

17 The Foreign Policy of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto

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Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto envisaged a foreign policy that liberated Pakistan from its American dependence. He perceived the Muslim nation in a different role than that cast by his predecessors; a role more in keeping with the country's projected stature in the Islamic world, a stature that could also provide him with the necessary credentials to be its spokesman. The United States did not prevent India from intervening in Pakistan's civil war, nor could it secure the country's territorial integrity, or deny the Bengali claim to Bangladesh. Pakistan may have been Washington's most allied ally but the Americans were powerless in restoring the *status quo ante*. Thus a rump Pakistan found itself in a new environment and given the disarray within as well as the prevailing national despair, the time seemed opportune not only for a new national beginning, but for a new framework to support the nation's foreign policy.

1. Personality and Foreign Policy

Bhutto was the man of the hour. He was a gifted and educated leader as well as a person with considerable public experience. By background, upbringing, and service he among all the other Pakistani luminaries appeared destined for the task that now lay upon him. Steeled by the affection of the masses, armed with a significant coalition, counselled by bright advisors, Bhutto was called to administer to a nation that had suffered the trauma of humiliating defeat, that had been forced to submit to dismemberment, that seemed to have lost direction and was on the verge of rejecting its ethos. In such dire circumstances it was all the more remarkable that Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto dreamed of placing Pakistan in the forefront of the Muslim nations, or that he aspired to be the recognized spokesman for Third World causes. But Bhutto was no ordinary politician. He was at his best when challenged by great issues, and while others fretted the past, Bhutto pressed forward with his preconceived plans. He took up difficult assignments and blunted assaults on his perfor-

both' and Moscow had picked up the theme. Both countries sought to influence Washington to reconsider its military support for Islamabad, but except for a few Democratic Senators and Congressmen, the Reagan administration refused to budge from its stated position. Reports that New Delhi was contemplating a preemptive attack on Pakistan's nuclear facilities supposedly had failed. Soviet support, but this only brought a biting reply from Islamabad. Zia served notice that any attack on Pakistani nuclear facilities would be countered by an attack on Indian installations. Washington's ambassador to Islamabad, Dean Hinton, seemed to reinforce Zia's position. He reassured Islamabad that the United States would not remain silent if Pakistan was subject to an overt attack. Shortly thereafter, Vice President George Bush visited Pakistan and he used the opportunity to reaffirm that commitment. Officially, Washington remained opposed to Pakistan's nuclear programme, but given Soviet aggression in Afghanistan, it was pleased to the preservation of Pakistan's territorial integrity. To clear this tense situation, Zia met Rajiv in December 1985 and the two men agreed to publicly renounce attacks on their respective nuclear installations. They never formalized that intention, however. Nevertheless, Rajiv Gandhi's emergence as India's Prime Minister seemed to offer new opportunities for dialogue and Zia found it necessary to separate the war in Afghanistan from his entreaties to New Delhi. Thus with the Geneva negotiations bogged down over the timing of the Soviet withdrawal and the future of the Karmal regime, Zia accelerated his efforts in the direction of India.

The two leaders had met in New York City for the 40th anniversary of the United Nations, while their foreign secretaries pursued a variety of avenues, including high level meetings of the Indo-Pakistani Joint Commission. The newly formed South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation also began to expand its activities during this period and a host of Pakistani and Indian representatives were able to pursue substantive contacts under its aegis, including border security issues and Sikh terrorism. On the other side of these positive activities, however, was the protraction of hostilities in Kashmir. Frictions between Pakistani and Indian border forces on the border had earlier caused losses on both sides, and subsequent negotiations at the border dispute were without significant result. Peace talks at the parties was not only an elusive goal, the threat of another Indo-Pakistani war surfaced in late December 1986 and spilled over into 1987.

Massive Indian army manoeuvres in the Rajasthan desert provoked Zia to call a state of emergency and a special session of the Pakistani Parliament. With the marshalling of combat forces on both sides of the frontier, Zia made a sudden and hurried flight to India, ostensibly to attend a 'cricket match' between Indian and Pakistani teams, but in fact to meet Prime Minister Gandhi over the troop mobilization issue. What was lightly called 'cricket diplomacy,' could not obscure the most serious exchanges ever entered into by the two leaders. In the end, Zia's dramatic move paid off. India and Pakistan agreed to reduce the size of their opposed forces, and to eventually pull back all except a token number from the frontier area. War had been averted but the two neighbours were far from reconciling their outstanding differences.

Islamabad had better luck with its long term friends. In 1986 it signed a peaceful nuclear co-operation treaty with China, and a new six year \$4.02 billion military and economic aid package with the United States, which included providing Pakistan with an additional 60 F-16s. When this latter agreement was approved by the US Congress in December 1987, Pakistan became the third highest recipient of American assistance, eclipsed only by Israel and Egypt. Pakistan also sustained its close relationship with the Persian Gulf states. Remittances from overseas Pakistanis fell somewhat but the feared mass return of workers from the Gulf did not materialize. Pakistan needed its friends, given the stepped up fighting in Afghanistan. By 1986, the Government recorded 700 violations of Afghan airspace, and 150 separate shellings of Pakistani territory. Hundreds of Pakistani civilians were reported to have died as a consequence of these attacks. Acts of terror, believed to be the work of Afghan agents, also multiplied during the period, and they had caused hundreds of additional deaths. Zia, however, was not to be deterred from his oft-stated goal of a free, independent and neutral Afghanistan. Thus, he held fast to his two-track policy: he remained firm in support of the Afghan resistance fighters, but used all available channels in the search for a diplomatic settlement.

The UN mediator, Diego Cordovez, made two trips to South Asia in 1986 in the belief that a breakthrough in the long negotiations was finally possible. Still another Soviet leader had died, and still another succession had followed. In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev took another stage in the Kremlin, and during a later visit to New Delhi he signalled his desire to terminate the Soviet role in Afghanistan.

answer the Sikh call for ethnic freedom. Zia was noticeably disturbed by this latest intrusion by the Indian Prime Minister into Pakistani affairs. He condemned the action and warned India that Pakistan would not suffer another assault on its sovereignty.

Nor was Mrs Gandhi's reply to Zia aimed at easing the situation. She described Zia's Government in terms that questioned its legitimacy and seemed more intent on pinning blame for her own Sikh problem on the Zia administration. Arguing that the Sikhs were loyal to India, she pointed to the few extremists among them who she demurred were encouraged to commit mayhem by their Pakistani mentors. Although New Delhi never provided proof of Pakistani complicity in the Sikh movement for Khalistan, prevailing Indian opinion shared her reading of the dilemma. Pakistan, it was believed, sought revenge for India's role in the creation of Bangladesh and in effect had created the Sikh problem.

When Sikh militants occupied the Golden Temple in Amritsar in 1984, Indian intelligence again insisted they were in league with Pakistani special forces and that their plan was to force New Delhi to yield to their demands for a separate Sikh state. Mrs Gandhi's decision ordering an attack on the Golden Temple in June 1984 supposedly was made with a view towards breaking the militants' connection with Islamabad. Like Zia who used his armed forces to crush the Sindhi protestors, Indira's decision led to the deaths of hundreds of Sikhs. The army assault also caused serious damage to the Sikhs' holiest shrine. Thus, in July, Sikh militants hijacked an Indian Airways jet on a domestic flight and forced its pilot to fly the aircraft to Lahore in Pakistan. The hijackers demanded the release of Sikhs imprisoned in India and the payment of \$25 million in reparations by the Indian government as compensation for the damage caused to the Golden Temple. Islamabad appeared to side with the hijackers, whom they had disarmed and arrested, by refusing an Indian request that they be extradited to India.

Neither Pakistan's Sindh or India's Punjab was pacified by the counterforce measures. Conditions were in fact more tense and far more disturbed in the aftermath of the bloodletting. Both President Zia and Prime Minister Gandhi believed their violent response was justified, but both also had to acknowledge the futility of their efforts. Moreover, in October 1984, Indira was herself victimized by her decision to use force against the Sikhs. She was shot and killed in her compound in New Delhi by her Sikh bodyguards.

Zia flew to New Delhi for Indira's funeral and there met her successor, Rajiv Gandhi. Their differences, however, were not

resolved by this gesture or a subsequent one wherein Zia ordered a three day period of national mourning for the slain Indian leader.

Zia's violent death in 1988 remains something of an enigma but some opinion in Pakistan hold to the view that his killing was also related to the nationalities question. Moreover, people on both sides of the border continue to believe foreign hands were involved in the deaths of these once powerful figures.

VII. Recurring Themes

Pakistan permitted the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD), an organization that included Pakistan, Iran and Turkey, to lapse in 1979. Established in 1964 from an idea expressed by Ayub Khan, RCD never lived up to expectations; nevertheless, it did bring the three northern tier countries together and it did encourage them to promote their common heritage. More important, RCD was an association not an alliance. It made no special demands on the member-states, and it stemmed from their own initiatives, not from that of an alien power. With the secretariat housed in Tehran, RCD could not function in the wake of the Iranian revolution and its activities were put in limbo. By the mid-1980s, however, the organization regained its *bona fides* and was resurrected. President Zia announced that RCD would examine possibilities for cooperation in the fields of agriculture, industry, and trade, but that it would not assume responsibility for major projects so long as Iran was locked in its struggle with Iraq.

General Zia paid still another visit to Moscow in February 1984, this time to attend the funeral of Yuri Andropov, but unlike his previous visit he did not meet his successor. Explanations for this absence of contact was not offered, but it was clearly a Soviet decision and was more than likely related to Zia's perceived obstinacy on the Afghanistan question. Pakistan's deepening commitment on the *mujahideen* was, from Moscow's view point, prolonging the war. The Kremlin did not want Zia to believe the Soviet Union was prepared to let up in its efforts to strengthen the Babrak Karmal regime. In fact, both Islamabad and Moscow turned up the heat on the other. Pakistan bolstered the Afghan resistance at every opportunity, and Soviet and Soviet-directed Afghan units escalated their attacks on targets within Pakistan. A series of air bombings in September 1984 over the Pakistani frontier town of Parachinar, for example, cost more than 100 lives.

The Soviets were also at odds with Islamabad on the nuclear question. New Delhi publicized a story about Pakistan's Islamic

in still another attempt to overcome Pakistan's disability as a frontline state, Zia directed his attention towards India. Repeated gestures of non-belligerence were meant to calm Indian fears about Pakistan's arms build up. Zia made a surprise visit to New Delhi in 1982 and from that meeting with Indira Gandhi an Indian-Pakistani Joint Commission was created to monitor activities between the two countries. Zia sought to explain the latest military assistance agreement with the United States, while Indira assured the Pakistani leadership that her country would co-operate in moderating the tensions felt by both governments. Despite these assurances, however, it was Islamabad's view that India's policy in the Afghanistan conflict too closely resembled Moscow's. Zia, therefore, had visions of a geopolitical pincer movement in which Pakistan could be pressured and ultimately squeezed from two sides. His remedy against such a possibility was a forward policy capable of warding off potential danger. He believed Pakistan had only one secure option: it had to step up its assistance to the *mujahideen* and to develop the needed leverage to control them. Moreover, Washington was now willing to provide the necessary weapons to fight a successful guerrilla war.

American arms shipments destined for *mujahideen* commanders, many of whom operated independently from one another, gave the Pakistani army the means to design something akin to a battle plan. A special inter-services intelligence unit had chief responsibility for distributing the supplies and thus for plotting tactics and directing operations. Without a formal declaration of involvement in the *mujahideen*, Pakistani forces became an integral feature of the resistance. Zia was able to have it both ways. He supplied and often directed *mujahideen* units, and he engaged his adversaries, over the opposition of the resistance, in the ongoing exchange of proposals concerned with terminating the struggle. By its involvement at both levels, Pakistan was able to gauge the threat to itself, and in so doing to deflect it.

The immediate security problem for Pakistan during this period was not the threat posed by the Red Army on the one side, or the Indian forces on the other, but from the Afghan refugees, and particularly those who moved among them, but who were actually Afghan secret police or paramilitary.¹ Pakistan was subjected to repeated acts of terror which became more deadly and costly as the conflict progressed. Zia was called to note these assaults on Pakistan

society, and to describe them as deliberate acts of intimidation. Pakistan's enemies were reluctant to commit themselves to a formal struggle but they were not reluctant to use other violent means to pressure the Zia government to cease its support of the *mujahideen*. Zia was hardpressed to deal with the law and order situation but he refused to waver from his chosen course. Despite the chorus of complaints from his political opposition about Pakistan fighting America's war, or engaging in a conflict that Pakistanis could not win, Zia defiantly held his ground.

VI. Internationalizing Ethnicity

India took advantage of Pakistan's problems in East Bengal in 1971 and thus was able to pry the eastern province away from the Pakistan federation. The Bengali issue was a constant reminder how internal questions can degenerate into international conflict. The Indo-Pakistani war of 1971 was a direct result of India's meddling in Pakistan's domestic affairs, and given that precedent, the likelihood of a repeat performance was never too far from the thinking of Islamabad's strategists.¹ Indira Gandhi ignored the internal character of the East Pakistan conflict, justifying its intervention on humanitarian grounds. But such an intrusion in the affairs of one state might well be replicated by another in the territory of the original perpetrator. Indeed, soon after the successful Indian intervention in the Pakistani civil war, India was faced with its own internal crisis in the Sikh Punjab. Moreover, now it was Islamabad which was seen intruding into matters solely the concern of New Delhi. Suspicions are not easily suppressed and in the zero-sum contest between the two rivals, India's perceived weakness was viewed as Pakistan's new strength. In spite of Pakistani denials, New Delhi accused Islamabad of supplying, training and providing sanctuary for Sikh extremists engaged in organized terror inside India.

These protestations aside, New Delhi still proved to be the more aggressive of the two states. Faced with something akin to an insurrection in Sindh Province in 1983, Islamabad also had to face a new threat from India. Prime Minister Gandhi felt compelled to comment on Sindh unrest in a meeting of the Indian Parliament. Moreover, she indicated her country's support for those inciting the disturbance. Claiming she was responding to still another democratic struggle, Mrs Gandhi ignored both Zia's bridge-building efforts as well as his criticism and belaboured the Islamabad government for failing to

¹ Hasan Askari Rizvi, *The Military and Politics in Pakistan, 1947-86*, Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1986, p. 203.

¹ Pervais Iqbal Cheema, *The Afghanistan Crisis and Pakistan's Security Dilemma*, *Asian Survey*, 23, 3 March 1983, pp. 234-7.

the F-16 warplanes with advanced electronics. Washington subsequently yielded to most of the Pakistani demands.

American critics of the F-16 sale focused their attention on the greater threat the F-16 posed to New Delhi. Indian officials echoed this concern. Their argument centred on the possibility that the new weapon system would heighten the chances of war between India and Pakistan. But when Zia offered to sign a 'no-war' pledge with New Delhi, the Reagan administration pressed ahead with the original programme. Moreover, Reagan would not be sidetracked on the matter. He spoke of the symbolic importance of the F-16 sale, how the revitalized US-Pakistan relationship hinged on the success of the total package, and especially the F-16s. With his peculiar brand of determination, Reagan not only won out, he also received Congressional approval despite persistent rumours that Pakistan was constructing an atomic bomb. Congress had to satisfy itself with a clause authorizing annual scrutiny of Pakistan's nuclear activities.¹

The dual strategy of preparing for war while skillfully seeking accommodations with the country's primary adversaries allowed Zia to intervene more directly in the Afghan campaign. On the one side Islamabad agreed to enter into proximity talks in Geneva with a Kabul regime that it steadfastly refused to recognize. Indeed, in the absence of official ties between the two governments, the UN mediator, Diego Cordevez, was required to meet the two parties separately, carrying the messages. Proposals and replies to the principals who sat in different locations. Islamabad's overriding need was to avoid major war, and while it avoided any appearance of timidity, it also refrained from actions that could be deemed aggressive. Zia paced his carefully balanced foreign policy on principle and conviction, tempered by realism. He did not hide his affinities with the *mujahideen*, nor did he interrupt the rising flow of sophisticated weapons to the resistance, but he also stoically controlled a desire for retaliation when the war across the border spilled over into Pakistan. On the other side, Zia made the most of his ties with the Islamic world, with China, and especially with the United States. The carefully structured arrangements addressed multi-dimensional questions, and even Pakistan's 'peaceful' nuclear programme was organized so as to provide the country with a nuclear weapons option circumstances required it.²

¹ Stephen Cohen and Marvin Weinbaum, 'Pakistan in 1981: Staying On', *Asian Survey*, 23, March 1982, pp. 144-5.
² Marvin Weinbaum and Stephen Cohen, 'Pakistan in 1982: Holding On', *Asian Survey*, 23, February 1983, p. 130.

Zia made a state visit to the United States in December 1982 and sought to overcome the poor Press he received there. An American cartoon of the period depicts a fumbling Reagan who cannot even recall Zia's country, shaking the blood-stained hands of the General, dressed in the uniform of the Nazi SS, with a hangman's noose gracing his left shoulder. Zia made a serious effort to correct that picture, to show himself as a responsible Asian leader burdened with enormous responsibilities. To some extent, American journalists signalled a willingness to change their reading of the Pakistani head of state, but they still displayed discomfort with the relationship. Zia, however, was not to be deterred. He had arrived in Washington following visits to the Persian Gulf states, Turkey, Iran, Southeast Asia, China, and the Soviet Union. In the latter visit he met Brezhnev's successor, Yuri Andropov, and all these contacts enhanced his credentials and marked him as an important world statesman. Clearly, neither the American Congress nor the American Press could ignore the realities of his international stature.

Zia's middle course foreign policy, described by Yaqub Khan as 'manoeuvre with flexibility on multiple fronts' was aimed at providing Pakistan with measurable security in an unstable climate. His acceptance of the UN Secretary General's mediation efforts despite the opposition from *mujahideen* factions, his stated desire that Afghanistan should be a non-aligned, free, Islamic state, 'friendly to the Soviet Union,' was not the vision of the resistance groups. Nevertheless, he stressed the necessity for compromise and even in the emotion-charged atmosphere of the Afghan conflict he was prepared to settle for an accommodation with Moscow, to allow the Kremlin to make an honourable withdrawal, and to speed the hostilities to a conclusion. Zia clung to this position for the duration of the war. He sent Yaqub Khan back to Geneva year after year with the hope that a *via media* could be found. Patiently, but consistently, and without modification, he pressed his view that the Soviet forces must be withdrawn, that the Soviet-installed puppet government must be dissolved, that the Afghans should be allowed to form a government of their choice, and that the refugees should be encouraged to return to their homes in peace. If these terms were met, he declared, Pakistan would do its part to influence the *mujahideen* to lay down their arms. Anything less could only perpetuate the conflict.

¹ Khalid B. Saheed, 'Pakistan in 1983', *Asian Survey*, 24, 2, February 1984, p. 227.

and that body was a constant source of peaceful endeavour in the initial years of the Iran-Iraq war. Zia travelled back and forth between the belligerents, always citing the futility of their conflict, and how it was being exploited by their enemies. According to Zia, Palestinian claims were obscured by the war in the Gulf, while Afghan needs were neglected. Only Israel on the one side, and Mexico on the other, stood to gain from the Iran-Iraq war. Zia was pointed that Tehran, more so than Baghdad, refused to listen to his argument.

Filling to achieve the larger goals of his diplomatic mission, but nevertheless a recipient of financial assistance from Saudi Arabia, Zia established a course for Pakistan that enabled the government to manage a complex foreign policy. Differences of interpretation as to what constituted an Islamic state did not prevent Pakistan from offering words of encouragement for the Iranian revolution. Nor did the Gulf war prevent the expansion of trade between Tehran and Islamabad or Islamabad and Baghdad. Pakistani citizens continued their trek to the Persian Gulf states in search of wealth and fortune. The remittances returned to Pakistan from this workforce amounted to \$2.128 billion in 1981 and rose to still higher levels in the next two years. Pakistan's reputation as a policeman in the Gulf states was also enhanced during the period with the despatch of 20,000 Pakistani soldiers to Saudi Arabia and another 10,000 to the area sheikhdoms where they supplemented indigenous defences.¹

Zia did not have to be reminded that three of the world's more deadly contemporary encounters were occurring within the Muslim world, and these did not even include the Arab-Israeli conflict. The war in Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq clash, the unyielding Lebanese civil war, were among the more prominent contests during Zia's reign. The Pakistani President confronted each of them with the same determination, and although frustrated by the inflexible character of the belligerents, he had nonetheless placed Pakistan in the forefront of leadership among the Muslim states. Moreover, with the selection of Suhazada Yaqub Khan to succeed Agha Shahi as Foreign Minister, Zia chose a close associate and former army confidant to assist him in his international manoeuvres.

Zia's task was always a delicate one. On the one side, he pursued an active policy of rearmament for the Pakistani armed forces and made it possible for arms and other supplies to reach

resistance fighters. On the other, he encouraged diplomatic initiatives with all countries, and especially with Pakistan's immediate and potential enemies. Thus, while accusing Moscow of criminal actions in Afghanistan, he also promoted better relations between their two states. In 1981, for example, the Pakistan government and their Soviet counterparts inaugurated a new steel mill in Karachi that had been built with Soviet personnel and resources. Although wary of Indian machinations, and especially New Delhi's support for Soviet actions in Afghanistan, Zia sought direct contacts with Indira Gandhi and new trade and cultural agreements from her government. Zia was undaunted by the magnitude of the foreign policy dilemma. Confident he could control any situation, and over the strong objections of the *mujahideen*, he also agreed to accept the UN Secretary General's good offices in seeking a negotiated settlement for the Afghan tragedy.

V. National Security

Zia's confidence was born of an innate skill in matters of foreign policy. The 1981 revival of the 'American card' was an important, perhaps the critical aspect of his strategy. Zia's agreement with the Reagan administration on 15 June 1981 was approved by a hesitant American Congress on 9 December, and it meant Pakistan would receive from the United States \$1.625 billion in economic assistance, a continuation of PL-480 Title VIII food supplies and low interest developmental loans, as well as funds for energy expansion and water management. Another component of the five-year programme was the sale of weapons on commercial terms for hard currency, reportedly supplied by Saudi Arabia. The list of weapons included reconditioned Patton tanks, self-propelled howitzers, armoured personnel carriers, and attack helicopters worth \$1.5 billion. Neither arrangement raised much excitement in the Congress. The third part of the agreement, however, was another matter, and it was not approved without a struggle.

The Reagan administration sanctioned the sale of 40 F-16A aircraft to Islamabad with their spare parts. Zia and his associates proved to be hard bargainers, insisting that the aircraft delivery dates be advanced so that the first six planes would be in Pakistani hands by the end of 1982, and the others within another year and a half. Zia rejected a substitute offer by the United States which would have given Pakistan the opportunity to co-manufacture the American F-5G, a shorter range aircraft than the F-16. Pakistan also balked and threatened to kill the deal when the United States refused to outfit

¹ The Military Balance 1983-1984, London: The Institute for Strategic Studies, 1983, p. 97.

larger communist world that its intentions were peaceful, Reagan's willingness to expand and modernize the Pakistani armed forces was more than Zia could resist. Zia and the junta committed themselves to a policy that was not only professionally appealing, it was also one they believed protected the short and long term security of Pakistan. In a period of considerable uncertainty, the officers who ruled Pakistan sought to capitalize on an opportunity that was no doubt fraught with major questions, but which also promised a more secure future for them and the nation.

IV. The Islamic World and Afghanistan

Zia led the diplomatic struggle against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In January 1980, he presided over an extraordinary session of the Islamic Conference. The Pakistani leader condemned the Soviet action and called upon Conference representatives to join together in defence of the Islamic *umma* (nation). Zia's strategy was to galvanize into action 'the Muslim peoples. He reminded his guests that the Islamic Conference had been organized a decade before as a response to the desecration of the *Masjid-i-Aqsa* in Jerusalem, and that the purpose of the organization from that time had been the defense of the Muslim faithful. Zia questioned why Muslim lives were in jeopardy in so many areas of the world, and now in Afghanistan too. In rhetorical reply to his query, he ventured the opinion that Muslims portray weakness to the rest of the world, a weakness that stems from our lack of conviction and Faith.¹

Examining the Afghanistan situation, Zia noted that this was the first instance since World War II that a superpower had 'made a sovereign, independent Muslim country the target of its attack.' If this precedent were allowed to succeed, he cautioned the Muslim leaders, 'what is happening in Afghanistan today will happen in another country tomorrow.' Zia called for more than 'resounding statements.' He urged the Conference to speak with one voice, to direct their efforts at Moscow, and to insist that Soviet forces be withdrawn. Zia acknowledged the action in the UN General Assembly wherein another Pakistani initiative had produced 104 votes in support of a resolution deploring the foreign intervention in Afghanistan. But he reiterated his belief that even that vote was insufficient; the Islamic Conference, he said, was duty-bound to pick up that call and to press it to a successful conclusion.

¹ Extraordinary session of the Islamic Conference, 26 January, 1980, *Foreign Affairs Pakistan*, 7, 1, Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 1980, p. 2.

Zia also used the occasion to appeal for assistance in meeting the needs of the Afghan refugees who were passing into Pakistan in increasing numbers. This humanitarian problem, he asserted, was not Pakistan's alone, but must be shouldered by the whole of the Islamic *umma* (community).

Finally, Zia called for study and deliberations on the establishment of a collective defence alliance for the Muslim *umma*. Separate national defences, he argued, were not enough to ward off aggressive intentions. 'History bears witness that only by collective and concerted action can nations withstand the challenges that are posed to them.² The activation of the Muslim *umma* was Zia's foremost goal and the Afghan situation seemed to provide the best opportunity for its attainment. For Zia it was an act of faith. 'The establishment of Islamic *Ummah* is ordained by God and negating this would be to go against the word of God. Going against the word of God brings retribution.'¹ Zia's piety was genuine, and his plea could not be minimized. Nevertheless, the assembled Muslim leaders had little knowledge of the Afghans, and sympathy for their cause was less than that required to mount a combined effort. Moreover, each state had its own problems. Muslims were hardly of one mind and their rivalries also prevented serious consideration of Zia's proposal. Syria, Libya, South Yemen, were too dependent on the Soviet Union to take a position in opposition to the Red Army manoeuvre. Zia soon realized that he would get little more than verbal support from a majority of the Muslim states, and with the exception of Saudi Arabia and Egypt, little material assistance was forwarded to Pakistan from Muslim nations with an interest in the Afghan struggle.

The war between Iraq and Iran which erupted in the fall of 1980 provided still another opportunity for Zia to plead for co-operation among the Muslim states, but it also drew Muslim attention away from Afghanistan. Again Zia stressed the need for a unified *umma* capable of reconciling the belligerents. Zia gave freely of himself in the pursuit of a formula that could begin the healing process. But this effort too was without a satisfactory result.² Zia could not 'galvanize' his brethren into a concerted and unified movement, and the several schisms in the Muslim world were more than a match for his pious sincerity.

Zia, nevertheless, persisted in his endeavour. He played an instrumental role in the formation of the Ummah Peace Committee.

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

² Lawrence Ziring, 'Government and Politics', R.F. Nyrop, ed., *Pakistan: A Country Study*, Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1984, p. 250.

The irony in this situation was the advantage he had personally gained by condemning Ayub Khan's handling of the deliberations in Ashkent in 1965. The unpopularity of that agreement gave Bhutto the chance to exploit mass sentiment. He was also able to represent himself as a staunch resistance fighter in a protracted campaign against superior but immoral forces. Compromise was not a viable scenario. Once responsible for official policy, however, Bhutto assumed a totally different posture. At Simla he not only showed willingness to negotiate, he was also prepared to yield to the demands of the stronger party. But perhaps more interesting than Bhutto's change of heart was the general lack of popular disfavour with his actions. Pakistanis believed they were winning the 1965 war; they were well aware they had lost the 1971 encounter. In 1972, the people of Pakistan were prepared to acknowledge India's greater prowess in the subcontinent. Therefore, unlike 1965 when Ayub faced strong public reaction to his peace moves, after Bangladesh, Bhutto was largely insulated from such assaults.

The surrender of the Pakistani garrison in East Pakistan, the incarceration of 93,000 soldiers and dependents, the threat to try 195 of this number for war crimes was uppermost in the minds of the Pakistani people and Bhutto seized the opportunity to ease the emotional strain of his countrymen by getting Indira to agree to the repatriation of those being held, in return for Pakistani concessions. On 2 July 1972, Bhutto agreed to put an end to the long period of conflict and confrontation and to acknowledge the greater military power of New Delhi. Bhutto pledged his country to an era of 'peaceful co-existence' with India, and expressed his willingness to avoid unilateral actions that might threaten the neighbouring country. He also accepted the inviolability of the ceasefire line in Jammu-Kashmir, thus seeming to support India's claim to two-thirds of Kashmir. The Simla Agreement seemed to say the line of control separating Indian Kashmir from Azad Kashmir was now a legal international frontier.

Simla had demonstrated India's preponderant power in the subcontinent. After this act, Pakistan could no longer claim to be the equal of its neighbour. Moreover, the event confirmed New Delhi's intention to expand its military prowess, and its armed forces are now recognized as the fourth largest in the world. The accords also drew an official end to the 'two nation' argument that the Muslim League had used in establishing independent Pakistan. Islamabad could no longer justify its position in South Asia as a consequence of two distinct religious communities. Bangladesh had shown and the ac-

cords seemed to confirm that Muslim identities were not nearly as important as regional, ethnic and secular forces.

Simla specified respect for the national unity, territorial integrity, political independence and sovereign equality of the signatory states. Each was to refrain from the use of force against the other and to seek peaceful means to redress their differences. They also agreed to lower the bombast hurled at each other by their respective propaganda machines, and to avoid arousing popular passions that threatened their new found harmony of interest. The issue of the prisoners of war was not completely resolved but the accords addressed on-going negotiations aimed at resolving that outstanding problem.¹

At the subsequent meeting in New Delhi which followed Pakistan's submission of the prisoner issue to the International Court of Justice, a partial agreement was hammered out. India had held up the matter of the prisoners thereby hoping to pressure Pakistan into recognizing the independence of Bangladesh. Thus, when Bhutto signalled New Delhi that recognition was in the offing, the Indians agreed to return the bulk of the soldiers. On 28 August 1973, more than a year after Simla, the Delhi Agreement was signed between India and Pakistan and the prisoners of war began their return to Pakistan. The 195 that were held for war crimes were not included in this arrangement but New Delhi agreed to retain them rather than transfer them to Bangladeshi control as had been first indicated. The Delhi Agreement also made the case before the International Court *functus officio* and Islamabad withdrew it. The issue of the 195 prisoners continued to cause alarm in Pakistan but this problem was finally rectified to everyone's satisfaction in February 1974 when Pakistan officially recognized Bangladesh and the remaining incarcerated soldiers were permitted to return to Pakistan.

The Simla Accords and the developments flowing from them did not please everyone in Pakistan, but the prevailing consensus held that Bhutto had done as well as could be expected. Moreover, the more sophisticated Pakistanis wanted better relations with India. They acknowledged India's greater strength and few among them wished to provoke another conflict. Bhutto therefore emerged from the negotiations stronger in resolve as well as more assured about the content of his new foreign policy.

¹ D.C. Jha, *The Basic Foundation and Determinants of Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, Surendra Chopra, ed., *Perspectives on Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, Anantpur: Guru Mook-Dev University Press, 1983, pp. 23-4.

III. The Islamic States
 Pakistan necessitated a course correction in its foreign policy. For strategic as well as sentimental reasons, Pakistan focused its attention on the Islamic states of the Middle East. Although Afghanistan had been a troublesome neighbour since the independence of the subcontinental state, Pakistan maintained good relations with the other Muslim nations and it was to them that Bhutto turned in seeking a new mooring for Pakistani identity and purpose. Islamabad's re-orientation came at a propitious moment. Bhutto's emergence as the ruler of Pakistan coincided with both a renaissance in the world of Islam, and the strengthened reputation of the Persian Gulf-dominated Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Muslim nations were alive with activity and the oil producers among them enjoyed unprecedented leverage in international economic and financial circles. The Islamic states could neither be taken for granted nor forced into submissiveness. Moreover, Pakistan had long championed Muslim solidarity. Its work on behalf of the Muslim community (*ummah*) may have been more verbal than practical but it was now prepared to make a larger commitment of resources and services.

(Only three weeks after assuming the presidency, Bhutto visited Kabul where he began a dialogue with Afghan leaders on the status of relations between their two countries. In January 1972 he embarked on a 'Journey of Renaissance' a 10,000 mile odyssey of goodwill to Iran, Turkey, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Syria. In May and June he sought to complete the circuit, visiting Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Nigeria, Guinea, and Mauritania. The tour was aimed at establishing direct, personal, and intimate contact between Bhutto and the leaders of the Muslim countries. Its most immediate purpose, however, was psychological. It was keyed to impact on the Pakistani nation, to boost national morale in the wake of the dismemberment and humiliating loss to India. Bhutto's well-publicized tour demonstrated to Pakistanis they were not alone. But it also inaugurated a creative phase in Pakistani diplomacy and focused the government's attention on the advantages it might reap in a familiar, but also receptive environment. The Pakistan Foreign Office established the following guidelines for its upgraded policy towards the Muslim nations:

1. Pakistan considered Arab nationalism, Iranian nationalism, and Turkish nationalism no more antithetical to Islamic solidarity than Pakistani nationalism.

2. Pakistan remained scrupulously impartial in all inter-Arab disputes.
3. Pakistan followed the principle of 'bilateralism' in its relations with all nations, including the Islamic states. The government emphasized its intention to maintain friendly relations with one state or group of states without antagonizing others.
4. Pakistan intended to maintain relations with fraternal Islamic states irrespective of variations in political systems, international alliances or ideology.
5. Pakistan's relations with Muslim states would be expressed through the establishment of permanent international institutions.
6. Pakistan would promote the Arab cause at every opportunity and raise the issue of Palestine from a regional to a universal plane.
7. Pakistan would avoid becoming embroiled in conflicts between rival Muslim states but it would urge bilateral settlement of disputes, or provide good offices or mediation if called upon.
8. Pakistan would aid Muslim minorities residing in non-Muslim states and would request the Islamic nations to join in the effort.¹

Bhutto publicly renounced H.S. Suhrawardy's statement in 1956 that the Muslim countries of the Middle East were nothing more than zero plus zero. He likewise repudiated Ayub Khan's reaction to the Arab-Israeli War of 1967, calling it 'lukewarm and lackadaisical'. Pakistan, he declared, was committed to a diplomatic initiative that focused on a united approach to the Middle East problem. In the aftermath of the 1973 Ramadan War, therefore, the Prime Minister called for the convening of the Second Islamic Summit Conference, and with assistance from Saudi Arabia's King Faisal, it was held in Lahore on 22-24 February 1974.

The Islamic Summit brought together the rulers of thirty-five member states and the leaders of the Palestine Liberation Organization. Twenty-six states were represented by their monarchs, or heads of state or government. Prime Minister Bhutto, as host of the summit, presided over its deliberations. As Chairman for the summit, Bhutto set the least of which was the problem of Palestine and the Muslim desire to reclaim Jerusalem. The summit's objective, he reiterated,

¹ *Pakistan's Relations with the Islamic States: A Review*, Islamabad: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan, 21 February 1977, pp. 20-1.