

Rwanda and Burundi, for example. However, such conflicts are by no means simply manifestations of ancient 'tribalism'. To a large extent they are a consequence of the divide-and-rule policies used in the colonial past.

Varieties of nationalism

Immense controversy surrounds the political character of nationalism. On the one hand, nationalism can appear to be a progressive and liberating force, offering the prospect of national unity or independence. On the other, it can be an irrational and reactionary creed that allows political leaders to conduct policies of military expansion and war in the name of the nation. Indeed, nationalism shows every sign of suffering from the political equivalent of multiple-personality syndrome. At various times, nationalism has been progressive and reactionary, democratic and authoritarian, liberating and oppressive, and left-wing and right-wing. For this reason, it is perhaps better to view nationalism not as a single or coherent political phenomenon, but as a series of 'nationalisms': that is, as a complex of traditions that share but one characteristic - each, in its own particular way, acknowledges the central political importance of the nation.

This confusion derives in part from the controversies examined above about how the concept of a nation should be understood, and about whether cultural or political criteria are decisive in defining the nation. However, the character of nationalism is also moulded by the circumstances in which nationalist aspirations arise, and by the political causes to which it is attached. Thus, when nationalism is a reaction against the experience of foreign domination or colonial rule, it tends to be a liberating force linked to the goals of liberty, justice and democracy. When nationalism is a product of social dislocation and demographic change, it often has an insular and exclusive character, and can become a vehicle for racism (see p. 116) and **xenophobia**. Finally, nationalism is shaped by the political ideals of those who espouse it. In their different ways, liberals, conservatives, socialists, fascists and even communists have been attracted to nationalism (of the major ideologies, perhaps only anarchism is entirely at odds with nationalism). In this sense, nationalism is a cross-cutting ideology. The principal political manifestations of nationalism are the following:

- liberal nationalism
- conservative nationalism
- expansionist nationalism
- anticolonial nationalism.

Liberal nationalism

Liberal nationalism can be seen as the classic form of European liberalism; it dates back to the French Revolution, and embodies many of its values. Indeed, in continental Europe in the mid-nineteenth century, to be a nationalist meant to be a liberal, and *vice versa*. The 1848 Revolutions, for example, fused the struggle for national independence and unification with the demand for limited and constitutional government. Nowhere was this more evident than in the 'Risorgimento' (rebirth) nationalism of the Italian nationalist movement, especially as expressed by the 'prophet' of Italian unification, Giuseppe Mazzini (see p. 112). Similar principles

Xenophobia: A fear or hatred of foreigners; pathological ethnocentrism.



Giuseppe Mazzini (1805–72)

Italian nationalist and apostle of liberal republicanism. Mazzini was born in Genoa, Italy, and was the son of a doctor. He came into contact with revolutionary politics as a member of the patriotic secret society, the Carbonari. This led to his arrest and exile to France and, after his expulsion from France, to Britain. He returned briefly to Italy during the 1848 Revolutions, helping to liberate Milan and becoming head of the short-lived Roman Republic. A committed republican, Mazzini's

influence thereafter faded as other nationalist leaders, including Garibaldi (1807–82), looked to the House of Savoy to bring about Italian unification. Although he never officially returned to Italy, Mazzini's liberal nationalism had a profound influence throughout Europe, and on immigrant groups in the USA.

were espoused by Simon Bolivar (1783-1830), who led the Latin-American independence movement in the early nineteenth century, and helped to expel the Spanish from Hispanic America. Perhaps the clearest expression of liberal nationalism is found in US President Woodrow Wilson's 'Fourteen Points'. Drawn up in 1918, these were proposed as the basis for the reconstruction of Europe after the First World War, and provided a blueprint for the sweeping territorial changes that were implemented by the Treaty of Versailles (1919).

In common with all forms of nationalism, liberal nationalism is based on the fundamental assumption that humankind is naturally divided into a collection of nations, each possessed of a separate identity. Nations are therefore genuine or organic communities, not the artificial creation of political leaders or ruling classes. The characteristic theme of liberal nationalism, however, is that it links the idea of the nation with a belief in popular sovereignty, ultimately derived from Rousseau. This fusion was brought about because the multinational empires against which nineteenth-century European nationalists fought were also autocratic and oppressive. Mazzini, for example, wished not only to unite the Italian states, but also to throw off the influence of autocratic Austria. The central theme of this form of nationalism is therefore a commitment to the principle of **national self-determination**. Its goal is the construction of a nation-state (see p. 121): that is, a state within which the boundaries of government coincide as far as possible with those of nationality. In J.S. Mill's ([1861] 1951:392) words:

When the sentiment of nationality exists in any force, there is a *prima facie* case for uniting all members of the nationality under one government, and a government to themselves apart. This is merely saying that the question of government should be decided by the governed.

Liberal nationalism is above all a principled form of nationalism. It does not uphold the interests of one nation against other nations. Instead, it proclaims that each and every nation has a right to freedom and self-determination. In this sense, all nations are equal. The ultimate goal of liberal nationalism, then, is the construction of a world of sovereign nation-states. Mazzini thus formed the clandestine organization Young Italy to promote the idea of a united Italy, but he also founded Young Europe in the hope of spreading nationalist ideas throughout the continent. Similarly, at the Paris Peace Conference that drew up the Treaty of Versailles, Woodrow Wilson advanced the principle of self-determination not simply because the breakup of European empires served US national interests, but because he believed that the

National self-determination:

The principle that the nation is a sovereign entity; self-determination implies both national independence and democratic rule.

Poles, the Czechs, the Yugoslavs and the Hungarians all had the same right to political independence that the Americans already enjoyed.

From this perspective, nationalism is not only a means of enlarging political freedom, but also a mechanism for securing a peaceful and stable world order. Wilson, for instance, believed that the First World War had been caused because of an 'old order' that was dominated by autocratic and militaristic empires bent on expansionism and war. In his view, democratic nation-states, however, would be essentially peaceful, because, possessing both cultural and political unity, they lacked the incentive to wage war or subjugate other nations. In this light, nationalism is not seen as a source of distrust, suspicion and rivalry. Rather, it is a force capable of promoting unity within each nation and brotherhood amongst nations on the basis of mutual respect for national rights and characteristics.

There is a sense, nevertheless, in which liberalism looks beyond the nation. This occurs for two reasons. The first is that a commitment to individualism implies that liberals believe that all human beings (regardless of factors such as race, creed, social background and nationality) are of equal moral worth. Liberalism therefore subscribes to universalism, in that it accepts that individuals everywhere have the same status and entitlements. This is commonly expressed nowadays in the notion of **human rights**. In setting the individual above the nation, liberals establish a basis for violating national sovereignty, as in the international campaign to pressurize the 'white' South African regime to abandon apartheid. The second reason is that liberals fear that a world of sovereign nation-states may degenerate into an international 'state of nature'. Just as unlimited freedom allows individuals to abuse and enslave one another, national sovereignty may be used as a cloak for expansionism and conquest. Freedom must always be subject to the law, and this applies equally to individuals and to nations. Liberals have, as a result, been in the forefront of campaigns to establish a system of international law (see p. 154) supervised by supranational bodies such as the League of Nations, the United Nations and the European Union. In this view, nationalism must therefore never be allowed to become insular and exclusive, but, instead, must be balanced against a competing emphasis upon cosmopolitanism.

Criticisms of liberal nationalism tend to fall into two categories. In the first category, liberal nationalists may be accused of being naive and romantic. They see the progressive and liberating face of nationalism; theirs is a tolerant and rational nationalism. However, they perhaps ignore the darker face of nationalism: that is, the irrational bonds of **tribalism** that distinguish 'us' from a foreign and threatening 'them'. Liberals see nationalism as a universal principle, but they have less understanding of the emotional power of nationalism, which, in time of war, can persuade people to fight, kill and die for 'their' country, almost regardless of the justice of their nation's cause. Such a stance is expressed in the assertion: 'my country, right or wrong'.

Second, the goal of liberal nationalism (the construction of a world of nation-states) may be fundamentally misguided. The mistake of Wilsonian nationalism, on the basis of which large parts of the map of Europe were redrawn, was that it assumed that nations live in convenient and discrete geographical areas, and that states can be constructed to coincide with these areas. In practice, all so-called 'nation-states' comprise a number of linguistic, religious, ethnic and regional groups, some of which may consider themselves to be 'nations'. This has nowhere been more clearly demonstrated than in the former Yugoslavia, a country viewed by the peacemakers at Versailles as 'the land of the Slavs'. However, it in fact consisted

Concept

Cosmopolitanism

Cosmopolitanism is literally a belief in a *cosmopolis*, or 'world state'. It thus implies the obliteration of national identities and the establishment of a common political allegiance uniting all human beings. However, the term is usually used to refer to the more modest goal of peace and harmony amongst nations, founded upon mutual understanding, toleration and above all

Human rights: Rights to which people are entitled by virtue of being human; universal and fundamental rights (see p. 302).

Tribalism: Group behaviour characterized by insularity and exclusivity, typically fuelled by hostility towards rival groups.

of a patchwork of ethnic communities, religions, languages and differing histories. Moreover, as the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s demonstrated, each of its constituent republics was itself an ethnic patchwork. Indeed, as the Nazis and later the Bosnian Serbs recognized, the only certain way of achieving a politically unified and culturally homogeneous nation-state is through a programme of **ethnic cleansing**.

Conservative nationalism

Historically, conservative nationalism developed rather later than liberal nationalism. Until the latter half of the nineteenth century, conservative politicians treated nationalism as a subversive, if not revolutionary, creed. As the century progressed, however, the link between conservatism and nationalism became increasingly apparent, for instance, in Disraeli's 'One Nation' ideal, in Bismarck's willingness to recruit German nationalism to the cause of Prussian aggrandisement, and in Tsar Alexander III's endorsement of pan-Slavic nationalism. In modern politics, nationalism has become an article of faith for most, if not all, conservatives. In the UK this was demonstrated most graphically by Margaret Thatcher's triumphalist reaction to victory in the Falklands War of 1982, and it is evident in the engrained 'Euroscepticism' of the Conservative right, particularly in relation to its recurrent bogey: a 'federal Europe'. A similar form of nationalism was rekindled in the USA through the adoption of a more assertive foreign policy, by Reagan in the invasion of Grenada and the bombing of Libya, and by Bush in the invasion of Panama and the 1991 Gulf War.

Conservative nationalism is concerned less with the principled nationalism of universal self-determination and more with the promise of social cohesion and public order embodied in the sentiment of national patriotism. Above all, conservatives see the nation as an organic entity emerging out of a basic desire of humans to gravitate towards those who have the same views, habits, lifestyles and appearance as themselves. In short, human beings seek security and identity through membership of a national community. From this perspective, patriotic loyalty and a consciousness of nationhood is rooted largely in the idea of a shared past, turning nationalism into a defence of values and institutions that have been endorsed by history. Nationalism thus becomes a form of traditionalism. This gives conservative nationalism a distinctively nostalgic and backward-looking character. In the USA, this is accomplished through an emphasis on the Pilgrim Fathers, the War of Independence, the Philadelphia Convention and so on. In the case of British nationalism (or, more accurately, English nationalism), national patriotism draws on symbols closely associated with the institution of monarchy. The UK national anthem is *God Save the Queen*, and the Royal Family play a prominent role in national celebrations such as Armistice Day, and on state occasions such as the opening of Parliament.

Conservative nationalism tends to develop in established nation-states rather than in ones that are in the process of nation building. It is typically inspired by the perception that the nation is somehow under threat, either from within or from without. The traditional 'enemy within' has been class antagonism and the ultimate danger of social revolution. In this respect, conservatives have seen nationalism as **the** antidote to socialism: when patriotic loyalties are stronger than class solidarity, the working class is, effectively, integrated into the nation. Calls for national unity and the belief that unabashed patriotism is a civic virtue are therefore recurrent

Ethnic cleansing: The forcible expulsion or extermination of 'alien' peoples; often used as a euphemism for genocide.

themes in conservative thought. The 'enemies without' that threaten national identity include immigration and Supranationalism.

In this view, immigration poses a threat because it tends to weaken an established national culture and ethnic identity, thereby provoking hostility and conflict. This fear was expressed in the UK in the 1960s by Enoch Powell, who warned that further Commonwealth immigration would lead to racial conflict and violence. A similar theme was taken up in 1979 by Margaret Thatcher in her reference to the danger of the UK being 'swamped' by immigrants. Anti-immigration campaigns waged by the British National Party, Le Pen's National Front in France, and far-right groups in Germany such as the Republicans also draw their inspiration from conservative nationalism. National identity, and with it our source of security and belonging, is threatened in the same way by the growth of supranational bodies and by the globalization of culture. Resistance in the UK and in other EU member states to a single European currency reflects not merely concern about the loss of economic sovereignty, but also a belief that a national currency is vital to the maintenance of a distinctive national identity.

Although conservative nationalism has been linked to military adventure and expansion, its distinctive character is that it is inward-looking and insular. If conservative governments have used foreign policy as a device to stoke up public fervour, this is an act of political opportunism rather than because conservative nationalism is relentlessly aggressive or inherently militaristic. This leads to the criticism that conservative nationalism is essentially a form of elite manipulation or ruling-class ideology. From this perspective, the 'nation' is invented and certainly defined by political leaders and ruling elites with a view to manufacturing consent and engineering political passivity. In crude terms, when in trouble, all governments play the 'nationalism card'. A more serious criticism of conservative nationalism, however, is that it promotes intolerance and bigotry. Insular nationalism draws upon a narrowly cultural concept of the nation: that is, the belief that a nation is an exclusive ethnic community, broadly similar to an extended family. A very clear line is therefore drawn between those who are members of the nation and those who are alien to it. By insisting upon the maintenance of cultural purity and established traditions, conservatives may portray immigrants, or foreigners in general, as a threat, and so promote, or at least legitimize, racialism and xenophobia.

Expansionist nationalism

The third form of nationalism has an aggressive, militaristic and expansionist character. In many ways, this form of nationalism is the antithesis of the principled belief in equal rights and self-determination that is the core of liberal nationalism. The aggressive face of nationalism first appeared in the late nineteenth century as European powers indulged in 'the scramble for Africa' in the name of national glory and their 'place in the sun'. Nineteenth-century European imperialism (see p. 131) differed from the colonial expansion of earlier periods in that it was fuelled by a climate of popular nationalism in which national prestige was increasingly linked to the possession of an empire, and each colonial victory was greeted by demonstrations of popular enthusiasm, or **jingoism**. To a large extent, both world wars of the twentieth century resulted from this expansionist form of nationalism. When the First World War broke out in August 1914, following a prolonged arms race and a succession of international crises, the prospect of conquest and military glory provoked spontaneous

Concept

Patriotism

Patriotism (from the Latin *patria*, meaning 'fatherland') is a sentiment, a psychological attachment to one's nation (a 'love of one's country'). The terms nationalism and patriotism are often confused. Nationalism has a doctrinal character and embodies the belief that the nation is in some way the central principle of political organization. Patriotism provides the affective basis for that belief. Patriotism thus underpins all forms of nationalism; it is difficult to conceive of a national group demanding, say, political independence without possessing at least a measure of patriotic loyalty or national consciousness. However, not all patriots are nationalists. Not all of those who identify with, or even love, their nation see it as a means through which political demands can be articulated.

Jingoism: A mood of public enthusiasm and celebration provoked by military expansion or imperial conquest.

Concept

Racialism, racism

The terms racialism and racism are often used interchangeably, although the latter has become more common in modern usage. Racialism includes any belief or doctrine that draws political or social conclusions from the idea that humankind is divided into biologically distinct races. Racist theories are thus based on two assumptions. First, genetic differences justify humankind being treated as a collection of races (race effectively implying species). Second, cultural, intellectual and moral differences amongst humankind derive from these more fundamental genetic differences. In political terms, racialism is manifest in calls for racial segregation (apartheid), and in doctrines of 'blood' superiority and inferiority (for example, Aryanism and anti-Semitism). Racism may be used more narrowly to refer to prejudice or hostility towards people on the grounds of their racial origins, whether or not this is linked to a developed racial theory.

public rejoicing in all the major capitals of Europe. The Second World War was largely a result of the nationalist-inspired programmes of imperial expansion pursued by Japan, Italy and Germany. The most destructive modern example of this form of nationalism in Europe has been the quest by the Bosnian Serbs to construct a 'Greater Serbia'.

In its extreme form, such nationalism arises from a sentiment of intense, even hysterical nationalist enthusiasm, sometimes referred to as integral nationalism. The term integral nationalism was coined by the French nationalist Charles Maurras (1868-1952), leader of the right-wing Action Française. The centrepiece of Maurras' politics was an assertion of the overriding importance of the nation: the nation is everything and the individual is nothing. The nation thus has an existence and meaning beyond the life of any single individual, and individual existence has meaning only when it is dedicated to the unity and survival of the nation. Such fanatical patriotism has a particularly strong appeal for the alienated, isolated and powerless, for whom nationalism becomes a vehicle through which pride and self-respect can be regained. However, integral nationalism breaks the link previously established between nationalism and democracy. An 'integral' nation is an exclusive ethnic community, bound together by primordial loyalties rather than voluntary political allegiances. National unity does not demand free debate and an open and competitive struggle for power; it requires discipline and obedience to a single, supreme leader. This led Maurras to portray democracy as a source of weakness and corruption, and to call instead for the reestablishment of monarchical absolutism.

This militant and intense form of nationalism is invariably associated with chauvinistic beliefs and doctrines. Derived from the name of Nicolas Chauvin, a French soldier noted for his fanatical devotion to Napoleon and the cause of France, chauvinism is an irrational belief in the superiority or dominance of one's own group or people. National chauvinism therefore rejects the idea that all nations are equal in favour of the belief that nations have particular characteristics and qualities, and so have very different destinies. Some nations are suited to rule; others are suited to be ruled. Typically, this form of nationalism is articulated through doctrines of ethnic or racial superiority, thereby fusing nationalism and racialism. The chauvinist's own nation is seen to be unique and special, in some way a 'chosen people'. For early German nationalists such as Fichte and Jahn, only the Germans were a true *Volk* (an organic people). They alone had maintained blood purity and avoided the contamination of their language. For Maurras, France was an unequalled marvel, a repository of all Christian and classical virtues.

No less important in this type of nationalism, however, is the image of another nation or race as a threat or enemy. In the face of the enemy, the nation draws together and gains an intensified sense of its own identity and importance, achieving a kind of 'negative integration'. Chauvinistic nationalism therefore establishes a clear distinction between 'them' and 'us'. There has to be a 'them' to deride or hate in order for a sense of 'us' to be forged. The world is thus divided, usually by means of racial categories, into an 'in group' and an 'out group'. The 'out group' acts as a scapegoat for all the misfortunes and frustrations suffered by the 'in group'. This was most graphically demonstrated by the virulent anti-Semitism that was the basis of German Nazism. Hitler's *Mein Kampf* ([1925] 1969) portrayed history as a Manichean struggle between the Aryans and the Jews, respectively representing the forces of light and darkness, or good and evil.

A recurrent theme of expansionist nationalism is the idea of national rebirth or

regeneration. This form of nationalism commonly draws upon myths of past greatness or national glory. Mussolini and the Italian Fascists looked back to the days of Imperial Rome. In portraying their regime as the 'Third Reich', the German Nazis harked back both to Bismarck's 'Second Reich' and Charlemagne's Holy Roman Empire, the 'First Reich'. Such myths plainly give expansionist nationalism a backward-looking character, but they also look to the future in that they mark out the nation's destiny. If nationalism is a vehicle for reestablishing greatness and regaining national glory, it invariably has a militaristic and expansionist character. In short, war is the testing ground of the nation. At the heart of integral nationalism there often lies an imperial project: a quest for expansion or a search for colonies. This can be seen in forms of **pan-nationalism**. However, Nazi Germany is again the best-known example. Hitler's writings mapped out a three-stage programme of expansion. First, the Nazis sought to establish a 'Greater Germany' by bringing ethnic Germans in Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland within an expanded Reich. Second, they intended to achieve *Lebensraum* (living space) by establishing a German-dominated empire stretching into Russia. Third, Hitler dreamed of ultimate Aryan world domination.

Anticolonial nationalism

The developing world has spawned various forms of nationalism, all of which have in some way drawn inspiration from the struggle against colonial rule. The irony of this form of nationalism is that it has turned doctrines and principles first developed through the process of 'nation building' in Europe against the European powers themselves. Colonialism, in other words, succeeded in turning nationalism into a political creed of global significance. In Africa and Asia, it helped to forge a sense of nationhood shaped by the desire for 'national liberation'. Indeed, during the twentieth century, the political geography of much of the world was transformed by anticolonialism. Independence movements that sprang up in the interwar period gained new impetus after the conclusion of the Second World War. The overstretched empires of Britain, France, the Netherlands and Portugal crumbled in the face of rising nationalism.

India had been promised independence during the Second World War, which was eventually granted in 1947. China achieved genuine unity and independence only after the 1949 communist revolution, having fought an eight-year war against the occupying Japanese. A republic of Indonesia was proclaimed in 1949 after a three-year war against the Netherlands. A military uprising forced the French to withdraw from Vietnam in 1954, even though final liberation, with the unification of North and South Vietnam, was not achieved until 1975, after 14 further years of war against the USA. Nationalist struggles in South East Asia inspired similar movements in Africa, with liberation movements emerging under leaders such as Nkrumah in Ghana, Dr Azikiwe in Nigeria, Julius Nyerere in Tanganyika (later Tanzania), and Hastings Banda in Nyasaland (later Malawi). The pace of decolonization in Africa accelerated from the late 1950s onwards. Nigeria gained independence from the UK in 1960 and, after a prolonged war fought against the French, Algeria gained independence in 1962. Kenya became independent in 1963, as did Tanzania and Malawi the next year. Africa's last remaining colony, South-West Africa, finally became independent Namibia in 1990.

Early forms of anticolonialism drew heavily on 'classical' European nationalism and were inspired by the idea of national self-determination. However, emergent

Concept

Anti-Semitism

Semites are by tradition the descendants of Shem, son of Noah. They include most of the peoples of the Middle East. Anti-Semitism is prejudice or hatred towards Jews. In its earliest systematic form, anti-Semitism had a *religious* character. It reflected the hostility of the Christians towards the Jews, based on the alleged complicity of the Jews in the murder of Jesus and their refusal to acknowledge him as the son of God. *Economic* anti-Semitism developed from the Middle Ages onwards, and expressed distaste for Jews in their capacity as moneylenders and traders. Jews were thus excluded from membership of craft guilds and prevented from owning land. The nineteenth century saw the birth of *racial* anti-Semitism in the work of Wagner and H. S. Chamberlain (1855–1929), which condemned the Jewish peoples as fundamentally evil and destructive. These ideas provided the ideological basis for German Nazism and found their most grotesque expression in the Holocaust.

Pan-nationalism: A style of nationalism dedicated to unifying a disparate people through either expansionism or political solidarity ('pan' means all or every).

Concept

Colonialism

Colonialism is the theory or practice of establishing control over a foreign territory and turning it into a 'colony'. Colonialism is thus a particular form of imperialism (see p. 131). Colonialism is usually distinguished by settlement and by economic domination. As typically practised in Africa and South East Asia, colonial government was exercised by a settler community from a 'mother country' who were ethnically distinct from the 'native' population. In French colonialism, colonies were thought of as part of the mother country, meaning that colonial peoples were granted formal rights of citizenship. In contrast, neocolonialism is essentially an economic phenomenon based on the export of capital from an advanced country to a less developed one, as seen, for example, in so-called US 'dollar imperialism' in Latin America.

African and Asian nations were in a very different position from the newly created European states of the nineteenth century. For African and Asian nations, the quest for political independence was inextricably linked to a desire for social development and for an end to their subordination to the industrialized states of Europe and the USA. The goal of 'national liberation' therefore had an economic as well as a political dimension. This helps to explain why anticolonial movements typically looked not to liberalism but to socialism, and particularly to Marxism-Leninism, as a vehicle for expressing their nationalist ambitions. On the surface, nationalism and socialism appear to be incompatible political creeds. Socialists have traditionally preached internationalism (see p. 128), since they regard humanity as a single entity, and argue that the division of humankind into separate nations breeds only suspicion and hostility. Marxists in particular have stressed that the bonds of class solidarity are stronger and more genuine than the ties of nationality, or, as Marx put it in the *Communist Manifesto* ([1848] 1967:102): 'Working men have no country'.

The appeal of socialism to the developing world is based on the fact that the values of community and cooperation that socialism embodies are deeply established in the cultures of traditional, preindustrial societies. In this sense, nationalism and socialism are linked insofar as both emphasize social solidarity and collective action. By this standard, nationalism may simply be a weaker form of socialism, the former applying the 'social' principle to the nation, the latter extending it to cover the whole of humanity. More specifically, socialism, and especially Marxism, provide an analysis of inequality and exploitation through which the colonial experience can be understood and colonial rule challenged. In the same way as the oppressed and exploited proletariat saw that they could achieve liberation through the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism, third-world nationalists saw 'armed struggle' as a means of achieving both political and economic emancipation, thus fusing the goals of political independence and social revolution. In countries such as China, North Korea, Vietnam and Cambodia, anticolonial movements openly embraced Marxism-Leninism. On achieving power, they moved to seize foreign assets and nationalize economic resources, creating Soviet-style planned economies. African and Middle Eastern states have developed a less ideological form of nationalistic socialism, practised in Algeria, Libya, Zambia, Iraq, South Yemen and elsewhere. The 'socialism' proclaimed in these countries usually takes the form of an appeal to a unifying national cause or interest, typically proclaimed by a powerful 'charismatic' leader.

However, nationalists in the developing world have not always been content to express their nationalism in a language of socialism or Marxism borrowed from the West. Especially since the 1970s, Marxism-Leninism has often been displaced by forms of religious fundamentalism (see p. 63), and particularly Islamic fundamentalism. This has given the developing world a specifically nonwestern, indeed an anti-western, voice. In theory at least, Islam attempts to foster a transnational political identity that unites all those who acknowledge the 'way of Islam' and the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad within an 'Islamic nation'. However, the Iranian revolution of 1979, which brought Ayatollah Khomeini (1900-89) to power, demonstrated the potency of Islamic fundamentalism as a creed of national and spiritual renewal. The establishment of an 'Islamic republic' was designed to purge Iran of the corrupting influence of western materialism in general and of the 'Great Satan' (the USA) in particular through a return to the traditional values and principles embodied in the *Shari'a*, or divine Islamic law. By no means, however, does Islamic nationalism have

a unified character. In Sudan and Pakistan, for example, Islamification has essentially been used as a tool of statecraft to consolidate the power of ruling elites. Nevertheless, in Egypt and Algeria revolutionary Islamic movements have emerged that call for moral renewal and political purification in the name of the urban poor.

Multiculturalism

The idea of the nation as a culturally and politically united whole has, particularly since the 1960s, been challenged by the rise of multiculturalism. Nationalism has always been an example of the politics of identity, in the sense that it tells people who they are: it gives people a history, forges social bonds and a collective spirit, and creates a sense of destiny larger than individual existence. Multiculturalism is also a form of identity politics, but its stress is rather on the 'politics of difference', stressing the range of cultural diversity and identity-related differences in many modern societies. Although such diversity may be linked to age, social class, gender or sexuality, multiculturalism is usually associated with cultural differentiation that is based on race (see p. 194), ethnicity (see p. 168) or language. Multiculturalism not only recognizes the fact of cultural diversity, but also holds that such differences should be respected and publicly affirmed. Although the USA, as an immigrant society, has long been a multicultural society, the cause of multiculturalism in this sense was not taken up until the rise of the black consciousness movement in the 1960s. Australia has been officially committed to multiculturalism since the early 1970s, in recognition of its increasing 'Asianization'. In New Zealand it is linked to a recognition of the role of Maori culture in forging a distinctive national identity. In Canada it is associated with attempts to achieve reconciliation between French-speaking Quebec and the English-speaking majority population, and an acknowledgement of the rights of the indigenous Inuit peoples. In the UK, multiculturalism recognizes the existence of significant black and Asian communities and abandons the demand that they assimilate into white society. In Germany, this applies in relation to Turkish groups.

The relationship between multiculturalism and nationalism is complex. The nationalist traditions that are most disposed to accommodate multiculturalism are liberal nationalism and anticolonial nationalism. This is because both traditions embrace an essentially 'inclusive' model of the nation as a political or 'civic' entity rather than a cultural or 'ethnic' entity. Members of the nation are thus bound together less by a unifying culture and more by common citizenship and shared allegiances. Liberalism, indeed, can be seen to favour multiculturalism in principle. Liberal multiculturalism is rooted, most fundamentally, in a commitment to freedom and toleration. Classically expressed in J.S. Mill's (see p. 46) *On Liberty* ([1859] 1982), toleration can be seen as fundamentally important both to the individual and to society. For the individual, the ability to choose one's own moral beliefs, cultural practices and way of life, regardless of whether these are disapproved of by others, is an essential guarantee of freedom and personal development. Such a defence of what can be seen as 'negative' toleration justifies at least a live-and-let-live multiculturalism, or the politics of indifference. Mill nevertheless believed that toleration has the additional advantage that, in breeding diversity, it both contributes to the vigour and health of society and ensures progress by stimulating argument, discussion and debate. Such a defence of 'positive' toleration comes close to the modern ethic of

Concept

Multiculturalism

Multiculturalism is used as both a descriptive and a normative term. As a descriptive term it refers to cultural diversity arising from the existence within a society of two or more groups whose beliefs and practices generate a distinctive sense of collective identity. Multiculturalism is invariably reserved for communal diversity that arises from racial, ethnic or language differences. As a normative term, multiculturalism implies a positive endorsement of communal diversity, based either on the right of different cultural groups to respect and recognition, or on the alleged benefits to the larger society of moral and cultural diversity. Multiculturalism, in this sense, acknowledges the importance of beliefs, values and ways of life in establishing self-understanding and a sense of self-worth for individuals and groups alike. Critics of multiculturalism argue that multicultural societies are inherently conflict-ridden and unstable, and view normative multiculturalism as an example of political correctness.



Isaiah Berlin (1909–97)

UK historian of ideas and philosopher. Berlin was born in Riga, Latvia, and came to Britain in 1921. He developed a form of liberal pluralism that was grounded in a lifelong commitment to empiricism and influenced by the ideas of counter-Enlightenment thinkers, including Vico (1668–1744), Herder (see p. 107) and Alexander Herzen (1812–70). Basic to Berlin's philosophical stance was a belief in moral pluralism, the idea that conflicts of

values are intrinsic to human life. His best-known political writing is *Four Essays on Liberty* (1958), in which he extolled the virtues of 'negative' freedom over 'positive' freedom. Berlin's writings constitute a defence of western liberalism against totalitarianism.

multiculturalism, in which communal diversity is not merely accepted, perhaps grudgingly, but is positively welcomed as a source of vitality and enrichment for all.

However, liberalism and multiculturalism are not entirely compatible. In the first place, individualism (see p. 190), the core principle of liberalism, conflicts with multiculturalism in that it highlights the primary importance of personal or individual identity over any collective notion of identity based on ethnicity, race, language or whatever. To this degree, liberalism looks beyond both multiculturalism and nationalism, supporting, instead, the principle of internationalism (see p. 128). Second, liberalism is universalist in the sense that it gives priority to a set of core values, amongst which freedom and toleration clearly feature. In other words, liberalism offers a particular conception of the 'good life', one in which personal autonomy and freedom of choice are seen as vital pre-conditions for human self-development. Liberals are therefore inclined to tolerate the tolerant, but they find it more difficult to tolerate what they may see as illiberal or intolerant cultural beliefs and practices, such as arranged marriages, female dress codes or discrimination against gays and lesbians. Multiculturalists, for their part, often view liberal toleration as nothing more than cultural imperialism, that is, as an attempt to impose western beliefs, values and sensibilities on the rest of the world.

Firmer foundations for a theory of multiculturalism can be found in the idea of value pluralism. Isaiah Berlin developed a theory of pluralism (see p. 78) that has been used by many multiculturalists to justify a politics of difference. In Berlin's view there is no single, overriding conception of the 'good life', but rather a number of competing conceptions: people, in short, are bound to disagree about the ultimate ends of life. As values conflict, the human predicament is inevitably characterized by moral conflict. As far as individuals are concerned, compromises must be made between competing values and goals. As far as society is concerned, ways must be found to allow people with different moral and cultural beliefs to inhabit the same political space while maintaining peace and mutual respect. Although Berlin's pluralism was not developed with multicultural societies in mind, it provides the basis for at least a live-and-let-live form of multiculturalism. Nevertheless, there are also tensions between Berlin's ideas and multiculturalism. As Berlin remained a liberal to the extent that he believed that only within a society that respects individual liberty can moral pluralism be contained, he failed to demonstrate how liberal and illiberal cultural beliefs can coexist harmoniously within the same society. An alternative basis for multiculturalism has been advanced by Bhikhu Parekh (2000).

In Parekh's view, cultural diversity is, at heart, a reflection of the dialectical interplay between human nature and culture. Although human beings are natural creatures, who possess a common species-derived physical and mental structure, they are also culturally constituted in the sense that their attitudes, behaviour and ways of life are shaped by the groups to which they belong. A recognition of the complexity of human nature, and of the fact that any culture expresses only a part of what it means to be truly human, provides the basis for a politics of recognition and thus for a viable form of multiculturalism.

However, multiculturalism is clearly incompatible with conservative nationalism and expansionist nationalism. This is because these nationalist traditions are based on an 'exclusive' notion of national identity that emphasizes cultural homogeneity and, in some cases, racial purity. The conservative case against multiculturalism is that stable and successful societies must be based on shared values and a common culture. Human beings, in this view, are limited and dependent creatures, who are naturally drawn to others similar to themselves but, by the same token, fear or distrust people who are in some way different. Burke (see p. 47), for this reason, portrayed prejudice as inevitable and socially beneficial insofar as it strengthens social cohesion. Multicultural societies are therefore fractured and conflict-ridden: suspicion, hostility and even violence between different ethnic communities are not products of intolerance, ignorance or social inequality, but are a simple fact of social psychology. Conservative nationalists thus recommend that cultural diversity be contained by restrictions on immigration, as pointed out earlier, or insist on an assimilationist strategy in which minority communities are encouraged to adopt the values, attitudes and allegiances of the majority community.

Expansionist or chauvinist nationalists simply take these arguments to their extreme. The strength of the 'national community' is based strictly on its ethnic and cultural unity, an idea that fascists have used to justify the repatriation, expulsion or otherwise removal of minority groups. In the case of Nazism, an explicitly racist version of anti-multiculturalism resulted in a programme of genocidal anti-Semitism. However, conservative and far-right objections to multiculturalism suffer from at least two drawbacks. The first is that even if they are not explicitly racist, they may harbour implicit racialism in serving to legitimize, and perhaps encourage, hostility between different ethnic communities. The second is that they revere an image of social, moral and cultural homogeneity that has long ceased to exist in modern societies and which could be re-established only through widespread repression.

Concept

Nation-state

The nation-state is a form of political organization, and a political ideal. In the first case, it is an autonomous political community bound together by the overlapping bonds of citizenship and nationality. It is thus an alternative to multinational empires and city-states. In the latter case, the nation-state is a principle, or ideal type (see p. 18), reflected in Mazzini's goal: 'every nation a state, only one state for the entire nation'. This acknowledges that no modern state is, or can be, culturally homogeneous. There are two contrasting views of the nation-state. For liberals and most socialists, the nation-state is largely fashioned out of civic loyalties and allegiances. For conservatives and integral nationalists, it is based on ethnic or organic unity.

A future for the nation-state?

As the twentieth century progressed, claims were increasingly made that the age of nationalism was over. This was not because nationalism had been superseded by 'higher' supranational allegiances, but because its task had been completed: the world had become a world of nation-states. In effect, the nation had been accepted as the sole legitimate unit of political rule. Certainly, since 1789, the world had been fundamentally remodelled on nationalist lines. In 1910, only 15 of the 159 states recognized in 1989 as full members of the United Nations existed. Well into the twentieth century, most of the peoples of the world were still colonial subjects of one of the European empires. Only three of the current 65 states in the Middle East and Africa existed before 1910, and no fewer than 74 states have come into being since 1959.