

Political Culture: Democratic and Authoritarian

Every state has a unique political culture and embraces a variety of political sub-cultures. It is a daunting, if not impossible, task to compare the political cultures of all the world's states and to relate those findings to particular forms of political behavior. Culture knows no borders. It is not confined inside the artificial boundaries of states. Cultural patterns can be found within countries and also across large regions and even continents where populations have shifted and share such factors as language, ethnicity, history, religion, and language. There are broad similarities in the overall patterns of political culture across regions such as Western Europe, North America, South America, and parts of Asia and the Middle East because of such factors as shared history, cultural and religious experiences, and economic development.

Belief and value systems in the countries of Western Europe and North America are relatively individualistic in nature. There is widespread emphasis on formal equality and the importance of individual rights and freedoms. Many Asian countries, by contrast, manifest an essentially collectivist culture based on their heritage of Confucian thought. Individuals in such societies view themselves as part of a social order that is hierarchical, and those in authority are seen as the natural leaders of an extended family. Challenges to authority are considered to be essentially inappropriate behavior, whereas in Western Europe and North America challenge and conflict are seen as a natural part of the fabric of a democratic society.

Broad similarities are also found across Third World developing countries. These countries often experience social turmoil when their national political cul-

tures are brought into confrontation with the political cultures of more modern states. As states adopt outside standards in order to achieve competitive economic performance with other states, they may jeopardize the parochial values which are the basis of local loyalties and politics. Modern technology, economics, and principles of efficiency, for example, are parts of a world culture that may weaken the sense of self-identity and dignity that comes from "a fundamental belief in the collective uniqueness of the national entity and its spirit of community."¹ Such clashing values pose a serious problem for developing nations and also for poorer areas within developed states where modern technologies and values are imposed on traditional societies.

To provide an overview of political culture in the range of democratic and authoritarian countries, this chapter is divided into four parts. The first part examines political culture at the state level. It reviews some significant findings of political culture studies in developed liberal democracies, and then considers the impact of religious and cultural belief systems on national politics. A discussion of Christianity is followed by sections on Islam and Confucianism. The second part explores aspects of two important subcultures which exist within states: ethno-linguistic groups, and a gender-based group—women. The third part of the chapter explores comparative political socialization; the fourth considers political participation as a behavioral manifestation of political culture.

POLITICAL CULTURE IN DEMOCRACIES

The practical and interpretive difficulties of comparing across cultures are considerable. Such problems have restricted most cross-national survey research comparing political cultures to a few developed, democratic countries with relatively similar political systems. For the same reasons, studies of political culture have often been confined to single countries. In the United States, for example, studies have concluded that Americans share many fundamental values. According to Robert Dahl, the most widespread are:

- Support for the system of elected government;
- Commitment to the idea of political equality;
- The right of private property;
- Strong emphasis on individual achievement; and
- The possibility to achieve personal goals in America.²

From a slightly different perspective, American political culture is characterized by pervasive liberal ideas which have been adapted to the American context.³ These ideas include:

- An inherent suspicion of political power;
- Belief that government is to be controlled by the people;
- Belief in the rights of the individual, liberty, and equality; and
- A strong component of political moralism.

Clearly, individual country studies provide rich and fascinating material for understanding the politics of a specific country. However, rather than focusing on the extensive literature on single-country political cultures, we shall concentrate here on some important general conclusions that apply across the spectrum of democracies. Early studies of political culture noted that people share basic social and political concerns regardless of state borders. All aspire to a happy family life, a decent standard of living, and good health; they fear political instability and war. Much political research has sought to determine what basic values and attitudes contribute to the likelihood that a state will enable its citizens to achieve these goals.

Using the various approaches described in the last chapter, social scientists have isolated factors in political cultures that promote stability and well-being within states. At a very general level these include national identity, trust, and political efficacy.

National Identity

A sense of national identity—of attachment or loyalty to the state and its institutions—provides a spiritual glue that helps keep countries united. The degree to which it is manifested varies significantly among states. When citizens have a weak national identity, states tend to be less stable and effective politically than when such attachment is strong. For this reason, leaders of new and developing countries try to promote a sense of national identity among their people, encouraging them to think in terms of belonging to the larger state unit rather than a smaller unit such as a province or region. As we shall see below, there are a number of ways political leaders can promote a strong national identity through development and promotion of unifying symbols such as flags, anthems, military decorations, military parades, and so on.

As we noted in the last chapter, the extent to which citizens appreciate the political institutions of their country has practical ramifications. When citizens accept the legitimacy of their state, this provides a stable political environment and a significant barrier to violent change. In recent years the world has witnessed the violent disintegration of several states that were unable to maintain a strong national identity in the face of ethnic or religious division. In Lebanon, for example, the larger state was torn apart by groups determined to identify themselves primarily as "Moslem," "Christian," or "Palestinian." In Nigeria, Ibo tribesmen sought to break away and form their own country of Biafra; they failed but much blood was shed. And in the former Yugoslavia, ethnic and religious divisions created a bloody civil war that United Nations peacekeepers were helpless to prevent.

Trust

A sense of trust, or a general belief in the honesty and veracity of people outside the immediate family, including neighbors, acquaintances, and also individuals involved in politics, is required as an underpinning to successful, stable political sys-

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tems. The degree of trust in society varies widely among states. Social trust is the basis of confidence in political institutions. A government needs a degree of voluntary compliance to its laws and directives. Where such compliance is high, the government need exercise only minimal force to carry out its activities and does not, as a matter of policy, resort to having individuals imprisoned or tortured because of subversive activities. The public's expression of trust in political institutions varies, depending on the popularity of the politicians in power, or major events such as war or external threats to the state, but it is still an important indicator of the political stability of a state.⁴

Political Efficacy

Political efficacy, the extent to which individual citizens feel they can affect political decisions, varies a great deal among and also within states, ranging from apathy to activism. The *Civic Culture* study, for example, found higher levels of political efficacy in Great Britain and the United States than in the former West Germany, Italy, and Mexico. It also found that differences among different educational groups *within* those states (except Great Britain) were even greater than the overall differences *between* states.⁵ Within states generally, higher educated individuals feel considerably more efficacious than those with only primary education; and consequently, as a group, they participate more in politics than the less educated who are more passive.⁶ Political efficacy, therefore, is intimately related to political participation. The aim of most political participation is to influence the selection or actions of political rulers.⁷ Differences in kind and rate of participation among democratic and authoritarian countries are discussed in the last section of this chapter.

The Civic Culture

A strong national identity, trust in one's compatriots, and a degree of political efficacy, then, are basic ingredients of a stable society. Almond and Verba used these concepts to identify the type of political culture that would be most conducive to sustaining a liberal democracy. This ideal culture, they concluded, would be a civic culture—a blend of three pure types of culture which they identified as participant, parochial, and subject cultures. (See Figure 7.1.) Participant political cultures are highly efficacious—they believe that political decisions affect their lives and that they can contribute to their political system. In parochial political cultures, on the




FIGURE 7.1 Components of a stable democracy, according to Almond and Verba.

other hand, people are distanced from their national government to such an extent that they feel it has nothing to do with them. The state does not penetrate deeply into such societies. Citizens in subject political cultures are not efficacious either. They view themselves simply as subjects whose lives are directed by a political process above them.

Almond and Verba concluded that a participant political culture was vital to a stable democracy. But they believed it was best if there was also a degree of parochial and subject culture. Citizens would therefore participate but at the same time would get on with their lives and leave much of political decision-making to their elites. They would willingly accept and give legitimacy to decisions of the elite even if they did not agree with them. Such a balance between governmental power and governmental responsiveness, they said, was necessary to maintain a stable democracy.⁸

Critics of the civic culture concept point out that there is no proof that a civic culture causes a stable democracy. It might, in fact, be the other way round and a stable government creates a civic culture. They point out that given the diversity of subcultures of class and ethnicity in most countries, one cannot identify a national culture that would be any more accurate than the stereotype that national character studies offer. Marxists consider political culture to be the outcome of the efforts of the dominant classes to legitimize their social and economic power over the masses. Features such as national identity, they maintain, are fostered simply to create a sense of unity across the social classes. In spite of such criticisms, however, Almond and Verba's *Civic Culture* study remains highly respected and essentially unrefuted.

BOX 7.1 Civil society.

The study of culture has, in recent years been enhanced by the concept "civil society." Civil society refers to the social and economic arrangements that counterbalance the powers of the state by providing an alternative source of power and prestige to that offered by the state itself. They include a complex web of "intermediate institutions,"—private groups that exist between the state and the family. They include associations such as charities, book clubs, volunteer agencies, human rights chapters, and so on that help create public-spirited citizens. They exist outside of the state and exercise restraint on it. According to proponents of the civil society argument, democracy grows from the grass roots of society upward through these intermediate structures of community life.

In the West, liberal, pluralist, scientifically oriented modern states have created civil societies based on several centuries of religious upheaval and economic and technological change. On the other hand, communist regions such as the former Soviet Union crushed or stifled civil society. Since the habits and attitudes that a liberal democracy depends on were destroyed, the new leaders must build or rebuild them. Many leaders in Eastern Europe want to go beyond establishing new governments and create a culture able to sustain political and economic liberalism. Western political leaders, too, are expressing the need to revitalize civil society. It is now evident that countries cannot build a civil society simply by rebuilding their economics.⁹

A test for the importance of civic culture in promoting stable democracy came with the third wave of new democracies in the period after Portugal's authoritarian regime was forced out of office by the military in 1974. A large number of countries became democratic in Latin America, in Eastern Europe, and to a smaller extent in Africa and Asia. However, many have proven to be extremely fragile. Their fragility indicates that an establishment or consolidation of democracy requires the masses to believe in democracy for its own sake and not only for its offers of better economic and social performance.¹⁰ In other words, a set of attitudes about governing similar to that found in the civic culture pattern is required for the long-term stability of democratic institutions.

FOUNDATIONS OF POLITICAL CULTURE

Many different forces shape the political cultures of states. Religion is one of the most important. It has played an important role in the evolution of civilizations and the founding of many states. It also provides moral principles which underlie basic cultural values such as trust, compassion, justice, and honesty. Religions throughout history have provided a social order necessary for human survival; they encouraged people to integrate and live together cooperatively—to repress individual instinctual drives in favor of the good of the community. They provided a force for social integration, a “universal” family for believers. They helped preserve family values and provided continuity of these values between generations. As well, early systems of law originated with religions, establishing the notion that individuals are equal before a god and divine laws. Secular laws later asserted that all persons “are considered equal before the laws of man.”

Cultural “Families”

In some parts of the world, political culture is based primarily on a cultural force such as Confucianism, which can underlie a variety of religions. Samuel P. Huntington has identified nine cultural families that encompass a great many of the world's countries: Nordic, Latin, Arab, Slavic, Indian, Sinic, Japanese, Malay, and African.¹¹ To this list we add Jewish culture (see Table 7.1). Huntington relates these cultural families to the principal religion(s) which provides many of the important ideals, aspirations, and goals of the countries or regions. Some states, of course, do not fit any of these categories exactly. However, Huntington estimates that at least 85% of the world's population is in national societies that fit reasonably well into one of his categories.¹² Since cultural differences among and within countries are important for the political analysis of states, Huntington says political scientists should ask whether each of these nine cultural groupings has its own pattern of political and economic development and goal achievement. He suggests that cultural identity may be the “single most important factor in predicting the extent to which X was likely to achieve growth, equity, democracy, stability and autonomy.”¹³

TABLE 7.1 Cultures, Religions, and Regions

Culture	Principal Religion	Region/Countries
Arab	Islam	North Africa, Middle East
Indian	Hinduism	India
Japanese	Confucianism/Buddhism/Shinto	Japan
Jewish	Judaism	Israel
Latin	Catholicism	Southern Europe, Latin America
Malay	Islam/Buddhism/Catholicism	Malaysia, Indonesia
Nordic	Protestantism	Northwest Europe, British settler countries, America
Slavic	Orthodox	Eastern Europe, Russia
Sinic	Confucianism	China, Taiwan, Korea, Singapore, Vietnam
African	Christianity/Paganism	Africa south of the Sahara

Source: Adapted from Samuel P. Huntington "The Goals of Development" in Myron Weiner and Samuel P. Huntington, *Understanding Political Development* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1987), p. 24.

Huntington goes on to point out that the ideal image of developed Western society is to be wealthy, equitable, democratic, stable, and autonomous, but for countries with different cultures the image of a good society may be quite different—for example, a good society may be considered one that is simple, austere, hierarchical, authoritarian, disciplined, and martial. Western goals therefore may not provide a meaningful model for a modern Islamic, Confucian, Pagan, or Hindu society. He suggests that the time may have come to "stop trying to change these societies and to change the model, to develop models of a modern Islamic, Confucian, or Hindu society that would be more relevant to countries where those cultures prevail."

We will consider next the impact of three of these belief systems, Christianity, Islam, and Confucianism, on national political cultures.

Christianity

About one in four people in the world belong to religious organizations.¹⁴ Christianity is the largest religion today; nearly 33% of those with religious affiliations belong to a Christian church. The Christian Church was founded by followers of Jesus Christ, known also as Jesus of Nazareth. Jesus, born between 4 and 6 B.C., and crucified about A.D. 28, was considered by them to be the Messiah predicted by the Old Testament prophets. Over time, the Christian Church has divided into many different branches.

In Europe, the basic division of Christians has been between Protestants and Roman Catholics. Protestantism had an immense impact on the countries of the north; the Roman Catholic Church exercised most influence in the south. Both Protestant and Catholic churches sent missionaries throughout the world. In 1900

BOX 7.2 Religion In Albania.

The case of Albania illustrates the impact the fall of communism has had on religious life in the countries of Eastern Europe. In 1967 the tiny communist state of Albania proclaimed itself the first official atheist state. Just over two decades later, after the collapse of communism, missionaries poured into the country. Ninety orthodox churches reopened, several hundred Catholic churches were built along with over 500 mosques. By 1995 there were 12 orthodox priests in the country, as well as about 450 missionaries from 70 evangelical churches (mostly American), 200 Roman Catholic nuns, 80 Catholic priests, and several hundred mullahs from the Gulf states. In 1992 the Albanian government became the first European country to join the Islamic Conference of Nations. Some observers began to fear that Albania could become a breeding ground for religious discord as happened in the former Yugoslavia.

about two thirds of the world's 500 million Christians lived in the United States and Europe. However, the center of Christianity has changed. By the year 2000, two thirds of the world's 2000 million Christians will live in South America, Africa, and Asia. Missionaries now come mainly from the Third World.

In communist states, the Communist party and ideology fills many of the same functions as religion. It even offers elements of salvation as in Christianity. As we shall see in the next chapter, instead of a god, the "dialectic of history" provides an inescapable historical plan and promises the perfection of the historical process. Utopia, in communist terms, is the inevitable withering away of the state and complete equality for all.

Between 1989 and 1993, belief in the communist ideology disintegrated in many former communist states along with the regimes that had supported them. Christians and Moslems began to rival each other to fill the vacuum. After decades of persecution, Orthodox Christianity and other missionary activity have re-emerged from Russia to Romania to provide moral teaching and strengthen national identity. (See Box 7.2.)


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The second largest religion in the world, in terms of both the number of adherents and the number of countries where it is professed by the majority of the population, is Islam. There are about 850 million Muslims in the world. Most followers of Islam are in the Arab states of the Middle East, however, there are substantial numbers in 21 other countries including Indonesia, countries of North Africa and Central Asia including Pakistan, Afghanistan, and three of the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union.

In most countries today, church and state are separate institutions, with religious leaders exercising varying degrees of influence on the behavior of citizens, political leaders, and policy issues. In some parts of the world, however, religion is

the driving force of political institutions as well as the backbone of cultures. The church and the state are one, and religious law governs both government institutions and the political rights of individuals. This is the case in Iran where the spiritual leader is also the head of state, and Shiite clerics fill all political offices. Islam does not coexist easily with democracy. The mullahs hold that any system which places the will of the people above the will of Allah destroys the soul and the nation. Powerful religious parties manipulate largely illiterate populations in much of Africa, the Middle East, and Asia.

Caspian Sea



The Middle East.

Political Culture:
Islam is a
Africa

Islam is a powerful religion that dominates many Arab states, particularly in Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia. It is the driving force behind the fundamentalist Islamic theocracy of Iran and of dynastic Saudi Arabia.

Islam is the religion of Muhammad (A.D. 570-632), who claimed to be the true prophet of God among the Arab people, the last of the prophets and successor to Jesus. The adherents of Islam, called Muslims, follow the revelations and teachings of Muhammad as contained in the Koran. After the death of Muhammad, Arabs from the Arabian peninsula carried the faith of Islam through the Middle East, across North Africa, and into Spain. Islam reached into the Balkans and Eastern Europe, establishing great civilizations and making significant cultural, artistic, and scientific achievements. The three principal languages of the Islamic tradition were Arabic, Persian, and Turkish.

The demise of the Ottoman Empire in the aftermath of World War I created the modern Arab states we know today. British hegemony was established in the Middle East region following the war, but the British Empire was waning, and it governed behind a façade of native rulers. Today, across contrived and imposed borders, Arabs revere earlier days of great deeds and achievements with the usual selective historical memory of a people that wants to control its own destiny. There are 21 Arab states including Palestine. They include about 200 million people, or 5% of the world's population. Another 6 million Arabs live outside the Arab states.

The Turkish, Iranian, and Arab nationalisms which developed during the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries never wholly superseded the bonds of Islam. During that time secular nationalisms developed in the Arab world, but nationalists often drew on Islam as a source of cultural strength to oppose encroachments of the West.¹⁵ Even today, pan-Arab nationalism and Islamic faith are often called on in times of crisis to mobilize the population across national borders. President Saddam Hussein of Iraq called in vain for a *jihad* , or holy war, against the UN forces when they declared war on Iraq in 1991 after his troops had invaded Kuwait.

In the 1990s Islam is exercising a profound effect inside the Middle East, and also in Africa and Central Asia. Iran, Sudan, and Afghanistan adopted Islamic ad-

BOX 7.3 Background to religious secularism in Turkey.

Turkey is 99% Muslim. Yet it is a secular state. After World War I, Turkey was defeated and partitioned. However, Mustafa Kemal rallied the Turkish military, drove out the occupying forces, and took political control. The next year the monarch stepped down, after 600 years of Ottoman rule, making way for the creation of the Republic of Turkey. Kemal stripped the state of its Islamic influences. He effectively separated church and state in Turkey and in doing so paved the way for peaceful coexistence of the Muslim factions and liberated women to participate openly and freely in society. Mustafa Kemal received the name Ataturk (father of the Turks) by a vote of the national assembly.

Today, Turkey's 15 million Alawis, who are Shia Muslims, are particularly fearful of a resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism and renewed persecution from the country's 40 million Sunni population.

ministrations as early as 1980, and Algeria, Egypt, and Turkey could follow. Islamic movements are active in the Palestinian territories, Lebanon, Jordan, the Gulf, and across northern and Central Africa.

Throughout the 1980s, after the Shah of Iran was ousted in 1979 and replaced by a vehemently anti-Western Islamic regime, Iran was a showcase of Islamic fundamentalist rule. However, by 1994, popular dissent with the rule by the mullahs was raising calls for the Islamic clerics to step down so free elections could be held. Iran has been a failure as an advertisement for Islamic rule. In some predominantly Muslim countries today (e.g., Algeria and Egypt), outlawed political parties formed by fundamentalist groups are engaging in violence against secular authorities. In others, the fundamentalists are playing by the rules of the game and being co-opted by a secular political system, as in Turkey.¹⁶ There, in 1991 municipal elections the secular republic faced its first electoral losses to Islamic fundamentalists since it was established by Ataturk in 1924. In the December 1995 national elections, the Islamic Welfare Party won the biggest share of the vote and 158 of the 550 seats in Parliament. Turkey faces a period of political turbulence as some of the country's secular parties have agreed to share government with the Islamic Welfare Party.

There are now 25 countries where the population is expected to be more than 90% Muslim by the year 2000.¹⁷ With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Iran moved to fill the political and religious vacuum left by the Communist party and its ideology in several of the southern republics including Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Azerbaijan. The slow march of Islamic fundamentalism is eroding traditional political patterns of authoritarianism, socialism, and military rule in the region of the Sahara. In the inland states of Mali, Chad, and the Sudan, despotic authoritarianism is also being replaced by fundamentalism, as if the dry ergs (lakes of sand) in the Sahara region were being slowly replaced by water.¹⁸ In the littoral states of Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, traditional political forms are being challenged by the persuasive, egalitarian ideology of this religious movement.

In Algeria, Islamists fought alongside secular liberation fighters to achieve that country's independence in 1962. Until 1988 they were content to let the National Liberation Front (FLN) rule the country as an Islamic state with a Marxist-oriented government. Government actions in 1988, however, led to a rise in Islamic fundamentalism and the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). The FIS swept the initial round of Algeria's first multi-party election in 1991 but a military takeover deprived them of victory. This gave rise to radical Islamic movements, the Armed Islamic Group and the Islamic Salvation Army, which joined forces to battle Algeria's military government. Violence and assassinations continue.

The change caused by Islamic fundamentalism in many countries is so pervasive and all-encompassing that social traditions and political forms are being swept aside in its wake. The number of Islamic theocracies may increase in the next decade. After the Gulf War in 1991, some observers speculated that Western influences might cause liberalization in some Arab states; the opposite may be true, however. In Saudi Arabia, for example, the *Mutawa*—religious police—became increasingly vigilant, ensuring that women were properly covered and not taking "Western" liberties.

BOX 7.4 Actions of an Islamic fundamentalist government.

In 1989 the late Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini broadcast a "fatwa" (religious decree) on Teheran radio concerning author Salman Rushdie:

I inform the proud Muslim people of the world that the author of *The Satanic Verses* book, which is against Islam, the Prophet and the Koran, and all involved in its publication are sentenced to death.

The author, a citizen of Britain, has been forced to live in hiding.

Even moderate fundamentalists espouse practices that many in the West find difficult to accept, especially curbs on freedom of expression and the segregation of women. When government is based on "God's word" it cannot be challenged. At best, Islamic movements aspire to a just society without exploitation where obedience to God's teachings as recorded in the Koran is the rule. It represents compassion, hope, order. Veiled women are free from sexual attack. At worst, however, it means religious intolerance. Throughout North Africa, women have been killed for not wearing proscribed head covering. In Turkey, Egypt, and Algeria non-conforming districts have been bombed. Individuals who dare to criticize fundamentalist teachings or actions, like British author Salman Rushdi, are sentenced to death.

Confucianism

For centuries, Confucianism has been a cultural force in Asia, where it has had a particularly powerful impact on politics. Confucianism is a Chinese political and moral philosophy based on the teachings of the scholar Confucius (551–479 B.C.) who advised rulers that they could obtain stable government by instilling correct moral behavior in both rulers and the ruled. Confucianism is not a religion—in fact it is agnostic in outlook. It is, however, compatible with formal religions and political philosophies, and this important fact assisted its spread throughout Asia. It still permeates politics and society and has been called "the ideology par excellence of state cohesion."¹⁹

Confucianism was the official creed of China in the second century B.C.—a guide for statecraft and moral instruction. It became the official state belief system for the Han dynasty in 136 B.C. and dominated Chinese political and ethical thought until the early twentieth century.²⁰ As an abstract guide to a way of life, it stresses management of society through a carefully defined system of social and familial relationships. It teaches that each person has a role to understand and perform obediently. Sons are subservient to fathers, wives to husbands, and subjects to rulers. As the highest authority, rulers must set a moral example by a pure spirit and manners above reproach. If the ruler has good thoughts and is utterly sincere, good government will follow. When things go wrong, it is an indication that rulers

have not been sincere. The emphasis on right thinking remains important in China today, even though Confucianism has been replaced by Marxist thought as the state orthodoxy. Today, the government emphasizes the need for revolutionary, pure thoughts.

Confucianism as a cultural tradition is extremely varied. Each Asian country developed its own distinctive version, and these diverged further as the countries modernized, modifying the doctrinal teachings of Confucianism without eliminating its essence.²¹ In this way the evolution of Confucianism contributed to distinct political cultures.²² Strands of Confucian culture are visible throughout Asia.

Confucian cultural tradition . . . is an important element underlying the economic dynamics of certain portions of Asia. During the period from 1965 to 1984, five of the ten fastest-growing nations in the world were countries shaped by Confucian and Buddhist traditions: Singapore, South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Japan. . . . It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Confucian cultural tradition is conducive to economic achievement today.²³

Some cultural characteristics and socialization patterns of Confucianism have significant political consequences. They include the following six important aspects:

- Respect for authority. Hierarchy is important. All social relations are structured by the status of subordinate and superior (child to parent, subject to ruler, etc.) and due respect and obedience are necessary. There is a translation of loyalty and obedience from family to state.
- Loyalty and obedience. These are primary virtues from the family grouping outward.²⁴
- Closely knit family. Good treatment of old people is maintained through extended families, where they are honored and respected.
- Less emphasis on the individual. There is a "family self" which "promotes the feeling that what shames the child shames the family."²⁵
- Dissent is a sign of weakness. Consensus is highly respected; protests are rare.
- Absolutism is honored. There is a long history of absolutist dynasties in Asia.

The effects of Confucian thought on some Asian economies are apparent. Economic activities are relatively less conflictual than in the West; only a low proportion of the work force is unionized; there is low unemployment; there is low inflation; and GNP growth is comparatively high. Some political scientists speculate that this positive economic performance can at least partially be attributed to cultural characteristics including "ambition for self and family; high value on education and learning by copying exemplars; frugality; the family as an economic unit; and entrepreneurship."²⁶

The tiny city-state of Singapore illustrates the relation between Confucianism, culture, and politics. When Lee Kuan Yew was elected Prime Minister in 1959, Singapore's future was uncertain. Its two-year federation with Malaysia had collapsed and many doubted Singapore's ability to exist as an independent nation. Today, however, 2.7 million Singaporeans enjoy one of the highest living standards in Asia, second only to that of Japan. Yet the Western goal of democracy played little role.

in this remarkable transition. Lee's 31-year leadership was based on strict, authoritarian methods. He did not believe that democracy had a place in his country, or anywhere in the developing world, because, he said, checks and balances interfere with governing in a developing country, "where executive action must be swift to forestall disorder."²⁷ In the three decades in which he transformed Singapore, the tightly controlled structure which he crafted rested heavily on his own incorruptibility and "the innate entrepreneurship and pragmatism of the ethnic-Chinese majority and its Confucian father-knows-best ethic."²⁸ In late 1990, Lee Kuan Yew installed his protégé, Goh Chok Tong, as Prime Minister but remained at Goh's shoulder as Senior Minister in the Cabinet and leader of the ruling party. Authoritarian capitalism is still directing the thriving Singapore economy.

As Samuel Huntington argues, "Islamic, Sinic, African, Latin, and other societies have developed in very different ways. It is hard to see much convergence among them in their patterns of development between the 1950s and the 1980s or between any one of them and the commonly accepted Western pattern (which is largely a Nordic pattern)."²⁹ He points out that in 1962 Ghana and South Korea were virtually identical in terms of economy. Today the South Korean economy is booming while Ghana's is stagnant. The divergence was not predictable in terms of economic or political variables, but cultural differences provided very different environments and probably were an important factor in accounting for the differences in development.

Japan is another example where religion and Confucianism exercise an important influence on politics. A democratic form of government was introduced there after its defeat and occupation at the end of World War II. However, evidence of Confucian influence is still to be found in political and social relations. Characteristics such as obedience, achievement, and respect for authority are important in Japanese society, and are reinforced by intense competition in national examinations for students at all levels of education and by loyalty to corporations in the work place. The Japanese culture includes both Buddhist and Shinto religions, which inspire habits of cleanliness and extraordinary discipline, and are often credited with playing a significant role in the Japanese economic "miracle." It is common, for example, for priests and engineers to gather in a ceremony outside a temple to burn pictures of worn-out computer chips to thank the chips and other electronic devices for their uncomplaining service.³⁰ The Japanese culture is basically consensual—an attitude considered vital in the conduct of political parties and Cabinet formation.³¹

SUBCULTURES AND POLITICAL CULTURE

Subcultures within a society become politically relevant when the attitudes and values they hold are different from those promoted by the state and shared by the majority. They are based on group definitions such as social class and ethnicity. There can be serious consequences for a country when subcultures become strong enough to challenge the overall political culture.

Since the end of the Cold War in which the world was aligned behind the two huge "superpowers," the United States and the Soviet Union, international hostilities have relaxed and there has been a corresponding rise of ethnic rivalry and escalated demands within states. Ethnic intolerance is surfacing on a scale unseen since the period before World War I. The Soviet Union and Yugoslavia disintegrated in the wake of challenges by ethnic minorities. And, extremist political parties, which advocate policies such as deporting citizens of different color and ethnic heritage, are gaining strength in many European countries and also in North America.

Ethno-Linguistic Subcultures

We noted in the last chapter that ethnicity is primarily a subjective phenomenon, although it usually is reinforced by the presence of objective traits such as different language or dialect, different customs and cultural heritage, and often distinct racial or physical characteristics. Ethnicity is reinforced by historical experiences that are unique to each particular ethnic group or subculture and which create a complex of shared values. Ethnic diversity, when combined with region, religion, and language differences, can be a powerful force that may tear a state apart.

In only about half of the world's states do more than 75% of the population speak the same language. Few states consist, as does Japan, of basically a single ethnic group with a single language. The political manifestations or cleavages of ethno-linguistic subcultures typically appear in a range of behavior from bloc voting and separate political parties to separatist movements. Many states, such as Canada, contain aspiring nations within them. The politicization of demands to redraw state borders along ethnic lines frequently results in highly emotional and even violent conflict.

Closely related to ethnicity are issues of race. Race is "an arbitrary social cate-

BOX 7.5 Official language in the United States.

Official language became an issue in the United States in the 1990s. Presidential candidate Pat Buchanan, House Speaker Newt Gingrich, and Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole among others urged that English be proclaimed the official language. As of 1995, twenty-two states had passed regulations declaring English to be their official language. Thirty-eight members of the House of Representatives sponsored legislation to do the same for the country. Advocates see this as a way to bring the United States together and stop "wasting" money on programs designed to ease the transition of immigrants and members of minority groups into the US mainstream.

Opposed to this view are multiculturalists who believe that the melting pot concept of American identity which celebrates the communality of the American experience should be repudiated. American society, they say, should be seen as a "Mosaic" of five races or racial communities—whites, blacks, Hispanics, Asian and Pacific Islanders, and native Americans.

gory, consisting of persons who share such inherited physical characteristics as skin colour and facial features, which characteristics are charged with social meaning in some societies.³² Racial discrimination is the imposition of handicaps, barriers, or different treatment on individuals solely because of their race. Behavioral and psychological differences are attributed to the genetic nature of a racial grouping. History is replete with examples—there has been discrimination by gentiles against Jews, whites against blacks, Japanese against Koreans, and so on—on the unwarranted basis that a particular "race" is inherently inferior or that one's own is superior.³³ Racial conflicts tend to become political, with discriminators trying to enact legislation against the discriminated, and encountering group protests, anti-discrimination movements, and affirmative action groups taking the opposite stand. Racist ideologies such as Nazism have served as rationalizations for the social, political, and economic control, and even the extermination, of minority groups.

A classic example of a very complex multi-ethnic society in which issues of race and ethnicity are highly politicized is India. It has a caste system—a hereditary system, delineated in terms of certain occupations, rules of marriage, and rules of interaction with other castes—which dates back to the origins of Hinduism more than 2000 years ago.³⁴ Hindus make up about 83% of India's 850 million people; 11% are Muslim, 3% are Christian, and 2% are Sikh. There are also Jain, Buddhist, and other minorities.³⁵ These ethnic and religious differences are reinforced by different languages. The constitution of India recognizes 14 major languages, and hundreds of other languages and dialects are spoken in the rural areas.³⁶

The Hindu population is divided further into four main castes, which contain hundreds of sub-castes based on descending levels of ritual purity. Within the broad caste groups are *jati*—the thousands of occupation-based groups. The *jati* observe strict rules about social contact and intermarriage.³⁷

Brahmins (12%) are the highest caste, traditionally the caste of Hindu priests, now found in most professions; *Kshatriyas* (13%) are soldiers, governors, and landowners; *Vaishyas* are tradespeople and farmers, and *Shudras* are the service castes or artisans including land tillers, barbers, craftspeople, and menial laborers (25% combined). Over time, an underclass also emerged. The *Harijan* (Untouchables), who are outcasts, and tribes who belong to none of the castes, make up the remaining 50% of Hindus. Caste discrimination begins early in life and extends to all parts of life; Untouchables are often barred from wells and temples and live in the semi-slavery of debt-bonded labor.

Attempts to eliminate even some of the worst injustices of the Indian caste system regularly meet with resistance and create significant political ramifications. In 1990, for example, Indian students staged violent protests over the Prime Minister's proposal to raise the number of government jobs reserved for so-called "backward castes" from 22% to 49%. The students wanted to keep favored access to the 18 million jobs provided by the government.³⁸

The existence of different subcultures can have serious and violent consequences for the politics of a country. One Indian subculture, the Sikh population, which is differentiated from the Hindu majority by ethnic, linguistic, and religious differences, has been in and out of the international news spotlight in recent years

as it has struggled to create a separate state of its own. Historically, the Sikh separatist movement makes an interesting comparison with the creation of Pakistan—a state with a Muslim majority—which was founded in the wake of Indian independence from Britain in 1947.

The Indian Sikh population is heavily concentrated in the north of the country, in an area known as the Punjab, and is relatively prosperous economically. The struggle for independence in this region has led to violence several times by Sikh extremists and more violence in anti-separatist backlashes. In 1984, for example, Sikh extremists occupied the Golden Temple in Amritsar. The recapture of the temple by the Indian army led to many deaths. Also that same year Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was assassinated by her Sikh bodyguards, and the anti-Sikh riots that followed caused over 1000 deaths. The struggle also reached the level of international terrorism with the bombing of one Air India plane and the attempted bombing of a second, both taking off from Canadian airports on June 22, 1985.

Even in states with relatively homogeneous societies, there are ethnic divisions. Japan has one of the most homogeneous societies in the world, yet there, too, racism is embedded in parts of society. A group called the *burakumin* (hamlet people) who are racially identical to most other Japanese were, until the middle of the last century, held to be legally inferior to other citizens, like slaves were in the Southern United States.³⁹ They number about 3 million people in a total Japanese population of more than 123 million. The *burakumin* had untouchable status, which originated centuries ago from "unclean" jobs such as handling leather or burying the dead. Japan has an elaborate system of permanent official records of ancestry so that it is almost impossible for a *burakumin* to conceal his or her origins, to work for major companies, or to marry outside of the caste.

Authoritarian states normally try to destroy or forcibly subjugate regional and ethnic subcultures within their borders to the dominant culture. There are many examples. The former Soviet Union excelled at forcing distinctive subcultures underground. After disintegration of the Union in 1991, however, it quickly became apparent that subculture identities had not been destroyed, and in many cases had become defiant toward Russia. Today, China imposes strong controls over Tibetan culture, making sure that Tibetan children learn the standard Communist Chinese version of history—that Tibet was "peacefully liberated" by China in 1951. However, Tibetans carefully guard elements of local culture including language and the Buddhist religion.

Women and Political Culture

Of the world's 5.3 billion people in 1990, slightly fewer than half (2.6 billion) were female.⁴⁰ The 1980s witnessed an unprecedented politicization of women in many of the world's states. In many countries today, young women can aspire to be an elected political leader, to assume a leadership position in law, medicine, education, business, or the sciences. They can enter occupations from architecture to firefighting that were closed to their mothers only a few years earlier.

Around the world and throughout history, women have often been treated as inferiors to men. Discrimination has been enforced by social customs and laws. As the bearers of children, endowed with less obvious physical strength than men, women have been assigned, and have generally accepted, primary responsibility for children and the family. Until relatively recently, even in developed countries, women have been barred from such societal participation as owning property, holding public office, and voting. Until the mid-1970s there was little hard evidence to back up claims of their relative deprivation, because statistics that were collected tended to ignore the contributions of women to the family and the economy. In 1991, however, a statistical portrait and analysis of the situation of women released by the United Nations, titled *The World's Women 1970-1990: Trends and Statistics*, provided the best comparative information to date on the condition of women around the world. Its profile of women in terms of education and training is instructive and revealing.

Around the world, both households and governments spend fewer resources to educate and train girls than boys, reducing the potential social, economic, and political contribution of women to society, and leaving women at a disadvantage in making major life decisions. Womens' ability is therefore not translated into recognized economic contributions to society.

The UN study shows that in much of the world women have progressed toward equal educational enrollment rates with men. Primary education has been accepted as a fundamental goal by all countries, and enrollment of girls in primary and secondary schools is now comparable to that of boys in most countries except those in southern Asia and sub-Saharan Africa.⁴¹ (See Figure 7.2.)

At the university and college level, female enrollment is also increasing




FIGURE 7.2 Girls' secondary school enrollment around the world compared to boys'. (Source: *The World's Women 1995* (New York: United Nations, 1995), p. 92. © United Nations. All United Nations rights reserved.)

around the world. In the developed regions, western Asia, some countries of southern Africa and Latin America, and the Caribbean, gender enrollment is now nearly equal. However in other regions, such as sub-Saharan Africa, southern Asia, the Pacific region, and some countries such as China and Indonesia, female percentages are lower. Although equality is being achieved in enrollments, it will take considerably longer to reach parity in male and female literacy rates. To be classed as literate in the UN study, a person must be able to read and write, with understanding, a short, simple statement about everyday life. Illiteracy rates are falling for young women, but they are still much higher than for men. Literacy is a better measure of education than enrollment in developing regions since it usually indicates a minimal level of successfully completed schooling.

Most Western states acknowledged women's right to vote around the time of World War I. Women in the communist states of the former Soviet Union and China were awarded new roles in the work place about that same time, but still only about 10% to 20% of the members of the prestigious Communist party of the Soviet Union were women. As in the Western democracies, most were employed in the lower echelons of society. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the traumatic shift to a capitalist economy, women were the first to lose their jobs, and many of the gains they had made were lost. In 1995, more than two thirds of Russia's unemployed were women. The average woman earned only 40% as much as the average man, compared to 75% in 1991.⁴² In China, soon after proclaiming the People's Republic in 1949, Chairman Mao Tse-tung wrote that women should "hold up half the sky" in the new country. It was only rhetoric. Forty-six years later, in 1995, women even had trouble holding a news conference announcing the United Nations' World Conference on Women. Eight of nine head table participants at the event were men. The lone woman did not speak and left before the conference was over.

In some countries, particularly theocracies like Iran which purport to encompass a complete way of life and system of government, women are subject to religious and governmental laws that restrict their freedom profoundly. In her recent book Geraldine Brooks examines the complex world of women in Islamic countries. She points out that many customs attributed to Islam come from *pre-Islamic* customs, politics, and resistance to modernization.⁴³ The most notorious of these customs, the mutilation of female genitalia, seems to have originated in the Stone Age in central Africa. Today, it is practiced by specific groups across the Muslim world and, on occasion, even in North America.

Women are traditionally responsible for the health and well-being of their families, and because of this they participate extensively in community affairs. Although they have been systematically cut off from men's traditional routes to political leadership (see Figure 7.3 for statistics on elected representatives), women in both developed and developing regions have made significant headway in recent years in terms of entering political life through nongovernmental organizations, womens' movements, and associations. Women are increasingly active in the politics of their local communities in such areas as discrimination, poverty, health and environmental issues, violence against women, and peace movements.

BOX 7.6 A woman's life in Saudi Arabia.


Saudi Airlines flight 812 from Cairo to Riyadh in the authoritarian monarchy of Saudi Arabia regularly carries at least one young woman decked out in bridal regalia. These young women marry immediately upon arrival. Most of them are poor, and have met their future husbands only once, when their family exchanged them for cash. Once in Saudi Arabia they may be one of four wives. Like other women they will be required to wear a long black robe, the *abaya*, and to cover their faces completely. Based on the religious establishment's interpretation of the Koran, women in Saudi Arabia are required to avoid all contact with men other than their fathers, brothers, husband or sons. This means they cannot work where men work, which means they can hardly work at all. They cannot drive a car. In 1991 when 40 Saudi women protested their lack of right to drive they were all arrested; those with jobs were dismissed and in many cases the women and their husbands were confined to the kingdom for more than two years. Their names were read from the pulpit of every mosque in the country and all were denounced as "whores."

When asked about the incident, a prince of the royal family is quoted as saying, "Let's be honest, deep down all men have a macho-sexual complex. They want to control women. It's a question of where to draw the line."⁴⁴

Routes to power in government decision-making are traditionally through political candidacy and the civil service. Around the world, women are usually more successful in local than national elections. Statistics on women in bureaucratic careers are not generally available, but one pattern is clear: Significant numbers of women work at the lower echelons, and their representation dwindles rapidly as pay and status increase.⁴⁵ Everywhere there is a need to end occupational segregation and wage discrimination and to recognize women's unpaid work as economically productive. The International Women's Movement is playing a major role in developing awareness of these kinds of problems and stimulating political action at national and international levels. Little girls in China may no longer have their feet crushed by foot binding, but female infanticide is not uncommon and prenatal scans enable abortions of female fetuses. Widows in India are still occasionally burnt alive on their husbands' funeral pyres. Unequal status and discrimination in the Third World can mean neglect and death. In the West they are more likely to mean inferior earnings compared to men and unequal representation in political and decision-making bodies.

The status of women has improved dramatically in the twentieth century, at least in the developed nations, but there is still a long way to go before gender equality will be reached socially and politically. The UN's 1995 *Human Development Report* says that on every continent women work longer hours, earn less money, and are more likely to live in poverty than men. It estimates that 70% of the world's poor are women.⁴⁶ The Preamble to the 1995 Human Development Report stated:

While the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious background must be born in mind, it is the duty of states, regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms.⁴⁷



Note: Data refer to unicameral assembly or lower chamber of bicameral assembly.
 * Oceania includes Fiji, French Polynesia, Guam, Kiribati, New Caledonia, Pacific Islands, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, and Vanuatu.

FIGURE 7.3 Women's parliamentary representation by world region. (Source: *The World's Women 1995* (New York: United Nations, 1995), p. 154. © United Nations. All United Nations rights reserved.)

POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION IN DEMOCRACIES

Political socialization in democracies is indirect and implicit. It is carried out by agents such as families, schools, peer groups, work groups, and the media. Families help to shape the political orientations of children through direct means, such as observational, imitative learning, and also through indirect means such as being part of a particular sociopolitical milieu. In Western democratic societies there are subtle differences in the role played by the family in socialization.

Almond and Verba's Civic Culture study found that families in the two continental European countries included in their research demonstrated a significantly higher degree of authoritarianism than did their counterparts in Great Britain or the United States. And the European school systems, (including the British) were also more authoritarian than their American counterpart.⁴⁸ Since that study was conducted in 1959, many changes have taken place in the family structure in Europe: Family size has decreased, more mothers are in the work force, and the paternal nature of family relations has declined, making them less authoritarian. Schools as well have moved to democratize the educational system and revise curricula.

As these changes have taken place, intergenerational value differences have appeared which indicate a weakening of the role of family and schools as socializing agents. Ron Inglehart, for example, found that older generations in Western democracies emphasize "materialist" values including economic growth, a strong defense system and maintenance of order. Young adults, on the other hand, he argued, tend to stress "post-materialist" values such as environmental concerns, freedom of expression, and more personal power in social and political life.⁴⁹ The proportion of citizens with post-materialist values in the United States, the United Kingdom, and West Germany nearly doubled between 1970 and 1984, to between 16 and 20% of the population in each of these countries.⁵⁰ Young people also appeared to be less allegiant to their countries and more inclined to protest than those in older generations. Apprehension about unemployment in the 1990s may have reversed this tendency toward post-materialist values.

There is a wide range in the degree to which socialization is actively pursued by state institutions in democratic countries. Even among the most highly economically developed Western democracies, there are significant variations. Agents of socialization are controlled differently by each state, and this leads to divergent outcomes. In France, for example, education and much of the media are relatively tightly controlled by the state or a small elite, and military service is used for civic education. French academics tend to support the view that it is necessary to ideologically indoctrinate the masses. They tend to reject the Anglo-Saxon type of "non-political" civic culture in which socialization is performed by non-state agents such as the family.⁵¹ This belief is reflected in the way French governments created a national identity in the nineteenth century. They took disparate regions, each with its strong identity, and created a highly centralized and bureaucratic education system managed from Paris. The United States, too, relies on the school system to provide basic civic instruction and to integrate immigrants into American life. The system

stresses a common language, pride in civic affairs, history, and culture. There is a strong emphasis on patriotism and the "goodness" of the American way of life.

POLITICAL CULTURE AND SOCIALIZATION IN AUTHORITARIAN STATES

Political culture in authoritarian states is more openly manipulated by political elites than it is in democratic states. For example, in the early stages of their regimes, the communist states of China, the Soviet Union, and Eastern Europe each tried to impose a cultural revolution to buttress industrial and technological revolutions. Primarily through education and persuasion, the political elite tried to create model citizens of a classless, socialist, atheist society. They wanted citizens who would be involved in politics, and organized and directed citizen participation through policies such as land reform. However, although individuals outwardly conformed, they harbored hidden attitudes and beliefs based on previously accepted cultural values. Communist leaders, therefore, became inconsistent in their approach and began to rely more on traditional political values of local culture. In this way the many nationality and language groups under the Soviet banner, for example, maintained nationalistic desires in spite of their official acceptance of the Russian language and political domination. Regional and ethnic subcultures were revived when Gorbachev introduced reforms in the late 1980s. They helped lead to the breakdown of the communist superpower.

In the satellite states of Eastern Europe, local political cultures had been subverted by the Soviet Army after World War II. In the former Czechoslovakia, for example, communism had been imposed on a thriving democratic culture. In 1968, local leaders attempted to reconcile the two cultures but the attempt was brutally put down by the Soviet Army, and the communist system was reimposed. In Poland, the democratic ethos was preserved during these years by the Roman Catholic Church. As long as the planned economies of the communist regime produced results, they were able to maintain order. When the economy no longer was able to provide purpose and justification, the authoritarian elite lost its purpose and collapsed. Eastern European cultures quickly distanced themselves from the imposed model and began to readjust and reassert their traditional pre-communist cultures.

In authoritarian states, political socialization is more overt and less subtle than in democracies. At the totalitarian extreme it is state controlled. Many authoritarian states try to reduce the influence of the family on their youth, often actively promoting defiance between parents and children. Hitler's youth groups, for example, were encouraged to report to their group leaders about any "disloyal" activities of their parents. Years later, after the collapse of the communist regime in East Germany, authorities discovered proof that the state had forcibly removed the children from families when it had deemed the parents "unfit." Loyal communist families adopted the children.

Authoritarian states attempt to dominate institutions such as schools, political parties, and the military. They forbid churches and educational institutions to voice thoughts that compete with the official line, and they simplify political dis-

course into slogans which are learned at school, reinforced in youth groups, at work, and in the media. One of the most extreme examples of this was in Cambodia from 1975 to 1979 when the Khmer Rouge government fractured not just families, but the entire country by forcing individuals back to what they called an "ideologically superior," "primitive" culture. Educated Cambodians were maltreated or murdered; families were broken up and dispersed in an effort to erase historical memory. Ironically, the leaders of the Khmer Rouge had developed their own ideas about ideology in France.⁵²

Socialization in communist states is intense and direct, although rarely as extreme as the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. Communist countries screen, recruit, and socialize the future ruling elite while they are still young. Older members of the elite endow themselves with prestige, power, and legitimacy and use their position to inculcate respect, obedience, and submission. They set up youth organizations, and extend their influence even beyond these specialized groups into families and schools, mobilizing and teaching young people, and providing a way to select the "best" for leadership positions.

Before its collapse in 1991, the Soviet Union maintained three major organizations to socialize the young in the spirit of communism—the *Octobrists* (boys and girls seven to nine), the *Pioneers* (nine to fourteen), and finally, the *Komsomol*, or Young Communist League (fourteen to twenty-eight). The Komsomol had extensive control of socializing agents including radio and television programs, special newspapers for Soviet youth, supervision of school curriculum and activities, and leadership of the Pioneers and Octobrists. Membership in the Komsomol served as an apprenticeship and was necessary to become part of even subordinate elite positions.⁵³

In the Soviet Union at that same time, the media also served as an important agent of socialization for the Communist party. A central agency in charge of propaganda assisted party leaders to assess, censor, or present both domestic and foreign news, maintaining total control of communications. All media were controlled by the Party, from the daily press to weekly or monthly publications and scientific or literary journals. This monopoly allowed events to be portrayed and interpreted in a uniform fashion, with no conflicting opinions presented.

The study and understanding of history, too, was manipulated in the former USSR. According to historian Edward L. Keeñan, now that the Soviet Union has collapsed, much of the content of the standard Soviet culture will be swept away quickly, but the "contrived national histories that were provided to all nationalities by Soviet propagandists will linger on." He elaborated:

In their modernizing zeal, Soviet administrators invented for many nations still emerging from a traditional culture full-blown national cultures of a 19th century type, modeled quite consciously on that of Russia; each nation was assigned, often quite arbitrarily, its heroes, national poets and the like. These were not only artificial; in suppressing authentic national memory, they were mendacious.⁵⁴

The crumbling of the Soviet Union has lent credence to the argument that even extensive control of communications can never be complete, and eventually

may create an indifferent and resentful populace. Such efforts at socialization may cause a state to lose, rather than gain, the support it seeks.

Similar patterns of socialization still exist in China. When the communists came to power in China following the revolution of 1949, traditional Chinese culture was nearly destroyed by the party's attack on religion, art, and the intelligentsia. The highly centralized Chinese Communist Party (CCP) still maintains its authoritarian command of politics and intellectual life. In *The Search for Modern China*, Jonathan Spence concluded: "The party that swept to power 40 years before by challenging all the existing social, political and economic norms now seemed to have no purpose but to ensure that it faced no such challenges itself."⁵⁵ In 1991, on the seventieth anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party, and as the Soviet Communist Party was falling into disrepute, the aging CCP leadership took the opportunity to enforce enthusiasm for the party. Across China it showed a new movie on the life of Mao; it sent officials back to party school to study Marxism; and it ordered workers to copy in their own hands the latest version of the party's official catechism. In recent years the government has attempted to do the same with the ideas of Deng Xiaoping; a Mao-Deng philosophy dominates the socialization process.

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: DEMOCRATIC AND AUTHORITARIAN

A wide range of behavior can be classified as political participation—from total inactivity, to engaging in conventional activities such as voting or signing petitions or working for a political party, to less conventional behavior such as civil disobedience, violence, or even revolutionary activities. Some political systems provide more opportunities and encouragement to participate politically than others. Democratic systems in general have what Almond and Verba termed a participant political culture in which individuals have an explicit political role with widespread opportunities to participate. In spite of this, however, most people in democracies do not engage in regular, high levels of political action. Voting is the most frequent political act, followed by other conventional contacts with publicly elected or appointed officials, in order to achieve political objectives. At the other end of the spectrum, some citizens in democracies (about one fourth to one half) have engaged in, or are willing to engage in, lawful demonstrations of protest against government policy. But very few of them are prepared to participate in violent protest against persons or property in order to achieve their political objectives.⁵⁶

There is substantial variation among Western democracies in regard to degree of participation in conventional or unconventional political activity. Education is the strongest predictor of political participation. University-educated citizens vote and participate in politics more than those who have not graduated from secondary school—a correlation that applies to both conventional and unconventional participation.⁵⁷ Gender, too, is often related to conventional political participation, with men more likely to participate than women. The correlation is weaker but still valid in the case of unconventional participation.

c. As in democratic states, authoritarian governments try to develop a broad consensus in society, promoting a specific value system and instilling pride, enthusiasm, and support for the regime. In totalitarian states, leaders develop an official ideology which they promote vigorously to legitimize the system. These regimes differ fundamentally from democratic regimes in that participation is not voluntary but induced, sometimes by physical coercion, in order to build support for the ideological goals of the ruling elite. The role of the individual is to be passive and obey the decisions of the state.

Other authoritarian systems which are closer to democracies on the spectrum do not strive as much for consensus. They are not as concerned to develop or follow the rationale of an official ideology, and have not assigned any particular role for the individual in the system. They tend to rely on the charisma of a leader. They are primarily concerned with obedience, which they consider to be the essence of stable government, and they seek to maintain the status quo. In such states apathy or acquiescence are therefore more attractive characteristics of citizenry than is participation.

There has been little systematic comparative study of socialization in less democratic or authoritarian countries; for obvious reasons survey research is not appropriate. In these situations, however, there is considerable evidence that reliance on nongovernmental channels and unconventional forms of political behavior is greater and more varied than in democracies. State repression often deters conventional political participation. When the established channels of participation are weakened or eliminated, the citizens must find other outlets for their dissatisfaction. Political violence, strikes, insurrections, and revolutionary activities may therefore occur in countries which are oppressive economically and politically. (See Chapter 20 on political violence, terrorism, and revolution).

The overarching political culture and the layers of subcultures within a state provide the environment for politics. They influence collective behavior and governmental policies indirectly through the complex channels of governmental structures, systems of group interaction, and formal decision-making processes. We turn to an examination of these institutions and processes after a closer look at ideologies, a particularly important part of political culture.

NOTES

1. Lucien W. Pye, "Political Science and the Crisis of Authoritarianism," *APSR*, 84, no. 1 (March 1990), 11.
2. Robert A. Dahl, "The American Opposition's Affirmation and Denial," in Robert A. Dahl, ed., *Political Opinion in Western Democracies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 35-41.
3. See William G. Mitchell, *The American Polity: A Social and Cultural Interpretation* (New York: Free Press, 1970), pp. 105-21.
4. Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), table 4, p. 267.