

theme but it fit well with the political, economic, and security goals of Pakistan in the period after the establishment of Bangladesh.

The dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971 with the active support of India was the greatest political, military, and psychological setback to Pakistan during the 24 years of its independent existence, 1947-1971. In addition to the loss of its eastern wing, over ninety thousand soldiers and civilians were made prisoners of war and it had lost about 5000 miles of its territory to India in the western sector. In this "vulnerable" situation Pakistan looked towards the Middle East for moral, political, and economic support. In January 1972 the new civilian President of Pakistan (Z. A. Bhutto) visited eight Muslim countries. Later in May-June 1972, he paid visits to fourteen Muslim countries. The major goal of these visits was to inform these governments of Pakistan's stance on Bangladesh. Iraq recognized Bangladesh after the signing of the Simla Accord in July 1972. Several others waited till the process of normalization was well underway. Iran, Turkey, Libya, Jordan, the U.A.E., and Saudi Arabia extended recognition to Bangladesh only after it was recognized by Pakistan.¹¹

The decision to hold the second summit conference of the heads of states/governments of the O.I.C. at Lahore (Pakistan) in 1974 was to boost Pakistan's morale and underline the importance the Muslim world attached to this country. This support was extremely useful to Pakistan for counterbalancing India's military ascendancy in the regional power structure during the post-Bangladesh war period. It would be no exaggeration to suggest that the Muslim world's support of Pakistan helped to restore its confidence after the 1971 debacle and improved Pakistan's position during the settlement process of the problems resulting from the 1971 war.

The emphasis on pan-Islamism and identification with the Muslim world, especially the Middle East, has been beneficial to Pakistan in the economic field. There was hardly any direct financial assistance from the Middle Eastern states prior to 1972. Since then Pakistan has received soft credits, interest-free loans and financial grants from a number of oil-rich Middle Eastern states, especially Saudi Arabia, Iran (pre-revolution), Kuwait, the U.A.E. and Libya. By 1976-77 Pakistan had become one of the "prime recipients of aid" from oil producing countries.¹² Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E. have invested capital in industrial enterprises in Pakistan. The most important benefit of Pakistan's ties with the Middle East has been the absorption of Pakistani manpower in the oil-rich Gulf states and Libya.

This has reduced the pressure on the unemployed or under-employed mass of people on the domestic political system of Pakistan. The remittances from the Pakistanis working abroad have become the single largest source of foreign exchange earnings. The induction of the money earned in the Middle East into Pakistan has had a profound impact on the life style and consumption patterns of the concerned population and helped the middle-level business. But this has also generated new social tensions in the society. Attention has not been paid to the cumulative impact of all these developments (more funds, the changes in life style and social tension) on the political system.

Pakistan's shift towards the Middle East was also necessitated by the fact that the loss of East Pakistan meant the loss of quite a big market for Pakistani goods. Pakistan needed an alternate market for its products, which it found in the Middle East and the Gulf states. The export of agricultural products and industrial goods to these states increased eleven times during 1972-75.¹³ Pakistan's export increases during the following years made the Middle East and the Gulf states economically important to Pakistan.

The seventies have also seen a growing realization amongst the decision-makers of Pakistan and the Gulf states that their security is inter-dependent because of geographic proximity; the linkages that have developed between these states; and the sharing of views on the growing pressures on the region by the policies of the extra-regional powers, especially the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. Pakistan has neither entered into any security treaty with the Gulf states nor joined the newly formed Gulf Cooperation Council,¹⁴ but it has maintained close contacts on defense and security affairs at a bilateral level. A number of officers and men of the Pakistan military have been serving with the armed forces of several Gulf states and other Middle Eastern states since the late sixties and the seventies. Some of these states send their men for training in Pakistan's military institutions. Pakistan also supplied small arms and weapons to several Gulf/Middle Eastern states and provided 'useful help' to the Arab states during and after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. Pakistan also obtained some Western weapons through these Middle Eastern states.

The diplomatic support extended to Pakistan by the Muslim world in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was a source of great strength for a country whose security situation was gravely worsened by the event. The two meetings of Foreign Ministers

of the O.I.C. held in Pakistan in January 1980 and May 1980 and the Taif Summit of January 1981 demonstrated general support for Pakistan and the need for a political settlement of the Afghanistan crisis. The Muslim countries have also provided financial assistance for the maintenance of Afghan refugees in Pakistan. All external assistance (provided by the Muslim countries, other states and international organizations) comes to about 50% of the total expenses which the Pakistan Government has to bear for extending humanitarian assistance to the Afghan refugees.

What is evident is that in the seventies the changes within the region and the Muslim world were more conducive to the effective projection of Islamic identity and ideology in foreign policy. Moreover, there has been a greater convergence of the ideological, economic, and strategic foreign policy goals of Pakistan than was the case in the fifties. This enabled Pakistan to successfully employ its Islamic identity and pan-Islamism as core themes in its foreign policy, and improved Pakistan's stature in the international and regional systems in the post-1971 period. This new diplomacy was an asset in the domestic political context as well, and it is significant that Pakistan's foreign policy has not substantially altered, despite a major change in regime in 1977.

The New Stresses

The consensus which developed in the Muslim world in the seventies to work together on a common platform came under strain during 1980-81 due to the resurfacing of political polarisation in the Gulf region in the background of the Islamic revolution in Iran. The revolution brought into being a government in the Gulf region whose political philosophy and strategies were totally dissimilar to other conservative, monarchical and pro-American regimes of the area. The leaders of Iran often talked of spreading the message of the Islamic revolution outside the territorial boundaries of Iran. This perturbed the Gulf shiekhdoms which felt threatened by the anti-monarchy, mass-oriented, and radical Islamic character of the Iranian revolution. Thus, the containment of the spillover effects of the Iranian revolution became the major concern of the Gulf states. The contours of the new polarisation became clear during the course of the Iraq-Iran war (September 1980 to the present). Most pro-west monarchical

regimes of the Middle East joined hands with Iraq vis-a-vis Iran. Some of the states, i.e., Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Oman, Jordan and Sudan openly provided military and economic assistance to Iraq. Iran was able to obtain the support of the so-called radical Muslim states—Syria, Algeria and Libya.

These developments have cast a shadow on the pan-Islamic movement and undermined the ability of the O.I.C. to pursue goals of peace and cooperation among its member states. As for Pakistan, the new stresses in the Muslim world have created some difficulties in the projection of its ideology in foreign policy. Pakistan now finds it more difficult to maintain a balance in its relations with the 'conservative and pro-West' Muslim states and the 'radical' Muslim states. If anything, it has become identified with the conservative, monarchical and pro-American regimes of the Middle East and the Gulf, especially the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. This is quite evident from the number of diplomatic exchanges at the highest level between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia since 1978-79. The official and personal visits of General Zia-ul-Huq to Saudi Arabia outnumber his trips to other Middle Eastern states. This clear tilt towards the monarchical regimes in the Gulf, especially Saudi Arabia, can be partly explained with reference to the financial support Pakistan has received from these states, the conservative Islamic disposition of the present Pakistani regime, and the strong personal reverence General Zia-ul-Huq feels for the House of Saud. The growing proximity of their views on regional security and their ties with the U.S. in the field of defense and security also contributed towards the improved relations between them. On their part, the Saudis have declared their firm support for the independence and territorial integrity of Pakistan.¹⁵ They are reported to have agreed to provide funds to Pakistan for the purchase of F-16 aircraft from the U.S. during the next five years. Pakistan is reciprocating by providing several thousand military personnel to Saudi Arabia. The official sources disclosed in December 1982 that there were 1,500 men from the Air Force, 3,000 to 4,000 from the Army and a few hundred from the Navy whose services had been put at the disposal of Saudi Arabia.¹⁶ Unofficial sources place these figures at a higher level.

If the present trend continues—polarisation in the Muslim world and Pakistan's identification with the conservative Muslim states—Pakistan will run the risk of being embroiled in the regional and local conflicts of the Gulf area. As a result, its efforts to project

an Islamic identity and ideology in foreign policy may meet with disappointments similar to those faced in the fifties and the early sixties. Good relations with one set of Muslim states will adversely affect its relations with another, and different, set. Pan-Islamism will remain the major feature of Pakistan's foreign policy but a number of Muslim states will become skeptical of Pakistan's efforts to promote unity in the Muslim world.

NOTES

1. The Muslims of the South Asian Sub-continent expressed sympathy for the Ottoman empire on numerous occasions, i.e. the Russo-Turkish war (1877), the Greek-Turkish war (1897), the Italy-Turkish war (1911), the Balkan war (1912). Soon after the conclusion of World War I, the prospects of Turkey being stripped of its possessions by the Allied powers caused political agitation in India. This ultimately led to the Khilafat Movement and the Hijrat movement. In 1933, the Muslim League passed a resolution in its Delhi session criticising and condemning the British efforts to make Palestine the national home of the Jews. In the subsequent years (1933-1947) the Muslim League repeatedly supported the cause of the Palestinians vis-a-vis the Jews and the British.

2. S. M. Burke, *Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani Foreign Policies* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1972), p. 116.

Outlining the foundations of Pakistan's foreign policy, Liaquat Ali Khan stressed: "Our relations with the Muslim countries should not only be friendly, but brotherly, and that they should be made stronger every day because the mission of Pakistan can achieve its success only when we make other Muslim countries join it." (Speech on August 14, 1950.) M. Rafique Afzal (ed.), *Speeches and Statements of Quaid-i-Millat Liaquat Ali Khan 1941-1951* (Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan, 1967), p. 432.

3. *The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan*, 1956, Part III, directive principles of State Policy, Article 24: "The state shall endeavour to strengthen the bonds of unity among Muslim countries. . . ." *Ibid.*, 1962, part II, Chapter 2, Principles of Policy, No. 21: "The bonds of unity amongst Muslim countries should be preserved and strengthened." *Ibid.*, 1973 part II, Chapter 2, Principles of Policy, Article 40: "The State shall endeavor to preserve and strengthen fraternal relations among Muslim countries based on Islamic unity. . . ."

4. For details, see: Burke, *Mainspring*, pp. 134-135, Keith Callard, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, (2nd edition, New York Institute of Pacific Studies, 1959), pp. 27-29, Mohammad Ahsen Chaudhri, "Pakistan and the Muslim World," *Pakistan Horizon*, (Vol. X, No. 3, September 1957), pp. 156-166.

5. Gamal Abdel Nasser, *Egypt's Liberation: The Philosophy of Revolution* (Cairo: Government Printing Offices, n.d.), p. 51.

6. *Ibid.*, pp. 51-52, 53-54, 67-68.

7. S. M. Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis* (London: Oxford University Press, 1973, p. 204). For an analysis of the impact of Pakistan's participation in the West-sponsored pacts on its relations with the Middle East, see: Sisir Gupta, "Islam as a Factor in Pakistani Foreign Policy," in M. S. Rajan and Shivaji Ganguly (eds.), *Sisir Gupta: India and the International System* (New Delhi: Vikas, 1981), pp. 88-110.