

insignificant by absolute and relative standards (approximately one percent of Pakistan's foreign trade turnover).¹¹

The change in Pakistan's foreign policy line in the 1960s was caused by the intensive processes which had taken place during the more than ten years of the state's development, and by intensification of the contradiction between the needs of the independent development of Pakistan society and the different forms of dependence on foreign powers. The onesided orientation toward these countries also had an undesirable effect on the interests of a large portion of the ruling classes, which underwent a certain evolution during the initial period of Pakistan's development.

It should especially be noted that in spite of the existing obstacles there was a growth of the economy during this period, especially in industrial production. The private sector of the national economy also expanded and grew stronger. A concentration of production and capital took place.¹² This meant a strengthening of the economic positions of the ruling classes, an increase in their incomes and riches; their political forms of government also grew stronger—with the aid of the Western allies the state, military and political machine also expanded and grew stronger. The position of the ruling classes as a whole consolidated in comparison with what it had been during the early years of Pakistan's existence; this made possible a more independent course for the state.

Important shifts also took place in the ruling classes themselves. The development of capitalist enterprise and the quite rapid growth rates of industrial production caused the strengthening of the national industrial and trade-industrial bourgeoisie, as well as an extension of the entrepreneurial activity of the landowners, especially its quite numerous middle strata¹³—i.e., the group which engaged in capitalist economy, but was as a rule deprived of these semifeudal privileges which the leading landowners had at their disposal. After the 1958 change in power, it was precisely these groups which began to determine Pakistan's state policy. They were interested in weakening the dependence of the country's reproduction process on foreign monopolies, in creating the basic sector of heavy industry, in expanding the home market, and in a more versatile and rapid development of the economy (in the period before 1959-1960, the average yearly growth rate of the gross product was only 2.5%).¹⁴ It was for precisely these aims that the new government carried out a series of reforms in various spheres of the

¹¹See the *Pakistan Economics*, Karachi, 9:4, 970, p. 60; *Pakistan Basic Facts*, 1965-66, Rawalpindi, 1966, p. 73.

¹²See S. Levin, *Formirovanie krupnoi burzhuazii Pakistana* (The Formation of the Upper Bourgeoisie in Pakistan), Moscow, 1970 pp. 114-117.

¹³These processes are studied in detail in works by the Soviet Pakistanist V. G. Rastyannikov. See V. G. Rastyannikov, S. A. Kuz'min, *Problemy ekonomiki Pakistana* (Problems in Pakistan's Economy), Moscow, 1958, pp. 93-128; V. G. Rastyannikov, "Tekhnicheskaya baza sel'skogo khozyaystva Pakistana" (The Technological Basis of Agriculture in Pakistan) in the collection, *Pakistan: Istoriya i ekonomika* (Pakistan: Its History and its Economy), Moscow, 1959, pp. 95-96.

¹⁴*Pakistan Economic Survey. 1966-67*, Rawalpindi, 1967 (Statistical Section) pp. 2-3.

domestic life of the society. It is natural that it was these interests of the ruling circles that also determined their foreign policy.

Pakistan's onesided orientation weakened its position in the world market; it made it extremely sensitive to the slightest fluctuation in the economy of the Western powers (this sensitivity was shown to be especially negative for Pakistan in 1957-1958 when there was an economic recession in the capitalist world), and defenseless before the actions of the monopolies; it reinforced Pakistan's role as a supplier of raw material and a consumer of the finished products of developed capitalist countries, when its growing national industry needed market sales; it hindered the trend of foreign capital activity in the country in a way desirable for the national bourgeoisie; finally, this position deprived Pakistan of the possibility of making use of, in the words of the *Pakistan Times*, "the result of the competition of the two world giants."¹⁵ The above mentioned groups of ruling classes in authority in Pakistan began to pursue a course directed toward weakening the dependence on the Western allies, establishing conditions for cooperation with them which were more profitable for themselves, and using the struggles of the two world systems and the keen competition within the capitalist system.

Following along with the policy of the Western allies led to a certain drop in Pakistan's authority and significance on the international scene and to its isolation, which was not convenient for the ruling circles. This position for Pakistan aroused special dissatisfaction among broad strata of the population. Pakistan's participation in the plans and activities of the Pentagon excited great apprehension in the country. The lengths to which this participation went was shown by Pakistan's participation in the 1960 American U-2 spy flights over Soviet territory.

External factors too exerted a strong influence on the change in the foreign policy line of Pakistan: a certain modification in the United States' policy in the Subcontinent, the rise and aggravation of tension in Sino-Indian relations, etc. An intensification in Pakistan's foreign policy of the tendencies toward strengthening independence, breaking away from its onesided orientation, and extending cooperation on the international scene was promoted by the success of the peaceloving foreign policy of the USSR, which dispelled the myth of the "Soviet threat" created by apologists of "the cold war." Let us note that the changes in Pakistan's foreign policy strategy were part of an over-all process of "equalizing" in the foreign policy of many of the developing countries (the reason for which were approximately the same factors of an internal and external order as in Pakistan). Under these conditions Pakistan exerted a definite influence on other states. In turn, it was subject to an influence on their part, which was especially important, if one bears in mind, for example, a country like Iran—Pakistan's neighbor and ally.

An extremely important circumstance which should be remembered when

¹⁵*The Pakistan Times*, October 27, 1962.

considering this topic, and which requires a special explanation, is the fact that, in contrast to the domestic policy, the changes in foreign policy did not begin immediately after the new government of M. Ayub Khan had come to power. The internal reforms began following the events in October 1958; the commission for carrying out agrarian reforms was formed at the end of October, and announcement was made of the reform in January 1959; in the same month a new policy in the sphere of trade began to be implemented, the next month in industry, etc. At the same time, in the early years of its activity the new regime followed the former line of foreign policy. In this period the government of M. Ayub Khan came out as an opponent of neutrality, as a true ally of the Western powers, and as an active participant in all of the military measures of SEATO, and of the Central Treaty Organization. In a speech in Karachi on December 25, 1958, on the celebration of the birthday of M. A. Jinnah, M. Ayub Khan stated: "We shall stand by our commitments and prove that we are steadily, dependable friends."¹⁶ In 1959 a "Friendship and Trade" agreement, which American monopolies had tried to achieve previously, was concluded with the United States; the same year a new military agreement was signed with the United States. In general, the end of the 1950s was a period of the flourishing of Pakistani-American relations. At the same time, it was the period of the worst relations between Pakistan and China. There was also unfriendliness in the policy of the Pakistan government in its relations with the USSR and other socialist states.

How can one explain the fact that the changes in the foreign policy did not begin immediately after the new groups of ruling classes came to power but later, when the basic domestic reforms had been proclaimed and were being implemented? It can apparently be explained by the fact that changes in state policy most often begin with the domestic policy; the chief factor, however, obviously lay in the specific situation in Pakistan at that time. The 1958 coup took place under conditions of acute economic and social tension and political crisis. Therefore the chief object of concern and activity for the new government lay in domestic problems, the need to ease internal tension, and the solution of problems which had long ago been created by the entire course of development of Pakistan society. The point here is not only the fact that in such a situation the government did not "have time" for foreign policy, although this did happen.¹⁷ The basic reason was that the attainment of the main object—settling the internal problems—was conceived by the new Pakistan government by means of certain reforms in various internal spheres of the life of the society, with invariability in the foreign policy, an alliance with the Western powers, and support from the United States, and

¹⁶M. Ayub Khan, *Speeches and Statements*, Vol. 1, October 1958-June 1959, p. 28.

¹⁷This was illustrated by the curtailment of the general volume of foreign policy activity engaged in by the government, above all the considerable decrease in such a form of it as reciprocal official visits by the rulers of Pakistan and foreign states. For approximately a year after coming to power, the new Pakistan leaders practically did not leave the country (nor did they receive leaders from foreign states).

American economic and military aid. The latter was especially important, since the leaders of the army, which depended on United States military equipment, were at the head of the new Pakistan government. The new tendencies in Pakistan's foreign policy began to be consolidated when the authorities succeeded, through a series of reforms, in achieving some internal stabilization.¹⁸ By this time the influence of the above examined external factors, the significance of which we in no way underestimate, had intensified.

In foreign scholarly literature one observes an urge to call a certain event a turning point in Pakistan's foreign policy line, and thus to establish a more or less precise date for the change in the state's foreign policy. The Sino-Indian military conflict very often serves as this event. It is natural that in such a case 1962 is named as the date of the change in Pakistan's foreign policy. K. B. Sayeed mentions that "in 1962 Pakistan's disenchantment with the pro-Western alliance crystallized into cordiality towards the Chinese."¹⁹ Such an approach to this problem does not seem fruitful, for in this case there drops out of the subject of study the period which embraces the early 1960s, during which the new elements in foreign policy gained strength, but had not yet become decisive factors (as subsequently happened). They were seemingly in a state of equilibrium with the elements which determined the course of Pakistan's foreign policy in the 1950s (in this sense, this period is similar to that at the beginning of the 1950s, but naturally, with a different content). Specifically, this was shown in the fact that in some tendencies the foreign policy had in this period already begun to acquire the features of the new one, but in others, it remained as before. Thus, for example, from the very beginning of the 1960s policies had been outlined toward extending collaboration with the socialist countries (the Soviet-Pakistani negotiations and the signing of the agreement on economic and technical cooperation of the Soviet Union, in oil and gas exploration, and the change in Pakistan's position in relation to PRC representation in the UN, etc.). At the same time, let us note, the attitude toward the blocs and the commitments which resulted from remaining in them still remained unchanged.²⁰ Thus, the change in the foreign policy line was in a certain transitional period; such events as the above mentioned treaties with USSR, the positions with respect to China's representation in the UN, and the signing of a number of agreements with the PRC and others, are evidence and testimony of such changes.

¹⁸One of the official publications explains directly: "With increasing stability at home, the Revolutionary Government found it possible to devote more attention to improving and stabilizing Pakistan's relations with other countries and thus contributing more effectively to the maintenance and promotion of world peace." (*Towards Consolidation. Two years of the Revolutionary Government in Pakistan*, Karachi, p. 27).

¹⁹K. B. Sayeed, *op. cit.*, pp. 231-232.

²⁰In December 1960, President M. Ayub Khan, in commenting on the situation in Laos, stated: "If Pakistan (as SEATO member) is called upon to shoulder its burden and responsibility we will never hesitate to do it." (Quoted from an article in K. B. Sayeed, *op. cit.*, p. 233). This position was also supported by the Pakistan Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Kadir, at a session of the SEATO Council in March 1961.

Among them, one of the first and most significant testimonies to the change in Pakistan's foreign policy is without a doubt its government's turning, in the summer of 1960, to the USSR for aid in organizing and carrying out the prospecting for oil and gas; the agreement signed in the following year made it possible for Pakistan to create a State Corporation for the development of the oil and gas industry, and to achieve certain concessions from the Anglo-American petroleum companies operating in the country.

The new period in Pakistan's foreign policy activity in the 1960s was a period in which Pakistan became active on the international scene, relinquishing its onesided orientation, developing relations with the great powers on the basis of bilateral equations, and extending various ties with many world states. In this period Pakistan actively entered into the most important problems of the modern day—peace and peaceful coexistence, universal and total disarmament and the ban on atomic weapons, colonialism and neo-colonialism, etc. This course contributed to reinforcing Pakistan's authority and prestige, as was evidenced by its selection as a non-permanent member of the Security Council and a member of the Committee on Disarmament; at the 17th session of the UN General Assembly, the Pakistan representative, Ch. M. Zafrullah Khan, was chosen chairman of this session of the General Assembly, and was subsequently appointed as a judge in the International Court.

The development of various ties between Pakistan and the socialist countries reached significant dimensions. In these years reciprocal visits took place between the leaders of Pakistan and these countries. In 1968 the head of the Soviet government visited Pakistan for the first time; the first visit made by a Pakistan President to the USSR was in 1965. Pakistan concluded a series of trade agreements with the socialist countries, in accordance with which it received needed industrial items, equipment, and agricultural equipment, in exchange for the traditional export products and industrial items (the latter were very important for the development of national industry). With the economic and technical aid of the socialist countries, dozens of large projects were constructed in extremely important sectors of the country's national economy. The help of the socialist countries (in addition to its direct significance) was also important for Pakistan because it obliged the Western powers to resort to certain concessions, to give up the conditions for supplying its aid which had been the most burdensome for Pakistan, and to send its aid to sectors which it had formerly ignored.

In this period, however, there were elements in Pakistan's foreign policy which differed from the general trend and weakened the positive effect of this policy, working to its detriment. Among these elements should be included Pakistan's continued membership in the blocs. Even though Pakistan's attitude toward them changed essentially in this period, nevertheless the very fact that it remained in the blocs imposed certain obligations on it. The continuing tension in its relations with India also exerted a negative, deforming influence on Pakistan's foreign policy.

The negative elements in Pakistan's foreign policy grew stronger at the end of this period—i.e., at the beginning of the 1970s. The influence of the United States and the PRC began to have a noticeable effect on the foreign policy of the country. Such a "bipolar" policy was not conducive to strengthening the independent line of the country's foreign policy nor to overcoming the problems arising on the subcontinent, and did not correspond to Pakistan's national interests. Therefore, after the government of Z. A. Bhutto came to power in December 1971, a certain correction of the state's foreign policy was made.

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