaks volumes on the subject. In spite of all the difficulties put in the way East Bengal, West Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan, North-West Frontier Province and Sylhet, all voted for the new Pakistan Constituent Assembly. On August 14, 1947 Pakistan emerged as a sovereign, independent state on the map of the world. The long and arduous struggle of the Indian Muslims, under the able and devoted leadership of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, had finally bore fruit. Pakistan Movement had triumphed against all odds.

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## 1. Block One: 1857 Uprising and the Role of Syed Ahmad Khan

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### 1.1 Introduction

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In this block we will study the 1857 Uprising and its impact on the Indian Muslim political life, highlighting in particular the role of Syed Ahmad Khan. The Uprising was of course an unsuccessful attempt on part of the Indians to get rid of the increasing British domination. The British came to India as traders under the banner of the East India Company, but soon involved themselves in political activities. They did not hesitate to go for the ultimate supremacy in India. Moghul Emperor, Bahadur Shah Zafar, made a final attempt to check their advance, but in vain. Moghul rule met its end and the British took over as the new rulers of India.

The failure of the Uprising had a severe effect on the Muslim community. While the Hindus readily reconciled with the rule, along with its attendant administrative, political and educational institutions, the Muslims found it exceedingly difficult to adjust themselves to the new situation. For one, the British considered them as their arch enemies, who had converted a "sepoj mutiny" into a "political conspiracy aimed at the extinction of the British Raj". And secondly, and more importantly, their substitution of English for Persian and Western education for traditional curricula dispossessed the Muslims of all positions of influence and authority in the country. The doors of civil and military services as well as all professions were closed to them. The British indeed put a seal on the decline of Muslims in all walks of life.

This new and unprecedented situation for the Muslims brought Sir Syed Ahmad Khan (1819 – 98) to the fore of Muslim politics, to save the Muslims from the deepening crisis. He implored the Muslims to find a *modus vivendi* with the British presence in India. British, he reckoned, had come to stay in India, at least for a while. He was convinced that if the Muslims did not respond to the new realities and in particular, did not take to the new system of education introduced by the British, they would not only remain a backward community but would suffer increasingly until there would be left no hope for their survival. The connection between education and government was too obvious for Syed Ahmad Khan to ignore. In 1874, he drew up the scheme of Anglo-Muhammadan College at Aligarh. By 1878, it was a reality hoping to satisfy the educational, cultural and political aspirations of the Muslims.

Politically, the Muslims were in dire straits. Not only they had to reconcile with the British rule in general but also the system of government, based on the

representative principle, introduced in India. The difficulty was that the representative institutions in India were bound to result in the domination of Hindus over the Muslims. As compared with the Hindus, the Muslims were numerically much smaller, educationally backward, and economically weak. Hindus would obtain four times as many votes as Muslims because their population was four times as large. "It would be like a game of dice", Syed Ahmad Khan lamented, "in which one man had four dice and the other only one". Syed Ahmad Khan was in fact convinced that representative government was possible only when voters belonged to a homogenous population. "In a country like India", he observed, "where caste distinctions still flourish, where religious distinctions are still violent, where education in modern sense has not made an equal or proportionate progress among all sections of the population, . . . the introduction of the principle of election, pure and simple, for representation of various interests . . . would be attended with evils of greater significance. . . . The larger community would totally override the interests of the smaller community . . . .".

Syed Ahmad Khan's fears were confirmed with the establishment of the Indian National Congress in 1885, demanding not only extension of the principle of elections and a greatly enhanced role in the administration of India but also the right to speak on behalf of the "Indian Nation". Syed Ahmad Khan pointed out that the Congress demands were based upon "ignorance of history and present-day realities". They did not take into consideration that "India is inhabited by different nationalities". Indian people professed different religions, spoke different languages, their ways of life and customs were different, their attitude to history and historical traditions was different. There was no one nation in India. This explicit denial of Congress demands and its faith in one nation carried with it all the elements of a separate Muslim identity in the political life of India. Muslims were separate from the Hindus, their interests were separate from those of the Hindus, and their interests could be secured and promoted only through a separate group life and activity. That was the pivot around which the Muslim politics of India came to rest, ultimately.

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## 1.2 Background

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### *Compulsory Readings*

- Reading 1: Modern Muslim India and the Birth of Pakistan  
(S. M. Ikram)

### *Self-Learning Questions (SLQs)*

#### Question – 1

Write a brief note on the history of Hindu-Muslim relationship as it evolved through the period of Muslim supremacy in India (712 – 1707).

KEY: *Points to Note*

- The role of Muhammad Bin Qasim.
- The state of relations between the Hindus and the Muslims in the Sultanate period.
- The efforts of the Moghul rulers, especially those of Akbar and Aurangzeb.

Question – 2

Analyse briefly the state of Muslim society in the eighteenth century, emphasizing in particular the developments in the cultural and religious spheres.

KEY: *Points to Note*

- The standardization of Muslim educational system.
- The work of Shah Wali Allah
- The Jihad Movement and its impact on the Muslim society.

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### 1.3 1857 Uprising

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#### *Compulsory Reading*

Reading 2: Ideological Basis of Pakistan: In Historical Perspective, 711 – 1940  
(S. Moinul Haq)

#### *Self-Learning Questions (SLQs)*

Question – 3

How would you explain the 1857 Uprising? Illustrate your answer with reference to the role of the Revolutionaries.

KEY: *Points to Note*

- Revolt of the people against British imperialism.
- Exploitation in political, economic and social spheres.
- Struggle for freedom by the Revolutionaries.

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### 1.4 Role of Syed Ahmad Khan

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#### *Compulsory Readings*

Reading 3: History of the Idea of Pakistan, Vol. I  
(K. K. Aziz)

Reading 4: The Muslim Community of the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent  
(I. H. Qureshi)

- Reading 5: Muslim Politics and Leadership in South Asia, 1876 – 1892  
(Muhammad Yousaf Abbasi)
- Reading 6: Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan and Muslim Modernization in India and Pakistan  
(Hafeez Malik)  
Ref: Reader 537 (Reading 1, Block 3)
- Reading 7: Muslim Separatism in India  
(Abdul Hamid)  
Ref: Reader 537 (Reading 2, Block 3)

### *Self-Learning Questions (SLQs)*

#### Question – 4

Evaluate the role of Syed Ahmad Khan in the growth of Muslim nationalism in India.

KEY: *Points to Note*

- Syed Ahmad Khan emphasized racial and religious differences between the Hindus and the Muslims.
- The Hindus and Muslims had different interests.
- Muslims are a separate nation.

#### Question – 5

Why did Syed Ahmad Khan insist on the acquisition of Western education? Discuss.

KEY: *Points to Note*

- Syed Ahmad Khan was convinced that the acquisition of Western education would contribute to their intellectual progress.
- His mission was to bring the Muslims up to the level of other communities in India.
- Education was inexorably linked with government service, professions and economic activity.

#### Question – 6

Why did Syed Ahmad Khan oppose the Indian National Congress? Discuss.

KEY: *Points to Note*

- Congress demands were detrimental to the Muslims who were educationally and economically backward.
- India was not one "Nation" as claimed by the Congress.
- Muslims had their own political identity which could not be made subservient to the Hindu Congress.

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## 1.5 Suggested Readings

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*For Background, see.*

1. I. H. Qureshi, 1977 — The Muslim Community of the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent 610 — 1947, Ma'aref Ltd., Karachi, pp. 183 — 96.
2. I. H. Qureshi, 1960 — "The Causes of the War of Independence" History of the Freedom Movement, Vol. II, Part-I, Pakistan Historical Society, Karachi, pp. 230 — 69.

*For 1857 Uprising, see.*

3. Hafeez Malik (ed), 1982 — Political Profile of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan: A Documentary Record, Institute of Islamic History, Culture and Civilization, Islamabad, pp. 133 — 74.

*For Role of Syed Ahmad Khan, see.*

4. Hafeez Malik (ed), 1982 — Political Profile of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan: A Documentary Record, pp. 342 — 85, 394.

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## 2 Block Two: Towards the Growth of Separate Muslim Political Identity – I

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### 2.1 *Introduction.*

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In this block we shall analyze a number of developments, concentrating primarily on the role of Syed Ahmad Khan's successors in furthering his political creed, the effects of the partition of Bengal in 1905 on the Muslim fortunes, the role of the Simla Deputation of 1906, and the founding of the All-India Muslim League the same year.

The Urdu-Hindi controversy that began in Syed Ahmad Khan's times became one of the major factors in determining Muslim attitude towards the rapidly changing political situation of India, forcing his erstwhile colleagues and successors, such as Mohsin-ul-Mulk, Secretary of the Aligarh College to launch a movement for the protection of Urdu as the official language of the United province, Sir Anthony MacDonnell, the lieutenant-Governor of the province in 1895, was keen on Hindi language and the Nagri script. In April 1900 his government issued a resolution declaring that Hindi written in the Nagri script would enjoy equal status with Urdu as the language of courts in the province as well as in recruitment to jobs except in a purely English office. Mohsin-ul-Mulk and his associates at Aligarh established in Lucknow an Urdu Defence Association to force the government to withdraw the resolution. Although the Muslim community failed to get the government change its policy as long as MacDonnell was in charge of the government, things improved with his departure. The new governor, Sir James La Touche, was more concerned about the future of Urdu, and did not insist on strict compliance of the said resolution. Syed Ahmad Khan's successors made another successful move to serve the Muslim cause first by arranging a deputation of leading Muslim representatives to call on the Viceroy to apprise him of the Muslim demands and aspirations in the emerging Indian polity, better known as the Simla Deputation, and then by founding the All-India Muslim League as the political organization of the Muslims. We will return to these developments after having taken note of yet another development, the partition of Bengal which too affected the Muslim interest in a significant manner.

In 1905, the unwieldy province of Bengal was partitioned. The Dacca, Rajshahi and Chittagong Divisions (excluding the Darjeeling District) and the district of Malda were separated from it and united with Assam were reconstituted into a new province of Eastern Bengal and Assam. In this province the Muslims



formed an overwhelming majority, nearly two-thirds of the population.

While the authors of the partition, Lord Curzon and other British officials insisted that the partition scheme was no more than an administrative device to tackle the administrative problem of a far too wieldy province (with an area of 1,89,000 square miles and population of 80 millions), the Hindus saw it as a policy of 'divide and rule', a ploy to arrest the growth of Indian 'nationalism.'

Nothing could be far from the truth and for a number of very cogent reasons: (1) Partition was meant not to divide Hindus and Muslims, but only Bengal province. The new province of 31 million still had 1/3 of its population comprising Hindus. The remainder of Bengal with some 50 million was a Hindu dominated province. (2) There was no definite sense of solidarity between the Hindus and the Muslims in the first place. The Muslims in Bengal were too disorganized and backward to really count in the political life of Bengal which was safely in the hands of the Hindus. (3) Even after the announcement, clearly to the benefit of the Muslims, the Muslim opinion was divided on the issue. At first even the Muslim Nawab of Dacca moved a resolution against the partition of Bengal at 22nd Congress session. In fact, it was the partition rather than the prospect of partition which later on formulated and developed Muslim opinion against anti-partition agitation launched by the Hindus. (4) Even if one were to concede that the partition of Bengal was a "deliberate" move on the part of the British government to sow the seed of conflict between the Hindus and the Muslims, the question arises, why did not the Hindus move to put forward "an alternative scheme" to satisfy legitimate grievances of the Muslims? After all, partition meant a great relief to the Bengali Muslims.

The fact of the matter was that the Hindus felt agitated because the new province of East Bengal threatened their dominance in public services and professions. Trade coming to Calcutta would go to Chittagong, and Calcutta lawyers would lose their clientele to Dacca, the capital and legal centre of the Muslim province. Lord Curzon himself was convinced that the whole anti-partition agitation was a mere blackmail, without purity and honesty of purpose, and will suffer in the end. Opposition to the partition was in fact dead by the end of 1910. But then the British government in "an abject surrender to militant Hindu opinion" did not hesitate to annul the partition in 1911. In December, King George V announced the annulment of partition of Bengal leaving Muslims distressed and disillusioned with the British attitude.

Muslims, however had some solace in the British response to the Simla Deputation geared to demand more equitable representation for the Muslim community. Led by the Aga Khan, the Deputation consisting of 36 members, waited on the Viceroy, Lord Minto, on October 1, 1906. The thrust of the Muslim demand was that the position of the Muslim community should not be estimated on its numerical strength alone, but in terms of its historical importance in the country. The deputation pointed out that the representative institutions introduced by the British in India were not appropriate and suitable to Indian conditions. The Muslims were a distinct community with their own special interest. It was therefore necessary that the Muslim community should be granted separate

electorates, to elect their own representatives through their exclusive Muslim constituencies, and that too commensurate not only with their numbers but also with the value of their contribution to the defence of the empire.

Although the Hindus, particularly the Hindu press of Calcutta, subsequently started a virulent campaign against the sponsors of the Deputation and their demands, the fact of the matter was that the Muslim demands were based on genuine complaints about the system of government, resting on the majority principle. Results of the elections of 1893 were a complete disappointment for the Muslims. Even some Hindu leaders, such as Gokhale, conceded that Muslim apprehensions regarding their future could not be arbitrarily dismissed. If the Hindus had been a minority, they would not have reacted differently. Yet it was after lot of hectic activity, and particularly after the unrelenting campaign launched by Syed Amir Ali in London to mobilize parliamentary and public support over the issue of separate electorates that the British government finally agreed to include the principle of separate electorates in the constitutional reforms of 1909.

The favourable response to the Simla Deputation helped the Muslim leaders in directing their attention to the immediate establishment of a political organization of their own, to demand and promote their own special interests. So far, the Muslims, under the influence of Syed Ahmad Khan, had shunned formal political activity. But now the changed conditions of India, particularly in the context of anticipated constitutional advance under the Act of 1909, and growing Hindu-Muslim chasm, forced the Muslims to found the All-India Muslim League on December 30, 1906.

The first steps towards the founding of a separate Muslim political organization were taken at Lucknow in the middle of September, 1906 when the Simla Deputation was meeting to prepare its brief, and it was decided that an All-India Muslim political organization should be established at the next annual meeting of the Muhammadan Educational Conference. The matter was again discussed at Simla in October, 1906 by the members of the Deputation, and it was decided finally to settle the aims and objects of the proposed organization after the conclusion of the annual session of the Muhammadan Educational Conference in the last week of December. In accordance with the decisions taken at Lucknow and Simla, a meeting of the delegates to the Conference and of other prominent Muslims, was held at Dacca on December, 30, 1906. Viqar-ul-Mulk, a colleague and follower of Syed Ahmad Khan presided. A resolution proposed by Khawaja Salimullah, Nawab of Dacca, and seconded by Hakim Ajmal Khan was unanimously adopted, and the long awaited political organization was founded under the name of the All-India Muslim League. One of its most important objects clearly was: "To project and advance the political rights and interests of the Musalmans of India and respectfully to present their needs and aspirations to the Government".

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## 2.2 Successors of Syed Ahmad Khan

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### Compulsory Readings

- Reading 8: Evolution of Pakistan  
(Syed Sharif-ud-din Pirzada)
- Reading 9: Modern Muslim India and the Birth of Pakistan  
(S. M. Ikram)

### Self-Learning Questions (SLQs)

#### Question – 7

Discuss the contribution of Syed Ahmad Khan's successors in the growth of separate Muslim political identity.

KEY: *Points to Note*

- The defence of Urdu.
- The principle of separate electorates.
- The founding of the All-India Muslim League.

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## 2.3 Partition of Bengal

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### Compulsory Readings

- Reading 10: Muslim Separatism in India  
(Abdul Hamid)

### Self-Learning Questions (SLQs)

#### Question – 8

Discuss the partition of Bengal of 1905. How did it suit the Muslim interest?

KEY: *Points to Note*

- Historic, geographic, economic and administrative grounds for the partition of an unwieldy province.
- The new province of Assam & Eastern Bengal comprised roughly two-thirds Muslim majority.
- The Muslims of East Bengal found some say in the management of local matters.

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## 2.4 Simla Deputation and the Founding of the All-India Muslim League

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### Compulsory Readings

- Reading 11: Muslim Separatism in India  
(Abdul Hamid)

*Self-Learning Questions (SLQs)*

Question – 9

Identify and discuss the main demands put forward by the Simla Deputation.

KEY: *Points to Note*

- Representative institutions of the West were not suited to Indian conditions.
- Muslims had no chance of getting fair representation in the system commensurate with their political importance.
- The Muslims must be granted separate electorates.

Question – 10

How did the establishment of the Muslim League contribute towards the emergence of Muslim nationalism in India?

KEY: *Points to Note*

- It helped to highlight and attend to exclusive Muslim interests in the country.
- The League contributed to the acceptance of separate Muslim electorates.
- It provided the Muslims an organised political platform.

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2.5 *Suggested Readings:*

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*For Successors of Syed Ahmad Khan, see,*

1. Syed Hashimi Faridabadi, 1963 – “The Urdu-Hindi Controversy” History of the Freedom Movement, Vol. III, Part-II, pp. 357 – 76.
2. G. Allana (ed), 1977 – Pakistan Movement: Historic Documents, Islamic Book Service, Lahore, p. 4.

*For Partition of Bengal, see,*

3. A.R. Mallick, 1961 – “The Muslims and the Partition of Bengal, 1905” History of the Freedom Movement, Vol. III, Part-I, pp. 1–28.

*For Simla Deputation and the Founding of the All-India Muslim League, see,*

4. Jamil ud din Ahmad, 1961 – “Foundation of the All-India Muslim League”, History of the Freedom Movement, Vol. III, Part-I, pp. 29 – 61.
5. G. Allana (ed), 1977 – Pakistan Movement: Historic Documents, pp. 5 – 21.
6. Syed Sharif ud din Pirzada (ed), 1969 – Foundations of Pakistan, All-India Muslim League Documents: 1906 – 1947, Vol. I, National Publishing House, Karachi, pp. 1 – 15.

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### 3. Block Three: Towards the Growth of Separate Muslim Political Identity – II

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#### 3.1 *Introduction*

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In this block we will devote our attention to the principle of separate electorates, the 1909 Act, Annulment of the Partition of Bengal, and the Lucknow Pact of 1916. As indicated in the previous block, the Simla Deputation had demanded in their address presented to the Viceroy on October 1, 1906 that Muslim representatives on all elected bodies — local, provincial and imperial — should be elected by the Muslim voters alone. The Viceroy had agreed to communicate the demand to the Secretary of State. The latter agreed to the principle that the Muslims needed special representation in the councils but did not favour a separate Muslim electorate. Instead, he proposed that there should be a fixed number of seats for each community to be filled by means of mixed electoral college composed of members of different communities in proportion to their numerical strength in a given electoral area. The Muslims did not approve. They insisted that Muslim seats in the councils should be filled only by Muslim electorates. In January, 1909 a deputation headed by Syed Ameer Ali impressed upon the Secretary of State the terrible implications of the mixed electoral colleges as far as they concerned the Muslims. Syed Ameer Ali's efforts finally convinced the British government to agree to separate Muslim electorates.

A very important feature of the Act of 1909, in fact, was the introduction of separate electorates for the Muslims. Some seats were reserved in each council, except that of the Punjab, to be filled exclusively by Muslim voters. The Muslims could, of course, take part in the elections for general seats and thereby enhance their representation. Other salient feature of the Act of 1909 was that the number of seats on the councils was increased considerably. An official majority was retained in the imperial legislative council, but small non-official majorities were conceded to the provinces with a considerable number of elected members. The scope of activities of the new councils was considerably enlarged. Members could discuss budgetary proposals, and could also ask questions and move resolutions on issues of public concern. The Act, however, left the control of the government firmly in the hands of bureaucracy. Councils were subject to government control. Yet the Act of 1909 was a considerable advance over the Act of 1892, and introduced for the first time the principle of election side by side with that of nomination.

While the Muslims gained legally and constitutionally a great deal in the grant of separate electorates under the Act of 1909, the annulment of the partition of Bengal in 1911, left them disenchanted with the British rule. They saw the announcement made at a coronation durbar for King George V at Delhi on December 12, 1911, a clear instance of concession to the militant Hindu agitation against the partition of the province. The annulment of the partition of Bengal, however, was not the only cause of Muslim discontent. A number of events ranging from the government refusal to raise the M.A.O College, Aligarh, to the status of a University, to the Cawnpore Mosque tragedy, to the attitude of the British towards the Turkish Empire, during the course of Balkan wars in 1912-13, agitated the Muslim community. They were indeed convinced that their problems were the result of the British policy which they thought was being employed to crush the Muslims inside as well as outside India. Thus an anti-British sentiment began to grow among the Muslims forcing them to join hands with the Hindus to make a united demand on the system. In November 1916, as the President of the Lucknow session of the League (Quaid-i-Azam) Jinnah moved the Muslim League and the Congress to draft a scheme of reforms acceptable to both organizations. The pact, better known as the Lucknow Pact, apart from other changes proposed in the system of representation, made two significant contributions. The Congress accepted the system of separate electorates granted by the British in the Act of 1909. Not only that, it conceded separate electorates to the Muslims in the provinces, such as the Punjab and the Central Provinces, where they did not exist previously. Secondly, the Muslims were given "weightage" in Muslim minority provinces. This Pact was the first political settlement between the Hindus and the Muslims. Jinnah, for his keen efforts in making this settlement possible, was hailed as the "Ambassador of Unity".

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### 3.2 *Separate Electorates*

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#### *Compulsory Readings*

- Reading 13: Separate Electorates as the Genesis of Pakistan  
(Shafique Ali Khan)
- Reading 14: PAKISTAN: The Formative Phase 1857 – 1948  
(Khalid Bin Sayeed)

#### *Self-Learning Questions (SLQs)*

##### Question – 11

Why did the Muslims demand separate electorates? Do you think its acceptance by the British was "a deliberate attempt to sow the seeds of conflict between Hindus and Muslim"? Discuss.

KEY: *Points to Note*

- Real and effective representation of the Muslims was possible only through the system of separate electorates.
- The British never foresaw the political development of India on British parliamentary lines.
- India was a vast complex of diverse classes, castes, communities and religions.

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### 3.3 1909 Act

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#### *Compulsory Readings*

- Reading 15: The Indian Problem, 1833 – 1935  
(Sir Reginald Coupland)
- Reading 16: Oxford History of India  
(Vincent A. Smith)

#### *Self-Learning Questions (SLQs)*

##### Question – 12

Did the British accept the Muslim demand for separate electorates? Discuss with reference to the Act of 1909.

KEY: *Points to Note*

- The British incorporated the principle of separate electorates in the Act.
- Special Muslim constituencies were created for the Imperial Legislative Council and some provincial legislatures.

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### 3.4 Annulment of the Partition of Bengal

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#### *Compulsory Readings*

- Reading 17: Muslim Separatism in India  
(Abdul Hamid)

#### *Self-Learning Questions (SLQs)*

##### Question – 13

How did the Muslims react to the annulment of the partition of Bengal?

KEY: *Points to Note*

- The annulment left them sullen and disillusioned.
- Estrangement began between the Muslims and the British.
- It showed to the Muslims that they could no longer put their faith in the government.

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### 3.5 Lucknow Pact

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#### *Compulsory Readings*

- Reading 18: PAKISTAN: The Formative Phase, 1857 – 1948  
(Khalid Bin Sayeed)
- Reading 19: The Struggle for Pakistan  
(I. H. Qureshi)

#### *Self-Learning Questions (SLQs)*

##### Question – 14

Identify and discuss the main features of the Lucknow Pact of 1916.

#### KEY: *Points to Note*

- The Congress accepted the principle of separate Muslim representation.
- Muslims and Hindus were to have "weightage" in provinces where they formed minorities.
- One-third seats were allotted to the Muslims at the centre.

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### 3.6 Suggested Readings:

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#### *For Separate Electorates, see.*

1. G. Allana (ed), 1977 – Pakistan Movement: Historic Documents; p. 24.
2. Syed Sharif ud din Pirzada (ed), 1969 – Foundations of Pakistan, Vol. I, pp. 59 – 77.

#### *For 1909 Act, see.*

3. Latif Ahmad Sherwani, 1961 – "Morely-Minto Reforms", History of Freedom Movement, Vol. III, Part I, pp. 62 – 87.
4. Syed Sharif ud din Pirzada (ed), 1969 – Foundations of Pakistan Vol. I pp. 175-76.

#### *For Annulment of the Partition of Bengal, see.*

5. Syed Sharif ud din Pirzada (ed), 1969 – Foundations of Pakistan, Vol. I, pp. 234–37.

#### *For Lucknow Pact, see.*

6. Mahmud Hussain, 1961 – "The Lucknow Pact", History of the Freedom Movement, Vol. III, Part I, pp. 118–39.
7. Syed Sharif ud din Pirzada (ed), 1984 – The Collected Works of Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Vol. I, East and West Publishing Company, Karachi, pp. 183 – 87.



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## 4. Block Four: Experiment with Hindu-Muslim Unity

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### 4.1 Introduction

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The purpose of this block is to discuss the 1919 Act, the Khilafat Movement and the growth of Hindu-Muslim communal movements in its aftermath. The 1919 Act made important changes in the structure of the central and provincial governments. Elections to the new legislatures were held in November 1920, and the Act went into operation on January 1, 1921.

The main feature of the 1919 Act was a new system of government, called 'dyarchy' introduced in the provinces of British India. The essence of the system was the division of administration of the province into two separate areas, namely, the "Reserved" and the "Transferred". The Reserved subjects were to be administered by the provincial governor with the help of executive councillors, responsible to the Government of India. The Reserved subjects were important and included land revenue, irrigation, justice, finance policy, jails, etc. But still a host of subjects of equal concern to the public at large were included in the transferred list, such as local self-government, public health sanitation, education, public works, agriculture, etc. This meant transferring of powers and responsibility to the Indian hands to a considerable extent, a significant development since the British took control of India after the 1857 Uprising. The size of provincial legislative councils was also enlarged. Direct elections were introduced. Separate electorates for the Muslims were confirmed.

The actual working of the system of dyarchy however, turned out to be far from satisfactory. The division of responsibilities into the Reserved and Transferred areas proved to be a real problem. Education, for instance, was a Transferred subject, but European and Anglo-Indian education was placed in the Reserved list. The provincial governors did not behave like constitutional heads acting on the advice of the ministers. They overruled their ministers frequently and thus frustrated all chances of the development of responsible government in the provinces. The resignation or removal of a minister did not affect his colleagues. It was, therefore, correctly said that there were ministers but without a sense of ministerial responsibilities. Thus despite the advance under the 1919 Act, the Indians were dissatisfied with the process of transfer of responsibility to the Indian hands. A number of events such as the passage of Rowlatt Act, the Jallianwala Bagh tragedy, and, above all, the Khilafat Movement made the whole

exercise all the more disconcerting. Indian Muslims launched the Khilafat Movement in 1919, as Maulana Mohamed Ali, its principal leader put it, "not for obliged to demand and secure the safety and survival of the Turkish empire in the first place. Maulana Mohamed Ali, therefore demanded: "The Khilafat shall be preserved, that there shall be no Christian mandate over any part of the Island of Arabia, and that the khalifa shall remain, as before the war, the Warden of the Holy Places".

Indian Muslims concern with the fate of the Turkish empire was clear from the moment Italy attacked Tripoli in October 1911. The Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913 caused instant convulsions among the Indian Muslims. Within a year of the breaking out of the Balkan war, they organized a medical mission for the Turkish army. Turkish empire was the greatest Muslim empire and its ruler, the Khalifa (Caliph) was the defender of their faith. When Turks, despite their sentiments and entreaties, joined the war on the side of Germany, the Indian Muslims stood up for the safety of the Turkish empire and the institution of Khilafat vested in the Khalifa.

Interestingly, the British authorities in India understood the significance and value of the Khilafat to the Muslims. They, in fact, exploited more than once the attachment of the Indian Muslims to the Khalifa to mobilize support for their rule in India. The Viceroy therefore at the very outset did not hesitate to hold out an assurance to the Muslims that their feelings will be "given the fullest representation" and that "no effort has been spared, no stone left unturned, to place before those, whom the decision will rest, the plea of Indian Mussalmans for the most favourable possible treatment of Turkey." In actual fact, however, these assurances were being violated even at the time they were being given, as the British troops were already on the move in Mesopotamia.

Maulana Mohamed Ali and other Indian Muslim leaders therefore saw fit to mobilize public opinion to make sure that the assurances given to them by the British government were honoured once the war was over. They decided to constitute the Khilafat Committee, and thus launched a country-wide Khilafat Movement. In the process, they did not hesitate to seek the support of the Hindus. A number of developments, as indicated above, had already taken place forcing the Muslims to reject the old policy of "loyalism", and seek cooperation and understanding with the Hindus. Hindus, too, on their part, needed the support of the Muslims and for a number of good reasons. More importantly, they needed the Muslim support in order to remedy the "Punjab wrongs", the situation in the Punjab after the Jallianwala massacre, and to force the British authorities to concede 'responsible government' to the Indians. Nothing could express the Hindu need to cooperate with Muslims more than Mr. Gandhi's support to the Khilafat Movement.

The Movement attained massive popular support in no time. The leaders of the Movement went on a whirlwind tour of the country mobilizing support of all groups and interests. They developed a network of alliances and support ranging from religious centres, educational institutions to social, political groups

and interests. They established close links with seminaries at Deoband, Nadva, and, of course, Farangi Mahal of Mian Abdul Bari. Aligarh also became one of the important centres of the Khilafat activities. Students came out of the government aided schools and colleges and lawyers boycotted the courts. Many thousands of Indians — Hindus and Muslims — courted arrest. A new dimension was soon added to the Movement by the religious edict issued by the leaders that India had become *Dar-al-Harb*, suggesting that it was incumbent upon Muslims to migrate to a *Dar-al-Islam*, an Islamic country. Thousands of Muslims responded to this edict and left India for Afghanistan — only to be refused entry, resulting in hundreds of deaths on the way back home.

But in spite of these sufferings and sacrifices, a number of events caused serious setback to the Movement, the most important being the Moplah rebellion of 1921 creating feeling of bitterness among the Hindus. This was followed by the Chauri Chaura incident where an unruly mob set fire to a police station and burnt twenty-two policemen who at that time were inside the building. Gandhi called off the Movement, leaving the Muslims bewildered. The Movement was peaceful generally, and there were only a few incidents where violence was resorted to. The Movement received a further setback a few months later when on November 21, 1922, the Turkish parliament decided to separate the Khilafat from the Sultanate. The fate of the Khilafat was sealed by Mustafa Kamal Ataturk on March 3, 1924, who sent Khalifa Abdul Majid into exile and abolished the institution of Khilafat. The Khilafat Movement, however, continued to linger on for a while but the wind out of its sails was taken out by the Turkish decision.

The petering out of the Khilafat Movement deeply affected the Hindu-Muslim relations. There were continuous Hindu-Muslim riots during the next few years — resulting in the loss of many a lives on both sides. The alarming increase in the number of riots was encouraged further by the Hindu movements of Shuddhi and Sangathan, meant to convert all Muslims to Hinduism and to organize the Hindus against the Muslims. The two organizations indeed professed to work for the complete annihilation of Islam in the subcontinent. In such a tense atmosphere, communal riots sparked off on trifles. Serious riots were reported from one or other part of the country almost very day. The spirit behind the Hindu-Muslim struggle of the Khilafat days had long been dead and forgotten.

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#### 4.2 1919 Act

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##### *Compulsory Readings*

- Reading 20: The Indian Problem, 1833 — 1935  
(Sir Reginald Coupland)
- Reading 21: The Struggle for Pakistan  
(I. H. Qureshi)

### *Self-Learning Questions (SLQs)*

#### Question – 15

How did the Act of 1919 affect the Muslim interests in the body-politic of India?

KEY: *Points to Note*

- The Act reaffirmed the principle of separate electorates for the Muslims.
- The Act rejected the recommendations of Lucknow Pact as far as they dwelt upon the Muslim demand for suitable representation in the legislatures.
- As the Indian ministers were now responsible to Indian people the Act created a sense of competition and conflict between the Hindus and the Muslims.

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### 4.3 *Khilafat Movement*

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#### *Compulsory Readings*

- Reading 22: "The Indian Khilafat Movement (1918 – 24)" *Journal of Asian History*  
(M. Naeem Qureshi)
- Reading 23: PAKISTAN: The Formative Phase, 1857 – 1948  
(Khalid Bin Sayeed)

### *Self-Learning Questions (SLQs)*

#### Question – 16

Discuss the nature and purpose of the Khilafat Movement.

KEY: *Points to Note*

- It was primarily a religious movement. The aim was to save the institution of Khilafat.
- Since the institution of Khilafat rested in the Ottoman empire, the Indian Muslims were keen to save it from dismemberment.
- Holy Places of Islam were located in the Ottoman empire, specially in the Jaziratul-Arab (Arabia, Iraq, Syria and Palestine). The Muslims could not surrender them to any non-Muslim government.
- The survival and security of Turkey, the only Muslim empire was a matter of great concern for the Indian Muslims, themselves under foreign domination.

#### Question – 17

Examine critically the impact of Khilafat Movement on the subsequent development of Muslim politics in India.

KEY: *Points to Note*

- It trained the Muslims in political agitation and also made them conscious of their potentialities.
- It also showed to the Muslims that the solution of their problem lay neither in the so-called Indian nationalism nor in doctrinal 'universal' Islamism, but in some kind of Muslim nationalism.
- It impressed upon the Muslims the need to give up the idea that they could depend on the Hindus to secure their political interests.

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#### 4.4 *Hindu-Muslim Communal Movements*

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##### *Compulsory Readings*

- Reading 24: PAKISTAN: The Formative Phase, 1857 – 1948  
(Khalid Bin Sayeed)
- Reading 25: History of Freedom Movement 1831 – 1905, Vol. III, Part I  
(I. H. Qureshi)

##### *Self-Learning Questions (SLQs)*

###### Question – 18

Analyse briefly the origin and development of the Hindu revivalist movements.

KEY: *Points to Note*

- The role of the Arya-Samaj.
- B. G. Tilak and the cult of Shivaji.
- The emergence of Shuddhi & Sangathan movements.

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#### 4.5 *Suggested Readings:*

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*For 1919 Act, see,*

1. G. W. Chaudhri, 1961 – "Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms", History of Freedom Movement, Vol. III, Part I, pp. 175 – 204.
2. Syed Sharif ud din Pirzada (ed), 1961 – Foundations of Pakistan, Vol. I, pp. 514 – 17.

*For Khilafat Movement, see,*

3. K. K. Aziz (ed), 1972 – The Indian Khilafat Movement, 1915 – 33: A Documentary Record, Pak Publishers, Karachi, pp. 64 – 81.
4. Syed Sharif ud din Pirzada (ed), 1961 – Foundations of Pakistan, Vol. I, pp. 542 – 44.

*For Hindu-Muslim Communal Movement, see,*

5. Sharif ul Mujahid, 1970 – "Communal Riots". History of the Freedom Movement, Vol. IV, Part I & II, pp. 142 – 47.

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## 5. Block Five: The Emergence of Muslim Political Platform

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### 5.1 Introduction

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In this block we will focus our attention upon the revival of the Muslim League, Delhi Muslim Proposals, Simon Commission, Nehru Report, and Jinnah's 'Fourteen Points'.

The All-India Muslim League which had been pushed into the background during the Khilafat struggle was revived in 1924. Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah was convinced that the only way the Muslims could secure their political interests in the changed circumstances was to revitalize the League platform. The League was needed to identify, articulate and express the Muslim interests as well as to persuade the Congress to see the validity of those interests and to accept them as a basis of cooperation between Hindus and Muslims in the common cause of Indian freedom.

Taking the initiative in his own hands, the Quaid called a meeting of representative Muslim leaders on March 20, 1927 to find a way out. After a lengthy discussion the Muslim leaders agreed to renounce separate electorates on behalf of the Muslims if the Hindus agree, *inter alia*, to the separation of Sind from Bombay Presidency, political reforms in the NWFP and Baluchistan as in any other province in India (under the 1919 Act), proportion of representation in the Punjab and Bengal, in accordance with their population, and one-third representation in the central legislature. It was a gesture of goodwill on part of the Muslim leaders to have agreed to surrender separate electorates in spite of the opposition of a strong section of its own community led by Sir Mohammad Shafi. The Congress, however, in spite of its early favourable response to the Muslim demands refused to oblige the Muslims. All-parties Conference convened on May 19 formally rejected the Muslim proposals. The conference, however, agreed to constitute a special committee under the chairmanship of Motilal Nehru to "consider and examine the principle of the constitution for India". Though this move meant the resumption of Hindu-Muslim talks on the future of India, it cannot be denied that Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah's "bold and patriotic initiative" was squandered away.

In the meanwhile, the British government in November 1927 announced the appointment of a constitutional commission headed by Sir John Simon to examine the pace of constitutional advance in India. The appointment of such a commission had been provided in the 1919 Act. This Commission consisting of seven

members (all — white) failed to find favour with the Congress and the League faction led by Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah. The Quaid was still keen to work with the Congress, and its constitutional committee headed by Motilal Nehru. Despite the opposition of major Indian political forces, the Simon Commission was able to complete its work. Its report, published in two volumes in 1930, recommended the abolition of Dyarchy, setting up of a federal system of government with maximum autonomy for the provinces, and continuation of the principle separate electorates. However, it did not accept the Muslim demands of raising the NWFP to the status of a full fledged province, statutory majorities in the Punjab and Bengal, and one-third representation at the centre. The Commission also postponed consideration of the Muslim demand for the separation of Sind from Bombay till its financial implications were fully examined.

But the Muslims were treated no differently by the Nehru Report, indeed more cruelly. The Nehru Report repudiated the principle of separate electorates accepted by the Congress under the Lucknow Pact of 1916. The Muslim demand for reservation of seats in the Punjab and Bengal legislatures was dismissed as opposed to "the principles on which responsible government rests". The Muslims were to get proportional representation in the Central legislature and not one-third of representation as demanded in the Delhi Muslim Proposals of March 1927. Though it was conceded in theory that the form of government will be federal, in actual fact, the residuary and other substantial powers were transferred to the central government. The reaction of the Muslim community was naturally bitter. Quaid-i-Azam was disappointed. But still he went to the All-Parties Convention held in Calcutta in the last week of December, 1928 to propose amendments to the report to help modify it. He fervently pleaded for "statesmanship", and referring to the cases of Canada and Egypt, pointed out that, "The minorities are always afraid of majorities. The majorities are apt to be tyrannical and oppressive, and particularly religious majorities and the minorities therefore have a right to be absolute by secured . . . ." But to no avail. The Hindus were in no mood to respond. The result was that the Convention turned down Quaid-i-Azam's amendments. The Quaid called it "the parting of the ways", and proceeded to draft his now famous "Fourteen Points", insisting that no scheme for the future constitution of India will be acceptable to the Muslims until and unless the provisions embodied in these points were accepted by the Hindu majority community.

The thrust of these 'Fourteen Points' clearly was to secure the autonomy of the Muslim provinces in federal setting with maximum number of provinces. The Quaid insisted that the Muslim majorities in the Punjab, Bengal and North-West Frontier Province should be guaranteed, Sind should be separated from the Bombay Presidency, and reforms should be introduced in the NWFP and Baluchistan on the same footing as in other provinces. Uniform measure of autonomy shall be granted to all provinces. The idea was to strengthen provinces, especially the Muslim provinces, against the imminent Hindu domination at the centre. This was a position different, radically different, from the position taken in the Delhi Muslim

Proposals. While in those Proposals, the Quaid had endeavoured to represent both Hindu and Muslim interests, these Points were clearly the work of Muslim interests. Quaid-i-Azam had clearly come to speak for the Muslim community.

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## 5.2 Revival of the Muslim League

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### Compulsory Readings

Reading 26: Middle Phase of Muslim Political Movement  
(Jamil ud din Ahmad)

### Self-Learning Questions (SLQs)

#### Question – 19

Discuss the importance of the revival of the League in 1924 and the role played by Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah.

KEY: *Points to Note*

- This session of the League witnessed after a long time the assembly of Muslim Leaders of all shades of opinion on one platform.
- Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah re-entered the centre stage of Muslim Politics.
- Quaid-i-Azam suggested a 'provincial strategy' for the Muslims which stated, *inter alia*: (a) the existing provinces shall have full autonomy. They were to form a federation confined only to matters of common concern; (b) any territorial redistribution if necessary should not affect the Muslim majority in the Punjab, Bengal and NWFP.

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## 5.3 Delhi Muslim Proposals

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### Compulsory Readings

Reading 27: Mohammad Ali Jinnah: A Political Study  
(M. H. Saiyid)

### Self-Learning Questions (SLQs)

#### Question – 20

Delineate and discuss briefly the main features of the Delhi Muslim Proposals.

KEY: *Points to Note*

- Sind should be constituted into a separate province.
- Reforms should be introduced in the NWFP and in Baluchistan on the same footing as any other province.



- In the Punjab and Bengal the proportion of representation should be in accordance with the population.
- The Muslims agreed to a mixed electorate.

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#### 5.4 *Simon Commission*

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##### *Compulsory Readings*

- Reading 28: The Indian Problem, 1833 – 1935  
(Sir Reginald Coupland)
- Reading 29: The Struggle for Pakistan  
(I. H. Qureshi)

##### *Self-Learning Questions (SLQs)*

###### Question – 21

How far did the Simon Commission respond to the Muslim demands?

###### KEY: *Points to Note*

- The Simon Commission reaffirmed, though grudgingly, the principle of separate electorates.
- However, it did not concede the Muslim demand of raising the NWFP to the status of a full-fledged province, statutory majorities in the Punjab and Bengal and one-third representation at the centre.
- The Commission postponed consideration of the Muslim demand for the separation of Sind from Bombay.

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#### 5.5 *Nehru Report*

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##### *Compulsory Readings*

- Reading 30: Towards Pakistan  
(Waheed-uz-Zaman)

##### *Self-Learning Questions (SLQs)*

###### Question – 22

How did the Nehru Report respond to the Muslim interests? Discuss.

###### KEY: *Points to Note*

- The Nehru Report repudiated the principle of separate electorates.
- Dismissed the Muslim demand for statutory majorities in the Punjab and Bengal.
- Recommended a unitary as opposed to federal form of government demanded by the Muslims.

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## 5.6 Jinnah's 'Fourteen Points'

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### Compulsory Readings

Reading 31: 'History of the Origin of Fourteen Points' by Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Collected Works of Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Vol. III, 1926-1931  
(Syed Sharif ud din Pirzada) (ed)

### Self-Learning Questions (SLQs)

#### Question – 23

Discuss the main thrust of the arguments in the 'Fourteen Points'.

KEY: *Points to Note*

- Autonomy of the Muslim provinces in a genuine federal setting.
- Muslim majorities in the Punjab, Bengal and NWFP, separation of Sind from Bombay, political reforms in the NWFP and Baluchistan.
- Strong Muslim provinces *vis-à-vis* Hindu dominated centre.

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## 5.7 Suggested Readings:

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For *Revival of the Muslim League*, see,

1. Syed Sharif ud din Pirzada (ed), 1969 – Foundations of Pakistan, Vol. I, pp. 575 – 82.

For *Delhi Muslim Proposals*, see,

2. Sharif al Mujahid, 1981 – Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah: Studies in Interpretation Quaid-i-Azam Academy, Karachi, pp. 466-66.

For *Simon Commission*, see,

3. K. K. Aziz (ed), 1978 – Muslims Under Congress Rule, 1937-1939: A Documentary Record, Vol. I, National Commission on Historical and Cultural Research, pp. 11-12, 61-62.
4. Syed Sharif ud din Pirzada (ed), 1970 – Foundations of Pakistan, Vol. II, National Publishing House, Karachi, pp. 114 – 18.

For *Nehru Report*, see,

5. G. W. Choudhri, 1961 – "The Nehru Report" History of the Freedom Movement, Vol. III, Part I, pp. 276 – 301.
6. Sharif al Mujahid, 1981 – Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah: Studies in Interpretation, pp. 468 – 72.

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## 6. Block Six: The Constitutional Quest

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### 6.1 *Introduction*

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In this block we will examine Allama Iqbal's Allahabad Address of 1930, the Round Table Conference, the Communal Award, and the Act of 1935, some of the most important developments affecting the Indian politics in general and the Muslim politics in particular. Allama Iqbal's Allahabad Address deserves special mention, because it contributed to the growth of Muslim nationalism in the sub-continent which ultimately led to the demand for Pakistan in March 1940. In a highly well-informed and philosophical address, Allama Iqbal surveyed the political situation of India and dismissed the notion of a united Indian 'nation' in which the various communities had to submerge their culture, traditions and norms. This condition affected the Muslims most because they were a minority in the country. As a minority they could hardly hope to see Islam as a principle of solidarity in national political life. Islam, according to Allama Iqbal, was "an ideal plus some kind of polity", and thus was "not prepared to compromise with any other law regulating human society". Allama Iqbal was indeed convinced that "the life of Islam as the cultural force in the country very largely depends on its centralization in a specified territory." Allama, thus, proposed that the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan be amalgamated into a single state. "The formation of consolidated North-Western Indian Muslim State," he declared, "appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims, at least of North-West India".

On their part, however, the British government convened a Round Table Conference at London to discuss political and communal problems, which held three sessions in 1930, 1931, and 1932. The Congress refused to participate in the first session though it agreed to participate in the second session with Gandhi as its only spokesman. But Gandhi proved to be its wrecker. Not only he opposed the Muslim demand for statutory majorities in the Punjab and Bengal, he went on to oppose the maintenance of separate electorates, a matter of prime concern to the Muslims ever since its recognition by the British. To complicate the matters further, Gandhi refused to work for a genuine federation, with maximum autonomy to the provinces. All that he could promise on behalf of the Congress was that: "The residuary powers shall vest in the federating units, unless on further examination it is found to be against the best interests of India". The

result was tedious and inconclusive negotiations forcing the British in the end to come out with their own solution of the problem. On August 16, 1932 the British Prime Minister, Ramsay Macdonald, announced the "Communal Award".

Although the Communal Award conceded the Muslim demand for separate electorates, it failed to oblige the Muslims on other issues. The Award simply turned down the Muslim demand for statutory majorities in the Punjab and Bengal. The Award took no concrete decisions on distributing powers between the centre and province on genuine federal lines. Muslim demand that residuary powers should be vested in the provinces was not accepted. Not surprisingly, then, the constitutional advance in the Act of 1935 failed to carry Muslim support and approval.

The Act of 1935, in fact, promoted a federation with a strong unitary bias. The Act not only empowered the centre to legislate the 'Federal' list of subjects, but, also the 'Concurrent' list, if it so desired. In addition the Act failed to protect the autonomy of the provinces. Ministerial functions were still restricted by "safeguards" placed in the hands of the governors. To further restrict the scope of the ministerial responsibility, the Act placed the governors under the 'superintendence' and 'general control' of the Governor-General. Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah did not hesitate to state that the Act was "devoid of all the basic and essential elements and fundamental requirements which are necessary to form any federation". He made it absolutely clear that the Muslims were not prepared to submit to a central government dominated by the Hindu majority community. They had a fear based on the results of the available evidence of the working of the representative system of government in India. They realized that they were a "permanent minority" and could not hope for turning the "majority rule" in the opposite direction. The more they saw the powers vested in the centre the more they feared that it must necessarily in practice favour the Hindus who formed the bulk of population.

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## 6.2 Allama Iqbal's Address of 1930 and the Idea of a Separate Muslim State

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### *Compulsory Readings*

- Reading 32: The Political Philosophy of Iqbal  
(Perveen Shaukat Ali)
- Reading 33: History of Idea of Pakistan  
(Abdus Salam Khurshid)
- Reading 34: "Allama Muhammad Iqbal and the Idea  
of a Separate Muslim State in India,"  
Pakistan Journal of Social Sciences  
(Sikandar Hayat)  
Ref: Reader 537, Reading 4, Block 6.
- Reading 35: "Muslim Nationalism: Iqbal's Synthesis  
of Pan Islamism and Nationalism",  
Journal of Pakistan Studies  
(Sharif al Mujahid)  
Ref: Reader 537, Reading 3, Block 6.

- Reading 36: Towards Pakistan  
(Waheed-uz-Zaman)  
Ref: Reader 537, Reading 1, Block 6.
- Reading 37: Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan  
1857 – 1964  
(Aziz Ahmad)

### *Self-Learning Questions (SLQs)*

#### Question – 24

How would you evaluate Allama Iqbal's solution of the 'complex politico-religious problems of the subcontinent'? Discuss in the light of his Allahabad Address of 1930.

KEY: *Points to Note*

- Allama Iqbal rejected the idea of a united India on communal grounds.
- Islam was not a mere dogma but a 'social order', and thus could not compromise with 'any other law regulating human society'.
- Rejecting Indian nationalism based on territorial considerations, Allama Iqbal evolved a concept of Muslim nationalism, emphasizing the unity of religion and state in Islam.

#### Question – 25

How did Allama Iqbal argue the need for a separate Muslim State? Discuss.

KEY: *Points to Note*

- That Muslims were not a mere 'minority' in India – they were a distinct communal group having their own culture.
- Development of Muslim culture was possible only in a separate Muslim state.
- A separate Muslim state was required not only to pave the way for peace in India but also to allow Muslims to live their lives according to their own faith, culture.

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### 6.3 Round Table Conference and the Communal Award

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#### *Compulsory Readings*

- Reading 38: The Indian Problem, 1833 – 1935  
(Sir Reginald Coupland)
- Reading 39: Road to Indian Freedom  
(Waheed Ahmad)

### *Self-Learning Questions (SLQs)*

#### Question – 26

Why was the RTC convened? Briefly examine the key issues discussed in its sessions held in 1930, 1931 and 1932.

KEY: *Points to Note*

- To discuss the political and communal problems of India.
- To frame the future constitution of India.
- To settle the communal issue.

#### Question – 27

Discuss the salient features of the Communal Award as far as it affected the Muslims.

KEY: *Points to Note*

- Conceded the principle of separate electorates.
- Turned down the Muslim demand for statutory majorities in the Punjab and Bengal.
- No concrete decision on distribution of power between centre and provinces.
- Muslim demand that residuary powers should be vested in the provinces was rejected.

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### 6.4 1935 Act

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#### *Compulsory Readings*

- Reading 40: The Great Divide, Britain-India-Pakistan  
(H. V. Hodson)
- Reading 41: Road to Indian Freedom  
(Waheed Ahmad)

### *Self-Learning Questions (SLQs)*

#### Question – 28

What were the main provisions of 1935 Act? How did the Muslims react to them?

KEY: *Points to Note*

- Promoted a federation with a strong unitary bias.
- Empowered the centre to legislate the 'Federal' as well as 'Concurrent' list of subjects.
- Ministerial functions in the provinces were restricted by 'safeguards' placed

in the hands of the governors, who in turn were placed under the 'superintendence' and 'general control' of the governor-general.

- Quaid-i-Azam declared that it did not contain "fundamental requirements" which were necessary to form a genuine federation.

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### 6.5 *Suggested Readings:*

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*For Allama Iqbal's Address of 1930 and the Idea of a Separate Muslim State, see,*

1. Latif Ahmad Sherwani (ed), 1977 — Speeches, Writings and Statements of Iqbal, Iqbal Academy, Lahore, pp. 3 — 26.
2. 1943, Letters of Iqbal to Jinnah, with a Preface by M. A. Jinnah, Lahore.

*For Round Table Conference and the Communal Award, see,*

3. G. Allana (ed), 1977 — Pakistan Movement: Historic Documents, pp. 95 — 112.

*For 1935 Act, see,*

4. Abdul Hamid, 1963 — "The Government of India Act, 1935", History of the Freedom Movement, Vol. III, Part II, pp. 317 — 49.
5. Jamil ud din Ahmad (Comp), 1970 — Historic Documents of the Muslim Freedom Movement, Publishers United, Lahore, pp. 181 — 91.
6. K. K. Aziz (ed), 1978 — Muslims Under the Congress Rule, 1937—1939: A Documentary Record, Vol. I, pp. 307—86, 388—419, 420—564.

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## 7. Block Seven: The Crisis and Its Resolution

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### 7.1 Introduction

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This block deals with the Congress rule of 1937 – 39, various partition schemes put forward by Muslim leaders of public opinion in India and concentrates in particular upon the Lahore Resolution of March 1940. If the Act of 1935 proposed in theory a system of government with a unitary bias, the Congress, during its two and half years of rule in the provinces (1937 – 39) left no doubt about it in anyone's mind. It insisted on the formation of one-party cabinets in the provinces, taking upon itself the mantle of national authority in order to prove its claim to be the natural successor to the British Raj. Not only it rejected League's moves at coalition-making but openly flouted the reservations and safeguards written into provincial constitutions. The Muslims felt that the Congress attitude was nothing short of an attempt at Hindu domination. Attempts with Gandhi's blessings to force Sanskritized Hindi and to remould the educational system particularly in the primary stages of education through *Vidyamandir* scheme further showed to them that the idea was to obliterate Muslim culture in India and to prepare "a generation which would cease to be Muslim in thought, character and action". The "fear of the future" that weighed heavily on the Muslim mind since the introduction of British parliamentary institutions in India now showed to Quaid-i-Azam and other Muslim leaders that Gandhi, Congress, and the Hindu majority were aiming to establish Hindu Raj in India.

One sure indicator of this fear of the future was the rapidity with which the Indian Muslims had devised schemes – zonal schemes, partition schemes – to get rid of the Hindu dominated centre. The Lahore Resolution was in fact a logical and historical extension of this sense of urgency. However, the Lahore Resolution differed from the early schemes in two very important respects. First, the early schemes were generally regional territorial solutions within the all-India setup. Lahore Resolution demanded the partition of India, complete and full. Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah clearly recognized the inherent difficulties in the regional solutions. He wanted to make the Muslim destiny "safe and inalienable". Secondly, and more importantly, the Lahore Resolution had an ideological basis – much in line with Allama Iqbal's Allahabad Address of 1930. It promised the Muslims an opportunity to develop to the fullest their "spiritual, cultural, economic, social and political life" in a way they thought "best" and in conson-



ance with their own "ideal" and according to the "genius" of their people.

The Resolution passed on March 24, 1940 resolved that the partition of India should be "designed on the following basic principles, viz, that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted, with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority as in the North-Western and Eastern zones of India should be grouped to constitute independent states in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign". As to the fate of Muslim minorities left behind in India, the Resolution further suggested that, "adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards shall be specifically provided in the constitution for them and other minorities for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights and interests in consultation with them". Quaid-i-Azam was not unmindful of the fact that "the Musalmans, wherever they are in a minority cannot improve their position under a united India or under one central government. Whatever happens, they would remain a minority". The question for the Muslim minorities in Hindu India, he, therefore reckoned, is "whether the entire Muslim India of 90,000,000 should be subjected to a Hindu majority Raj or whether at least 60,000,000 of Musalmans residing in the areas where they form a majority should have their own homeland and thereby have an opportunity to develop their spiritual, cultural, economic and political life in accordance with their own genius and shape their own future destiny, . . . ." Quaid-i-Azam was in fact convinced that a separate Muslim homeland was "not only a practicable goal but the only goal if you want to save Islam from complete annihilation in this country".

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## 7.2 Congress Rule 1937 – 39

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### *Compulsory Readings*

Reading 42: The Struggle for Pakistan  
(I. H. Qureshi)

### *Self-Learning Questions (SLQs)*

#### Question – 29

Congress rule in the provinces (1937 – 1939) left no doubt in any one's mind that the "logic of 'majority rule' was to be strictly enforced". Discuss.

#### KEY: *Points to Note*

- Congress refusal to form coalition ministries with the League.
- Attempts to force Sanskritized Hindi and introduction of Vidyamandir scheme at primary stages of education inspite of Muslim protests.
- Indifference to Muslim complaints and sufferings under Congress rule.

Question – 30

How did the Muslims react to the Congress rule of (1937 – 1939)?

KEY: *Points to Note*

- Many a wavering Muslim politicians rushed to join the Muslim League at its Lucknow Session of October 1937.
- Muslims collected evidence of the hostile, indifferent Congress attitude – Pirpur and Sharif reports and Fazlul Haq's 'Muslim sufferings under Congress Rule'.
- The League emerged as the fierce champion of the Muslim interests and the foundations of a separate Muslim destiny were firmly laid.

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### 7.3 Partition Schemes

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#### *Compulsory Readings*

Reading 43: Evolution of Pakistan  
(Syed Sharif ud din Pirzada)

#### *Self-Learning Questions (SLQs)*

Question – 31

What do you think was the main thrust of the various partition schemes put forward by the Muslim leaders from time to time?

KEY: *Points to Note*

- That Hindu-Muslim unity "will never become a fact, it will never become a *fait accompli* . . ."
- The sooner the Indian leaders "get rid of the idea of a unitary Indian nation", the better for all communities concerned.
- There was no other way out but to redistribute India, on the basis of religious, historical and cultural affinities.

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### 7.4 Lahore Resolution

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#### *Compulsory Readings*

Reading 44: "The making of the Pakistan Resolution: A Politico-Historical Analysis", *Journal of History and Culture*  
(Muhammad Ahmad Saleem)

Reading 45: *Towards Pakistan*  
(Waheed-uz-Zaman)  
Ref: Reader 537, Reading 4, Block 8

Reading 46: "Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah and the Demand for a Separate Muslim State: Lahore Resolution Reappraised"  
(Sikandar Hayat)

*Self-Learning Questions (SLQs)*

Question – 32

Discuss the fundamental principles of the Lahore Resolution.

KEY: *Points to Note*

- That Muslims were a nation, entitled to the right of self-determination. They must be allowed to develop to the fullest their "spiritual, cultural, economic, social and political life," in the light of their own ideals.
- Partition into Muslim majority and Hindu majority area was the only solution of the communal and constitutional problem of India.
- Adequate and mandatory safeguards to be provided to the minorities.

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7.5 *Suggested Readings:*

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*For Congress Rule 1937 – 39, see,*

1. K. K. Aziz (ed), 1978 – Muslims Under the Congress Rule 1937–1939: A Documentary Record, Vol. I, pp. 307–86, 388–419, 420–564.

*For Lahore Resolution, see,*

2. Latif Ahmad Sherwani (ed), 1969 – Pakistan Resolution to Pakistan 1940–1947, National Publishing House, Karachi, pp. 21.
3. Jamil ud din Ahmad (ed), 1968 – Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah, Vol. I, Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, Lahore, pp. 151–72.

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## 8. Block Eight: The Emergence of Quaid-i-Azam

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### 8.1 Introduction

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The purpose of this block is to evaluate and assess Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah's role in the reorganization of the All-India Muslim League in the crucial post 1940 years as the sole representative organization of the Indian Muslims. Quaid-i-Azam planned a strategy comprising four major elements. First, he initiated the task of reorganizing the League to make room for the new entrants, particularly those who were moved by the Pakistan ideal, and thus appeared more than willing to join the League and serve its cause. He gave it a new organizational set up, opening up new avenues of association and participation within the League. The result was that the League came to represent not only the 'traditional' groups, such as, the landlords, Nawabs and other titled gentry but also the 'modern' educated, urban middle classes, merchant-industrialists, traders, bankers, professionals, as well as the *ulema*. Indeed, it had come to transform itself into an Indian Muslim nationalist organization. Secondly, Quaid-i-Azam moved to seek the support of strong provincial leaders of the Muslim-majority provinces. This was by no means an easy task. The provincial leaders were reluctant to yield to the control of the centre. But with lot of patience, hard work, and direct appeal to the masses over the demand for Pakistan, the Quaid was able to bring the provincial leaders under the effective control of the All-India Muslim League. Thirdly, Quaid-i-Azam launched a mass mobilization campaign to reach all groups and sections of the Muslim society.

Some segments of the society not only responded enthusiastically to the promise held out by the Pakistan idea but also took it upon themselves to carry the message to the masses. They were: (1) the students, (2) the *ulema*, *pirs*, *sajjadanashins*, and (3) the women. They were the ones who went on to serve and promote the cause of the League with enthusiasm, single-hearted allegiance, and dedication. Finally, Quaid-i-Azam made the most of his efforts to organize the Muslims behind the banner of the League by taking full advantage of the acts of omission and commission committed by the British and the Congress during the war years. The Congress provided him the most momentous opportunity by resigning its ministries in reaction to the decision of the British Government in 1939 to declare war on behalf of India and thus leaving the political field entirely to the League. Quaid-i-Azam hastened to instal League ministries in its place, especially

in the Muslim-majority provinces, such as, Assam, Bengal and the NWFP. The Punjab was already under the League-Unionist coalition. The war itself provided the Quaid an ideal opportunity to mobilize support for the League. The British, in view of the Congress attitude during the war, were virtually left with no choice but to woo the non-Congress parties in the country. This, of course, did not mean that the Quaid was willing to acquiesce in the British war effort. He would have nothing to do with it unless the British in turn were prepared to offer the Muslims "their real voice and share in the Government of the country". On August 8, 1940 the British Government were constrained to state publically that they "could not contemplate the transfer of their present responsibilities for the peace and welfare of India to any system of Government whose authority is directly denied by large and powerful elements in India's national life". Although the Quaid did not accept the August offer as it did not address itself directly and sufficiently to the League demands, as the later events were to demonstrate, the die was cast. Henceforth, no move could be made at the centre without League influencing the course of events. The Cripps Mission (1942), Simla Conference (1945), and the Cabinet Mission (1946) discussions went on to confirm the unassailable position of the League. Muslim League was the party as far as the Muslims were concerned. By the end of 1946 it stood as the "sole representative body of Muslim India", having now all the Muslim seats in the central assembly. In the provincial assembly it was able to secure overwhelming majority of Muslim seats. In all, it was able to secure 460 of the 533 Muslims seats in the central and provincial assembly elections. In terms of the percentages of the votes polled, League was able to manage 86.7 percent of the total Muslim votes cast in the elections to the central assembly and 74.7 percent in the provincial assemblies. This was a remarkable achievement over the paltry 4.4 percent it had polled in the 1937 elections. Quaid-i-Azam himself was elated "Now the only thing I can say", he declared at League Legislator's Convention held in Delhi in April 7 - 9, 1946, "is this: I do not think there is any power or any authority that can prevent us from achieving our cherished goal of Pakistan ... I am confident that we shall march on from victory to victory until we have Pakistan".

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## 8.2 *Early Political Career*

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### *Compulsory Readings*

- Reading 47: Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah: The Formative Years, 1892 - 1920 (Riaz Ahmad)
- Reading 48: Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah: Studies in Interpretations (Sharif al Mujahid)

### Self-Learning Questions (SLQs)

#### Question – 33

Discuss Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah's role in Indian Politics till 1920.

KEY: *Points to Note*

- He was "an embodied symbol of the Hindu-Muslim unity".
- He joined the Indian National Congress in the "pious" hope that "he could do much more for the Muslims from within the Congress than from without".
- His main object was to promote and secure Muslim interests in India. He joined the All-India Muslim League in 1913.

#### Question – 34

Why did Quaid-i-Azam change from his erstwhile role of the "ambassador of Hindu-Muslim Unity" to the fiercest champion of the Muslim cause? Discuss.

KEY: *Points to Note*

- Congress attitude convinced him that it was essentially a Hindu body, pursuing Hindu interests at the expense of the Muslims.
- Hindus and Muslims had fundamental incompatibilities and conflicts of interests.
- Muslims had special interests and claims, and they could only be realized through a separate course of action.

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### 8.3 Quaid-i-Azam and the Reorganization of the All-India Muslim League

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#### Compulsory Readings

- Reading 49: "Aspects of the Development of Muslim League Policy 1937-47" in *The Partition of India: Policies and Perspectives 1935 - 47*, edited by C. H. Philips and Mary Doreen Wainwright  
(Z. H. Zaidi)
- Reading 50: *PAKISTAN: The Formative Phase, 1857 - 1948*  
(Khalid Bin Sayeed)
- Reading 51: "Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah, Muslim League and the Achievement of Pakistan: A Study in Political Mobilization", *Pakistan Journal of History and Culture*  
(Sikandar Hayat)

### *Self-Learning Questions (SLQs)*

#### Question – 35

What strategy did Quaid-i-Azam adopt for the reorganisation of the Muslim League in the post-1940 years?

KEY: *Points to Note*

- Initiated the task of restructuring the League to make room for the newly mobilized groups and interests.
- Moved to seek the support of strong provincial leaders of the Muslim-majority provinces.
- Launched a mass mobilization campaign to organise Muslims behind the banner of the Muslim League.

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#### 8.4 *Suggested Readings:*

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*For Early Political Career, see,*

1. Mary Louise Becker, 1979 – “Some Formative Influence on the Career of Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah”, *World Scholars on Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah*, edited by A. H. Dani, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, pp. 83 – 89.
2. M. H. Siddiqi, 1979 – “Jinnah’s Emergence to Muslim Leadership, 1906 – 13”, *World Scholars on Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah*, edited by A. H. Dani, pp. 90 – 101.
3. L. F. Rushbrook Williams, 1979 – “The Evolution of Quaid-i-Azam as Observed by the Author”, *World Scholars on Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah*, edited by A. H. Dani, pp. 126 – 33.
4. Abdul Hamid, 1979 – “The Crucial Years (1928–40)”, *World Scholars on Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah* edited by A. H. Dani, pp. 65 – 74.

*For Quaid-i-Azam and the Reorganisation of the All-India Muslim League, see,*

1. Sharif al Mujahid, 1963 – “Re-emergence of the All-India Muslim League”, *History of the Freedom Movement*, Vol. III, Part II, pp. 303 – 16.

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## 9. Block Nine: The Creation of Pakistan

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### 9.1 Introduction

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In this block we will devote our attention upon the crucial phase of the struggle for Pakistan, emphasizing in particular the constitutional discussions around the Cripps Proposals (1942), Gandhi-Jinnah Talks (1944), Simla Conference (1945), Cabinet Mission Plan (1946), and the formation of (1946-1947) Interim Government and Partition Plan, and the critical role played by Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah and the Muslim League in this context. Organization of the Indian Muslims under the League was but the fulfillment of half of Quaid's mission. He had also to make the British and the Hindus concede the demand for Pakistan. He had to secure Pakistan's creation.

Cripps came to India in March 1942. He was known for his sympathies with the Congress and its leadership, particularly Jawaharlal Nehru. The constitutional proposals which he carried from London were published soon after his arrival. They stated that the British will help create "a new Indian Union" after the war. It was noted, however, that if any province of British India was not prepared to accept the new constitution or the present constitutional set-up, "the British government will be prepared to grant such "non-acceding provinces" the same status as that of the Indian Union. Apparently it was a great concession to the Muslim sentiment on the subject. The Muslims had already rejected the Indian Union. Lahore Resolution clearly stipulated a separate homeland for the Muslims. But there was a catch. Both Muslims and non-Muslims of a given province had to vote in favour of non-accession. Muslims alone were not given the right of option. The League could not possibly secure majority support in the Punjab and Bengal in the presence of Hindus and other non-Muslims. The Quaid, thus, rejected the proposals without much hesitation: "So far as the Pakistan demand is not agreed to", he declared, "we cannot agree to any present adjustment which will in any way militate against or prejudice the Pakistan demand".

In May 1944, Gandhi entered into lengthy discussions with the Quaid on the constitutional issue. The ground for the meeting was prepared by C. Rajagopalachari, a leading Congressman. But the talks proved fruitless. The two leaders saw the problem from very different angles. Gandhi wanted the Muslims to abandon their demand till the withdrawal of the British. The Quaid, on the other hand, insisted that he should "accept the fundamentals of the Lahore Resolution and pro-



ceed to settle details". One of the main outcome of these talks in fact was that the Quaid made it abundantly clear to all concerned that no interim solution of the constitutional problem could be agreed unless the principle of Pakistan was conceded first. Unfortunately, the Viceroy, Lord Wavell, missed the point, and paid the price in the failure of the Simla Conference of 1945.

The Quaid told the Viceroy on the very first day of the Conference that the League "would not agree to any constitution except on the fundamental principle of Pakistan". Though the conference in the end concerned itself primarily with the interim arrangement, i.e., the composition of the Viceroy's expanded Executive Council for the war period, the implications of the Quaid's demand for an exclusive right to nominate its Muslim members were absolutely clear. The long term and interim arrangements were inexorably linked. As the Quaid put it, "we know that this interim or provisional arrangement will have a way of settling down for an unlimited period and all the forces in the proposed Executive plus the known policy of the British Government and Lord Wavell's strong inclination for a united India, would completely jeopardize us . . . ." The Quaid, thus, rejected the Viceroy's proposals. He could not agree to compromise the principle of Pakistan for the sake of a doubtful advantage in the provisional scheme of things. The Simla Conference, however, marked a breakwater in Indian political history as far as the Pakistan issue was concerned. Pakistan issue emerged as the issue of the day. The League won the 1945-46 elections precisely on the Pakistan issue.

After the elections, the British Government sent a mission of three Cabinet ministers, Pethick Lawrence, Stafford Cripps and A. V. Alexander to India to bring about an agreement on the constitutional problem. The Mission reached India in March 1946. They brought no concrete proposals, but after a series of inconclusive interviews and discussions with the political leaders, they decided to formulate and announce their own plan. Announced on May 16, the main thrust of the plan was to offer India a three-tiered constitutional structure in which provinces were grouped to form "sections" and to determine themselves what subjects would be under the jurisdiction of their respective sectional government. Section A comprised the provinces of Madras, Bombay, United Provinces, Bihar, Central Provinces and Orissa; Section B included the provinces of Punjab, NWFP and Sind; Section C was to consist of the provinces of Bengal and Assam. The three sections of the Constituent Assembly had to come together along with representatives of the Indian state to settle the Union Constitution after the provincial constitutions had been formed. Once the Union Constitution had come into force, the provinces could "opt out" of their groups. The Mission also stressed the importance of setting up an Interim government immediately with the support of major political parties. The plan was thus divided into two parts: a long-term plan and a short-term plan. The two parts of the plan were interdependent and were to be accepted or rejected as a whole. It was further made clear that if either of the two parties refused to join the Interim Government, the Viceroy would seek the help of other parties to form the government.

The Mission was sure that the Congress would accept the plan. Its members were equally sure that the Muslim League would outrightly reject it. But contrary to their expectations, the League accepted the plan in the hope that it would ultimately pave the way for the achievement of Pakistan. The Congress, on the other hand, accepted the long-term plan but refused to join the Interim Government. The Mission was thus committed to ask the League to form the government. But the British government went back on their "plighted word". Seeing this "breach of faith", the League withdrew its earlier acceptance, and decided to resort to 'Direct Action' to achieve Pakistan. The League's rejection of the Cabinet Mission plan, and the decision to resort to 'direct action' marked virtually the end of any prospect of united India in the ensuing struggle for the transfer of power to the Indian hands. The Quaid refused to attend the 'Hindu-dominated' Constituent Assembly, in spite of the fact that he eventually agreed in October 1946 to join the Interim Government at the centre.

The Muslim League, of course, joined the Government "as sentinels which would watch Muslim interests in the day-to-day administration of government". The idea was to "resist every attempt which would directly or indirectly militate or prejudice our demand for Pakistan". The Interim Government thus merely helped to serve and accentuate the bitterness between the Hindus and Muslims on the one hand and the League and the Congress on the other.

On February 20, 1947 Attlee, the British Prime Minister, was constrained to announce in the parliament that the "present state of uncertainty is fraught with danger and cannot be indefinitely prolonged". Mountbatten was appointed the new Viceroy for the purpose of transferring to Indian hands [Hindus and Muslims] responsibility for the government of British India in a manner that will best ensure the future happiness and prosperity of India...". How far Mountbatten succeeded in this task was another matter. June 3, 1947 plan, and the subsequent partition of the two Muslim-majority provinces of the Punjab and Bengal speaks volumes on the subject. In spite of all the difficulties put in the way, East Bengal, West Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan, NWFP and Sylhet, all joined Pakistan. On August 14, 1947 Pakistan emerged as a sovereign, independent state on the map of the world.

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## 9.2 Constitutional and Political Advance at the Centre

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### *Compulsory Readings*

- Reading 52: "The Cripps Mission" History of the Freedom Movement, Vol. III, Part II (G. W. Choudhry)
- Reading 53: 'Aspects of the Development of Muslim League Policy 1937-47' in The Partition of India: Policies and Perspective 1935-47, edited by C. H. Philips and Mary Doreen Wainwright (Z. H. Zaidi)

- Reading 54: PAKISTAN: The Formative Phase, 1857 – 1948  
(Khalid Bin Sayeed)
- Reading 55: "The Simla Conference" History of the Freedom Movement, Vol. III, Part II  
(Zafar ul Islam)
- Reading 56: Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah: As I Knew Him  
(M. A. H. Ispahani)
- Reading 57: 'Aspects of the Development of Muslim League Policy 1937–47' in Partition of India; Policies and Perspectives 1935 – 47, edited by C. H. Philips and Mary Doreen Wainwright  
(Z. H. Zaidi)

### *Self-Learning Questions (SLQs)*

#### Question – 36

Critically examine the Cripps Proposals. Why did the Muslims reject them?

KEY: *Points to Note*

- Promised India the status of a dominion, setting up of a constitution – making body to frame a single constitution for Indian Union after the war.
- Long term option given to the provinces, i.e. to refuse to join the India Union in which case they could form their own union with 'complete self-government'.
- Muslim League rejected the proposals as it did not allow the Muslims alone to vote in favour of non-accession of a given province. Thus the possibility of Pakistan's creation was considerably remote.

#### Question – 37

Why did the Gandhi – Jinnah Talks prove futile? What did the Quaid-i-Azam and the Muslim League gain out of it?

KEY: *Points to Note*

- Gandhi was willing to accord the 'right of separation' to the Muslims because they wanted to separate themselves from 'one family consisting of many members' and not because they were a separate Nation.
- The Quaid-i-Azam, on the other hand, demanded that Gandhi should "accept the fundamentals of the Lahore Resolution" i.e., the Muslims were a separate nation, entitled to their right of self-determination.
- Quaid-i-Azam's image and that of the Muslim League as the sole representative body of Muslim India was firmly established both in India & abroad.

Question – 38

Why did the Muslim League first agree and then reject the Cabinet Mission Plan? Discuss.

KEY: *Points to Note*

- The League was convinced that its honest working would ultimately lead to the creation of Pakistan.
- The League rejected the plan because the British refused to offer the Muslim League the Interim Government in spite of the fact that they had accepted both its long-term and short-term plans (and the Congress had accepted only the long-term plan).
- The League rejected the plan because the Congress insisted on interpreting the “grouping clause” as it suited their interest in violation of the intent and purpose expressed in the plan.

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### 9.3 Partition of the Indian Subcontinent

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#### *Compulsory Readings*

- Reading 58: PAKISTAN: The Formative Phase, 1857 – 1948  
(Khalid Bin Sayeed)
- Reading 59: Transfer of Power in India  
(V. P. Menon)
- Reading 60: PAKISTAN: The Formative Phase, 1857 – 1948  
(Khalid Bin Sayeed)
- Reading 61: Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah: Myth and Reality  
(Waheed-uz-Zaman)

#### *Self-Learning Questions (SLQs)*

Question – 39

How did the working of the Interim Government serve as a prelude to the ultimate partition of the Indian subcontinent? Discuss.

KEY: *Points to Note*

- Quaid-i-Azam’s decision to allow the League to join the Interim Government “as sentinals who would watch Muslim interests in the day-to-day administration of Government.”
- Open division in the Interim Government (League members meeting under the Chairmanship of Liaquat Ali Khan rather than Nehru).

- Liaquat Ali Khan's "Poor Man's Budget", affecting adversely the Hindu commercial and industrial interests, caused further distrust and suspicion between the League and the Congress.

**Question – 40**

Was the 3rd June Plan primarily a Congress-Mountbatten accord? Discuss it in the light of V. P. Menon's account. What was the reaction of the Muslim League?

**KEY: Points to Note**

- Mountbatten's contacts with the Congress leadership, particularly Nehru.
- Understanding between the Congress Leaders and Mountbatten and the drafting of the Plan by V. P. Menon himself.
- Mountbatten proceeded to London to approve the plan only after he had secured the support of the Congress.

**Question – 41**

Critically examine the Radcliffe Award.

**KEY: Points to Note**

- Setting up of Boundary Commission.
- Role of Sir Cyril Radcliffe, Chairman of the Boundary Commission, "made it abundantly clear that he fixed the boundaries" not "on the basis of ascertaining the contiguous majority areas of Muslims and Non-Muslims" but on the flexible and convenient considerations of "other factors".
- Delay in the announcement of the Award.

**9.4 Suggested Readings:**

*For Constitutional and Political Advance at the Centre, see,*

1. Latif Ahmad Sherwani (ed), 1969 – Pakistan Resolution to Pakistan 1940 – 1947, pp. 106 – 15, 118 – 21, 136 – 38.
2. Syed Sharif ud din Pirzada (ed), 1977 – Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah's Correspondence, East and West Publishing Company, Karachi, pp. 82 – 133.

*For Partition of the Indian Subcontinent, see,*

3. Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, 1979 – The Emergence of Pakistan Research. Society of Pakistan, Lahore, pp. 129 – 59, 203 – 21.
4. Jamil ud din Ahmad (comp), 1970 – Historic Documents of the Muslim Freedom Movement, pp. 563 – 71.

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## ERRATA

Page 15.	Para 1.	Line 18.	<i>For</i> 'wilt' <i>Read</i> 'writ'
Page 16.	Para 4.	Line 16.	<i>For</i> 'merge' <i>Read</i> 'emerge'
Page 17.	Para 1.	Last Line.	<i>For</i> 'resultin' <i>Read</i> 'resulting in'
Page 19.	Para 5.	Line 4.	<i>For</i> 'demand' <i>Read</i> 'demands'
Page 20.	Para 2.	Line 2.	<i>For</i> 'state' <i>Read</i> 'started'
Page 26.	Para 1.	Line 7.	<i>After</i> 'principle' <i>Add</i> 'of'
	Para 2.	Line 7.	<i>For</i> 'Proposal' <i>Read</i> 'Proposals'
Page 29.	Para 3.	Per.ultimate Line.	<i>For</i> 'ideal' <i>Read</i> 'ideals'
Page 33.	Para 3.	Line 15.	<i>For</i> 'constitution' <i>Read</i> 'constitutions'