PART IV

TYPES OF DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT

35

Public Diplomacy

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INTRODUCTION

Public diplomacy is a term, concept, practice and multidisciplinary field of study. As a diplomatic practice, which preceded its conceptual and scholarly foundations, it centers on diplomatic communication between political entities (kings in ancient times and nation-states today) and people (that is, publics), usually in foreign countries but, according to some accounts, also domestic publics. Like many other tools of diplomacy, public diplomacy continues to evolve in response to societal changes such as democratization, globalization and the communication's revolution, and it may well influence some of those changes (see also Chapter 44 in this Handbook). As a multidisciplinary field of study that inspires multiple definitions and practices that often go beyond those associated with diplomacy and diplomatic studies, public diplomacy is a blooming area of scholarship and practice.

This chapter argues that the evolution of public diplomacy can be usefully understood as comprising several conceptually related stages: traditional diplomacy; new diplomacy; and another stage that appears to present a more integrative approach. Perhaps controversially, it also argues that there is a domestic dimension to public diplomacy (directed to domestic civil society as publics, partners and actors), and that several governments' conceptualizations, which emphasize international publics, often contrast with their practices, which emphasize interaction with domestic publics. This more comprehensive approach sees public diplomacy's international and domestic dimensions as stepping stones on a continuum of public participation that is central to international policymaking and conduct. Finally, given the recent evolutions of public diplomacy mentioned above, the future of public diplomacy, especially its integrative evolution, is hard to predict without more theoretical and empirical research. This chapter thus traces the evolution of public diplomacy through its different stages (see Table 35.1) and concludes with some suggestions for future research on the integrative public diplomacy approach.

ORIGINS

One of the first uses of the term 'public diplomacy' was in an 1856 edition of *The Times*, where it was employed as a synonym for 'civility' to contrast that behavior with what might be seen as the less-than-civil posturing of US President Franklin Pierce (*The Times*, 1856: 6; Cull, 2008a: 19–24). This type of usage, however, fails to reflect the rich history of practice behind the term. The earliest evidence of public diplomacy's practice can be found in public discourses from before the state became the primary geopolitical actor. For example, diplomatic messages and treaties dating back to 2500 BC have been found in the Middle East, with royal envoys exchanging gifts and kings promoting relations via early 'city diplomacy', as well as cases of ancient Greece's negotiations of treatments, and Roman diplomacy imposing its objectives on, client states (Cohen, 2013: 19, 23).

Understanding the origins of public diplomacy practice, however, is determined more by recognizing that it is an intrinsic part of the ongoing democratization of international policymaking and conduct, rather than by trying to find an exact point of origin. Democratization processes often move from more indirect (for example, electing representatives and parliamentary representation) to more direct forms of participation by people. Although it is often forgotten that public diplomacy has non-democratic origins too (including Soviet practices after the revolution, or powers with non-democratic features such as China investing heavily in public diplomacy),[2] it thrives in a context of participatory democracy that emphasizes widespread constituent participation in governmental systems and policymaking. Yet despite participatory democracy's past manifestations, such as the Iroquois Confederacy, Athens' civic gatherings (albeit limited by the exclusion of women and slaves) and the Swiss Cantons of the Middle Ages (Roussopoulos and Benello, 2015), concrete practices were not evident until the twentieth century, when practical implementations of participatory democracy began again (such as its promotion and use as a major theme by the American Left in the 1960s) (Miller, 2011).

Public diplomacy, understood as the practice of states' one-way communication with foreign publics, appears partly to coincide with the evolution of twentieth-century participatory democracy, especially in North America. It is also associated with another twentieth-century development, the two world wars. During the Great War of 1914–18, public diplomacy was often used to inform populations about the war and influence foreign publics. The term was adopted as a more modern mantle and alternative to the by then discredited term 'propaganda', which was seen as systematically manipulating people's cognitions and behavior to serve the intent of the propagandist (Auerbach and Castronovo, 2013).

Modern use of the term of public diplomacy is associated with the United States, even though it is clear that it has earlier origins. Scholars continue to associate the term with the description coined in 1965 by Dean Edmund A. Gullion of Tufts University's Fletcher School as the 'transnational flow of information and ideas' and his view that:

> […] public diplomacy deals with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy; the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with those of another; the reporting of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; communication between those whose job is communication, as between diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the processes of inter-cultural communications.[3]

Use of the term, however, did not come about without hiccups. For some, putting 'public' and 'diplomacy' together seemed contradictory. The vision of diplomacy as the relationships between governments, with only states being diplomatic actors and non-state actors' roles being largely ignored, was certainly not conducive to public diplomacy. The 1961

Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations confirmed that diplomacy had little to do with interacting with the ordinary public (United Nations, 2005).

Key Points

- Public diplomacy is a practice, term and field of study. Its practice as diplomatic engagement with people naturally preceded the term and studies on it.
- Understanding the origins of public diplomacy practice is determined more by recognizing that it is an intrinsic part of the ongoing democratization of international policymaking and conduct, rather than by trying to find an exact point of origin.
- Although having earlier origins, public diplomacy is associated with the United States and particularly the Edward R. Murrow Center of Public Diplomacy at the Fletcher School, and encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy.

TRADITIONAL PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Traditional diplomacy evolved in several stages. In the first half of the twentieth century, public diplomacy was seen as an offshoot

Table 35.1 Summary of the stages in public diplomacy

Traditional PD: twentieth century	BEYOND NEW = INTEGRATIVE PD = The best of both Complementarities instead of Contradictories	New PD: twenty-first century
• Clear boundaries between foreign and domestic, states and civil society		• Permeable and non-existent boundaries, power diffusion
• State-to-state diplomacy		• Polycentric diplomacy: above, below, and beyond the state
• Established rules and norms		• Emerging rules and norms
• Fewer diplomatic actors, fewer people, fewer issues		• More diplomatic actors, more people, more issues
• Industrial age technologies: print, radio, television		• Digital age technologies: traditional and social media
• Hierarchical, state-centered, top-down		• Networked, horizontal
• Information dissemination, message design and delivery		• Relational, collaborative: message exchange, dialogue and mutual understanding, and collaborative policy networks
• One-to-many (unidirectional)		• Many-to-many (multidirectional)
• Less information, more attention		• More information, less attention
• Foreign ministries: gatekeepers, primary actors in foreign affairs		• Whole-of-government diplomacy: foreign ministries as subsets, important but not primary
• War on the battlefield: between state-actors		• Armed conflict among the people: between state and non-state actors
• Cultural barriers		• Incorporate cultural diversity
• Public diplomacy is episodic and peripheral to diplomacy		• Public diplomacy as enduring and central to diplomacy
• Government-to-people public diplomacy		• Many state, regional, sub-state and civil-society actors in public diplomacy
• Passive audience (indirect participation)		• Active audience (direct participation)
• Foreign publics		• Foreign and domestic actors as publics, partners, independent actors
• Persuade by 'wars of ideas': meta-narratives		• Understand, influence, engage and collaborate in global public spheres: multiple narratives
• Get the message right, pre-formed and static message		• Understand what others perceive, co-created and dynamic
• Shaping images of the sender		• Influencing policy agendas by shaping policy attitudes
• Dominated by US and UK experiences		• US, European and (later) non-Western experiences

Sources: Gregory (2014: 29); Zaharna (2010: 113); Cull (2009: 14)

of diplomacy and by some as a less-biased type of propaganda. During the world wars, it amounted to one-way dissemination of information mainly aimed at influencing domestic and foreign publics, and disinterested in dialogue or relationship-building. As well as the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany propagating their respective ideologies, public diplomacy was largely dominated by the United States (Committee on Public Information) and Great Britain (British Propaganda Office). These agencies were created with the aim of influencing and mobilizing domestic publics via available media about American and British participation in the First World War, creating enthusiasm for the war effort and enlisting public support against foreign attempts to undercut American and British war aims (see Arndt, 2005; Taylor, 1999).

Public diplomacy flourished during the second half of the twentieth century, including during the Cold War (1947–91). Both the United States and the Soviet Union (Caute, 2004) supplemented their own programs through support of their respective proxies in the developing world (Africa and Asia). The intent of public diplomacy was not only to inform and justify actions to both publics, but also to convince the enemy of their ideological, economic and political convictions.

Public diplomacy gradually adopted new methods and forms of media, such as cultural and broadcasting activities, and involved new – although still state-sponsored – stakeholders. As well as the most listened to international radio stations in the world – such as the BBC World Service, Voice of America, *Radio France Internationale* and *Deutsche Welle* – the English version of the Russian political newspaper *Pravda* was notorious in the West as the official mouthpiece of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Western nongovernment actors, such as former practitioners and scholars, contributed to a broadening of knowledge about public diplomacy, and additional expertise was derived from the range of promotional activities undertaken by the United States Information Agency (USIA) from 1953–99. For example, USIA undertook a wide range of overseas information programs and aimed to promote mutual understanding between the United States and other nations by conducting educational and cultural activities (of which the best known are the Fulbright exchange program and International Visitors program) (Cull, 2008b).[4]

Traditional public diplomacy in the late twentieth century thus incorporated a wide variety of practices, such as information management and cultural promotion. Cultural institutes across Europe (such as Germany's *Goethe Institut*, the UK's British Council and France's *Alliance Française*) organized cultural events and exchange programs. European countries, in contrast to the United States, developed a more proactive and geographically and thematically targeted style of public diplomacy. The aim was to promote international cultural relations, mutual understanding and knowledge in a less heavy-handed manner.

An important conceptual development with policy implications was made in the 1980s by US academic and former official Joseph Nye. Nye coined the concept 'soft power', contrasting it with hard power (that is, the use of coercive diplomacy, threat of military intervention, or implementation of economic sanctions). Nye later developed the concept in greater detail, when in the Preface of his 2004 book he suggested that

> [Soft power] is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals, and policies. When our policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, our soft power is enhanced (Nye, 2004: x).

Public diplomacy practice and literature have been significantly inspired and shaped by Nye's writings on the connections between public diplomacy and soft power, as public diplomacy is seen as one of soft power's key instruments. Annual soft-power surveys, such as by *Monocle* magazine, are nowadays

much in demand, with Germany apparently leading the pack in 2013. In Asia there is much interest in soft power and public diplomacy. In Europe, EU leaders and academics are keen to use the concept in describing how the EU used a 'soft (normative/ethical) approach' to enlargement, handling its international relations and solving (internal) differences (see Landaburu, 2006; Manners, 2002).

Globalization and the communication's revolution were the most important twentieth-century developments affecting the practice of traditional public diplomacy. Technological advances in communications – such as digital technology and its far-reaching variety of applications – substantially influenced thinking about the methods, risks, promise and limitations of traditional public diplomacy. In reaction to the vicissitudes of the twentieth century, there was further growth in public diplomacy practice with these technologies and methods coming into play, which became internationally known as the 'new public diplomacy'.

NEW PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND 'BEYOND THE NEW'

Twenty-first-century public diplomacy, or what is now called 'new public diplomacy', has several origins. Many in the academic community called for governments to update public practices in light of societal changes. European scholars joined the US-dominated debate about such issues as the impacts of globalization, increased online and offline mobility, the growing number of diplomatic actors and the insertion of domestic publics into an area typically reserved for officials. The call for change was also partly a counter-reaction to US diplomacy and public diplomacy, which had been forged in the heat of the 9/11 'war on terror' and was dominated by considerations of national security. It was also inspired by forward-looking studies by a new generation of academics and by some countries' advanced public diplomacy practices. The Canadian government, for instance, had been influenced by the 1997 International Campaign to Ban Landmines, led by non-state actors and domestic civil society, to support an international treaty banning landmines.

In European public diplomacy relative newcomers, such as the supranational institution of the European Union (EU) and sub-states, challenged traditional practices, for example through their introspective focus on domestic audiences and not just international publics. To a certain extent, they forced nation-states out of their comfort zone. For example, sub-states' public diplomacy can aim to create a distance from the main state and build a different – even competitive – perception abroad, especially if independence referenda are on the horizon. The Public Diplomacy Council of Catalonia (previously the *Patronat Catalunya Món*), for instance, is a public–private consortium set up by the Catalan government to promote international awareness of Catalonia – and especially its distinctiveness from Spain – through economic, digital and citizens' diplomacy with other countries. The EU's public diplomacy may differ in scope, purpose and complexity from its members (Cross and Melissen, 2013) and its drive for unity and a collaborative image abroad may seem threatening to nations if this chips away at members' sovereignty. However, some sub-national governments, such as California and municipalities in Asia, have shown that collaboration on public diplomacy with nation-states is within reach (such as on climate change and new security issues) (see Wang, 2006). Moreover, apart from the EU, other international organizations with a large public diplomacy department, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), are laboratories for collaborative and multi-actor public diplomacy. Seib argues that supranational institutions have potential if they can continue to deliver benefits to their members while respecting their distinctiveness (Seib, 2014).

The 'new' prefix for public diplomacy has rapidly achieved traction, and it has helped the field and practice of public diplomacy to bloom and crystallize twenty-first-century public diplomacy's key normative characteristics. Contemporary public diplomacy needs to – or should – encompass at least two features: first, a multi-actor approach, with many actors above and below the level of national government and different types of nongovernmental actors at home and abroad; and second, the formation of relations between them through dialogue and networking activities. With regard to digital applications that need to be incorporated into new public diplomacy, this concerns the 'internet moment' in international policy, involving an amalgam of digital diplomacy applications, some more effective than others. The United States invests heavily in what it terms twenty-first-century statecraft, with multi-language Twitter feeds, Facebook accounts and participation in other social media networks, combined with many other actions, such as the Civil Society 2.0 initiative.[5] A dark side also exists to digital communication, as shown by Islamic State extremists whose members' medieval brutality is equaled only by the sophistication of their communications. They have mastered the use of state-of-the-art videos, ground images shot from drones and multilingual Twitter messages intended to appeal to youths, recruit fighters and intimidate enemies (Shane and Hubbard, 2014).

As well as by increased digitalization, a new public diplomacy approach is reinforced by the involvement of non-state actors: religious actors; sub-state units; international, multinational and nongovernmental organizations; multinational corporations; and individuals. The idea of non-state public diplomacy is encouraged by academic work that reflects governance tendencies to include civil society (Edwards, 2011; Levi-Faur, 2012; Hochstetler, 2013). This work is reinforced by examining the role of non-state organizations such as Greenpeace, Amnesty International and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, and the role of individuals, including Nelson Mandela (after leaving office) and Martin Luther King. Unintentional or not, this emphasis on the role of non-state actors in public diplomacy has divided the governmental and nongovernmental spheres, because it has pushed non-state actors onto the main stage and has challenged the legitimacy of states and their outdated structures, methods and techniques (Bieler, 2000; Sending and Neumann, 2006; Hocking, 2012).

Another approach that stimulated the role of non-state actors in new public diplomacy is the broader notion of 'polylateralism', set in motion by Geoffrey Wiseman (Wiseman, 2004 and 2010). Polylateralism refers to a third dimension in diplomacy, in addition to bilateralism and multilateralism. It involves the conduct of relations between official – such as a state, several states acting together, or a state-based international organization – and at least one unofficial non-state entity. In this view, state and non-state actors develop regular diplomatic relations, including reporting, communication, negotiation and representation activities, without 'mutual recognition as sovereign, equivalent entities' being necessary (Wiseman, 2010: 27).

Considering non-state actors as public diplomacy actors is widely accepted when governments consult them and develop partnerships with them. The idea that they operate independently from states as public diplomacy actors remains contested and the subject of debate among scholars and practitioners. Non-state actors are generally categorized as diplomatic actors if they act as an agent or on behalf of a government. If they act independently (without the government), they are often considered governance actors serving public interest (Gregory, 2016: 8–13,18,19). Other less actor and goal-oriented criteria are process-oriented, implying that whether the actor performing public diplomacy is or is not a state is less relevant than the legitimacy and effectiveness of any given actor serving (inter)national public interests (Cooper et al., 2008; La Porte, 2012).

'Non-state diplomacy' has largely become integrated into the new public diplomacy approach and is challenging traditional diplomacy's boundaries. This is most obvious in the proposition of a public diplomacy 'for and by the public', often referred to as people-to-people or citizen diplomacy (Mueller, 2009) (see Chapter 42 in this Handbook). This is often considered an advanced stage of new public diplomacy, as it is closely related to long-term relationship-building and intercultural relations, with the role of government less clearly present (Huijgh, 2011a). However, investments in people-to-people initiatives remain fragile. For example, despite attempts by some Israeli and Palestinian citizen groups to bridge differences, military conflict can override people-to-people efforts.

As the new public diplomacy approach and people-to-people focus become more prevalent, awareness of domestic citizens' roles surfaces. The domestic dimension of public diplomacy must be understood within this broader context and public diplomacy's evolution over time (Huijgh, 2011b and 2012). An initial aversion to including domestic citizens in the conception of public diplomacy remains, however, because of the (US-influenced) tradition and now outdated definition of public diplomacy as directed toward foreign publics only, even if public diplomacy practices in these countries show involvement by domestic non-state actors. In the virtually connected and interdependent world of today, this view is thus open to challenge. Some newcomers, such as supranational organizations, substates and Asian countries, that have learnt from predecessors' pitfalls, have had less difficulty than Western nation-states including a domestic dimension in public diplomacy.

Despite the risk of involving domestic publics in public diplomacy action as a purely political tool or for electoral gains, the benefits are clear: namely, creating public understanding and support for a government's international policy, substantiating a government's outreach to foreign publics and increasing its outside knowledge; and thus consolidating overall credibility, legitimacy and efficiency at home and abroad. Among the examples are the popular speaker programs (the Dutch 'In Dialogue with the MFA', India's distinguished lecture series and Indonesia's Foreign Policy Breakfast Forum).

Including a domestic dimension in public diplomacy does not separate the domestic and international components; rather, it highlights that there is a holistic/integrative approach to public involvement at home and abroad. In this more comprehensive approach, public diplomacy's international and domestic dimensions can be seen as stepping stones on a continuum of public participation (including traditional and new practices implemented at varying speeds) that is central to international policymaking and conduct. The degree to which specific publics (through their expertise, effectiveness and legitimacy) can become important governmental partners prevails over whether they are international or domestic (Huijgh, 2012).

Another aspect of new public diplomacy is the multidisciplinary embracing of the term. As well as diplomatic studies, communication science scholarship has helped to shape the study of public diplomacy by providing insights into the characteristics of its practice, including evaluation, engagement, advocacy and opinion research. Earlier groundbreaking conceptualizations – such as Walter Lippmann's 'public opinion' (1997 [1922]), Jürgen Habermas's 'public sphere' (1962) and Manuel Castell's 'network society' (1996) – had provided a broader perspective and foundation for public diplomacy research on bottom–up dialogic models of engagement, networks and global civil society's role. Furthermore, public diplomacy scholarship now investigates a series of sub-categories, such as public relations, strategic communication and nation-branding (Gregory, 2008: 274–90; Huijgh et al., 2013). Communication studies influenced thinking about public diplomacy to such an extent that academics from this discipline sometimes equate public diplomacy with communication, or consider

it as an end in itself. In contrast, diplomatic studies scholars usually consider public diplomacy as one of many communication tools for achieving the goal of international policy cooperation.

While diplomacy and communication studies may provide the majority of insights, other disciplines, such as the behavioral sciences and security studies, also mold new public diplomacy. They provide seeds of thought and conceptual frameworks, but also different angles from which to study public diplomacy's facets. This multidisciplinary approach not only influences the body and nature of the literature, but also adds to the credibility and legitimacy of the research field.

The notion of public diplomacy that goes beyond new public diplomacy is often labeled as 'beyond the new' public diplomacy. It originates in scholars' reactions to the over-juxtaposition of the new public diplomacy with traditional public diplomacy, and attempts to find conceptual clarity and ways of thinking about the future of public diplomacy (Melissen, 2013: 440–2). Other efforts aim at untangling the new public diplomacy approach from its normative newness and vagueness, by providing more concrete insights on networks (the structure), collaboration (the process) and relations (competitiveness, and how they can be leveraged for collaboration) (Zaharna et al., 2013). An essential advancement is the gradual shift from a debate dominated by the nature of actors toward their relationships and patterns of interaction. This recent scholarship recognizes that the 'new' versus 'traditional' categories are rather sterile, that the overlaps between them are largely ignored and suffer from a strong normative judgment.

Key Points

- Twentieth-century public diplomacy, or traditional public diplomacy, is conceptualized as information-messaging, cultural projection and international reputation management. Twenty-first-century diplomacy, or new public diplomacy, is built upon the idea of the formation of relations through dialogue and networking activities by many actors above and below the level of national government and different types of non-governmental actors at home and abroad.
- As the new public diplomacy focus on the role of non-state actors becomes more prevalent, awareness of domestic citizens' roles surfaces. Including a domestic dimension in public diplomacy does not separate the domestic and international components; rather, it highlights that there is a holistic approach to public involvement at home and abroad.
- The 'beyond the new' public diplomacy is a label originating in scholars' reactions to the over-juxtaposition of 'traditional' and 'new' public diplomacy, which stresses complementarities over compartments.

FUTURE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: AVENUES FOR RESEARCH

In thinking about the future of public diplomacy and further adjusting it to the contemporary context, one of the most productive scholarly areas is the integrative/comprehensive or holistic approach, which reflects the more fluid context wherein public diplomacy acquires shape today. This is partly also a reaction to the unveiling of (mis)leading assumptions influencing twenty-first-century diplomacy and new public diplomacy (Hocking, 2012: 73–92), caused by categorical thinking that focuses on rigid pre-existing categories (such as hierarchies/networks, old/new, domestic/foreign, state/non-state) and highlighting differences rather than possible overlaps and commonalities, especially in public diplomacy research. The integrative approach is thought to have the potential to temper categorical thinking in (public) diplomacy and promote complementarities between public diplomacy's past and present. As recently formulated by Hocking et al. (2012: 4), it stresses the need to combine several outlooks, including: change and continuity (pre-modern, modern and post-modern structures and processes); old and new

elements; agendas and arenas (domestic and international policy, development, defense and diplomacy, and local, national and global issues); interaction between actors (within the state, below and above, and non-state actors at home and abroad); and integration within the diplomatic process and structures (public diplomacy in diplomatic practice, a whole-of-government national diplomatic system).

Diplomatic studies' adoption of holistic approaches partly aims at reinserting diplomacy, or reclaiming the practice of public diplomacy and the 'public' dimension that was emphasized by communication studies. Reclaiming public diplomacy is necessary, because its usage has expanded so much that it has become a generic term, without a particular focus. Public diplomacy seems to have become a victim of its own success. Moreover, for some scholars (Gregory, 2014: 6–7; 2016: 6–8), public diplomacy has become the heartbeat of all diplomatic actors' thoughts and actions, and therefore has less value as a separate term and conceptual subset of diplomacy. Consequentially, it is gradually defined as diplomacy's public dimension.

While the holistic approach holds promise, it remains more rhetoric than reality. For it to become widespread practice rather than an ideal, scholars and practitioners need avenues to shape it further and put it into practice. This chapter thus modestly suggests some of the many potential paths for exploring and researching the integrative approach in the future, such as suggestions to include non-state actors and build upon the digital dimension in the integrative research, study the use of applied communication and horizontal management techniques to orchestrate an amalgam of actors, and theoretically analyze the integrative approach in a Constructivist International Relations frame of thought. The chapter also encourages further exploration of the integrative approach through studying empirical cases – that of collaboration between the emerging powers – that goes beyond non-geographical groupings and regional views.

The first suggestion above entails the actors and a digital dimension in integrative public diplomacy. Namely, alongside understanding how agencies of state-based diplomacy are adapting to change, it is equally important to understand non-state actors' communication patterns and strategies in facing the challenges posed by integrative diplomacy. While clearly acknowledging the importance of non-state actors, analysis so far has mainly focused on state-related diplomatic mechanisms in relation to a rapidly evolving landscape where growing involvement by international non-state entities is critical (Hocking et al., 2013). Non-state actors can contribute to a balanced public diplomacy strategy that integrates agenda-setting, narrative elaboration and interaction with other players. In driving the development of new strategies for communication and influence, engagement techniques and the creation of opportunities for dialogue, non-state actors can in turn contribute to putting the integrative diplomacy approach further into practice, although this will require further exploration. While non-state actors are becoming more influential in international policymaking, digital innovations are meanwhile revolutionizing the institutionalized modes of communication. This is a future challenge for state and non-state actors alike, as it demands a more integrative approach of the policy agenda, rules and norms, and roles and relationships in diplomacy. The digital dimension of public diplomacy is increasingly attracting attention, but poses a steep learning curve and needs further exploration that focuses on the practical applications of information and communications technology for diplomacy, instead of worrying about the technicalities (Bjola & Holmes 2015; Slotman, 2014).

The second suggestion is that – with a myriad of actors involved and public diplomacy employed in governmental departments other than foreign affairs (development, defense, environment and health, etc.) – public diplomacy becomes a whole-of-government responsibility. To realize this ideal, questions

not only arise about who should lead and why, but also about how to manage all these international policy-related public involvement activities. Insights from applied communication studies can contribute to methods for managing the vast array of intra- and interdepartmental public diplomacy activities conducted at home and abroad.

For example, 'integrated corporate communication' is one path to explore managing public diplomacy at the whole-of-government level (Van Riel, 2011 and 2012). Applied to public diplomacy, organizational communication is useful for building long-term relationships with foreign and domestic publics. Management communication is useful for preventing fragmentation, by coordinating the increasing number of different state and non-state actors engaged in public diplomacy. Finally, marketing communication instruments and short-term management activity can contribute to the organization of informational messaging and gathering, although they will be less effective in enhancing the process of dialogue (Huijgh, 2011b).

Another path to explore is holistic management practices. This starts from an acknowledgement that organizations act within the context of both their external and internal environments (including foreign and domestic actors and policies, and broader power diffusions). The aim is not to simplify relationships among different systems, but to fathom the complexity and illuminate opportunities and trouble spots. The criteria for success depend less on structure, sequential plans, rules and certainty and more on adaptability, process audits, simultaneous assessment and movement, a concentration on values, quality of interaction, managing interdependent relationships and flexibility (Marshak, 1995; Witchel, 2003; Knight, 2004).

Moreover, these techniques are not only useful for governments, but are also relevant for international non-state actors trying to manage their members from various societies (the so-called whole-of-society level). Such techniques, in essence, relate to attempts to solve the broader riddle of public diplomacy as part of a more systematic networked future diplomacy, and the way in which international relations will be understood and practiced in the years to come.

The third suggestion mentioned above is to reinforce the theoretical body of the holistic approach with theoretical insights from the discipline of International Relations, in particular Constructivist thought. When considering public diplomacy as a multidimensional and increasingly integrative endeavor, 'holistic constructivism' is noteworthy (see Nia, 2001: 282–83; Reus-Smit, 2001: 201; Bozdaglioglu, 2007: 142). It provides a framework through which a more efficacious and logical integrated approach to the public involvement of state and non-state actors at home and abroad might support further research. Some Constructivist scholars (Sending et al., 2011: 540) are convinced that how states behave and define their goals is determined by the multiple ideational and intersubjectively shared frameworks within which they operate – a central claim of Constructivism. Over time, changes in these frameworks will result in the development of new organizing principles between states, potentially reshaping the parameters of diplomatic practice, such as the integrative approach is.

The fourth suggestion is to investigate the future of the integrative approach in more empirical settings, such as those surrounding emerging powers that have the potential to collaborate beyond geographical and regional views. Views from other regions inform thinking about the future of public diplomacy. Driven by global competition for the attention of publics, many Asian countries in the 1990s began to entertain the concept of soft power and possible connections with its application through public diplomacy. Subsequently, some scholars sought to delineate East Asian from Western public diplomacy, stressing its more strategic nature and greater recognition of the regional and domestic dimension (Lee and Melissen, 2011; Melissen and Sohn, 2015). China's approach to soft power and public diplomacy has overshadowed literature on

other Asian approaches, and can be characterized in several ways, namely: the importance the Chinese government attaches to public diplomacy as an offensive and defensive instrument; its hierarchical, state-centered strategic approach; its interconnection with international policymaking and conduct; and its attention to both the domestic and international dimensions. China's rhetoric on relational public diplomacy policies does not, however, always fit with its concrete practices at both the international and domestic levels (D'Hooghe, 2014: 353–55).

As well as regional views, public diplomacy has also been informed recently by insights from geographically disparate groupings of countries, such as the 'emerging powers', which are bound by their economic status rather than geographic location. Several terms cover the notion of emerging powers, mainly from the fields of finance and economics, with the goal of creating a list of the most promising markets for investors around the world, such as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, coined by Goldman Sachs analyst Jim O'Neill) and acronyms including MINT (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey) and CIVETS (Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey and South Africa) that have followed it. Emerging powers are classified according to their economic performance (steady rapid growth in GDP, increasing foreign direct investment and trade activities), international policies in regional and international affairs (sovereignty claims, regional or global leadership, fulfilling responsibilities in international affairs) and their stage of domestic political development (democratization, civil rights movements, etc.) (see Chapter 23 in this Handbook).

It is within this last criterion that the development of public diplomacy as an expression of international policy democratization would logically be situated. Yet within the group of emerging powers, the degree of economic power does not necessarily correlate with the degree of democracy, public diplomacy and the role of civil society. Emerging powers such as Indonesia, Brazil, South Korea and South Africa are relatively young democracies. Indonesia and Turkey have both preferred to use democratization rather than economic growth as their dominant public diplomacy narrative at home and abroad, though this recently changed (Huijgh 2016a, 2016b).

However, increased economic growth does not always lead to increased public diplomacy as an expression of democratization. China stresses its economic success as its dominant public diplomacy theme, thus both attracting regional and Western countries to China and raising their concerns about China's future intentions. Nevertheless, despite differences, there seems to be an arguably positive relationship between increasing economic performance and growing investment in public diplomacy. Emerging powers increasingly seek a greater voice and engagement in international affairs, partly to support their economic relations with other countries, and public diplomacy is seen as one of the tools for achieving this objective.

Yet, being part of an international grouping does not necessarily result in more strategic partnerships or an increase of public diplomacy among members, although Turkey and Indonesia sought public diplomacy alliances on interfaith problems and interreligious relations. The heterogeneity of public diplomacy styles among a grouping of emerging powers need not, however, challenge unified action. The MIKTA (Mexico, Indonesia, (South) Korea, Turkey and Australia) group of emerging middle powers, established in 2013, for instance, aims to pursue joint public diplomacy, as became clear at the first MIKTA academic seminar in August 2014 in Mexico City. It can be hoped that this is but the dawn of more empirical cases and greater study on integrative public diplomacy in the future.

Key Points

- While the increasingly promoted integrative approach among scholars holds promise for tempering categorical thinking and combining past

and present outlooks, it is more rhetoric than reality. For it to become a widespread practice rather than an ideal, scholars and practitioners need more conceptual and empirical case-study research to solidify this approach.

- Some suggestions for exploring the integrative approach are to: (1) increasingly research the role and contribution of non-state actors and use of digital tools; (2) theoretically analyze the integrative approach in a constructive frame of thought; (3) study the use of applied communication and horizontal management techniques to orchestrate the amalgam of actors involved and put into practice the public diplomacy part of a more systematic networked diplomacy; (4) study empirical cases – of collaboration among the emerging powers – that go beyond non-geographical groupings and regional views.

CONCLUSION

This chapter examines the evolution of public diplomacy practice and its future trends. The term 'public diplomacy' has become a generic concept, having grown popular in conjunction with the increase in actors, issues and methods that it encompasses. The explosion of attention given to public diplomacy scholarship and practice has transformed it into a multidisciplinary field, molded mainly through communication and diplomatic studies. The practice of public diplomacy precedes and nourishes it as a term and field of research. It is a reflection of democratization tendencies in international policy and diplomacy, and is subject to changing contexts, conceptualizations and practices. It is thus place- and time-related and often presented as a fluid transition from traditional, to the new, and beyond the new public diplomacy.

Looking to the future, recent scholarship advocates more holistic and integrative conceptualizations that emphasize the complementarities between these pre-existing categories and their insights. However, more concrete empirical case-study analysis and a larger theoretical body are required to validate ideals and implement them.

NOTES

1 The author would like to thank the numerous public diplomacy scholars with whom conversations on this topic provided enriching insights, and is particularly indebted to Jan Melissen and Pauline Kerr for their invaluable feedback on this chapter.

2 The author is grateful to the reviewer for this comment.

3 See 'What is diplomacy?', http://fletcher.tufts.edu/Murrow/Diplomacy

4 See http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/usia/usiahome/factshe.htm

5 See more at http://www.state.gov/statecraft/cs20/index.htm

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36

Quiet and Secret Diplomacy

William Maley

INTRODUCTION

The vast bulk of diplomatic activity goes unpublicised and largely unnoticed. Why, then, should 'quiet' and 'secret' diplomacy be singled out for special attention? The answers to this question are complex, but four elements stand out. First, negotiations carried out behind a veil of secrecy or under a cloak of silence can result in *faits accomplis* from which innocent people may be the main losers. Second, an alleged need for secrecy may be used to protect vested or sectional interests. Third, in democratic systems where ordinary people enjoy the right periodically to change their rulers without bloodshed, informed decisions may be possible only if voters have full access to information about what their rulers have been doing. Fourth, if most diplomatic activity is carried out in secret, one may lose the ability to learn lessons from past successes and failures as a way of improving diplomatic performance in the future. These factors do not in and of themselves establish an insuperable barrier to the use of quiet or secret diplomacy, but they do create the need for careful evaluation of the circumstances in which secret or quiet diplomacy may or may not be deemed desirable.

At the outset, it is important to clarify what we mean by 'quiet' and 'secret' diplomacy. The former is perhaps the easier to pin down. 'Quiet diplomacy' is simply diplomacy that is not advertised by the participants. Those participants may be quite willing if quizzed about it to admit that it has been taking place, and perhaps to supply information about its content or substance, but they do not go out of their way to draw attention to it. This may be because they think that the issues involved are arcane or technical, and of little interest to a wider public; but it may also be because they see some virtue in handling issues away from the glare of publicity. As we shall see shortly, certain types of issues can potentially benefit very much from such discretion. The idea of 'secret diplomacy' is rather more complex. Secrecy needs to be distinguished

from confidentiality. Almost any diplomatic engagement is likely to have some elements which are highly confidential. Delegations acting on instructions from their capitals will not share their instructions with other delegations (except by accidentally leaving documents unsecured). This is not, however, a manifestation of 'secret diplomacy'. Furthermore, that some discussions may take place behind closed doors does not of itself mean that 'secret diplomacy' is occurring. If this were the case, virtually all diplomatic engagement would potentially qualify as secret diplomacy. Rather, 'secret diplomacy' arises when the *very fact of a diplomatic engagement's taking place* is itself concealed.

This chapter is divided into four sections. The first offers a brief overview of secrecy and diplomacy, noting that the very nature of the world in which diplomacy emerged meant that most activities associated with diplomacy remained hidden from most people. The second looks at a range of arguments advanced to defend secret diplomacy, while the third canvasses arguments critical of secrecy. The fourth sets out some of the challenges to secret diplomacy in the twenty-first century.

SOME HISTORY

Secrecy has a venerable history, especially in the sphere of international affairs. 'Secrecy', wrote de Vera in the seventeenth century, 'is expressly recommended in all of the actions of the perfect ambassador; it is the foundation of the edifice, the helm of the ship, the bridle on the horse, and the cause of success in that at which one is aiming' (quoted in Berridge 2004: 91). In his famous study *The Torment of Secrecy*, Edward Shils, defining secrecy as 'the compulsory withholding of knowledge, reinforced by the prospect of sanctions for disclosure', argued that '*Raison d'état* as a barrier to publicity and a generator of secrecy obtained its maximum power in the domain of foreign policy and, above all, of military policy' (Shils 1956: 25, 26). Yet until relatively modern times, information could be obtained and spread only in slow and laborious ways, even if it was not secret. Whilst the interception of documents or the interrogation of suspects are far from modern developments – Sir Francis Walsingham pioneered these techniques when pursuing Papist plots during the reign of Elizabeth I (Alford 2011) – it was only in much more recent periods that technological innovation, beginning with the telegraph, the telephone and the camera, provided the means by which information obtained by piercing a veil of secrecy could be put to rapid operational use. This was of course so critically important during the Second World War, when automated code-breaking came into its own, that it is easy to forget that the preservation of secrecy was much less of an issue until twentieth-century developments made the violation of secrecy much more feasible.

With the increase in risk that secrecy would be compromised, measures came to be taken in both domestic and international spheres to underpin secrecy and confidentiality. In a number of states, domestic legislation for the protection of 'official secrets' came to be enacted, legislation of which the British *Official Secrets Act 1889* was a prototype. Furthermore, official legislation could be augmented by mechanisms amounting to self-censorship of the press; for example, within the British Commonwealth there developed the mechanism of so-called 'D Notices', first used in the United Kingdom in 1912, by which the government was able to signal to the press that a particular issue was of national security importance and therefore should not be covered. 'D Notices' were for the most part not legally enforceable, and in some countries it would have been difficult to find any constitutional basis for their promulgation; nonetheless, they proved effective means for preserving secrecy in respect of certain issues. Beyond domestic practices, diplomatic law preserved confidentiality and

secrecy indirectly via the immunities (see Chapter 16 in this Handbook) granted to diplomatic premises and means of communication that were eventually codified in the 1961 *Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations*. The inviolability of diplomatic communications can be defended as a matter of principle, but even more so on the pragmatic basis that without such protections, much valuable diplomatic intercourse simply would not take place.

This is not to say that these principles of diplomatic law were uniformly respected (see Chapter 15 in this Handbook). On the contrary, diplomatic history is replete with examples of attempts to use surreptitious mechanisms to obtain access to information subject to the protection of such principles. For example, when the Earl of Perth was British ambassador to Italy in the 1930s, the 'security of his embassy was fatally breached by the Italian secret service, a fact which he totally refused to recognize, even when Lady Perth's tiara vanished from the Embassy safe' (Watt 1989: 85). Such problems were particularly common during the Cold War, during which the United States experienced the remarkable humiliation of constructing a new embassy building in Moscow which could not then be used because it had been riddled with Soviet listening devices during the construction period. One writer labelled it 'a stark monument to one of the most embarrassing failures of American diplomacy and intelligence in decades' (Sciolino 1988). (Of course, protected means of communication such as diplomatic bags can also be misused, a classic case being the discovery of an anaesthetised former Nigerian minister in a diplomatic crate at Stansted Airport in 1984 (Kleiner 2010: 186)).

One other area of secrecy, often overlooked, deserves some attention, and that relates to the health of political leaders. For understandable reasons, leaders have preferred to go into negotiations with an image of robust good health; and more generally, a state may feel that it is less likely to be threatened if its leadership appears stable and in control. There is thus a long history of states going to inordinate lengths to disguise fragility at the top. On occasion this may have led to major problems during diplomatic crises. For example, a recent study by the former British Foreign Secretary Lord Owen, who was a medical practitioner before entering politics, suggests *inter alia* that the course of the 1956 Suez crisis may well have been affected by the ill health of the British Prime Minister Sir Anthony Eden, and even more so by the amphetamines with which he was being treated. It was not a secret that Eden had had health problems even before becoming Prime Minister; what *was* a secret was the nature of the treatment he had received (Owen 2009: 138).

On occasion, major health problems of leaders *have* been successfully kept secret. Sir Winston Churchill's June 1953 stroke was concealed from the public, and the Shah of Iran was a cancer patient well before the outbreak of the 1978–9 Iranian revolution, as was French President Mitterrand from a mere six months after the commencement of his presidency in 1981 (see Owen 2009: 191–249). Perhaps the most dramatic examples, however, relate to Presidents of the United States (Crispell and Gomez 1988). President Woodrow Wilson, ironically a strong proponent of open diplomacy, suffered two debilitating strokes, on 25 September and 2 October 1919, which his wife and doctor went to elaborate lengths to hide. One consequence was that he was unable to lobby effectively for the Treaty of Versailles, which in November 1919 the US Senate declined to ratify. President Franklin D. Roosevelt from 1943 suffered from severe hypertension and congestive heart failure that contributed to the massive cerebral haemorrhage from which he died in April 1945. Public comments on Roosevelt's health by his doctor, Admiral Ross McIntire, were for the most part fiction, and while it probably goes too far to suggest that health problems compromised his performance during the February 1945 negotiations at Yalta

(see Ferrell 1998: 106–7), in the eyes of experienced medical practitioners he was clearly a very ill man by that stage. Finally, President John F. Kennedy had twice received the Last Rites of the Roman Catholic Church *before* he became president in 1961, a result of the Addison's Disease from which he had long suffered, and which was kept secret from the American public and the wider world during his presidency.

If one seeks to identify the point at which secret diplomacy became a matter of genuine controversy, it was almost certainly at the time in the aftermath of the First World War when the diplomatic processes that had immediately preceded the outbreak of the conflict were subject to a post-mortem examination. On the one hand, the interests of the various parties to the conflict were extremely complex (for detailed discussions see Cassels 1984; Fromkin 2004; Clark 2012; MacMillan 2013), as were the 'chains of causation' (Lebow 2010: 93) that led to its outbreak. This can make it somewhat unfair to lay the blame for the conflagration solely at the door of secret diplomacy. There were some extremely belligerent figures walking the European stage, ranging from Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany to the Austrian Chief of the General Staff Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf to the hothead terrorists of the Black Hand (*Crna Ruka*); and the assassination in June 1914 of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir apparent to the throne of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, brought their various agendas into play. In a real sense, the story of the period between the assassination of the Archduke in late June and the outbreak of a general European war in early August is one of misperception and misunderstanding (Clark 1980: 104–7). Yet there is no doubt that the *reputation* of diplomacy was grievously harmed by the war, and to the extent that it enjoyed a peculiar mystique, that probably suffered irreparable damage as well. Secret diplomacy certainly persisted, but in a much more sceptical environment than had earlier been the case.

Key Points

- Many states have taken steps to protect the secrecy of their own documents and negotiating positions.
- Secrecy has commonly been used to hide the frailty of political leaders charged with negotiating on behalf of their countries.
- The outbreak of the First World War did much to damage the reputation of secret diplomacy.

ARGUMENTS FOR QUIET AND SECRET DIPLOMACY

Evaluating secret diplomacy as a phenomenon is methodologically complex. Mussolini's Foreign Minister in 1930s Italy, Count Ciano, wrote in his diary that victory finds a hundred fathers but defeat is an orphan (Muggeridge 1947: 502). In secret diplomacy, however, even 'victory' may go unadvertised, or only capture analysts' attention long after the events in question. For this reason, it makes more sense to discuss *a priori* the arguments for and against quiet and secret diplomacy than to attempt to build some kind of data set for evaluation which will likely be fatally flawed.

One of the more curious features of arguments in favour of quiet and secret diplomacy is that rather similar arguments have been put forward by writers from radically different traditions of international relations scholarship. From within the Realist tradition, the diplomatist Sir Harold Nicolson was a fierce critic of the idea of open diplomacy, although he was strongly opposed to secret treaties and commitments. For Nicolson, open diplomacy was an invitation to public grandstanding and ever-more secretive meetings at which the real discussions took place (see Otte 2001: 164; see also Drinkwater 2005: 102–8). From within the modern school of peace research, Nicolson's views were very much echoed by the influential writer John Burton. While Dr Burton at the outset of his career had served as Secretary of the Australian Department

of External Affairs from 1947 to 1950, his scholarly writings took him in a very different direction from Realism, and his comments on 'traditional diplomacy' were extremely critical (Burton 1968: 199–204). Nonetheless, he was emphatic (*inter alia* in conversation with this writer) that peace negotiations, if they were to have much prospect of success, needed to take place in secrecy. What united these different perspectives was the tacit understanding that diplomats and negotiators are typically entangled in complex two-level games, seeking to reconcile the desire for a successful outcome in negotiations with a range of other pressures to which they are exposed as agents and political actors (see Putnam 1988). Holding negotiations in the glare of publicity invites those who are dissatisfied with their trajectory to move into aggressive spoiler mode, doing their best to sabotage a process in its entirety. In this sense, the ability to present a *fait accompli* at the end of a process has its value as well as its dangers.

A very clear illustration of this came with Dr Henry Kissinger's secret visit to China in July 1971. With cooperation from Pakistan, Kissinger was able to visit China without attracting any attention. The whole issue of China was an intensely controversial one in US domestic politics. The establishment of a Communist regime on the Chinese mainland in 1949 had led to furious debate in the US around the question of 'who lost China'. Richard Nixon, who by 1971 was US President, had had no qualms in the 1950s in moving in Republican circles where this kind of rhetoric was a staple element of the political diet. For this reason, any attempt by the United States to re-engage with mainland China risked domestic political consequences, the more so because China itself was only beginning to emerge from the political convulsions associated with its 'Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution' from 1965. The last thing a US president in Nixon's position wanted was to be publicly rebuffed by the Chinese. Kissinger's successful visit allowed Nixon to announce that he would visit China in 1972 (see Kissinger 1979: 684–787; 2011: 236–74). Nixon's visit was widely regarded as a sensational diplomatic achievement. Certainly both Kissinger and Nixon regarded the breakthrough over China as a pivotal development in international affairs, and went to great lengths to ensure that it encountered no stumbling blocks, one consequence being an unfortunate US silence over massacres by Pakistan in what was to become the new state of Bangladesh (see Bass 2013). Secret diplomacy, even when very productive, can have its downsides.

One of the strongest arguments against open diplomacy is actually that of practicality, at least where issues of high policy are concerned. A potent illustration of this can be seen from Woodrow Wilson's attempt to change the character of diplomatic interaction. The first of his famous 'Fourteen Points', set out in a speech to the US Congress on 8 January 1918, referred to 'Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view'. The negotiations that led to the Treaty of Versailles saw Wilson depart from this model. Nicolson, who was a participant in the conference, wrote that the Treaty:

> was certainly an open covenant since its terms were published before they were submitted to the approval of the sovereign authority in the several signatory States. Yet with equal certainty it was not 'openly arrived at'. In fact few negotiations in history have been so secret, or indeed so occult. (Nicolson 1950: 83)

Where quiet diplomacy is concerned, one of the strongest arguments in its favour is that it can prevent the pursuit of desirable objectives from being complicated by such issues as fear of 'loss of face'. States typically care about their reputations: as Thomas Hobbes remarked in *Leviathan*, 'Reputation of power, is power' (Hobbes 1996; see also Mercer 1996; Walter 2009). If one state is seeking

favours or concessions from another, it pays not to insult or offend it. One area where this is particularly important is consular work. This label embraces a wide range of activities (Dickie 2007; Lee and Quigley 2008; Maley 2011), but one of the most important is the provision of assistance to one's nationals who find themselves at odds with the law of a foreign country in which they are travelling or living. Governments often find themselves under pressure from media outlets to react stridently in defence of such people, but there is little to suggest that politicising a consular matter is likely to prove rewarding unless the state doing so is a powerful one. While a quiet approach will not necessarily resolve the situation either, it is certainly worth trying before a state moves to adopt more vociferous tactics.

Another area where a quiet approach is likely to predominate is the vexed one of making deals with terrorists. The rhetoric of political leaders might lead one to believe that there is a strong norm prohibiting such engagement. In the real world, the picture is a more complex one. It is much easier to be heroic when one's own citizens are in no danger from terrorists than when they are directly threatened. For example, in 2004 the Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer described the Philippines as a 'marshmallow' when it advanced the withdrawal of its troops from Iraq in order to secure the release by a terrorist group of a kidnapped Filipino truck driver, Angelo de la Cruz. The Minister's comment provoked anti-Australian demonstrations in the Philippines, and a sharp rebuke to the Australian Ambassador (Forbes 2004). Yet in December 1999, when an Australian citizen was on board Indian Airlines flight IC814 that was hijacked to Kandahar after taking off from Kathmandu (see Misra 2000), the same Minister's response was starkly different. The standoff was resolved when India released three militants in its custody, one of whom was subsequently convicted in Pakistan for the 2002 murder of *Wall Street Journal* correspondent Daniel Pearl. Minister Downer showed no inclination to describe the Indians as marshmallows; on the contrary, he issued a statement on 31 December 1999 in which he stated that he was 'delighted by the recent news that there has been a peaceful resolution of the hostage crisis in Kandahar', and acknowledged the 'role played by the Indian government … which has led to the peaceful resolution of this hostage situation' (Downer 1999). The literature on negotiating with terrorists makes it clear that such negotiations typically involve very different approaches from those which characterise state-to-state diplomacy (see Pruitt 2006; Faure 2008) and almost always occur quietly or secretly unless in the midst of a crisis provoked by hostage-taking or an aircraft hijacking. The principal reason is that of moral hazard: the fear that if terrorist tactics are seen to be producing rewards for terrorists, more actors may be tempted to adopt them.

Key Points

- Secret diplomacy militates against comprehensive analysis, since key cases (or data points) are likely to be missing.
- Secrecy may serve to protect sensitive negotiations from attack by 'spoilers' who want to see diplomacy fail.
- Secrecy may be important in facilitating engagement with groups with whom state actors do not want to appear to be engaging, such as terrorists or hostage-takers.

ARGUMENTS AGAINST QUIET AND SECRET DIPLOMACY

While, as we have seen, there are a number of arguments in favour of quiet or secret diplomacy, there are also strong arguments against these practices. Secrecy may be exceedingly difficult to maintain, and the consequences may be dire if what has actually gone on becomes a matter of public knowledge.

A rather dramatic example of this came with the 1956 Suez crisis. As has now been comprehensively documented, Israel, the United Kingdom and France at a meeting on 22–4 October 1956 responded to Egypt's nationalisation of the Suez Canal by plotting that Israel would launch a large-scale attack on Egyptian forces and that the British and French governments would then demand that Egypt accept temporary occupation of key positions on the Canal by the Anglo-French forces. Astoundingly, the terms of this conspiracy were actually committed to paper in the so-called Protocol of Sèvres (Shlaim 1997). The Israeli attack and the Anglo-French intervention proceeded exactly as planned, but unravelled spectacularly in the face of criticism of Britain's action both at home and abroad. Amidst wild scenes in the House of Commons on 1 November 1956, a well-informed Conservative MP, William Yates (who had a background in intelligence in the Middle East and subsequently elaborated on his conclusions in a conversation with this writer), stated that 'I have been to France and I have come to the conclusion that Her Majesty's Government have been involved in an international conspiracy'. This soon became received opinion amongst experts: two weeks later, Sir Harold Nicolson wrote in his diary that 'I have always believed that there was some collusion between the French and the Israelis to which we were a consenting party. If the story gets out, I do not see how the government can survive. It is an utterly disgraceful tale' (Nicolson 1968: 319). Faced with US opposition, the British had no option but to back down in favour of a UN peacekeeping force, and the architect of Britain's policy, Prime Minister Eden, resigned on health grounds shortly thereafter.

Secrecy may also militate against appropriate lessons being learned from diplomatic experience. A very interesting recent example of this relates to the October 1962 Cuban missile crisis. It is now widely accepted that one of the key contributors to a resolution of the crisis was an understanding reached by US President John F. Kennedy and Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev that the US would withdraw Jupiter missiles from Turkey once the Soviet Union had dismantled the missile bases that were being constructed on Cuba. This was a 'trade' that had been proposed relatively early in the crisis by the US Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Adlai Stevenson; and which was then agreed at a meeting in the Oval Office in the White House on 27 October 1962. Absent from that meeting was US Vice-President Lyndon B. Johnson, who was not an insider in Kennedy's circle. Furthermore, it appears that when Johnson became President of the United States following the assassination of Kennedy in November 1963, none of those who had been present at the 27 October 1962 meeting took steps to acquaint Johnson with what had happened. While it is a matter of speculation to what extent Johnson's subsequent behaviour with respect to Vietnam (see Brodie 1973) might have been shaped by 'lessons of Cuba', the historian Sheldon M. Stern has argued that:

> in conversations with McGeorge Bundy in late 1965 and early 1966, Johnson specifically alluded to Kennedy's allegedly tough stand in October 1962, and Bundy made no effort to set the record straight. Instead, Johnson went to his grave in 1973 believing that his predecessor had threatened the use of U.S. military power to successfully force the Soviet Union to back down. (Stern 2012: 153)

Furthermore, in certain circumstances official secrecy can have the effect of encouraging the flourishing of rumours, amongst both elites and masses. When Radio Liberty in 1986 broadcast information that pointed to a nuclear accident at Chernobyl in Ukraine, the absence of any official account of what had happened led rumours to spread rapidly. Recognition of the danger that this could pose seems to have been one of the factors underpinning Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's shift to a policy of *glasnost* (candour). The problem with rumours is

that baseless claims can obtain traction and contribute to the emergence of 'information cascades' that can fundamentally reshape political behaviour (see Sunstein 2014).

One form of secret diplomacy that has maintained a reasonably good reputation is back-channel negotiation as a form of problem-solving. This was used by President Kennedy during the Cuban missile crisis when the US Attorney-General, the President's brother Robert Kennedy, was a trusted and credible channel for the sending of messages to the Soviet leadership. However, there can also be problems associated with secret back-channel negotiations. On occasion those who play roles in such discussions may lack some of the professional skills of analysis and communication that one associates with career diplomats. This can lead to confusion, and in certain circumstances even dangerous misperception. In addition, back-channel negotiations, if they lead to outcomes that some critical players find unappealing, can stimulate vigorous attempts to prevent any progress at the phase of implementation (Wanis-St. John 2006). They are thus not a panacea, but rather one tool that in certain limited circumstances may have a constructive role to play.

Key Points

- Secret undertakings may become known to the public, damaging the reputations of those who sought to act secretly.
- Secrecy may prevent leaders from learning important lesson for the future.
- Secrecy may cause rumours to spread, with detrimental consequences for those who opted for secrecy.

CHALLENGES FACING QUIET AND SECRET DIPLOMACY

The era of secret diplomacy is hardly over. The role of Norway in the early 1990s in orchestrating the secret discussions between the Israelis and the Palestinians that led to the establishment of the Palestinian Authority shows that this is the case. But at the same time, the challenges in maintaining secrecy are more difficult now than at any time in the past, and once secrecy is violated, information can spread very far indeed. It may go too far to speak of a 'crisis' for secret diplomacy, but it would be an unwise political figure who counted on anything remaining secret for too long.

One reason for this is the determination of investigative media. Even in countries such as the United States, there was long a tradition of accepting constraints imposed on reporting by political leaderships. During the time of President Franklin Roosevelt, the broad rule governing reporting was that in general anything said by the President was 'off the record', and it was only with specific permission that his words could be quoted. All this changed with the Watergate scandal that engulfed the presidency of Richard Nixon in 1973–4, leading to his resignation. Nixon had sought to use spurious claims of national security to justify the cover-up of the burglary by people close to the White House of the headquarters of the Democratic National Committee in the Watergate Hotel (see Emery 1995). After this was exposed, media were much less inclined to show undue respect to Presidents, let alone more junior officials.

Another factor making it difficult to maintain secrecy is the multiplicity of agents and agencies that can now be involved in diplomatic interaction. With complex issues coming up for discussion, it is more and more the case that participants in diplomatic engagement come not just from foreign ministries, but from functional ministries and agencies that may have expertise with respect to particular questions under discussion. When this is the case, the prospects that at some point information will leak out about what has been under discussion tend to grow. Adding to this problem is that of *deliberate* leaking by politicians, which may be intended to wrong-foot their domestic opponents, but may also be designed to put pressure on other parties in

the context of negotiations, or even to sabotage those negotiations if they do not seem to be going in a direction with which a party is happy. Finally, the move towards the preservation of information in digital as opposed to 'hard copy' form has proved a boon for those who wish to put information in the public domain, as the activities of WikiLeaks and Edward Snowden have made clear in recent times (see Greenwald 2014).

Political developments in other countries can also put secrecy at risk. Secret diplomacy by definition involves engagement between agents of a number of powers, and while one may be quite confident of one's ability to preserve secrecy in the circles over which one has control, this is simply not the case with respect to the other participants in a negotiation. This may be because information is subject to disclosure through orders of a court; or it may be because of the routine opening of archives after a set period of time; or it may be because dramatic political change, such as occurred with the collapse of the Soviet Union, leads information to become available that otherwise almost certainly would have remained hidden. For political actors who care about their historical reputations, it is worth bearing these risks in mind.

It is easy to be cynical about quiet diplomacy, to see it as amounting to little more than two ostriches having an underground conversation. It is equally easy to be sceptical about the claims made for secrecy, especially since Watergate exposed how easily such claims can be misused for domestic political purposes. One of the reasons why observers may feel uneasy about certain types of secrecy is that it may be necessary to lie in order to protect that secrecy. Lying is not necessarily evil or wrong. In a fascinating study of rescuers of Jews in Nazi-occupied Europe, the authors offered the following story about one of the rescuers they interviewed:

> We also noted that during the war our rescuers deviated wildly from the standards they claimed to have been given by their role models. 'Always tell the truth, that's my motto!' Peter told us. 'But, Peter,' we protested, 'you just told us you lied like crazy during the war.' Peter laughed. 'Oh, well, that was different'. (Monroe et al. 1990: 111)

Indeed it was. Lying also has a long history in international relations (Mearsheimer 2011), but a diplomat who acquires a reputation for telling lies is likely to experience a catastrophic fall in credibility. It pays therefore, in conclusion, to reflect on what kind of ethical considerations might appropriately underpin secret diplomacy. Given that deontological ethics will likely generate a dim view of lying, a broad temptation for those seeking to defend quiet or secret diplomacy is to approach the issue from a consequentialist point of view, assessing the appropriateness of behaviour in terms of the consequences which flow from it. The difficulty with this, however, is that what consequences are likely to flow from secret diplomacy as a phenomenon is far from clear: as noted earlier, it is not possible to produce comprehensive data sets of past experience from which conclusions for the future might be drawn.

A more promising approach, therefore, is that which has been recently defended by Corneliu Bjola, drawing on the idea of ethics without ontology. As Bjola puts it, 'the ethical theory I propose is not informed by abstract normative principles applicable to any circumstances and at any time. Instead, it draws on the actors' own ethical beliefs and practical experiences to probe the normative relevance of the arguments they propose' (Bjola 2014: 91). Taking the US 'extraordinary rendition program' (see Grey 2006) as a case study, he argues that 'secret diplomacy is ethically unjustifiable when actors fail to invoke normatively relevant principles of justification, inappropriately apply them to the context of the case and when the moral reasoning process suffers from deficient levels of critical reflection concerning the broader implications of the intended actions for diplomatic conduct'. (Bjola 2014: 97). This does not provide a magic formula to determine when quiet or secret diplomacy is a good thing, but it does suggest useful ways in which one might go about exploring this question.

Key Points

- Active media make the maintenance of secrecy more and more difficult.
- Secrecy is hard to maintain when many different actors are involved in diplomatic process, and leaking information may serve their individual interests.
- Secrecy is hard to evaluate ethically from either deontological or consequentialist perspectives; a situational approach may prove more illuminating.

CONCLUSION

One common usage of the word 'diplomatic' implies discretion, that is, behaviour that is 'tactful or subtle' (Bull 1977: 163). Tact or subtlety rarely involve broadcasting information to a wide audience, and for this reason, quiet or secret diplomacy is likely to retain a place in the repertoire of professional diplomats and political leaders. In certain circumstances it can be a very valuable problem-solving tool. But that said, secrecy is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain in a globalised, media-dominated world, and actions that take place in the shadows but then fall under a spotlight may well come to be seen as suspect or even sinister (and sometimes rightly so). For this reason, the decision to opt for secrecy is one that should be taken with considerable care.

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37

Crisis Diplomacy

Edward Avenell and David Hastings Dunn

INTRODUCTION

To the casual observer perpetual crisis seems to be the dominant characteristic of the contemporary international system. The corollary of this is that crisis diplomacy is constantly in demand to prevent crisis leading to disaster. With continued globalisation and the interconnected nature of modern societies, crises everywhere are then the concern of all governments and international organisations. They hold particular importance for policy makers, especially those who hold high office, for how they handle crisis is often how history judges their role. The British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, is known more for his alleged policy of appeasement towards Nazi Germany than his other achievements, such as laying the foundations for the welfare state. Similarly, the American president Lyndon Johnson's Great Society legislation is overshadowed by his role in escalating the Vietnam War.

Crises today are not only perpetual, they are very complex and far reaching, encompassing many different types of threats, issues and actors. For example the rise of the Islamic State (IS) is having far-reaching effects way beyond where it began. IS's expansion into Iraq is threatening that country's very existence and millions of refugees are putting pressure on the surrounding nations; foreign-born militants are worrying their home governments, fearful that they will return radicalised; and Iran's intervention is worrying Washington as the USA is concerned about Iran's dominance in the region. This chapter examines definitions of crisis and crisis diplomacy, some of its conceptual developments, theoretical principles, practical tools (including mediation, negotiation and the use of force) and finally its future prospects. This chapter argues that crisis diplomacy is a key process in International Relations. It has developed a great deal in recent years, taking into account the changing nature of the international system to redefine its core theories and explore new tools and techniques to help its practitioners work successfully in the modern world.

The discipline has become more context specific, adapting to deal with new and different crisis. The crises the international community faces are much more varied than they were in the past, and incorporate all manner of different events and dangers – not all of them military based. How to adapt and deal with these crises is one of the key growth areas for the study and research of crisis diplomacy.

DEFINITIONS OF INTERNATIONAL CRISIS

International crises are unavoidable by-products of the anarchic nature of the international system. States have a tendency to compete with each other for power and to pursue their national interests, and on occasion this escalates into a crisis and sometimes the use of force. For Kenneth Waltz, 'force is a means of achieving the external ends of states because there exists no consistent, reliable process of reconciling the conflicts of interests that inevitably arise among similar units in a condition of anarchy' (Waltz 2001: 238).

Yet despite the wide use of the term 'international crisis', it has no agreed definition (Acuto 2011: 521). Many definitions (Williams 1976: 22, Richardson 1994: 12, Young 1967: 10, Taeyoung 2003: 7) were proffered during periods when state-to-state conflict was the dominant form of international crisis.

Phil Williams explores the problems associated with defining a crisis in his book, *Crisis Management*. He suggests that two separate terms be used, foreign policy crisis and international crisis. He defines a foreign policy crisis as 'an urgent problem facing a single government' and an international crisis 'involves certain kinds of stress and strains in the relationship between governments' (Williams 1976: 22). The term foreign policy crisis is not commonly used in literature or by policy makers in the way Williams defines it. This may be because with a more interconnected international system any foreign crisis facing a government would likely involve other states as well, thus making it an international crisis according to Williams' definition, with any other situation coming under the auspice of domestic crisis, or a national emergency. Williams also explores the issues associated with perspective. A crisis to one person or state is not necessarily a crisis to another. Disparity of perspective can even exist between two actors both involved in the same crisis. The Vietnam War demonstrates this: while substantial assets were committed and heavy causalities suffered by the USA, it did not wage the almost total war that North Vietnam did (Williams 1976: 21).

In his work, *Crisis Diplomacy*, James Richardson explores the debate on the issue of defining a crisis. He breaks the definition down into three types: as an *abrupt systematic change or turning point*, a *certain class of decision making*, and a *situation with a high risk of war* (Richardson 1994: 10). These three types deal with the patterns of interactions between states, the decision makers at the heart of the crisis and how they reacted to any forewarning, and how they cope with the pressures placed upon them, and finally the specific issues which lead decision makers to believe there is a serious risk of war. Richardson's three types have pros and cons, however. Today these state-centric definitions have less value because interstate conflicts average less than 1 per decade (Human Security Report Project 2013: Figure 1.3) and hence they no longer completely describe the situations that modern crisis diplomacy wrestles with now or will in the future.

Rather than interstate conflict, intrastate conflicts, and intrastate conflicts with foreign involvement, are currently the most common forms of armed conflict or the political tensions which constitute many modern crises. Indeed modern crises have become increasingly more complex, involving more states and a wider array of 'non-state' actors.

Crises, however, should not only be defined as those situations which involve an element of violent conflict. The rise of globalisation and fast worldwide travel has created a situation

where dangers that were once confined to a single state can now pose global security threats. Nana Poku frames the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Africa in crisis terms (Poku 2002), and Gwyn Prins goes further to argue that a crisis is any global security concern (Prins 2004). The HIV/AIDS epidemic, and the 2003 SARS, 2009 H1N1, and 2014–15 Ebola outbreaks are four examples of global security crises, broadly defined. Economic crisis must also be considered. The devastating effect that economic downturns can have on the world was demonstrated only recently following the Global Financial Crash of 2008, and the still ongoing Eurozone crisis. These must also be considered along with other crises, especially as they have the potential to affect many more lives than traditional conflict-based crises. Mindful of the broader array of threats that can constitute a crisis, Michael Acuto's definition that 'An international crisis is the abrupt enhancement of disruptive relations as a result of a perceived threat to the system or to the lives of those who compose it' (Acuto 2011: 526) will be adopted in this chapter.

Key Points

- International crises are a constant in world politics. They have existed in one form or another for as long as states and different actors have existed.
- Definitions of an international crisis are evolving: traditional, narrow state-centric definitions are being supplemented with broader understandings encompassing such threats as intrastate conflict and non-military global threats, like epidemics and economic instability.
- The development of instantaneous communication and easy access to worldwide travel has meant that a wider array of states and actors are involved in crises of all kinds.

CRISIS DIPLOMACY: DEFINITIONS AND DEBATE

Perhaps unsurprisingly, alongside the lack of agreement on what constitutes an agreed definition of a crisis there is an equal disagreement about the nature of crisis diplomacy. The concept itself comes from Robert McNamara's comment during the Cuban Missile Crisis that 'there is no longer any such thing as strategy, only crisis management' (Williams 1983: 144). He uses 'strategy' as a synonym for diplomacy, and implicit in this definition of diplomacy, given the context, was that crises themselves were the common enemy and it was central to the role of diplomacy to resolve the crisis and avert catastrophe. More recent scholarship, however, problematizes this approach as only applicable to 'normal' diplomacy and contrasts it with more subversive or revolutionary attempts to manufacture or make crisis as a way to challenge legitimacy, security or the status quo. Costas Constantinou cites Mahatma Gandhi and Ho Chi Ming as examples of crisis makers who sought radical change through the manufacturing of international crisis (Constantinou 2015). More traditional treatments of crisis diplomacy, however, use a different dichotomy but one which also speaks to these modern interpretations.

Williams suggests there are two schools of thought about the meaning of crisis diplomacy. The first has the sole objective of peacefully resolving the confrontation, and avoiding all-out war. The second sees it as an exercise in winning, with the main objective being to make the enemy capitulate and back down, therefore furthering one's own ambitions (Williams 1976: 28). In a sense this second definition would embrace crisis makers who provoked the crisis in order to try to 'win' from it. These are clearly on completely opposite sides of the spectrum, and actions taken by actors following these schools will differ. Essentially, followers of the first school will choose any option that makes war less likely, with high-risk strategies being avoided. Success is defined in terms of war being avoided and where high-risk strategies have a greater risk of failure. In this approach the crisis is approached as if it were a common enemy to be dealt with

through diplomacy rather than the process polarising the situation by characterising the problem as being the other party. The second school sees the capitulation of the other state as the primary objective, and high-risk strategies are acted upon, the sole restraining factor being the ratio of gains to losses (Williams 1976: 27). An example here could be German mobilisation in 1914, which was intended to coerce its neighbours into backing down and accepting its will.

While there are some who place their definition of crisis diplomacy into one of these two schools, there are issues with doing so. Leslie Lipson leans towards the avoidance of war side with her view that crisis diplomacy is 'reaching a solution acceptable to both sides without resorting to force' (Taeyoung 2003: 10). This underplays the conflict itself. Whereas William Kinter and David Schwarz fall firmly into the winning the war school with their definition that crisis diplomacy is 'winning a crisis while at the same time keeping it within tolerable limits of danger and risk to both sides' (Taeyoung 2003: 10). In this case, Kinter and Schwarz almost ignore the issue of controlling a crisis and steering it towards a peaceful conclusion.

We argue in this chapter that crisis diplomacy should sit somewhere in the middle, combining elements of both schools. We also argue that attempts to define and frame crisis diplomacy that focus on state-to-state interactions are too narrow and need to be supplemented with broader definitions. Because interstate conflicts are rare and intrastate conflicts and threats from non-state actors are more common, the focus of crisis diplomacy needs to be broadened. States still play a major role in dealing with these crises and are the primary actors in crisis diplomacy. However, other significant actors, for example international organisations (IOs) and non-government organisations (NGOs), are crucial to resolving crises.

Crisis diplomacy is more than a concept that needs to be defined, it is a practical strategy. For example, NATO sees it as one of its fundamental security strategies, involving both military and non-military responses to security challenges, which can be military or non-military, natural, technological or humanitarian problems (NATO 2011). The United Nations' crisis diplomacy strategy is to 'help parties in conflict settle disputes peacefully' (UN *Diplomacy and Mediation* n.d.). We agree with William's characterisation of crisis diplomacy:

> The essence of skilful crisis management lies in the reconciliation of the competing pressures which are inherent in the dual nature of crises …. Crisis management requires that policy-makers not only recognize the inherent dilemmas, but that they are willing and able to make the difficult trade-offs that are required. (Williams 1991: 146)

Key Points

- The definition of crisis diplomacy should sit somewhere in the middle of Williams' two schools of thought, winning and furthering one's own ambitions vs ensuring peace by avoiding war at all cost. It should combine elements of both.
- Crisis diplomacy is a vital practical strategy used by governments, international organisations and NGOs worldwide.

THEORETICAL PRINCIPLES OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT

Crisis diplomacy is a practical tool to be used in real-world situations. As such, contributors to the field have worked to produce theoretical principles which aid in its use when dealing with a real crisis. These principles focus on different aspects of the crisis. One such area is the role of decision makers. They should ensure that a system of multiple advocacy is in place to provide them with information and advice from multiple sources including dissenting opinions (Richardson 1994: 27). They should maintain close political control over all the orders given, thus avoiding the risk of decisions deviating from an overall strategy (Richardson 1994: 27).

Actions and objectives should be clear to their opponent, thus avoiding the risk that confusion will lead to greater risk of escalation (Richardson 1994: 30). Similarly, it is important that the opponent's view is understood. This is a difficult task, however, and it is necessary for decision makers to try and understand how their opposite number will respond (Richardson 1994: 29).

Maintaining flexible options is an important principle; it means that options are not taken if they prevent another one from being used next (Richardson 1994: 28). For example, embargoes/sanctions do not rule out the possibility of future military action, but a military strike would represent an escalation that would limit the effectiveness of any actions (see Chapter 38 in this Handbook). Similarly, reducing time pressure not only is important to allow the greatest range of options to be taken, but it is imperative that an adequate amount of time is given for the other actor to consider and respond without stress (Richardson 1994: 29).

The overall objectives must also be considered. Having tightly defined limited objectives which avoid challenging the vital interests of the other actor serves as a basis for negotiation and settlement (Richardson 1994: 28). By focusing on specific achievable goals, decision makers increase the likelihood that both sides can come to an acceptable agreement. Opportunistic and less defined objectives risk extending the crisis with little chance of achieving the objectives.

There certainly is criticism of some of these principles, both from academics and policy makers. Henry Kissinger is critical of reducing time pressure on the basis that while it might actually facilitate the gradual escalation of the crisis. He wrote in his memoirs:

> In my view what seems 'balanced' and 'safe' in a crisis is often the most risky. Gradual escalation tempts the opponent to match every move … A leader must choose carefully and thoughtfully the issues over which to face confrontation. He should do so only for major objectives. Once he is committed, however, his obligation is to end the confrontation rapidly … He must be prepared to escalate rapidly and brutally to a point where the opponent can no longer afford to experiment. (Kissinger 2014)

As a result of such criticism it might be argued that these principles should not be seen as hard rules to be applied to all crises without fail, but more as potential guidelines. With the nature and definition of a crisis changing to reflect the modern international system, theories of crisis diplomacy will have to adapt to deal with criticisms such as those expressed by Kissinger. The effects of a much wider range of factors and different actors will have to be taken into account.

These principles are useful for an understanding of crisis diplomacy and how it is utilised by diplomats, and policy and decision makers. However, like the definitions of crisis and crisis diplomacy, the appropriate principles to use in a crisis are context specific. The above principles also rely on an assumption that all crises are manageable and can be resolved without escalation to war. This is not the case if one side sees an advantage in engaging in war or sees the issue as so vital to their national interests that compromise is not an option (Richardson 1994: 31). However true this may be, the likely outcomes of not trying to resolve the crisis are significantly more damaging, and in the nuclear age potentially cataclysmic. With crisis moving away from state-on-state situations to include a wider array of issues, there is a need for further research into how well suited the principles discussed above are when dealing with different type of crisis such as economic, health and natural. A further potential area of research is how these principles should be adapted to deal with the changing nature of global power and the move to a more multipolar system.

Key Points

- Research into crisis diplomacy has led to the development of several principles which should guide practitioners when engaging in crisis diplomacy in a real world setting.

- These principles should be used as guidelines rather than hard and fast rules for how to deal with crisis.
- With the shift away from 'traditional' state-on-state crisis, the increase in non-armed conflicts and the continuing move to a more multipolar world, there is need for further research into how crisis diplomacy will develop to meet these new challenges.

THE PRACTICE OF CRISIS DIPLOMACY: CONSTRAINTS AND PROBLEMS

The change in the nature of international crises has resulted in reconceptualisations of crisis diplomacy practice. As crises have moved away from the classical interstate conflicts towards those raging within states, the issue of sovereignty has become an important issue. It is worth noting that the issue of sovereignty is less prominent in economic and health crises, though there are certainly situations where it is an important factor. The Libyan crisis was a demonstration of the most radical new aspects of crisis diplomacy, the putting into practice of the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (R2P). R2P was conceptualised in the *2000 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty* (IDRC 2001). The core principle of R2P is that:

> state sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies with the state itself. Where a population is suffering serious harm as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect. (IDRC 2001: XI)

The reconceptualisation of sovereignty followed the UN's failure on numerous occasions to act in the face of horrific violence instigated by states on their own citizens.[1] By enacting R2P in the Libyan case the UN gave the UK/French-led NATO force the legitimacy to defend Libyan rebels in Benghazi following Gaddafi's threatened slaughter (Heneghan 2011). This military support led directly to the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime.

Some argue that the Libyan crisis has established R2P as a fundamental practice of modern crisis diplomacy (CIC 2012). However, many questions continue to be raised. Several governments, including Russia (Pidd 2011) and South Africa (*USA Today* 2012), believe that the NATO-led force grossly overstepped the original UN mandate. NATO argues that the only way to resolve the crisis was to remove the Gaddafi regime. The fallout from this apparent overreach is having an effect on how the international community now deals with crises.

The question of legitimacy to intervene is also becoming problematic at the national level. In 2013, the United Kingdom's Prime Minister, David Cameron, lost a vote in his own parliament on the UK's possible military action against the Syrian government. Such was the reticence by some British parliamentarians to intervene, that when David Cameron sought approval to join the air campaign against Islamic State, this was originally only approved for targets inside Iraq. Strikes against targets inside Syria were later approved in December 2015; however, this was only after the massacre in Paris in November 2015, and the downing of a Russian passenger plane over Egypt in October 2015.

The Libyan crisis showed the increased importance of regional organisations in crisis diplomacy. The Arab League's request for intervention was a crucial element in the Security Council's deliberations on whether to intervene (Freeman et al. 2011). In 2002, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan said 'regional security organisations have never been more important than today' (Annan 2002). The rationale for this is that regional organisations are better suited to act on crises that occur within their region. Their success in this has been mixed. Depending

on their size they often have very limited budgets, for example the African Union's annual budget in 2003 was $32 million (Cilliers 2008: 16). This reliance on outside funding leads to the inevitable problem of donor interest. However, smaller regional organisations have successfully lobbied for intervention from the UN and larger bodies. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) successfully lobbied for assistance in Mali's Northern crisis (Melly 2012). Lack of resources affects the UN as well. There have been occasions when the Security Council was willing to act but member states were unwilling to provide the resources required (Roberts and Zaum 2010: 8). This situation has only worsened since the 2008 global financial crisis. This makes further empty promises more likely, unless national interests are at stake.

The primary reason for lack of engagement in international crisis diplomacy is states' national interest. This is particularly an issue with the P5 members of the UN's Security Council, all of whom carry a veto on any UN action. UN attempts to resolve the crisis in Syria and Ukraine will be in danger of being vetoed by Russia, who has significant national interest in the first and is actively involved in the second. Russia began its own military intervention in September 2015. This is firmly on the side of the Syrian government, and targets all opposition forces, including the Islamic State. This can be considered a proxy war with the US, which seeks to remove Assad from power (Cotton 2015). Adam Roberts and Dominik Zaum describe the UN as a 'selective security' institution, when examining how it responds to crises (Roberts and Zaum 2010: 7). It is often used by major powers to solve some crises, while it is ignored by them during others. The P5 are much more willing to act on what Richard Gowan describes as 'second-order problems' in Africa than on those in Eurasia or the Middle East (Gowan 2014: 49). This damages the UNs legitimacy as a crisis management institution. It wasn't always so. The UN was able to act in Suez, Congo and Korea despite heavy P5 involvement in those crises. This contemporary lack of action and the corrosion of legitimacy have also had the effect that rising and ambitious regional powers have become more emboldened to act with their own interests in mind. For example, in the absence of firm action on Syria by the UN, Saudi Arabia stepped up its supply of weapons to the Syrian rebels in 2013/2014, and publically criticised the UN and the West's inaction (McElroy 2013). These challenges to the UN's role increase the number of actors involved in a crisis, with each pursuing different strategies, with their own national interests in mind, further increasing the risk of a crisis escalating.

It would, however, be an exaggeration to claim that the UN has had no successes. The OPCW–UN joint mission to resolve the 2013 Syrian chemical weapon crisis has been highly successful. In a little over a year 96 per cent of Syria's chemical weapon stockpile has been destroyed (OPCW 2014). Meanwhile in South Sudan, despite a rocky start, the peacekeepers have been protecting 80,000 civilians while the crisis unfolds (Gowan 2014: 45). While the success of these missions is to be applauded as they undoubtedly saved lives, both were smaller parts of larger conflicts, and the deployment and success of the missions did not directly affect the outcome of that conflict or the national interests of any of the P5.

Key Points

- The development and use of Responsibility to Protect and the move to link a state's sovereignty to its responsibility to its citizens has had a significant impact on the debate regarding intervention, both for and against.
- Regional organisations are seen to have a much bigger part to play in the resolution of regional crisis.
- Despite changes in the international system, national interest still play a vital role in determining what, if any, action will be taken.

PRACTICAL TOOLS OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT

Policy makers have a range of tools at their disposal to resolve a crisis, the choice and effectiveness of each one will depend on the specific crisis and the tools of implementation. The overall objective of the tools is to change the behaviour of the actors involved through either influence or interaction, and they fall into non-military and military categories.

Sanctions and embargoes are non-military tools that are frequently used in crisis diplomacy. The use of sanctions increased drastically in the 25 years following the end of the Cold War (Wallensteen 2007: 240). They are used to influence a state or actor into changing their behaviour. Sanctions and embargoes can be applied to almost anything. The most common are financial, import/export licences, arms and travel. As well as being chosen for the crisis in hand, each one will be imposed to achieve a specific change in the actor's behaviour. Their effectiveness is mixed, and the contribution a sanction regime had on any subsequent change is contentious. Financial sanctions have been placed on Iran to resolve the ongoing nuclear crisis. When these were increased in 2012 (UK Government 2012) the effect was dramatic: Iran's oil revenue plummeted and its GDP shrank by $160 billion (Coles 2013). Is it a coincidence that shortly after this shock the negotiations resumed? There is no firm agreement on the cause. Financial sanctions were imposed on Russia in response to its involvement in the Ukraine crisis. Will these be effective? There are significant differences between Iran and Russia; the latter is much more integrated in the world economy, and provides nearly 30 per cent of the EU's supply of gas (Noack 2014). It is unsurprising then that the sanctions did not target the gas industry. This perfectly demonstrates one of the major obstacles to the use of sanctions in crisis diplomacy. Sanctions on smaller, less economically connected states can be applied with little to no financial risk to those applying them. However, as soon as sanctions are considered for a major power, those imposing the actions begin to think about their own national interest first and crisis resolution second.

The weakness of sanctions as a tool for crisis diplomacy is that unless correctly targeted they can be very damaging to innocent groups within a state without achieving their stated objective. Those targeted by the sanctions are invariably in a position of power where they can pass on the cost to others, usually their own citizens. The effectiveness of sanctions against states also depends on the nature of the regime they are targeting. The more authoritarian a regime, the more able it is to spin the increased cost and suffering caused by the sanctions as the aggressive actions of the international community. The danger that sanctions will harm innocent civilians instead of the regimes they are supposed to be targeting increases the risk that the enforcer will fall into the sanctions termination trap – they cannot stop the sanctions in fear of appearing to back down yet their moral authority is severely damaged by the harm that is being done to innocent civilians (Thakur 2013: 83).

The damage that sanctions can cause was demonstrated when the UN imposed economic sanctions on Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait. These sanctions devastated the economy and caused terrible suffering to the Iraqi people through malnutrition and outbreaks of disease (Gordan 2011: 315). This led to a call for more research into how sanctions could be used to deliver the required impact but without hurting civilians. *Smart sanctions* were the outcome of this research, and were hailed as an 'elegant and powerful solution' (Gordan 2011: 331). They are designed to target specific areas in a bid to hurt regimes or groups within a state, and can vary in scale from travel bans on specific individuals to embargoes of entire industries, such as arms. The success of smart sanctions has been mixed – often they still had effects on innocent civilians, for example, arms embargoes can cripple the self-defence capabilities of victims (Gordan 2011: 332). There is perhaps a danger that

by naming them 'smart sanctions' the debate on their impact has been partially silenced. Further research and work needs to be done to continually improve smart sanctions.

While sanctions can be effective, their use in the Ukraine crisis highlights one of the fundamental problems in crisis diplomacy in the modern world. When one of the actors involved in the crisis is a major world power, then the tools of crisis diplomacy are limited by that actor's power. In the Ukraine example, sanctions have been used against Russia, but the exclusion of the gas industry perhaps shows that their limited use reveals an international community that is unable, or is unwilling, to go further in resolving the crisis because of their national interests.

The use of sanctions relies on other states to abide by them, and traditionally the US and EU as the major economic powers had the greatest effect on a sanctions regime. This position is still secured; however, with the rise of the BRICS, the dominance of the US and EU is reducing. This has the knock-on effect that whether the rising powers abide by the sanctions or not will have a greater and greater impact.

Negotiation and Mediation

Negotiation and mediation should be considered the ideal way for crisis diplomacy to be conducted (see Chapters 17 and 18 in this Handbook). As a result it is the arena where skilled diplomats can have their most important role and impact. Negotiation is 'the process of combing conflicting positions into a joint agreement' (Zartman 2009: 322). Mediation is the process used by disputants to resolve their differences with the help of an outside party. This is done by searching for a mutually acceptable solution and to counter a move towards win–lose strategies (Kressel 2006, 726). Mediation works in situations where an outside actor is needed to bridge an almost intractable divide. Crisis born out of long-standing tribal or ethnic divisions, or where there is a history of violence or oppression on one side, are examples of when independent mediation is needed. The crisis following South Sudan's independence is one such example; the long-standing divisions and angry history which exists makes unassisted negotiations unlikely.

There are problems with the use of negotiation and mediation in crisis diplomacy, which stem from the factors that must be present for them to be effective: identifying parties and compatible interests. In most situations the identification of parties is straightforward, but in the more complicated crisis that the world is now facing there are situations where this presents a problem. The Syrian and Ukraine crises demonstrate this. In Syria it has been noted by commanders and policy makers that the opposition to Assad is made up of a huge array of different actors, all with different ambitions and levels of influence. Identifying, and then selecting, which group to try and engage in mediation with Assad presents a difficult – almost impossible – problem. The situation in Ukraine also sees a multitude of different groups arranged against Kiev, with the added difficulty of Russian forces being involved – while all the time the Russian government refuses to admit this. How can successful mediation take place if a significant portion of one side claims not to be involved at all?

Negotiations and mediation can be affected by other factors within the international system. The International Criminal Court issued a warrant for Muammar Gaddafi's arrest three months after the NATO-led mission had started (ICC 2011), while the mediation teams were still attempting to find a resolution to the violence. By issuing an arrest warrant for war crimes, the ICC may have damaged the mediation efforts by reducing Gaddafi's willingness to deal. Successful negotiation mediation by the international community requires a much more systematic and joined-up approach.

Negotiation and mediation are not reserved for conflicts alone. Non-military crises such

as epidemics require careful negotiation to ensure the crisis is contained. These negotiations will deal with issues such as access to areas of a country, discussing concerns with local communities, and gaining support for inoculation campaigns. An extra level of complexity is added due to the higher numbers of NGOs involved in these crises, who are very often the first ones on the ground and provide the majority of the personnel.

The underlying problem with negotiation and mediation is that they require all the actors involved in the crisis to participate, and it needs the international community to be willing to negotiate with those involved. The Islamic State crisis demonstrates this perfectly. Islamic State is not interested in negotiating, and even if it was, its conditions would be incompatible and unacceptable with all others involved in the crisis. With the murder of American and British hostages, it is unlikely that either the US or UK would consider negotiating with Islamic State.

Use of Force

The use of force is the ultimate back-up to the other tools available in crisis diplomacy. With the continued advancement of military technology and the still disproportionate level of military power held by Western powers, especially the US, the force options available are wide ranging. Air power and long-range missiles were the primary weapons in Libya, whereas ground troops were deployed in the 2013 Mali crisis. Use of force in a crisis does not necessarily have to mean an outbreak of combat, but rather that military tools are used to prevent actions by the actors involved. The blockade in the Cuban Missile Crisis is an example of this. The American blockade bought time for other crisis diplomacy tools to resolve the situation. It also demonstrates one of the fundamental factors of crisis diplomacy, one that is particularly important when considering the use of force: that one must maintain flexible options. In Cuba's case if Kennedy had ordered airstrikes, as some were advising him, this had the potential to quickly escalate the crisis to a point where a full-scale military confrontation was inevitable. The use of a blockade allowed other tools to be used, while keeping the option open for later airstrikes if they were deemed necessary. When the use of force is authorised in a crisis situation it is important that it doesn't end the negotiations or mediation efforts. As soon as military operations start it becomes much harder for negotiations and mediation to succeed. This is why they must be closely linked to one another, with force being used with a clear objective. In the case of Libya, while NATO forces were conducting airstrikes the African Union (AU) was tasked with continuing efforts for a diplomatic solution. It soon became abundantly clear that there was no real linkage between the two efforts; AU requests for additional funds from the EU were delayed for weeks, and proposals were quashed (DeWaal 2012). The use of force in Libya, initially to defend Benghazi but later used much more widely, certainly emboldened the rebels, and eventually enabled them to overthrow the regime. In the same way as the ICC warrant made Gaddafi's willingness to negotiate less likely, the support the rebels received may have diminished their readiness to negotiate.

There are, however, crises when the only response is the use of force. The rise of the Islamic State in 2014 would appear such an example. The mishandling of sectarian diversion and the disfranchisement of Sunni Muslims by the al-Maliki government which created the circumstances that allowed for IS to spread so rapidly through Northern Iraq require long-term solutions. However, the immediate crisis of IS rampaging across Iraq, committing mass killings and brutalizing civilians, could only be met with force, supplying weaponry to the Kurdish Peshmerga, and targeted air and drone strikes to assist their efforts.

If force is used in support of one side of the crisis then they are invariably bolstered

by that support, like in Libya. In situations where there are multiple actors allied with the intervening force, it can enhance one of them over another. For example, it could be argued that the support that the US is giving to the Iraqi Kurds in their fight against IS also brings the possibility of an independent Kurdish state a step closer.

Since the Iraq War, the use of force by Western states has become increasingly unpopular domestically. While airstrikes from manned aircraft and drones are still tolerated because they are seen to carry almost no risk of casualties to service personnel, there has grown a real aversion to 'boots on the ground'. This reluctance to use the full range of military assets at their disposal demonstrates once again the problem of national interest in crisis diplomacy. The risk of soldiers returning in body bags makes full military intervention in a crisis extremely dangerous politically. Problems emerge when the actors involved are states with significant military capabilities capable of shooting down drones or aircraft, or a nuclear deterrent. There is essentially no chance of force being used in Ukraine by the international community, even if this were to be the most effective solution. Similarly, it is unlikely that air power will be used in Syria against the Assad regime due to its highly developed air defence system.

The use of force in crisis diplomacy is something that should never be considered lightly, and is not a solution by itself. Simply destroying the regime, or group, will not resolve the underlying cause of the crisis. For example, the Libyan intervention cannot now be considered a success story. NATO assisted in removing the Gaddafi regime, yet the situation that remains is one of multiple warring factions, extra-judicial killings, and chaos (Fadel 2014). Fundamentally, the use of force should always be accompanied by an equally supported diplomatic strategy – they should work together to resolve the crisis. Relying on weaponry alone won't work.

Key Points

- The use of sanctions should be carefully tailored to the specific crisis. Broad sanctions have the potential to cause massive harm to civilian populations.
- Negotiations and mediation should be engaged in at every level of a crisis.
- Military force remains the ultimate back-up to the other tools used in crisis diplomacy. It should be used sparingly and only when absolutely necessary. Its use should not signal the end of negotiations.
- These tools should be used together as part of an overall strategy for resolving the crisis.

THE FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR CRISIS DIPLOMACY

With the rise of intrastate conflicts and crises involving non-state actors, the field of crisis diplomacy is becoming more complex. The crises that are facing the international community will need the concerted efforts and support of states, and international and regional organisations. There needs to be a much more joined-up approach to the use of different crisis diplomacy tools and a longer term view of the effects that these can have. The interconnectedness of modern crises must be better understood and accounted for. While hindsight is a wonderful thing, lessons should be learned from the Libya and Syria–Islamic state crises. The international community helped in Libya, but did not in Syria. The prolonged nature of the Syrian crisis enabled the rise of Sunni extremists from which the Islamic State was born and the enduring crisis that they created.

All the crisis management tools that have been discussed serve a role; their use must be on a case by case basis with strategies and objectives defined for the specific crisis at hand. More importantly, with the increasing multipolar nature of the international system, brought on as a result of the rising powers beginning to flex their international muscles, there must be a concerted effort to build an

established consensus on the major aspects of crisis management and how they interact, and how the international community can greater support these efforts.

Sanctions must be better integrated into the diplomatic process – rather than simply punishing regimes, their use must be more focused on creating incentives to engage in dialogue. The suffering these sanctions can cause to innocent civilians must be better integrated into their planning.

The concept of Responsibility to Protect is seen by many as a positive step forward in terms of humanitarian intervention. There are, however, very real concerns as to when and how it should be used, or not used. Its utilisation in the Libyan case and the possible overreach of NATO forces has presented challenges for supporters of the principle. The Libyan case demonstrates the difficulty of separating R2P from the national interests of the states involved. However, its acceptance by the UN and the subsequent enshrinement in the UN Charter means that states will no longer be able to hide behind sovereignty when committing brutal acts on their own people, is seen by many as a positive step (UN Charter, n.d.). The use of R2P and force in crisis diplomacy must be accompanied by substantial plans and commitments of resources to post-crisis management. The intervention in Libya resolved one crisis but the vacuum created by Gaddafi's death caused another to emerge.

Crisis diplomacy and its tools must be utilised for crises that do not fall into the traditional definitions of crisis. The 2014 Ebola outbreak was declared a 'social crisis, a humanitarian crisis, an economic crisis, and a threat to national security' by the Director General of the World Health Organization, Dr Margaret Chan (Chan 2014). With the increased interconnectedness of the international community, crises like the Ebola outbreak, even if they pose no realistic threat to the lives of Western citizens, pose a real threat to international stability and must be addressed accordingly.

The definition of international crisis has changed, and the states, organisations and actors involved in crisis diplomacy need to recognise this shift and adapt and evolve the tools they use to resolve modern crises. Future research on crisis diplomacy should focus on the interconnectedness of crisis. Work should be done to examine what the resolution of a crisis will create and this should be closely linked with post-crisis management to ensure that the solution of one crisis does not inadvertently lead to another. Additionally, despite the work done to redefine crisis diplomacy it is still too often seen as concerning armed conflicts. This must be addressed, as the world is facing more crises that do not fall into this category – Ebola, HIV, climate change, economic instability. These have the potential to be far more devastating than many armed conflicts. Crisis diplomacy must look at how best to resolve these crises.

NOTE

1 Kosovo, 5000 dead (Erlanger, 1999), East Timor, 150,000 dead (Jones 2008: 193) and Rwanda, 1 million dead (Jones 2008: 190).

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38

Coercive Diplomacy

Peter Viggo Jakobsen

INTRODUCTION

> No diplomacy relying only upon the threat of force can ever claim to be both intelligent and peaceful. No diplomacy that would stake everything on persuasion and compromise deserves to be called intelligent. (Morgenthau 1948: 565)

Coercive diplomacy, the use of military threats and/or limited force in support of diplomatic negotiations, is as old as the institution of diplomacy. Thucydides describes several instances where Athens and Sparta use military threats as part of their negotiation strategies in his account of the fifth century BC Peloponnesian War; Frederick the Great is attributed the statement that 'diplomacy without military power is like music without instruments'; American President Theodore Roosevelt believed in speaking softly while carrying a big stick; and UN Secretary General Kofi Annan found that: 'if diplomacy is to succeed, it must be backed both by force and by fairness' (Annan 1998).

That the practice of coercive diplomacy is old and used routinely does not make it well-understood or popular, however. Some readers probably find it strange, even inappropriate, for a handbook on diplomacy to contain a chapter on coercive diplomacy. The concept of coercive diplomacy is often regarded as an oxymoron because military coercion and diplomacy are seen as mutually exclusive alternatives employing different instruments and serving very different ends. Whereas military coercion relies on threats and limited use of force (sticks) to coerce adversaries to do something against their will, diplomacy relies on negotiation, positive inducements (carrots) and assurances to solve conflicts peacefully and to develop 'friendly relations among nations' as the *Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations* (1961) puts it. Use of military threats and force is commonly regarded as evidence that diplomacy has failed and as undermining the prospects of diplomatic success.

This perception is not unfounded since coercive diplomacy has a relatively poor track

record. Recent studies analysing Western use of coercive diplomacy find seven successes in 22 attempts (Art and Cronin 2003: 387) and six successes in 36 attempts respectively (Jakobsen 2010: 291), and that use of force was required in most cases. This modest success rate has convinced some scholars that coercive diplomacy should not be attempted at all (Ganguly and Kraig 2005). This widespread view that coercive diplomacy often has unsuccessful outcomes may also stem from the fact that the concept is less understood and less studied than the related concepts of peace, war and diplomacy, which are all at the core of large, well-established research programmes complete with university departments, educational programmes, research centres and think tanks. Whereas you can get an MA, a PhD or a chair in peace, war or diplomacy studies, the same is not true with respect to coercive diplomacy. Moreover, scholars and practitioners studying and practising the art of coercive diplomacy disagree among themselves on terminology, on the amount of force allowed, and on the requirements for success (see Table 38.1). The only thing they do agree on is that coercive diplomacy is a high-risk, hard-to-use strategy with a limited chance of success in war threatening confrontations (Bratton 2005; Jakobsen 2011). (See Chapter 37 in the Handbook.)

This chapter's review of the coercive diplomacy field focuses on works meeting three requirements. First, they must include both sticks and carrots in their conceptualisation of the strategy and study their interaction. Second, they must define the objective of the strategy as war avoidance, that is, as a strategy that actors employ in order to achieve their goals without resorting to war. Third, they must aspire to be policy relevant and seek to bridge the gap between theory and practice that is characterising much contemporary international relations theory (Jentleson 2002; Walt 2005). In keeping with this Handbook's focus on diplomacy, this chapter scrutinizes the coercive diplomacy literature analysing how military threats and symbolic/limited use of force can be used in tandem with diplomatic instruments (carrots and assurances) to resolve crises and conflicts short of war. These rules of engagement exclude the much larger literatures which focus solely on military coercion involving the use of threats and limited force or carrots and assurances, or regard carrots and sticks as competing instruments. These writings will only be included to the extent that they have influenced the coercive diplomacy literature in focus here.

Table 38.1 Comparing diplomacy, coercion and war

Strategy / *Dimension*	*Diplomacy*	*Military coercion*		*Full-scale war*
		Coercive diplomacy	*Compellence/ coercive war*	
Instruments	Persuasion, positive incentives and assurances	(Military) threats and/or symbolic use of force coupled with carrots and assurances	Military threats and use of limited force	Decisive or brute force
Purpose	Peaceful settlement of disputes	Obtain compliance without escalating beyond symbolic use of force	Obtain compliance without defeating the enemy	Impose compliance through military defeat
Requirements for success	Adversary cooperation and overlapping interests	Adversary cooperation and overlapping interests	Adversary cooperation and overlapping interests	Control: adversary cooperation and common interests not required

Source: Jakobsen (2015)

COERCIVE DIPLOMACY – THE ANALYTICAL CONCEPT

Alexander L. George (2003: 464), who developed the concept, conceived it as part of a broader influence theory that combines threats and use of symbolic force (sticks) with positive inducements (carrots) and reassurances. The name of the game is to 'influence' to avoid war rather than to 'defeat' or 'control' to win (see Table 38.1). The stick is employed in support of diplomacy to enhance the prospects of a negotiated settlement. Its use should therefore be kept to a minimum and coupled with carrots and reassurances. Threats should only be employed reactively to stop or undo undesirable actions (for instance military attacks) already undertaken by an opponent. This reactive use of threats distinguishes coercive diplomacy from other threat-based strategies such as deterrence and compellence. A deterrent threat is issued pro-actively in order to prevent the target from acting in the first place, for example to prevent a military attack. Deterrent threats constituted the core of the West's efforts to prevent a Soviet attack on Western Europe during the Cold War. The difference between coercive diplomacy and compellence is that the latter also allows for the pro-active use of military threats and limited force in order to coerce the target to do something, for instance give up territory. Russia's almost bloodless annexation of the Crimea in 2014 is a case in point as the Russian government relied on the implied threat of full-scale invasion (brute force) to coerce the Ukrainian government to withdraw its forces from the Crimean peninsula without a fight. George refers to such pro-active use of military threats as blackmail (see Figure 38.1), whereas Schelling would categorize it as compellence.

In George's formulation, the stick is seen as constitutive of and necessary, but rarely sufficient, for coercive diplomacy success: a mutually acceptable negotiated settlement. The stick is necessary to instil fear of unacceptable escalation in the minds of the target leadership in order to get it to the negotiation table. But is it also necessary to give the target carrots to allow it to comply with the coercer's



Figure 38.1 Conceptual overview

Source: adapted from Jakobsen (1998: 12) for this chapter. Reproduced with permission from Palgrave Macmillan.

demands without losing face and to reassure it that compliance will not result in additional demands and more threats in the future.

Key Points

- Coercive diplomacy is a diplomatic strategy combining military threats and symbolic use of force with carrots and reassurances in order to resolve war-threatening crises and armed conflicts short of full-scale war.
- Coercive diplomacy theorists seek to bridge the carrot–stick gap characterising much of the literature on crisis and conflict management.
- Carrots, reassurances, military threats and symbolic use of force are not alternatives but interdependent instruments that can reinforce or undermine each other depending on the circumstances.

THEORIES AND PRACTICE – THE EVOLUTION OF THE FIELD

The principal determinant shaping the field of coercive diplomacy has been the desire to assist US policy makers in avoiding war and keeping the use of force to a minimum. The link between theory and practice has been intimate, which is why this section presents the evolution of the field as driven by the principal policy challenges characterising the three different strategic eras the world has moved through since coercive diplomacy was born as a separate field of inquiry during the Cold War.

The Cold War: Avoiding Nuclear War and Controlling Escalation

George got interested in coercive diplomacy when he conducted a classified study at the Rand Corporation seeking to identify the conditions under which the US could escalate its use of air power in Vietnam (Operation Rolling Thunder) without risking nuclear war with the Soviet Union and China (George 1965). This study later formed the basis for the classic, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy* (George et al. 1971). Thomas Schelling also sought to understand how military threats and limited use of force could be used for bargaining purposes so that nuclear war could be avoided. He coined the term compellence and identified five necessary conditions for coercive success that has since formed the basis of all military coercion theories, including the coercive component of George's concept (see Box 38.1).

Whereas Schelling never operationalised his theory and was reluctant to use it as a basis for advising the US government on how to conduct Operation Rolling Thunder (Kaplan 1983: 330–6), George explicitly sought to develop a policy-relevant theory

Box 38.1 Schelling's five conditions for coercive (compellence) success

1 The threat conveyed must be sufficiently potent to convince the adversary that the costs of non-compliance will be unbearable.
2 The threat must be credible in the mind of the adversary; he/she must be convinced that the coercer has the will and the capability to execute it in case of non-compliance.
3 The adversary must be given time to comply with the demand.
4 The coercer must assure the adversary that compliance will not lead to more demands in the future.
5 The conflict must not be perceived as zero-sum. A degree of common interest in avoiding the resort to full-scale war must exist. Each side must be persuaded that it can gain more by bargaining than by trying unilaterally to take what it wants by force.

Source: Schelling (1966: 1, 3–4, 69–76, 89). Box reproduced from Jakobsen (2012a: 245) with permission from Oxford University Press.

that could help US policy makers manage real-life crises. He and his associates identified five contextual factors that should be taken into consideration when the use of coercive diplomacy was contemplated and nine success conditions favouring its use (see Box 38.2). They rejected the unitary rational actor assumption that Schelling's theory was based on in favour of empirically derived behavioural models of the adversaries in order to reduce the risk that cultural misunderstandings and psychological biases would cause coercive diplomacy to fail (George et al. 1971; George and Simons 1994).

The emphasis on war avoidance and escalation control so visible in the writings of both George and Schelling was a natural consequence of the Cold War context. The risk that a crisis would draw in the United States and the Soviet Union and escalate into a thermonuclear war meant that full-scale use of force was seen as too risky by most thinkers and policy makers. As a result, the study of military coercion focused far more on deterrence than on coercive diplomacy or compellence during the Cold War.

Key Points

- Coercive diplomacy was developed with the ambition to assist US policy makers to resolve their Cold War confrontations with the Soviet Union.
- The fear of nuclear escalation led to the emphasis on war avoidance, minimum use of force and peaceful conflict resolution.

The Humanitarian 1990s: The Quest for Coercive Credibility

The scope for using military coercion changed completely with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Military threats and force could now be used on a far greater scale without the risk of great power confrontations and nuclear escalation, but the perceived national interest and

Box 38.2 George and Simons' coercive diplomacy framework

Contextual factors

1 Global strategic environment
2 Type of provocation
3 Image of war
4 Unilateral or coalitional coercive diplomacy
5 The isolation of the adversary

Conditions favouring success

1 Clarity of objective
2 Strength of motivation
3 *Asymmetry of motivation**
4 *Sense of urgency**
5 Strong leadership
6 Domestic support
7 International support
8 *Adversary fear of unacceptable escalation**
9 *Clarity concerning the precise terms of settlement of the crisis**

*These four conditions are considered 'particularly significant' for success.

Source: George and Simons (1994: 271–4, 287–8, 292). Box reproduced from Jakobsen (2012a: 245) with permission from Oxford University Press.

hence motivation for doing so was lower since every crisis and conflict was no longer regarded as part of a larger struggle for global power. Instead, crisis and conflict management efforts were increasingly justified by humanitarian concerns and so-called 'humanitarian interventions' came to the fore (Liberia, Northern Iraq, Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone). In this context, coercive diplomacy emerged as a strategy of choice for coalitions of states (mostly led by the United States) who wanted to stop human suffering caused by intra-state conflicts, but were reluctant to put their troops in harm's way to do so. Yet as George's framework underlines (see Box 38.2), coercive diplomacy rarely succeeds if the asymmetry of motivation favours the target, and threat credibility proved difficult to establish for the Western powers, who made no attempt to hide their fear of casualties or their reluctance to use force (Jakobsen 1998).

The difficulties highlighted by the increased resort to 'humanitarian' coercion triggered a new scholarly interest in the concept. Unsurprisingly, the problem of establishing credibility took centre stage in these studies, and George's insistence on keeping the use of force to a minimum came under fire from scholars viewing graduated escalation strategies as a recipe for failure. In their view, the best way to avoid war was to threaten the adversary with military defeat (Freedman 1998; Jakobsen 1998; Pape 1996). There was no point in reducing threat credibility and potency by keeping the use of force to a minimum now that the risk of great power war had receded. Jakobsen's *ideal policy* illustrates this line of thinking (see Box 38.3). Drawing on the works of George and Schelling, it sought to enhance threat credibility and potency by emphasising the need to threaten the opponent with quick defeat or denial of objectives and the need to issue deadlines for compliance. Failure to heed these recommendations was regarded as a recipe for failure. This refinement of coercive diplomacy allowed for far greater use of force than George. Jakobsen defines use of force as 'limited' and as part of a coercive diplomacy strategy as long as it does not force compliance upon the target but leaves the latter with a choice between continued resistance or compliance. Isolated use of air and sea power would in accordance with this definition count as limited use of force regardless of the number of munitions expended (Jakobsen 1998: 14–17). Following George it also emphasised the need to couple the stick with carrots and assurances to enhance the scope for negotiated solutions, and this insistence set it apart from the much larger debate that was triggered by the heavy reliance on coercive air power characterising US crisis and conflict management during this era (Byman and Waxman 2000; Pape 1996). The air power debate was problematic from a coercive diplomacy perspective because it ignored the crucial role that carrots and assurances played in Western crisis and conflict management (Jakobsen 2000).

Key Points

- The end of the Cold War facilitated the use of coercive diplomacy by removing the risk of great power war and nuclear escalation.

Box 38.3 Jakobsen's *ideal policy*

1 A threat of force to defeat the opponent or deny their objectives quickly with little cost.
2 A deadline for compliance.
3 An assurance to the adversary against future demands.
4 An offer of inducements for compliance.

Source: Jakobsen (1998: 4). Box reproduced from Jakobsen (2012a: 246) with permission from Oxford University Press.

- It proved very difficult for Western-led coalitions to use coercive diplomacy to end humanitarian suffering.
- These problems led to new studies advocating greater use of force than George's original conceptualisation allowed for.

The War on Terror: More Coercion Than Diplomacy

The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001 (9/11) removed the reluctance to use force and the fear of casualties that had shaped the conduct of American-led coercive diplomacy in the 1990s. The Bush Administration declared war on terrorist groups and 'rogue' states that sponsored terrorism and sought to acquire weapons of mass destruction (The White House 2002: 13–15), employed brute force to defeat and overthrow the regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq, and threatened to do the same to Iran, North Korea and Libya. While effective with respect to removing the two regimes, the brute force option involved high costs. The American decision to go to war in Iraq in 2003 triggered widespread international condemnation and alienated many traditional friends and allies. Moreover, the United States soon found itself fighting insurgencies in both Afghanistan and Iraq, and North Korea and Iran stepped up their nuclear programmes.

Coercive diplomacy scholars reacted to this change in US foreign policy by recommending a greater reliance on diplomacy. The concern from the 1990s that US coercive diplomacy was undermined by a transparent unwillingness to use force (see Box 38.3) was now replaced by the concern that it was being undermined by excessive use of force. Thus Art and Cronin (2003) edited a major study of US post-Cold War coercive diplomacy arguing that George had been right to insist that coercive diplomacy should allow for symbolic use of force only. Similarly, Jentleson and Whytock (2005–6) proposed a new framework emphasising that the coercer's strategy should focus on the importance of proportionality between ends and means, reciprocity and economic as opposed to military coercion (see Box 38.4). Jentleson and Whytock argued on the basis of an empirical case study that threats of regime change were counterproductive, and that the Bush Administration was wrong in claiming that Libya's decision to give up its weapons of mass destruction in 2003 had been caused by the fall of Saddam Hussein and American threats of regime change. The need for a balanced approach to coercive diplomacy was also emphasised by other scholars (Blechman and Brumberg 2010; Jakobsen 2012b).

Box 38.4 Jentleson and Whytock's coercive diplomacy framework

Coercer strategy

1 Proportionality between ends and means.
2 Reciprocity – linkage between the coercer's carrots and the target's concessions.
3 Coercive credibility – threats must be perceived to enhance costs of non-compliance.

Target's domestic politics and economy

1 Is internal political support and regime security served by compliance or resistance?
2 What are the economic costs of compliance versus resistance?
3 Do domestic elites act as circuit breakers or transmission belts for the coercive pressure?

Source: Jentleson and Whytock (2005/06: 51–5). Box reproduced from Jakobsen (2012a: 248) with permission from Oxford University Press.

The era also witnessed a greater interest in obtaining a better understanding of the targets, since a poor understanding of their culture, motivations, vulnerabilities, capacity for counter-coercion, mindset and decision-making processes was regarded as a major source of the problems that the United States was facing in its war against terror (see Box 38.4). The result was a number of works emphasising (strategic) cultural awareness, the development of psychological profiles, and actionable intelligence as necessary requirements for coercive diplomacy success (Byman and Waxman 2002; Bolland 2006; Crenshaw 2003; Morgan 2003; Tarzi 2005); considerations that also featured prominently in the booming literature on counterinsurgency. Jentleson and Whytock's focus on the target's domestic politics and economic elites is indicative of this trend. They highlighted the importance of these actors by demonstrating empirically how Libya's surprise decision to give up its weapons of mass destruction programmes in part could be explained by the pressure that economic elites hurt by international sanctions had exerted on Libya's leader Gaddafi to persuade him to terminate these programmes.

Key Points

- The heavy US reliance on brute force in response to the 9/11 attacks prompted coercive diplomacy scholars to make the case for a more balanced approach relying on both carrots and sticks.
- Practical difficulties with respect to understanding adversary behaviour and their capacity for counter-coercion resulted in research highlighting these challenging requirements for success.

A Hybrid Future: More Actors, Greater Complexity, New Challenges

Russia's annexation of the Crimea and its active support for separatists in eastern Ukraine in 2014 and China's growing assertiveness over sovereignty issues in the East and South China Seas suggest that we are entering a new strategic era where confrontations among the world's (nuclear armed) great powers will become more frequent. These confrontations are unlikely to result in new Cold Wars in either Europe or East Asia as some have suggested (Legvold 2014; Lucas 2014; Mearsheimer 2010; Room for debate 2012). The Cold War only involved two superpowers and was global in scope. The new era has a higher number of great powers, who, except for the United States, have a primarily regional outlook and reach. They are also more interdependent economically than the United States and the Soviet Union ever were. These features suggest a more regionalised world order where conflict in one region is unlikely to spill over into another, but where more regional confrontations occur as declining status quo powers seek to resist demands from the rising powers for a greater say in the running of regional affairs. Since this dynamic is most likely to exacerbate the current instability plaguing Sub-Saharan Africa and the area stretching from Morocco to Pakistan, the future practice of coercive diplomacy is likely to feature elements from the Cold War, the 1990s and the war on terror as all the main challenges and opponents characterising these eras interact in the era we are entering.

The resort to coercive diplomacy will increase for the simple reason that the number of actors willing and capable to use military coercion and force in pursuit of their objectives is rising. The rise of new regional powers and the proliferation of militant non-state actors with regional/global reach, such as al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, Hizbollah and al-Shabaab, will increase the number of challenges that status quo oriented actors will employ coercive diplomacy to resolve. They will do so for a mixture of the reasons already spelled out above: a strong interest in war avoidance, fear of (nuclear) escalation, a reluctance to use force and put troops in harm's way to stop mass violations of human rights, or a strong determination to threaten and use force to protect national security.

The increasing number of actors and their different nature (state and non-state) will further complicate the use of coercive diplomacy. Sometimes the principal opponent will be nuclear armed as was the case in the Ukraine crisis between the Western powers and Russia; sometimes the opponent will be a much weaker fragile state. At other times, it will be non-state actors using coercion and force in pursuit of political, ideological or criminal objectives. Yet the opponent may also be a hybrid, that is, a coalition of actors spanning these three categories that employs a variety of overt and covert military (conventional, irregular and terrorist), economic and political methods in an integrated way to achieve their objectives (Hoffman 2009). While this is not entirely new, it complicates the use of coercive diplomacy, forcing the coercer to target a higher number of actors and hostile actions simultaneously. The Ukraine crisis erupting in 2014 is a case in point as Russia skilfully integrated the actions of Ukrainian separatists in the Crimea and Eastern Ukraine with its own use of conventional, irregular, political, economic, cyber and informational means in order to coerce the Ukrainian government to end its rapprochement with the EU and NATO and accept its place in a Russian sphere of influence.

Key Points

- The emerging strategic era features all the actors and challenges that have characterised the three previous ones.
- The rise of hybrid opponents using all their means of power in unexpected and asymmetric ways will greatly complicate the effective use of coercive diplomacy.

FUTURE CHALLENGES FOR THEORY AND PRACTICE

As in the past, the emerging strategic era will create new and context specific policy challenges. Some of these are as yet unknown, others are already visible. A key challenge arising from the changing distribution of global power and increasing number of actors (state and non-state) capable and willing to use force to challenge the status quo is the need to move away from the US-centric bias that has characterised the study of coercive diplomacy since its inception during the Cold War. The number of studies examining how other actors than the United States employ coercive diplomacy and other forms of military coercion is growing (Aras 2009; Ohnishi 2012; Thies and Bratton 2004; Zhao 1999–2000), but more are needed in order to give us a better understanding of how and to what extent cultural factors, regime/actor-type variables and different views of war produce behaviours that differ from the ones predicted by a rational actor model.

In addition to addressing context specific challenges, coercive diplomacy scholars must also address the generic problems that have hampered theoretical progress in the field since its inception. They include a failure to integrate qualitative and quantitative methods, vague definitions of key concepts and variables, and lack of systematic and rigorous empirical analysis of generally accepted propositions (Bratton 2005; Jakobsen 2011; Larson 2012). Yet the single most important challenge facing the study and practice of coercive diplomacy is how to get its central finding across: that strategies combining sticks, carrots and assurances have a far better track record with respect to resolving crises and conflict short of war than strategies relying solely on sticks or on carrots and assurances (Art and Cronin 2003; Blechman and Wittes 1999; Davis 2000; George and Simons 1994; Greffenius and Jungil 1992; Jakobsen 1998, 2010; Snyder and Diesing 1977).

This key finding has thus far been overshadowed completely by coercive diplomacy's low rate of success. This has given rise to the widespread perception that coercive diplomacy is an oxymoron and that use of military threats and use of force undermines diplomacy and the prospects for peace.

The practice and study of coercive diplomacy prove this perception wrong. It clearly shows that skilful use of coercive diplomacy can resolve crises and conflicts short of full-scale war when the conditions are right. Unfortunately, our understanding of these conditions remains wanting in several respects. More research and scholarly attention are needed if we want to realize more of the potential for peaceful conflict resolution that coercive diplomacy does hold.

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39

Revolutionary Diplomacy

David Armstrong[1]

INTRODUCTION

The first use of the term 'revolutionary diplomacy' was, almost certainly, in a series of volumes commissioned by the US Senate in 1888, whose aim was to document the diplomatic correspondence of the American Revolution.[2] In this context the term simply referred to the communications of the American revolutionaries with France, Spain and other countries. Similarly, states enjoying formal diplomatic relations with a state undergoing a revolution against an established government inevitably confront numerous issues in determining whether and at what point they should transfer their official recognition of that state from one government to another. Some adopt the simple principle that recognition should be accorded to the government that is clearly exercising 'effective control' while others take a range of political factors into account. For example, while the UK moved rapidly to recognise the new Communist government of China in 1949, the USA, for various reasons, withheld recognition until 1978, as it had done earlier with the Soviet Union. Here I shall be focusing upon a different usage of the term 'revolutionary diplomacy', one denoting states whose relations with other states are revolutionary because they are based on fundamentally different principles than those on the basis of which states traditionally conduct their relations with each other (see Chapter 10 in this Handbook).

Orthodox diplomacy is based on principles developed over the last five hundred years, mainly by the leading European powers. Here, the underlying assumption is that states form a sort of international society marked by certain common interests, norms, rules and institutions. Given that the fundamental criterion for membership of this society is the sovereign status of its members – their right to govern themselves as they choose – the 'societal' aspects of this community of states are inevitably somewhat more limited than, for example, those prevailing in a

national community, with a common culture and laws enforced by police and upheld by courts. Rules and enforcement mechanisms in what Hedley Bull refers to as the 'anarchical society' of states are more limited and revolve around upholding the basis of international society – sovereignty itself. Hence diplomacy, as an institution of international society, has the purpose of enabling states to find peaceful means of negotiating and resolving their differences without compromising their sovereign equality. In this sense diplomats function, in effect, as the personal embodiment of this society: they stand for the sovereign states which are its members.

The leading works on diplomacy all attempt to derive their understanding of the key features of diplomacy from this underlying notion of a society of states (see Chapter 8 in this Handbook). Satow,[3] for example, defines diplomacy as 'the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations … or, more briefly still, the conduct of business between states by peaceful means'. Nicolson's ideal diplomat possessed an enviable list of personal qualities: 'truth, accuracy, calm, patience, good temper, modesty, loyalty'. For Berridge,[4] diplomacy is 'the conduct of international relations by negotiation rather than force, propaganda or recourse to law, and by other peaceful means (such as gathering information or engendering goodwill) which are directly or indirectly designed to promote negotiation'. De Callières'[5] classic work specifically relates the practice of diplomacy to the existence of a community of states in Europe, a usage followed by Watson, who talks of diplomacy as involving the adjustment of the differing interests of states through bargaining and compromise and through an awareness not merely of reason of state but of '*raison de système*' or of the interests of international society as a whole.

The revolutions that I am considering here are not about the smooth running of anything but about fundamental change. They frequently invoke violent rather than peaceful means of achieving change and proceed from ideologically derived black-and-white views of the world rather than the subtle flexibility required of Satow's diplomats. Although there are many such animals as cool headed revolutionaries, it would be hard to find one possessing even half of Nicolson's[6] list of diplomatic qualities. Finally, the idea that diplomats represent not merely their own countries but the common interests of international society as a whole has little resonance with revolutionaries, who, if they have a conception of international society, see it as an oppressive, unequal and immoral structure of power.

The intrinsic conceptual antagonism between diplomacy and revolution is reflected in the mutual perceptions of the individuals who are the prime actors in each process. Even such a moderate revolutionary as Thomas Jefferson saw diplomacy as 'the pest of the peace of the world' and believed there to be little point in sending Americans abroad to perform diplomatic tasks because, being honest republicans, they would inevitably be outwitted by less virtuous Europeans.[7] Similar sentiments were expressed by Washington, John Adams and others. The underlying concern here was essentially the same as can be found in many revolutionary states: fear that the revolutionary society might be contaminated by too much contact with foreigners who did not share its ideals, which made diplomacy automatically suspect. Even as late as 1885 an American Senator could still lament:

> This diplomatic service is working our ruin by creating a desire for foreign customs and foreign follies. The disease is imported by our returning diplomats and by the foreign ambassadors sent here by monarchs and despots to corrupt and destroy our American ideals.[8]

So deeply ingrained in the American psyche was this distrust of diplomacy that it was not until well into the twentieth century that the United States felt able to devote significant resources to the development of a professional diplomatic service (see Chapter 26 in this Handbook). And if such sentiments could

be so widespread in the least ideological of the major revolutionary states, they inevitably emerged with even greater force in revolutions that proceeded from more doctrinaire mind-sets, such as the French Revolution and the various revolutions inspired by Marxism or Islam.

For their part, diplomats were no less hostile towards certain revolutions. A study of the American Foreign Service during the years after the Bolshevik Revolution, for example, has shown how the American diplomats developed a profound antipathy towards the Soviet Union, whose diplomats they saw as bent upon subversion.[9] Even more seriously, so far as their professional sensibilities were concerned, the Americans believed the Soviets to be systematically undermining the basic principles that had governed the diplomatic system to that point. If, as appeared to be the case to the American diplomats, their Soviet counterparts saw diplomacy merely as another arena of global class struggle, this made a mockery of any conception of diplomacy as a means of bringing about compromises and other kinds of peaceful settlement of international disputes (see Chapter 27 in this Handbook).

Apprehensions of this kind were first expressed with regard to the French Revolution. Although European international relations before 1789 could hardly be said to have been a model of harmony and goodwill, there was a widespread belief that states conducted their affairs within certain self-imposed limitations and in accordance with generally understood principles of chivalry and courtesy which derived from the aristocratic code of honour shared by all European leaders and were embodied in the institution of diplomacy. The French Revolution was thought by many to place all this in jeopardy. In the words of the Austrian Chancellor, Kaunitz, in a note to Austrian diplomats in July 1791, the spread of the 'spirit of insubordination and revolt' was so menacing that all governments needed to 'make common cause in order to preserve the public peace, the tranquillity of states, the inviolability of possessions and the good faith of treaties'. The prosperity and harmony of Europe, he continued, were 'intimately linked to a community of interests of all kinds, of internal administration, of gentle and calm manners, of well-informed opinions, and of a beneficent and pure religion, which groups them all in a single family of nations'. This could be threatened not only by the Revolution but, Kaunitz perceptively added, by the necessary counter-measures that would have to be taken against it.[10] The work of diplomats was, for example, inevitably affected by the increasing attention paid by the international community to the internal affairs of states: one by-product of the international counter-revolution after 1789. This may perhaps be seen as an early sign of what were to be increasingly important phenomena in the next 200 years: the growing role of non-state actors in many aspects of international affairs and the corresponding expansion of the international arena from the narrow confines of formal diplomacy to numerous public domains.

Key Points

- Diplomacy as an institution of an international society is founded on the principle of sovereignty, but both the idea of an international society and conventional diplomacy are challenged by revolutionary states.
- The early and continuing US distaste for diplomacy shows that even the least ideological of revolutionary states had problems with diplomacy.
- There were hostile reactions to the French Revolution by conservative forces and international society itself was affected.

THE REVOLUTIONARY VIEW OF DIPLOMACY

Revolutionary states are not identical and the problems some of them have caused for the institution of diplomacy are not unique to

revolutionary situations. There have, for example, been many violations of diplomatic immunity by states that could in no sense be termed 'revolutionary'. Therefore, to talk of a general phenomenon of 'revolutionary diplomacy' is inevitably to oversimplify a more complex reality. With that proviso, it is nonetheless possible to discern certain recurring problems in the interaction between revolutionary states and diplomacy.

The first, which has already been alluded to, derives from the contrast between the contrasting normative assumptions and world views that underpin revolution and diplomacy. Numerous revolutions, including the French, Soviet, Cuban, Chinese and Iranian, proceeded from an ideology that conceived of the world in transnational rather than interstate terms. In theory, at least, the world was seen as divided into peoples or classes or believers and unbelievers rather than states, which are interpreted by various revolutionary ideologies as false or unnatural ways of dividing humanity. There is an obvious contrast between such views and the diplomats' conception of themselves as the personification of the sovereign state. Similarly, the common revolutionary notion of an inevitable conflict between the ideas and classes represented by the revolution and the forces that are hostile to the revolution because it threatens their demise is clearly incompatible with the underlying principle of diplomacy that states share a common interest in the continued smooth functioning of international society that enables them to accept a set of common rules, norms and institutions and seek consensual means of resolving their differences. In Engels' words: 'diplomats of all countries constitute a secret league as against the exoteric public and will never compromise one another openly'.[11]

This fundamental difference of principle is at the heart of the many specific problems that revolutions have caused for diplomacy. If the revolutionary state has an intrinsic suspicion of foreigners this is hardly likely to make the task of the diplomat any easier and revolutionary states have been foremost in imposing restrictions on the freedom of diplomats to travel within their host countries and to make contact with the local population. When revolutionary states undergo a period of internal terror, as was the case with France, Russia and China, amongst others, diplomats may find it virtually impossible to engage in the most innocent of conversations with the locals whose lives may be endangered simply by virtue of having been seen talking to foreigners.[12] Even in more normal times the diplomats' ability to communicate with individuals may be severely constrained, as a former British ambassador to Moscow discovered: 'The normal role of the foreign diplomatist, which is essentially to get to know the important people and to gain their co-operation by discussion and personal influence was almost wholly ruled out'.[13] Conversely, revolutionary diplomats have gone to some lengths to pursue 'people's diplomacy', or to develop links with fellow believers in their receiving country, most comprehensively when Moscow dominated the world communist movement.

Numerous other petty restrictions, all arising from the same fear of contamination by 'counter-revolutionary forces', may also add to the difficulties faced by diplomats. For example, for many years foreign diplomats in the Soviet Union had to organise all their domestic requirements, from a theatre ticket to a plumbing job, through a single government department, the Burobin.

A related problem, in the sense that it arises from the same suspicion of foreigners and, by association, those citizens of the revolutionary state who consort with them, is evident in the frequent unwillingness of revolutionary states to entrust the conduct of their foreign relations entirely to professional diplomats, who might lack the necessary ideological commitment. The French Revolution was the first of many revolutionary states to decide to send out trustworthy political agents to keep a watchful eye on French diplomats, arguing that '… it is important that those who are

involved in the general administration of the Republic do not serve merely with probity; it is necessary that the agents of the Republic are its most zealous and ardent partisans' and that removal from the revolutionary scene combined with unavoidable contact with anti-revolutionary foreigners might dilute their enthusiasm for the Revolution.[14] These agents were the forerunners of the political commissars who accompanied Soviet diplomats and, in a more extreme version, the Red Guards who replaced Chinese diplomats during the Cultural Revolution, when they were charged with implementing 'Chairman Mao's revolutionary diplomatic line'. China's *People's Daily* newspaper hailed the Red Guard diplomats as 'proletarian diplomatic fighters', whose role was to 'show a dauntless revolutionary spirit, a firm and correct political orientation, an unconquerable fighting will'.[15]

From the perspective of conventional diplomatic practice the greatest problem arises from the revolutionary view of diplomacy as merely another form of struggle against the world-wide enemies of the revolution. Even as late as 1964 a Soviet handbook on diplomacy could argue:

> The theoretical foundation of Soviet diplomatic activity is a Marxist-Leninist understanding of the international situation, of the laws of social development, of the laws of class struggle … a Marxist-Leninist evaluation of international events and the formulation of a line of diplomatic struggle on this basis is a powerful element in Soviet diplomacy.[16]

This issue manifested itself in several distinct ways. First, encounters with such diplomats inevitably had a very large propaganda component, which exacerbated the task of reaching agreement through negotiation. Even one-to-one meetings could be affected in this way, as illustrated in the culture clash evident in the first meeting between the British Consul General to Vietnam and his Cuban opposite number in 1966:

> He addressed me didactically … on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and the inevitability of the triumph of communism throughout the world. I saw no reason to put up with this and politely pointed out to him that diplomatic relations, which Cuba and the UK enjoyed, were between states and should exclude ideological polemic or the export of political theory.[17]

The same envoy experienced a somewhat worse discourtesy when China's *chargé d'affaires* during the Cultural Revolution greeted him by spitting in his face.[18]

The use of diplomacy for propaganda purposes is merely one facet of a potentially more serious problem: that diplomats may perceive their prime function to be that of spreading the revolutionary cause. The suspicion that revolutionary diplomats may be actively engaged in internal subversion has bedevilled relations between revolutionary and non-revolutionary states since Oliver Cromwell's emissary to Spain pronounced the imminent arrival of the Spanish revolution on his first day there.[19] Even where diplomats are not engaged in revolutionary activities in their receiving state itself, they may sometimes use their embassy as a base for proselytising the revolution elsewhere. One notorious case here involved the French revolutionary diplomat, Genêt, who was sent to the United States in 1793 with instructions to foster anti-monarchical sentiments in those parts of North America that were still controlled by Spain and England. Although he regarded France as a friend of the United States, his activities clearly hindered American efforts to remain neutral in the revolutionary wars and he was expelled. Similarly, the French representative in Madrid in 1795, Mangourit, after making various undiplomatic comments about the Spanish king, was obliged to withdraw after only seven months, while other French diplomats saw their role primarily as one of spreading the new revolutionary values.[20] Missionary activities of this kind have been a part of the diplomacy of many other revolutionary countries including most communist states and Iran. As Trotsky argued of his fellow Bolsheviks, they 'do not belong to the diplomatic school. We ought rather to be considered as soldiers of the revolution'.

Key Points

- Recurring problems from the time of Cromwell in the interaction between revolutionary states and diplomacy include subversive activities by the revolutionaries and restrictions on the work of conventional diplomats.
- There are contrasting normative assumptions and world views of revolutionary and non-revolutionary states.
- Revolutionary diplomacy suffered early problems in France, the Soviet Union and China.

RELATIONS WITH 'BOURGEOIS' STATES

Revolutionary regimes frequently go through a period when their hold on power is uncertain and their legitimacy challenged by their predecessors and other contenders. In such circumstances there is often a tendency for such conflicts to spill over into other countries and for revolutionary diplomats to compromise their positions by becoming involved with perceived enemies of the revolution who have escaped to other countries. Even where the revolutionary state refrains from such conduct itself, it may find its diplomats targeted by its enemies abroad, as was the case of a number of White Russian assassinations of Soviet diplomats during the 1920s.[21] A related problem in recent years has been the tactic of kidnapping and sometimes killing diplomats by revolutionary groups opposed to established governments as a means of disrupting the government's external relations.

The ideologically based conviction that international relations with non-revolutionary states must of necessity consist of a form of struggle pending the universal triumph of the revolutionary cause has seriously affected diplomatic relations. This was particularly the case where the Soviet Union was concerned. In the early days of the Bolshevik regime the Soviets assumed that all encounters with the West would inevitably take the form of an overt or disguised struggle between socialism and capitalism. The revolutionary purpose of participating in such negotiations was to exploit them for propaganda purposes, with the aim of putting their enemies on trial before world opinion, as Trotsky candidly explained in 1917, in discussing his tactics at the forthcoming Brest–Litovsk conference. Demonstrating an early awareness of the opportunities presented by technological developments in communications, he noted that the details of all negotiations would be 'taken down and reported by radiotelegraphists to all peoples, who will be the judges of our discussions'; the overall objective was to reveal the truth about 'the diplomacy of all imperialists'.[22]

The manoeuvres of the Bolsheviks during November 1917 perfectly illustrated their belief that diplomacy was revolutionary struggle by other means. They had published the secret treaties and now issued a call for an armistice on terms that no belligerent power could possibly accept. When their appeal met with its inevitable lack of response, they used this as propaganda against the allied governments. In a radio broadcast on 28 November to the peoples of the belligerent countries, they made traditional ('reactionary') diplomacy an explicit target of their attacks.[23]

When world revolution failed to materialise the Soviets made some adjustments to their approach to diplomacy, opting for a general observance of the conventional norms of diplomacy in their formal relations with other states, while continuing to support world revolution through their 'alternative' diplomatic arm, the Comintern. But their negotiating tactics showed little fundamental change since they remained convinced that those they were negotiating with were implacable enemies. As one reporter noted of Molotov's attitude during the 1947 London Foreign Ministers meeting: 'He is innately suspicious. He seeks for hidden meanings and tricks where there are none. He takes it for granted that his opponents are trying to trick him and put over something nefarious'.[24]

The generally negative attitude of the Soviets towards negotiations probably also resulted in their frequently noted tendency to treat any offered concession as a sign of weakness and to immediately raise the stakes. Diplomatic relations with foreign powers, in the words of an American ambassador to Moscow, tended to be seen by the Soviets as 'armistice relations', pending renewal of open battle.[25]

The negotiating style of Communist China in its first three decades often paralleled that of the Soviet Union, suggesting that this was essentially a product of ideological preconditioning rather than Russian national culture. During the Cultural Revolution (1966–72) the Chinese went far beyond even Soviet conceptions of diplomacy as a form of struggle. One observer characterised their approach to diplomacy during this period as 'unremitting, implacable effort by diplomatic guerrilla warfare', in contrast to the orthodox version of diplomatic negotiations, which he saw as based on 'a natural desire for a common outcome by the accommodation of some mutual conflict and by the development of a common understanding'.[26]

Revolutionary states sometimes attempted to distinguish between their relations with other such states and the rest of the (non-revolutionary) world. Talleyrand was the first to attempt such a distinction between French relations with other republics, notably the United States, with whom it was possible to conclude 'solemn treaties of friendship' and relations with old regime states with whom only 'temporary conventions concerning political and commercial interests' were possible. Typically, this was seen by Talleyrand as an expedient way of overcoming revolutionary aversion to diplomacy, but the policy took an extreme turn in 1795, when only the United States and Switzerland received representatives of full ambassadorial status. Similarly, the Soviet Union used the phrase 'international relations of a new type' to refer to diplomacy among members of the socialist camp. On the other hand, when revolutionary states fell out with each other, the acrimony between them tended to descend to levels below that of their relations with supposed ideological enemies.

Key Points

- Internal conflicts in revolutionary states can spill over into other countries, especially where opponents of a particular revolution have fled to neighbouring countries.
- There have been attacks on diplomats both in the revolutionary states where mobs have burnt down embassies and on the diplomats from the revolutionary states by exiles opposed to the revolution.
- The negotiating styles of the Soviet Union and China were marked by suspicion and negativity.

REVOLUTIONARIES AND THE INSTITUTION OF DIPLOMACY

Although revolutionaries are not alone in their ability to disregard the rules and conventions of diplomatic relations, their ideologies may legitimate systematic abuse of the institution of diplomacy. Expulsion of diplomats for supporting terrorist activity or for importing arms in the diplomatic bag, for example, have frequently involved diplomats from states founded on revolutions. Similarly, violation of the fundamental norm of diplomatic immunity has often occurred in revolutionary states – for instance when Iran held American diplomats hostage after the 1979 revolution there. Islamic law itself formally acknowledges the principle of diplomatic inviolability[27] (see Chapter 16 in this Handbook). However, in the interpretation of the Ayatollah Khomeini this principle took a poor second place to the need to guard against 'control' by foreigners and to the even more all-embracing 'interests of Islam'. Khomeini established what amounted to a separate diplomatic system to ensure that his edicts were implemented.[28] The Chinese Cultural Revolutionaries were even more dismissive

of the standard diplomatic conventions, asserting 'diplomatic immunity is a product of bourgeois norms'. Interestingly, however, when the possibility of holding foreign diplomats hostage was debated by the French revolutionaries, it was done in the context of fears that other governments might not respect the rights of French envoys.[29] In other words, when the French Assembly considered hostage taking, it did so as a means of enforcing compliance by other states with the established principles of international law. Indeed some of the worst violations of diplomatic immunity during the French Revolution were perpetrated by its opponents, as when Austria captured and imprisoned two fully accredited French diplomats in 1793.[30] Perhaps the central point here is that revolutions help to create an atmosphere in which respect for the conventions of international society tends to diminish on all sides.

The impact of revolutionary states on rules and conventions has been felt even in relatively trivial areas, such as dress and etiquette. Both American and French diplomats went to some lengths to demonstrate republican simplicity in their attire. And when a would-be-helpful French diplomat tried to advise the first American diplomats sent to Paris to pay more heed to observing existing diplomatic formalities, John Adams brusquely informed him that 'the dignity of North America does not consist in diplomatic ceremonials or any of the subtleties of etiquette; it consists solely in reason, justice, truth, the rights of mankind and the interests of the nations of Europe'. Similarly, when Litvinov, who was sent to London by the Bolsheviks to try to obtain British recognition, was not accorded the status that would have been due to a properly accredited diplomat, he claimed 'like Mr Trotsky, I do not attach much importance to matters of etiquette and unnecessary formalities'.[31]

The matter of diplomatic titles has also exercised the minds of revolutionaries over the last 200 years. For many years after winning independence, the United States maintained a studied amateurism in its approach to foreign relations, including keeping many missions at consular level only. During the early years of the French Revolution, proposals were put forward to replace the then current range of diplomatic titles with the single title *nonce de France* (French nuncio), while other questions of etiquette were carefully scrutinised with a view to arriving at politically correct alternatives.[32]

Diplomatic ranks in the Soviet Union were abolished in 1918, being replaced with the single title of Polpred (plenipotentiary). At the same time the Bolsheviks made known their intention to treat equally all foreign diplomats regardless of their ranks. However, as early as 1922, Andrei Sabanin, a member of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs (NKID), had noted the disadvantages of the Soviet policy with regard to diplomatic ranks, arguing that it put Soviet diplomats in an impossible position, since they were unable to claim the status (and associated benefits) to which they were entitled under 'bourgeois' diplomatic norms.[33] This plea, from one of the few Russian diplomats practising before October 1917 to have been allowed to continue, was followed in 1924 by a partial bow to the inevitable: the distinction 'with the title of ambassador' was bestowed upon certain Polpreds. In a more recent case, when Colonel Gaddafi renamed the Libyan embassies 'People's Bureaux' in 1979, this was initially objected to by many receiving states and not accepted by a few, who were concerned that such embassies might have a similarly unorthodox view of their functions.[34]

Key Points

- There have been specific examples of the abuse of diplomacy such as importing arms in the diplomatic bag, supporting terrorist acts in receiving countries and holding diplomats hostage.
- Revolutionary diplomats' contempt for various diplomatic formalities include dress, ceremonials and etiquette.
- Revolutionary states have searched for alternative diplomatic titles and ranks.

CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE

As the discussion to this point suggests, revolutions and revolutionary states pose a multifaceted challenge to diplomacy: a challenge that has its roots in the fundamental ideological incompatibility between the two but that can extend to a wide ranging abuse of diplomatic privileges, a disregard for various diplomatic niceties and a distrust by the revolutionary leadership of even its own professional diplomats. Faced with such a sweeping assault on the basic principles of classical diplomacy, non-revolutionary governments have had little choice but to respond in ways which also undermined the traditional role of the diplomat. These included, for instance, a greater tendency to rely on summit diplomacy with the masters of the revolutionary diplomats on the assumption that there was little point in negotiating with individuals who lacked the freedom and status their non-revolutionary counterparts possessed (see Chapter 19 in this Handbook). There have also been developments of what one might classify as 'track 2 diplomacy', where unofficial meetings of private individuals from the revolutionary state and its non-revolutionary opponents have discussed their differences, the first such meeting taking place in 1960 after the shooting down of the American U2 spy plane over the Soviet Union.[35] In addition, all states have been obliged to play the new game of public diplomacy, to prepare against terrorism and subversion and to engage in the relentless propaganda war that was a basic element in revolutionary diplomacy[36] (see Chapter 35 in this Handbook). They have also felt obliged to respond in kind to restrictions placed upon their own diplomats by revolutionary states. On balance, therefore, the impact of revolutionary states upon the institution of diplomacy has been profoundly negative. No single change in diplomatic practices may be attributed solely to the impact of revolutionary states since other factors, including technology and the imperatives of the modern democratic state, have probably played a greater part, but some impact is undeniable. The same may be said of the larger picture of the evolution of international society in its entirety. As Paul Sharp suggests, international societies in one sense are 'sites of continual arguments about how life is and ought to be organised'.[37] The increasing emphasis on seeking collective solutions to numerous problems – including those identified by revolutionary states – in multilateral negotiations is part of this process and one which, to some extent, may be seen as one of the long term consequences of revolutions.

This, however, is not the whole picture since diplomacy has also had a significant impact upon revolutionary states. A common experience of such states in the immediate aftermath of their revolution has been the discovery that, whatever their longer term aspirations to transform the world in their own image, for the present they had little choice but to accept international society on its own terms unless they desired total isolation. The paradigmatic case here was Soviet Russia. On 14 January 1918, the Bolsheviks arrested the Rumanian Ambassador to Russia but, faced with a unanimous protest by the entire diplomatic corps on the grounds that this violated rules 'respected for centuries by all governments', they released him on the following day.[38] This was the first of numerous adaptations of Soviet diplomacy to the international society within which it found itself unavoidably located. At first such changes, which ranged from adopting the conservative clothing styles of diplomats to agreeing in treaties not to promote revolution, were explained by Soviet ideologues as necessary tactical manoeuvres in a world that was still dominated by enemies of the Revolution. In other words, Moscow was, in theory, pursuing a dual policy in which the objectives remained the same but temporary concessions had to be made to take account of certain unfortunate realities. It was not until the Gorbachev era in

the 1980s that Soviet leaders felt able openly to acknowledge that there might actually be some intrinsic value in the international rules and conventions which they had initially adopted as a cynical tactic. As Gorbachev's foreign minister, Shevardnadze, explained: 'we should not pretend, Comrades, that norms and notions of what is proper, of what is called civilized conduct in the world community do not concern us. If you want to be accepted in it you must observe them'.[39]

It is easy to see why diplomacy has been a particular target of revolutionary states. Especially in its eighteenth and nineteenth century forms, diplomacy represented everything that revolutionary states tend to stand against. It was an activity carried out by aristocrats who saw themselves as the physical incarnation of international society and the upholders of international order and whose role was to endeavour to achieve agreement and compromise solutions through secret negotiations that were to be conducted in accordance with well-established rules of courtesy and etiquette. Furthermore, traditional diplomacy belongs in a world governed by such assumptions as reason of state, the primacy of foreign policy over domestic considerations and the rights of great powers. In its fundamental principles, in its form and in its content, therefore, diplomacy could be seen as the antithesis of revolutionary values and the encounter between the two has been consistently uneasy.

Yet it has been virtually impossible for revolutionary states to avoid becoming involved in conventional diplomacy. However transnational or universal their conception of themselves, they have been unable to escape the only kind of identity that legitimised their existence in the eyes of others: sovereign statehood, a status that conferred benefits as well as obligations. But statehood entailed membership of a society of sovereign states whose chief medium of communication is through diplomacy. Whatever public and private reservations revolutionary states may have had about the operational norms and conventions of diplomacy, in most cases they found it difficult to conduct their formal relations by other means. Revolutions have threatened and, to a limited extent, changed diplomacy but the institution has survived.

Key Points

- Varying responses of non-revolutionary states to the challenges posed by revolutionary states include a greater emphasis on summit diplomacy, public diplomacy and track 2 diplomacy.
- There has been a broad impact of revolutions on international society, including collective responses to some of the issues raised by revolutions.
- There have been violations of diplomatic immunity by several states, including Iran in 1979, despite Islamic injunctions against such violations.
- Once a revolutionary group wins leadership of a state it unavoidably forms part of a world of other states and finds some acceptance of the established practices of the rest of the world is unavoidable – a process one can term 'socialisation'.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has considered the impact of states which, following a revolution, attempt to transfer their revolutionary doctrines to their international relations. The specific effects of this endeavour have included a generally suspicious attitude towards the institution of diplomacy by the revolutionary states and a corresponding concern by established states that the revolutionary state might seek to export its doctrines and practices. From as early as the English Civil War, revolutionary states have seen themselves as representing some larger entity, whether that be the opponents of monarchy, the rights of peoples to live as free nations, the working class or, in Islam, the *umma* – the community of believers. In all of these cases diplomacy has been seen as a form of struggle by the revolutionary states. The responses by the

established powers have at times led to armed conflict, as in the case of the French revolutionary wars, or to the more complex range of confrontations that characterised the Cold War. The many other impacts of revolution on diplomacy have included violations of diplomatic immunity and contempt by the revolutionaries for many of the formal aspects of diplomacy.

One rather pressing question to which this discussion gives rise is whether Islamist extremism in general and the so-called Islamic State (IS) in particular form the latest chapter in the ongoing saga of revolutionary diplomacy. A consistent theme in some Islamist writings since the seventh century has been a particularly bellicose interpretation of the doctrines of *jihad* as requiring struggle against all non-believers until all the world is united in a single caliphate.[40] The notion of a caliphate is itself a denial of the principle that there can be several distinct Muslim states, which, of course, is the claim to legitimacy of IS.

While there can be no denying that IS may be seen as representing the latest twist in the long tale of revolutionary challenges to the prevailing world order, there are several reasons why it is extremely unlikely to rise to the level of threat posed by the French and Russian revolutions. First, all members of the international society of sovereign states share the same interest in preventing any serious contender to an alternative order. Second, as it has in the past, international society is in the process of developing both violent and non-violent means of dealing with the various forms of Islamist extremism. Finally, when the murderous tactics of IS have caused even Al-Qaeda to protest, it is unlikely that any serious attempt will be made to engage in negotiations with IS. While nothing is impossible, it is hard to envisage a scenario where the outside world decides to employ diplomacy with a more civilised IS embarked upon the normal processes of socialisation rather than continuing to work towards its total destruction.

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40

Conference Diplomacy

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INTRODUCTION

Conference diplomacy can be defined as *multiparty diplomatic negotiation*, where diplomatic negotiation can be regarded as an 'exchange of concessions and compensations in a framework of international order accepted by sovereign entities' (Meerts 2015: 11) (see Chapter 17 in this Handbook). Multiparty means complexity, which will have positive and negative effects on the process of give and take between the representatives of the parties involved (Crump and Zartman 2003). One positive effect is the inclusion of stakeholders – that is, those countries and other concerned parties such as intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations – that have an interest in the negotiation process at hand. Including the relevant actors will enhance the probability that the conference's outcomes will be implemented. The negative side of inclusion, however, is the ability of spoilers among the stakeholders to prevent an outcome that is undesirable to them, or to weaken the final agreement in such a way that it will be harmless to their interests and thereby ineffective for the collective whole.

Most conferences nowadays are focal points in a long-term ongoing negotiation process, often in the framework of an intergovernmental organization such as the United Nations, African Union, Gulf Cooperation Council, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Organization of American States, or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (Walker 2004). Being structured and with a history of precedents as well as a perspective of the future, these conferences form relatively stable structures that allow for more or less successful outcomes by protecting the processes (Meerts 2015: 313). The example of the European Union as an intergovernmental and supranational organization shows how important this is for effective decision-making. However, such organizations have an interest in being relevant on their own merits. They might thus give priority to their own needs, instead of those of the community that they represent.

Not all conference diplomacy is undertaken within the framework of international organizations. In cases of conflicts, where negotiation will rather be defined as 'war by peaceful means', conferences can be a one-time event that is not embedded in an international organizational structure. In this case, the negotiation process will be relatively unprotected and thereby more vulnerable to power dynamics. Although unhampered by a bureaucratic structure, the process in such one-time events has to manage without organizational protection, making it vulnerable to failure. Although conference diplomacy is multilateral by definition, bilateral, trilateral, and plurilateral negotiations are essential components of its processes. Plurilateral negotiating, which involves bargaining among several, but not too many, negotiators, will normally be done away from the table, either in corridors or behind closed doors in small rooms, but it might well happen in the conference room during breaks, in so-called 'huddles'. Huddles are flexible groups of negotiators that continuously change, trying to prepare for successful progress during the formal sessions. This interchange between formality and informality is an important characteristic of conference diplomacy, as are the notions of procedural frameworks, which involve such factors as rules and regulations, time and timing, power and persuasion, and diplomatic behavior and political statements (Kaufmann 1996).

This chapter examines conference diplomacy by looking at its evolution, the procedures and processes of international negotiation, the role of negotiators and the countries and organizations that they represent, and negotiators' strategies and tactics, as well as the prospects for conference diplomacy in the near future.

Key Points

- Conference diplomacy is a multilateral diplomatic negotiation process that is often part of an ongoing negotiation process within a multilateral organization.
- The multilateral organization protects the negotiation processes and this protection enhances the effectiveness of negotiation as an alternative to warfare.
- Formal sessions help to keep the order; informal sessions are essential for the give and take and thereby enable progress in the negotiation process.

THE EVOLUTION OF CONFERENCE DIPLOMACY

Tracing the evolution of international diplomatic negotiation from early times shows how some aspects became a regulated multilateral process that supported conference diplomacy. It is evident from ancient clay tablets that negotiators in the Middle East some 5,000 years ago were negotiating and exchanging treaties. In those early times, diplomatic negotiations were bilateral meetings between absolute rulers or the councils of city-states, which sometimes negotiated directly, but normally sent their envoys to bargain with the other party. In Renaissance Italy, the city-states not only used special representatives, but also established more or less permanent diplomatic posts in each other's towns. Diplomacy thus became more regulated, and regulations are, this chapter contends, beneficial for effective negotiation. Machiavelli, who is often portrayed as a manipulative diplomatic player, nonetheless saw the importance of regulating diplomatic relations. Diplomacy thus slowly but surely became more complex, as more adversaries had to deal with more conflicts between them. Negotiation was not always enough to settle disputes, however, so mediators were asked to help the opponents to solve their mutual problems (see Chapter 18 in this Handbook). These third parties were negotiators who either had no stake in the conflict, or were non-contending stakeholders who wanted the conflict to end. The next step was diplomatic negotiations in which more than two parties participated. The most famous of the early conferences were those held in

Westphalia, which ended the Thirty Years War in the Holy Roman Empire of German nations, as well as the Eighty Years War between the Kingdom of Spain and the Republic of the United Netherlands.

The Peace of Westphalia changed the meaning of sovereignty. It was concluded in 1648 through a series of bilateral negotiations in the cities of Münster and Osnabrück, and it declared for the first time that all countries were legally equal. Westphalia is widely seen as the mother of all diplomatic conferences and the beginning of the era of procedural frameworks, because it helped to create more effective negotiation processes as an alternative to warfare (Holsti 1991). Essentially, the conference was an assembly of conferences – that is, the parties came together in official ceremonial meetings and, while these acted as focal points, the real bargaining took place elsewhere, most of the time in secret (see Chapter 36 in this Handbook). In the case of Westphalia, the countries negotiated in each other's places of residence, often indirectly through Italian mediators sent by the Pope and Venice. These officials, who studied the letters handed over to them by the ambassadors who took part in the Westphalia negotiations, often pressed for changes to make the demands more acceptable to their opponent.

Two hundred years later, the Congress of Vienna (1814–15) became the first plurilateral negotiation, although not yet multilateral, as the number of real negotiating parties was kept at five: Russia; Austria; Prussia; Great Britain; and (as a latecomer) France. Interestingly, the rulers realized that they should not exclude a major power like France, even if France had lost the war. Excluded, however, were the other interested countries and parties. They were consulted, but the five did not allow them to be part of the decision-making process. The outsiders were kept busy by salons, operas, ballets, balls, excursions, and fireworks that kept them away from the inner circle, who decided for them. Some middle powers, such as Bavaria, were allowed some influence when they acted as go-betweens.

The Paris Peace Conference of 1919 ended the First World War and became a major event in the history of diplomacy. As with the Vienna conference, representatives of hundreds of sovereignties presented their credentials in Paris, but only five were included in the inner circle: the United States; France; Great Britain; Italy; and Japan. Moreover, the negotiation was de facto trilateral, as Japan did not really participate and Italy's role was comparatively weak. Other countries had a more important role to play in Paris than in Vienna, and voiced their concerns in separate meetings. In that sense, a multilateral process surrounded the 'exclusive zone' of the inner circle comprising the five major players. Some 'outsiders' were particularly successful in overruling the principle of self-determination, including Romania and Poland, which were regarded as functioning as buffers against the Soviet Union and were therefore allowed to annex huge territories with non-nationals such as Hungarians and Ukrainians. Others, such as the fledging major powers of Germany and the Soviet Union, were kept outside the negotiation process. This exclusion from the conference had grave consequences for the future and demonstrates that inclusion helps to create an effective negotiation process, whereas exclusion can be the source of ineffective implementation.

The League of Nations (1919–46) could be regarded as the first fully fledged multilateral negotiation process. It did some good work in resolving territorial questions after the First World War, but in the security field it did not live up to expectations. Until the mid-twentieth century, bilateral, trilateral, and plurilateral negotiations dominated the political and diplomatic scene, like those in Munich in 1938 with Germany, Italy, Great Britain, and France, and during and after the Second World War with the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom. It was only with the San Francisco Conference in 1945, which created the United Nations, that a reasonably effective multilateral diplomatic conference came into existence

(Holsti 1991). Its strong plurilateral nucleus, the United Nations Security Council, helped to reduce complexity and enhance efficiency.

Through the institutionalization of rules and regulations, such organizations enhanced the effectiveness of conference diplomacy and the processes of international negotiation, while also securing and sanctioning their implementation. The growth in the number and quality of international organizations strengthened diplomacy as an instrument in managing international affairs through negotiation instead of warfare (Meerts 2015).

Key Points

- Changes occurred in the understanding of sovereignty and the need for sovereignties to work together because of interdependency.
- There was growth in the number of diplomatic conferences and the creation of international organizations stabilizing international relations between sovereign states.
- As the number of participating states has a negative impact on a negotiation process's effectiveness, the dilemma of inclusiveness and exclusiveness comes to the fore.

THE NATURE OF CONTEMPORARY CONFERENCE DIPLOMACY: PROCESS, PEOPLE, AND POWER

Process

Diplomatic conferences are complex and complicated. They require a process, or rules of procedure, to guide the proceedings of the main actors in the conference – that is, the negotiating parties' delegations, groupings of parties (caucuses), formal and informal mediators and facilitators, president of the overall meeting, the chairs of sub-meetings, and last but not least the secretariat. A draft text has to be prepared in consultation with others. It will then be circulated among those who were not involved in the informal drafting, after which it has to be deposited with the secretariat. The secretariat translates the text into the conference's formal languages and circulates the text as an official document. The text's sponsors give an oral introduction, after which there is a debate. Amendments and sub-amendments might be introduced, circulated, and debated and voted upon. A negotiation working group of country representatives and conference staff could be installed by the president of the conference, and its outcomes will be debated and voted upon by the plenary. After a decision has been taken, delegations might wish to explain their votes or interpret the resolution (Kaufmann 1996).

The negotiation process can be divided into stages, but these will not follow each other in a neat sequential way. Indeed, negotiations tend to be circular – that is, negotiations proceed in a certain direction, then fall back to an earlier stage, usually because countries are hesitant to make decisions early. To negotiate is to take risks, and diplomats are rarely risk-takers, particularly in complex conference situations where their political bosses and their parliament are absent, yet have to be consulted before a negotiation process comes to an end. This, together with the multitude of issues and actors involved, plus the many rules of procedure and a complex, sometimes nontransparent international institution, ensures that the negotiation process in diplomatic conferences is slow and painful. Moreover, elections in democratic countries can topple governments, and even if they do not, it is often wise to stall the negotiation process for a few months before elections, or go to the other extreme and hasten its conclusion. There can also be shifts in the international arena that might have a negative influence on the proceedings, although sometimes the opposite can also be true.

In practice, the negotiation process starts with a pre-negotiation phase, followed by an exploration phase, selection phase, decision-making phase, and a post-agreement or implementation phase. In many organizations these cycles are connected to earlier

negotiation processes, as well as to future ones. The process is part of a wider political process, involving other issues, present, past, and future. The chronology is of great importance. The shadow of the past – that is, positive or negative experiences with the other parties – can either drive the negotiation forward or stall it, and even destroy it. Emotional issues can block progress, even if these issues are rooted in the distant past. Examples of a negative shadow of the past can be found in traumas such as the defeat of the Serbs against the Turks in Kosovo in 1389, the slaughtering of the Armenians in 1915, or more recently the events in the Balkans during the breakup of the former Yugoslavia. In some past cases, including the defeats of the French nobility by the British longbowmen at the battles of Crécy, Poitiers, and Agincourt (in 1346, 1356 and 1415), the events have been digested and have become ongoing good-humored sport between French and British diplomats. In other cases, however, past events, such as the Japanese atrocities during the Second World War, have not been forgotten by the Koreans and the Chinese, and linger over present-day negotiations.

After the pre-negotiation process, which is often the most difficult phase, when adversaries sometimes have to be dragged to the negotiation table, a process of exploration will follow. This process of exploration is very much influenced by culture. Some cultures are very results-oriented and negotiators will feel that they are wasting their time if the real bargaining phase has not begun. Other cultures see it as vital for a good outcome to take a lot of time in getting to know the subject matter and the interests and personalities of the opponents. A mismatch between these perceptions might derail the whole negotiation. The same is true for the selection phase, which is a mixture of exploration and bargaining that avoids finite decision-making. Decision-making concludes the negotiation process as such. Finally, there is the post-negotiation phase, in which the agreement will have to be ratified and implemented.

The main decision-making procedures are unanimity, consensus, and voting. Under unanimity, all parties will have to give a positive vote to the final contract; under consensus, some parties might abstain; and under voting, there can be simple or qualified majority voting. The procedure of decision-making can have an enormous impact on the substance of the agreement, especially if there are numerous parties with different expectations. The more parties there are, the stricter the rules should be for the organization to be an effective decision-making apparatus. Under consensus, parties have veto rights and can therefore easily spoil the process. This spoiling can be limited by introducing decision-making by qualified or even simple majority voting, as opposing countries might then be sidelined. However, even if one group of countries can outvote the others, the countries will normally pretend that consensus has been reached. Neither countries nor people like to lose face. The United Nations Security Council is an interesting example of a combination of a consensus and a voting system. A Security Council resolution will be adopted if nine of the fifteen members are in favor, provided that there is no veto against it.

There are many different ways to approach the process of negotiation (Jönsson 2001). The linear way presented above is very 'Western', as if negotiation is a chess game, with an opening, mid-, and endgame. In China, however, there is the perception that the negotiating process should rather be seen as a spiral, in a circular way, connected to events in the past and the future. Other countries focus on the overlapping interests of the parties, and the question of to what extent there is common ground (Iklé 1964). It is also possible to see the negotiation as a process of concession-making. In Russian culture, concession by one party is often seen as a sign of weakness, while in US culture, concession-making is regarded as a rational way to connect to the other party and to push things forward.

People

A second aspect of diplomatic conferences concerns the role of people. Individual negotiators can influence the outcome of the processes in conference diplomacy. People matter. Of course, this depends very much on their position in the conference proceedings, which country they represent, and how high they are in the hierarchy of their delegation and ministry. It also depends on the culture from which the negotiators come. In cultures with huge power differences, the negotiators' position will be stronger than in egalitarian cultures. The same is true for diplomats from so-called high-context cultures and those from individualistic societies (Cohen 1997).

The role that diplomats hold in conferences has varied over time. Diplomats in bygone centuries were, in theory, even more dependent on their masters than they are today. After a failed negotiation, the absolute ruler might decide to behead the negotiator, or at least to have his beard shaved off. In reality, however, it might well be that the professional diplomat of the past was more influential than his political master. For example, during the Westphalia Conferences (1648), the absolute rulers were far away in their capitals and could hardly connect with their representatives, not least because the civil war was raging around the cities of Münster and Osnabrück. Furthermore, the diplomats had much in common: they spoke the same language (Latin), and had common norms and values of chivalry.

Remarkably, despite the many challenges to professional negotiators discussed above, this common culture shared by European diplomats during the Westphalian period can be recognized within the diplomatic corps of today (see Chapter 14 in this Handbook). Some 300 years later, there is a common diplomatic negotiation culture in the world. Diplomats speak a common language (English, although French is still strongly present), but more importantly, they understand that give and take are absolutely vital.

Although diplomats are representing their country or institution, their nationality is slowly but truly becoming of less importance. They get to know each other, so the usual stereotypes, while not withering away, lose their political significance. Perhaps this is the greatest value of the huge conference diplomacy system: through day-by-day contacts in a strong common context, the shadow of the past has become more and more irrelevant.

One explanation for why the common diplomatic culture faded between Westphalia and today's global system is that professional diplomatic negotiators have always been under threat from politicians, whether sovereign dynasties in the past, or elected and non-elected professional politicians today. Slowly but surely the politicians moved into the realm of conference diplomacy. As one of the first politicians at the negotiating table, Tsar Alexander I of Russia mingled with diplomatic negotiators such as Charles Maurice de Talleyrand, Klemens von Metternich, Karl August von Hardenberg, and Henry Robert Stewart Castlereagh. They were *de jure* ministers, and thus politicians, and they were indeed agents of their imperial and royal masters, or their parliament. De facto, however, they commonly decided on the fate of Europe, with the Tsar as the odd man out. During the course of the eighteenth century, the politicians became more and more influential, but there was still no clear separation between them and the diplomatic negotiators. In Paris in 1919, however, with the presence of US President Woodrow Wilson, French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau, and British Prime Minister David Lloyd George, the rulers themselves obtained a dominant place at the table.

From the Paris conference onwards, politicians started to push the diplomats aside, so that they increasingly became agents who relied on the mandate of their chiefs (see Chapter 7 in this Handbook). On the one hand, this is favorable for the negotiation process in a conference diplomacy setting, as the highest in rank can take decisions without much

consultation with their constituencies, thus enhancing decision-making and making it more effective. On the other hand, however, it is disadvantageous, as these decisions might be taken on the spur of the moment, as was clearly visible in Paris and during negotiations in Munich and Yalta, as well as during the top-level meetings during the Cold War. If the chemistry between leaders is good, as it was between US President Ronald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, the negotiations will proceed in a positive direction. Both leaders, for example, convinced their own delegations to start meaningful negotiations, although their underlings were very hesitant about doing so. This is all the more interesting because the political visions of the two leaders were diametrically opposite. Yet they had a common personal feeling, and this proved to be more important.

Other examples include the good chemistry between French President François Mitterrand and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, or at least a kind of common understanding – even if they have completely opposite opinions – such as between Russia's President Vladimir Putin and German Chancellor Angela Merkel. Yet there are also examples of leaders who dislike(d) each other, such as French President Jacques Chirac and Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi. As politicians often have strong egos, the necessity to defend their reputation might lead to 'egotiation' (Meerts 2015: 219–42), a situation in which the face of the political leader takes precedence over the interests of the country.

Modern communication technology might undermine the position of the diplomatic negotiator: it enhances the growing grip of the political leader on his or her diplomatic agents, and it increases transparency, which limits the professional negotiator's autonomy over the negotiation process, not least because ordinary civil servants and non-state actors can participate or influence negotiations (see Chapter 44 in this Handbook). These 'new' actors seem to be everywhere in diplomatic conferences and in several cases they marginalize diplomatic negotiators to the extent that one can question how meaningful the future diplomat will be. Conference diplomacy might become 'undiplomatized', meaning that common conference norms and values might be ameliorated and diplomatic culture weakened, resulting in negotiations becoming less smooth, more bureaucratized, and perhaps more politicized. This could lead to less-effective international negotiation processes, more stalemates, and more unresolved conflicts. The positive impact of the development of protective regimes might thus be undone by the erosion of the processes themselves (Hale *et al.* 2013).

Power

A third aspect of contemporary conference diplomacy concerns the issue of power. The differences in power between parties in diplomatic conferences are, of course, of great importance in understanding why the process has led to a certain outcome. Power, however, is not one-dimensional. A country can have huge power resources, but that does not mean that it can apply this power to any situation on the ground. There is also 'situational power'. This concept can be relevant to the process of negotiation, which is itself a situational process. This means that diplomats can enhance their structural resources through 'process power', such as looking for allies and support from domestic and international constituencies, being well informed and experienced, or being charismatic and legitimate. Too much power difference can be problematic, but some difference in power can be helpful for reaching satisfactory conclusions (Zartman and Rubin 2000).

Dominant powers can have both negative and positive roles in diplomatic conferences. They can exclude parties, which may lead to unresolved conflicts, as the excluded parties might not be willing to comply in implementing the agreements. Yet dominant powers can

also be the motor behind diplomatic conferences, which would otherwise end in the middle of nowhere. So-called middle powers can help to smooth relationships between the more and the less powerful (see Chapter 23 in this Handbook). However, if the great powers cannot and do not want to cooperate, diplomatic conferences will be of no avail (see Chapter 22 in this Handbook). In many cases, the great powers do not really care about the conflict at hand; rather, they are anxious about the power balance between them and other dominant players in the world. The downfall of the Soviet Union gave rise to a unipolar world, in which the United States assumed that there was no other power to counterbalance it. As a result, the United States believed it had to be the reality on the ground that acted as a barrier against further power expansion, with wars in Afghanistan and Iraq as a consequence. Powerful countries can get entrapped by weaker opponents. A rational decision to take action might lead to an irrational situation in which the less powerful state gains a hold over the more powerful. Entrapment, then, is 'a decision-making process in which [actors] strengthen their commitment to a previously chosen, although failing, course of action to justify or recover their prior investments' (Brockner and Rubin 1985: 5).

Diplomatic conferences help to soften power asymmetry among the negotiating parties. The rules and regulations, common norms and values, and perhaps the organizational culture of the institution might prevent the powerful nations from running amok. Yet in the end, it is politics that decides the outcome of diplomatic conferences. If the permanent members of the UN Security Council are at odds with each other, nothing will move. The situation in Syria since 2011 is an example of the impossibility of putting an end to the fighting if the interested great powers have more opposing than common interests. Non-intervention in Syria is also a signal of the enhanced awareness of the Security Council's permanent members about the dangers and consequences of interventions. They recognize the potential for entrapment. Powerful actors use and misuse diplomatic conferences for their own interests. Yet these conferences allow the smaller powers to gain some shelter against the stronger countries' overt power. When part of a conference, smaller powers cannot be totally overlooked, hence the smaller countries' interest in the process of European conference diplomacy. They are an institutional part of the negotiation process and, although their position can be more or less ignored at the very end, being ignored completely will not be likely. If Germany, France, and the United Kingdom agree on the necessity for certain steps, not much can be brought against them. Decisions will be made according to their wishes. If they cannot agree, however, the process of European conference decision-making will come to a dead end, and countries will have to wait for, or work on, the political or economic context to change. The strength of the international organization thus plays an important role in equalizing the power differences of the member states through common rules, regulations, understandings, and values. It prevents the major powers from forcing smaller powers into agreements that weaker member states do not like. This, in turn, enhances the confidence of the small countries – and most EU members are small – in a fair outcome, therefore enhancing the effectiveness of the negotiation processes.

Key Points

- There are different stages in the negotiation process, such as exploration and decision-making. The lengths of these stages vary by culture.
- The position, character, experience, and ego of negotiators have quite an impact on the flow and outcome of the negotiation process.
- Power is important and can be structural and situational. In some cases situational power proves to be more effective than structural power resources, thereby enhancing the chances of minor parties being the winner.

PERSPECTIVES ON CONFERENCE DIPLOMACY: PRESENT AND FUTURE

One of the earliest examples of negotiation analysis is *The Art of Negotiating with Sovereign Princes*, by the French diplomat François de Callières (Callières 1716). After the Second World War, research on negotiation increased. A range of academics tried to qualify or quantify the processes of international negotiation, both inside and outside diplomatic conferences. The main aim of all these studies is to explain the outcome by the process that unfolded. This approach was, and still is, problematic. There are so many factors of influence, from the characteristics of the process itself, the people and parties involved, to the organizational and power-related context in which these negotiations flow to their end-stage. Moreover, research on these factors continues to be difficult to conduct. A fundamental issue remains the practitioners' unwillingness to allow researchers (and trainers) to sit in on real negotiation processes. Another problem concerns methodology: for example, the impact of culture on the researcher's analysis and on the trainer in diplomatic negotiation. It is hardly possible to have a value-free approach. Perhaps this is not disastrous in itself, so long as those involved are well aware of their biases. Moreover, these various problems can be addressed in international academic conferences, negotiation programs, and through international academic journals such as *International Negotiation*. For example, the Processes of International Negotiation (PIN) program tries to explain the mechanics of conference diplomacy by mainly qualitative analysis, while the Group Decision and Negotiation (GDN) program focuses more on the quantitative aspects.

Training for conference diplomats is essential in order for them to be as effective as possible in defending the interests of their country or organization. Parallel to research on negotiation, seminars on training diplomats have gradually come to the fore. Understanding the importance of diplomacy in establishing a powerful position in Europe, Cardinal de Richelieu founded the first diplomatic academy in 1626. Negotiation seminars for diplomats were, however, slow to develop. While many diplomatic academies were established after the Second World War – with an exception being the diplomatic academy of Vienna, which was established in 1754 as the 'Oriental Academy' – training on conference diplomacy was in short supply. There were seminars for commercial negotiation, but the first seminars for diplomats only appeared in the 1960s, mainly in the form of simulation games. It was only in the 1990s that real diplomatic negotiation training came to flourish, and even today it is a scarce commodity. Interestingly enough, one would expect practitioners to help researchers to understand the intricacies of diplomatic bargaining, while researchers would then instruct the trainers, who could thereby train new practitioners. This is, however, not the case. These three specializations – practitioners, researchers, and trainers – stand alone and seldom exchange their findings. Simulated negotiations are of great help, and attempts to come as close as possible to reality are quite successful, but in the end it is not the real thing. Nevertheless, for those who want to get a feel for conference diplomacy, the family board game 'Diplomacy' is the best experience one can get, although friendships might be damaged forever (Sharp 1978). It is said to be the favorite board game of Henry Kissinger!

As for conference diplomacy itself, its future role is not expected to diminish. Indeed, it will be of greater significance in the coming years, as its alternative – warfare – is becoming more and more costly in terms of human and material losses. While two-thirds of the conflicts in the last 50 years have been decided through conference diplomacy, one-third was ended by military victory by one party over the other (Mack 2007: 35). This trend of the growing significance of ending conflicts through words instead of weapons is expected to continue in the coming decades

(*Conflict Barometer* 2012: 2–3). However, the nature of diplomatic negotiation and conference diplomacy will change. Diplomats are expected to play a less prominent role, outflanked by politicians on the one hand and ordinary civil servants on the other (Melissen and van Staden 2000). Moreover, one sees the growing influence of non-state actors, from non-governmental organizations to individuals working through social media. The impact of these constituencies on conference diplomacy will grow accordingly, and, along with more transparency, diplomatic negotiations will be more boxed in and lack the relative autonomy needed to be effective.

In view of the observations above, a few recommendations are useful. First, it would be wise to give researchers and trainers access to real negotiation processes in diplomatic conferences. By studying the flow of these processes and the diplomats' behavior, valuable material for analysis and thereby for training new practitioners can be obtained. Additionally, these negotiation experts could be used as process consultants during conference diplomacy sessions, as miscommunication, mismanagement of the proceedings, and bad strategies and tactics are major problems in negotiation. Conferences often fail because of negotiators' inability to oversee the situation and to understand the real significance of their opponents' internal and external positions.

Second, the diplomat might specialize further and become the main communicator in the process of merging the interests of countries and organizations into one outcome by which all the parties can abide. This means that the diplomat will have to connect more effectively with other civil servants and representatives who operate in the international arena, instead of focusing so much on diplomatic colleagues, which might breed 'group-think', becoming too inward-looking. If diplomats do not become more outward-looking, they will make themselves irrelevant in the future.

Third, diplomats will have to manage their political masters and their constituencies, and the media, in a more modern and forthcoming way, which will not be easy. Public diplomacy is of the essence here, as the populace back home, and sometimes the politicians as well, have no real understanding of the possibilities and impossibilities of the negotiation process.

Last but not least, conference diplomacy itself will have to be reformed, and this might prove to be the most difficult task of all. This can be seen with the ongoing problems in reforming the UN Security Council, the EU's struggle to restructure itself in order to be more effective after enlargement, and the failed attempts to make the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) more effective in the face of Chinese moves to claim islands in the South China Sea. Reforming the conferences themselves is difficult. It involves political will, and political will depends on synergy among the member states' interests, and the (im)balance between cooperation and competition. The world's growing interdependence stresses the need for closer cooperation. In order to cooperate more effectively, conference diplomacy is still one of the most important instruments in helping to create some world order. This order is not self-evident and eternal. 'Every international order must sooner or later face the impact of two tendencies challenging its cohesion: either a redefinition of legitimacy or a significant shift of the balance of power' (Kissinger 2014: 365). It is up to conference diplomacy to manage these changes.

Key Points

- Practitioners, researchers, and trainers should try to work more closely together in order to enhance the effectiveness of conference diplomacy.
- It would be useful to find some kind of arrangement that will harmonize relationships among politicians, diplomats, and civil servants.
- The effectiveness of many diplomatic conferences and organizations will have to be enhanced for them to remain important international players, but as they often have to reform themselves, not much can be expected from this modernization.

CONCLUSION

Conference diplomacy is a paradox: it is the most legitimate and inclusive mode of diplomatic negotiation and therefore the most representative, but the multitude of actors limits its effectiveness. Conference diplomacy is of great importance. The future depends on the decisions that countries and organizations take concerning, for example, climate change, the global economy, and the internal and external conflicts that abound. Negotiations inside and outside diplomatic conferences are the most effective tool for dealing with the opposing and concurring needs of all the parties involved. Both the number of issues and parties are growing. Conference diplomacy started some 300 years ago, but established its organizational format only 100 years ago. It is therefore a relatively recent phenomenon in human history. It is enormously helpful in protecting the vulnerable process of international negotiation from failure, thereby creating a legitimate and valid alternative to violence.

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41

City Diplomacy

Michele Acuto

DIPLOMACY, BY *CITIES*?

It is now commonplace, well beyond studies of architecture and planning, to hear the claim that 'more than half of the world's population lives in urban areas' and that by 2050 this might grow to as much as two-thirds of humanity.[1] Today cities are seen as critical engines driving the global economy, global information flows and the worldwide mobility of goods and people. We can now comfortably argue that urban issues overlap extensively with some key areas of international affairs. For quite some time, just a few scholars of international relations theory (IR) and global governance have recognised this (Alger 1990; Hobbs 1994; Amen et al. 2011; Acuto 2010). The growing global emphasis on cities is also taking place beyond the discipline where the fascination for the 'urban age' is rampant (Brenner and Schmid 2014). A critical question for the diplomatic studies community is therefore whether we can associate diplomacy, as practice as much as an institution, to cities.

In this chapter I argue that the idea of 'city diplomacy' (van der Pluijm and Melissen 2007) is an apt testing ground for the intersection between diplomatic and urban practices. When considering the intricate possibilities of city diplomacy we confront the limitations of our traditional views of international relations (as the domain of the 'international system') and of our established diplomatic institutions (as the structure of mediated politics among nations). City diplomacy helps us expand this narrow horizon, reacquaint ourselves with the *long durée* of world politics, and appreciate the networked patterns that cities are weaving in international affairs. To make this argument the chapter explores the long affair between cities and diplomacy, the challenges in studying city diplomacy, the advances and limitations of practices of city diplomacy and concludes with observations about its future.

CITIES AND DIPLOMACY: A LONG AFFAIR

Many contemporary accounts of the international activities of cities tend to focus on the present and future. Talk of the urban age and of the possibilities of 'smart', 'networked' or 'innovative' cities all too often obscures the past that led to this urbanised world. By contrast, planning, geography and urban studies often account for the long-lived impact of cities. One of the great contemporary urbanists, Peter Hall, dedicates countless pages to illustrate the intertwined evolution of 'cities in civilization' (1998) and to how some cities in particular, those he termed 'world cities' (Hall 1966), are now critical nodes in aggregating and mobilising the human condition. Likewise, Peter Taylor illuminates the possibility of 'putting cities first' in the description of civilisations and international orders. As Taylor argues in his book *Extraordinary Cities*, cities are and have always been linked to other cities and other places, and this connectivity is not just a feature of present-day conditions, but of millennia of geopolitical 'tangos' with states, empires and global processes (Taylor 2013). Cities, in short, are a permanent feature of (world) politics.

As I have argued elsewhere with my colleague Parag Khanna (Acuto and Khanna 2013), to appreciate the political role of the city in the twenty-first century, we must remember that cities are arguably humanity's oldest diplomatic actors. Ancient Mesopotamian and Anatolian cities engaged in regular exchanges of envoys to establish mutual recognition and trade missions. Medieval and Renaissance diplomacy was similarly dominated by city-states, particularly in Italy and northern Europe with the Hanseatic League, whose intense diplomatic competition and interactions helped to undermine the Holy Roman Empire, while fuelling the commercial revolution and voyages of exploration across the Atlantic and to Asia. Even after the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, widely marked as the transition to sovereign nation-states, diplomacy remained a heterogeneous affair until the post-Napoleonic Congress of Vienna in 1815. Nation-states have therefore only been the (nearly) exclusive diplomatic actors for less than two centuries. Even then cities (and other sub-national entities) have continuously maintained regular 'paradiplomatic' (Aldecoa and Keating, 1999) contacts on disparate matters, ranging from environmental management (through organisations such as United Cities and Local Governments, or UCLG) or nuclear disarmament (through Mayors for Peace) (see Chapters 7, 8 and 49 in this Handbook).

Studying city diplomacy, then, tells us a broader story of world politics than much of the discipline of IR: cities have historically conducted diplomatic activities, such as communication and representation, far beyond the life of the nation-state Westphalian system. We can speak of a city 'diplomacy' (following from Nicolson 2001 and Jönsson and Hall 2005) here because: (1) city representatives are connecting and negotiating internationally on behalf of (political) constituencies; (2) this involves embassies and envoys, as well as heads of (local) government; and (3) it involves mediation and agreement by cities both between third party actors as well as on their own behalf.[2] In this sense, early modern Italian city-states played a critical role in the development of these core notions of diplomatic relations. Frigo (2000) provides solid evidence that in the Italian peninsula, Florence, Mantua, Modena or 'city kingdoms' like Naples, developed diplomatic instruments and foreign relationships with each other. There is a heritage of diplomatic activities developed over many centuries that is reflected in contemporary diplomatic studies of economic diplomacy, small state diplomacy, religious diplomacy and international negotiation and mediation (see Chapters 45, 24, 47, 17 and 18 in this Handbook). Similarly, studies of earlier diplomatic activities by cities include security and secret diplomacy (see Chapter 36 in this Handbook). Robert Finlay's account of *Venice*

Besieged (2008) documents the intricate and refined diplomatic web of the Serenissima (the Republic of Venice) throughout its spice trade wars, clashes with other Mediterranean city-states, and diplomatic manoeuvring during the Ottoman–Habsburg conflict. In short, while often presented as 'new', innovative and future-oriented, city diplomacy is in practice a stable feature of world politics beyond international relations.

This is, however, only a partial and Northern-biased account of the long history of city diplomacy. As with the issue of power and the demand for comprehensive review of the urban 'imprint' on global governance, the historiography of city diplomacy is conspicuously absent from libraries and class reading lists. The ultimate book on the deep legacy of cities on the formation, change and ultimately future of diplomacy remains to be written, and likewise the city diplomacy of the countries included in the 'Global South' (Parnell and Robinson 2012) is badly in need of closer, systematic and critical attention.

Key Points

- The international role of cities is well acknowledged in disciplines other than International Relations theory (IR), but a systematic *political* analysis of this is lacking.
- Many contemporary diplomatic instruments and practices, such as economic diplomacy and secret diplomacy, have a heritage in earlier city diplomacy.

THE SCHOLARSHIP AND ITS LIMITS

The major challenge that diplomatic analysts face at present is the limitations of a scholarship on city diplomacy. When looking for explicit analysis of the *diplomatic* practices of cities (not just international connections, branding or networking), researchers generally face a paucity of analysis. To date, just a handful of authors and institutions have dealt directly with this topic. For instance, the Netherlands Institute of International Affairs has undertaken some preliminary explorations of city diplomacy (van der Pluijm and Melissen 2007), seeking to categorise the modalities and domains in which cities perform international relations. Likewise, in the US, Chad Alger (2010) has unpacked the formation of a few 'early' inter-state organisations of local governments, like the International Union of Local Authorities (IULA) or Metropolis, specifically examining their relation to the UN system. Overall, the scholarship on the 'external relations' (Alger 1990) of cities is scattered across a few academic disciplines other than IR. And within IR, systematic attention to the intersection between cities and the core institutions of diplomacy, as understood in this Handbook, is only tangential to other geopolitical considerations.

That said, some of the paradiplomacy debates of the 1990s, albeit rarely theorising city diplomacy *per se*, left important theoretical propositions which can inform the study of city diplomacy. In the context of these discussions on the foreign relations of sub-national entities, Brian Hocking (1993) introduced a particularly relevant perspective on the growing influence of non-traditional diplomatic actors. While criticising the idea of paradiplomacy he described the political geography of diplomacy as a 'multilayered' context, within which states *and* non-central governments can project their interests at both the international and national level. Similar to Geoff Wiseman's idea of 'polylateral diplomacy' (2010) as the international relations between governmental and 'non-official entities', Hocking (1993: 3) described international relations as a multilevel political environment spanning subnational, national and international arenas, 'where the achievement of goals at one level of political activity demands an ability to operate in the others'. Shedding new light upon the complexities of diplomacy in the variegated political landscape of the late twentieth century, this view offers interesting possibilities for studying the diplomacy of cities.

This is not to say, however, that broader analyses of cities' external relations are of no use to understanding the diplomatic role of cities. It is important to acknowledge that there is some solid, albeit often overlooked, literature on the capacity of cities to link across state boundaries with peers, non-governmental entities and multilateral bodies. This is not limited to urban studies and historical accounts of cities and civilisations. Rather, it is in geography that a prolific set of scholars, like Michele Betsill and Harriet Bulkeley (2004), have engaged with the role of transnational municipal networks, or simply 'city networks' in environmental politics. This body of literature, mostly developed in the early 2000s, points to how cities are developing networked urban connectivity in global governance in order to cope with the limitations of the international system and the constraints of economic downturns.

Considering the implication for global environmental governance by, not just *in*, global cities (like Los Angeles), Bulkeley and Schroeder (2012: 744) have sought to demonstrate the need to go beyond the great divide, arguing that roles of international actors (as state or non-state) and forms of authority (public or private) are 'not pre-given, but [are] determined through the process of governing' – a statement that hits at the heart of the assumption that 'diplomacy' is a nation-state affair. This once again echoes the reality sketched by Hocking, and the complex diplomatic engagements in which cities are entangled. In this sense, a focus on city diplomacy opens up exciting possibilities for meaningful and transferable considerations for IR as a whole, not simply diplomatic studies.

Following this pathway, younger interdisciplinary scholars have recently ventured prolifically into the creation and international politics of city networks. This is now a useful and provocative collection of emerging work that could make the study of city diplomacy even more relevant to academic and policy research. For instance, Taedong Lee (2013) and Sofie Bouteligier (2012) unpack the inner dynamics of city networks, and illustrate how the logic and the factors that drive local governments' transnational activities may differ from those of nation-states, and constitute a new force in twenty-first-century world politics (also see Gordon 2013 and Setzer 2014). Likewise, Simon Curtis (2011) illustrates how the rise of global cities challenges IR scholars 'to consider how many of the assumptions that the discipline makes about the modern international system are being destabilised'.

These are just some of the works by young interdisciplinary scholars that are blazing a trail for the current (and next) generation of international and diplomatic scholars. We can now embrace the complexity of city diplomacy, its networked impact and the many pressing questions that the rise of cities in world affairs is putting on the front pages of many key journals in the field. So, as the public as well as major international actors turn their attention to the role of mayors in world affairs, we are now required to offer a scholarly and understandable assessment of the diplomatic capacity of cities. The extent, collective impact and influence of city networks on global governance is largely limited to case studies and rare comparative investigations: we now need more systematic and critical appraisals of the actual impact of city diplomacy.

Key Points

- In, and beyond, IR 'city diplomacy' is still a scattered and anecdotal scholarship.
- Yet, some theoretical developments are now well rooted in human geography and the study of city networks.
- There is an encouraging 'new generation' of city diplomacy scholars emerging in IR.

CITIES AND DIPLOMATIC INSTITUTIONS

The emerging research, public interest and historical roots of the urbanisation of society all point to the possibilities for a productive

scholarship of city diplomacy. However, we should not assume that these academic limitations mean there is a lack of city diplomacy practice. On the contrary, cities in developing and developed countries have to date sustained city diplomacy efforts across a wide range of global challenges. For instance, United Cities and Local Government (UCLG), which covers over 1000 cities and 155 national urban networks, has had for nearly a decade a formal Committee on Development Cooperation and City Diplomacy, tasked with proposing and developing policies on issues related to local government international development cooperation and international relations. Amidst other tasks, the Committee has been liaising directly with the OECD to set up a structural mechanism to monitor the effectiveness of aid on local governments throughout the world. UCLG has now a substantial advocacy role on the OECD Working Party on Aid Effectiveness and the United Nations Development Cooperation Forum, and likewise it has had continuing lobbying efforts for greater city input in the Sustainable Development Goals process. The network aims to condense and communicate key policy messages on aid from the vast UCLG membership, sustain participation in international conferences and meetings, and foster common efforts. This highlights how cities are not only individual diplomatic actors, but rather, as many other international players in this Handbook, can also create transnational structures like city networks that have the ability, as per UCLG's mission, to 'represent and defend the interests of local governments on the world's stage'.

While encouraging, these efforts often remain rather limited to discussions between municipal officers, or between cities, international organisations and business entities. Little space is left for evaluation of their overall effectiveness, especially in concert with academic research. Moreover, little is being done to satisfy the demand for systematic diplomatic training to better prepare this burgeoning cadre of 'more-than-local' municipal officers. If we want to step beyond rhetoric and develop a critical and useful scholarship of city diplomacy, it is crucial to start by mapping how this practice compares with discussions within diplomatic studies about the 'essence of diplomacy' (Jönsson and Hall 2005). In order to do so, I rely here on a brief overview of the role of cities vis-à-vis two sets of the main 'diplomatic institutions' contained in this Handbook: embassies (see Chapter 12 in this Handbook) and international recognition.

Embassies, Foreign Offices and Ambassadors

Cities have been showcasing a limited but steady capacity to develop a number of diplomatic institutions, which are similar in form to embassies and diplomatic corps, and which are now part of cities' international outreach and international organisation. To begin with, while rarely associated with them, cities have a variety of bodies that in form and function present very close parallels to the diplomatic staples of the 'embassy' and the 'foreign office' (see Chapter 5 in this Handbook). In major global cities, such as Tokyo or Paris, these are represented by dedicated international relations offices tasked specifically with promoting the city abroad and forging cross-national connections. These offices take the shape of either paradiplomatic branches of the city council or, in an increasing number of instances, public–private bodies set up specifically for promotion, public diplomacy and networking purposes. For example, in the British capital, the Mayor of London in April 2011 launched London & Partners, which is a not-for-profit public–private partnership, with additional support from key commercial partners like the Barclays group. It was set up to link the remits of the capital's three promotional agencies – Think London, Study London and Visit London – into one single public diplomacy body for London, capable

of representing the city with one voice to all audiences in the UK and internationally, and therefore building the city's international reputation and global business network (see Chapter 35 in this Handbook).

Different from (and in addition to) more traditional paradiplomatic activities, these institutions at the city level focus on cultural-economic activities rather than systematising networks of cooperation or promoting political connections. Not surprisingly, the self-professed mission of London & Partners is 'to tell London's story brilliantly'. It is important, then, to acknowledge how cities have become increasingly proficient at fostering business, commercial, inter-municipal, and more broadly 'non-traditional' international linkages beyond just setting up policy collaborations.

Another example of the cities developing their own diplomatic institutions is New York City's global arm. Formerly 'The Sister City Program of the City of New York, Inc.', the now New York City Global Partners, Inc. is a not-for-profit body set up in 1962 by the Mayor's Office for International Affairs to connect the City of New York with 'other leading world cities by promoting exchange among policymakers and citizens alike'. So, while the Office for International Affairs is designed to maintain international linkages, Global Partners Inc. tends to focus more on forging and fostering (profitable) connections with a wider array of non-governmental actors. The programme was originally based on the model of Sister Cities International, a non-profit citizen diplomacy network active since 1956, and was developed to systematise relationships with Beijing, Budapest, Cairo, Jerusalem, Johannesburg, London, Madrid, Rome, Santo Domingo and Tokyo. In 2006, the programme was restructured and renamed to engage with additional foreign cities and extend more explicitly into the business sector, engaging in substantive programming with more than one hundred cities, fostering not only city-to-city cooperation but also student exchange, and international summits in New York that have engaged numerous cities and international business actors.

The experience of London and New York points to a broader trend. While cities have for a long time focused on city-to-city cooperation only (in particular in the last century), the practices of city diplomacy and city networking generally are now expanding beyond the 'sister city' approach, demonstrating greater 'catalytic diplomacy' (Hocking 2004) initiatives aimed at pooling a variety of actors, governmental and non-government, towards an urban agenda for international affairs.

International Recognition, Summitry and Collaboration

International endeavours, whether by states or other actors, demand two-way communications and the establishment of a common 'playing field' on which to 'mediate the estrangement' (Der Derian 1987) among international players. Cities are not exempt from this need for *international recognition*, another key institution of diplomacy. Once again there is evidence here of cities playing a prominent role in world politics.

This starts with an urban shift away from just national politics. Amidst many international bodies, the European Commission is, for instance, increasingly targeting cities as important (para) diplomatic actors and cornerstones of the EU's subsidiarity principle even in external affairs. For example, the 2012 EU–China Mayors' Forum promoted an 'EU–China Urbanisation Partnership' to address urbanization challenges in China through cooperative EU–China efforts between stakeholders at national, regional and local levels. The Forum was convened in the spirit that: 'Given the array of challenges they face in adapting to the "urban century," China and Europe have a strong interest in working together to build better cities'. While still representative of a national (or regional) project *on*, rather than *by*, cities, this is one of the many instances of enrolment and thus

recognition of local government in processes aimed at reinforcing international cooperation and stability. The Forum included EU and Chinese mayors and a variety of delegations of city planners, local businesses and NGOs, and was devised to share experience in sustainable, integrated and efficient urban solutions. While purely consultative, peer-to-peer connections, paradiplomatic exchanges between local governments and urban stakeholders, involving, for instance, the Chinese Association of Mayors and the European Covenant of Mayors in a range of cross-sector activities and multi-player events, all hold important potential to manage geopolitical shifts and East–West relations. While the state level often suffers directly the turbulence of geopolitics, at the city level technical, exchange and collaboration networks can persist similarly to 'track II' initiatives now common in diplomacy. In this spirit, the Forum tackled a number of the challenges that modern cities face, such as increasingly mobile urbanites, increased traffic and problems of waste management. Likewise, it revealed possible avenues for city-driven cooperation between China and Europe in meeting the demands of China's urban billion.

Increased international recognition for city diplomacy has also been the result of vast summitry activities by cities since the early nineties (see Chapter 19 in this Handbook). Beyond the 'potential' influence of top-down initiatives like the EU–China Mayors' Forum, cities themselves have been very industrious in maintaining regular international fora, and even more importantly in producing extensive and sometimes innovative international frameworks (for cooperation but also standard setting) out of these. As I have argued elsewhere (Acuto 2013a), an example of this type of regime-building capacity is the Istanbul Water Consensus – an initiative by Istanbul Mayor Kadir Topbaş and ICLEI that now gathers more than 1,000 cities across more than 56 countries. Building on the 'Local Government Declaration on Water' of 2006 (promoted by Mexico City) – which expressed local leaders' awareness concerning water and sanitation and called on national governments for more effective sustainability partnerships – the Consensus not only advocates urban solutions with central governments, but also undertakes comprehensive assessments and inventories of water policies to facilitate city diplomacy exchanges. Examples such as the Water Consensus indicate the increase in mayor-sponsored regimes, particularly the ones that in addition to their regulatory purposes also aim to pool resources in order to expand the policy-making capacity of the group and individual cities.

Cities are increasingly demanding that international audiences take them and their worldview much more seriously, while substantiating these requests with clear diplomatic outcomes like the Water Consensus. The sprawl in city-based networking and the growing enmeshment of city politics with key transnational actors like the World Bank certainly suggest that cities are playing an ever-increasing role in safeguarding urban security. Equally, it testifies the recognition of cities by multilateral bodies, and not just states, reinforcing the capacity of cities to be meaningful 'actors' in international processes. The recently launched Global Network for Safer Cities (GNSC) is a case in point. Led by the United Nations, the GNSC aims to equip local authorities and urban stakeholders with the tools to deliver and maintain urban security. GNSC follows the footsteps of successful examples of city-to-city cooperation like the C40 Group or Eurocites, which are today quite active components in the international response to issues like climate change, inequality and diversity. The UN system's attention is demonstrating here not only recognition, but also trust in the capacity of cities to deliver international frameworks (regimes and institutions) that emphasise the networked influence of cities in global governance.

Pooling their network power, cities seem to be increasingly capable of responding to pressing challenges arising locally and globally.

For instance, GNSC is progressively formalising the large pool of cities (77 in 24 countries), and the UN is already providing technical support in terms of improving urban safety. Likewise, global networks can have a 'web-bing' networked effect at a national and local level: GNSC has already received firm commitments for national sub-networks on Safer Cities in several key countries affected by urban insecurity like Mexico, Colombia and South Africa. GNSC is not alone in this effort. For example, the European Forum on Urban Security has been connecting municipalities and non-governmental actors in the sphere of urban safety ever since 1987, and with 250 European members it is a solid networking entrepreneur in prompting joint training and city-to-city learning.

Key Points

- Cities have (para)diplomatic branches comparable to classic diplomatic corps institutions, but the overall trends are pushing towards more and more 'quango' international affairs bodies focused more specifically on public diplomacy.
- Cities have a growing recognition by states and multilateral organisations as legitimate actors in international cooperation.
- This recognition is coupled with a growing buy-in for their capacity to forge networked structures for cross-regional collaboration.

CITY DIPLOMACY: PAST, PRESENT, FUTURE AND BLINDSPOTS

Embassies, summits, public diplomacy, regimes and mediated activities all point to the mounting evidence, and success, of city diplomacy in the present world order. Nonetheless, if in aggregate the diplomatic role of cities scores quite favourably in terms of traditional diplomatic institutions, there remain some substantial diplomatic 'blindspots' that neither the city diplomacy literature or practice seem to address with much accuracy.

As with many other subnational diplomatic actors, the diplomatic role of cities raises the problem of representation. In some cases, city leaders are elected by constituencies that include not only national citizens, but also urban residents more generally. For instance, in the UK, registered European Union residents generally bear the same rights as citizens in electing mayors (as in the Greater London Authority), and in Sweden voting for local elections is allowed for all foreign residents with a three years residence. This is not the norm, but representation is also complicated by the fact that, owing to the political nature of their positions, most active mayors in international affairs would not be considered legitimate international representatives of their metropolises by all of their constituents (see Chapter 21 in this Handbook).

Critical for a more complete understanding of the diplomatic impact and capacity of cities is also a more systematic study of their international legal dimension (see Chapter 15 in this Handbook). Work by Israeli lawyer Yishai Blank (2005) on 'the city and the world' represents a rarity for its legalistic account of localities as a 'normative mediator between the world and the state' and for its analysis of how metropolises intersect with a variety of 'spheres' of international law. Yet these considerations are extremely limited and demand closer attention by the diplomatic community. Issues of legality, representation and normative mediation stand at the heart of those processes of international legitimacy, regime building and transnational collaboration and will define the diplomatic influence of cities in the current global order.

This leads to one last important theoretical blindspot that demands closer attention: the issue of power. Undoubtedly, the growing interest in urban issues as part of global sustainability, development or security discussions affects the study and practice of international relations and diplomacy. A small example of this is that the United Nations Secretary General recently appointed former New York Mayor Michael

Bloomberg – who has been chairing the influential global network of cities called Climate Leadership Group (C40) – to become the UN Special Representative for Cities and Climate Change. Although evidence from initiatives like C40 or institutions like the UN indicates that cities are having a growing *influence* on international affairs this consideration is, at the moment, rarely followed by its logical counterpart, the question of power. Do cities have growing *power* over international relations and diplomatic affairs? And, equally, what are the sources, media and modes of cities' power in world politics? As a recent book edited by Simon Curtis (2014) points out, we need to pay closer attention to the mechanisms that are empowering cities to stand the ground of other international actors and stake rightful claims to take part in global governance. This means charting a clearer agenda to understand the power that cities have to partake in both traditional (e.g. UN) and non-traditional (e.g. city networks) international processes. As such, diplomatic scholars should pay equal attention not only to cities' power *over* international affairs (in terms of coercive clout), or power *to* influence diplomatic processes (in terms of potential capacity). Rather, there is also mounting evidence that cities can leverage a form of power *with* other cities, NGOs and business (in terms of shared coercion and potential) – a 'network power' (Acuto 2010) that, while not so 'soft' as it might appear, is a critical tool for diplomatic influence. Overall, all too often the popularity of cities is only matched by superficial attention to the global trends of urbanisation, forgetting the (long) past of city diplomacy, barely unpacking its (extensive) international practices, and turning a blind eye to thornier issues such as legality, representativeness and power.

Once we have acknowledged the limitations and blindspots of current inquiries into city diplomacy, we can then start focusing a more systematic eye on how the role of mayors in the twenty-first century is changing, and how the participation of city leaders in policymaking at the international level is endowing them with influence formerly reserved for diplomatic officials at the state level. The trend toward urbanisation seems unlikely to lose speed in the near future, and so mayors will likely continue to increase their policymaking clout. Thus analytical frameworks for studying international relations and global governance must adapt to a new reality: one where non-state actors, including cities and their leaders, are exerting increasing influence over the means and goals of international diplomacy.

Were we to end our assessment of the diplomatic capacity of cities at the institutions of the embassy and the foreign office, the picture painted above would most definitely be a rather partial and structuralist one. On the contrary, the diplomatic practices of cities, even more than their ambassadorial capacity, are well entrenched in global challenges and transnational processes and well rooted into the international system. As I suggest above, city diplomacy has a long-lived history and a pervasive network presence in global governance. Yet, the systematic appreciation of cities in diplomatic studies, if not more broadly in IR, rarely goes beyond the rhetoric of the 'urban age' and some sporadic attention to the negotiations of city networks. This is an evident limitation: the state of the art of city diplomacy, in academia and policy research, is lagging far behind the momentous emergence of cities as international actors. The wind might be changing, but there is still much theoretical and empirical terrain to be covered.

Key Points

- The legal status and legal implications of city diplomacy are at present largely overlooked with possibly critical accountability and political consequences.
- There is a need for a more systematic assessment of city diplomacy's range of 'coercive' and 'soft' powers (power *over, to* and *with*) in international processes.

CONCLUSION

By looking back at the past of city diplomacy we can appreciate a story that stretches far deeper into the history of civilisation than the study of the international system might suggest. The diplomatic entrepreneurship of cities reminds diplomatic and international studies of a key necessity: moving beyond the classic notions of 'international system' and 'diplomacy' is a near mandatory step in order to appreciate the complexity of the emergence of cities in world politics. This move is not necessarily a rejection of IR's core tenets: cities do interact with, and in many instances benefit from, the system of state-centric institutions and processes that is still shaping much of world politics. Likewise, cities do mirror, and seek recognition from, the international system (Bouteligier 2012).

If we contemplate present city diplomacy we are then confronted with a changing, but somewhat hopeful, scenario. Cities have a demonstrated track record in terms of transnational networking, agenda-setting and resource mobilisation. This all points to a substantial capacity to confront global challenges via city diplomacy, whether international processes are stalling or not. Equally, multiple generations of city networks signify the capacity of cities to adapt, at least in part, to the changing nature of international relations: city diplomacy has withstood the ebbs of the international order by partly shifting its modalities, adapting to the neoliberal climate of world affairs, and by benefiting from the new geographies of globalisation. As illustrated above, this has predominantly taken the shape of a move from sister cities connections to city-to-city cooperation and polylateral city networking with IGOs and NGOs, linking deeply with the corporate and industry worlds, and cutting across the spectrum of global governance from environment, to culture or security. If we look towards the future of city diplomacy, finally, we can likely see how cities are weaving a networked texture of trans-national, inter-national and sub-national connections. City networks are now a pervasive reality in global governance, and city diplomacy raises a plethora of critical and influential questions for the practice of international relations and for the contemporary shape of world politics. City diplomacy, seen from this angle, is at the same time a reminder of the heritage and the present possibilities of diplomatic studies.

NOTES

1 Rather than providing an extensive list of references on the rate of urbanisation, see the work by David Satterthwaite and the International Institute of Environment and Development (IIED) at http://pubs.iied.org/10709IIED.html (last accessed 8 September 2014).

2 For brevity, I am not including in this chapter the instances whereby 'city diplomacy' takes place *within* the spatial constraints of the city itself, as in the case of the Olympics or Expos. I have elaborated on this case more extensively in Acuto (2013b).

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42

Citizen Diplomacy

Melissa Conley Tyler and Craig Beyerinck

INTRODUCTION

Diplomacy has traditionally been defined as the work of diplomatic officers sanctioned and sent by their home country to represent it abroad. Hedley Bull (1977: 170–1) outlines diplomacy's main functions as facilitating communication, negotiating agreements, gathering intelligence and minimising friction in the practice of international relations between states. It has long been the major institution for conducting relations between states.

Though the practice of diplomacy has always been adaptive, it has recently had to flex sharply to accommodate the changes brought by globalisation and technological change (Kerr and Wiseman, 2012). One change is the increasing discussion of citizen diplomacy. Generally defined: 'Citizen diplomacy … is about how citizens as private individuals can make a difference in world affairs' (McDonald, 1991: 119).

Those who practise traditional diplomacy have not universally embraced the concept of citizen diplomacy. It is understandable that a profession that has enjoyed relative exclusivity is reluctant to embrace the concept that anyone can be a 'citizen diplomat'. As Cooper (2013: 41) points out, 'the push to extend the status of diplomat is fraught with contestation. To call oneself a diplomat as in the case of "citizen diplomacy" is very subjective and arguably even flimsy'.

The term 'citizen diplomacy' is relatively new, gaining wider currency after being used by Hillary Clinton (Gregory, 2011: 360). It raises the question of whether those without official diplomatic status are engaging in diplomacy in any meaningful sense or if the term 'citizen diplomacy' is merely a loose metaphor for everyday people engaging in cross-border relations. For example, Gregory (2011: 359) does not consider most cross-border relationships to be citizen diplomacy and chooses instead to define this as 'cultural internationalism' (see Chapter 8 in this Handbook).

This chapter will outline how citizen diplomacy has developed and what citizen diplomacy

actors do. It explores emerging trends in citizen diplomacy and ways in which it can be theoretically understood. Due to the contested definition of citizen diplomacy, two understandings will be discussed: as a metaphor to describe people who participate in cross-border interactions (citizen-led citizen diplomacy) and as a term used when private citizens are involved in state-sanctioned diplomatic interactions (state-led citizen diplomacy). This chapter shows that citizen diplomacy is a highly contested term that may or may not add to our understanding of the impact of people-to-people contact on diplomacy.

Key Points

- The classification of some actors as citizen diplomats is contentious.
- The term citizen diplomacy can be used either as a metaphor for those who are involved in international interactions in some way (citizen-led citizen diplomacy) or, more narrowly, to refer to the use of citizens in more traditional forms of diplomacy (state-led citizen diplomacy).

THE DEVELOPMENT OF CITIZEN DIPLOMACY

People have always interacted across borders and this has long been a part of how countries and foreign publics have viewed each other (Sharp, 2001: 143). Over the centuries, intercommunity and interstate relations have been shaped by a variety of actors, including unofficial ones. In addition to the traditional role of diplomats as officially representing their state, a range of actors such as traders, missionaries, authors and artists have contributed both positively and negatively to how their countries are viewed abroad.

Not surprisingly, governments have had a strong preference for valuing official diplomats as the true bearers of a state's image and message over everyday citizens who are involved in cross-border interactions. Official diplomats have the responsibility for managing government-to-government relations and communication with foreign publics (public diplomacy). Over time, and especially with the communications revolution, the public diplomacy aspect of officials' work has become very significant (see Chapter 35 in this Handbook).

Recognising traditional diplomacy as the sole driving force of international relations is, however, problematic when considering the many different examples of cross-cultural exchanges throughout history. For example, the Greeks used *proxenoi*, or the citizens of other city-states domiciled in Athens, to represent other governments' interests in Athens (Black, 2010: 20). As Black states, 'part of the history of diplomacy is the account of how far these processes have been conducted through, or under the control of, the formal mechanism of diplomacy. In practice, this has always been the case only to a limited extent' (Black, 2010: 14).

A contentious example of citizen diplomacy is when George Logan, a private US citizen, negotiated the de-escalation of Franco-American tensions in Paris in 1798. His actions led France to lift its embargo and release US ships and seamen. Despite the positive outcome of this interaction, the US passed the 1799 Logan Act which prohibits private citizens from undertaking diplomatic negotiations (Chataway, 1998: 269).

It may have been more possible to restrict citizens' international role when it was relatively difficult for anyone not affiliated with the state to travel abroad due to logistic and financial constraints. However, citizens now have more opportunities to participate in cross-border interaction due to relatively inexpensive international travel and communications technology. These developments have led to debate on the role of citizen diplomacy and how it should be defined.

Citizen Diplomacy as a Metaphor

One way to understand citizen diplomacy is as a loose term for cross-cultural interaction:

'the work people do to connect across national differences … directed at building the kinds of understandings, relationships, and actions needed to build a more peaceful and prosperous world' (The Coalition for Citizen Diplomacy, quoted in Hovey and Weinberg, 2009: 45).

The vague nature of this definition means that the term citizen diplomacy can be applied to a wide range of actors. It is through such wide-reaching definitions that the terms 'diplomat' and 'diplomacy' have come to be associated with cultural and sporting activities and the notion that anyone, and thus everyone, abroad can be a 'diplomat' for their country (Black, 2010: 12). The definition can even sometimes be stretched to encompass local citizens who interact with foreigners in their own country as well as people who participate in social action that is visible on a global stage.

Officials who consider themselves to be 'proper' diplomatic actors can view this development in an extremely negative light (Marshall, 1949: 83). Not unlike the use of 'war' as a metaphor in phrases such as the 'war on drugs', the term 'citizen diplomacy' has widened the activities with which diplomacy is associated, thus making it a metaphor for a person or activity that in some way affects states' foreign interests (Black, 2010: 13). As Melissen (2013: 436) states, citizen diplomacy can be 'a metaphor for the democratization of diplomacy, with multiple actors playing a role in what was once an area restricted to a few'.

Involvement of Citizens in Official Diplomacy

By contrast, traditional actors would generally only use the term 'citizen diplomacy' in instances where civil society actors are formally involved in official diplomatic activity. Despite resistance to such involvement from those who believe that involving civil society actors adds 'too many unpredictable and uncontrollable elements to diplomatic processes forged over centuries' (Williams et al., 2008: 182), there are situations where citizens are specifically selected by the state to participate in some type of diplomatic activity.

There are examples of states involving citizens in diplomatic forums over many decades, such as involving 42 civil society organisations in the United Nations San Francisco Conference (Marshall, 1949: 85–6) or US President Eisenhower bringing together US and Soviet citizens to discuss relations between their countries at the 1959 Dartmouth Conference (McDonald, 1991: 206). States often encourage citizen diplomacy in situations where there are limited official relations, for example between the US and Cuba or North Korea (Hovey and Weinberg, 2009: 45).

Contemporary state-sanctioned cross-border citizen interaction can be seen on topics such as climate change, child soldiers and many others where civil society actors are invited by officials to form part of international discussions and negotiations. A high-profile example is the UNFCC on climate change where civil society organisations, scientific experts and individual citizens are involved in discussions.

This type of citizen diplomacy was born from the realisation in the early 1960s that traditional diplomacy cannot fix everything (Sharp, 2001: 132). The resulting reorientation of diplomacy to include more non-state actors has allowed traditional diplomats to benefit from expert advice and the ability to be closer to their own publics (Shale, 2006: 197). While concerns remain about the potentially abrasive effects and difficulties of controlling the actions of those who are only loosely affiliated with the state, as practice is evolving today, non-state and non-official actors are playing an increasingly large role (Melissen, 2013: 450).

Key Points

- The actions of private citizens have long played a role in interstate relations, despite a preference by states for officially-sanctioned diplomacy.
- Ease of travel and communication have led to a growing role for private citizens in relations between states.

ACTIVITIES, ROLES AND ACTORS IN CITIZEN DIPLOMACY

The debate about the meaning of citizen diplomacy has implications for understanding the activities, roles and relationships of actors in citizen diplomacy.

People-to-People Contact

Defining citizen diplomacy in its broadest sense as a metaphor means that many actors and their actions can be thought of as being part of it. People-to-people contact across borders can occur in a wide range of areas including international tourism, international sports matches, academia, business and cultural exchanges (Rana, 2011: 260). There is no limit on the citizens who can potentially be involved whether through study abroad, youth exchanges, sister city relationships, inter-faith dialogue and many other ways.

This type of people-to-people contact can have a demonstrable impact on how a country is viewed by citizens of other countries. Personal experience is a big factor in forming positive or negative views on other countries. Sustained, long-term and authentic interaction with foreign nationals is a very important factor in national image in an information-saturated world where 'you are what you seem' (Copeland, 2009: 161).

A good example of this type of citizen diplomacy is the role played by expatriates simply by living and interacting abroad (Gregory, 2011: 359). Their relatively long residence in a country and regular interaction with locals means that they can influence how their country is viewed. From the perspective of official diplomats, this is potentially a resource to help socialise foreign populations to new ideas before and after diplomatic efforts (Hochstetler, 2013: 176).

Given that it would be impossible for a state to control the myriad people-to-people interaction that occurs through tourism, education and other exchange, the question for states is whether they can or should form some relationship with these activities. By allowing citizens who take part in cross-border interactions to be distantly associated with their state, a practice that states have little say in to begin with, states can potentially benefit from any positive image that their citizens convey through close interaction with foreign individuals. An example of such co-option can be government use of track two diplomacy where non-officials engage in dialogue which is independent of, but linked with, the state (McDonald, 1991: 119).

There are a number of examples of state-funded activities that bring citizens from different countries together such as the US Fulbright and Peace Corps programmes and a range of scholarships and international visitor programmes (Gregory, 2011: 351–2). Such programmes are predicated on the belief that people-to-people contact can lead to long-lasting and deep connections with the potential to create a strong bond between countries.

However, there is a limit to how far states should try to insert themselves into these people-to-people interactions. A clear benefit of citizen-led citizen diplomacy is its ability to remain untouched by government officials, or at least to be regarded as such. Its strength is the perception that interaction is not based on strategic interests and is not an advertising or political campaign (Sharp, 2009: 287). In support of this, Gregory (2011: 353) suggests that citizen diplomacy is best used by states to 'to understand cultures, attitudes, and behaviour; build and manage relationships, and influence thoughts and mobilise actions to advance their interests and values'. No matter what form citizen diplomacy takes, much of its legitimacy and impact comes from the belief that the messages being conveyed are authentic and untouched by government officials.

Citizen Involvement in Official Diplomacy

As well as encouraging or exploiting people-to-people contact by its citizens, states can

go further and sanction private citizens to play some type of diplomatic role (state-led citizen diplomacy). Examples can be explicit, such as when states invite non-officials to represent their country in negotiations, or implicit, as in the case of ex-officials meeting with other governments where some continuing official connection is assumed. Sharp (2001: 137–41) identifies five ways in which citizens can become citizen diplomats: as a go-between; as a representative of a sectoral, regional or local economic interest; as a lobbyist or advocate; as a subverter or transformer of existing policies; or as an autonomous agent. All except the last may be state-sanctioned.

Involving private citizens in diplomatic activity has a number of benefits for states. For example, by virtue of not being directly affiliated with a government body, citizen diplomats can facilitate indirect communication between governments that do not communicate officially. There are clear benefits to states in using independent individuals to hold talks with 'enemy' countries.

States can also benefit from bringing citizens' expertise in a certain area to negotiations and meetings. Citizens, whether individuals or through organised groups, can bring valuable technical expertise and detail to negotiating teams. This can even extend to foreign citizens; an interesting example of this is the non-profit organisation Independent Diplomat (2015), which provides diplomatic advice and services to governments including assisting states to sanction private citizens from other countries to represent them in diplomatic processes.

It appears that governments are increasing their investment in and acceptance of such activities. They have perhaps decided that the benefits of involving citizens in diplomacy outweighs the risk that as private citizens they may advocate for a cause that is not necessarily government-sanctioned.

If the goal of diplomacy is to create a conducive environment to pursue a country's national interest, both people-to-people contact and some involvement by citizens in traditional diplomacy can play a role. Regardless of how citizen and state-led diplomacy seeks to engage foreign publics and governments, both rely on the presence of someone who, in one way or another, is seen as a representative of their country. The simple presence of this person can influence how that country is regarded by foreign individuals and governments. As Gopin (2009: 161–2) states, 'the citizen diplomat embodies symbol. A person comes from one civilization and enters into another, with everyone fully aware that this person is crossing over boundaries of tension, distrust, and conflict. The act of arrival *itself* and the presence in the new civilization becomes a symbolic gesture.'

Key Points

- People-to-people contact between citizens can have benefits including forming deep and long-lasting relationships that are perceived as authentic and untouched by government.
- There are a number of examples of state-sanctioned citizen involvement in official diplomacy where citizens assist the state with their expertise.

EMERGING TRENDS AND CHANGES TO THE PRACTICE OF CITIZEN DIPLOMACY

The neat division between 'citizen' and 'official' diplomacy is being challenged by changes to modern diplomatic practice. Citizen diplomacy should be understood in the context of broader trends that have seen the move from 'club' to 'network' diplomacy (Thakur, 2013). Using this definition, 'club diplomacy', or classical diplomacy, refers to a time when diplomats met primarily with other government officials and the occasional businessperson. In contrast, in 'network diplomacy' a greater number of actors are involved in policy-making processes with a devolution of power traditionally concentrated by the state to many more actors (Heine, 2013: 60–3).

In other words, diplomacy has transformed from 'a stiff waltz of rituals and protocol among states alone' to become 'a jazzy dance among coalitions of ministries, companies, churches, foundations, universities, activists, and other wilful, enterprising individuals who cooperate to achieve specific goals' (Khanna, 2011: 22). As Seib (2012: 106) puts it, '[b]alancing recognition of historical context with the pressures generated by new information and communication technologies will require a new approach to the construction of diplomacy and to being a diplomat'.

This means that traditional diplomats are now more likely to spend more of their time on public diplomacy in an attempt to broadcast messages and reach a much wider audience; the development and growing use of communication tools is making traditional diplomacy more responsive to citizens' concerns (Hochstetler, 2013: 188). Sharp and Wiseman (2012: 119) go so far as to say 'public diplomacy is now so central to diplomacy that it is no longer helpful to treat it as a sub-set of diplomatic practice'.

This change to the practice of traditional diplomacy is important for citizen diplomacy (Copeland, 2009: 169): the convergence between the two means there is a growing acceptance of official engagement with citizen diplomats to fill the gaps found between local and foreign publics and traditional diplomatic practices. This is being acknowledged by some traditional diplomatic actors. For example, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton went as far as calling on students to become 'citizen ambassadors' when using social networking to build partnerships and expose and fight the oppression that followed presidential elections in Iran (Sharp and Wiseman, 2012: 172).

Citizen diplomacy helps deal with the distrust among publics of traditional diplomats and diplomacy in general, born out of the relative secrecy in which communications have traditionally been carried out. While government-led public diplomacy can be a good tool to promote a country's image abroad, maintaining positive images can be thwarted, as can be seen with China, by poor domestic policies and actions (Seib, 2012: 119). Longer-term and unregulated interaction with everyday citizens can help to maintain a country's positive image.

Citizen diplomacy has the advantages of transparency, responsiveness and wide application (Sharp, 2001: 147). There are actors in and outside of the government who have come to realise that citizen diplomacy can address some cross-border issues in ways that traditional diplomacy cannot (Williams et al., 2008: 189). For example, citizen diplomacy operationalised through non-government organisations and interest groups has achieved great success in addressing the issues of landmines, international crimes, child soldiers, explosive remnants of war and rights for disabled persons.

Even though today's diplomatic landscape is being influenced by the 'growing number, expanding role and increasing influence of non-state actors', the practice of traditional diplomacy is not being crowded out or replaced by citizen diplomacy; instead, it is working to supplement and support its more traditional twin (Thakur, 2013: 77). Both citizen and traditional diplomacy can use strategies traditionally reserved for the latter but, as Copeland (2009: 162) states, 'their content, purpose, and practice are evolving'. While this is understandable, in that the two entities' goals may be the same, 'their roles are not the same' (Gregory, 2011: 357).

As alluded to by Gopin (2009: 164), neither traditional nor citizen diplomacy can be effective in achieving state goals without the other. 'There are also many actors in addition to states interacting … in an increasingly networked web of national and international diplomacy' (Thakur, 2013: 84). For example, both citizen-led diplomacy and more traditional approaches to diplomacy have been needed to make progress on arms control issues, such as small arms, indicating that official diplomacy is still an important part of a country's diplomatic toolkit (Williams et al., 2008: 194).

Key Points

- The transition from 'club' to 'network' diplomacy has created closer interaction between diplomats and foreign publics.
- Changes in diplomatic practice mean a growing place for citizen diplomacy to fill the gaps found between publics and traditional diplomatic practice.

UNDERSTANDING CITIZEN DIPLOMACY THROUGH THEORETICAL APPROACHES

In order to understand what diplomacy is today it is important look at what diplomacy meant in its most classical sense. By looking at diplomatic practice throughout history, it is clear that citizen diplomacy is in fact merely enjoying a revival: it is on top of this that what is now understood to be traditional diplomacy is built. As such, ways of thinking about diplomacy only need to be revisited and revised in order to develop a way of thinking about a diplomatic practice that is applicable to today's context, rather than completely made anew.

In considering arguments about what diplomacy is and what role citizens can and do play a role in it, Sharp (2001) outlines two approaches with which to conceptualise the craft: 'no change' and 'all change'. The 'no change' approach views the world as being divided into sovereign states, which are its most powerful actors, and finds these states to be the most authentic expression of political interests available. As such, the no change approach maintains that only those who officially represent states can be considered to be diplomats (Sharp, 2001: 142). This approach, as suggested by the name, prizes official interaction above all else. By contrast, from the 'all change' perspective, '[t]echnology, democracy, and education are combining to erode the sovereignty of the modern territorial state and … the sovereignty of those who determine what is to be regarded as important and what is not' (Sharp, 2001: 143). This approach supports the modern day changes that are taking place in the practice of diplomacy. The reality may be between these two approaches.

Taking another look at Bull's (1977: 170–1) functions of diplomacy between states (facilitating communication, negotiating agreements, gathering intelligence and minimising friction in international relations), it is clear that citizen diplomacy can also be used to carry out diplomatic functions. Not only have both types of citizen diplomacy and traditional diplomacy worked together to fill gaps in each other's work, but they have also worked to address the needs of newly opened avenues of interaction. According to Williams et al. (2008: 187–8), 'the most notable feature of the "new diplomacy" has been the partnership formed between key governments and civil society to achieve common humanitarian aims'. Partnerships between government and civil society have proven to be very useful and allow these two previously separate actors to adjust strategies, goals and thinking based on the work of the other, bringing about a more streamlined and efficient use of resources.

The proper development and use of citizen diplomacy tools is important because '[d]iplomats are only part of the process by which information is obtained, and often are not the most important part' (Black, 2010: 14). This fundamental change in how diplomacy is practised 'requires fundamental reappraisal of missions, skills and structures – transformation, rather than adaptation, in institutions, methods and priorities' (Gregory, 2011: 354). It is for this reason that citizen diplomats, as Sharp (2001: 148) says, should be 'courted, coddled and educated' by traditional diplomatic actors and institutions.

Citizen diplomacy's revival should be understood in the wider context of the expanding opportunities there are for interaction as a result of globalisation (Chataway, 1998: 271), including the deep and widespread impact of the revolution in information and communication

technology and travel. According to Copeland (2009: 170): 'Globalization is causing the center of diplomatic gravity to move, as it were, down the mountain, shifting the action off the peaks and into the populated valleys – out of the chancellery and into the street.'

Key Points

- Two ways to conceptualise changes to diplomatic practice are 'no change', which favours traditional diplomatic practice, and 'all change', which prefers the changes being made to diplomacy.
- Citizen diplomacy can combine with traditional diplomacy to fulfil diplomatic needs.

CONCLUSION

Diplomacy has always been a cornerstone of the way societies interact. It is the definition of what constitutes a diplomat and diplomacy that is highly contentious. This is uncomfortable in a field that craves strict definitions. This chapter has offered examples of what citizen diplomacy can be taken to mean in order to contribute to the growing literature that attempts to define citizen diplomacy and its trends. As suggested throughout this chapter, difficulties in defining citizen diplomacy arise from different views on the definition and role of non-official actors in the institution of diplomacy. This suggests that the term may not add to our understanding of the conduct of diplomacy; however, the term is in common use and cannot be ignored.

The facets of citizen diplomacy identified in this chapter can be broadly defined in two distinct categories: citizen-led diplomacy and state-led diplomacy. These delineations can also be thought of in terms of using the term citizen diplomacy as a metaphor for people whose actions have some impact on international perceptions or as a term used for when states utilise citizens in official diplomacy. The operationalisation of both types of citizen diplomacy can ensure that each benefits from the other. The inevitable and continuing change to how diplomacy is thought of is greatly due to the successes of citizen diplomacy in many areas. This change has led to the reconceptualisation of diplomacy to include at least some aspects of citizen-led diplomacy.

In the face of the changing practice of diplomacy, there is an ongoing debate about the continued importance of traditional diplomacy and the growing role of citizen diplomacy. While Chataway (1998: 272) believes that traditional diplomacy is slowly becoming obsolete in the face of rising citizen diplomacy, this chapter has argued that traditional diplomacy is instead taking on more diverse roles and co-opting citizen diplomacy into its practice. As Copeland (2009: 178) states, diplomacy needs 'the construction of a bigger, better tent with larger, more diverse, crowds inside'. This new tent is needed for states to fulfil traditional and new roles as well as for citizen and state-led diplomacy to work efficiently together.

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Celebrity Diplomacy

Mark Wheeler

INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines the rise of transnational forms of celebrity diplomacy – the employment of well-known or famous individuals to publicize international causes and to engage in foreign policy decision-making circles. International governmental organizations (IGOs) including the United Nations (UN) have a long-standing tradition of appointing Goodwill Ambassadors and Messengers of Peace. In turn, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), such as the Red Cross, Oxfam and Save the Children, have been represented by celebrity advocates. These developments emerged from a transition from state-centric to public diplomatic state-people and people–people initiatives (see Chapters 35 and 42 in this Handbook). A new 'currency' of public diplomacy has occurred in which emotion and rhetoric help shape the outcome of international affairs. Moreover, with the rise of 24/7 news programming and the accompanying 'CNN effect' on foreign policymaking and the social media, there has been a reconfiguration of international public opinion from elite interest to grassroots representation.

Invariably, this use of celebrity diplomats is presented as an anti-democratic phenomenon in which celebrities are accused of reinforcing global North–South stereotypes by academics working within the fields of political communications, media studies and development studies (Kellner, 2010; Polman, 2011; Kapoor, 2012).Conversely, the International Relations scholar Andrew F. Cooper conceives celebrity diplomacy as an alternative form of agency in which stars fill the void in public trust vacated by the international political classes (Cooper, 2008). Within this schema, celebrity diplomacy contrasts with Westphalian traditions founded on the values of state security and hard power. Consequently, proponents of celebrity diplomacy claim that stars provide a greater openness in diplomatic endeavours, thereby constructing a consensus for local,

supranational and global initiatives. These types of 'track-2' diplomacy mean that stars not only bring public attention to international activities but can apply pressure for meaningful change in foreign policymaking. These concerns accord to Joseph Nye's concept of soft power, which refers to the ability to affect reform through the processes of attraction rather than coercion or payment (Nye, 2004).

This chapter will analyse, assess and explain whether celebrity diplomats have effected a 'politics of attraction' through which they may legitimize their positions within the global public sphere. Such soft power potential will be unpacked to ask if celebrities can effectively lend their weight to transnational forms of diplomatic engagement. Consequently, this chapter will situate celebrity diplomacy within a broader view of the concepts associated with public diplomacy; provide case studies in relation to IGOs, NGOs and 'go it alone' forms of humanitarian initiatives (Bono, Bob Geldof); and will discuss the creditability (or not) of these types of celebrity-driven 'affective capacities'. As Geoffrey Wiseman notes, 'we are investing our emotions, our time and our money in celebrity activities and [need to know] whether this is a sound investment' (Wiseman, 2009: 5). This chapter argues that celebrity diplomacy is an important phenomenon which cannot be ignored as it is creating new forms of diplomatic endeavour in the arena of international affairs.

CELEBRITY DIPLOMACY AS PART OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

The traditions of diplomacy have been seen as a coordination of state interests with broader conceptions of collective security and economic power. The mechanisms of bargaining and cooperation have been utilized as a diplomatic 'currency' for example by British Foreign Office mandarins, ambassadors and United States (US) State Department officials. This has been presented as being part of a Realist discourse in which matters of ethics and emotional value are secondary to the complexities of the global state system. Moreover, public diplomacy – in which governments influence international attitudes regarding their national images – remained defined by state interest and power. While the communication of intercultural interests existed beyond the traditional forms of diplomacy, governmental ministers, embassy diplomats and consular officials used public relations strategies to effect agendas within the international media. Further, cultural, arts and exchange based diplomatic initiatives were developed by state-sponsored institutions such as the United States Information Agency (USIA), the British Council, the Voice of America and the British Broadcasting Corporation's (BBC) World Service (Cull, 2010).

However, as the nature of media coverage has expanded with the rise of 24/7 global news programming in which the decentralization and fragmentation of opinion has intensified, these traditions of diplomacy are being challenged (see Chapter 8 in this Handbook). Moreover, the rise of social media networks places a greater emphasis on interactive and person-to-person communications. These developments have been tied together with a democratization of foreign policy in which global concerns are placed on the popular agenda. Therefore, a 'new public diplomacy' has emerged in the wake of alternative communications through which non-state actors (NSAs) and civil society organizations (CSOs) have promoted cultural interchanges to mobilize public interest to advance their causes (Melissen, 2011).

In this respect, a new 'currency' of public diplomacy emerges in which emotional rhetoric and values become key bargaining tools. Geoffrey Pigman comments that CSOs, including non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as Greenpeace, use direct action techniques to become newsworthy and achieve public visibility. Pigman also notes that so-called 'eminent person diplomats'

have made their presence felt on the international stage through developments such as the Elders Programme to raise public awareness and affect diplomatic responses about the war in Darfur (Pigman, 2010: 88–9). This initiative was constructed by the musician Peter Gabriel and the Virgin Media entrepreneur Sir Richard Branson and included the late South African President Nelson Mandela and former US President Jimmy Carter.

Within this sub-category, Pigman comments that celebrities have influenced humanitarian initiatives (for example, through Live Aid, Live-8, and numerous charities in telethons), and that the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) have used Goodwill Ambassadors (Pigman, 2010: 97). This proliferation of celebrity representations reflects a broader set of social, political and international changes within diplomatic practices. As Pigman points out (2010: 96–7):

> It makes sense to consider the activities of these individuals as diplomacy because, importantly – at least when they are successful – they and the messages that they bear are received by the interlocutor with which they wish to communicate. They are accredited as having standing and legitimacy by the counterparts to whom they seek to negotiate. They are engaging in the core diplomatic functions of representation and communication … and by doing so they play a key role in mediating estrangement between other actors.

Therefore, celebrity activists have shifted the focus away from state-directed types of public diplomacy to bring attention to more cosmopolitan concerns related to global citizenship and mutual solidarity. Lisa Tsaliki, Christos A. Frangonikolopoulos and Asteris Huliaras argue that celebrity activists can 'bridge' the gap between Western audiences and faraway tragedies by using their fame to publicize international events (Tsaliki et al., 2011: 299). Celebrity diplomats provide a creditable lead 'through the "non-confrontational" reordering of political and economic forces in the service of global goals' (Tsaliki et.al., 2011: 300). Through their charismatic authority they complement the work of NGOs to establish a discourse within the global civil society about such organizations' activities.

In turn, Andrew Cooper maintains that if public diplomacy is married to more open-ended versions of individual agency, then traditional forms of state-centric diplomacy are eroded (Cooper, 2008: 2). He argues that celebrity diplomacy creates a new 'space' in which stars provide a conduit between the public and foreign affairs to overcome the 'disconnect' which has occurred as official diplomats have sought to husband information rather than share it (Cooper, 2008: 113–14). Consequently, celebrities can provide points of identification to mobilize public opinion for diplomatic reform. Therefore, Cooper identifies celebrity diplomacy as an alternative form of agency (see Chapter 7 in this Handbook) which has the potential to define international communication agendas:

> The power of agency – and … its adaptive capabilities … – is captured by the continued rise of Angelina Jolie … Jolie has exhibited many of the potential strengths, in part because of her ability to mix art and real life. Starring in adventure films in exotic locations provided added credibility to her frontline activity as a UN Goodwill Ambassador and her more recent ventures into freelance diplomatic activity. It also reflected an immense amount of personal growth … caused by … [her] … growing appreciation of what her role could be. (Cooper, 2008: 116)

Cooper contends that celebrities not only draw public attention and actively promote causes but are ideational figures who frame and sell ideas within the international community (Cooper, 2008: 10). This enables them to employ their rhetorical power within the centres of diplomatic power, such as the US Department of State and the United Nations. Cooper defines this as the 'Bonoization' of diplomacy, suggesting that celebrity advocates, such as the U2 singer Bono (Paul David Hewson), have placed causes such as world debt on the international agenda.

Further, he argues that decision-makers can benefit from the favourable public opinion engendered through such an association with celebrities. This mutuality of interests means that celebrities can gain an unprecedented amount of face-to-face time with leaders, meaning that stars may advance their causes.

Cooper's celebrity diplomacy thesis accords with Joseph Nye's concept of soft power as it suggests that change occurs through attraction rather than 'carrots or sticks' (Nye, 2004). In terms of nation states, this power derives from the legitimacy of a society's culture, political ideals, and policies directed towards other countries. At the more individualist level, Cooper contends that celebrity diplomats have utilized the politics of attraction to legitimize themselves within the global public sphere and to access networks of power (Cooper, 2008: 10). This 'soft power potential' has meant celebrity diplomats have lent their weight to 'sell' transnational campaigns within a commercially driven news media. In this manner, celebrities have utilized their star power to affect pressure upon diplomats, international policymakers and national leaders. Therefore, it remains necessary to consider the activities, roles and techniques that celebrities have used in order to examine the nature and extent of their influence within the diplomatic arena.

Key Points

- Traditional forms of diplomacy are being challenged by the rise of public diplomacy.
- The rise of global communications means that international public opinion is a growing resource which is contested by both elite and grassroots organizations.
- Celebrity diplomacy has emerged as there has been a democratization of the foreign policy process.
- Celebrity diplomacy shares a number of characteristics with soft power, such as the politics of attraction.

HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORANEOUS FORMS OF CELEBRITY DIPLOMACY: THE UNITED NATIONS, NGOS AND FREELANCE ACTIVISTS

Pigman makes a useful distinction between those celebrities who have represented a supranational institution and others who have endorsed international causes, such as Live Aid or Product RED (Pigman, 2010: 87). In the case of the former, there is a significant history of celebrity endorsement concerning IGOs and NGOs. This has been complemented by the rise of more freelance forms of celebrity diplomacy, such as Bob Geldof's emotive response to the famines in Ethopia with the initial creation of Band Aid and release of the 'Feed the World' charity single leading to the Live Aid Global concerts in 1985.

When UNICEF appointed the movie actor Danny Kaye in 1954 as its first Ambassador-at-large, it was the start of the UN's policy to employ celebrities to raise funds, affect diplomatic agendas and draw attention to development causes. As 'Mr UNICEF' Kaye, and his fellow Goodwill Ambassador Peter Ustinov, were seen as good international citizens who could engender a 'thick layer of goodwill for UNICEF' (Ling, 1984: 9). The celebrity who provided the template for this 'glamorous … conformity' was Audrey Hepburn (Cooper, 2008: 18). She made visits to Ethiopia and Somalia with little fear for her personal safety, met African Leaders and took causes to the US Senate. Hepburn used her fame to promote UNICEF's humanitarian causes and refused to take political sides by insisting the worst violence in Africa was widespread poverty (Ling, 1984: 20).

As celebrity activity in the 1980s and 1990s increased, with the further employment of Goodwill Ambassadors by UNICEF and other agencies, notably the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the World Health Organization (WHO), celebrities decided to

become politically engaged. In this transformative era of celebrity diplomacy stars felt that they should use their fame to expose human rights injustices. This led to several UN Goodwill Ambassadors, including Richard Gere and Mia Farrow, going distinctly off-message when they criticized the organization's moral stance. Another Goodwill Ambassador, Harry Belafonte, even accused George W. Bush of being 'the greatest terrorist in the world' when visiting the late Venezuela President Hugh Chavez.

When Kofi Annan was appointed as the UN Secretary-General in 1997, he oversaw a public relations revolution which engaged in the wide-scale employment of Goodwill Ambassadors. He believed celebrities could influence international public opinion to support the UN's goals of idealism and universalism. Moreover, the usage of celebrity diplomacy intensified with Annan's creation of Messengers of Peace drawn from famous individuals who could perpetuate the aims of the UN Charter. For instance, George Clooney became a Messenger of Peace because he supported NGO projects in war-torn Darfur. He was seen to be effective in fronting a humanitarian campaign forged from a coalition of groups ranging from political liberals, the African-American community and the Christian Right. In 2007, he co-founded a non-profit organization called Not on Our Watch to bring resolution to the conflict in Darfur and draw attention to human rights abuses in Burma, Sudan and Zimbabwe.

In raising the UN's profile for liberal internationalism, the most spectacular success is the film actress Angelina Jolie whose image was transformed from a Hollywood wild-child to a credible celebrity diplomat. Undoubtedly, she knows that her fame, beauty and photogenic qualities can attract the world's media to promote the causes she endorses. Yet, Jolie's emotive responses were seen to be legitimate when she published her diaries about her visits to refugee camps, which appeared to be serious and well-informed. Therefore, Jolie's activism epitomized Annan's belief that through celebrity diplomacy the UN's mission for universalism would be enhanced.

These forms of transnational star activism have moved beyond the institutional confines of the UN as NGOs have used global celebrities to publicize their activities and direct media attention to issues. For instance, Jolie has worked independently from the UN and has collaborated with Peter Gabriel in his Witness Programme, which documents human rights abuses and establishes policies for international justice. Similarly, the singer Annie Lennox has accompanied her role as a United Nations Education Science and Culture Organization (UNESCO) Goodwill Ambassador with active support for Amnesty International, Greenpeace and Burma UK. The American Red Cross utilizes a 50-member Celebrity Cabinet that includes Jamie Lee Curtis, Jane Seymour, L.L. Cool J. and Jackie Chan.

In matching up the celebrity with the NGO, the 'fit' between the motivations of a celebrity and a charity is a priority. One of the most successful linkages occurred when the late Princess Diana became an advocate for the banning of landmines when she agreed to endorse the Mines Advisory Group (MAG). She had become involved with MAG when representing UK Red Cross as part of her responsibilities as the wife of Prince Charles. However, she realized her image of 'glamour with compassion' could deliver a message for which she had a very personal concern. In making her trips to Angola and Bosnia to publicize the landmines issue, Princess Diana's enthusiasm for the cause was evident from her comment that: 'This is the type of format I've been looking for' (Cooper, 2008: 26).

Yet events and media perceptions also shaped how the landmines message was publicized and received. Princess Diana was due to attend the first major ceremony concerning the banning of landmines on 1 September 1997 when she was killed in a car crash in Paris. However, she was so closely associated with the cause that her influence on the

campaign proved to be instrumental even after her death. Bob Geldof had some time before this understood that a royal seal of approval, in his case from Prince Charles and Princess Diana's attendance at the opening of his 1985 Live Aid show, was necessary to provide credibility for the entire enterprise of aid (Geldof, 2005).

Geldof's globally televised Live Aid shows reconfigured the public's attitude towards charities by demonstrating that fundraising could be desirable. On 24 October 1984, the BBC News correspondent Michael Buerk filed a devastating report about the widespread starvation of Ethiopian refugees in camps at Korem. In the resulting outpouring of public grief the horrified Geldof, the front man of a fading post-punk band The Boomtown Rats, became an unlikely celebrity humanitarian. He cajoled 45 UK pop stars including Bono, George Michael and Sting to form Band Aid, which recorded a charity single 'Do They Know it's Christmas' (1984). The record raised millions of pounds. This led to Geldof quite forcefully persuading celebrities such as Bowie, Paul McCartney, Mick Jagger, Lionel Ritchie and Elton John, along with bands including Dire Straits, Queen, U2 and The Who, into performing at the simultaneous Live Aid concerts in London and Philadelphia on 13 July 1985.

The media spectacle brought the plight of the starving Ethiopians to the attention of two billion viewers across 160 countries and challenged them to contribute to the cause, not least due to Geldof's impatience. Because the BBC failed to effectively advertise the phone numbers available for public donations, only a relatively small amount of money had been raised. Consequently, Live Aid is remembered for Geldof's (in)famous outburst on a pre-watershed channel which has inaccurately gone down in folklore as 'Give me the Fucking Money!' Live Aid raised a global total of £50 million and Geldof's indignant behaviour was seen to be crucial to its success (Gray, 2005).

Geldof's anger has been a key determinant in his approach to international relations. Cooper contends that he is an 'anti-diplomat' who smashes through the niceties of diplomacy to achieve his goals (Cooper, 2008: 52). His verbal belligerence and desire for personal recognition has been countered by his genuine sense of compassion, organizational skills and realization of the power of public spectacle. It is noted that Geldof, whatever responses he arouses, has demonstrated a long-term commitment to his endeavours. Further, U2 became a major international act on the back of their appearance within the globally televised Live Aid concerts and their front-man Bono has utilized his fame to break down the spheres of entertainment and global advocacy to become *the* celebrity spokesman on human rights.

Bono has been responsible for tilting much of the focus of celebrity advocacy toward poverty in the developing states of the global economy (Cooper, 2008). He has placed an emphasis on direct action and building effective institutions, while using his fame to gain an inside track to lobby governments. The rock singer is the co-founder and remains the public face of the One Campaign and DATA (Debt, Aids, Trade Africa) which promote the ending of extreme poverty, the fighting of the AIDs pandemic and international debt relief. He was also instrumental, along with Jeffrey Sachs, Bobby Shriver and Paul Farmer, in the construction of Product RED, which combined celebrity activism with corporate social responsibility (Nike, Apple, Gap) to support the Global Fund in its fight to stem the spread of HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria in Africa.

As a regular speaker at the G8, the Davos World Economic Forum and World Bank meetings, Bono's views on aid and debt relief for developing nations have garnered the attention of world leaders, senior policymakers, NGOs, the media and the public. Consequently, he has utilized his position as a global performer to bring politicians and corporate executives together (Jackson, 2008: 218). Undoubtedly, Bono has demonstrated tenacity in establishing political alliances not

only with liberal figures such as Bill Clinton and Bill Gates but with George W. Bush and Jesse Helms, the late arch-conservative Senator from North Carolina. He attended Republican as well as Democratic National Conventions to extend his message and mobilize support for his causes. In this manner he achieved cross-party consensus for the Jubilee 2000 debt relief alliance in Africa and placed the issue firmly on the political agenda in Washington. These forms of political expedience have been necessary to achieve the greater good of aid reform.

Cooper notes how Bono has used his fame to gained entrance to the corridors of power by appealing to modern leaders such as Tony Blair and Bill Clinton due to their fascination with popular culture (Cooper, 2008: 38). Yet, as he has engaged with compromised leaders such as George W. Bush and Blair, alongside illiberal figures such as Vladimir Putin, Bono has been accused of being an impotent 'bard of the powerful' (Monbiot, 2005). Others have suggested that Bono's proclamations have been a good way of selling tickets for his band and assuaging Western consumer guilt. With the increase in celebrity diplomacy, the worth of such activism has been questioned and its impact on cultural and political practices has become more controversial.

Key Points

- Celebrity diplomacy has been associated with IGOs such as the UN and most especially the UNICEF Goodwill Ambassadors scheme.
- There was an exponential increase in UN Goodwill Ambassadors when former Secretary-General Kofi Annan engaged in a public relations revolution designed to promote the UN's liberal international values.
- Increasingly, NGOS such as Amnesty and Greenpeace have developed ambassadors' schemes.
- Freelance celebrity diplomats such as Bob Geldof and Bono have grown in importance through charitable records, globally televised concerts and their use of their fame to enter into key decision-making arenas.

QUESTIONING THE WORTH OF CELEBRITY DIPLOMACY

The critiques of celebrity diplomacy have several dimensions. Some celebrity diplomats are accused of debasing the quality of international debate, diverting attention from worthy causes to those which are 'sexy' and failing to represent the disenfranchised. They are criticized for being superficial and unaccountable. Concerns are raised that Goodwill Ambassadors trivialize the UN's mission. Mark D. Alleyne argues that the UN's deployment of Goodwill Ambassadors has been elitist and ethno-centric. He maintains that the employment of celebrities was part of a general malaise in which a desperate UN incorporated public relations techniques into its marketing so that the international media would provide it with a favourable coverage (Alleyne, 2005: 176). Essentially, Alleyne argues that this is a shallow approach to solving crises, reinforcing ethnic stereotypes by perpetuating an imbalanced view of need and offering 'a primarily meliorative approach, giving succour to the incapacitated rather than hope for a better life through programmes of education, consciousness-raising and cultural affirmation' (Alleyne, 2003: 77).

Moreover, Lisa Richey and Stefano Ponte contend the celebrity activism that occurred in relation to 'Band Aid' was commoditized into 'Brand Aid'. This meant that major corporations and celebrities combined to support charities aimed at African poverty. As these apparently ethical forms of behaviour sell 'suffering' to the public, Richey and Ponte argue that aid causes have become 'brands' to be bought and sold in the global marketplace. Product RED marked the point wherein there was a fusion of consumption and social causes so that, 'the primary goal of RED is not to push governments to do their part, but to push consumers to do theirs through exercising their choices' (Richey and Ponte, 2011: 33–4).

Consequently, Richey and Ponte argue that this apparent altruism provides another

means through which corporations may market themselves in relation to the growing concerns of lifestyle, culture and identity. Thus, corporations such as Amex and Armani (sponsors of Product RED) gained from developing 'responsible practices' so that they can brand themselves to a wider consumer base. However, by focusing the public attention on the plight of 'distant others' they deflect the focus away from their own dubious behaviour in exploiting cheap labour forces in developing states. In this respect, celebrities lend credence and validate such 'ethical' corporate behaviour.

Within this schema, Ilan Kapoor contends that the ideological underpinnings of celebrity advocacy are not so much about humanitarianism as about perpetuating a 'post-democratic' political system which may be characterized by neo-liberalism, self-promotion, brand marketing and the reinforcement of elite-centred politics (Kapoor, 2012). Thus, Geldof and Bono's involvement in Live-8 is criticized for sloganizing poverty, deflecting the public's attention away from the viability of aid and being co-opted by an unaccountable political class (Polman, 2011). Concurrently, anti-poverty campaigners such as Making Poverty History argue that Live-8 wilfully undermines their messages of 'Justice not Charity', steals the media agenda and depoliticizes the cause through its construction of a dependency culture (Monbiot, 2005).

Therefore, this has meant that instead of Geldof and Bono acting as humane philanthropists, in reality they have reinforced the West's neo-colonial rule over the Global South. According to Andrew Darnton and Martin Kirk, the 'Live Aid Legacy' has established an inequitable relationship between 'Powerful Givers' and 'Grateful Receivers' (Darnton and Kirk, 2011: 6). This dominant paradigm has meant that aid will 'magically' release the 'victims' from the shackles of Southern societies. Within this apparently benevolent narrative the focus on the indigenous peoples' needs rather than the facilitation of their creativity has been used to 'police' the boundaries of the public's imagination (Yrjölä, 2011: 187; Dieter and Kumar, 2008).

Such criticisms suggest that this cluster of celebrity activists remain North-centric actors. Jemima Repo and Riina Yrjölä maintain that the values of celebrity diplomacy preserve global stereotypes. Principally, Bono, Geldof and Jolie are represented as selfless Western crusaders dedicated to alleviating the suffering of Africans who exist outside of the 'civilized' processes of development, progress, peace and human security. Therefore, celebrities and 'Africa' operate under assumed roles which are presented as part of a wider discourse about the natural order of world politics (Repo and Yrjölä, 2011: 57). Celebrity diplomacy indicates an underlying cultural imperialism which has abused 'the Third World [so that] the latter becomes [a stage] for First World self-promotion and hero-worship, and [the] dumping ground for humanitarian ideals and fantasies' (Kapoor, 2011).

However, despite the validity of these criticisms, a more nuanced approach to celebrity diplomacy is required. For instance, in a commercially dictated global media, the escalation of UN Goodwill Ambassadors and Messenger of Peace Programmes was one of the few realistic responses open to Annan and his successor Ban Ki-Moon, along with NGOs, to promote the international community's activities (Kellner, 2010: 123). The ability of celebrity advocates to bring focus to international campaigns, to impact on diplomatic agendas and to advocate global principles has been of significant worth in seeking resolution in a period of sustained international conflict.

Key Points

- Celebrity diplomats have been accused of trivializing the debates about poverty and humanitarian reforms.
- They serve to reinforce a dominant Western paradigm that indigenous people are 'victims'.

- They have been understood as supporting the values of global capitalism, reinforcing the power of cultural imperialism and assuaging consumer guilt.
- Celebrity diplomats have a greater degree of autonomy than their critics realize and are necessary to publicize key issues in a commercially driven global media.

CONCLUSION

In analysing celebrity involvement in diplomatic initiatives, a mixed picture has emerged. UN Goodwill Ambassadors and Messengers of Peace, NGO endorsers and famous activists have used their star power to affect pressure upon diplomats, international policymakers and national leaders. As the critiques of celebrity advocates have indicated, there are dangers in over-simplifying complex forms of international diplomacy, utilizing emotional responses and becoming servants of the power elite. However, celebrities have promoted alternative discourses, and have developed credible diplomatic interventions. As Ira Wagman comments, the analysis must now move beyond the polarities of 'help or hurt' to consider why 'celebrities turn to diplomatic issues, why specific celebrities team up with particular institutions, and what each has to gain' (Wagman, 2014). Therefore, while remaining critically engaged with the processes of celebrity diplomacy, it is necessary to engage with the implications for opportunity and reform that have become manifest in an open-minded and intellectually curious fashion.

In moving the debate along, it should be noted that as celebrities have become more politically conscious they have brought about new forms of diplomatic engagement which have indicated a transformation from a state-centric to more populist approaches to international relations. These reforms have occurred within a construct of global collaboration so that networks of institutional and ideological power facilitate diplomatic reforms. Thus, in soft power terms, the politics of attraction within celebrity-led campaigns such as Make Poverty History and Product RED have facilitated greater forms of agency to alleviate global suffering. Further, the dialogue between celebrities and the public has allowed for new opportunities for public diplomatic engagement. This has reflected a willingness within audiences to accept celebrities as authentic advocates due to the public's identification with stars. Consequently, the celebritization of international politics must not be simply dismissed as an erosion of the diplomatic order but should be understood as part of the transformation processes which are occurring within public diplomacy.

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Digital Diplomacy

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INTRODUCTION

Information and communication technologies (ICTs) have created a global connectivity that has challenged diplomacy but also created opportunities for more effective and innovative practice. This connectivity has facilitated two-way communication between governments and foreign publics, between peoples and governments, and between and among peoples. Diplomats can now reach and engage large audiences, and citizens can influence foreign policy and diplomacy as never before. They can also employ ICTs for listening to the wishes, praise, criticism and reservations of both domestic and foreign audiences. Although states still remain the dominant actors in international relations, 'networking' – the informal sharing of information and services among individuals, groups and institutions having a common interest – has altered the global power structure. Adjustment of governments to ICTs was slow but now foreign ministries and diplomatic legations have created, developed and adopted new Digital Diplomacy (DD) strategies designed to connect cultures, increase awareness, and advocate policy positions (Sarukhan et al., 2012).

Much of the existing research on DD is limited and has been conducted mostly on the American experience and public diplomacy (PD) (Digital Diplomacy Bibliography, 2014; Gilboa, 2016a) (see Chapter 35 in this Handbook). This isn't surprising because the US was the first to adopt DD, has been conducting the most intensive DD in the world and American scholars have dominated research in this field. Yet, the massive concentration of research and analysis on the US experience is limited because it may have missed significant national and cultural differences and idiosyncrasies. Many examples and illustrations in this chapter are taken from the American case, but they exist in somewhat less developed formats in the diplomatic establishment of many countries.

DEFINITIONS

DD is a relatively new term created by the need to explain and analyze the effects of ICTs, especially the internet and social media, on the conduct of foreign policy and diplomacy. Scholars and practitioners haven't yet found a definition of DD that all can agree on. DD is often equated, contrasted, or confused with terms such as 'ediplomacy,' 'cyber diplomacy,' 'virtual diplomacy,' 'real-time diplomacy,' 'networked diplomacy' or 'social diplomacy'. Secretary of State John Kerry (2013) equated DD with diplomacy: 'the term digital diplomacy is almost redundant – it is just diplomacy, period'. While DD is increasingly dominating traditional government-to-government relations and new government-to-people and people-to-people relations, non-digital diplomacy still covers many more areas and issues.

A frequently used definition refers to DD 'as the use of the Web, ICTs, and social media tools to engage in diplomatic activities and carry out foreign policy objectives' (Sandre, 2013: 9). DD is conducted via digital-based platforms and tools including websites, blogs, social networks and smartphones. The web networks of Facebook and Twitter have become especially popular channels for communication between politicians and officials and the public, and between and among peoples. Hence the terms: 'Facebook diplomacy' and 'Twiplomacy.'

DD is often equated with PD because the latter is extensively employed to reach diverse audiences (Gilboa, 2016b). Initially, in 2002, the State Department (State) introduced the term ediplomacy, and created a special office to plan and organize relevant programs in eight different areas, only one of which was PD. The others were knowledge management, information management, consular communication and response, disaster response, internet freedom, external resources and policy planning (Hanson, 2012a). Cohen argued that DD utilization for effective and innovative communication and advocacy is PD, while utilization for empowering citizens, promoting greater accountability and building capacity is statecraft (cited in Larson, 2010).

As PD is an integral part of diplomacy and foreign policy, equating DD only with PD is misleading because DD serves other significant areas of diplomacy. Equating DD with diplomacy is also misleading because diplomacy is conducted in several areas where ICTs are absent, such as negotiations and meetings between leaders and diplomats with government officials and heads of companies and organizations. DD also shouldn't be equated with ediplomacy, because DD only provides ICTs for the implementation of ediplomacy programs. The most useful approach to DD is to view it as an instrument of diplomacy, based on ICTs and serving both traditional and new foreign policy goals of states and non-state actors.

EVOLUTION

DD has developed in several stages defined by vision, rapid technological innovations and organizational adoptions by foreign ministries. Already in 1968, Leonard Marks, the Director of the US Information Agency, envisioned a global computer network that would dramatically connect people in the world (Cull, 2013: 123–4). Thirty years later, the Center for Strategic and International Studies published a report generated by a group of scholars, diplomats, journalists and businessmen predicting that the internet would become the central nervous system of international relations (Robison & Fulton, 1998). Dizard (2001) wrote one of the first books on digital diplomacy and complained about the slow, reluctant adjustment of State to the challenges and opportunities of the information age.

This approach, however, turned around after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The US decided that the battle for the hearts and minds of people, especially in the Middle East, would have to be a central component

of their response to the attacks (Hallams, 2010; Hayden, 2012). In 2002, Secretary of State Colin Powell established the first task-force of ediplomacy which later became the Office of ediplomacy (Hanson, 2012b). Until 2009, however, this unit was very small, with a staff of six employees focusing on the use of ICTs for internal purposes.

Powell's successor, Condoleezza Rice, introduced 'Transformational Diplomacy,' which included a major plan for more and better use of ICTs across the Department of State. In 2006, she established the Digital Outreach Team (DOT) to counter misinformation and explain US policies through direct engagement with the Muslim world. The breakthrough came under her successor Hilary Clinton, who adopted a far-reaching vision of DD programs and tools under the umbrella of her Twenty-first-century Statecraft initiative (Lichtenstein, 2010; Sandre, 2015). Clinton's approach well matched the overall characterization of Obama as the first American digital president.

Diplomacy 1.0 refers to the passive presentation and consumption of content, primarily via email and websites. This format characterized the DD pursued during the administration of President George W. Bush. Diplomacy 2.0, coined in 2008, primarily refers to interactivity, sharing user-generated content via platforms such as blogs, forums, Wikipedia, Flicker, and the social media networks of Facebook, LinkedIn, MySpace, YouTube, Twitter, Instagram and Google+. In Diplomacy 1.0, communication went vertically and only in one direction, from governments downward; in Diplomacy 2.0 it has been interactive and horizontal.

Key Points

- The evolution of DD was slow due to the stiff organizational structure and norms of foreign ministries.
- Dramatic events such as the 9/11 terror attacks, and visionary foreign ministers such as Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, inspired better and faster DD practices.

EFFECTS

Diplomats and scholars have argued that DD is only a new instrument designed to achieve the traditional goals of diplomacy. The counter argument is that it has caused a paradigmatic shift, completely changing the environment and conduct of diplomacy and the role of diplomats (Graffy, 2009; Seib, 2012; Bjola and Holmes, 2015; Sandre, 2015). Ross (2011) has suggested that ICTs have 'disrupted' international relations by creating and using new and innovative channels for diplomatic activity.

The information revolution has changed the balance of power between governments and citizens. Institutions became less powerful and the people became more powerful. It has multiplied and diversified the number of actors and interests involved in foreign policymaking, and has created opportunities for collaboration among them. Foreign ministries have more tools to disseminate more information, more effectively and more quickly. At the same time, citizens are demanding more transparency and accountability, and are debating foreign policy choices with policymakers and among themselves. ICTs inspired the emergence of 'citizen diplomacy' – ordinary citizens representing their country and even negotiating with the officials and citizens of other countries (see Chapter 42 in this Handbook). This way, DD enables politicians and officials to monitor and listen to domestic and foreign perceptions of their policies and programs.

DD is also an effective tool to bypass the controlled media in authoritarian states. During the initial phases of the vicious civil war in Syria, US ambassador Robert Ford extensively used the US embassy's Facebook page to bypass the Syrian government's heavy censorship. He wanted to reach as many ordinary Syrians as possible and tell them the truth about the atrocities (Barry, 2011). DD has been also very effective in humanitarian aid and the crisis management of natural disasters such as the earthquakes in Haiti and Japan (Harris, 2013).

DD is more effective for reaching young people, who are more versed in ICTs than older people. About half of the world's population is under 30 and lives on-line. Ministries of Foreign Affairs have initiated and implemented projects to meet this challenge. The State Department created a program to help young international activists to seek reforms. In 2008, Facebook was used to organize a strong international protest against the FARC guerrillas in Colombia. The protest led to the establishment of the Alliance of Youth Movement, a platform for similar cyber activism (Cartalucci, 2011).

Key Points

- The debate about the effects of DD on diplomacy cuts across both scholars and practitioners.
- There is more agreement now that DD has significantly changed the diplomatic landscape and isn't merely one new tool of diplomacy.

DD AND THE FOREIGN SERVICE

DD has altered the role of diplomats. One of the main functions of diplomats has always been to gather information about the places they serve in. Since much of this information is now available on the internet, this function has become less significant. Yet, 'human intelligence' didn't disappear when new sophisticated spying technologies, such as satellites, were developed and activated. Likewise, diplomats still directly receive sensitive information from policymakers that isn't available from open sources, and are therefore in a much better position to assess the importance and validity of the information that is available on the internet.

DD has atomized the Foreign Service and created tension between diplomats stationed abroad and foreign ministries (Sarukhan et al., 2012). The Foreign Service is very hierarchical. Official statements and activities in the field require authorization from headquarters which could take days, because they have to be cautious and consistent with overall policy. On the other hand, DD requires fast and sometimes spontaneous responses to developing events. If diplomats have to wait too long for authorization, they lose the conversation and are excluded from the discussion. Consequently, diplomats have become much more independent and assertive. This has led to fruitful engagement but also to blowbacks, the unintended adverse results of a political action or situation. In November 2013, the British Ambassador to Lebanon, Tom Fletcher (2014), wrote a letter to mark the 70th anniversary of the Lebanese republic. He listed achievements but also antagonized many Lebanese by offering 'some unsolicited critical advice.'

Veteran diplomats think that DD has gone too far, is too risky and should be limited. Other diplomats admit that DD is risky, especially in social media, but is still worth pursuing because the alternative is to forfeit a critical instrument (Wichowski, 2013; Sandre, 2015). The solution is to better train diplomats to use DD and trust them to make an effort to avoid mistakes and to increase collaboration and consultation between the traditional and the DD diplomats, both at the embassy level and between embassy and headquarters. Diplomats have always needed to be aware of cultural and religious sensitivities, but today this imperative is even more significant because once a message is posted on Facebook or Twitter, it quickly spreads all over the world. Foreign Service manuals can help to reduce the risks, but they tell diplomats mostly what not to do. They all require significant revisions and adjustments to DD.

DD has inspired innovations such as the Virtual Student Foreign Service (2014), which began in 2009 and was designed to engage civil society in the work of the government by harnessing the expertise and digital excellence of US citizen students. The students have contributed skills and creativity entirely remotely to numerous projects in areas such as human rights, environmental protection and economics, sponsored by several departments and agencies.

DD has also inspired the establishment of virtual embassies. In 2007, Sweden opened the first virtual embassy in the virtual world of Second Life (http://secondlife.com/). It more resembles the routine work of the cultural attaché office as it offers information about Swedish culture, tours of museums and on-line courses. In 2011, the US opened a virtual embassy in Teheran, Iran, which broke diplomatic relations with the US after the 1979 Iranian hostage crisis (Ryan and Frantz, 2014: 8). This virtual embassy was designed to create a direct channel of information and dialogue with the Iranian public. In the absence of its ability to establish diplomatic relations with Arab states, in 2013 Israel founded its first virtual embassy on Twitter to promote dialogue with the population of six gulf countries: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Abu Dhabi. In these cases, the virtual embassies substituted the functions of real embassies in states where normal diplomatic relations couldn't be established or were broken. The virtual embassies had only limited success. The US virtual embassy in Teheran didn't help to inspire a widespread resistance to the Iranian extreme theocracy, and Sweden closed its virtual embassy in 2013.

Key Points

- DD has created a dilemma for the Foreign Service because it requires fast responses which could be careless and counterproductive.
- On the other hand, it offers opportunities to establish innovative mechanisms for diplomacy such as virtual embassies and, in the case of the US, a Student Foreign Service.

TWIPLOMACY

Twitter was developed in 2006 and has become a very popular DD instrument (Sandre, 2013, 2015; Bastianello, 2014). In 2014, about three quarters of world leaders had a Twitter account compared to only half in 2012. Leaders and government agencies including embassies use Twitter to document their most significant daily activities, to communicate with foreign and domestic audiences, to answer questions and comments, and to exchange views in open forums with their colleagues and counterparts. In the networked world, diplomats have to be outstanding communicators.

Any foreign policy, particularly of great and intermediate powers, is too complex to explain in 140 characters. It is difficult to succinctly compose but easy to read and follow. Twitter forces diplomats to distill their government's message to its essence. Twitter is best to send quick messages or to amplify them. It is also best for gathering information on leaders and major political, economic and social processes. Leaders and foreign ministers use Twitter to promote longer presentations that they place in blogs or in other forums. Tweets are used to initiate a communication with foreign leaders, and move them to the traditional government-to-government diplomacy. In May 2012, the Swedish foreign minister, Carl Bildt, was unable to connect with the foreign minister of Bahrain, Khalid Al Khalifa. He tweeted him and got an immediate response on Twitter and on the phone (Sandre, 2013: 28).

Re-tweets amplify messages. Three communities in foreign countries are especially relevant: the local media, the diplomatic community and the home state diaspora. Ministries and embassies push national media outlets in foreign countries to cite as many tweets as possible, written and transmitted by agencies as well as by embassies and other diplomatic legations. The diplomatic community in any country often follows what colleagues are tweeting and disseminating messages to their own audiences. This practice is especially effective when countries collaborate on certain issues or adopt similar opinions.

A few examples demonstrate Twiplomacy (Sandre, 2013: 30–3). British foreign minister William Hague initiated a 'Meet the Foreign Secretary' channel to improve his relations with domestic and foreign audiences. He solicited tweets on questions such as the idea, innovation, or trend that will have the greatest impact on the world in the next 20 years, or the priorities the Foreign Office should adopt for the next year. Susan Rice, the US Ambassador to the UN, was the first to use Twitter from the closed doors of the UN Security Council, and became one of the most followed diplomats in the world. When in 2010 Dino Patti Djalal became the Indonesian Ambassador to the US, he said he would be Indonesian's first 'Twitter Ambassador.' In two years he got around 100,000 followers and became the most followed ambassador in Washington. When Michael McFaul became US ambassador to Russia in 2011, he pioneered the use of Twitter as an embassy tool. He explained that Twitter allowed him to interact with a high school student in Vladivostok or a minister in the Russian government without having to go through the Russian government (Landler, 2014).

In 2009, the US employed Twitter to encourage protests in Iran against the regime's rigging of the presidential elections. The effort, however, boomeranged because the Basij paramilitaries used Twitter to identify, hunt and execute protesters (Burns and Eltham, 2009). Sometimes, information alone can't cope with violent repression, and social media can even become a double-edged sword.

Key Points

- Twiplomacy is used for several purposes but mostly for fast and concise exchanges.
- Diplomats who know best when and how to use Twitter become popular, attract many followers and have more opportunities to influence leaders and public opinion. Yet, chatting on social media is difficult to record and evaluate, and Twiplomacy is seen in several countries, like China, as intrusive.

AUDIENCES

Traditional diplomacy was used only in connection with foreign governments and peoples. DD is much broader and is used to reach and engage three types of audiences: internal, domestic and foreign. Internal audience refers to people and units inside the ministry of foreign affairs and other relevant agencies. The domestic audience is citizens and residents of a country. The foreign audience is people in another country or around the world.

Foreign ministries first used DD for internal purposes. It helped to better coordinate policies, programs, responses and initiatives with other branches of the foreign policy and national security establishment. It also significantly assisted the steering, oversight and evaluation of diplomatic activities. The Department of State developed several DD tools for internal communication and coordination (Hanson, 2012a), based on digital concepts such as Wikipedia and Facebook. Search was established in 2004 and functions as a documentation archive. Communities@State was inaugurated in 2005 and contains issue specific blogs. Diplopedia was established in 2006. It looks like Wikipedia and performs similar functions of providing information on people, events, processes and so on. Sounding Board was founded in 2009 and serves as a platform to solicit ideas and innovation directly from State's employees. Established in 2011, Corridor, like LinkedIn, is a professional networking site.

In the globalization and information age, the traditional distinction between domestic and foreign policy and between domestic and foreign audiences has become blurred (see Chapter 5 in this Handbook). In the past, the life of ordinary citizens was not affected by developments and events in other parts of the world – they were not interested in foreign affairs, didn't know much about them and trusted their leaders to formulate and implement the right policies. Today, all these elements have changed. The life of citizens is affected by world events and people want to

know more and to participate in discussions about foreign policy.

In view of these transformations, policymakers employ DD, especially social media, for several functions: to investigate what the public thinks about foreign policy choices; to educate the public about foreign policy and international relations; to explain challenges and alternative means to address them; and to cultivate public support for policies they have selected. This use of DD could be called domestic DD. The Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade was the first ministry of foreign affairs to consult the domestic public via DD and other means on foreign policy priorities (Potter, 2008: 126).

Key Points

- DD is employed to reach and engage three different audiences: internal, domestic and foreign.
- The challenge is how to formulate and transmit messages that would meet the different needs and interests of each audience.

DIGITAL PUBLIC DIPLOMACY (DPD)

DPD reaches foreign audiences. ICTs have significantly affected the practice and theory of PD because they have created a global arena for direct information dissemination and interactivity. Almost all states and non-state actors maintain websites and blogs to present their history, policies, values, culture, science and other achievements as well as positions on current affairs and policies. During diplomacy 1.0, ICTs provided actors with ample opportunities to present themselves in creative textual and visual formats designed to cultivate positive support or attack opponents. The cumulative effect of using ICTs for self-promotion has created competing e-images. NGOs and terrorist organizations have been particularly effective in using ICTs to promote their causes and actions. Wikipedia, written by ordinary citizens from all over the world, is now a significant source of information worldwide (Byrne and Johnston, 2015). The interactive social media created public diplomacy 2.0 (Dale, 2009).

PD is pursued via several instruments such as advocacy, media relations, cultural diplomacy, international exchanges, international broadcasting, nation-branding and international public relations. Most of these instruments include a digital component. For example, international exchanges are conducted in a traditional way, but if participants in a specific program interact among themselves and with sponsoring institutions via Facebook or Twitter, they create digital international exchanges (Ryan and Frantz, 2014: 7).

Very few studies have examined the organizational and planning aspects of DPD. Zhang (2013) identified four phases in DPD strategic issue management: (1) fermenting; (2) proactive; (3) reactive; and (4) new fermenting. Social media are largely tactical tools in the first and the last phases, and may become strategic tools in the proactive and reactive phases, in which diplomats may use them to reinforce a favorable viral trend, build an agenda, or respond to a conflict. Park and Lim (2014) found that Japan had a strong internal DPD network infrastructure achieved through dispersed connections and partnerships, while Korea had a centralized network, including a limited number of dominant actors. This comparative analysis of DPD is rare. Kersaint (2014) is also an exception. She closely compared the DPDs of the US and Germany and identified both differences and similarities.

Several studies found poor and ineffective utilization of DPD. Nurmi (2012) revealed that the Finnish missions abroad failed to exploit DPD for dialogue and interactivity, and instead employed them as traditional media. Grincheva (2012) used the rhetorical lenses of the European discourse on cultural agenda and found that the UK DD hardly went beyond the traditional cultural promotion. Natarajan (2014) examined uses of narratives in India's PD and concluded that DPD

should be used only within the context of a larger set of diplomatic practices.

Considerable research was conducted on the DPD of President Barack Obama. Khatib et al. (2012) examined efforts to engage Arab audiences in Obama's Cairo speech of June 4, 2009. They exposed the limits of DPD in trying to engage hostile audiences. Ciolek (2010) analyzed the use of Facebook by the US embassy in Jakarta to engage young Indonesians in dialogue about Obama's visit to Indonesia in 2010. In just a few months, the Facebook pages for the embassy and two consulates had more fans than all other US embassies and missions combined. Hayden et al. (2013) investigated information generated by the US embassy Facebook sites in Bangladesh, Egypt and Pakistan in the 2012 presidential elections. Much of the communication on these sites were 'praise and blame' of Obama and American political institutions. All these studies, however, present only isolated and disconnected islands of research.

Key Points

- DPD is the most researched area in DD. Researchers have used similar methods: quantitative content analysis of messages, responses and exchanges, interviews with policymakers and diplomats, and data collection and analysis with techniques employed in internet studies.
- The different and interesting studies, however, have not yet produced cumulative knowledge. The main reason for this deficiency is the absence of a clear and rigorous research agenda.

LIMITS AND CHALLENGES

The enthusiasm around DD has obscured several lingering challenges and problems. DD isn't a magic solution to weaknesses in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. DD has to be connected not only to people but also to strategic purposes and national communication strategies. At times, it seems that the medium, rather than critical interests, has become the main message. DD offers tools. Selection of a tool has to be based on clear goals and strategies, otherwise it would be floating directionless. DD doesn't replace traditional government-to-government diplomacy and the new media doesn't replace the traditional media (newspapers, radio and television). There is a clear need for a balance between traditional diplomacy and DD, between soft and hard power, between the new and the traditional media and between governments and citizens.

DD can be used for both good and ill purposes. DD seems to punish moderation and amplify the messages of extreme and violent movements. Terrorist organizations have effectively used social media to recruit fighters and supporters, raise funds, glorify actions, challenge rules and norms and delegitimize states and regimes (Weimann, 2014). This practice can be vividly seen in the appalling use of social media since 2014 by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) terrorist organization. Despite the innovative DD efforts of the State Department's Center for Strategic Counterterrorism and Communication, it seems that the West hasn't yet been able to mount an effective DD counter campaign.

Julian Assange's WikiLeaks and Edward Snowden's revelations about abuses in the American military and national security system demonstrate how ICTs can be used to damage and embarrass the foreign policy and national security establishment (Cull, 2011). They also demonstrate the importance of the traditional media even in the information age. Both Assange and Snowden assembled and posted a large volume of secret information on the web, but used newspapers and networks to reach elites and gain credibility.

Measuring the impact of DD is difficult (Wallin, 2013). Several organizations and private companies have established DD monitoring systems and built big data banks. These sources provide interesting statistical information on the spread and popularity of social media accounts and networks.

Each focuses on certain dimensions of DD. Twitalyzer (2014) developed a 0-to-100 index that combines influence, number of followers and frequency of message writing. Burson-Marsteller (2014) monitors and analyzes Twitter accounts of leaders and governments. Agence France Presse (2014) established in 2012 the e-diplomacy hub for monitoring, visualizing, analyzing and measuring the presence and influence of diplomatic actors on Twitter across the globe and in real time.

Technical counting of contacts, the number of followers on a Facebook page of a ministry or an embassy, the number of times people use content, or the number of re-tweets are insufficient to verify engagement processes and content. If the same people follow each other, they won't reach the diverse audiences they claim to have been engaging with. Twitter can only be an effective DD tool when it leads to an open conversation, not to a monologue.

Sending messages has become easier but also challenging. Leaders and organizations use ICTs as alternative channels to push the same message. But the best use of ICTs is to offer information, context and analysis that otherwise isn't available. Leaders are still sending one message in a native language for the domestic audience and another in English to foreign audiences. This practice is quickly and easily exposed and doesn't work anymore. When so many people and organizations employ DD, the challenge is how to keep a consistent message, how to avoid sending content that people don't want and how to add a personal tone to an official position. With so many networks, the challenge is also how to select a specific platform to send a specific message, such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Pinterest, Flickr, or Google+.

CONCLUSION

Experts have claimed that Diplomacy 2.0 is already obsolete but the next phase is confused and being debated. Several are already using the term Diplomacy 3.0, but others prefer terms such as 'networking.' For the Department of State, Diplomacy 3.0 is one essential pillar of foreign policy with the other two being defense and development. Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt, the initiator of the Stockholm Initiative for Digital Diplomacy, thinks that Diplomacy 3.0 means replacing national DD and social media with collaborative international effort and multilateral digital diplomacy (Sandre, 2014, 2015).

Scholars have argued that networks are much more significant than a specific technology or platform (Zharana et al., 2013). Any transition from diplomacy 2.0 to another phase will have to resemble the quantum leap found in the transition from diplomacy 1.0 to diplomacy 2.0. Diplomacy 3.0 will exist only after social media has been further developed or even replaced by a newer technology or conceptual paradigm.

Scholars and diplomats argue that the most powerful nations in the future will be those with the most connections and those at the center of the most networks, rather than those with the largest armies. Similar statements were made after the end of the Cold War, but given the current high levels of intra- and interstate violence, these assessments may be premature. Even if Slaughter (2009) is correct and 'connectedness' is 'power,' there is still much to investigate into how different types of connections and networks are initiated, developed and maintained.

DD provides new tools for diplomats to make foreign policy and diplomacy more efficient, more inclusive and more engaging. In using DD, however, diplomats must be careful not to undermine traditional relationships. In certain situations, face-to-face communication is the preferred method – not DD (Vanc, 2012). Based on scholarly research and practical experience, several experts have suggested useful guidelines for the cautious and effective utilization of DD. These principles could help to address the limitations and challenges of DD (Glassman, 2008; Cull, 2011: 7; Sandre, 2013: 60–70; Sandre, 2015).

DD is an exciting developing field for both research and practice. Research on DD, however, is especially difficult because ICTs are invented, developed, modified and applied very rapidly, generating new processes and patterns of diplomacy that need constant monitoring and updating. Research on DD is also challenging because it requires a complex multi-disciplinary effort, new and innovative methods and frameworks for analysis, and much greater collaboration between scholars and practitioners. There are many gaps to bridge but also many new skilled scholars and experts ready to fill them up.

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45

Economic Diplomacy

Maaike Okano-Heijmans

INTRODUCTION

Globalisation and shifting power balances between the West and other countries, particularly those in the Asia-Pacific region, are creating new incentives for governments everywhere to rethink the balance between their different national interests. In addition, pressing global issues, such as climate change and scarcity of natural resources (for example, water, energy and minerals) are growing challenges for governments (see Chapter 49 in this Handbook). Economic diplomacy is central to all these issues. Although it is certainly not a new phenomenon, the end of the Western-dominated era of free-market capitalism marks a new episode in its conceptual and practical evolution. The revolution in communications technologies acts both as a facilitator of and a challenge to such change (see Chapter 44 in this Handbook). As institutions at the domestic and the multilateral level, such as ministries of foreign affairs (MFAs) and the World Bank, are adapting to this new reality, national diplomatic systems (NDS) are also changing (see Chapter 5 in this Handbook).

Given this context, this chapter raises several questions about economic diplomacy. Is economic diplomacy defined differently across disciplines and across countries? What debates underlie the re-emergence of economic diplomacy in foreign affairs? How do governments adjust their strategy and practice in this field? And what are the consequences for national diplomatic systems and foreign policy at large?

To answer these questions, this chapter adopts a diplomatic studies perspective and argues that the concept and practice of economic diplomacy is becoming more comprehensive, covering at least three types of diplomatic activity: trade and investment promotion (commercial diplomacy); negotiations on economic agreements (trade diplomacy); and development cooperation. As governments seek new and innovative ways to advance decision-making in these fields,

the practice and institutional organisation of economic diplomacy is undergoing significant change. Such change is not unidirectional, however, and there is significant variation in countries' national diplomatic systems, that is, the set of institutions and actors, configured for the management of a state's international environment (Hocking, 2013: 126–7). The chapter also argues that, although a broader network of sub-state and non-state actors is becoming involved in economic diplomacy, the state remains the primary actor. Government officials continue to represent and mediate the interests of business as well as civil society interests to political and public entities abroad. However, in this process the balance between advocating narrow sectoral interests and the more general concerns of domestic citizens and global public goods remains a precarious one.

Key Points

- Economic diplomacy is certainly not a new phenomenon, but globalisation and shifting power balances are making it a more important diplomatic instrument in foreign affairs for governments throughout the world.
- Economic diplomacy is becoming increasingly comprehensive, as both strategy and practice.

EVOLVING THINKING ON ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY: A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

In recent years governments have strengthened the economic aspects of foreign policy. For many developed countries in the West, more attention to national economic interests is a sensible response to increased competition from emerging economies, growing financial constraints, and demands for transparency, accountability and result-driven policies at home. For the governments of developing countries, economic diplomacy is primarily a means to build a coherent economic approach to foreign policy, while simultaneously converting their growing economic muscle into political leverage (see Chapter 34 in this Handbook). For rising powers, 'great power economic diplomacy' is a means to realise power transition and reshape the global order (Zhang, 2014) (see Chapters 28 and 29 in this Handbook). While China is the most recent example of this, Britain, the United States, the European Union (EU) and Japan have followed similar paths.

Clearly, when seen from a diplomatic studies perspective, economic diplomacy serves both economic and politico-strategic goals. Thus a comprehensive definition of economic diplomacy would see it as an umbrella term that refers to both the use of political means as leverage in international negotiations with the aim of enhancing national economic prosperity, and the use of economic leverage to increase a country's political stability. Activities subsumed under this umbrella term range considerably, from trade and investment promotion (including through economic missions and intelligence sharing) and negotiations on economic and financial agreements, to inducements such as development assistance and coercive measures like economic sanctions.

Also from a diplomatic studies perspective on economic diplomacy it is useful to mention some distinctions and what is not emphasised. Economic diplomacy is distinct from business diplomacy in that a public sector agent – a government agency, an official or a political figure – is the principal actor (see Chapter 46 in this Handbook). While the private sector is either actively or passively involved, businesses or their representatives are not the focus of analysis. An economist's approach to economic diplomacy is also distinctive for its focus on quantitative cost–benefit analyses that adopt an economic logic to identify where and when economic diplomacy works. This includes analyses of the effectiveness of one or more instruments, of economic diplomacy between particular

(groups of) countries, or of specific industrial sectors or goods. Such economic studies often investigate geographical patterns in international trade and diplomacy by use of the so-called gravity model to trade (see, for example, Van Bergeijk and Brakman, 2010). While economic diplomacy can have a multidisciplinary focus with contributions from rich research traditions, this chapter follows the approach taken by most MFAs: that is, it addresses the subject from a diplomatic studies perspective that emphasises a qualitative approach and an inherent political logic.

In practical terms in recent years, individual governments of developed countries, from Germany to Australia, have refocused on core strategic and economic interests and strengthening relationships with key partners. This is apparent from governments' strategy documents[1] and greater investments in economic diplomacy capabilities, including the opening of more representations with an economic focus and the appointment of diplomats with economic credentials (to promote trade, investment and cooperation in the field of innovation or agriculture, for example). Governments have also strengthened economic diplomacy activities, such as economic missions led by high-level political figures to promising markets, and negotiations on bilateral and regional economic agreements, including free trade agreements. In the multilateral context, economic diplomacy is also high on the agenda. More generally, developed and developing countries note the growing importance of economic and financial diplomacy and the challenge of 'state capitalism'.[2] This is hardly surprising as governments in latecomer countries commonly play an important role in industries that are operated by the private sector; for example, in sectors such as water management, energy, agriculture and harbour development.

For all countries, the growing challenges of security and stability are another reason to invest in economic diplomacy. Building closer ties or partnerships with some countries and not with others denotes not mere diplomatic signalling (see Chapter 6 in this Handbook) but constitutes real attempts to avoid isolation, create coalitions and to improve stability – for example, the bilateral relationship of China and Japan and their respective relations to neighbouring countries in the Asia-Pacific, which both regional powers seek to court. Both Beijing and Tokyo employ a variety of economic diplomacy instruments, including comprehensive economic partnership agreements and development cooperation projects, in an attempt to strengthen their relative position towards the other. A similar game is being played by the EU and Russia in their bilateral relationship and neighbourhood region.

In economic diplomacy, broadly conceived, economic/commercial interests and political interests reinforce one another and should be seen in tandem. Economic diplomacy is thus an umbrella term, involving several strands that may be more economic or more political in purpose (Okano-Heijmans, 2013: esp. 27–33; Bayne and Woolcock, 2013: esp. 2–13). Moreover, it includes a range of activities that are largely economic in character, such as commercial diplomacy (that is, generic and sector/company-specific trade and investment promotion) as well as trade diplomacy (i.e. negotiations between two or more countries that support economic transactions and trade and/or investment agreements). But economic diplomacy also involves more politically-motivated attempts to influence others, either through positive engagement (the premier example being development or economic cooperation) or by less benign means, such as sanctions.

The question of whether and when it is legitimate or desirable for governments to engage in economic diplomacy or not continues to be a matter of fierce debate, in which scholars of varying backgrounds emphasise diverging points. In general, it is probably fair to say that the role of a governmental network as a broker towards other governments is less disputed than direct financial or

other government support to their own businesses in their activities abroad. Concerns about 'fair competition' and 'level-playing field' are often heard from economists, both to criticise others for supporting domestic companies as well as to legitimise their own government support by other than financial means. Political scientists emphasise that no fair or equal standard can be created for all countries; the differences between countries' levels of development, political and economic systems, types of home industries, natural endowments, and political power of influence are simply too big. These divergences also explain the different conceptualisations and practices of economic diplomacy between countries and regions, and are an important reason why there can be no 'one-size-fits-all-approach' to economic diplomacy.

Within diplomatic studies, economic diplomacy is distinguished from other forms of diplomacy in two ways (Woolcock and Bayne, 2013: 389–90). First, MFAs are not necessarily leading the decision-making processes. Economic diplomacy also involves various 'line ministries' such as those involved in economic affairs, agriculture and infrastructure, as well as development cooperation and climate change. The second distinguishing feature of economic diplomacy is its significant link with private sector bodies. This is a natural result of the fact that the direct beneficiaries of economic diplomacy are, to a significant degree, non-government agencies – that is, small and medium-sized enterprises as well as big business. Importantly, the goals sought by these two beneficiaries – government entities on the one hand, and the private sector on the other – differ substantially. While private sector entities principally aim for economic merit, most governments and for that matter non-governmental agencies and civil society organisations, strive for so-called global public goods, such as robust institutions to manage climate change, scarce natural resources (water and energy, for example) and international stability.

Taken together, these two distinctive features of economic diplomacy make decision-making in economic diplomacy an extremely complex process. More than any other form of diplomacy, the management of economic diplomacy involves a variety of state actors at the national, provincial and local levels. Furthermore, a significant number of non-state actors, including an extremely diverse private sector as well as civil society organisations, have a stake in the government's economic diplomacy.

Key Points

- There are different economic and political motivations to employ economic diplomacy in foreign affairs, especially between developed and developing countries.
- Whether or not and when it is legitimate or desirable for the government to engage in economic diplomacy continues to be a matter of fierce debate.
- Decision-making in economic diplomacy is a complex issue because there is a diversity of state and non-state stakeholders which aim for different economic and political outcomes.

THE NEXUS BETWEEN COMMERCE, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT

As governments are actively re-emphasising economic diplomacy in their foreign policy, there is a common trend towards developing stronger linkages between three strands of economic diplomacy: trade diplomacy, commercial diplomacy and development cooperation. These economic diplomacy tools are employed most regularly in times of relative peace, that is, when there is no need to resort to more extreme instruments such as sanctions or, worse still, declarations of war. Commercial diplomacy, trade diplomacy and development cooperation were largely separated until the 1990s, when the more developed countries in the West largely dominated

global political and economic affairs. The more recent trend, however, has been back to greater linkages between the three (see Figure 45.1). In Europe and the United States, this change is spurred by the growing presence and influence of a group of countries that is not necessarily inclined to follow the rules and conventions of the game of international politics and economics that developed in the aftermath of the Second World War. For their part, latecomer countries, including Asian, post-colonial and transition states, have for a long time openly adhered to the comprehensive approach to economic diplomacy. This may be explained by the viscosity of global governance and international political and financial institutions, and therefore the greater dependency of the governments of emerging countries on economic tools and commercial relations to strengthen their position in international relations.

Of the various economic diplomacy strands, commercial diplomacy probably has the broadest consensus and the most developed body of literature. Economic diplomacy is sometimes even equated with commercial diplomacy, particularly by those who have a dominantly economic take on the subject. Trade and investment promotion – at both the general level and more specifically, via business advocacy – is a task that all governments perform in some way. In general terms, the three key activities are: providing (market and technology) intelligence; offering concrete hands-on assistance, including with trade questions, market access issues and trade missions; and providing partner search and networking support (Jones-Bos et al., 2012: 137). These tasks can be performed by specialised trade and investment support offices at home and/or by embassies or other representations abroad. The location of important new markets and production bases thus guides government decisions to focus activities on a certain country or region, as do the depth and breadth of economic relations and the involvement of the other country's government in the market. In other words, the more substantial the links between the public and private sectors in a particular country, the greater the incentive for others to invest in commercial diplomacy in relations with that country.



Figure 45.1 The trinity in economic diplomacy

Source: Author's compilation.

Development cooperation can be an expression of economic diplomacy in two rather distinct, although not mutually exclusive ways, when seen from the perspective of the country providing such assistance. First, it can be employed with the primary aim to promote more political objectives such as good governance, democracy or human rights. This approach has been adopted by European countries: their activities have often been commissioned to non-governmental agencies and geographically focused on the African continent. Another approach, which is more readily adopted by non-Western and new players in the field, largely emphasises economic objectives. The rhetoric is one of adding to the economic strength of the recipient and providing assistance, by linking assistance to trade and investment. To emphasise the mutual gains, this is commonly labelled economic cooperation rather than development assistance/aid. While Japan in the 1970s was an early example of this approach, the Japanese government has partly adjusted its policies in order to appease Western concerns of 'tied aid' – that is, of using development policies to promote its own private sector interests. The rise of new players with similar approaches to Japan of old – including China, India and Brazil – now puts Japan in a middle

position, as a country that aims for both economic and political objectives. Pressured by new players and financial constraints at home, European countries are evolving in a direction that resembles that of Japan, albeit coming from the opposite end. Slowly but steadily they are overcoming the long-held taboo that development and profit can go hand in hand, and becoming more mercantilist themselves.

Trade diplomacy has become a popular policy instrument for governments since the 1990s. This conforms with the argument that governments are more likely to employ economic tools for political and foreign policy purposes during periods of systemic change. The scare of economic crises in various parts of the world prompted countries to work together in different ways, and the failure of the multilateral trade negotiations in the World Trade Organization (WTO) Doha round further contributed to this trend. Trade diplomacy thereby shifted focus from unilateral liberalisation backed up by WTO commitments to preferential liberalisation through bilateral and (inter) regional free trade agreements. Importantly, the motivations to engage in such talks are not just economic ones such as trade liberalisation, preferential market access and trade diversion. Rather, and increasingly so, they involve a variety of economic, political, legal and geostrategic considerations. Negotiations have come to involve issues of norm setting, rivalry for influence, strengthening of partnerships, and resource allocation. Hence, the concept of trade *diplomacy*, rather than trade *policy*. This politicisation of trade diplomacy has been most apparent in the Asia-Pacific, where negotiations on trade, investment and financial agreements play a major role in the competition for influence (see, for example, Das, 2014 and Chapter 29 in this Handbook). While the European Union, on behalf of its member states, remains largely committed to economic goals, aiming for economically 'high-quality' and 'deep' agreements, its latest strategy document of October 2015 also evidences a shift in this direction (European Commission, 2015).

As strategies and practice evolve in all three strands of economic diplomacy, linkages between the various fields are multiplying. The conflation of trade and investment promotion (commercial diplomacy) and development cooperation has been characteristic of many non-Western players and is now becoming increasingly apparent including in countries like Denmark and Australia. But development issues also increasingly feature in trade agreements, which come to involve much more than economic issues alone. Economic partnership agreements, for example, have been conceived – next to free trade agreements – as a way to move beyond issues of trade alone, and may also involve cooperation in the field of energy and environment, science and technology, trade and investment promotion and tourism.

Key Points

- In the evolution of economic diplomacy, the three strands of commercial diplomacy, trade diplomacy and positive incentives are becoming increasingly interlinked.
- Trade and investment promotion remains the most traditional task of economic diplomacy and is becoming more important as different forms of capitalisms meet.
- In developed countries in the West, the idea that development cooperation can go hand in hand with trade and development promotion is once again gaining acceptance.
- Negotiations about international trade rules are proliferating at the regional and bilateral level, and are becoming more politicised.

DIPLOMATIC ACTORS AND ORGANISATION

Although the state is by no means the only actor in economic diplomacy, it remains the most central one. Vast differences exist, however, in the extent to which governments are

active in the field of economic diplomacy, as well as in how the interlinkages between politics and economics are strategised and institutionalised.

Which responsibilities a state takes up in the field of economic diplomacy differs substantially between countries. In countries that adhere to a stricter separation between state and market – mostly developed, neoliberal market economies – governments generally take a back seat, playing the role of facilitator. In countries at an earlier stage of development, governments tend to adopt a greater role, including steering and guiding certain sectors of the economy. This is no different from earlier times when European countries started to develop in the nineteenth century. But the level of development is not the only indicator of the extent of state involvement in the market. Differences also exist between countries and regions. A common characteristic of governments of many Asian countries, for example, is the fact that they strategically allocate resources to spur growth of a vastly diverse private sector at home and abroad. This may be the largest difference compared with countries in the Middle East and Russia, where state-owned natural resource industries dominate the private sector – making for a narrow, state-led economic diplomacy focused on the energy sector. Variations between Asian states, in turn, lie in whether the strong role of the state is organised in formal ways – such as in China, Vietnam and Singapore – or more informally – as in Japan, South Korea and Indonesia (Okano-Heijmans, 2012: 275–7).

When unpacking the various players that comprise 'the state' as an actor in economic diplomacy, it is instructive to think in terms of the national diplomatic system (NDS) – that is, a set of institutions and actors, configured for the management of a state's international environment (Hocking, 2013: 126–7). MFAs and the network of overseas representation are one characteristic feature that has assumed particular significance within this system. But they operate in an increasingly complex network that manages foreign affairs. Other ministries and semi-governmental agencies involved in the field of economic diplomacy include those in charge of trade and economic affairs, agriculture, infrastructure, as well as development cooperation and climate change. No matter the level of development or the politico-economic culture of a country, all share the continuous challenge of optimising extremely complex decision-making processes in economic diplomacy.

In an attempt to improve coordination between the various dimensions of foreign economic affairs, governments have tried to overcome the traditional and pragmatic, but unnatural, separation between politics and economics, or between MFAs and other departments involved. In some countries this resulted in a more or less formal arrangement between the MFA and the economic or trade departments, of which the so-called 'Concordat' in the Netherlands is one example (Serry, 1999). This agreement notwithstanding, the Dutch Department for Foreign Economic Affairs continues to be an 'odd-man-out' in both the MFA and the Ministry of Economic Affairs. As a result, it has moved back and forth several times between the two ministries. For much the same reasons, in the 1980s and 1990s a number of countries – including Australia, Canada and Argentina – amalgamated the foreign office with the trade department. That this is also a less than ideal way to deal with the challenge is illustrated by the comment of an Australian diplomat, who said that this was a 'shotgun marriage, but ultimately well worth it' (quoted in Mills, 2013: 407). (Australia took amalgamation further – see below.) In South Korea, a similar merger took place in 1998 but was undone ten years thereafter.

A more recent trend concerns the merging of the offices responsible for foreign affairs, trade and development. In Australia the conservative government, when led by Prime Minister Tony Abbott, amalgamated the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). In the

Netherlands and Denmark, where the MFA took up responsibility for development cooperation years ago, foreign trade was added in recent years. The rationale offered was that alignment of policies will improve policy coherence on priority issues and will result in the greater overall impact of efforts. An unanticipated result, however, has been that organisations that traditionally concerned themselves with development cooperation are now also making their voice heard on trade policy.[3] The government therefore increasingly needs to consider the voice of domestic stakeholders engaged in development in international trade negotiations. A similar process of institutionalising links between commerce, trade and development in foreign affairs has been taking place in Canada. Here, foreign affairs and trade had amalgamated decades ago, and development was added in 2014. Also the EU, which holds trade negotiating authority for its 28 member states, now formally links trade and development, stating that its policies aim to put trade at the service of development and poverty reduction.[4]

In those countries where the various economic diplomacy strands are merged, there is, as before, a minister with responsibility for international development and another minister responsible for trade. Both ministers' powers derive from those of the minister of foreign affairs, however. They are thus subordinate to the foreign minister, even if for practical reasons the development and trade ministers are allowed quite a degree of latitude. When looking at trade negotiations in particular, one finds that countries have come up with diverging solutions to enhance coordination between ministries and to ensure that non-economic issues are also considered. In the European Union, the chief negotiator – and his staff – are all from the Directorate-General for Trade, while the chief negotiator of trade negotiations in Japan is always an MFA official. Norway takes a middle road, by putting the foreign ministry in charge of multilateral trade issues and having the Ministry of Trade taking care of bilateral (Melchior et al., 2013: 63), whereas in the United States, the Office of the Trade Representative (USTR) has a direct link to the President and his Cabinet as it is part of the Executive Office.

The renewed emphasis on economic diplomacy is also a driver of adjustments that many governments are making in their diplomatic network. New representations – embassies, consulates (-general) and/or trade representative offices – are opened in large countries where presence in the capital city alone does not match economic potentialities (see Chapter 12 in this Handbook). This is a particularly interesting trend in those countries that are scaling down representation abroad more generally, such as the Netherlands. At the same time, new initiatives are being developed to limit the number of closures, such as asking fees for economic diplomacy activities including 'matchmaking' for companies. Japan, for its part, is adding to its number of representations despite financial constraints more broadly, with a particular focus on new posts in Africa. Despite having formal diplomatic ties with more African countries than China, however, it has fewer diplomats stationed on the continent than its giant neighbour. For its part, France is a frontrunner in emphasising the role of territorial (local) collectivities, complementing that of the state. The assets of French regions are deemed significant in terms of international competitiveness and attractiveness. Amongst others, this has resulted in activism by the EU as a trade negotiator to include 'geographical indications' in trade agreements as a way to protect trade names and trademarks used in relation to food products identified with a particular region.

While the above illustrates the challenges of managing interests and responsibilities between ministries, economic diplomacy obviously involves many more actors than representatives of nation-state governments alone. Economic diplomacy involves government-to-government relations, but is increasingly also about the build-up of government-to-business networks and the

opening up of these networks for the private sector and for the economy at large. As in other fields of diplomacy, the e-revolution greatly contributes to the brokering and information gathering by practitioners of economic diplomacy.[5] A network of relevant actors can generate an overall capacity to search, find, analyse and disseminate the kind of strategically relevant information that most private actors do not readily possess. Political will is of course another vital ingredient and, indeed, a necessary condition. So is the recognition that a sophisticated economic diplomacy offers possibilities for a country's private sector and its foreign policy goals.

The extreme diversity of the private sector stands in stark contrast to the limited capabilities of governments, however. After all, the interests of small and medium-sized enterprises differ substantially from those of large companies that have greater financial and network capacity to perform certain economic diplomacy functions themselves. And this is not all: other actors, including chambers of commerce, business federations and civil society organisations, make their voices heard on economic diplomacy. Their aims may include calls for sustainable trade, reducing the power of big business, greater transparency of government, and attention to human rights and labour standards.

The fact that non-state actors have a stake in economic diplomacy, however, is not to say that they have a significant say. Trade diplomacy, for example, is said to continue to consist primarily of private negotiations between trade ministry officials representing particular governments, while business and civil society interests are still mediated and represented, for the most part, by government diplomats (Pigman and Vickers, 2012). Likewise, while non-state actors have a significant stake in commercial diplomacy and in development cooperation, they do not actually take part in negotiations with foreign public counterparts. Rather, they are better characterised as pressure groups, trying to steer government policy in a certain direction, and as consumers of government facilitation (in the case of commercial diplomacy) or as executors of government policy (in the case of development cooperation).

Key Points

- MFAs, as key players in the National Diplomatic System, are adapting to the evolving dimensions of economic diplomacy and incorporating various elements of it, especially as it concerns responsibility for trade and development.
- Choices for how to reorganise the extremely complex decision-making process in economic diplomacy depend in part on the level of development and the politico-economic culture of a particular country.
- Although many non-state actors – including the diverse private sector and a variety of civil society organisations – have a stake in economic diplomacy, they do not necessarily have a significant say.

ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY TOWARDS THE FUTURE

One important side-effect of the global and financial crisis that started at the end of the 2000s, is that it discredited Western standards for other countries. The *laissez faire*-style capitalism and economic diplomacy as a means to primarily further political and economic liberal values (such as free market capitalism, liberal democracy and civil liberties) thereby lost much of its appeal. Instead, a more comprehensive approach that pragmatically links trade, investment and development for economic and strategic purposes is gaining ground. This trend is reinforced by the growing power and influence of China, as well as India, Brazil and others and confirmed by the renewed emphasis in recent years in European countries on a new economic diplomacy that emphasises national economic interests.

The redistribution of global power in the twenty-first century is also having an impact on economic diplomacy in the field of economic

governance. First, the trend is towards more bilateral and regional economic diplomacy, at the expense of multilateralism. Trade negotiations, for example, are moving away from the truly multilateral talks under the auspices of the WTO and resulting in a strengthening of competitive multilateralism. Separately, EU countries are becoming partners and competitors in commercial diplomacy. A second change that the evolution of economic diplomacy is having on economic governance concerns the emergence of new governance structures, at least partly at the expense of existing ones. As an example of the latter, consider the comment of one expert in the field of development cooperation that South Korea in 2010 may well have been the last non-Western country to join the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) – an organisation that risks losing relevance as a club of traditional donors.[6] New governance structures established in 2014 include the New Development Bank, initiated by the BRICS-countries, and the China-led Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank. Although these institutions still face major practical and strategic challenges, they are probably the two most prominent examples of what may be new multilateral economic diplomacy in the making.

Key Points

- The global and financial crisis that started at the end of the 2000s discredited Western ways as standards for other countries, including in the field of economic diplomacy.
- In economic governance, multilateralism is losing ground against more bilateral and regional economic diplomacy and new governance structures are being created.

CONCLUSION

Historically, economic diplomacy takes a more prominent place in foreign policy during periods of change. It is thus no coincidence that economic diplomacy is gaining in importance once again as the international system is shifting from a multilateral towards a multipolar order (Rood et al., 2015). Confronted with the viscosity of global governance and international political and financial institutions, the governments of emerging countries primarily employ economic diplomacy – rather than political influence or military force – to strengthen their position. This is leading to Western countries rethinking the balance between their different national interests, resulting in a renewed emphasis on their economic diplomacy.

As a result of this there is an increased emphasis on pragmatic linkages between commercial diplomacy, trade diplomacy and development cooperation in developed countries. This is recognisable in policies at home and abroad, as well as in the reorganisation of government institutions, where MFAs are increasingly taking up responsibility for trade and development. For their part, latecomer countries have long weighed political considerations more substantially in their economic diplomacy, pragmatically linking trade, investment and development.

In an increasingly competitive world where political and economic power is in flux and financial constraints are increasing, countries need to make clear decisions about where their priorities lie. While a comprehensive approach to economic diplomacy should not be mistaken for killing three birds with one stone, it can be instrumental in turning tomorrow's challenges into today's opportunities. Making environmental protection a feature of economic diplomacy, and focusing activities on industries that contribute to this cause, is one way of doing this. Established powers in the West have reason to protect the political-economic model and fundamental values that took years to develop, but they should not be afraid to comply with necessary adjustments to the structural design of global economic governance. At the domestic level, this means that a long-term, thought out strategy is required in order to be successful. If

the revival of economic diplomacy is to keep a benign character, however, governments are well advised to invest in new economic governance structures and to limit their economic diplomacy to activities where the government has real added value; that is, where domestic economic interests intersect with the basic needs of citizens throughout the world in terms of security and prosperity.

NOTES

1 See, for example: *Shaping Globalization – Expanding Partnerships – Sharing Responsibility: A Strategy Paper by the German Government*, Berlin, 2012; and *The Coalition's Policy for Foreign Affairs*, Canberra, September 2013.
2 'The Foreign Ministry at a tipping point', unpublished Post-Conference Report of The Foreign Ministry of the Future Conference, Brussels, 10–11 July 2011.
3 Meeting with a Dutch MFA official, May 2014.
4 Official website of the European Union: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/development/.
5 The implications of the internet revolution on diplomacy at large are discussed in Chapter 44 in this Handbook.
6 At present the OECD-DAC consists of 29 members, comprising the United States, Japan, South Korea and European countries.

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46

Business Diplomacy

Huub Ruël and Tim Wolters

INTRODUCTION

Globalization has a major impact on how multinational national corporations (MNCs) are organized nowadays. Statistics from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) show that the number of Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs) has risen in the last 30 years (UNCTAD, 2011). Doing business internationally requires MNCs to deal with various local requirements, national laws, and international agreements, negotiated by different international groups such as the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Saner and Yiu, 2005). MNCs need the capability to cope with complex interactions with multiple stakeholders such as foreign government representatives and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

Despite today's globalized economy, it is still governments that play an important role in providing access to business opportunities (Boddewyn and Brewer, 1994; Hillman et al., 1999). Indeed, Luo (2001) states that, 'from an MNC's perspective, its foreign operations increasingly depend on educational, technological, and industrial infrastructures built by host governments' (p. 403). Especially in emerging or recently emerged economies, governments are key stakeholders in the economy, and without their support operating successfully in these economies is almost impossible. MNCs that are able to get this support, and as a result access these opportunities, will enjoy a greater competitive advantage (Schuler et al., 2002). However, getting access to business opportunities is just one aspect. In order to operate successfully in the long term, MNCs need legitimacy: 'a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desired, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions' (Suchman, 1995: 574). For this, MNCs should negotiate and make compromises with local governments, while simultaneously taking into account the wishes and demands of the international and national NGOs that oversee international firms in conducting business (Saner and Yiu, 2005).

Saner et al. (2000) explain which developments have caused these complexities. First of all, the public has become more critical and demanding towards corporate governance. Their voice can have a great influence on an MNC's reputation and therefore cannot be ignored. This effect is enhanced now that the public has unlimited access to all kinds of communication channels, news sources, and business information (Ruël, 2013). Second, emerging markets such as Indonesia, China, Russia, India, Turkey, and Brazil will entail challenges that MNCs need to take into account, such as weak institutional settings, cultural aspects, and strong government roles (Saner et al., 2000). The third development concerns the emergence of a variety of NGOs and communities. Saner et al. emphasize that environmental standards and working conditions should be taken into account in order to prevent conflicts that can damage an MNC's image. Ruël (2013) adds an explanation of what might have caused the complexities MNCs face in today's business environment. He argues that developed markets are frequently entered by developing market MNCs. This has fueled fear among businesses and governments in developed economies. This increased competition heightens the necessity for firms to build upon positive relationships in foreign business environments, even in developed, 'easy to access' markets. Second, governments, MNCs, and NGOs need to collaborate in order to cope with global challenges such as reducing poverty, climate change, and building sustainable economies.

In order to survive in this complex and rapid changing business environment, international businesses need to engage in business diplomacy (Saner et al., 2000; Muldoon, 2005; Ruël, 2013).

Key Points

- Globalization has changed the roles and relationships between MNCs, governments, NGOs, local pressure groups, and society.
- To survive in today's international business landscape, MNCs need to create legitimacy by interacting and building upon positive relationships with all stakeholders.
- MNCs should therefore engage in business diplomacy.

BUSINESS DIPLOMACY DEFINED

In the context of this chapter, we consider business diplomacy and corporate diplomacy as describing the same concept. From now on, business diplomacy will be termed a synonym for corporate diplomacy.

Business diplomacy as a concept is relatively new in the literature (see Chapter 45 in this Handbook). At the end of the twentieth century, it began to be dealt with at an academic level. One of the first references originates from the early 1990s in an International Relations publication by Strange (1992). She recognized the increasing importance of firms and market forces in world politics and described new, emerging forms of diplomacy. Strange (1996) claims that governments are losing authority and impact, despite paradoxically that the number of government rules and regulations in different aspects of societies has increased. Markets are dominating and the role of large and international firms is so significant that governments are competing to have them within their national borders. As a consequence firms have entered the diplomatic arena as an actor.

The concept was also noted in International Management and International Business studies (London, 1999; Saner et al., 2000; Muldoon, 2005; Saner and Yiu, 2005), Behavioral Science studies (Ordeix-Rigo and Duarte, 2009), Communication Management studies (Macnamara, 2011) and the General Management literature (Amann et al., 2007). However, consistency about what exactly is business diplomacy has still not emerged.

Until the 1980s diplomacy was defined in terms of a dialogue or the formal communication between states (e.g. Watson, 1982; Berridge, 1995). In this view only states are recognized as

diplomatic actors. This changed when the cold war ended and the 'global economy' took off (see Chapters 2 and 8 in this Handbook). New actors entered the diplomatic arena such as supranational organizations (e.g. the European Union), or multilateral organizations (United Nations, World Trade Organization, IMF, World Bank), non-governmental organizations (Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, The Red Cross), and last but not least large international businesses such as oil companiess, financial companies, technology companies and many others. Due to their size, impact, or public support, they have become diplomatic actors in their own right (Ruël, 2013). In this context, Heine (2008) observes a shift from the 'club model' of diplomacy, where diplomats mostly meet with host country government officials, to a 'network model' of diplomacy, with a much larger body of and a more diverse set of players with whom diplomats have to engage, among others representatives from companies. This view implies a broader definition of diplomacy than the 'cold-war' one. Melissen (2005) includes citizens and civil society in foreign countries as well in the definition of diplomacy (see also Chapter 42 in this Handbook). Central to the question of what diplomacy actually is are the aspects representation and communication.

Overall, in the literature, the terms 'business diplomacy' and 'corporate diplomacy' are not generally recognized and only a limited number of scholars have applied these terms. For example, Ordeix-Rigo and Duarte (2009) define corporate diplomacy as 'a process to develop a corporation's power and legitimacy' (p. 561). In their work, an organization is considered as a member in a stakeholder network instead of a profit-making entity. In his book on corporate diplomacy, Steger (2003) states, 'Corporate diplomacy is an attempt to manage systematically and professionally the business environment in such a way as to ensure that "business is done smoothly," basically with an unquestioned "license to operate" and an interaction that leads to mutual adaptation between corporations and society' (pp. 6–7). According to Saner et al. (2000), 'business diplomacy management involves influencing economic and social actors to create and seize new business opportunities; working with rule-making international bodies whose decisions affect international business; forestalling potential conflicts with stakeholders and minimizing political risks; and using multiple international forums and media channels to safeguard corporate image and reputation' (p. 85). In accordance, Saner and Yiu (2005) state, 'Business diplomacy pertains to the management of interfaces between the global company and its multiple non-business counterparts (such as NGOs, governments, political parties, media and other representatives of civil societies) and external constituencies' (p. 302). As a final example, Macnamara (2011) states that 'corporate diplomacy would require corporations to engage in ongoing dialogue with publics guided by specific principles and with mechanisms in place to balance power, amortize conflicts, facilitate negotiation, and maintain relationships even in the face of outright disagreement' (p. 321).

What at least seems central to these definitions of business diplomacy and corporate diplomacy is the acknowledgment of a stakeholder perspective of companies rather than a shareholder perspective. On other aspects, however, such as the goals of business diplomacy, its contexts, and how business diplomacy differs from existing concepts such as lobbying or corporate political activity, the existing literature is far from clear.

This is also reflected in the way scholars describe the person who is conducting business diplomacy. Some scholars consider a business diplomat to be a business environment manager (Saner et al., 2000; Muldoon, 2005) or an organizational change manager (Saner et al., 2000; Saner and Yiu, 2005), or consider business diplomacy to be a leadership style (London, 1999) or a strategic management tool (Monteiro, 2013). This confusing picture asks for a thorough analysis of what exactly is business diplomacy and for a clear definition.

Related Concepts

Although the concepts of business diplomacy may not be widely recognized and well defined, the literature on the business–government relationship, or business as political actors, is quite extensive and informative to the scholarly conversation on how to define business diplomacy. The most important related concepts are: corporate political activity (Hansen and Mitchel, 2000; Hillman et al., 2004; Hadani, 2011; Lux et al., 2012; Dahan et al., 2013; etc.), corporate political strategy (Keim and Baysinger, 1988; Baron, 1997; Hillman et al., 1999; Hillman, 2003), strategic political management (Oliver and Holzinger, 2008), MNC global governance (Levy and Prakash, 2003; Detomasi, 2007; Kourula and Laasonen, 2010), MNC–host government relationships (Boddewyn and Brewer, 1994; Moon and Lado, 2000; Luo, 2001; Bartkus and Davis, 2008; Skippari and Pajunen, 2010), and politically oriented corporate social responsibility (Shirodkar et al., 2013). We will briefly discuss these concepts.

Corporate political activity (CPA) represents a 'strategy whereby firms attempt to influence government policymaking, to advance their strategic goals; [and that] firm owners may benefit from it' (Hadani, 2011: 945). Corporations use political activities to avoid or influence expensive regulations and safeguard potential sales (Hansen and Mitchell, 2000). Corporations engage in CPA practices more and more often as they increasingly expand their business operations across borders in which more political actors and institutions are involved (Hillman et al., 2004).

Corporate political strategies (CPS) are also directed at influencing public policy outcomes in order to create the best possible business climate for the firm (Keim and Baysinger, 1988; Baron, 1997; Hillman et al., 1999; Hillman, 2003). 'Strategic political management (SPM) refers to the set of strategic actions that are planned and enacted by firms for purposes of maximizing economic returns from the political environment' (Oliver and Holzinger, 2008: 3). In this sense, CPA, CPS, and SPM describe similar phenomena.

MNC global governance emphasizes that stakeholder commitments of MNCs go well beyond simply complying with the laws and regulations (Detomasi, 2007). The author states: 'An indication that MNCs increasingly accept broader stakeholder obligation is the current emphasis many of them place on developing or renewing their public commitment to the broad domain of corporate social responsibility (CSR)' (p. 223). By taking stakeholder interests into account, MNCs can reduce their political, social, and media risks and obtain better local market insights. Eventually, this can improve an MNC's competitive advantage. Muldoon (2005) stresses the relevance of the terms 'corporate social responsibility' (CSR) and 'corporate citizenship'. The author explains that the extent to which MNCs engage in stakeholder commitment significantly determines the success of an organization. This effect seems to be getting stronger as NGOs are increasing in number and size (Kourula and Laasonen, 2010).

The concept of MNC–host government relationships covers a wide range of the literature regarding relationship building. The importance of MNC–host government relationships is recognized by Boddewyn and Brewer (1994). According to these authors, these relationships are critical for an MNC's potential to expand internationally as host governments control the parameters of localization, production, and investment. Building upon MNC–host government relationships is a process in which governments and MNCs need each other's resources to achieve their economic goals (Luo, 2001).

Politically oriented CSR activities, are defined as:

> broadly consisting of corporate actions that are politically-oriented, but simultaneously aiming to achieve at least one social objective, either in the short-term or the long-term. In effect, we argue that although these activities are communicated as 'CSR activities', the underlying goal in implementing

these is to influence public policy or to seek political resources (Shirodkar et al., 2013: 2).

This concept of politically oriented CSR activities' can best be seen as a combination between CSR and CPA.

Having discussed concepts related to business diplomacy, it helps to define what business diplomacy exactly is.

Defining Business Diplomacy

In order to develop a clear and complete definition of business diplomacy, it is important to understand how concepts are related. As mentioned in the beginning of this section, we consider business diplomacy to be a synonym for corporate diplomacy. The same applies to CPA, CPS, and SPM: all three concepts describe the same process and related elements. For the purpose of simplification, the term CPA will be used as a common denominator to describe all three concepts. In our research on business diplomacy (Ruël et al., 2013a), we explained that business diplomacy differs from CPA. CPA mainly focuses on influencing public policymakers (in the home country, and more and more in foreign countries) to benefit the firm, whereas business diplomacy is concerned with the creation of long-term, positive relationships with foreign government representatives and non-governmental stakeholders (economic and non-economic) in order to create legitimacy in a foreign business environment (p. 39). Lobbying is an element of CPA and serves here as a tool for influencing public policymakers. Activities such as lobbying and campaign contributions have a specific, short-term focus and are therefore excluded from the definition of business diplomacy (Ruël et al., 2013a).

We also recognized a certain degree of overlap between business diplomacy and CPA. Both concepts are aimed at influencing parties in the external environment of the organization. However, this is where the similarity stops. The concepts MNC–host government relations and global governance can best be regarded as elements of business diplomacy. In order to create legitimacy and obtain a license to operate, MNCs need to build upon relationships with host governments and foreign non-governmental actors. Figure 46.1 shows how the previously discussed concepts are related to business diplomacy.



Figure 46.1 Business diplomacy and its related concepts (Ruël et al., 2013a)

As a result of our structured literature analysis (Ruël et al., 2013a), Ruël (2013) proposed the following definition: 'Business diplomacy is the representation and communication activities deployed by international businesses with host government representatives and non-governmental representatives in order to establish and sustain a positive relationship to maintain legitimacy, and a license to operate' (p. 41). Businesses may have all the legal rights necessary to operate in a foreign business environment, but may not be welcomed and accepted by the local community and society. Legitimacy in this context of business diplomacy means that a business firm is accepted by the local community and society by which it is surrounded physically.

Business diplomacy has three focus points that distinguish it from other related concepts: its focus on foreign governments and non-governmental stakeholders, its focus on the establishment and nurturing of long-term positive relationships, and its focus on the creation of legitimacy in a foreign business environment as the ultimate goal.

Now we have defined business diplomacy we can distinguish it from related types of diplomacy, namely commercial diplomacy and economic diplomacy.

Lee (2004) defines commercial diplomacy as 'the work of a network of public and private actors who manage commercial relations using diplomatic channels and processes' (p. 51). Commercial diplomacy considers the interests of both business and government. 'Successful commercial diplomacy gains access to new markets and serves the home country economy, and the idea that successful international business is just a matter of a clear business strategy and good business management is naïve and outdated' (Ruël, 2013: 19). So, while business diplomacy can be described as a business-driven approach in maintaining long-term relationships with foreign government representatives and non-governmental stakeholders, commercial diplomacy is driven by a network of business and government representatives aimed at the promotion of home country business in foreign countries by using diplomatic channels (Ruël, 2013). Commercial diplomacy is often considered to be the same as economic diplomacy (Mercier, 2007). Indeed, both have an overarching economic objective (Potter, 2004). However, economic diplomacy has a general focus and is concerned with economic policy issues and trade agreements (Woolcock, 2013), whereas commercial diplomacy is much more specific and particularly focused on business support (Yiu and Saner, 2003; Kostecki and Naray, 2007; Mercier, 2007; Naray, 2008; Okano-Heijmans, 2010).

Key Points

- The term business diplomacy is not generally recognized; it is a relatively new term.
- Related concepts are corporate political activity, corporate political strategy, strategic political management, MNC global governance, and MNC–host government relationships.
- Business diplomacy differs from these concepts in that its focus is on foreign governments and non-governmental stakeholders, it involves establishing and sustaining long-term positive relationships, and its ultimate goal is to create legitimacy in a foreign business environment.
- Unlike economic and commercial diplomacy, business diplomacy is a business-driven approach.

THE EMERGENCE OF BUSINESS DIPLOMACY

Globalization has considerably changed the international business landscape and MNCs. Rising demands from the surrounding business environments have increased the role and responsibilities of corporations, especially when operating internationally (Monteiro, 2013). Survival in today's complex business environment no longer depends on an MNC's efficiency and competitiveness

only (Muldoon, 2005). Other important factors that will determine the continuity of the organization are managing complex interactions with governments, multilateral institutions, and social movements. According to Muldoon (2005), MNCs need to build upon long-term cooperative stakeholder relationships, thereby implementing strategies that address social and environmental concerns. In accordance, Nartey (2013) states: 'By understanding who the stakeholders are and strategically forming ties to engender cooperation and reduce conflict with these stakeholders, the firm favorably shapes its nonmarket environment to facilitate market-based operations and benefits' (p. 10). There is a shift from a shareholder view to a stakeholder model in MNCs, and in order to obtain a license to operate, MNCs should respond to the expectations of various stakeholders and thus engage in business diplomacy (Ordeix-Rigo and Duarte, 2009). These authors explain that corporate diplomacy entails that a firm actively participates in society, thereby contributing to wealth creation, employment, and quality products and services. Through corporate diplomacy, firms can increase their power and legitimacy. Muldoon (2005) recognizes the public affairs function as the diplomatic engine to manage a corporation's reputation in the global landscape:

> The corporate public affairs profession has evolved over the last decade or so from its traditional role as an internal 'PR' agency focusing primarily on corporate communications and media relations to a multifaceted and strategic corporate function that encompasses public policy and issues management, government and investor relations, corporate philanthropy and community relations, business ethics, corporate social responsibility and citizenship, and crisis management. (Muldoon, 2005: 354)

The importance of business diplomacy is recognized by only a few MNCs, and most global companies hire former political diplomats to manage the complex interactions with foreign government representatives (Saner et al., 2000). As international and local interest groups increasingly put demands on MNCs, it is no longer sufficient to rely solely on the experiences of former diplomats. 'Instead, firms must develop diplomatic know-how from within and help their own global managers acquire competence as business diplomacy managers' (Saner et al., 2000: 88). Business diplomacy know-how should be dispersed throughout the organization by global business managers. 'Global companies can improve their effectiveness by setting up a business diplomacy management function and by developing and utilizing competent business diplomacy managers' (Saner et al., 2000: 80).

Key Points

- Doing business successfully in today's international business environment requires MNCs to move away from one-sided shareholder models and, instead, become active members of stakeholder networks.
- MNCs should develop knowledge about and skills on how to conduct diplomacy.

BUSINESS DIPLOMACY IN MNCS: EMPIRICAL STUDIES' RESULTS

Although several researchers have stressed the relevance of business diplomacy (Saner et al., 2000; Muldoon, 2005; Saner and Yiu, 2005; Amann et al., 2007; Ordeix-Rigo and Duarte, 2009; Macnamara, 2011; Monteiro, 2013), it is not actually clear from the literature how MNCs engage in it. We reduced this knowledge gap in the literature by conducting empirical research into how MNCs conduct business diplomacy in practice (Ruël et al., 2013a).

In order to create an in-depth understanding of this relatively underexplored topic, we designed an exploratory qualitative study in which eight large Dutch MNCs were surveyed. We operationalized the concept of business diplomacy and distinguished six

dimensions: business diplomacy intensity, policy clarity, breadth, responsibility, means deployment, and resource availability.

Business diplomacy *intensity* reflects the extent to which a company actively establishes and sustains positive relationships with foreign government representatives and non-governmental stakeholders. This dimension indicates how intensively the company executes business diplomacy.

The second dimension, *policy clarity*, reflects the extent to which an MNC has a clear and organization-wide policy on how to establish and sustain these relationships. This dimension indicates whether there are formal/written rules for business diplomacy, or whether informal/unwritten guidelines exist.

Business diplomacy *breadth* reflects the extent to which establishing and sustaining these relationships is done by every company representative. This dimension also indicates whether employees consider themselves as representatives of their organization when they are in contact with foreign government representatives and non-governmental stakeholders.

Business diplomacy *responsibility* reflects the extent to which the company's responsibility for establishing and sustaining positive relationships with foreign government representatives and non-governmental stakeholders lies with its headquarters or within the foreign subsidiaries, or whether they are both partly responsible. This dimension indicates whether business diplomacy is set by the headquarters for the whole organization (centralized), whether a framework of guidelines is set by the headquarters in which a foreign subsidiary has some degree of freedom to act, or whether subsidiary executives are free to decide upon how to conduct business diplomacy (decentralized).

The fifth dimension, *means deployment*, reflects the extent to which the company deploys a diversity of means for establishing and sustaining positive relationships with foreign government representatives and non-governmental stakeholders. It indicates which means, methods, and channels (e.g. social meetings, public forums, seminars, local government debates, media channels, ethics, sponsor activities, etc.) are used by the firm for business diplomacy.

Finally, business diplomacy *resource availability* reflects the extent to which the company uses multiple firm resources (e.g. financial, time, knowledge) for establishing and sustaining these relationships.

By means of in-depth interviews we conceived a rich picture of how business diplomacy is enacted by and embedded in MNCs. Our research findings suggest that seven out of eight MNCs conduct business diplomacy intensively. None of the eight MNCs applies a clear organization-wide policy for business diplomacy. Instead, general guidelines for business diplomacy and business values and principles were set in place for these matters. The research findings also showed that in none of the eight MNCs were all employees involved in establishing and maintaining positive relationships with foreign government representatives and non-governmental stakeholders, such as international interest groups and local communities. Although business diplomacy is seen here as a management responsibility, all eight MNC respondents emphasized that all employees need to consider themselves as representatives of the organization when they are in contact with stakeholders of the business, and hence should adhere to the general codes of conduct. Such codes may, for example, prescribe that employees have to interact in a respectful way with local communities and may not get involved in illegal activities. Furthermore, the research findings showed that in all eight MNCs the responsibility for business diplomacy is mainly decentralized to the foreign subsidiary level. The MNC respondents in the study explained that the foreign subsidiary managers had the best insight into their local markets and stakeholders. For this reason, the foreign subsidiaries have a certain degree of freedom in adapting business diplomacy to the specific characteristics of their local

business market. MNCs deploy a wide range of means for business diplomacy: meetings, forums, direct stakeholder dialogues, events, industry associations, social partnerships, and social projects. Although all eight MNCs invest time and financial resources in business diplomacy, there are no specific training programs that teach managers how to set up and maintain stakeholder relationships.

The first thing we noticed during the interviews was that seven out of eight MNCs recognized and defined business diplomacy as an important long-term activity, aimed at establishing and sustaining legitimacy in all foreign business environments, meaning that business operations are accepted by the local environment and society. Empirical research by Amann et al. (2007) has also illustrated the importance of business diplomacy for managing external pressures in today's business environment. Illustrative in-depth case studies on four companies have shown that irrespective of the level of external pressure, MNCs with a diplomatic attitude are definitely better able to manage external pressures and obtain a 'license to operate' than those with a tough, conflict-risking attitude. Amann et al. (2007) conclude that MNCs need to look beyond short-term profit maximization. Instead, MNCs should take the political landscape and media into consideration. MNCs should notice and understand stakeholder issues and develop adequate means for solving them. 'The opposite, such as denial as the first reaction, misinformation, no sense of urgency, absence of a stakeholder dialogue, lacking credibility and dearth of proactivity build-up goodwill before things may go wrong, are still quite prevalent in today's corporate world, regardless of their obvious drawbacks' (p. 48). Through business diplomacy, future incidents can be managed more successfully.

Our study (Ruël et al., 2013a) showed that none of the eight MNCs had an actual business diplomacy function or department. Instead, departments like Government Affairs, Corporate Communications, Public Relations, and Public Affairs are concerned with such activities. Our study also reveals that the MNC respondents recognize the value of business diplomacy training programs. Such training programs should involve, for example, geopolitical analysis skills, stakeholder analysis skills, intercultural communication skills, and negotiation skills. Yet, there is an absence of such training programs in these eight MNCs.

Several researchers have already conducted research into what encourages firms to become active influencers of government policies. For example, Lux et al. (2011) and Hillman et al. (2004) explored whether firm-, industry-, and institutional-level factors influence a firm's engagement in the political arena to influence policymaking processes. Ruël et al. (2013b) conducted a study into the determinants of business diplomacy. The authors explored whether firm characteristics, industry type, and institutional development influence the approach and organization of business diplomacy. In this quantitative study the same six business diplomacy dimensions as in our other study (Ruël et al., 2013a) were measured by surveying 50 Western (United States and Western Europe) MNC subsidiaries in Asia. The research findings of Ruël et al. (2013b) suggest that firm-level characteristics and industry type determine the approach and organization of business diplomacy for some dimensions. The study results reveal inter alia that firm size is positively related to policy clarity, meaning that larger MNCs are more likely to have a clear business diplomacy policy than smaller MNCs. This means that first of all they do have a policy on the goals of and the way how to conduct business diplomacy that is clearly set and accessible for all organization members.

The authors also examined whether the type of MNC affects the approach and organization of business diplomacy. For that purpose, they used the typology of Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989), in which the level of local responsiveness and global integration declares whether a firm is characterized as

transnational, multinational, global, or international. Their results imply that the level of global integration is positively related to business diplomacy intensity, breadth, means deployment, and resource availability. Local responsiveness is positively related to business diplomacy breadth and responsibility, suggesting that MNCs with a higher level of local responsiveness have a broader approach towards establishing and sustaining positive relationships with foreign government representatives and non-governmental stakeholders, and that the responsibility is more often centralized to the headquarters level. The latter conclusion contradicts our qualitative research findings (Ruël et al., 2013a), in which all eight MNC respondents indicated that the business diplomacy responsibility lies at the subsidiary level so that it can be adjusted to the specific characteristics of their local markets. In the quantitative research of Ruël et al. (2013b), no evidence was found of a relationship between the institutional setting of a host country and the approach and organization of business diplomacy. Our study findings (Ruël et al., 2013a) do suggest that industry-specific factors determine the degree of intensity with which MNCs conduct business diplomacy. During the interviews we observed that particularly MNCs that operate in sensitive industries, such as financial services or the oil business, conduct business diplomacy intensively. The MNC respondents explained that large projects in these industries directly affect populations, and hence are always associated with foreign governments and NGOs. Our findings furthermore suggest that the intensity also depends on the institutional settings of the countries in which they operate. MNCs that operate in weak institutional settings recognize that personal networks are essential for survival. Hence, they are more likely to conduct business diplomacy intensively. One MNC in our study only operates in three Western European countries in which the institutional settings are highly developed. Business diplomacy is conducted with low intensity in this MNC. Indeed, the empirical study of Monteiro (2013) showed that the firm-specific context (country of origin, culture, dimension, sector, etc.) should be taken into account because these moderators affect the relevance level of the business diplomacy tool in managing the foreign business environment.

Key Points

- Little empirical research has been conducted into business diplomacy. The existing empirical research has so far focused on the importance, the execution, and the determinants of business diplomacy.
- By measuring six business diplomacy dimensions, our research (Ruël et al., 2013a) created in-depth insight into how business diplomacy is enacted by and organized in MNCs.
- Empirical study findings furthermore suggest that the execution of business diplomacy is determined by firm-, industry-, and institutional-level factors.

CONCLUSION

The goal of this chapter was to deepen our understanding of the relatively untapped concept of business diplomacy. We started out by highlighting the evolving circumstances in today's complex and rapidly changing international business environment. Due to globalization, changes are taking place in the roles and relationships between businesses, governments, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). This has tremendously impacted the way of doing business internationally as business operations are closely monitored by a multitude of stakeholder groups. Operating successfully among these complexities requires multinational organizations (MNCs) to become diplomatic actors and interact with host governments, NGOs, and pressure groups. Therefore, MNCs should develop business diplomacy knowhow and skills, such as geopolitical analysis skills, stakeholder management skills, intercultural

communication skills, and negotiation skills. Business diplomacy can be defined as the representation and communication activities deployed by international businesses with host government representatives and non-governmental representatives in order to establish and sustain a positive relationship to maintain legitimacy and a license to operate.

The big question is how? How do global companies manage these complexities and pressures, and how do they set up these relationships? It is rather difficult to answer these questions since hardly any empirical research has been conducted in this direction. Results of our empirical study were presented in this chapter and have enhanced and enriched our understanding of how business diplomacy is enacted by and organized in MNCs.

Still, there is a great need for further in-depth, case study-based research into how global companies conduct business diplomacy around the world. In addition, future research will focus on: how small and medium-sized firms establish positive, long-term relationships with multiple stakeholder groups as they expand their business across borders; different types of business diplomacy; risks of business diplomacy; the actors involved in business diplomacy; business diplomacy instruments; and the determinants and outcomes of business diplomacy.

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Religion and Diplomacy

David Joseph Wellman

INTRODUCTION

This chapter seeks to outline the evolution of the contributions scholars have made toward analyzing the religious dimension of International Relations (IR) and its implications for the practice of diplomacy. To this end, this chapter will present the following: scholarly sources of information that influence the study of religion and diplomacy; the primary challenges IR and Diplomacy Studies confront when studying religion and diplomacy; the contribution of Religious Studies to constructing diplomatic strategies; recommendations for contemporary state-based diplomatic practices around religion; and the role of religion in a new sustainable diplomacy which reflects the worldview of Ecological Realism. This chapter will argue that having a sophisticated understanding of religion and its influence on political actors, cultures, institutions and the work of promoting transnational cooperation is essential for twenty-first-century diplomats.

When examining the religious dimension in the analysis and practice of diplomacy, it is important to first distinguish between two broad categories of analysis. The first category, which comes under the rubric of *religion and diplomacy*, refers principally to the influence of religion on the practice of track-one diplomacy among nation-state actors. The second category, *faith-based diplomacy*, generally refers to the practice of diplomacy on the part of track-two actors in the form of religious institutions, religiously affiliated NGOs and/or individual practitioners of a religious tradition. While these two categories provide a useful initial framework for analysis, in practice they often do not operate discretely.

This chapter is informed by the work of Paul Sharp, put forward in his volume *Diplomatic Theory of International Relations* (Cambridge, 2009). Sharp defines the work of diplomats as being embodied in three injunctions: 'be slow to judge,' 'be ready to appease,' and 'doubt most universals.'[1] He notes that the work of diplomacy takes place in a space that is

separate from the space nation-states or groups that diplomats themselves inhabit, and is most successful when it acknowledges the 'realities of people's differences and separateness, rather than their similarities and togetherness'[2] (see Chapter 1 in this Handbook). Sharp frames his own analysis of a diplomatic tradition of thought in light of Martin Wight's three classifications of international theories: radicalism, rationalism and realism, arguing that diplomats must be able to manage three types of relations. These include *encounter relations* (between people meeting for the first time), *discovery relations* (between people seeking to find out more about and enjoying closer relations with each other), and *re-encounter relations* (where people stay in touch, but keep one another at arm's length).[3] For Sharp, all of these relations require acknowledging the reality of pluralism, both in terms of the fact that relations between different groups of people are different, and that the membership of international society itself is defined by the pluralism of its character. In this milieu, notes Sharp, the diplomat works as a 'professional stranger' who seeks to 'become familiar with and to those with whom they have relations.'[4] Sharp's definition of the work of diplomats is quite useful in framing the work of interrogating the religious dimension of diplomacy, in both descriptive and prescriptive ways. This conclusion is underscored by Sharp's noting that 'we should not expect religions and religious thought to be enemies of diplomacy and the relations it sustains.'[5] This chapter will argue that Sharp's description of diplomacy and the framework of analysis he provides offer useful insights that illumine why successfully engaging the religious dimension of transnational relations is essential for both practitioners and scholars of diplomacy.

RELIGION AND DIPLOMACY: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FIELD

According to Scott Thomas, scholars of IR and diplomacy have been historically predisposed to viewing their discipline in secular terms, a fact which can be traced back to what he refers to as the 'Westphalian presumption,' leading theorists to the conclusion that 'religious and cultural pluralism cannot be accommodated in international public life.'[6] Thomas observes that the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, which brought the Thirty Years War to an end, ended the legitimacy of religion as a source of international conflict through recognizing the state as the dominant actor, usurping the former role of the Catholic Church.[7] As a result, Thomas argues, the dominance of *raison d'etat* (reason of state) was established as the foundational principle of relations among nation-states, leaving behind 'religion as the basis of foreign policy.'[8]

The origin of modern systematic efforts to examine the religious dimension in the analysis and practice of track-one and track-two diplomacy can be traced to a number of sources, including scholars who have examined the anthropological, cultural and historical dimensions of domestic and regional political systems and their ultimate influence on relations among nation-states. With the 1994 publication of Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson's edited volume, *Religion, The Missing Dimension of Statecraft*, a number of these strands of inquiry converged.[9] The authors featured in that volume provided a number of compelling arguments underscoring the utility of considering the influence of religion on IR, with clear prescriptions for the practice of diplomacy. Johnston himself argued that a post-Cold War analysis of international relations necessitated a consideration of international conflict that privileges the influence of communal identity, including race, ethnicity, nationality and – ultimately – religion.[10] At the same time, Johnston emphasized that pathways to cooperation among nation-states could be promoted through the identification of 'shared spiritual convictions or values,' which emerge from religion as it is practiced and understood by national populations and their

representatives.[11] Johnston emphasized that such an analysis does not present an 'either-or' choice between a secular or religious understanding of relations among nation-states. Rather, such an approach necessitates an integration of political, economic and security concerns with those of the moral claims which emerge from religions as they are practiced and understood by the citizens of each respective national population.[12]

Religion, the Missing Dimension of Statecraft also contained a powerful critique of what Edward Luttwak referred to as the 'Enlightenment prejudice' of the long dominant *realist* or *realpolitik* approach to IR analysis.[13] According to Luttwak, the secularist-materialist assumptions of realpolitik, which have persisted well beyond political realism's Cold War heyday, have led many scholars of IR and diplomacy to fail to consider the influence of religion in relations among nation states due to two factors. The first of these, Luttwak argues, is grounded in the desire of many foundational thinkers of IR theory to have their discipline viewed as a hard science, where power can be measured in quantitative ways, most commonly in military, economic, or geopolitical terms. Luttwak holds that the second factor in play is a historically intellectual bias among many scholars of international politics against the validity of religion as an abiding influence in advanced societies, resulting in a worldview which privileges what he calls a 'dogmatic secularism.' According to Luttwak, this worldview emerges from 'the mistaken Enlightenment prediction that the progress of knowledge and the influence of religion were mutually exclusive.'[14] The conversation that emerged in the wake of the publication of the Johnston and Sampson volume crystalized in December of 2000, when the journal *Millennium* published an issue devoted to the subject of religion and international relations that proved to be a watershed document.[15] This publication captured the attention of a much broader audience regarding the importance of what has ultimately come to be known as the *postsecular* approach to analyzing relations between nation-states, which privileges the resilience of religious traditions in modern life and thus in the practice and analysis of IR and diplomacy.

RECOGNIZING THE COMPLEXITY OF RELIGION AND RELIGIOUS CULTURE IN IR AND DIPLOMACY SCHOLARSHIP

Practitioners and scholars of international politics who engage the religious dimension must grapple with the complexity of analyzing religion itself, as it is understood by both scholars and practitioners of religion alike. Religious Studies is among the most disciplinarily diverse fields in the humanities. Scholars of religion include those who pursue active roles in the fields of anthropology, linguistics, historiography, art, sociology, philosophy, theology, ethics, and culture, among others. As a result, normative understandings of what religion is, as well as how it impacts the lives of individuals and communities, requires substantial contributions from a multiplicity of disciplinary perspectives. At the same time, understanding the influence of religion on the population of a nation-state and its diplomatic representatives requires conceding that many different manifestations of religious belief and understanding across a broad political/ideological spectrum can co-exist simultaneously, even within one movement of one tradition in a single nation-state. Such real complexities initially undermine the efforts of many scholars and practitioners of diplomacy to easily categorize or predict the predispositions of any one actor or community with regard to the influence of religion in their lives, or upon their political worldview or praxis.

A further challenge for scholars and practitioners of diplomacy is the work of distinguishing between the influence of *religion* on political actors who are practitioners of a tradition versus the influence of *religious*

culture on an entire population, including both practitioners and non-practitioners. The term *religious culture* refers to a particular dimension of the social milieu in which all people live; it is most often distinguished by geographic locale, ethnicity and nationality. Religious culture teaches individuals and communities to understand and use language and metaphors, and conveys moral norms that originated from dominant religious traditions that remain vital and intelligible. This is true even if those who engage such language, metaphors or ethical claims understand themselves to be entirely secular. As a political phenomenon, religious culture can come into play in the following contexts: (1) in the use of religious symbols or language by a national government or other actors to convey particular meaning or justify ostensibly secular actions in the eyes of domestic populations or international actors; (2) through the use of religious language and/or imagery as a vehicle for conveying meaning and value among members of a specific domestic or transnational population; (3) as an appeal by the state or influential individuals or groups to ethical norms drawn from what were originally religious sources (particularly, but not exclusively, the dominant religious tradition of a particular nation-state); (4) through the cultivation by national leaders of the perception that the state acts in concert with, or out of sincere respect toward, the dominant religious institutions and traditions of the nation-state; and (5) via the governmental use of both actual and perceived connectivities with religious institutions or fidelity to broadly acknowledged religious traditions to fortify the legitimacy of state leadership and its apparatuses in the eyes of the national population. In light of the importance of religious culture, scholars and practitioners of diplomacy who wish to understand the influence of religion on domestic and transnational exchanges are therefore compelled to not only interrogate the influence of religion on elite political actors, but also on the lives of ordinary people on the ground.

An additional challenge posed to scholars and practitioners of diplomacy who engage religion is the task of distinguishing the ways practitioners interpret their tradition. These lenses can range across a broad scale; from highly doctrinal understandings which cleave to the normative teachings of elite religious leaders and theologians, to highly 'folkloric' beliefs and practices which radically depart from mainstream, broadly-acknowledged truth claims, and all points in between. The pitfalls of accepting a one-dimensional static definition of any religious tradition and assuming it is normative has arguably been the source of some of the most spectacular blunders of late twentieth and early twenty-first-century Western foreign policy, most notably in terms of actors associated with Christian religious cultures failing to understand the role of Islam in the lives of their Near Eastern counterparts (see also Chapter 31 in this Handbook). In the absence of a sophisticated understanding of the religious dimension in the lives of people on the ground, the dynamic nature of religion as it is actually understood and lived out defies the efforts of diplomats to easily anticipate political outcomes. Examples of this include: (1) the inability of Western policy makers to distinguish between the religio-historical aspirations of Sunni and Shi'i Muslims in Iraq; (2) the failure to anticipate the evolving interpretations of Islam and their relationship to political praxis among Afghani Mujahideen and later the Taliban; and (3) the surprise many Western analysts expressed by what they initially interpreted to be the 'irrational' behavior of Iranian religio-political leaders before and after the fall of the Shah.

THE CONTRIBUTION OF RELIGIOUS STUDIES TO CONSTRUCTING DIPLOMATIC STRATEGIES

Because of the breadth and depth of knowledge necessary to understand religion and its

influence on both individuals as well as national populations, the time has now come to systematically broaden the sources of information practitioners and scholars of diplomacy draw on in their analyses. They must concede that just as one must draw on the work of economists in order to produce a sophisticated analysis of international politics, so too must scholars and practitioners of diplomacy now acknowledge the importance of approaching their discipline in light of the work of scholars of religion.

With this claim in mind, I was invited to present a workshop on religion and diplomacy for the largest undergraduate department of Religious Studies in the United States.[16] After presenting a synopsis of my most recent work, I posed a question to the assembled group of scholars. I asked them what information they would want diplomats and scholars of diplomacy to integrate into their work in order that it reflect a sophisticated understanding of religion. Their answers produced a set of questions that they believe diplomats should be asking about religion as it exists in the countries they are engaging. They also included a number of observations about the nuances of understanding religion that must be acknowledged by any diplomat who wishes to engage the religious dimension of culture and its attendant influence on the political lives of those who live within a particular religious culture. Their advice, which I will now present under disciplinary categories, outlines what can be seen as a set of recommendations for diplomats and scholars of diplomacy.

The historians of religion wished to remind practitioners and scholars of diplomacy that historical narratives which engage religion – like all historical narratives – are made by highly subjective individuals whose own social locations must first be critically examined before their conclusions can be integrated into policy formation. The historians also pointed out that modern religious historiographies are neither pre-modern nor modern, and are never linear. They noted that histories of religion and their attendant impact on culture and political life are constructed by individuals. These individuals are reflecting on symbolic beings emerging from circumstances produced by competing mythical narratives. For example, in regard to Islam one must carefully distinguish between what we can know about Muhammad the man, what he has come to symbolize to the ongoing construction of Islamic jurisprudence, and the way he is understood by highly diverse and divergent Muslim populations.

The anthropologists of religion pointed out the need for diplomats to be aware of *positionality*, which refers to the fact that substantive conclusions drawn about political actors and populations are always made in light of observing people and movements in and from particular geographic and social locations. In other words, diplomats must resist the temptation to craft generalizations about broad cross sections of a population based only on the observation of particular groups. At the same time, positionality calls attention to the fact that diplomats themselves will draw particular conclusions based on their own social locations and specific experiences. The anthropologists went on to make a number of observations about the necessary field work that they believe diplomats must engage in if they are to come away with truly useful understandings of the role of religion in the political and cultural formation of any population. They observed that special attention must be devoted to try to understand how people understand themselves. This can be done, they noted, by carefully and unobtrusively observing people in their everyday lives – particularly in the way peoples' lives interface with and respond to the religious cultures they inhabit. Thus, the anthropologists argued that diplomats must engage in a deeper level of fieldwork and possess proficiency level language skills. In addition, they recommended that diplomats acknowledge how their questions reflect their own identities, concerns and pre-existing beliefs about the population and its traditions being examined.

The theologians and ethicists of religion recommended that diplomats focus their attention on both the inter-religious and intra-religious conflicts in the populations they are examining. Any prominent group associated with one interpretation of a religious tradition today may or may not be in power tomorrow, and their particular interpretation of their own tradition may or may not be normative or even considered constructive by the majority of people they represent or claim to represent. For this reason, credible religio-political analysis must also include a sophisticated understanding of the implicit theological positions of any group being examined, including the degree to which dominant theological positions are associated with exclusivist claims (i.e. one particular group claiming to represent the only 'true' religion). At the same time, diplomats could benefit from understanding the degree to which the current leadership of a nation-state and their possible successors are theologically and politically committed to promoting sustainable interreligious engagement among communities of different religious traditions. Religious diversity among the members of ruling parties and their adversaries could be viewed as a potential advantage for long-term influence in a government and even a region, especially if such diversity is based on coalitions that have been formed non-coercively. These same theological categories will also be of great help to diplomats who seek to understand the ethical claims and guiding moral norms of any group influenced by a specific religious culture. This knowledge could potentially be of great assistance when assessing the most fruitful paths to bring people to the negotiating table, and even assessing how negotiations might more quickly be brought to a place which Andrea Bartoli refers to as 'ripeness'[17] (see Chapters 17 and 18 in this Handbook). Only after the above questions are answered about the historically normative interpretations of a religious tradition in any particular nation-state can a political analyst hope to understand the more fundamentalist interpretations of the same tradition. Many scholars and practitioners of diplomacy who struggle to interpret and predict the rhetoric and actions of non-normative, fundamentalist interpretations of a tradition do so because they begin their consideration of a tradition through the lens of an extremist's theological interpretation, without first understanding the root of the tradition from which the extremist's position has departed.

Finally, the scholars of sacred texts implored scholars and practitioners of diplomacy to not begin with sacred texts in their efforts to understand what practitioners of a religious tradition actually believe. The first problem with such an approach is rooted in the many challenges of accurately translating sacred texts. Secondly, there is the necessity of becoming familiar with the significant body of knowledge required to understand the history and diversity of the texts' interpreters and the dominant and non-dominant interpretations that are linked to them. Thus, for the purpose of diplomacy, religions themselves cannot be defined by their sacred texts, even though the narratives which specific movements and groups choose to employ when justifying their moral claims often reference them. In truth, determining how and why particular individuals are favored to interpret texts over others and the role of the sacred texts in a community are actually more important for understanding the religious dimension of the political lives of a group than the texts themselves. For this reason, an astute analysis of the current conversations about a text or the popular extra-textual conversations associated with the sacred text can serve as an invaluable window into what a community values, expects, fears, or desires.

RELIGION AND THE CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE AND ANALYSIS OF DIPLOMACY

In examining the ways religion informs the practice of track-one diplomacy, one must

consider the role of religion and religious culture on multiple levels. While some nations will designate religious figures as special envoys or ambassadors, others will select the location of diplomatic missions to reflect either the normative religious claims of the host country, or the religious identity of their own nation. Approaches to inter-state negotiation styles may also reflect religious moral claims or sensibilities associated with religious cultures. Other track-one diplomatic practices reflect sensitivities to the reality of religion or religious culture. The place of religion in shaping diplomatic state practice regarding protocol or etiquette is one example of this, be it in the form of wearing religiously respectful clothing when called for, the serving of appropriate food reflecting religious laws, or other inter-personal practices that reflect both understanding of and respect toward the religious faith or religious culture of one's counterparts.

On a broader, national level, one must consider the relationship of religion and diplomacy in nations whose political identity is profoundly and institutionally linked to a religious identity. Saudi Arabia's ruling House of Saud's direct relationship with the Wahhabist interpretation of Sunni Islam (a derivation of Salafism) is a clear example of this. This is particularly true with regards to Saudi Arabia's relations with its regional Muslim neighbors, who are unlikely to be able to uncouple the exclusivist claims of Wahhabism from the way Saudi Arabia's foreign policy and the diplomatic efforts that represent it are received and understood. Less obvious to some is the influence of religion in relationships and approaches to diplomacy cultivated among nations whose religious cultures are Christian. It can be argued, for example, that Serbia's and Russia's shared Orthodox Christian identities created a connectivity which served to deepen their relationship and approach to diplomacy in the post-Soviet era; a connectivity which could be seen as subsequently impacting the United States' approach to its role in crafting the Dayton Accords. Even more subtle to many is the role of the common Christian religio-cultural identity shared by the membership of the European Union, and its impact on both the diplomatic relations among EU member states and with those outside the EU borders – most particularly with the Islam-identified nation-states of North Africa and Turkey.

While many other observations can be made regarding the past and present roles of religion in the practice of diplomacy, the level of religious illiteracy that persists among architects of foreign policy suggests the need to reimagine the role of the twenty-first-century diplomat. This role would name the diplomat as one who has been given a greater capacity to impact foreign policy formation in light of his or her ability to interpret and convey a sophisticated understanding to senior policy makers of the role of religion and religious culture in the lives of ordinary people on the ground. This role reflects the advantages Sharp describes as being afforded the diplomat, who inhabits a space that lends itself to observing and naming facts that are not readily apparent to those they represent. Recent events unfolding in the Near East alone underscore the value of such a new role. The rise of Daesh (ISIL) should arguably not have come as the surprise it appears to have been to many Western analysts, nor should the manner and degree to which the territorial integrity of Iraq, Syria and Yemen have been impacted by competing actors whose identities are significantly shaped by different movements within Islam. All of these developments have an explicit and profound religious dimension – in their roots, their evolution and in the future implications of what is unfolding. The role of Saudi Arabia, through its muscular exportation and diffusion of a non-normative expression of Islam, is intrinsically connected to many of these developments – a fact which remains misunderstood or even unknown to many who continue to principally view relations among nations through a secularist-materialist lens.

Key Points

- The study of religion is complex by its very nature. Understanding religion and its subsequent influence on the practice of diplomacy requires the input of anthropologists, linguists, historiographers, sociologists, philosophers, theologians and ethicists, among others.
- Examining the influence of religion on the practice of diplomacy requires analysis of the influence of *religion* as it is practiced and serves to influence nation-state leaders and their representatives, as well as the way *religious culture* can influence an entire population, including those who understand themselves to be entirely secular.
- Understanding religion in the context of diplomacy requires an understanding of the normative, traditional components of a religious tradition. One cannot claim to understand 'extremist' versions of a tradition unless one first understands the normative or mainstream expression of the religion itself.
- Analyzing the influence of religion on the practice of diplomacy requires acknowledging that one movement or one interpretation of a religious tradition by a political actor does not necessarily provide insights into the tradition as it is understood or practiced by an entire national population, its diversity of practitioners, or multiplicity of interpretations.

FAITH-BASED DIPLOMACY

Faith-based diplomacy can initially be understood as the practice of diplomacy on the part of track-two actors which can come in the form of religious institutions, religiously affiliated NGOs and/or individual practitioners of a religious tradition, though faith-based diplomacy is also present in track-one diplomacy as well. According to Scott Thomas, faith-based diplomacy 'can be distinguished … from traditional models of peacemaking and conflict resolution by its holistic approach to the sociopolitical healing of … conflict.'[18] Thomas notes that faith-based diplomacy also distinguishes itself from traditional diplomacy through its emphasis on the ethical claim of its praxis: 'the restoration of the political order that has suffered from war and injustice, and the reconciliation of individuals and social groups'[19] (see Chapter 10 in this Handbook).

While the ethical dimension of secular diplomacy presents its own set of assumptions, practices and goals, the moral norms central to the practice of faith-based diplomacy distinguish themselves from their secular counterparts in that they are openly acknowledged as directly connected to the religious identity of the religion's practitioners. The religious identity of those who practice faith-based diplomacy can offer some tangible advantages, if in fact the actors in question are perceived to be politically neutral. The credibility of those practicing diplomacy from a faith-based position is also often enhanced by their being associated with a cross-culturally respected set of values associated with their religious tradition.[20] At the same time, some practitioners of faith-based diplomacy have the advantage of being tangibly connected to multiple communities that are crucial to the promotion of long-term peace building in the region of the conflict being mediated.

FAITH-BASED DIPLOMACY IN TRACK-TWO DIPLOMACY

One of the more well-known Western-based NGOs associated with faith-based diplomacy is the World Council of Churches (WCC). Based in Geneva, Switzerland, the WCC is one of the most important institutional outgrowths of the European ecumenical movement. Representing over 500 million Christians worldwide, the WCC's membership includes most of the world's Orthodox churches, as well as scores of Anglican, Baptist, Lutheran, Methodist and Reformed congregations, with member churches in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, Latin America, the Middle East and Oceana. Because the WCC represents such a large and diverse transnational constituency, its programs and policy statements

provide the international community with well-vetted contributions from an explicitly faith-based perspective to international discourses on human rights, economic development, ecological sustainability, defense spending, indigenous rights and the rights of women, among the broad array of its social justice focused efforts. The WCC has long maintained a presence at the United Nations, where its policy statements have found their way into the language of UN resolutions.

The Italian Catholic Community of Sant'Egidio is a powerful example of a community devoted to the practice of faith-based diplomacy. Founded in 1969 in Rome, the Community of Sant'Egidio served in a central role in the mediation efforts that led to the end of the civil war in Mozambique, as well as making important contributions to peacemaking efforts in Algeria, the Balkans, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The track-two mediation efforts that the Community employs stand in marked contrast to many normative approaches to diplomacy. In their efforts in Mozambique, representatives of Sant'Egidio described their approach to the work of mediation as one that was pursued from a position of absolute powerlessness, forcing the actors in conflict to take responsibility for the work of peacemaking. As a non-governmental body, which is not subject to the same pressures or time constraints of many nation-states, Sant'Egidio was able to invite representatives from both sides of the Mozambiquan conflict to Rome, to enter into an open ended process which did not engender many of the common methods of coercion employed by third party track-one mediators. The philosophy of the Community of Sant'Egidio is that war is the mother of poverty. Hence, the Community's work also includes a substantial effort to combat poverty, and through its actions promote its goal of embodying its interpretation of the Gospel narrative, which features an understanding of Jesus as one who modeled non-violence, a belief in prayer and the power of persuasion from a position of ostensible powerlessness.

Faith-based diplomacy can also be practiced on an intimate scale, an approach that holds the potential to engender a transnational impact. One example of this approach can be found in the Parents Circle Family Forum (PCFF), a joint Palestinian–Israeli organization comprising 600 Jewish, Muslim and Christian families, all of whom have lost a family member as a result of the prolonged conflict. Established in 1995 by Yitzhak Frankental and a group of bereaved Israeli families, the PCFF initially began in cooperation with a group of Palestinian families from Gaza, 'who identified with the call to prevent further bereavement through dialogue, tolerance, peace and reconciliation.'[21] When the ties between these groups were cut off by the second Intifada, the PCFF continued its work by establishing connections between Israeli families and Palestinian families in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. The PCFF operates out of the belief that joint activities have shown that reconciliation between individuals and nations is possible, and that reconciliation is a prerequisite to building a sustainable peace. While the PCFF does not officially provide a stated position on the political resolution of the conflict, most members favor a two-state solution. The PCFF is managed jointly by a professional staff of Israelis and Palestinians working in two offices, the Palestinian office in El'ram and the Israeli office in Ramat Ef'al, Tel Aviv.[22]

The Amman-based Royal Strategic Studies Centre (RISSC) provides an intra-religious approach to faith-based peace building among Muslims. An independent research entity affiliated with the Royal Aal al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought, the RISSC is an international Islamic non-governmental institute, whose work focuses on protecting, preserving and propagating what it describes as a 'traditional, orthodox, moderate interpretation of Islam,' in an effort to provide a consensus based counterpoint to claims by Islamic groups that many mainstream Muslims would interpret as extremist, and thus far afield of historically agreed upon Islamic beliefs

and ethical claims. The Three Points of the Amman Message offers three core claims which define an inclusive, non-sectarian interpretation of Islam: (1) the validity of all eight Mathhabs (legal schools) of Sunni, Shi'i and Ibadhi Islam; of traditional Islamic Theology; of Islamic Mysticism (Sufism); and of traditional Salafi thought, which provided a concise and broadly inclusive definition of who is a Muslim; (2) that mainstream, traditional Islam forbids takfir (declarations of apostasy) between Muslims; and (3) a Mathahib-based set of preconditions for the issuing of fatwas, thereby exposing ignorant and illegitimate edicts in the name of Islam.

There are many other examples of institutions, NGOs and individuals who practice faith-based diplomacy. As one considers these, it is helpful to broaden normative definitions of diplomacy to include a more comprehensive understanding of what diplomacy is and what it could be. Citizen diplomats, aid organizations, and domestic efforts at peace and reconciliation across boundaries of religious difference that have transnational implications arguably all fall within this category. In this regard, faith-based diplomacy holds the potential to go well beyond an exclusive engagement with actors who identify themselves as practitioners of a specific religious tradition. Faith-based diplomacy also opens the door to a different discourse and diplomatic praxis with regards to naming and acting on ethical claims. Simultaneously, those who practice faith-based diplomacy who wish to engage the root causes of poverty, ecological unsustainability, racism, or gender discrimination effectively are obliged to acknowledge that comprehensive and sustainable solutions to these challenges are, by necessity, transnational.

FAITH-BASED DIPLOMACY IN TRACK-ONE DIPLOMACY

While many clear examples of faith-based diplomacy are evident in track-two diplomacy, there are certainly others that fall under the category of track-one efforts. One clear example is the phenomenon of heads of state who profess to craft their approach to diplomacy out of a set of convictions and moral claims rooted in a professed faith tradition, whether or not the nation they represent is institutionally committed to representing a religious tradition. One example of this could arguably be seen in the US presidency of Jimmy Carter, who rhetorically framed his commitment to peacebuilding in the Middle East and tying aid to the human rights records of its recipients to the moral claims of his own interpretation of Christianity. However, while on a broad scale one can cite enough clear examples to come to provisional conclusions about the driving motives of particular heads of state, such observations can also be contested. To what degree Iran's approach to international relations (and subsequently diplomatic practices) reflects the Muslim identity and Islamic moral claims of its leaders, and to what degree they simply reflect the same secular pragmatisms one can identify in the actions of non-religiously identified states, is difficult to quantify. The value of scholars of religion and scholars and practitioners of diplomacy working together to examine questions such as these suggests itself quite clearly in this case and many others like it.

Key Points

- Faith-based diplomacy distinguishes itself from traditional diplomacy through its emphasis on the ethical claim of its praxis: the restoration of the political order that has suffered from war and injustice, and the reconciliation of individuals and social groups.
- Faith-based diplomacy opens the door to a discourse and diplomatic praxis that directly engages the work of naming and acting on ethical claims, which are readily apprehensible to a broad cross section of a national, or even transnational population.
- The credibility of those practicing diplomacy from a faith-based position is often enhanced if

they are perceived as being politically neutral, or by their being associated with a cross-culturally respected set of values drawn from their religious tradition.

A NEW DIPLOMATIC WORLDVIEW: RELIGION, ECOLOGICAL REALISM AND A NEW LANGUAGE OF DIPLOMACY

The prospect of critically analyzing the tremendous diversity of perspectives within even one religious tradition and its impact on the political worldviews of its practitioners is daunting. The inability to generalize about competing and divergent interpretations of religion, their contradictory historical, theological and ethical claims, and the multiplicity of ways that such beliefs are manifested in political exchanges can ostensibly thwart any efforts to create easy consensus across boundaries of difference. At the same time, to acknowledge such realities would seem to comprehensively undermine any lingering efforts to view IR (or for that matter the analysis and practice of diplomacy) as a scientific discipline. This of course opens the door to acknowledging the truth of Paul Sharp's assertion that the knowledge that informs the practice of diplomacy is intrinsically qualitative, by virtue of the highly pluralistic realm in which it operates.

Thus, one must ask this question: given the pluralistic reality in which diplomacy takes place, how do diplomats best approach the work of cultivating an environment which promotes consensus, cooperation and peacebuilding? Identifying a common language and common goals are arguably central to this task. While the historic language of diplomacy was a European one – French – a modern sustainable diplomacy must find a lingua franca and set of objectives that does not privilege one culture, geographic region, or religious tradition over the other (see Chapter 20 in this Handbook). One strong candidate for a new language of diplomacy is found in the common ecosphere and the transnational bioregions that straddle the borders of individual nation-states. These shared realities on the ground are being revealed through the common threats posed by climate change, transnational resource scarcity, and the intricacies of human migration tied to other cross border realities such as poverty and the human labor requirements of agriculture. Crafting new approaches to foreign policy and the practice of diplomacy in light of these realities is the foundation of a new method of analyzing relations between nation-states that I call *ecological realism* (see Chapter 49 in this Handbook).

Ecological realism understands relations between nation-states as an ecocentric rather than an anthropocentric endeavor, one that defines long-term power in terms of a nation-state's and bioregion's capacity for ecological sustainability, rather than exclusively through its monetary or military capacities. This diplomatic worldview acknowledges that regardless of national identity, all people require potable water, arable land and breathable air, and the long-term preservation of all three of these resources cannot be achieved in the absence of a sustained level of transnational cooperation. For this reason, ecological realism groups nation-states together first and foremost in terms of their common bioregions, rather than exclusively through human-drawn borders.[23]

The ecological resilience of human communities in the context of the global ecological crisis is dependent upon the willingness of national governments and individuals to substantially change long established behaviors. Such changes will require tremendous courage and transnational coalition building, on the level of sub-state diplomacy as well as relations between nation-states. The role of the diplomat will be pivotal in achieving this goal. Most current consumption patterns, waste disposal methods, definitions of value and economic systems all privilege short-term gain over long-term sustainability. The transition

to a sustainable diplomacy informed by the insights of ecological realism will require a level of willingness and creativity that an exclusively secular-materialist worldview is hard pressed to invoke. This is because the ecological crisis is not just a material crisis – it is a crisis that arguably contains a spiritual dimension. Applying a sophisticated understanding of the religious traditions that have influenced political cultures and motivated individuals will be central to the diplomatic task at hand: leveraging extant religious moral claims that honor the ecosphere in the work of increasing transnational cooperation. Such moral claims exist in a diversity of forms in every religious tradition. The success of such efforts will require substantially increasing the level of cooperation and coordination between practitioners of track-one and track-two diplomacy. A disciplinary commitment to deepen the religious literacy of the practitioners of diplomacy of every type will be central to achieving this goal.

NOTES

1 Sharp, Paul, *Diplomatic Theory of International Relations*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, 296.
2 Ibid, 309.
3 Ibid, 10.
4 Ibid, 99.
5 Ibid, 295.
6 Scott M. Thomas, *The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations: The Struggle for the Soul of the Twenty-First Century*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, 33.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Johnston, Douglas and Cynthia Sampson, eds. *Religion, The Missing Dimension of Statecraft*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.
10 Douglas Johnston, 'Introduction: Beyond Power Politics,' in Johnston, Douglas and Cynthia Sampson, eds, *Religion, The Missing Dimension of Statecraft*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1994, 3.
11 Ibid, 5.
12 Ibid.
13 Edward Luttwak, 'The Missing Dimension,' in Johnston, Douglas and Cynthia Sampson, eds. *Religion, The Missing Dimension of Statecraft*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1994, 9–10.
14 Ibid.
15 See the Bibliography for all the contributions to the Millennium volume.
16 The department of Religious Studies of DePaul University is composed of 19 full-time historians, anthropologists, linguists, ethicists and theologians, and includes scholars of Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism and a number of Indigenous Traditions. The workshop being referenced took place at DePaul University, Chicago, on June 5, 2009.
17 Bartoli, Andrea, 'Christianity and Peacebuilding,' in Coward, Harold and Gordon S. Smith, eds, *Religion and Peacebuilding*, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2004, 147–68.
18 Scott M. Thomas, *The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations: The Struggle for the Soul of the Twenty-First Century*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, 184.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid, 185.
21 For more on the work of the PCFF, see their website, www.theparentscircle.com (accessed 28/8/14).
22 Ibid.
23 For a more detailed description of Ecological Realism see Wellman, David Joseph, 'The Promise of Sustainable Dipomacy: Refining the Praxis of Ecological Realism,' in Constantinou, Costas M. and James Der Darian, eds, *Sustainable Diplomacies*, Basingstroke: Palgrave Macmillan, 25–45.

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48

Military Diplomacy

See Seng Tan

INTRODUCTION

Military diplomacy has often been described as an oxymoron. Militaries exist to wage wars or deter them by force whereas diplomacy involves the use of negotiation and dialogue to achieve national goals. The idea of armed warriors, the epitome of what scholars call 'hard power', engaging in the diplomatic arts, or 'soft power', might indeed seem incongruous to some (George, 2014; Nye, 2004). However, not resorting to the use of force or the threat of it to realize one's political and military objectives is a strategy long appreciated by military leaders. In *The Art of War*, the Chinese strategist Sun Tzu reckoned the subduing of one's enemy without using force as 'the supreme art of war' (Sun Tzu, 1963: 77–8). Britain's wartime leader, Winston Churchill, famously opined that talking (or 'jaw jaw' in his words) is preferable to warring (Evans, 2012: 35). During the Cold War years, reassurance, restraint and mutually agreed norms of competition, all of which involved significant diplomatic skill and effort, were arguably as central as deterrence to ensuring that nuclear war did not break out between the Soviets and the Americans (Stein, 1991).

The ending of the Cold War led to the drawdown of military forces worldwide – albeit the Asia Pacific has proved a notable exception – and growing attention to threats to societies of a nonconventional and often transnational nature. In response, national defence establishments and militaries have had to redefine their mission and retool themselves in support of their expanded roles (Huntington, 1993; Moskos et al., 1999; Wong, 2001). There has also been a marked increase in the involvement of militaries worldwide in activities and arrangements that are putatively *diplomatic* in approach. While the absence in the post-Cold War era of an explicit enemy posing a common and unambiguous strategic threat to all has undoubtedly facilitated international peace and stability, it has also engendered a collective

sense of uncertainty over who precisely one's friends and foes are (Baylis et al., 2014; Fris, 2013). Military diplomacy therefore serves as a useful enterprise through which states and their militaries interact with one another and presumably learn more about others' capabilities and intentions.

This chapter briefly examines the following about military diplomacy: how it has been defined in the literature and how it differs from the ancillary idea of defence diplomacy; how it has been variously applied by countries and militaries and for what ends; how it has been increasingly applied in and through multilateral modalities; and, finally, its limitations.

Key Points

- Not using force or the threat of it to achieve one's political and military goals is a time-honoured strategy.
- Militaries today participate in diplomatic activities and arrangements as part of their adaptation to the changing strategic environment and their evolving mission.

DEFINING MILITARY DIPLOMACY

A useful place to begin this discussion is to highlight what others think military diplomacy is not. As concepts go, *military* diplomacy and *defence* diplomacy, often used interchangeably in the academic literature, are not quite the same even though they clearly overlap. Du Plessis (2008) has persuasively argued that military diplomacy consists strictly of military-to-military – meaning, the armed forces rather than the civilian ministries and agencies that support them – relations and arrangements, whereas defence diplomacy is a broader category that includes both the uniformed and civilian components of the defence establishment. As sensible as this analytical distinction is, military diplomacy has nonetheless evolved to such a complex extent today that it is at times difficult to differentiate between what properly constitutes military and civilian. In a key sense, this development is a function of the increasingly holistic and 'hybridized' nature of international conflict as well as the complexity of security environments in which militaries have to operate today (Baldwin, 1995; Elhefnawy, 2004; Tan, 2005, 2015). While the distinction between military diplomacy and defence diplomacy should nonetheless be maintained, suffice to say for our immediate purposes that many if not most of the ostensibly 'civilian' facets of defence diplomacy – such as the Munich Security Conference or the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue – either include the active participation of uniformed personnel or incorporate military-to-military activities (Capie and Taylor, 2010a; Ischinger, 2014; Tan, 2012). Hence, to speak today of military diplomacy as practically synonymous with defence diplomacy, even as we acknowledge their conceptual distinctiveness, is not entirely farfetched.

Just as there is no universally accepted definition for defence diplomacy (Mulloy, 2007), the same could be said of military diplomacy. Broadly speaking, military diplomacy involves the deliberate application by a nation of its military assets and resources, in nonviolent ways and in bilateral or multilateral settings, to attain positive outcomes for its security. An authoritative study, contrasting the related enterprise of defence diplomacy with the traditional military roles of defence, deterrence, compellance or intervention, has defined it as 'the peacetime cooperative use of armed forces and related infrastructure … as a tool of foreign and security policy' (Cottey and Forster, 2013: 6) – a description that befits military diplomacy as well. Increasingly, it has also come to be seen as an enterprise that aims to contribute to the security of the nations and/or communities with which the initiating nation is engaging (Tan and Singh, 2012). The contributions in question could range from the provision of assistance in support of the efforts

by needy countries to develop their armed forces ('capacity building') to considerably more challenging tasks such as preventing conflicts from arising among opposing groups ('preventive diplomacy') to settling conflicts and disputes that have arisen ('conflict resolution') (Cottey and Forster, 2013; Zyck and Muggah, 2012). An early post-Cold War attempt at a comprehensive definition of military or defence diplomacy comes from the British Government, which argued in 2000 that its armed forces must be trained and equipped 'to dispel hostility, build and maintain trust and assist in the development of democratically accountable armed forces [elsewhere], thereby making a significant contribution to conflict prevention and resolution' (UK Ministry of Defence, 2000). A concrete example of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) focus on preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution is the formation of its Comprehensive Crisis and Operations Management Centre (CCOMC). Based at Mons in Belgium, the centre furnishes military (and civilian) military expertise on crisis identification, planning, operations, reconstruction and stabilization capabilities (Simón, 2014: 224).

Thus understood, the goals of military diplomacy can either be conservative or transformative. While states may desire the same end – interstate peace and stability – the paths they take to realize that could differ markedly. The British and NATO examples cited in the preceding paragraph suggest the use of military diplomacy by states to achieve particular transformative ends, namely, to democratize civilian–military relations in target countries and ensure their armed forces are democratically accountable. On the other hand, military diplomacy is also used by states for largely conservative or pragmatic purposes. One analyst has offered at least six pragmatic ends: build interoperability and capacity among allies and partners; build strategic depth in one's regional backyard; gain influence in countries where the military is a key actor; better apprehend the strategic cultures of other states; build 'crisis-proof' bilateral relationships through establishing bilateral networks and improving mutual understanding; and build the capacity of other states and their militaries to contribute to shared tasks (Wesley, 2011). That said, if strategy, according to the British strategist Basil Liddell Hart, is principally about the allocation and application of 'military means to fulfil the ends of policy' (Liddell Hart, 1967: 321), then neither the conservative nor transformative versions of military diplomacy fall far from the tree of strategy, so to speak.

Moreover, while the accent of military diplomacy is on cooperation and reassurance, it does not automatically follow that competition and deterrence therefore have no place in military diplomacy. After all, it has been employed by countries to counterbalance their adversaries through strengthening cooperation with their allies and security partners and sourcing for new ones (Clinton, 2011; Manning, 2013; Swistek, 2012). In the case of India, it has been argued that countries such as Indonesia, Japan, Singapore, South Korea and Vietnam occupy a prominent place in New Delhi's strategic thinking because those countries either have antagonistic relations or uneasy relations with China, and as such are appropriate partners with whom India should engage using military diplomacy (Jha, 2011). For a global power such as the United States, the importance of military diplomacy has grown even as America's military footprint has diminished in many parts of the world as a consequence of defence cuts and greater reliance on its allies to carry a bigger share of their joint security responsibilities than they might have hitherto done (Lord and Erickson, 2014; Obama, 2014). In the face of such constraints, military diplomacy has allowed the United States to keep a decent semblance of its forward presence through maintaining access points with countries that are receptive to Washington's policies (Shea, 2005). For example, under the 1990 memorandum (and its 1998 addendum) signed between the United States and Singapore

concerning the former's use of the latter's facilities, Singapore grants the US military access to the air base at Paya Lebar, the naval base at Changi, and the port of Sembawang where Commander, Logistics Group Western Pacific (COMLOG WESTPAC) – the unit responsible for coordinating US Pacific Command (PACOM) military exercises – is based (Tan, 2014).

Notwithstanding the more conservative uses described above, it is safe to say, however, that military diplomacy has increasingly assumed a more *inclusive* conception of security wherein security is pursued *with* and not simply against others (Haacke and Morada, 2010; Ponsard, 2007). For instance, it has been argued that the aim of military diplomacy is to increase interstate stability and security 'by changing attitudes and perceptions' of decision makers (Jha, 2011: 48). Similarly, others have noted that the emphasis in military-to-military engagements have shifted over the years from the provision of assistance to needy countries for building their own defence forces to collaboration and the mutual promotion of harmony and peace and building trust in the strategic environment shared by engagers and recipients (Bateman et al., 2013). In this respect, military diplomacy provides countries with an alternative strategy to coercive diplomacy (see Chapter 38 in this Handbook), whose utility has increasingly come under question (Art and Cronin, 2003; Jentleson, 2006).

Key Points

- Often used interchangeably, military diplomacy and defence diplomacy are, however, not the same. In recent times, civilian facets of defence diplomacy have nonetheless seen greater involvement by their military counterparts, complicating further the distinction between those two types of diplomacy.
- Military diplomacy involves the peacetime cooperative use of military assets and resources as a means of a country's foreign and security policy.
- The goals of military diplomacy include both the conservative/pragmatic (e.g., build capacity and interoperability, improve mutual understanding) and the transformative (e.g., resolve conflicts, develop democratically accountable armed forces).
- Military diplomacy aims to be inclusive and reassuring without rejecting the more exclusive logics of competition and deterrence.

DOING MILITARY DIPLOMACY

Military diplomacy comprises a wide range of activities. Activities that befit military diplomacy include: bilateral and multilateral contacts between senior commanders and service chiefs; the appointment of defence attachés to foreign countries; bilateral defence cooperation agreements; training of foreign military personnel; provision of expertise and advice on the democratic control of armed forces, defence management and military technical areas; contacts and exchanges between military personnel and units, and ship visits; placement of military personnel in the armed forces or defence ministries of partner countries; deployment of training teams; provision of military equipment and other material aid; and bilateral or multilateral military exercises for training purposes (Cottey and Forster, 2013). The significance which states attach to military diplomacy today is evidenced by the quality of assets and quantity of resources they are willing to commit to the enterprise. For instance, going well beyond 'protocol, alcohol, and cholesterol' – the standard joke about defence attachés of yore – the strategic importance today of attachés to helping their governments and defence establishments realize their political and military objectives is such that countries now regularly send only their best and brightest military people abroad (Shea, 2005).

States engage in military diplomacy to strengthen ties with other likeminded states. The idea here is to develop mutually beneficial relationships with the armed forces of

countries – some with whom they might even be competing economically or engaged in soft balancing – to contribute to a stable international and regional environment (Chong et al., 2008). The formation in 2010 of the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus or ADMM-Plus by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), a regional organization formed in 1967, with eight of its dialogue partners (Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, Russia, South Korea and the United States) is an instance of Southeast Asian countries seeking to enhance their security regionalism through strengthening military-to-military ties with outside powers and 'stakeholders' (Capie and Taylor, 2010b; Tan, 2013).

States also engage in military diplomacy to develop confidence, trust and transparency with past, present or potential rivals they seek to reassure or over which they want to keep a watchful eye. It is used to build and enhance cooperative capacities with partners new and old, as well as with former foes (Swistek, 2012). As a former US Pacific Command chief once remarked, the problem with countries caught up in security dilemmas has less to do with their respective force structures than with the shared proclivity of their leaders for zero-sum, balance of power mind sets and ambiguous intentions (Blair and Hanley, 2001). While the specific aims and objectives of nations participating in military diplomacy might differ, 'the crux is that they work together to develop an environment of peace and trust' (Muthanna, 2011: 3). For example, military-to-military ties between Russia and the United States have particularly been aimed at overcoming the barriers to trust from 'years of staring at each other across the Fulda Gap' (Holinger, 2007: 59). Similarly, in the case of Vietnam and the United States, military-to-military ties between the two former foes have benefited from the evolving cooperative partnership between the National Defense University in Washington, DC, and the National Defence Academy in Hanoi (Stern, 2012). In the case of China–US ties, it has been argued that the expansion of regular contact between military elites and at the lower levels would raise the benefits of engagement for both Beijing and Washington while increasing the costs to both should ties be severed (Harold, 2013). In other words, as a strategy of engagement, the success of military diplomacy relies on the logic of frequency of contact and communication. According to Admiral Mike Mullen, the former chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, strategic trust comes about through 'more frequent discussion, more exercises, [and] more personnel exchanges' (Mullen, 2011).

Finally, states engage in military diplomacy with the aim to establish and enhance not only the professionalization of the armed forces of target countries but, crucially, their democratic accountability. According to a British Member of Parliament and shadow defence secretary, military diplomacy is about the minimization of hostility, the building and maintenance of trust and the provision of assistance in the development of democratically accountable armed forces and military strategies (Murphy, 2012). Likewise, the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF) has identified the facilitation of defence or security sector reform, the establishment of peace support operations in conflict and post-conflict theatres that involve military and civilian participation, and the development of arms control and disarmament mechanisms and confidence and security building measures in response to security problems posed by changing security environments as the elements of military diplomacy (DCAF, 2007). The resumption by the United States of its International Military and Education Training (IMET) programmes with Indonesia, which Washington had suspended following allegations of human rights abuses by the Indonesian military in East Timor in the late 1990s, was effected with reform of the Indonesian national military (TNI) clearly in mind and in the context of Indonesia's democratic transition (International Crisis Group, 2001).

On the other hand, military diplomacy has also been employed not as a driver to bring about political change but offered as a 'reward' for continued change. For example, former US defence secretary Leon Panetta told a Shangri-La Dialogue audience in 2012 that America would be prepared to establish military ties with Myanmar if the country were to continue with its democratic reforms and improve its human rights record. To that end, it has been suggested Myanmar could be invited to participate in US-sponsored military exercises such as Cobra Gold in Thailand, the maritime Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) exercises or the US Navy's Pacific Partnership programme (Hiebert, 2012). Britain's planned resumption of military ties with Myanmar has similarly identified reform of its armed forces, the Tatmadaw, and continuation of the peace process begun by President U Thein Sein as the key reasons behind its decision (Hiebert and Nguyen, 2013).

Key Points

- Military diplomacy comprises a wide range of activities conducted bilaterally and multilaterally.
- Military diplomacy is used to enhance ties with friendly states, build transparency and trust with rival states, professionalize and develop democratically accountable armed forces, and reward and strengthen ongoing democratic transitions.

MULTILATERALIZING MILITARY DIPLOMACY

One of the more intriguing developments regarding military diplomacy has to do with the growing patterns of multilateral interaction and cooperation among militaries. As a multilateral collective defence organization, NATO is a natural institutional locus for multilateral military ties (Schimmelfennig, 2005). On the other hand, as a region long defined by security bilateralism as a result of its Cold War architecture of bilateral alliances and bilateral security relationships (Acharya, 1990), the Asia Pacific has in recent years hosted a growing experiment with security multilateralism (see Chapter 29 in this Handbook). But rather than the institutional singularity embodied in Europe by the European Union (EU), multilateralism in the Asia Pacific is akin to what Francis Fukuyama (2007), commenting on the global institutional landscape, has termed 'multi-multilateralism': burgeoning webs or concentric circles of interlocking and overlapping ties and arrangements (Frost, 2008; Green and Gill, 2009; Tan, 2009; Tow, 2002). A concrete example is the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), an annual gathering of foreign ministers (as well as defence officials) from twenty-six Asia Pacific countries and the EU, the ADMM-Plus, the eighteen-country forum of defence ministers, the East Asia Summit (EAS), a leaders-led forum whose membership corresponds with that of the ADMM-Plus, and the Shangri-La Dialogue, a semi-official (or 'Track 1.5') annual confab of defence leaders, practitioners and intellectuals. In addition to these, military-to-military engagements have proliferated all over the Asia Pacific region to the extent that analysts, accurately or otherwise, have resorted to labels such as 'webs' and 'communities' to describe those emerging relationships (Blair and Hanley, 2001; Tan and Singh, 2012). The US Pacific Command (US PACOM), for instance, is pursuing military-to-military activities within existing bilateral frameworks, while encouraging the development of more multilateral venues and new strategic partnerships with Asia-Pacific countries (Keating and McCaffrey, 2007).

Some see utility in such a complex architecture for avoiding gridlock when negotiations which become toxic in one institutional setting can presumably continue unhindered in another more salubrious setting (Cha, 2011). Others have warned

against the potential dangers of duplication and overlap in an increasingly crowded domain of security cooperation (Bisley, 2009; Taylor, 2011; Tow and Taylor, 2010). More often than not, defence practitioners tend to view those multilateral arrangements as consultative mechanisms for countries to resolve differences and clarify misunderstandings. Mechanisms such as the ADMM-Plus 'help to prevent miscalculations, and entrench a culture of peaceful resolution of disputes in the region', while the opportunities they furnish for increased interaction and networking 'form the basis for exploring new areas of cooperation' (Tan, 2002). In the face of common security challenges, states have few better options than to develop multilateral approaches and habits of cooperation which require effective policy coordination and, more often than not, military-to-military cooperation (Blair and Hanley, 2001). For example, it has been argued that the ADMM-Plus serves as 'an easy and natural venue for defence leaders to get to know one another and share information. It also serves as a vehicle for joint exercises on counterterrorism, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), maritime security, military medicine, and peacekeeping' (Bower, 2013). In June 2013, the ADMM-Plus undertook exercises in HADR and military medicine in Brunei, where Chinese and American troops conducted joint training for the first time. In September 2013, ADMM-Plus exercises in counterterrorism and maritime security were held in Indonesia and Australia respectively. In February 2014, the ADMM-Plus conducted a table-top exercise on peacekeeping operations in the Philippines. Arguably, what the capacity building arrangements within the ADMM-Plus have also enabled is an embryonic regional capability in preventive diplomacy – ironically, the very thing the ARF has not been able to implement (Tan, 2011). In the same way, the US PACOM's engagement with Southeast Asian armed forces has been described as a 'significant enabler', providing the region with capacity, training, resources and a framework for regional security cooperation (Wheeler and Weinstock, 2007).

Key Points

- Military diplomacy in the Asia Pacific has developed into a multilateral enterprise.
- Despite serious reservations with the 'multi-multilateral' character of Asia Pacific security cooperation, the ADMM-Plus, US PACOM-based and other multilateral modalities have facilitated and enhanced military-to-military cooperation among regional countries.

THE LIMITATIONS OF MILITARY DIPLOMACY

However, the conduct of military diplomacy does not automatically or always lead to improved ties. Despite China's longstanding *pauk phaw* (fraternal) relationship with Myanmar and its provision of arms to the latter, mutual distrust persists between both countries and their armed forces (Hiebert and Nguyen, 2013). Moreover, countries at times hold divergent perspectives on the goals of their military relationship. As a leading democracy and global military power, the United States is used to transparency and expects it in the context of its military relationship with, say, China. As such, Americans see their military ties with the Chinese as an opportunity to apprehend how People's Liberation Army (PLA) elites think, convey American expectations, and deter by showcasing their advanced capabilities. On their part, the Chinese, unused to transparency and indeed suspicious of it, see their ties with the Americans as an opportunity to learn how better to modernize their own military without revealing their own weaknesses (Harold, 2013).

Key Point

- Military diplomacy has not always contributed to enhancing strategic trust and improving relations between and among countries.

CONCLUSION

The goals of military diplomacy have been about conservation as much as innovation. This serves as a cautionary note against unrealistic expectations regarding what it can achieve, particularly where transformative military diplomacy is concerned. Yet the same holds true of pragmatic or conservative military diplomacy aimed at mitigating the negative consequences of security dilemmas. As evidenced by its rise and popularity in the post-Cold War era, military diplomacy is more appropriate for risk-based security situations than threat-based ones. That said, in regions like the Asia Pacific where tensions between regional powers could rise as a consequence of on-going maritime and territorial disputes, military diplomacy has arguably been used by countries to enhance partnerships and build coalitions against their competitors. Where military diplomacy ends and mutual defence cooperation against a common threat begins is to imply that military diplomacy is defined by the aims and intentions behind particular activities rather than the activities themselves.

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49

Environmental Diplomacy

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INTRODUCTION AND DEFINITIONS

The term 'environmental diplomacy' remains nascent and contested in terms of definitions. For International Relations relations scholars, the definitional frame is around negotiations between nation-states on environmental governance. However, for interdisciplinary scholars of environmental studies, the term has a broader meaning around negotiations concerned with conflict resolution over natural resources as well as instrumental use of the environment in resolving disputes and building peace (see Chapter 17 in this Handbook). Just as views of diplomacy are evolving from an exclusive focus on Track 1 (between state representatives) process to a more inclusive Track 2 enterprise (between stakeholders), so too must the views on environmental diplomacy (see Chapters 2 and 8 in this Handbook). For the purposes of this Handbook, we will endeavor to posit a more inclusive and expansive view of environmental diplomacy (Track 2) that is gaining traction in ecological discourse, along with outlining major agreements (Track 1) that became turning points in the evolution of modern environmentalism and sustainable development.

The term environmental diplomacy acquired currency after the formation of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) in 1973, given the prominence that environmental issues received soon thereafter. However, it could be argued that environmental diplomatic efforts could be traced back to the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling which was initially signed by 15 nations in 1946 and came into force in 1948. The broader use of the term became common after the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), popularly known as the Earth Summit (or the Rio Summit, after its venue: Rio de Janeiro, Brazil). The advent of this international forum bringing together world leaders prompted attention from scholars in fields such as international law, political science, and regional planning.

Lawrence Susskind, the founder of the MIT-Harvard Public Disputes Program, published the book *Environmental Diplomacy* in 1994 which gave broader appeal to the term and its usage (the second edition of the book was published 20 years later; Susskind and Ali, 2014). In its original connotation, Susskind had intended the term to encompass multilateral environmental agreements and how best to negotiate them in the context of broader international security priorities. Diplomacy was conceived very much in the tradition of Westphalian interactions between nation-states. Thus environmental diplomacy in this conventional view was also considered in the context of interactions between nation-states on environmental policy. The term connoted the resolution of any international disputes over managing the global environment (such as the Antarctic Treaty) or a proactive treaty process to manage the global commons (such as with ozone depletion or climate change). However, the contemporary usage of the term has broadened to consider ways of resolving environmental conflicts that emanate from efforts at conservation prioritization. At times the term is also used to consider pathways by which the environment can instrumentally be used in diplomatic activities between adversaries – a genre of literature in this arena is also referred to as 'environmental peace-building'.

Environmental conflicts occur at the intersection of ecology and society and are thus bound by natural systems constraints on the one hand and social values on the other. What is important to note is that environmental conflicts are about governing ecosystems and the value we may want to place in conserving such common resource domains for the future generations. Ecologists have a long-term perspective of the future and a more holistic understanding of global problems and therefore they avoid the trap of discounting the future more than do economists, whose accounting processes pose tremendous challenges for environmental conflict resolution and decision making (Ali, 2003; Speth, 2005). We can name three key underlying components of any environmental conflict which are in synch with the literature on sustainable development: environmental protection; economic development; and social justice. These are represented in Figure 49.1 in terms of their connectivity and a typology of conflicts that each connection implies.

Value conflicts (A), which are highlighted by the clash of environmental protection priorities and economic development priorities, are the most common kind of conflicts at the international level where environmental treaties being negotiated often get stalled. Often there are fundamental political ideologies on which the conflicts are predicated. Resolving these conflicts requires us to negotiate the monetary and non-monetary values associated with natural systems as well as consider what level of risk or 'insurance' value we may place on the occurrence of uncertain environmental harm. Building energy infrastructure, roads, business parks, and so on may be how we consider these conflicts at the local level but these same local-level issues can be operationalized at the international level through treaties that may place constraints on development for the sake of environmental protection. Indeed, a majority of environmental treaties would fall in this category. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), for example, boils down to how much economic development should be qualitatively constrained by the kind of energy usage or land-use policies for development in order to protect long-term natural processes from being eroded. Despite calls for greater democratization of the processes around climate governance (Stevenson and Dryzek, 2014), the overall tone of the debate remains aligned with classic 'North–South' divisions – albeit that definitions of who remains in each camp are changing with the rise of middle-powers such as the BRICS countries (Held et al., 2014) (see Chapter 23 in this Handbook). Diplomatic efforts around the UNFCCC also had to negotiate the terms of risk assurance as they pertained to different



Figure 49.1 Anatomy of environmental conflicts and concomitant opportunities for diplomacy

Source: adapted from Ali (2004).

scenarios of impact and the ability of various sides to adapt to climatic change.

Identity conflicts (B) around environmental issues stem from perceived social biases within human societies that are often manifest in disproportionate environmental harm being borne by minority communities. These conflicts are also presented in terms of indigenous politics and how natural systems constitute an integral part of the identity of particular populations. Conflicts between indigenous people and environmentalists around conservation lands are particularly significant in this arena (Dowie, 2005). However, identity can also be configured on the basis of a history of injustice that is exacerbated by inequality. Such features of identity that are often a legacy of pernicious norms of class and creed also make their way into resource allocation processes. Resource nationalism within nation-states leading to civil war in parts of sub-Saharan Africa are perhaps the most acute examples of such linkages between natural resources, identity, and conflict.

Distribution conflicts (C): with scarce natural resources, there is bound to be a 'zero sum' aspect to some environmental conflicts (where one party loses for another to win). How scarce resources get allocated, especially water resources in the context of riparian communities based on some norms of social justice, is the most challenging aspect of environmental diplomacy. The classic case in this regard is one of downstream versus upstream riparian communities, within nation-states or across borders. For example, does Ethiopia deserve to keep its water since most of the rainfall occurs on its land that feeds the Nile or does Egypt deserve a greater share of the water since Egyptian societies first found means of harnessing the water for broader commerce and are most dependent on it? Colonial agreements and voluntary standards such as the 2004 Berlin Rules from the International Law Association offer a backdrop for such diplomacy but are rarely consequential on their own. Such matters usually require linkage with other non-environmental diplomatic efforts as

well in order to augment the bargaining spectrum (Islam and Susskind, 2012).

Key Points

- There is definitional variance in using term 'environmental diplomacy' by disciplinary background of scholarship.
- It is important to note an expansive and inclusive definition given the development of diplomatic discourse to include both Track 1 and Track 2 processes.
- Despite different disciplinary backgrounds there is a shared focus on negotiation in studies on environmental diplomacy.

THE EVOLUTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY AND EMERGENT THEMES

Environmental diplomacy had its origins in conventional views of diplomatic processes whereby nation-states negotiated with each other on bilateral or multilateral agreements. However, since environmental issues have multiple levels of engagement and the connections between local and global are more inextricable, we argue that environmental diplomacy is part of a broader genre of discourse on environmental conflict resolution. As J. Gustave Speth (2005), the former head of the United Nations Development Program, points out, the emergence of environmental concern in the 1960s had several distinguishing features. Initially this concern was local and state-driven in scope; the drivers at first were not global – local air and water pollution, strip-mining, highway construction, noise pollution, dams and streams channelization, clear-cutting, hazardous waste dumps, local nuclear power plants, exposure to toxic chemicals, oil spills, and suburban sprawl. In the US these concerns culminated in the passage of the US National Environmental Policy Act in 1969 and in the first Earth Day a few months later.

At the state level a policy window had emerged and government action, which had once been impossible, became inevitable and part of the electoral process (Speth, 2005). The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) were established, the Clean Air and Water Acts were passed, and federal courts were overwhelmed with lawsuits brought by a new generation of environmental advocacy organizations. This led to Congress establishing far-reaching and tough deadlines for industry.

International Environmental Issues and Global Negotiations

The establishment of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) was a landmark achievement of the first International Conference on the Human Environment, held in Stockholm in 1972. The mandate of UNEP originally was 'to be the leading global environmental authority that sets the global environmental agenda, that promotes the coherent implementation of the environmental dimensions of sustainable development within the United Nations system and that serves as an authoritative advocate for the global environment'.[1] Thus the role it was meant to play was largely one of a coordinating agency for the UN system.

The 1970s was also a time when global-scale environmental issues attracted popular attention, prompted by several reports and publications on the topic, particularly the seminal Club of Rome's *Limits to Growth* report (Meadows et al., 1972) and, most consequentially, the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, held in Stockholm, Sweden in June 1972. Some authors (Linnér and Selin, 2013) argue that the Stockholm Conference had a real impact on the environmental policies of the European Community; for example, it laid out a foundation for how environmental advocacy, or 'environmentalism', was operationalized

within international organizations. This also led to further comprehension of global climate change, and eventually paved the way to European consensus on agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol.

Key outcomes of the Stockholm Conference were: a major declaration (known as the Stockholm Declaration), containing 26 principles related to the environment and development; an Action Plan; and a Resolution. Among the principles, the Stockholm Principle 21 has become an important part of the following international treaties: the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer; the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution; the 1972 London Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping Wastes and other Matter; the 1982 UNCLOS Article 193; the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD); and the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (Lynch, 2014).

However, the output from the conference was constrained by the dominant paradigm of national sovereignty trumping transboundary concerns. This was most definitely manifest in Principle 21 of the resolution, which brings together two ideas of different historical and geo-political origins, and reflects divergent perspectives held respectively by the 'developing' and 'industrialized' states:

> [The] States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies …[2]

This principle was initiated to transform what the South perceived as an unfair international economic and legal order created by former colonial regimes. Schachter (1977) describes this first part of Principle 21 as follows:

> In recent years no normative principle has been more vigorously asserted by the less-developed countries than that of 'permanent sovereignty over natural resources', a concept generally defined by its proponents as the 'inalienable right of each state to the full exercise of authority over its natural wealth and the correlative right to dispose of its resources fully and freely'. For many developing countries this right is regarded as an essential condition of their national independence and of their ability to decide on basic political and economic arrangements.

The enshrining of sovereignty over natural resources was clearly noted as a voice against postcolonial influence by the colonizers. However, the challenge facing any global environmental agreement is that at some level sovereignty has to be eroded to allow for trans-boundary ecological concerns to be realized. This essential tension between social justice and self-determination of countries versus the common good of global environmental decision-making would remain a defining feature of future environmental diplomacy.

The second part of Principle 21 defines a two-fold responsibility for states. One is to prevent transboundary environmental impacts which might lead to substantial harm. Another is to prevent activities which entail significant risk of transboundary harm (Pallemaerts, 1992). Thus, in the context of state activities which have transboundary impacts, the precautionary principle appears to flow naturally from the admonition in Stockholm Principle 21 that states are responsible for ensuring that '… activities within their jurisdiction and control do not cause harm to the environment of other states or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction'. Some 20 years later the 'precautionary principle' appeared as the 'precautionary approach' in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration (United Nations, 1992):

> In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.

The precautionary principle, along with the Stockholm Principle 21, is another

significant normative component used in international negotiations to balance economic preferences with the carrying capacity of natural systems. Only ten years after the Stockholm conference, in the 1980s, a series of reports began to pull the various tradeoffs between economic development and environmental conservation into a coherent agenda for international action. The term 'sustainable development', which had previously been given currency by *The Club of Rome*, began to be used by the United Nations as the paradigm to gain global consensus on the tradeoffs between economic development and environmental action. The UN General Assembly established the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) in 1983 and asked the former Prime Minister of Norway, Gro Harlem Brundtland, to chair the body with a mission to craft a major report on sustainable development. The 'Brundtland Commission', as it was subsequently known, prepared a comprehensive report within four years and published it as *Our Common Future* (United Nations, 1987). This book became widely used as an educational tool worldwide and paved the way for the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) – otherwise known as the Rio Summit – which was held in Brazil in 1992.

Unlike the Stockholm Conference, the Rio Summit agenda included the deliberations on four specific treaties pertaining to climate change, desertification, biodiversity, and forests. The first three were formally adopted at the summit while no agreement was reached on having an international agreement on forests. Environmental groups and governments alike were concerned in general that an international treaty on forests would dilute the efficacy of stronger local programs in this arena. The aphorism 'think global – act local' is emblematic of this tension on when to focus on international macro-cooperation and when to operate at a local level for community-driven solutions. Approaching environmental diplomacy from the conflict resolution lens that we present in this chapter allows the paradigm to be considered at multiple scales.

International Consensus, Epistemic Communities, and Network Governance

According to Speth (2005) there are some ten factors that led to international consensus around environmental issues as part of the broader range of international diplomatic efforts: depletion of the stratospheric ozone layer; climate change due to greenhouse gases; loss of crop and grazing land due to desertification, erosion, and conversion of land to non-farm uses; depletion of the world's tropical forests, leading to loss of forest resources and serious watershed damage; mass extinction of species from global loss of wildlife habitat and the associated loss of genetic resources; rapid population growth, burgeoning third world cities, and ecological refugees; mismanagement and shortages of freshwater resources; overfishing, habitat destruction, and pollution in marine environment; threats to human health from organic chemicals, particularly endocrine disruptors; and acid rain and the effects of a complex mix of air pollutants on fisheries, forests, and crops.

This menu of thematic areas, listed by Speth, was moved forward by a relatively small international community of leaders in science, government, the United Nations, and civil society, which 20 years later was given the name 'epistemic community' by Peter Haas in his landmark study of the Mediterranean Action Plan (Haas, 1992). The term implies that knowledge has a central role in improving the quality and sustainability of the consensus-building process. These epistemic communities had to contend with ideological rifts on environmental governance which were largely aligned around state versus market forces of economic development. Between the 1930s and 1970s, there was a dominance of the state-centric coordination

mechanism for resource management that was determined by both the world wars and then the Cold War period. Security was determined by the state apparatus and trumped all other forms of international relations or community-level interactions. In the 1980s, the emergence of market forces began to take shape, particularly hybrid models of economic markets and state-centric governance in China. The turn of the millennium has seen the emergence of a new paradigm for diplomacy, which brings in public and private sector forces through more integrative network mechanisms. The United Nations allowance for participation at treaty forums of 'major groups', which are often non-governmental advocacy organizations such as labor unions, human rights groups, environmental organizations, and universities, is a manifestation of this network-centered governance process (Khagram and Ali, 2008).

The pernicious impact of the Cold War and some state-centered policies on the environment were widely documented as communist countries opened up to greater research inquiry (Shapiro, 2001). Because of the apparent failure on the part of the state-centric coordination to govern complex environmental problems (Darst, 2001), new modes of governance have been proposed in recent years (Newig et al., 2010). In one such mode, known as 'the network model', multilevel political networks composed of stakeholders interested in the same issues can take shape. The networks are organized with the purpose of negotiating and agreeing on solutions. An example of how such networks can develop and facilitate environmental diplomacy is exemplified by the 'Salzburg Initiative', undertaken by the Dana Greeley Foundation for Peace and Justice in 1989, whereby 25 diplomats and scholars were convened to suggest reforms in environmental governance which were subsequently endorsed by stakeholders from more than 50 countries (Susskind, 1994). By integrating stakeholders from different sectors, governance networks can provide an innovative, learning-oriented environment and pave the way for adaptive and effective governance. Epistemic communities, which are able to dissociate themselves from political bickering and catalyze cooperation, are a type of network that is particularly important for addressing environmental governance problems (Haas, 1992).

Similar to the contending pathways of environmental security discourse, the same feature can be viewed as a strength or a weakness, depending on which pathway (process) will be chosen to reach the goal. The network approach to 'environmental governance', which in essence is the overarching means through which environmental diplomacy can be operationalized (government and civil organizations), also has strengths and weaknesses. The main argument favoring network governance over traditional, command-and-control regulation or market regulation is that network governance can better deal with intrinsic uncertainty and with decision making under conditions of bounded rationality (limited information) (Haas, 2004). Such conditions specifically apply to the cases with fundamental conflict between spatial scales, global versus local, where network institutions can both create synergy between different competencies and sources of knowledge and encourage individual and collective learning, thereby making it easier to address complex and interrelated problems (Haas, 2004; Dedeurwaerdere, 2013). Environmental policy makers often operate under conditions of uncertainty: they may not understand the technical aspects of the issues they are regulating. Their limited understanding affects their ability to define the interests of the state and to develop suitable solutions for scales larger than the local (e.g. cross-boundary or cross-regional environmental regulation). Environmental crises also exacerbate uncertainty for decision makers (Haas, 1992). To reduce uncertainty, decision makers seek expert knowledge and advice on issues such as: the scale of environmental problems; cause-and-effect relationships between ecological processes; and how (science-based) policy options will play out.

Environmental governance in general and network-centered coordination in particular face challenges characterized by complexity and uncertainty, which are inherent in issues associated with the environment and sustainability (Newig et al., 2007). Furthermore, decision making and conflict resolution that assume the supremacy of science are likely to alienate developing countries at the global scale and the public at the local scale, where stakeholders all too often complain about disparities in scientific and technical expertise. For example, a small community organization standing for the rights of indigenous forest conservation does not have the capacity to digest voluminous environmental impact statements of industrial forestry projects (see Chapter 51 in this Handbook).

Like other phenomena and circumstances, even natural disasters and crises can be viewed from different perspectives. On the one hand, environmental crises exacerbate uncertainty and could potentially result in community panic and lead to a reluctance for internal community consensus or national diplomatic efforts. On the other hand, crises have the potential to lead to cooperation and the search for new solutions, as there is greater need to address a particular need that may require collaborative processes. Positive exchanges and trust-building gestures can be a consequence of realizing common environmental threats. Often, a focus on common environmental harms (or aversions) is psychologically more successful in leading to cooperative outcomes than focusing on common interests, which in turn may lead to competitive behavior (Ali, 2003).

Key Points

Among the important points to note in the evolution of environmental diplomacy are the following:

- The legislative origins of environmental diplomacy in the United States and Europe;
- The key thematic areas for ecological concern that historically led to the current range of global environmental diplomatic efforts.
- The development of UNEP and the role of international commissions and conferences, such as the Stockholm Conference, in the emergence of environmental diplomacy.
- The tension between whether to act globally for environmental agreements or focus on local action, which arguably can be resolved by considering multiple scales of conflict resolution processes.
- The development of `epistemic' communities and their respective contributions to more effective environmental diplomacy.

ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICTS AND SCIENCE

As noted earlier, our view of environmental diplomacy encompasses a broader vision of conflict resolution processes involving environmental factors and how various tools can be employed to benefit diplomacy in this context. Environmental Conflict Resolution (ECR) has emerged as a specialized field within the broader realm of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), and many of the tools and analytical frames used in this context are also applicable to environmental diplomacy. While ECR focuses on finding pathways to avoid litigation in specific environmental regulatory disputes, environmental diplomacy encompasses the full frame of analytical and behavioral processes that lead various parties towards a sustained cooperative outcome. The convergent element in these two fields that are situated at different scales is the role environmental science can play in negotiation and moving parties closer to consensus.

Since the term *environmental conflict* first appeared in the 1960s, our understanding of the role of science in consensus building has been gradually changing. Starting as a purely neutral source of authority, a venue for discovery, and an independent mechanism of accountability, the role of science has slowly been co-opted into society whereby it can be socially constructed as a 'shield' rather than an agent of some indelible truth. The entire field

of Science and Technology Studies, which has its own Handbook of record (Jasanoff et al., 2001; Hackett et al., 2007) developed as a result of this realization. Creating an illusion of arbitrating between alternative policy viewpoints or choices, science is often employed instead as a tool for political persuasion. Furthermore, it can be more and more frequently observed that in difficult or intractable cases, scientific uncertainty, complexity, and disagreement can prolong conflict, exacerbate poor relationships, and actually provide a rationale for avoiding resolution (Martin and Richards, 1995; Ozawa, 2006).

In her notable article, 'Science in environmental conflicts', Ozawa (1996) asks whether science can play a role in resolving environmental conflict – and answers affirmatively. Ozawa observes that, during the 1980s, as a byproduct of innovations in decision making (which included direct negotiations between individuals and representatives of groups engaged in environmental disputes), an alternative role for science emerged. In some environmental mediation cases, parties now explicitly agree that the technical information and analysis necessary to understand current conditions and to identify possible options for action is one of the first topics on the agenda (Susskind and Cruikshank, 1987; Ali, 2003; Voinov Vladich, 2012). Thus, scientific analysis has become a tool in the negotiation process. Almost from the start, stakeholders discuss what kinds of technical knowledge are pertinent; moreover, the results of the scientific analysis are openly discussed and subject to agreement (Ozawa and Susskind, 1985). They note that for science to play a facilitative role in conflict resolution, the decision-making process must be deliberately structured to ensure the following: all stakeholders must have access to scientific expertise and analysis; a period of time should be explicitly set aside to address political concerns to prevent participants from clinging to technical positions with the aim of obtaining political gains; and experts invited to participate in the decision-making process must commit to sharing scientific information as a means of educating, rather than intimidating, stakeholders. If these conditions are met, scientific analysis may sustain dialogue, enabling stakeholders to develop a constructive understanding of the various perspectives on an environmental conflict.

There are also some specific structured tools which can supplement the role of science in environmental diplomacy. Participatory Modeling (PM) is one approach that is gaining a lot of attention. PM is a general approach to involving stakeholders in the modeling process and is designed to assist in decision making, conflict resolution, and general management of the process (Voinov and Gaddis, 2008, Voinov Vladich, 2012). It has been a particularly valuable tool in furthering environmental diplomatic efforts. PM is driven by the goals of the stakeholder group and is not limited to the use of any specific modeling tools or requirements to ask particular types of management questions. The goal of the PM approach is to make the modeling development process transparent and share the excitement of modeling with the stakeholders. This, in turn, makes it possible to: educate stakeholders about the processes and functions of the environmental system; solicit input and data about the system; define scenarios, types of output, and the uses of the model; and create a constructive environment for negotiation and consensus building.

PM is a powerful tool for decision making. Under the PM approach, a series of models are built, with citizens' participation at various stages of the project. As part of the model-development process, information is collected, the information is tested against information obtained from residents, and assumptions and data sets are translated into the formal language of models (Argent and Grayson, 2003; Voinov et al., 2004; Brown Gaddis et al., 2007; Bowden et al., 2008; Voinov Vladich, 2012).

Another tool that can supplement the role of science in environmental diplomacy is Mediated Modeling (MM). It is a non-spatial

form of participatory modeling that focuses on building a conceptual model together with stakeholders (Van den Belt, 2004). It assumes an extended deep involvement on the part of a relatively small number of stakeholders who are committed to long-term participation. The process creates common ground for discussion, develops trust between participants, and helps discipline deliberation and decision making. The focus on building the model yields a shared understanding of the system and its dynamics, and makes it possible to analyze temporal trends and trade-off scenarios. The use of geographic information systems (GIS) to provide a spatial dimension to diplomatic processes and change perceptions of conflicts among negotiators is also gaining traction (Lovett and Appleton, 2007; Jasani et al., 2009).

Ultimately, the instrumental use of science in these processes must also link with the broader perceptions among negotiators that ecological factors have the potential for fostering cooperative behavior and hence peace-building.

Key Points

- Environmental diplomacy requires an understanding of broader underpinnings of environmental conflicts.
- Science has an important role to play as an arbitrator in environmental diplomacy but has its limitations based on how stakeholders will always try to socially construct the relevance of scientific data.
- Participatory Modeling and Mediated Modeling, coupled with spatial analysis techniques, are new tools that can be employed to facilitate environmental diplomacy.

ENVIRONMENTAL PEACE-BUILDING

There is yet another way of invoking the environment in conflict resolution that would address the concerns of the skeptics who don't recognise the connections between the environment, conflict resolution, and diplomacy. Instead of trying to tease out environmental causality in political conflicts, such as civil war, and thereby accentuate the importance of conservation, one can also try and see how environmental issues can play a role in cooperation – regardless of whether they are part of the original conflict. For example, the causes of the Darfour crisis in Sudan were hotly debated in the literature, with environmental determinists arguing that desertification and climate change were to blame, while other scholars of African governance were arguing that ethnic and political issues were causal factors. Even if the cause for conflict was about identity rather than environment, the issue of desertification is a common threat to both sides and could thus be a diplomatic means of bringing parties to the negotiating table.

Such an approach has been termed environmental peace-making (Conca and Dabelko, 2003). The main premise of environmental peace-making is that there are certain key attributes of environmental concerns that would lead acrimonious parties to consider them as a means of cooperation. Thus environmental issues could play an instrumental role even in cases where the conflict does not involve environmental issues. The theoretical basis for this approach has been presented in the literature on environmental planning (Ali, 2003, 2007), and can also find its roots within the international relations literature, albeit it has rarely been explicitly noted in ecological terms (Stein, 1993). Indeed, an active role by environmental planners is important to galvanize action and to help in the realization of environmental issues in peace-building. Table 49.1 shows ways in which environmental planners can approach this task.

Social scientists trying to study causal relationships of any kind must contend with the problem of 'endogeneity' – the direction of causality. Hence environmental cooperation and the resolution of larger conflicts must be considered in this light as well. Is environmental cooperation a result of conflict

Table 49.1 Consensus catalysis by environmental planners

Concept	*Approach*	*Action*	*Initiative*	*Function*
Framing conflict as a dilemma of common aversion	Provide information on joint harms of noncooperation	Institute long-term engagement between parties to monitor environmental harms	Joint audits of environmental criteria and data collection for ecosystem based planning efforts	Establishes neutral cognitive base for discussion of derivative issues
Linking environmental concerns to other issues	Provide a bargaining opportunity for sides where none was perceived to exist	Negotiate comprehensive agreements rather than individual contracts on specific issues	Interdisciplinary commissions for problem solving that are facilitated by a mutually agreeable mediator	Enlarges 'the pie' for positive solutions and adds flexibility for integrative bargaining
Using environmental concerns as a trust-building tool	Provide forums for joint participation in conservation initiatives	Develop conservation plans that would be inclusive of adversaries	Peace parks, good neighbor compacts on riparian conservation, and sister city lesson drawing arrangements	Provides a mutually satisfying experience for parties to exemplify rewards of cooperation

Source: (Ali, 2003)

mitigation or is it leading to conflict reduction itself? The temporal analysis can often be so closely intertwined that the causality confounds researchers. However, it may be argued that the process is much more dialectical in nature. Environmental issues can be an important entry point for conversation between adversaries and can also provide a valuable exit strategy from intractable deadlocks because of their global appeal. However, they cannot be taken in strategic isolation and are usually not a sufficient condition for conflict resolution. Thus technical cooperation over environmental issues may help to develop a level of trust in sharing knowledge and open avenues for Track 2 diplomacy that in turn may lead to peace dividends.

The key to a constructive approach in environmental peace-building is to dispense with linear causality and instead consider the conflict de-escalation process as a nonlinear and complex series of feedback loops. Positive exchanges and trust-building gestures are a consequence of realizing common environmental threats. Often a focus on common environmental harms (or aversions) is psychologically more successful in leading to cooperative outcomes than focusing on common interests (which may lead to competitive behavior). This is because common interests can also lead to competition whereas common aversions have a greater propensity for prompting group cooperation (Ridley, 1998).

A skeptical take on environmental peacebuilding would highlight the view that cooperation on environmental issues between adversaries would be relegated to low politics and might not translate into a larger resolution of the conflict. In this view, environmental conservation would at best be a means of diplomatic maneuvering between mid-level bureaucrats and at worse be a tool of co-optation by the influential members of a polity. Such critics give examples of cooperation on water resources between adversarial states like India and Pakistan or Jordan and Israel without translating into broader reconciliation (Lowi, 1995). Thus it could be argued that water and environmental issues are not important enough to play an instrumental role. However, a more positive framing of the case might reveal that water resources in this context are so important that even adversaries must show some semblance of cooperation over them.

Furthermore, the instrumental impact of environmental issues in building peace must be considered over longer time horizons. The process by which environmental issues

can play a positive role in peace-building is premised on a series of steps: a unified information base on a mutual environmental threat; recognition of the importance of cooperation to alleviate that threat; a cognitive connection and trust development due to environmental cooperation; continued interactions due to environmental necessity; clarification of misunderstandings as a result of continued interactions; and, finally, de-escalation of conflict and resultant peace-building.

Given the necessity for certain environmental resources and a growing realization that environmental issues require integrated solutions across borders, the likelihood for their instrumental use in peace-building has gone up in recent years. There is a growing commitment to 'bioregionalism', or the realization that ecological management must be defined by natural delineations such as watersheds and biomes (ecological systems which support life), rather than through arbitrary national borders. Numerous joint environmental commissions between countries and jurisdictions have taken root all over the world in this regard. We have seen this played out in various ways at international forums where bioregionalism and common environmental sensitivities have transcended traditional notions of state sovereignty. Regional environmental action plans such as those in the Mediterranean, the Black Sea, the Caribbean, and the Red Sea are examples in this regard. While we are a long way from having global governance of environmental issues, the momentum is clearly in the direction of giving environmental protection that directly impacts human lives and livelihoods the same moral ascendancy as 'human rights'.

Key Points

- Even where environmental factors are not part of the conflict they can be used instrumentally for peace-making.
- Cooperation is more likely when environmental degradation is presented as a common aversion, rather than trying to force environmental cooperation as a common interest which may lead to competitive behavior.

CONCLUSION

Environmental diplomacy has evolved considerably as a concept and ambit of diplomatic practice from the time when the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) was struggling to be considered on par with other UN bodies in the 1970s (Tolba and Rummel-Bulska, 2003). Yet, many more challenges both at the local and global scales remain for environmental diplomacy to realize its full potential. Despite the fact that since the 1972 Stockholm Convention the global nature of environmental degradation has initiated the global, UN-based treaty making approach as a main pillar to sustainability, some authors argue that the quest for global solutions for the degradation of transnational ecosystems is unworkable and theoretically ill-grounded (Corti, 2002). They challenge the belief that there is a positive relationship between the geographical scope of international action and the utility of environmental regimes. Critics argue that except for treaties focused on very specific chemical eradication like the Montreal Protocol, the actual impact of environmental agreements has been minimal.

Moreover, the value of global treaties has been challenged by a growing realization (starting from the Founex Report of 1972[3] (de Almeida, 1972)) of the link between Third World poverty, environmental degradation, and Northern consumption. The tendency of the 'North' to maintain industrialized countries' lifestyles – through resource control and monetary mal-distribution – is seen by 'South' countries as a cause of their environmental degradation, widespread poverty, and underdevelopment (Lynch, 2014). As Anil Agarwal points out, there are many factors

which are linked to the South's plight: 'Which questions should [the world] try to solve first. Why ozone layer depletion or climate change or biodiversity conservation? Why not the international financial system, terms of trade or poverty, all of which have deep ecological linkages with the environmental problems of the South?' (Agarwal, 1992).

Another factor challenging global treaties are natural disasters. The Japanese Fukishima catastrophe violates the Stockholm Principle 21, the Rio Declaration Principle 15 (the precautionary approach), and the Brundtland Report *Our Commmon Future* (which characterizes 'sustainable development' in terms of meeting present needs without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs). Equally importantly, the Fukishima disaster is a health threat for current and future generations (Caldicott, 2013).

On December 21, 2012, the United Nations General Assembly passed a momentous resolution to reform the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) – an organization that had been established with much hope 40 years earlier to improve governance of the global ecological commons. The resolution 'upgraded' the organization to 'universal membership' and provides for 'stable and increased financial resources from the regular budget of the UN'. Before this change, UNEP had only 58 countries represented on its governing council; this change allows for full participation from all UN member states in the workings of UNEP. As the administrator of several multilateral environmental agreements, UNEP has a crucial role to play in any reform efforts to allow for environmental diplomacy to function more constructively. The UNEP reform effort so far has been modest and not revolutionary by any means. Suggestions to establish a specialized UN agency similar to the World Health Organization were not adopted. However, there was a clear recognition that there are serious problems with the current system, and that a more adaptive process of correction is needed.

Ultimately, we might want to consider a more inclusive Track 2 international environmental diplomacy through the lens of negotiating global public goods – a view that scholars from different disciplines would agree upon. Scott Barrett presciently alerted us to this prospect through the lens of game theory in 2003 with his notable work *Environment and State Craft: The Strategy of Environmental Treaty-making.* To be 'self-enforcing', Barrett cautioned that any environmental agreement must be both *individually rational* in the context of sovereignty, as well as *collectively rational* in the context of governing common resources. Although many of the generic lessons on environmental consensus-building provided at the conclusion of our narrative can be applied across diplomatic efforts and treaties, we must not forget that there are key differences in terms of the underlying incentive mechanisms for each agreement. For example, riparian disputes where the upstream nation has more power will require bargaining extant to the water conflict itself to resolve, whereas cooperation over water quality in a lake may be easier to achieve given the common aversion of resource degradation.

What is true at the macro-level of international relations is also true at the micro-level of environmental conflict resolution processes. In this chapter we have attempted to provide a broader context for environmental diplomacy which is appropriate for a handbook. Environmental diplomacy will always have scientific underpinnings and there is clearly a level of analytical rigor which research can bring to refining this field of international relations. Many more doctoral dissertations need to be written to further inform and refresh the debate on mechanisms for reforming the environmental diplomatic system. While global governance systems remain elusive, environmental diplomacy can at least provide a prototype for how human institutions can transcend tribalism, catalyze peace-building and sustainable development, and gain further acceptance within the annals of diplomacy.

NOTES

1 Noted on the UNEP website: http://www.unep.org, accessed March 22, 2015.
2 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 1972, accessed online from the UNEP archives: http://www.unep.org/Documents.multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=97&ArticleID=1503
3 A conference held in Founex, Switzerland in 1971 in preparation for the Stockholm Summit that particularly focused on concerns from developing countries regarding asymmetries in environmental impacts and the need to focus on major consumers of resources and polluters.

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Sports Diplomacy

Stuart Murray

INTRODUCTION

The interplay between sport, international relations and diplomacy is a long, complex and fascinating one. Like music or art, sport is a universal language that can transcend acrimonious diplomatic relationships, offer high profile pathways for dialogue beyond the negotiating table and, idealistically, unite disparate nations and their publics through a mutual affection for physical exercise, competition and games. As Nelson Mandela (2000) noted:

> sport has the power to change the world. It has the power to inspire. It has the power to unite people in a way that little else does. Sport can awaken hope where there was previously only despair. Sport speaks to people in a language they can understand.

For such individuals, and institutions such as the International Olympic Committee (IOC) or the British civil society organisation (CSO) Beyond Sport, sport can be used as a vehicle to promote development, social awareness and human rights. Sporting events can also significantly boost a state's public diplomacy profile (see Chapter 35 in this Handbook). If, for instance, a government wins the rights to host a megaevent such as the World Cup, billions of foreign perceptions about the host country can be enhanced over a period of weeks. In the pluralistic, modern diplomatic environment sport can positively attract 'others' to the attributes of the host country and in this sense it is a potent soft power tool. However, for cynics and sceptics, sports diplomacy is amorphous, idealised, often exploited by politicians or rogue actors and nothing more than a parody of international relations; 'war minus the shooting', to use Orwell's popular observation about international sport. Sporting events are regularly hijacked by states to demonstrate various types of superiority, from their athletic prowess to a particular ideology. In its Hobbesian guise, sport is also plagued by corruption, graft, violence, cheating, racism

or blatant displays of jingoistic pageantry. As such, sport is hardly diplomatic. Moreover, sport is insignificant in an anarchic, zero sum international relations system dominated by hard power concerns, the use of armed force or economic policy aimed at influencing the behaviour of other states.

This debate about the role of sports diplomacy alludes to a common error when conceptualising sports diplomacy: over-simplification. This chapter contends that to understand sports diplomacy it is first necessary to review, re-conceptualise and critique the role that sport, sportspeople and sporting events play in international relations and diplomacy. To this end, two new categories of sports diplomacy are introduced: the traditional and version 2.0. Limitations, controversies and certain dark realities of sports diplomacy are then discussed. The chapter concludes with some observations about the possible future of sport diplomacy.

Key Points

- The relationship between sport and diplomacy often generates debate.
- Many prominent figures argue that sport is a remedy for some of the major problems of this era. For others, sport is a false promise.
- To move beyond these positions is to re-conceptualise sports diplomacy.

TRADITIONAL SPORTS DIPLOMACY

When thinking of traditions in sports diplomacy, its most obvious form is as a tool that governments consciously and sporadically employ to achieve foreign policy goals. Sport, in other words, is a diplomatic means to foreign policy ends (see Chapter 5 in this Handbook). Jackson and Haigh (2008: 354) argue that when this happens, sport is 'co-opted by politics.' Well aware of the power of sport to mediate, sublimate or, in more egregious cases, increase separation, states of all kinds have long been drawn to sport and sporting competitions. As Allison (1993: 17) notes, many types of governments:

> have endorsed international sporting competition as a testing ground for the nation or for a political 'system.' German Nazis, Italian Fascists, Soviet and Cuban Communists, Chinese Maoists, western capitalist democrats, Latin American juntas – all have played the game and believed in it.

Such occurrences are most evident in the megaevent theatres, quadrennial global tournaments such as the Olympic Games. On the surface and for the few weeks that they occur, these are great festivals of sport; however, they also afford states tremendous diplomatic opportunities. Obviously they provide a shop window for host nations to show off, be it their athletic prowess, organisational capacities, culture, values or ideology. The right to host such an event can also be seen as a reward for good international citizenship and one that creates significant avenues for public diplomacy. As Grix and Lee (2013) suggest, the politically savvy governments of China (2008 Olympic Games), South Africa (2010 World Cup) and Brazil (2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympics) coveted megaevents as 'relatively cheap means of improving' their 'image, credibility, stature, economic competitiveness and (they hope) ability to exercise agency on the international stage.' Over the course of the tournament, billions of people tune in, and if the diplomatic posture, brand and message are thoughtfully crafted, foreign publics can be engaged and influenced, not to mention the trade opportunities that arise or the financial gains that host nations can enjoy. Megaevents can also be used to reduce tensions, consolidate political relationships or bring old enemies together, as was the intent behind the 2002 World Cup, co-hosted by Japan and South Korea.

However, disdain for a host nation can also be expressed via megaevents or if so inclined a nation can boycott and say, simply, we're not playing. During the Euro

2012 football tournament, for example, the British, Germans, Swedes and the European Union (EU) boycotted any matches played in Ukraine because of the host nation's selective justice in the case of the jailed Ukrainian opposition leader Yulia Tymoshenko. Viviane Reading, the EU Justice Commissioner, pointed out that 'you cannot close your eyes on human rights, even during a great sporting celebration' (BBC News, 2012). In more extreme cases, a nation can withdraw altogether, as was the case when the US boycotted the 1980 Moscow Olympics in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a gesture reciprocated by the Soviet Union and thirteen satellite states four years later at the 1984 Los Angeles Games. In the build-up to megaevents, there is usually an equal focus on the politics of the host nation as there is on the sport.

Traditional sports diplomacy is also a versatile tool within bilateral relationships. For one, international sporting competition can allow states to test possible policy shifts and bring leaders together. The best known example of this is Ping-Pong diplomacy, which occurred after a warm, chance and well-publicised meeting between American player Glenn Cowan and the then Chinese World Champion Zhuang Zedong at the World Table Tennis Championship in Nagoya, Japan, in March 1971. Shortly after, the US not-for-profit National Committee on USA–China Relations suggested that the American team should tour China. The proposal was then embraced by the Chinese and US governments, initially to test if the publics of both countries would accept the normalisation of diplomatic relations (a good, early example of sport as a vehicle for public diplomacy). The US team's subsequent visit in April of the same year was a tremendous success and paved the way for National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger's visit to China in July 1971 and later President Nixon's visit in 1972. At the conclusion of Nixon's trip, the Shanghai Communiqué was issued and the Sino-US diplomatic relationship rebooted.

More often than not sporting contests generate ad-hoc summits for high profile politicians or leaders to meet informally. Various leaders of bitter rivals India and Pakistan, for instance, have repeatedly met on the sidelines of cricket matches between their national teams. These cricket diplomacy meetings have occurred since the early 1980s as a way of decreasing tensions over nuclear ambitions, Kashmir, terrorism or any number of other disputes. Similarly, the presidents of long-time adversaries Turkey and Armenia met during two historic World Cup qualifying matches between their national teams in 2008 and 2009, a gesture that helped the eventual diplomatic reconciliation between the two countries. Likewise Dilma Rousseff, Angela Merkel, Vladimir Putin and Jacob Zuma all enjoyed a chat in the VVIP room before, during and after the half-time break of the 2014 World Cup Final. On such occasions, international sport generates productive and informal opportunities for leaders of states to come together.

Another form of traditional sports diplomacy is the occasional use of sportspeople to complement or amplify a state's diplomatic message. The Americans perhaps best embody this practice, first employing the famed sprinter Jesse Owens as a goodwill ambassador to nations with questionable attitudes toward racial integration in the 1960s. More recently, the State Department has employed dozens of sports envoys. Two openly gay athletes – Billie Jean King (a retired tennis player) and Caitlin Cahow (a hockey player) – figured prominently in the US delegation for the opening and closing ceremonies of the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics. Their inclusion was both a response and challenge to Russia's draconian anti-Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) policies. China has also used specialist sports emissaries. Before the 2008 Olympic Games, the giant basketball player Yao Ming was able to attract millions of Chinese fans to the National Basketball Association (NBA) and, vice-versa, expose millions of Americans to the 'new' China.

During his time with the Houston Rockets (2002–2011), reporters from China followed his every move, American fans wore Chinese national team jerseys and many arenas welcomed the humorous, genial giant with dragon dances. As James Sasser, the former US Ambassador to China, noted, 'Yao Ming gave the Chinese people and China a human face in the United States' (in Zhang, 2013: 229). Ambassadors for sport can serve a valuable role in dramatically amplifying a state's diplomatic message.

It can be argued, however, that traditional sports diplomacy is somewhat limited. For one, and compared with the number of people that play professional sport, the number of celebrity sports diplomats that states employ is relatively small. This is because sport, sportspeople and sporting events are co-opted by governments only if they serve a state's national interests or help realise a foreign policy goal. In this traditional context, sports diplomacy is but a *means* to a foreign policy *end*. Sport, in other words, is viewed 'through the embassy window' (Wilson, 1962: 122). The practice of traditional sports diplomacy is also arguably inconsistent and elitist, with high profile leaders exploiting high profile tournaments, matches or sports people in choreographed pieces of theatre. Certain aspects of traditional sports diplomacy will endure; however, these are increasingly being complemented and in some cases supplanted by a new form of sports diplomacy, a version 2.0 if you like. This is a more inclusive, amateur form that reflects and embodies state, non-state and public partnerships colluding via the horizontal and vertical networks characteristic of twenty-first-century diplomacy.

Key Points

- Traditional sports diplomacy is a tool that governments occasionally use to achieve foreign policy goals.
- If sport serves a diplomatic function beyond the game it is often exploited by governments.
- Megaevents are prized by states as they offer multiple public diplomacy opportunities.
- In a traditional, bilateral sense sporting matches can create leadership summit opportunities for engagement beyond entrenched foreign policy positions.

SPORTS DIPLOMACY VERSION 2.0

To effectively describe sports diplomacy version 2.0 is to first contextualise it in the modern diplomatic environment. Since the end of the Cold War, international relations have 'flattened' and pluralism has gradually brushed aside the Westphalian notion of a state monopoly on diplomacy (Friedman, 2007: 51). These days, diplomacy is no longer a 'stiff waltz' among states alone but a 'jazzy dance of colourful coalitions' with ambassadors and diplomats acting as managers of such plural networks (Khanna, 2011: 22). In the modern diplomatic environment, large CSOs, multinational corporations, inter-governmental organisations (IGOs), and even influential celebrities, can be thought of as distinct and significant diplomatic actors. Therefore, Hocking's 'multi-stakeholder' paradigm, where 'diplomacy is an activity concerned with the creation of networks, embracing a range of state and non-state actors', aptly describes the character of modern diplomacy (2006: 13). In this context, sports diplomacy 2.0 is facilitated by traditional diplomats working alongside CSOs, IGOs, sportspeople and corporations. These networks use sport to 'engage, inform and create a favourable image among foreign publics, governments and organizations, to shape their perceptions in a way that is (more) conducive to the sending government's foreign policy goals' (Murray and Pigman, 2013: 4).

Perhaps because most Americans love innovation and sports, as well as their pioneering spirit, the American State Department was the first player to experiment with a

more sustainable, amateur and inclusive form of sports diplomacy. A proactive 2.0 form emerged at the turn of the last century when America sought to boost its public diplomacy profile abroad and complement other soft power tools (such as Voice of America or the Fulbright scholar program) with exchanges built around sport. The State Department's flagship initiative is *SportsUnited*, which aims 'to build ever-strengthening relations between the United States and other nations [and] which uses the universal passion for sports as a way to transcend linguistic and sociocultural differences' (Sports Diplomacy, n.d.). Remarking on the initiative, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (2011) noted that:

> … our sports exchanges are the most popular exchanges we do. When I go to other countries and we talk about what kind of exchanges that people are looking for, very often a leader will say, how about a sports exchange?

On the other side of the Atlantic, the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) provides a second, richer example of sports diplomacy 2.0. States, CSOs, foreign publics, players, coaches, etc., have formed a network bound and driven by a common interest in sport and the right to play. Seeking to capitalise on the London 2012 Olympic Games, the FCO coordinated a network – the British Council, UNICEF, UK Sport, Comic Relief, Laureus Sport for Good Foundation, the Youth Sport Trust, and individual donors – which designed and implemented a sports legacy programme called International Inspiration (II). At heart, the programme sought to 'enrich the lives of children and young people of all abilities, in schools and communities across the world, particularly in developing countries, through the power of high quality and inclusive physical education (PE), sport and play' (International Inspiration, 2014). In other words, II hoped to get more children playing sport by educating, funding and helping schools and governments develop sustainable programmes built around games and exercise. According to Ecorys (2014), an external consultancy firm hired to evaluate the success of the initiative, the programme exceeded all initial key performance indicators. The programme ran for seven years (2007–2014) and during this time 'over 25 million children and young people were enriched; 55 national policies, strategies and legislative changes were influenced and over 250,000 practitioners (teachers, coaches and leaders) trained in over 21 countries' (Ecorys, 2014: 2).

By sheer volume II was a success and, in the sports diplomacy 2.0 context, the FCO successfully managed and coordinated a network of actors, created a favourable impression amongst millions of people overseas and learned 'important lessons for the future of other sport and development programmes' (Ecorys, 2014: 11). Moreover, the programme shied away from using high profile politicians and professional sports people preferring amateurs such as teachers, coaches and children.

It is not only Western nations that are engaging in sports diplomacy version 2.0. Zhang (2013) reminds us that China has a long history of old and new sports diplomacy. Likewise, Japan invests heavily in domestic and international football in order to overcome imperial stereotypes and better reflect 'a level worthy of its economic power and overall achievements after 40 years of post-war peace and prosperity' (Manzenreiter, 2008: 417). And, finally, Cuba's public diplomacy continues to focus on sports as a 'vitally important mechanism for furthering the causes of the Cuban revolution and garnering international admiration and respect' (Bunck, 2013: 236).

From the above examples, certain characteristics of this new type of sports diplomacy are evident. Version 2.0 retains some elements of the old (the continued use of sports envoys, for example); however, the practice is no longer sporadic, inconsistent, elite and reactive. Rather, it is proactive, regular and inclusive. Sport is used by governments as

a vehicle to proselytise the values that certain nations often champion. For example, Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade's new sports diplomacy programme focusses on participation, gender equality, discipline and teamwork.[1] Instead of being geared around elite-to-elite theatre, version 2.0 targets and embraces the amateur levels of sport, not just the megaevents and superstars. The attraction for governments is partly practical. Sports diplomacy 2.0 is relatively 'low-risk, low-cost and high profile' (Keech and Houlihan, 1999: 112). Moreover, by engaging with new methods, the culture of a state's diplomacy can be less aloof, hermetic and 'dead' and more innovative, effective, public and even fun (Ramsay, 2006: 273). Perhaps the most significant lesson to be drawn from the above examples is that traditional diplomatic institutions are but one actor among a cast of others. In the British case, the FCO participated, coordinated and facilitated; but it did not direct.

To further understand the concept of sports diplomacy, regimes, clubs and individuals can be thought of as diplomatic actors. A postpositivist theory – one that 'encompasses a broader range of actors and processes' than a state-centric, rationalist understanding of diplomacy – facilitates such an exercise (Pigman, 2013: 78). Seen through this lens, powerful non-state actors such as the International Olympic Committee (IOC), multinational corporations, security, television and media outlets, teams and prominent sporting heroes, national sports associations and CSOs all continuously and diplomatically interact to make international sport possible in the first place (Pigman, 2013: 78).

The actors that constitute these vast sporting networks have been briefly studied. Murray and Pigman (2013), for example, argue that powerful administrative institutions such as the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) can be thought of as para-diplomatic actors. They practise core diplomatic functions such as negotiation, communication and representation; they have interests and agendas to pursue; they have charters, constitutions, presidents and mission statements which define their objectives and guide their interactions; and they have institutional structures, rules, norms and flags, which they use in 'a highly self-conscious effort to brand themselves and their sport' (Murray and Pigman, 2013: 14). Considering the benefits a megaevent can generate for host nations – anything from new infrastructure to public diplomacy opportunities – these international sporting regimes are immensely powerful, and states will go to great lengths to secure certain tournaments. Paying exorbitant amounts of money just to bid for the tournament, states covet the Olympics or World Cup just as athletes and national teams would a medal or trophy. Little wonder that senior representatives from the IOC or FIFA presidents are given the red carpet treatment wherever they go.

The same can be said of the role certain superstar athletes play in international relations, off the pitch, court or running track. Borrowing from Cooper's work on celebrity diplomacy, Roger Federer, Usain Bolt or Leo Messi can be considered as celebrity sporting diplomats, people who '[use] the attention they receive to focus the cameras on international issues' (Cooper, 2008: 7). Messi, for instance, acts as a Goodwill Sports Ambassador at Team UNICEF, using his profile to raise awareness of children's rights, health, education and sport all over the world. In a postpositivist view, even clubs such as Messi's F.C. Barcelona, the New York Yankees or Manchester United (with its 650 million fans) can also be considered as 'significant diplomatic actors in contemporary international affairs' according to Rofe (2014: 1136).

The list of actors in international sport is a long one – non-profit CSOs such as the Beyond Sport Foundation, the MNCs that sponsor sport on a global scale and the television companies that screen events are also notable diplomatic players. This acceptance

illustrates several vital points for those interested in sports diplomacy 2.0: the international sporting system is extremely complex, much more than simply megaevent tournaments or a superstar basketballer touring Africa under the auspices of the UN in the off-season. Sports diplomacy can be thought of a series of domestic and international networks that continuously interact and often overlap in order to make sport possible in the first place. To boost public diplomacy efforts, governments are increasingly tapping into these networks.

Key Points

- Sports diplomacy 2.0 programmes emphasise government partnerships with non-state actors such as CSOs, IGOs, sportspeople and corporations.
- In the past, states co-opted sport in a sporadic, inconsistent fashion centred around securing or participating in megaevents. By contrast, sports diplomacy 2.0 is regular, inclusive and embraces the amateur levels of sport.
- In the twenty-first century, sporting regimes, clubs and individual celebrities can be thought of as powerful, non-state diplomatic actors.

THE LIMITATIONS OF SPORTS DIPLOMACY

Compared to some of the major issues in twenty-first-century international relations – terrorism, poverty and climate change, to name but a few – sports diplomacy is a generally positive phenomenon. Granted, many states will continue to use sport to further self-serving national interests and foreign policy goals. However, it is important to remember the core, *diplomatic* components of sports diplomacy: to overcome separation between disparate peoples, nations and states and to reduce misunderstandings between 'them' and 'us' by demonstrating that strangers speak a shared, universal language of sport. For the most part, sports diplomacy aims to foster peace and unity, not conflict and (more) separation.

For sports diplomacy to realise its potential, however, a frank appraisal of its limitations is important. This is not to support its detractors but to encourage thinking, collaboration and scholarship on ways to overcome or at least negate certain received truisms about sport, international relations and diplomacy. Below, six limitations are presented (although the list is by no means exhaustive).

First, the rhetoric this chapter began with – that 'sport has the power to change the world' – could suggest that sport is some magical remedy that has hitherto been neglected or ignored by theorists and practitioners. This is quite incorrect. It is self-evident that sport alone cannot eliminate poverty in Africa, encourage gender equality, women's rights or the right to play in traditional, fundamentalist societies. These types of sport-development or sport-for-peace projects have been going on for decades with limited or mixed results.[2] Such projects will continue but they are increasingly being subsumed under broader sports diplomacy strategies orchestrated by diplomats. As a result, the capacity for sport to contribute, in part, to alleviating some of the major problems of our time will improve.

Second, sport and politics *do* mix, like it or loathe it. For idealists, sport has a 'spiritual power' (Redeker, 2008: 499) and exists in a hallowed realm 'above' (Allison, 1993: 5) government, untainted by the divisiveness of politics. The reality of the relationship between sport, diplomacy and politics suggests otherwise. In the lead up to the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics, for example, Russia was accused by many states of graft,[3] illegal dumping of construction waste, forced evictions, bizarre anti-LGBT policies and disputes with Circassian nationalists demanding Russia apologise for its genocidal policies of the nineteenth century. All the while, however, Russia insisted that sport and politics *should* not mix (just as the Chinese government claimed during the lead up to the 2008

Beijing Olympics) and that concerned leaders, states and members of the global public *should* focus on the sport. Such rhetoric is problematic. Sport and politics have always mixed and always will. In the pluralistic, twenty-first century the 'mixing' of sport should be considered as a given.

Russia's typical behaviour also alludes to a third limitation of sports diplomacy: the temporal reality of megaevents. These huge tournaments are a unique feature of international relations. No other event has the ability to unify and rally states, CSOs, global publics and media, who often use the tournament as a vehicle to express dissatisfaction with the host nation. However, any political and diplomatic opportunities occur *before* the event. When the actual games begin, sport takes over and concerns over shoddy human rights records, corruption, the plight of the oppressed and so on are immediately forgotten. For example, the pressure on Russia before the Sochi Winter Olympics evaporated as soon as the first starter's pistol was fired. Positive, diplomatic messages and pressure were lost to sport *during* and *after* the tournament. Just weeks after the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics closing ceremony, Russia began meddling in Ukrainian politics (just as they did in Georgia after the 2008 Olympics) and it played a vital role in the annexation of Crimea and the war waged by so-called separatist rebels in Eastern Ukraine. In a matter of weeks, the megaevent is over, concerns are forgotten, the global public begins salivating over the next glamorous festival of sport and the host nation is left to behave as it did before the event. The challenge for those interested in further developing sports diplomacy is to overcome the temporal nature of megaevents and build real, lasting *diplomatic* legacies during and after significant tournaments.

A fourth limitation of sports diplomacy is that just as sport can bring people and nations together it can also drive them apart. It can increase estrangement, in other words. In international sport, the anthems, flags and sense of tribe all heighten feelings of nationalism, sometimes in a manner unbefitting of diplomacy. During the 2004 Asian Cup hosted by China, for example, the Japanese team was hounded everywhere they played. Chinese spectators heckled the players, sang 'anti-Japanese songs from the war of liberation and displayed banners reading "Look into history and apologize to the Asian People", or "Return the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands!"' (Manzenreiter, 2008: 423). In this case, sport contradicted a core diplomatic function: the minimisation of friction in international affairs.

In addition, sport and violence are sometimes inextricably linked. In the past, terrorists have used sport as a way of spreading anti-diplomatic messages to vast, global audiences. Jackson and Haigh (2008: 351) note that, between 1972 and 2005, '171 sport-related terrorist attacks have been logged'. The most egregious example was the 1972 Munich Games tragedy when eleven Israeli athletes were kidnapped and eventually murdered by Black September, a radical Palestinian organization. A week after the incident the group issued the following statement:

> A bomb in the White House, a mine in the Vatican, the death of Mao-Tse-tung, an earthquake in Paris could not have echoed through the consciousness of every man in the world like the operation at Munich … the choice of the Olympics, from a purely propagandistic viewpoint was 100 percent successful. It was like painting the name of Palestine on a mountain that can be seen from the four corners of the earth. (In Toohey, 2008: 434)

Just as sports can disseminate and represent positive values about unity, fair play and harmony, there has sometimes been an undeniable association between sport and terrorism, war, violence and separation.

Fifth, this occasional disconnect between sporting idealism and reality is given further credence by briefly discussing the diplomatic qualities of sporting administrators and their behemoth organisations. In the formal world of diplomacy, Satow (2009:

617–22) attaches great importance to dignity, self-control, empathy ('to listen and not to talk'), calmness, fairness, humility, virtue and so on. Professional diplomats are also accountable to both the sending and receiving state and are legally bound to the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. Conversely, international sporting organisations and their staff are not bound by any such rules or norms. As such, large, influential sporting organisations such as FIFA, the IOC or the International Cricket Council (ICC) often make headlines for behaviour, customs and practices that are hardly diplomatic (at least in terms of how Satow and others have *imagined* it). The Salt Lake City 'bribery scandal', where six IOC officials who accepted gifts and 'hundreds of thousands of dollars' from local officials were sacked, serves a historic case in point (The Guardian, 1999). More recently, FIFA's behaviour has come under intense scrutiny from the BBC, the Sunday Times newspaper and the Swiss Government (FIFA's HQ is in Zurich). As one, they have accused FIFA of ticket scandals, vote-rigging during presidential elections (incumbent President, Joseph 'Sepp' Blatter, was the only candidate in the last election) and bribery and negligence, particularly over the award of the 2022 World Cup to Qatar, a tiny desert nation of two million people with a dreadful human rights record and summer temperatures that exceed 50°C. The FIFA President and his all-powerful Executive Committee engage in one-way communication with the public, any negotiation with states that bid for the World Cup is rather one-sided and who or what does FIFA actually represent? Indeed, can FIFA, the IOC or the ICC be considered diplomatic at all? As noted earlier, further research is required to answer such questions.

Such questions relate to the sixth and final limitation: the diplomatic calibre of the sports diplomats themselves. As Murray and Pigman (2013: 8) note, there seems to be:

> [a] disconnect between competitors used as national representatives and the bulk of their fellow sportsmen and women. Those chosen to become sports envoys embody the aspirational version of sport that governments imagine and are thus unrepresentative of real sport.

Success in sport does not equate to success in diplomacy. Compared with the number of senior sportspeople that play and have played, only a few are considered fit for envoy or ambassadorial work. Many will never be considered at all. Moreover, perhaps many sportspeople wouldn't want the job. The case of the boxer Mohammed Ali, who had 'no quarrel with them Viet Cong', comes to mind. Sports envoys such as David Beckham – handsome, charming and instantly recognisable – seem to be the exception rather than the rule. Former NBA superstar player Dennis Rodman's odd, alcohol fuelled 2014 outburst at a CNN reporter who questioned his motives during his third visit to the basketball loving North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un revealed a stark truth: not every sportsperson can be a sports diplomat.

The six limitations mentioned above help to confirm that there can be a dark side to sport. However, the same can be said of diplomacy. Like diplomacy, the failures of international sport seem to attract more interest than its successes. Egregious examples such as the Fascist Games (the 1936 Olympics and 1938 World Cup, which Mussolini's 'black shirts' won, incidentally) are well known, and perhaps account for the trepidation many governments recently showed about consciously 'mixing' sport and politics. Consequently, and as noted, the traditional co-option of sport by states has often been rather clumsy, opportunistic, short-lived and centred at the elite level. Relatively speaking, however, it should be remembered that examples of bad sports diplomacy are the exception rather than the norm. If an objective perspective is adopted, the observer will realise that sport often celebrates the best of humanity and generally brings people together.

CONCLUSION

As this chapter demonstrates, there have been many innovations in the theory and practice of modern diplomacy. Sport, music, culture and art, for example, are no longer niche or backwater institutions but attractive, untapped and potent soft power tools. All are universal languages, where no words are spoken. Their power to unite is only just being discovered. As such there is much work to be done on sports diplomacy. This chapter, for instance, focused mainly on the last century. Scholarship tracing the interplay between sport and diplomacy in the Ancient Olympiad or the games of chivalry during the medieval period remains to be written. The same can be said of figuring out the diplomacy of powerful and prominent non-state sports actors and, for ministries, one glaring challenge remains: how can qualitative exchanges built around sport be accurately measured? In short, esoteric research into sports diplomacy is relatively new. Further collaboration between theorists and practitioners from both the realms of sport and diplomacy is required.

This impending body of work should not deter those interested in sports diplomacy. From the baseball diamonds of Havana to the basketball courts of Beijing, sport has demonstrated significant potential to bring separated nations, leaders and people together. More and more states are implementing sports diplomacy 2.0 programmes. As such, its short-term future looks assured. In an age sullied by global terrorism, financial crises, overpopulation and resource scarcity, sporting exchanges between nations, states and people should be fostered and encouraged. Sports diplomacy is one of the genuine success stories of the era of globalisation.

NOTES

1 See Stuart Murray (2013) 'Sports diplomacy in the Australian context: a case study of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade', *Sports Law eJournal*, ISSN1836-1129.

2 See R. Levermore and A. Beacom (2012) 'Reassessing sport-for-development: moving beyond mapping the territory', *International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics*, 4 (2): 125, 137.

3 The Sochi winter games cost US$50 billion. By comparison, the London summer Olympics came in at US$12 billion.

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