



edited by ROBERT A. DAHL,  
IAN SHAPIRO,  
and JOSÉ ANTONIO CHEIBUB

# THE DEMOCRACY SOURCEBOOK

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## Contents

Introduction	ix		
<b>1</b>	<b>DEFINING DEMOCRACY</b>	<b>1</b>	
	<b>The Social Contract</b>	<b>2</b>	
	Jean-Jacques Rousseau		
	<b>Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy</b>	<b>5</b>	
	Joseph Schumpeter		
	<b>Minimalist Conception of Democracy: A Defense</b>	<b>12</b>	
	Adam Przeworski		
	<b>Democracy and Disagreement</b>	<b>18</b>	
	Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson		
	<b>The Voice of the People</b>	<b>25</b>	
	James S. Fishkin		
	<b>Defining and Developing Democracy</b>	<b>29</b>	
	Larry Diamond		
	<b>Participation and Democratic Theory</b>	<b>40</b>	
	Carole Pateman		
	<b>Polyarchal Democracy</b>	<b>48</b>	
	Robert Dahl		
<b>2</b>	<b>SOURCES OF DEMOCRACY</b>	<b>55</b>	
	<b>Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics</b>	<b>56</b>	
	Seymour Martin Lipset		
	<b>Social Revolutions in the Modern World</b>	<b>65</b>	
	Theda Skocpol		
	<b>The Impact of Economic Development on Democracy</b>	<b>71</b>	
	Evelyne Huber, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and John D. Stephens		
	<b>Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America</b>	<b>76</b>	
	Adam Przeworski		
	<b>Democracy's Third Wave</b>	<b>93</b>	
	Samuel P. Huntington		
	<b>South Africa's Negotiated Transition: Democracy, Opposition, and the New Constitutional Order</b>	<b>99</b>	
	Courtney Jung and Ian Shapiro		
	<b>Economic Development and Political Regimes</b>	<b>108</b>	
	Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi		
<b>3</b>	<b>DEMOCRACY, CULTURE, AND SOCIETY</b>	<b>117</b>	
	<b>The Federalist No. 10</b>	<b>118</b>	
	James Madison		
	<b>The Federalist No. 14</b>	<b>123</b>	
	James Madison		
	<b>The Concept of a Liberal Society</b>	<b>126</b>	
	Louis Hartz		
	<b>Pluralism and Social Choice</b>	<b>133</b>	
	Nicholas R. Miller		
	<b>Consociational Democracy</b>	<b>142</b>	
	Arend Lijphart		
	<b>The Contest of Ideas</b>	<b>147</b>	
	Donald Horowitz		
	<b>The State of Democratic Theory</b>	<b>153</b>	
	Ian Shapiro		
	<b>Democracy</b>	<b>157</b>	
	Robert D. Putnam		
	<b>Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values</b>	<b>168</b>	
	Ronald Inglehart and Wayne E. Baker		

	<b>Culture and Democracy</b>	181			
	Adam Przeworski, José Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi				
<b>4</b>	<b>DEMOCRACY AND CONSTITUTIONALISM</b>	191		<b>5</b>	<b>PRESIDENTIALISM VERSUS PARLIAMENTARISM</b>
	<b>The Federalist No. 23</b>	192			257
	Alexander Hamilton				
	<b>The Federalist No. 47</b>	193			<b>The Perils of Presidentialism</b>
	James Madison				258
	<b>The Federalist No. 48</b>	195			Juan Linz
	James Madison				
	<b>The Federalist No. 62</b>	197			<b>Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy: The Difficult Combination</b>
	James Madison				266
	<b>The Federalist No. 70</b>	199			Scott Mainwaring
	Alexander Hamilton				
	<b>The Federalist No. 78</b>	201			<b>Presidents and Assemblies</b>
	Alexander Hamilton				272
	<b>Madisonian Democracy</b>	207			Matthew Soberg Shugart and John Carey
	Robert Dahl				
	<b>A Bill of Rights for Britain</b>	217			<b>Minority Governments, Deadlock Situations, and the Survival of Presidential Democracies</b>
	Ronald Dworkin				277
	<b>A Rights-Based Critique of Constitutional Rights</b>	221			José Antonio Cheibub
	Jeremy Waldron				
	<b>The Political Origins of Judicial Empowerment through Constitutionalization: Lessons from Four Constitutional Revolutions</b>	232			<b>Minority Governments in Parliamentary Democracies: The Rationality of Nonwinning Cabinet Solutions</b>
	Ran Hirschl				284
	<b>Decision Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policymaker</b>	246			Kaare Strom
	Robert Dahl				
	<b>Democratic Justice</b>	252			<b>Institutional Design, Party Systems, and Governability: Differentiating the Presidential Regimes of Latin America</b>
	Ian Shapiro				296
				<b>6</b>	<b>REPRESENTATION</b>
					311
					<b>Representative Government</b>
					312
					John Stuart Mill
					<b>On Elections</b>
					315
					Marquis de Condorcet
					<b>Liberalism against Populism</b>
					317
					William H. Riker

	<b>Saving Democracy from Political Science</b>	321		<b>Inside Campaign Finance: Myths and Realities</b>	408
	Gerry Mackie			Frank J. Sorauf	
	<b>Unlikelihood of Condorcet's Paradox in a Large Society</b>	326	<b>8</b>	<b>DEMOCRACY'S EFFECTS</b>	419
	A. S. Tangian			<b>The Economics and Politics of Growth</b>	420
	<b>Congruence between Citizens and Policymakers in Two Visions of Liberal Democracy</b>	330		Karl de Schweinitz, Jr.	
	John D. Huber and G. Bingham Powell, Jr.			<b>Rent Seeking and Redistribution under Democracy versus Dictatorship</b>	427
	<b>The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws</b>	343		Ronald Wintrobe	
	Douglas W. Rae			<b>Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development</b>	436
	<b>South Africa's Negotiated Transition: Democracy, Opposition, and the New Constitutional Order</b>	350		Mancur Olson	
	Courtney Jung and Ian Shapiro			<b>Freedom Favors Development</b>	444
	<b>The Representation of Women</b>	354		Amartya Sen	
	Anne Phillips			<b>Political Regimes and Economic Growth</b>	447
<b>7</b>	<b>INTEREST GROUPS</b>	363		Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi	
	<b>The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion</b>	364		<b>Democracy in America</b>	455
	David B. Truman			Alexis de Tocqueville	
	<b>The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups</b>	372		<b>Does Democracy Engender Justice?</b>	459
	Mancur Olson			John E. Roemer	
	<b>Neo-Pluralism: A Class Analysis of Pluralism I and Pluralism II</b>	381		<b>Facing up to the American Dream: Race, Class, and the Soul of the Nation</b>	463
	John F. Manley			Jennifer L. Hochschild	
	<b>The Theory of Economic Regulation</b>	393		<b>Beyond Tocqueville, Myrdal, and Hartz: The Multiple Traditions in America</b>	480
	George J. Stigler			Rogers M. Smith	
	<b>Interest Intermediation and Regime Governability in Contemporary Western Europe and North America</b>	398	<b>9</b>	<b>DEMOCRACY AND THE GLOBAL ORDER</b>	489
	Philippe C. Schmitter			<b>Perpetual Peace</b>	490
				Immanuel Kant	



<b>How Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations Create a System for Peace</b>	492
Bruce Russett	
<b>Dirty Pool</b>	497
Donald P. Green, Soo Yeon Kim, and David H. Yoon	
<b>Democracy and Collective Bads</b>	504
Russell Hardin	
<b>Representation and the Democratic Deficit</b>	510
Pippa Norris	
<b>The Transformation of Political Community: Rethinking Democracy in the Context of Globalization</b>	516
David Held	
Appendix	527
Index	535

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# The Social Contract

Jean-Jacques Rousseau

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## The Social Pact

I assume that men reach a point where the obstacles to their preservation in a state of nature prove greater than the strength that each man has to preserve himself in that state. Beyond this point, the primitive condition cannot endure, for then the human race will perish if it does not change its mode of existence.

Since men cannot create new forces, but merely combine and control those which already exist, the only way in which they can preserve themselves is by uniting their separate powers in a combination strong enough to overcome any resistance, uniting them so that their powers are directed by a single motive and act in concert.

Such a sum of forces can be produced only by the union of separate men, but as each man's own strength and liberty are the chief instruments of his preservation, how can he merge his with others' without putting himself in peril and neglecting the care he owes to himself? This difficulty, in terms of my present subject, may be expressed in these words:

"How to find a form of association which will defend the person and goods of each member with the collective force of all, and under which each individual, while uniting himself with the others, obeys no one but himself, and remains as free as before." This is the fundamental problem to which the social contract holds the solution.

The articles of this contract are so precisely determined by the nature of the act, that the slightest modification must render them null and void; they are such that, though perhaps never formally stated, they are everywhere the same, everywhere tacitly admitted and recognized; and

if ever the social pact is violated, every man regains his original rights and, recovering his natural freedom, loses that civil freedom for which he exchanged it.

These articles of association, rightly understood, are reducible to a single one, namely the total alienation by each associate of himself and all his rights to the whole community. . . .

If, then, we eliminate from the social pact everything that is not essential to it, we find it comes down to this: "Each one of us puts into the community his person and all his powers under the supreme direction of the general will; and as a body, we incorporate every member as an indivisible part of the whole."

Immediately, in place of the individual person of each contracting party, this act of association creates an artificial and corporate body composed of as many members as there are voters in the assembly, and by this same act that body acquires its unity, its common *ego*, its life and its will. The public person thus formed by the union of all other persons was once called the *city*, and is now known as the *republic* or the *body politic*. In its passive role it is called the *state*, when it plays an active role it is the *sovereign*; and when it is compared to others of its own kind, it is a *power*. Those who are associated in it take collectively the name of a *people*, and call themselves individually *citizens*, in that they share in the sovereign power, and *subjects*, in that they put themselves under the laws of the state. However, these words are often confused, each being mistaken for another; but the essential thing is to know how to recognize them when they are used in their precise sense.

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## The Sovereign

This formula shows that the act of association consists of a reciprocal commitment between

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society and the individual, so that each person, in making a contract, as it were, with himself, finds himself doubly committed, first, as a member of the sovereign body in relation to individuals, and secondly as a member of the state in relation to the sovereign. . . .

Now, as the sovereign is formed entirely of the individuals who compose it, it has not, nor could it have, any interest contrary to theirs; and so the sovereign has no need to give guarantees to the subjects, because it is impossible for a body to wish to hurt all of its members, and, as we shall see, it cannot hurt any particular member. The sovereign by the mere fact that it is, is always all that it ought to be.

But this is not true of the relation of subject to sovereign. Despite their common interest, subjects will not be bound by their commitment unless means are found to guarantee their fidelity.

For every individual as a man may have a private will contrary to, or different from, the general will that he has as a citizen. His private interest may speak with a very different voice from that of the public interest; his absolute and naturally independent existence may make him regard what he owes to the common cause as a gratuitous contribution, the loss of which would be less painful for others than the payment is onerous for him; and fancying that the artificial person which constitutes the state is a mere fictitious entity (since it is not a man), he might seek to enjoy the rights of a citizen without doing the duties of a subject. The growth of this kind of injustice would bring about the ruin of the body politic.

Hence, in order that the social pact shall not be an empty formula, it is tacitly implied in that commitment—which alone can give force to all others—that whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be constrained to do so by the whole body, which means nothing other than that he shall be forced to be free; for this is the necessary condition which, by giving each citizen to the nation, secures him against all personal dependence, it is the condition which shapes both the

design and the working of the political machine, and which alone bestows justice on civil contracts—without it, such contracts would be absurd, tyrannical and liable to the grossest abuse. . . .

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### Whether the General Will Can Err

It follows from what I have argued that the general will is always rightful and always tends to the public good; but it does not follow that the deliberations of the people are always equally right. We always want what is advantageous to us but we do not always discern it. The people is never corrupted, but it is often misled; and only then does it seem to will what is bad.

There is often a great difference between the will of all [what all individuals want] and the general will; the general will studies only the common interest while the will of all studies private interest, and is indeed no more than the sum of individual desires. But if we take away from these same wills, the pluses and minuses which cancel each other out, the balance which remains is the general will.

From the deliberations of a people properly informed, and provided its members do not have any communication among themselves, the great number of small differences will always produce a general will and the decision will always be good. But if groups, sectional associations are formed at the expense of the larger association, the will of each of these groups will become general in relation to its own members and private in relation to the state; we might then say that there are no longer as many votes as there are men but only as many votes as there are groups. The differences become less numerous and yield a result less general. Finally, when one of these groups becomes so large that it can outweigh the rest, the result is no longer the sum of many small differences, but one great divisive difference; then there ceases to be a general will, and the opinion which prevails is no more than a private opinion.

Thus if the general will is to be clearly expressed, it is imperative that there should be no sectional associations in the state, and that every citizen should make up his own mind for himself—such was the unique and sublime invention of the great Lycurgus. But if there are sectional associations, it is wise to multiply their number and to prevent inequality among them, as Solon, Numa and Servius did. These are the only precautions which can ensure that the general will is always enlightened and the people protected from error. . . .

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# Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy

Joseph Schumpeter

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## The Classical Doctrine of Democracy

### I. The Common Good and the Will of the People

The eighteenth-century philosophy of democracy may be couched in the following definition: the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions which realizes the common good by making the people itself decide issues through the election of individuals who are to assemble in order to carry out its will. Let us develop the implications of this.

It is held, then, that there exists a Common Good, the obvious beacon light of policy, which is always simple to define and which every normal person can be made to see by means of rational argument. There is hence no excuse for not seeing it and in fact no explanation for the presence of people who do not see it except ignorance—which can be removed—stupidity and anti-social interest. Moreover, this common good implies definite answers to all questions so that every social fact and every measure taken or to be taken can unequivocally be classed as “good” or “bad.” All people having therefore to agree, in principle at least, there is also a Common Will of the people (= will of all reasonable individuals) that is exactly coterminous with the common good or interest or welfare or happiness. The only thing, barring stupidity and sinister interests, that can possibly bring in disagreement and account for the presence of an opposition is a difference of opinion as to the speed with which the goal, itself common to nearly all, is to be approached. Thus every member of the community, conscious of that goal, knowing his or her mind, discerning what is

good and what is bad, takes part, actively and responsibly, in furthering the former and fighting the latter and all the members taken together control their public affairs.

It is true that the management of some of these affairs requires special aptitudes and techniques and will therefore have to be entrusted to specialists who have them. This does not affect the principle, however, because these specialists simply act in order to carry out the will of the people exactly as a doctor acts in order to carry out the will of the patient to get well. It is also true that in a community of any size, especially if it displays the phenomenon of division of labor, it would be highly inconvenient for every individual citizen to have to get into contact with all the other citizens on every issue in order to do his part in ruling or governing. It will be more convenient to reserve only the most important decisions for the individual citizens to pronounce upon—say by referendum—and to deal with the rest through a committee appointed by them—an assembly or parliament whose members will be elected by popular vote. This committee or body of delegates, as we have seen, will not represent the people in a legal sense but it will do so in a less technical one—it will voice, reflect or represent the will of the electorate. Again as a matter of convenience, this committee, being large, may resolve itself into smaller ones for the various departments of public affairs. Finally, among these smaller committees there will be a general-purpose committee, mainly for dealing with current administration, called cabinet or government, possibly with a general secretary or scapegoat at its head, a so-called prime minister.<sup>1</sup>

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1. The official theory of the functions of a cabinet minister holds in fact that he is appointed in order to see to it that in his department the will of the people prevails.

As soon as we accept all the assumptions that are being made by this theory of the polity—or implied by it—democracy indeed acquires a perfectly unambiguous meaning and there is no problem in connection with it except how to bring it about. Moreover we need only forget a few logical qualms in order to be able to add that in this case the democratic arrangement would not only be the best of all conceivable ones, but that few people would care to consider any other. It is no less obvious however that these assumptions are so many statements of fact every one of which would have to be proved if we are to arrive at that conclusion. And it is much easier to disprove them.

There is, first, no such thing as a uniquely determined common good that all people could agree on or be made to agree on by the force of rational argument. This is due not primarily to the fact that some people may want things other than the common good but to the much more fundamental fact that to different individuals and groups the common good is bound to mean different things. This fact, hidden from the utilitarian by the narrowness of his outlook on the world of human valuations, will introduce rifts on questions of principle which cannot be reconciled by rational argument because ultimate values—our conceptions of what life and what society should be—are beyond the range of mere logic. They may be bridged by compromise in some cases but not in others. Americans who say, “We want this country to arm to its teeth and then to fight for what we conceive to be right all over the globe” and Americans who say, “We want this country to work out its own problems which is the only way it can serve humanity” are facing irreducible differences of ultimate values which compromise could only maim and degrade.

Secondly, even if a sufficiently definite common good—such as for instance the utilitarian’s maximum of economic satisfaction<sup>2</sup>—proved acceptable to all, this would not imply equally

definite answers to individual issues. Opinions on these might differ to an extent important enough to produce most of the effects of “fundamental” dissension about ends themselves. The problems centering in the evaluation of present versus future satisfactions, even the case of socialism versus capitalism, would be left still open, for instance, after the conversion of every individual citizen to utilitarianism. “Health” might be desired by all, yet people would still disagree on vaccination and vasectomy. And so on.

The utilitarian fathers of democratic doctrine failed to see the full importance of this simply because none of them seriously considered any substantial change in the economic framework and the habits of bourgeois society. They saw little beyond the world of an eighteenth-century ironmonger.

But, third, as a consequence of both preceding propositions, the particular concept of the will of the people or the *volonté générale* that the utilitarians made their own vanishes into thin air. For that concept presupposes the existence of a uniquely determined common good discernible to all. Unlike the romanticists the utilitarians had no notion of that semi-mystic entity endowed with a will of its own—that “soul of the people” which the historical school of jurisprudence made so much of. They frankly derived their will of the people from the wills of individuals. And unless there is a center, the common good, toward which, in the long run at least, *all* individual wills gravitate, we shall not get that particular type of “natural” *volonté générale*. The utilitarian center of gravity, on the one hand, unifies individual wills, tends to weld them

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2. The very meaning of “greatest happiness” is open to serious doubt. But even if this doubt could be removed and definite meaning could be attached to the sum total of economic satisfaction of a group of people, that maximum would still be relative to given situations and valuations which it may be impossible to alter, or compromise on, in a democratic way.

by means of rational discussion into the will of the people and, on the other hand, confers upon the latter the exclusive ethical dignity claimed by the classic democratic creed. *This creed does not consist simply in worshiping the will of the people as such* but rests on certain assumptions about the “natural” object of that will which object is sanctioned by utilitarian reason. Both the existence and the dignity of this kind of *volonté générale* are gone as soon as the idea of the common good fails us. And both the pillars of the classical doctrine inevitably crumble into dust.

## II. The Will of the People and Individual Volition

Of course, however conclusively those arguments may tell against this particular conception of the will of the people, they do not debar us from trying to build up another and more realistic one. I do not intend to question either the reality or the importance of the socio-psychological facts we think of when speaking of the will of a nation. Their analysis is certainly the prerequisite for making headway with the problems of democracy. It would however be better not to retain the term because this tends to obscure the fact that as soon as we have severed the will of the people from its utilitarian connotation we are building not merely a different theory of the same thing, but a theory of a completely different thing. We have every reason to be on our guard against the pitfalls that lie on the path of those defenders of democracy who while accepting, under pressure of accumulating evidence, more and more of the facts of the democratic process, yet try to anoint the results that process turns out with oil taken from eighteenth-century jars.

But though a common will or public opinion of some sort may still be said to emerge from the infinitely complex jumble of individual and group-wise situations, volitions, influences,

actions and reactions of the “democratic process,” the result lacks not only rational unity but also rational sanction. The former means that, though from the standpoint of analysis, the democratic process is not simply chaotic—for the analyst nothing is chaotic that can be brought within the reach of explanatory principles—yet the results would not, except by chance, be meaningful in themselves—as for instance the realization of any definite end or ideal would be. The latter means, since *that* will is no longer congruent with any “good,” that in order to claim ethical dignity for the result it will now be necessary to fall back upon an unqualified confidence in democratic forms of government as such—a belief that in principle would have to be independent of the desirability of results. As we have seen, it is not easy to place oneself on that standpoint. But even if we do so, the dropping of the utilitarian common good still leaves us with plenty of difficulties on our hands.

In particular, we still remain under the practical necessity of attributing to the will of the *individual* an independence and a rational quality that are altogether unrealistic. If we are to argue that the will of the citizens *per se* is a political factor entitled to respect, it must first exist. That is to say, it must be something more than an indeterminate bundle of vague impulses loosely playing about given slogans and mistaken impressions. Everyone would have to know definitely what he wants to stand for. This definite will would have to be implemented by the ability to observe and interpret correctly the facts that are directly accessible to everyone and to sift critically the information about the facts that are not. Finally, from that definite will and from these ascertained facts a clear *and prompt* conclusion as to particular issues would have to be derived according to the rules of logical inference—with so high a degree of general efficiency moreover that one man’s opinion could be held, without glaring absurdity, to be roughly

as good as every other man's.<sup>3</sup> And all this the model citizen would have to perform for himself and independently of pressure groups and propaganda,<sup>4</sup> for volitions and inferences that are imposed upon the electorate obviously do not qualify for ultimate data of the democratic pro-

3. This accounts for the strongly equalitarian character both of the classical doctrine of democracy and of popular democratic beliefs. It will be pointed out later on how Equality may acquire the status of an ethical postulate. As a factual statement about human nature it cannot be true in any conceivable sense. In recognition of this the postulate itself has often been reformulated so as to mean "equality of opportunity." But, disregarding even the difficulties inherent in the word opportunity, this reformulation does not help us much because it is actual and not potential equality of performance in matters of political behavior that is required if each man's vote is to carry the same weight in the decision of issues.

It should be noted in passing that democratic phraseology has been instrumental in fostering the association of inequality of any kind with "injustice" which is so important an element in the psychic pattern of the unsuccessful and in the arsenal of the politician who uses him. One of the most curious symptoms of this was the Athenian institution of ostracism or rather the use to which it was sometimes put. Ostracism consisted in banishing an individual by popular vote, not necessarily for any particular reason: it sometimes served as a method of eliminating an uncomfortably prominent citizen who was felt to "count for more than one."

4. This term is here being used in its original sense and not in the sense which it is rapidly acquiring at present and which suggests the definition: propaganda is any statement emanating from a source that we do not like. I suppose that the term derives from the name of the committee of cardinals which deals with matters concerning the spreading of the Catholic faith, the *congregatio de propaganda fide*. In itself therefore it does not carry any derogatory meaning and in particular it does not imply distortion of facts. One can make propaganda, for instance, for a scientific method. It simply means the presentation of facts and arguments with a view to influencing people's actions or opinions in a definite direction.

cess. The question whether these conditions are fulfilled to the extent required in order to make democracy work should not be answered by reckless assertion or equally reckless denial. It can be answered only by a laborious appraisal of a maze of conflicting evidence.

Before embarking upon this, however, I want to make quite sure that the reader fully appreciates another point that has been made already. I will therefore repeat that even if the opinions and desires of individual citizens were perfectly definite and independent data for the democratic process to work with, and if everyone acted on them with ideal rationality and promptitude, it would not necessarily follow that the political decisions produced by that process from the raw material of those individual volitions would represent anything that could in any convincing sense be called the will of the people. It is not only conceivable but, whenever individual wills are much divided, very likely that the political decisions produced will not conform to "what people really want." Nor can it be replied that, if not exactly what they want, they will get a "fair compromise." This may be so. The chances for this to happen are greatest with those issues which are quantitative in nature or admit of gradation, such as the question how much is to be spent on unemployment relief provided everybody favors some expenditure for that purpose. But with qualitative issues, such as the question whether to persecute heretics or to enter upon a war, the result attained may well, though for different reasons, be equally distasteful to all the people whereas the decision imposed by a non-democratic agency might prove much more acceptable to them. . . .

. . . If results that prove in the long run satisfactory to the people at large are made the test of government *for* the people, then government *by* the people, as conceived by the classical doctrine of democracy, would often fail to meet it.



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## Another Theory of Democracy

### I. Competition for Political Leadership

I think that most students of politics have by now come to accept the criticisms leveled at the classical doctrine of democracy in the preceding chapter. I also think that most of them agree, or will agree before long, in accepting another theory which is much truer to life and at the same time salvages much of what sponsors of the democratic method really mean by this term. Like the classical theory, it may be put into the nutshell of a definition.

It will be remembered that our chief troubles about the classical theory centered in the proposition that “the people” hold a definite and rational opinion about every individual question and that they give effect to this opinion—in a democracy—by choosing “representatives” who will see to it that that opinion is carried out. Thus the selection of the representatives is made secondary to the primary purpose of the democratic arrangement which is to vest the power of deciding political issues in the electorate. Suppose we reverse the roles of these two elements and make the deciding of issues by the electorate secondary to the election of the men who are to do the deciding. To put it differently, we now take the view that the role of the people is to produce a government, or else an intermediate body which in turn will produce a national executive<sup>1</sup> or government. And we define: the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.

Defense and explanation of this idea will speedily show that, as to both plausibility of

assumptions and tenability of propositions, it greatly improves the theory of the democratic process.

First of all, we are provided with a reasonably efficient criterion by which to distinguish democratic governments from others. We have seen that the classical theory meets with difficulties on that score because both the will and the good of the people may be, and in many historical instances have been, served just as well or better by governments that cannot be described as democratic according to any accepted usage of the term. Now we are in a somewhat better position partly because we are resolved to stress a *modus procedendi* the presence or absence of which it is in most cases easy to verify.<sup>2</sup>

For instance, a parliamentary monarchy like the English one fulfills the requirements of the democratic method because the monarch is practically constrained to appoint to cabinet office the same people as parliament would elect. A “constitutional” monarchy does not qualify to be called democratic because electorates and parliaments, while having all the other rights that electorates and parliaments have in parliamentary monarchies, lack the power to impose their choice as to the governing committee: the cabinet ministers are in this case servants of the monarch, in substance as well as in name, and can in principle be dismissed as well as appointed by him. Such an arrangement may satisfy the people. The electorate may reaffirm this fact by voting against any proposal for change. The monarch may be so popular as to be able to defeat any competition for the supreme office. But since no machinery is provided for making this competition effective the case does not come within our definition.

Second, the theory embodied in this definition leaves all the room we may wish to have for a proper recognition of the vital fact of leadership. The classical theory did not do this but, as we have seen, attributed to the electorate an

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1. The insincere word “executive” really points in the wrong direction. It ceases however to do so if we use it in the sense in which we speak of the “executives” of a business corporation who also do a great deal more than “execute” the will of stockholders.

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2. See however the fourth point below.

altogether unrealistic degree of initiative which practically amounted to ignoring leadership. But collectives act almost exclusively by accepting leadership—this is the dominant mechanism of practically any collective action which is more than a reflex. Propositions about the working and the results of the democratic method that take account of this are bound to be infinitely more realistic than propositions which do not. They will not stop at the execution of a *volonté générale* but will go some way toward showing how it emerges or how it is substituted or faked. What we have termed Manufactured Will is no longer outside the theory, an aberration for the absence of which we piously pray; it enters on the ground floor as it should.

Third, however, so far as there are genuine group-wise volitions at all—for instance the will of the unemployed to receive unemployment benefit or the will of other groups to help—our theory does not neglect them. On the contrary we are now able to insert them in exactly the role they actually play. Such volitions do not as a rule assert themselves directly. Even if strong and definite they remain latent, often for decades, until they are called to life by some political leader who turns them into political factors. This he does, or else his agents do it for him, by organizing these volitions, by working them up and by including eventually appropriate items in his competitive offering. The interaction between sectional interests and public opinion and the way in which they produce the pattern we call the political situation appear from this angle in a new and much clearer light.

Fourth, our theory is of course no more definite than is the concept of competition for leadership. This concept presents similar difficulties as the concept of competition in the economic sphere, with which it may be usefully compared. In economic life competition is never completely lacking, but hardly ever is it perfect. Similarly, in political life there is always some competition, though perhaps only a potential one, for the allegiance of the people. To simplify matters

we have restricted the kind of competition for leadership which is to define democracy, to free competition for a free vote. The justification for this is that democracy seems to imply a recognized method by which to conduct the competitive struggle, and that the electoral method is practically the only one available for communities of any size. But though this excludes many ways of securing leadership which should be excluded,<sup>4</sup> such as competition by military insurrection, it does not exclude the cases that are strikingly analogous to the economic phenomena we label “unfair” or “fraudulent” competition or restraint of competition. And we cannot exclude them because if we did we should be left with a completely unrealistic ideal.<sup>5</sup> Between this ideal case which does not exist and the cases in which all competition with the established leader is prevented by force, there is a continuous range of variation within which the democratic method of government shades off into the autocratic one by imperceptible steps. But if we wish to understand and not to philosophize, this is as it should be. The value of our criterion is not seriously impaired thereby.

Fifth, our theory seems to clarify the relation that subsists between democracy and individual freedom. If by the latter we mean the existence of a sphere of individual self-government the boundaries of which are historically variable—*no* society tolerates absolute freedom even of

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4. It also excludes methods which should not be excluded, for instance, the acquisition of political leadership by the people’s tacit acceptance of it or by election *quasi per inspirationem*. The latter differs from election by voting only by a technicality. But the former is not quite without importance even in modern politics; the sway held by a party boss *within his party* is often based on nothing but tacit acceptance of his leadership. Comparatively speaking however these are details which may, I think, be neglected in a sketch like this.

5. As in the economic field, *some* restrictions are implicit in the legal and moral principles of the community.

conscience and of speech, *no* society reduces that sphere to zero—the question clearly becomes a matter of degree. We have seen that the democratic method does not necessarily guarantee a greater amount of individual freedom than another political method would permit in similar circumstances. It may well be the other way round. But there is still a relation between the two. If, on principle at least, everyone is free to compete for political leadership<sup>6</sup> by presenting himself to the electorate, this will in most cases though not in all mean a considerable amount of freedom of discussion *for all*. In particular it will normally mean a considerable amount of freedom of the press. This relation between democracy and freedom is not absolutely stringent and can be tampered with. But, from the standpoint of the intellectual, it is nevertheless very important. At the same time, it is all there is to that relation.

Sixth, it should be observed that in making it the primary function of the electorate to produce a government (directly or through an intermediate body) I intended to include in this phrase also the function of evicting it. The one means simply the acceptance of a leader or a group of leaders, the other means simply the withdrawal of this acceptance. This takes care of an element the reader may have missed. He may have thought that the electorate controls as well as installs. But since electorates normally do not control their political leaders in any way except by refusing to reelect them or the parliamentary majorities that support them, it seems well to reduce our ideas about this control in the way indicated by our definition. Occasionally, spontaneous revulsions occur which upset a government or an individual minister directly or else enforce a certain course of action. But they are not only exceptional, they are, as we shall see, contrary to the spirit of the democratic method.

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6. Free, that is, in the same sense in which everyone is free to start another textile mill.

Seventh, our theory sheds much-needed light on an old controversy. Whoever accepts the classical doctrine of democracy and in consequence believes that the democratic method is to guarantee that issues be decided and policies framed according to the will of the people must be struck by the fact that, even if that will were undeniably real and definite, decision by simple majorities would in many cases distort it rather than give effect to it. Evidently the will of the majority is the will of the majority and not the will of “the people.” The latter is a mosaic that the former completely fails to “represent.” To equate both by definition is not to solve the problem. Attempts at real solutions have however been made by the authors of the various plans for Proportional Representation.

These plans have met with adverse criticism on practical grounds. It is in fact obvious not only that proportional representation will offer opportunities for all sorts of idiosyncrasies to assert themselves but also that it may prevent democracy from producing efficient governments and thus prove a danger in times of stress.<sup>7</sup> But before concluding that democracy becomes unworkable if its principle is carried out consistently, it is just as well to ask ourselves whether this principle really implies proportional representation. As a matter of fact it does not. If acceptance of leadership is the true function of the electorate’s vote, the case for proportional representation collapses because its premises are no longer binding. The principle of democracy then merely means that the reins of government should be handed to those who command more support than do any of the competing individuals or teams. And this in turn seems to assure the standing of the majority system within the logic of the democratic method, although we might still condemn it on grounds that lie outside of that logic. . . .

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7. The argument against proportional representation has been ably stated by Professor F. A. Hermens in “The Trojan Horse of Democracy,” *Social Research*, November 1938.