



CHAPTER 18

Diplomacy and Foreign Policy

- Diplomacy and Statecraft in International History 363
- Diplomacy in the Contemporary World 365
- Cold War Diplomacy 368
- Summit Diplomacy 372
- Public Diplomacy 374
- Foreign Policy 376
- The EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy 379
- Conclusion 381
- Key Questions 381
- Further Reading 382
- Web Links 382

CHAPTER OVERVIEW

Diplomacy has been fundamental to relations between political communities for thousands of years. Today, formal diplomacy is the job of professionalized state bureaucracies, although other types of actors may also

have important roles to play, from Indigenous governments to special envoys or third-party mediators tasked with special missions. In addition, there are special forms of diplomacy such as *summit diplomacy* and

▲ Major world powers attend talks on 16 May 2016, in Vienna, Austria, regarding the expanding presence in Libya of the Islamic State jihadist group (Leonhard Foeger/AFP/Getty Images).

public diplomacy. Foreign policy behaviour is a closely related but distinctive field of study focusing on the strategies that states adopt in their relations with each other, strategies that reflect the pressures that governments face in either the domestic or the international

sphere. In this chapter we will also consider the foreign and security policy of the EU, which now has a role and an identity as an international actor in its own right. The EU is just one example of the other actors with which the state must now contend in the international system.

Diplomacy and Statecraft in International History

If IR in the conventional sense refers to the pattern of interactions between states in the international system of states, then diplomacy is the main formal mechanism through which these interactions take place. **Statecraft** refers to the skilful conduct of state affairs or, as some put it, “steering the ship of state,” usually in the context of external relations. The practice of diplomacy has a very long history, reaching back beyond the earliest oral and written records. One author remarks that even though we can only imagine what ancient practices were really like, diplomacy must have begun when the first human societies decided it was more advantageous to hear the message than to devour the messenger (see Hamilton & Langhorne, 1994, p. 7). To this observation we should add that the possibility of sending the messenger back with a response, thereby establishing a basis for ongoing communications, would have represented another advantage. A specific recorded reference to the utility of envoys or messengers may be found in the ancient Indian text called the *Arthashastra*: according to Kautilya, its author, the first principle of diplomacy is “Don’t shoot the messenger”; see Box 18.1.

We know that diplomacy was practised in ancient China. Before they were conquered and unified in 221 BCE, relatively autonomous city-states (*guo*) formed a multistate system with patterns of interstate relations and diplomacy comparable to those that developed many centuries later in early modern Europe (Hui, 2005, pp. 4–5). Tansen (2003) has argued that Buddhism played an important role in the development of diplomacy and trade between India and China. Evidence has also been found for the practice of alliance diplomacy in the regions covered by the ancient Inca, Aztec, and Mayan empires (see Cioffi–Revilla & Landman, 1999). Indigenous diplomacy is also now being increasingly studied; see Box 18.2.



See Chapter 14, p. 288, for a discussion of the history of international state system.

KEY QUOTE BOX 18.1

Kautilya on an Ancient Principle of Diplomacy

Messengers are the mouth-pieces of kings, not only of thyself, but of all; hence messengers who, in the face of weapons raised against them, have to express their mission as exactly as they are entrusted with do not, though outcasts, deserve death; where is the reason to put messengers of Bráhma caste to death? This is another’s speech. This (i.e., delivery of that speech verbatim) is the duty of messengers. (Kautilya, n.d., Book I, Chapter XVI)

KEY QUOTE BOX 18.2**Indigenous Diplomacies**

Acclaimed writer Leanne Betasamosake Simpson of Michi Saagiig Nishnaabeg ancestry describes the complex diplomatic protocols and practices of Indigenous peoples in what is now Canada, both before and after colonization:

Each nation has its own spiritual and political mechanisms, rooted in its own unique legal system, for maintaining the boundaries of territory, for immigration and citizenship, and for developing and maintaining relationships with other nations regarding territory, the protection of shared lands, economy, and well-being, among many other things. Indigenous diplomatic traditions generate peace by rebalancing conflict between parties. Spiritual and social practices such as storytelling, the oral tradition, ceremonies, feasting, and gift-giving are designed to bond people together toward a common understanding. Our diplomacy concerns itself with reconciliation, restitution, mediation, negotiation, and maintaining sacred and political alliances between peoples. (Simpson, 2013)

Most analyses of diplomatic history have focused on developments in Europe, partly because the European state system has been so dominant through colonization and other forms of expansion of influence. This is so partly because norms and negotiating practices in contemporary diplomacy reflect long-established European practices (including the use of English and French as the standard languages of diplomacy).

The first formal diplomatic practices in early modern Europe were developed in Italy, where resident embassies were established by the 1450s. Niccolò Machiavelli was among the most experienced diplomats of his time as well as one of the most famous commentators on statecraft. In addition to serving on bodies that oversaw the conduct of Florence's war efforts between 1500 and 1511, Machiavelli acted as a government envoy on 35 missions, including missions to France, the Papal Court, and the German Emperor (Miller, 1991, p. 303). The prime responsibility of an ambassador as a servant of the state was well understood by this time.

The practice of maintaining embassies quickly spread to other parts of Europe, where it became part and parcel of the sovereign state system (Mattingley, 1955, p. 10). In seventeenth-century France, the administrative machinery for managing foreign policy took on a more advanced form under the guidance of one of diplomatic history's foremost figures, Cardinal de Richelieu (1585–1642). Richelieu famously established a system characterized by a continuous flow of information both in and out of Paris, careful record-keeping, and a unified system of management under his control. This type of bureaucratic centralization was largely absent elsewhere in Europe, where effective centralized government barely existed and foreign policy often depended “on the coming and going of court favourites, the whim of a monarch and accidents of administrative chaos—to name just three possibilities” (Langhorne, 2000, p. 37).

Another significant development was the consolidation of the notion of *raison d'état*. As we have seen, this reflected the idea that the state amounted to more than its ruler and that its needs should therefore come before the wishes of the king or (occasionally) queen (Craig & George, 1990, p. 5). The term subsequently became associated with realist ideas

about *machtpolitik* (power politics), which also implied the irrelevance of morality in the conduct of international relations and the notion that “might is right.” In the realist paradigm, *raison d'état* requires statecraft attuned to the inevitability of conflict rather than one seeking justice and perpetual peace. It follows that however much we might want justice and peace, the *reality* is that such highly desirable political goods in the international sphere can only ever be incidental or subordinate to the main business of diplomacy, statecraft, and foreign policy: the preservation of the state and the advancement of its interests by whatever means it is prudent to employ.

Amoral *raison d'état* was eventually absorbed into the ethically more acceptable notion of national interest, which is the face of power politics today. There is now much discussion of the concept of “normative power,” a quality attributed to the EU that, according to its proponents, was developed precisely to escape “great power mentality” (Manners, 2006, p. 183).

In the wake of the Napoleonic wars, Europe achieved a relatively stable **balance of power** system, initially through the Congress of Vienna (1814–15) at which the great powers were represented mainly by ambassadors and their diplomatic aides. In agreeing to conduct regular meetings, the great powers established the **Concert of Europe**, an early European attempt to institute a formal structure for conducting international relations. As Fry et al. note, Concert diplomacy, through which the great powers “tried to avoid war, protect the status quo and, if this was impossible, to arrange for change by multilateral agreement,” represented a high point in the history of diplomacy (Fry, Goldstein, & Langhorne, 2002, p. 113). In the Concert system we see the first glimmerings of the kind of European multilateralism that became the foundation of the League of Nations and the EU.

The Concert system declined gradually over the next half-century, its failure evident in the Crimean War of 1854–6 and the Franco–Prussian War of 1870–1. Its demise may be attributed in part to the rise of the **nationalism** that was to become such a destructive force in the twentieth century. Nonetheless, the basic institutions of diplomacy and statecraft developed in Europe remained integral parts of the sovereign state system.

KEY POINTS

- Diplomacy and statecraft have been practised from the earliest times, appearing in various forms in different parts of the world.
- Indigenous nations practised forms of diplomacy, which continue today even within Western settler states.
- Traditional views of diplomacy and statecraft in international relations incorporate realist concepts such as *raison d'état* and *machtpolitik*.
- The methods of diplomacy and statecraft used today developed within the modern European state system, which provided the initial template for the current international system.

Diplomacy in the Contemporary World

Contemporary diplomatic processes cover virtually all aspects of a state’s external or foreign relations, from trade to aid, negotiations about territorial borders, international treaties, the implementation of international law, the imposition of sanctions, the mediation

of hostilities, the negotiation of disputed boundaries, fishing rights, and agreements on environmental protection. Diplomacy extends beyond the pursuit of a given state's own foreign policy objectives to encompass activities that range from third-party peace negotiations to Earth Summits involving a variety of actors in extensive multilateral diplomatic activity.

We have also seen the emergence of **track two diplomacy**: informal or unofficial diplomatic efforts undertaken by private citizens, businesspeople, peace activists, or NGOs as well as state actors. Informal diplomatic efforts are often helpful in peace negotiations, preparing the ground for more formal talks by persuading the parties in conflict to agree to negotiate.

Heads of government are now often involved directly in diplomatic activities, as we shall see shortly, but the routine business of external affairs is still carried out by professional diplomatic services, which are usually located within foreign ministries (in Canada the Department of Global Affairs; in Britain the Foreign and Commonwealth Office; in the United States the Department of State). Whatever they are called, such departments run diplomatic missions, usually in the form of permanent embassies around the world. Within the Commonwealth, these are called High Commissions and the head of mission is the High Commissioner rather than the “ambassador”—one of the legacies of Britain's imperial system. Many small developing countries face particular problems in maintaining embassies or high commissions because of the costs of premises and personnel. This makes it difficult for them to participate on an equal footing, even though the diplomatic “playing field” is in principle level. As in other spheres, the greater the resources, the greater the clout. For example, richer countries are able to fund consulates and trade missions in other cities, as well as cultural centres and other forms of diplomatic representation. This increases their profile, not only with diplomats in the host country, but also with business and cultural leaders.

In addition to regular diplomatic missions, special envoys may be appointed for particular purposes. For example, in 2013 Canada's ambassador to the United Arab Emirates, Arif Lalani, was appointed as Canada's first “Special Envoy” to the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, an organization based in Saudi Arabia devoted to representing the views of 57 Muslim countries on a range of political issues (Global Affairs Canada, 2013). Other special envoys are sometimes appointed by nonstate actors such as religious leaders. Both the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Catholic Pope have appointed special envoys for various purposes—often in conflict situations or as special negotiators when people are being held hostage. Since the Vatican has its own special status as a sovereign entity, the appointment of envoys by the Pope may be seen as a regular function of state.

Special forms of diplomacy are sometimes used to resolve internal conflicts and problems. In 2000, ethnic conflict in the Solomon Islands, a former British colony in the Pacific, brought the state to the verge of collapse. With the assistance of Australia and New Zealand, approximately 150 representatives from the rival factions travelled to Townsville, Australia, for an “offshore” meeting with mediators. This is an example of third-party mediation, which has become commonplace as conflicts within states, as well as between them, raise problems for regional and international order.

Styles of diplomacy vary depending on regional factors or considerations. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has promoted what it calls the “ASEAN Way” as a distinctive style of diplomacy marked by commitment to noninterference in the internal affairs of member states (see Box 18.3).

KEY QUOTE BOX 18.3

The ASEAN Way

Former ASEAN Secretary-General Rodolfo C. Severino explains the nonconfrontational style of the “ASEAN Way,” comparing it to the European Union:

By not forcing its incredibly diverse and mutually suspicious members into legally binding standards, ASEAN has done the remarkable job of moving its members from animosity to the close cooperative relationship that they enjoy today, a relationship in which violent conflict is all but unthinkable. We can say that the ASEAN Way has served ASEAN well. Even today, thirty-four years after its founding, ASEAN adheres to the evolutionary approach, relying largely on patient consensus-building to arrive at informal understandings or loose agreements. With the recent entry of new members, ASEAN seems to be, in a way, starting over in terms of having to delicately manage the legacies of history. It is not just a matter of history; it is also a matter of culture. Southeast Asians’ way of dealing with one another has been through manifestations of goodwill and the slow winning and giving of trust. And the way to arrive at agreements has been through consultation and consensus—*mushawara* and *mufakat*—rather than across-the-table negotiations involving bargaining and give-and-take that result in deals enforceable in a court of law. (Severino, 2001)

By contrast, member states of the EU have reduced the weight they give to state sovereignty in the interests of political and economic integration. They have also been known to openly criticize one another. However, the fact is that the doctrine of state sovereignty is itself a European invention, adopted elsewhere for its political efficacy, not because it was a good “cultural fit.” In any case, the West is not a coherent cultural entity. The diplomatic style of the EU, for instance, stood in sharp contrast to the hawkish approach of the George W. Bush administration in the United States. Within the EU, cracks appeared over whether to adopt an EU constitution in 2004, and economic splits developed in the wake of the Eurozone crisis from 2009. In June, 2016, British voters endorsed the yes vote for a “Brexit” or British exit from the EU. This will have major implications for the EU and Britain.



See Chapter 7, pp. 156–7, for a discussion on Britain’s decision to leave the EU.

KEY POINTS

- Contemporary diplomacy may involve a broad range of actors, including professional diplomats, special envoys, heads of government, the UN, NGOs, and regional bodies such as the EU and ASEAN.
- Different countries or regions are said to possess certain diplomatic styles, which sometimes reflect cultural differences.
- Track two diplomacy is commonly deployed in peace negotiations and is an important adjunct to formal intergovernmental modes.

Cold War Diplomacy

Cold War diplomatic history is an eventful field of study. The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, for example, was the closest the world ever came to nuclear Armageddon. Triggered when the United States discovered that the Soviets were building a base in Cuba from which they could launch nuclear missiles, the crisis was resolved largely because US President John F. Kennedy and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev both recognized that the consequences of a military confrontation would be disastrous. Strategic thinking subsequently produced a theory of **deterrence** known as “mutually assured destruction” (MAD). The idea that the key to preventing war is the ability to destroy any enemy remains an essential aspect of US foreign and security policy. Work on nuclear diplomacy during the Cold War has sought to determine whether the possession of nuclear weapons by both sides actually prevented World War III (Gaddis, Gordon, May, & Rosenberg, 1999). Although there is no definitive answer to this question, it is clear that without diplomacy, however clumsy, the Cold War might well have become the “hottest” war ever.

Where diplomacy often did fail was in relation to the developing countries, which bore the brunt of the fighting with conventional weaponry during the Cold War years. Many conflicts in Africa have stemmed from Cold War rivalries encouraged by the two superpowers. While some of these conflicts have been resolved, the proliferation of weapons has allowed others to continue.

Cold War diplomacy also introduced the concept of *détente* (French for “relaxation”) in foreign policy. A key promoter of *détente* was Henry Kissinger, the US Secretary of State who orchestrated President Richard Nixon’s groundbreaking trip to China in 1972. The easing of tensions that took place between 1969 and 1979 reflected a number of economic and geopolitical circumstances, including the recognition by Kissinger and Nixon that the Vietnam War was a disaster, the development of closer relations between the United States and the People’s Republic of China, the huge cost of the arms race, the desire to devote more attention to domestic matters, and the souring of relations between China and the USSR, which feared that China and the United States might form an alliance against it and therefore sought to improve its relations with the Americans. These factors led to the signing of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (or SALT I) in 1972. As well, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which had been signed in 1968, was extended indefinitely. The NPT currently has a total of 190 signatories, including five nuclear-weapon states—the United States, France, the UK, Russia, and China. But India and Pakistan, both of which possess nuclear weapons, have not signed; nor have Israel, which probably possesses nuclear weapons, and North Korea, which may well have a covert nuclear program.

The NPT was complemented by other treaties and agreements, including the second phase of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II), which was negotiated between 1972 and 1979. However, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 took the Carter administration by surprise, and the policy of *détente* effectively collapsed. The Reagan administration withdrew from SALT I and adopted a more confrontational approach to the USSR. Nevertheless, international treaties and conventions concerning weapons remain a crucially important part of international diplomacy. The practices and procedures put in place during the Cold War continue as vital elements of contemporary diplomacy surrounding nuclear energy and weaponry, chemical and biological weapons, and the full range of conventional weapons, including small arms and land mines.



AP Photo/File

PHOTO 18.1 | In February 1972, Richard Nixon launched a new era in world politics when he became the first US president to visit the communist People’s Republic of China. Here he meets formally with Mao Zedong. Nixon’s trip opened the way for the establishment of full diplomatic relations, and in 1979 the United States formally recognized the People’s Republic rather than the Republic of China (Taiwan) as the legitimate Chinese state.

Other aspects of Cold War politics and diplomacy have become staples of popular culture, especially in fiction and film. Although the James Bond genre has been thoroughly reinvented for the post–Cold War world, its Cold War origins are unmistakable in its central theme of espionage. Real-life spy dramas were not uncommon during the Cold War, as intelligence agencies on both sides were prepared to do whatever it took to learn one another’s secrets. Embassies and their diplomatic staff were prime targets, but even cabinet ministers were sometimes implicated in sexual and other intrigues. The Canadian Parliament was rocked by scandal in March 1966 when it was found that a junior cabinet minister had had an affair with a suspected spy. The scandal deepened as information came to light indicating how much Prime Minister Pearson knew about the affair; see Box 18.4.

A more recent debacle occurred in mid-2010 when the FBI purportedly discovered 11 Russian “sleeper” or “deep-cover” agents who had been living and working in the United States since the mid-1990s (see Box 18.5). Ten of the alleged spies appeared in a Manhattan court, suspected of trying to gather information on US foreign policy in the Middle East, nuclear weapons, and the activities of the CIA, among other matters. The court charges, 55 pages in total, were published by the *New York Times* (Adams, 2010). In early 2015, there was further fallout from this scandal as another man was arrested.

KEY QUOTE BOX 18.4**The “Munsinger Affair”**

The *Vancouver Sun* published this summary of the Munsinger Affair in 1997, following the release of cabinet documents from the time:

Then Prime Minister Lester Pearson was so desperate to divert attention from the sensational Gerda Munsinger sex-and-spy scandal that he opened an explosive debate about capital punishment that led to the elimination of the death penalty. Cabinet documents released Wednesday show the Munsinger scandal dominated government business in March 1966, bringing Parliament to the brink of paralysis. . . .

Pearson told cabinet it was “imperative” for the Liberals to end debate on the issue, which threatened “to exacerbate an already dangerous and destructive Parliamentary situation.” Seeking to douse the fevered debate in the Commons, Pearson agreed to a royal commission into Canada’s first Parliamentary sex scandal. He also suggested the government close debate on the matter at once and start a new debate on the death penalty, also a hot subject as two Quebec separatists were on death row. . . .

The scandal erupted March 4, 1966, when justice minister Lucien Cardin—under attack for his handling of the Spencer spy case—lashed out at his Tory critics. Goaded mercilessly, Cardin shouted to Tory leader [John] Diefenbaker that he was the last man to be advising on security—given his performance in “the Munsinger case.” Chaos ensued. Still angry, Cardin told reporters outside the Commons to ask Diefenbaker if they wanted the story, which he said was as serious as the 1963 Profumo sex-spy scandal in England [which nearly brought down Harold Macmillan’s Conservative government]. As prime minister in the late 1950s, Diefenbaker retained [Pierre] Sévigny in cabinet even though the junior defence minister had an affair with Munsinger, a German immigrant US sources accused of being a security risk. . . .

When the scandal broke in Parliament, opposition members accused the government of mishandling an issue of national security. . . . The scandal escalated when Munsinger was found alive in Germany, after the government said she died of leukemia years before. After weeks of riotous debate in the House, cabinet decided to name Supreme Court Justice Wishart Spence to a narrowly defined inquiry, successfully burying the issue once and for all. Simultaneously, Pearson diverted attention from the scandal by introducing the debate on capital punishment. His gambit succeeded in calming one storm with another. Even though an initial vote retained the death penalty, the ensuing national debate led the government to abolish the death penalty in 1967 for a trial period of five years, except in cases where the victim was an off-duty police officer or a prison guard. (Evenson & Duffy, 1997)

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KEY QUOTE BOX 18.5**FBI Breaks Up a Russian Spy Ring in New York City**

This article, from the *Washington Post*, dispels some of the supposed glamour of being a Russian spy in New York:

Evgeny Buryakov claimed he worked for a Russian-owned bank in Manhattan as its deputy representative, and his LinkedIn page said he belonged to several online groups that suggested a background in finance. But that was just a cover story to hide his true affiliation when he arrived in the United States in 2010. The FBI said Monday that Buryakov was an agent under nonofficial cover, collecting economic information for the SVR, Russia's foreign intelligence service. He was arrested and charged with conspiracy to act and acting as an unregistered agent of a foreign government. Two other SVR agents, posing as official Russian representatives in New York, were forced to leave the country, their roles in the spy ring exposed in a detailed criminal complaint filed against Buryakov. Both of the men who returned to Russia had diplomatic immunity, officials said.

Prosecutors said Buryakov, known by the diminutive Zhenya, rendezvoused dozens of times in Manhattan and the Bronx with his Russian handlers, Igor Sporyshev, a Russian trade representative, and Victor Podobnyy, an attaché at the Russian mission to the United Nations. Sporyshev and Podobnyy operated out of a secure office in Manhattan where they talked freely, unaware that FBI counterintelligence agents had bugged the facility, according to the complaint.

The FBI said the SVR agents used the office to communicate with headquarters—"Moscow Center"—to transmit and receive intelligence reports, along with information Buryakov gleaned in "confidential talks" as a banker. Part of Buryakov's focus, according to the complaint, was information on U.S. sanctions and the development of alternative energy sources. Russia is a major oil and gas exporter, and the United States, working in tandem with the European Union, has imposed sanctions on Moscow for its annexation of Crimea and its role in the continued fighting in Ukraine.

The FBI said it discovered the SVR agents shortly after arresting sleeper Russian spies—known as "illegals"—in 2010. The group of 10 deep-cover agents, many of whom had created ordinary American lives, pleaded guilty to conspiracy charges and were sent back to Russia as part of a spy exchange. It is not clear why the FBI decided to bring charges now and whether it is hoping to use Buryakov as "trade bait." Counterintelligence investigations take years and rarely end in charges. The accused spies are typically expelled with no fanfare or sent home in exchange for U.S. assets held overseas.

Buryakov appeared Monday in federal court in Manhattan. His attorney, Sabrina Shroff, said that he was being held without bail. She had argued that he was not a threat to flee, but the judge disagreed. "This case is especially egregious, as it demonstrates

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the actions of a foreign intelligence service to integrate a covert intelligence agent into American society under the cover of an employee in the financial sector,” said Randall C. Coleman of the FBI’s Counterintelligence Division.

Sporyshev and Podobnyy were recorded complaining about their work and the fact that they didn’t have secret identities. Podobnyy said that when he joined the SVR, he didn’t expect to be James Bond or fly helicopters but thought he might be “someone else at a minimum.” The men lamented that the SVR had lost some of its luster but said that their colleagues in the Middle East and Asia still did good work, according to the complaint. (Goldman, 2015)

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KEY POINTS

- The Cold War was marked by crises in which diplomacy played a key role in preventing what might have been World War III waged with nuclear weapons.
- Cold War diplomacy also led to the negotiation of treaties and conventions that continue to play an important role in the ongoing effort to limit the production and distribution of a wide range of weapons.
- Although the end of the Cold War marked a major change in world politics, continuities have been evident in recent diplomatic dramas, such as spy scandals.

Summit Diplomacy

It is evident from the previous sections that diplomacy is practised by many different kinds of actors operating at different levels and in different capacities. In the early years of the Cold War, Winston Churchill coined the phrase *summit diplomacy* to refer to top-level meetings in which heads of government meet to negotiate over key issues (Melissen, 2003, p. 4). In the past such meetings were rare, but in recent years heads of government have met more regularly to discuss or negotiate directly. Summits come in many different kinds, from ad hoc bilateral meetings—which may include a third-party mediator if the issue in question involves a serious dispute—to global multilateral summits attended not only by heads of government and their teams but by leading figures from the UN; these major summits often include parallel meetings for NGOs.

Among the largest and best-known multilateral meetings have been the Earth Summits organized by the UN. In addition, regional or interregional summits are now regular features of the international scene; organizations such as the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC), the Organization of American States (OAS), and the Asia–Europe Meeting process (ASEM) have become solidly institutionalized. The Commonwealth has reinvented itself as something of a diplomatic summit club: a Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) is held every two years to discuss matters of mutual interest and concern and to formulate policies and initiatives at the

highest level. Although such events are sometimes seen as little more than opportunities for international socializing (the acronym APEC, for example, has been amusingly recast as “A Perfect Excuse for a Chat”), their value should never be underestimated: Diplomatic socialization at any level invariably contributes to building international society.

Indeed, sometimes summits yield concrete results. A recent example was the Iranian nuclear agreement reached in July 2015 after extensive meetings in Vienna. A new grouping of countries known as the “E3/EU+3” (comprising the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, China, and the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy) and Iran worked in a series of summit meetings to hammer out an agreement over Iranian nuclear technology. In their Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran pledged that “under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons.” In return for adopting a wholly peaceful nuclear program, the “E3/EU+3” agreed to “the comprehensive lifting of all UN Security Council sanctions as well as multilateral and national sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear programme, including steps on access in areas of trade, technology, finance and energy” (US Department of State, 2015).

A summit of major historic importance was arranged by US President Jimmy Carter in 1978. The Camp David Summit led to a peace accord between Egypt and Israel that has lasted to this day. Carter, acting as a mediator, demonstrated the efficacy of “shuttle diplomacy,” keeping the principals largely apart and moving back and forth between them to broker an agreement; see the Case Study in Box 18.6.

CASE STUDY 18.6

Arab–Israeli Relations, Summit Diplomacy, and the Camp David Accords

Camp David, the presidential retreat north of Washington, DC, was the location for a summit meeting between President Anwar Sadat of Egypt and Prime Minister Menachem Begin of Israel in 1978, initiated by US President Jimmy Carter. Since the Six-Day War of 1967, Israel had occupied the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula, both former Egyptian territories. Sadat had been attempting to reclaim the Sinai since 1971, but negotiations had failed and fighting broke out again when Egypt and Syria, with the support of other Arab countries, launched a joint attack on Israel on the Jewish holy day of Yom Kippur in 1973. A UN ceasefire was organized on 24 October, followed by a peacekeeping operation. Further negotiations were held in which the US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, acted as a peace broker. In an interim agreement, signed in 1975, both Egypt and Israel agreed to renounce further military action. Several years of inaction followed until Sadat broke the stalemate with a visit to Jerusalem in 1977. Begin reciprocated six weeks later, travelling to the Egyptian city of Ismailia. These meetings constituted the main diplomatic prelude to the Camp David Summit.

Sadat believed that Gaza and the West Bank belonged to the Palestinians while the Sinai should be returned to Egypt. Begin insisted that God had given them to the Jews. After three days of direct negotiations, tensions had mounted to the point that Carter feared there was little chance of a lasting agreement. He then decided to separate the parties and act as a go-between. A single document was created and Carter worked individually with each leader to revise it, carrying

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proposals and counterproposals back and forth over a two-week period. Although the negotiations almost broke down completely on several occasions, an accord was at last reached through Carter's nonstop "shuttle diplomacy." The Israeli–Palestinian dispute continues today despite the Oslo Accords of 1993 and a further summit at Camp David in 2000 mediated by President Bill Clinton. However, there have been no hostilities between Egypt and Israel since 1978.

(For the text of the 1978 Camp David Accords, go to www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/documents/campdavid/accords.phtml)

KEY POINTS

- Summit diplomacy has become a common feature of the international political landscape, both in ad hoc situations and at regularly scheduled events.
- Summit diplomacy has been used in situations that range from small bilateral meetings to large-scale multilateral negotiations over issues such as the environment.
- Summit events may help to promote the development of an international society by creating opportunities for personal interaction between world leaders.

Public Diplomacy

The term *public diplomacy* refers primarily to the ways in which governments attempt to influence public opinion abroad. This activity has acquired increasing importance in recent years. It draws on the cultural power of ideas and the notion of "soft power" formulated by the American liberal academic Joseph Nye; see Box 18.7. In effect, the exercise of soft power amounts to winning "hearts and minds." Interestingly, this has some resonances with Antonio Gramsci's notion of cultural power and the way it supports hegemony. Nye seeks to use public diplomacy as a way of achieving US objectives in the world.

KEY QUOTE BOX 18.7

Nye on "Soft Power"

Nye defines *soft power* as

the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals, and policies. When our policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, our soft power is enhanced. . . . When you can get others to admire your ideals and to want what you want, you do not have to spend as much on sticks and carrots to move them in your direction. Seduction is always more effective than coercion, and many values like democracy, human rights, and individual opportunity are deeply seductive. . . . But attraction can turn to repulsion if we act in an arrogant manner and destroy the real message of deeper values. (Nye, 2004, p. x)

In the UK, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) has defined public diplomacy as “Work aiming to inform and engage individuals and organisations overseas, in order to improve understanding of and influence for the United Kingdom in a manner consistent with governmental medium and long term goals” (FCO, 2005). Canada too promotes public diplomacy through its Department of Global Affairs, which in addition to marketing Canada abroad seeks to promote “social cohesion” and “attachment and belonging to Canada” at home (Global Affairs Canada, 2005). The US Department of State also has an under secretary dedicated to matters of public diplomacy and public affairs, as well as an advisory committee on public diplomacy. The office of the under secretary explains its purpose in terms of three strategic objectives:

1. Offer people throughout the world a positive vision of hope and opportunity that is rooted in America’s belief in freedom, justice, opportunity, and respect for all
2. Isolate and marginalize the violent extremists; confront their ideology of tyranny and hate; undermine their efforts to portray the West as in conflict with Islam by empowering mainstream voices and demonstrating respect for Muslim cultures and contributions
3. Foster a sense of common interests and common values between Americans and people of different countries, cultures, and faiths throughout the world (Hughes, 2006)

Other countries promote their own brands of public diplomacy. In 2006, for example, the government of India created a public diplomacy division within its external affairs ministry “to educate and influence global and domestic opinion on key policy issues and project a better image of the country commensurate with its rising international standing” (*Times of India*, 2006). And China has been proactive in raising its international profile through initiatives such as the international network of Confucius Institutes. Public diplomacy of this kind is all the more important for a country with a poor human rights record and international image problems. This was especially the case following the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989, when large numbers of unarmed, peaceful, pro-democracy protesters were killed by soldiers of the People’s Liberation Army. The incident was televised internationally, and it is commonly believed that this was a major factor in the failure of China’s bid to host the 2000 Olympic Games. However, the state took action to rehabilitate China’s image, and its bid for the 2008 games succeeded despite ongoing human rights (and other) problems that sparked protests by individuals and groups around the world when the games were actually held.



PHOTO 18.2 | Public diplomacy in action. Here a US assistant secretary in the State Department gives a water pump to a beneficiary of a program jointly coordinated by the United States, the UN, and the government of Sri Lanka.

It has also been suggested that a new type of public diplomacy is developing in which the goal is not to indirectly influence other governments, which is still a state-to-state interaction, but rather to shape the attitudes of other societies in a more direct state-to-society interaction (Henriksen, 2006, p. 1). The need was especially acute for the United States under the Bush administration, which had a serious image problem. In many places, attitudes toward the United States improved rapidly when Barack Obama came to power. With the battle for hearts and minds so prominent in international affairs, it is clearly important for states seeking to play a prominent role on the world stage, or to attract support for their various causes, to invest in developing “soft power” through public diplomacy.

In 2007, the inventor of the term *soft power*, Joseph Nye, co-chaired a bipartisan Congressional committee called the Smart Power Commission to improve the image of the United States and, in his words, “move from exporting fear to inspiring optimism and hope.” Nye even quoted then Defense Secretary Robert Gates, who had observed that the budget of the State Department was a tiny fraction of his own department’s much larger budget and called for “strengthening our capacity to use soft power and for better integrating it with hard power.” Sadly, as Nye observed in mid-2011, Gates’s plea for more State Department funding “was as odd as a man biting a dog, but these are not normal times.” He went on to note that “Since then, the ratio of the budgets has become even more unbalanced” (Nye, 2011).

So what is the line between public diplomacy (usually perceived as a positive thing) and propaganda (usually perceived in negative terms)? Are they merely different sides of the same coin? Propaganda in a neutral sense simply denotes the dissemination or promotion of particular ideas and values through some means of communication. In a slightly more instrumental sense, it implies an attempt to influence beliefs and behaviour rather than an objective presentation of “the facts.” Over time it has acquired more sinister overtones and often conjures up images of deceit, distortion of facts, or even “brainwashing,” perhaps because Nazi Germany actually had a ministry of propaganda, run by Joseph Goebbels. Contemporary variations on the theme of propaganda include *spin doctoring*, otherwise known as *news management*: a conscious strategy of minimizing negative images of either politicians or political events while maximizing positive images (see Jowett & O’Donnell, 2006, pp. 2–3). Although “spin” is most often directed to domestic audiences, it has an important place in the international sphere of diplomacy and statecraft as well.

KEY POINTS

- Public diplomacy at its most basic is the effort by a government to influence public opinion in other countries by promoting positive images of its country.
- Many acts of public diplomacy, from the release of hostages to the everyday activity of news management, involve elements of propaganda and “spin.”
- Public diplomacy may be understood as an instrument of soft power, in contrast with the methods of power politics.

Foreign Policy

Foreign policy is generally framed in terms of the strategies that those in control of a state adopt in their dealings with other actors in the international system or with respect to

relevant issues, such as the environment, aid to developing countries, trade regimes, and so on. Whatever particular issue is at stake, the study of foreign policy links the domestic and international spheres of politics. As Evans and Newnham (1998, p. 179) put it, foreign policy is often called a “boundary activity” because it effectively straddles the two spheres and mediates between them.

An important factor affecting a state’s foreign policy behaviour is its regional or geopolitical location. For example, the history of US foreign policy shows the degree to which the country’s location in the Americas has influenced its foreign policy behaviour. It was in the context of the establishment of independent states in South America, and the efforts of European powers to maintain colonial systems there, that the United States enunciated the Monroe Doctrine, named for its initiator, President James Monroe. After safely concluding the purchase of Florida from Spain, Monroe announced to Congress in 1823 that the United States would focus on its interests in the Americas, seeing this region as its sphere of influence to do with it as it pleased.

The Monroe Doctrine reflected the view that European powers should not intervene in the politics of Latin America because, as the dominant power in the region, the United States itself was entitled to intervene whenever and wherever it felt it appropriate to do so. Subsequent interference by the United States in the internal affairs of Central and South American politics—including the undermining or outright overthrow of leftist governments, whether democratically elected or not—may be seen as the logical outcome of the doctrine. The legacies of “Yanqui imperialism” continue to give the United States a bad name in the region.

The foreign policy of the United Kingdom has followed a different trajectory in its historical development, shaped both by the dynamics of the European region and by its colonizing enterprises. In more recent years, it has become deeply enmeshed in “special relationships” that have been decisive for its foreign policy. The Anglo–American special relationship has ebbed and flowed depending on the nature of the salient issues in world politics as well as the personalities involved. The term *special relationship* actually dates from the time when Roosevelt and Churchill forged a close personal alliance during World War II. Another strong personal alliance developed between Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan during the latter years of the Cold War, assisted no doubt by their conservative dispositions and their shared loathing of communism. More recently, President Obama, meeting with Prime Minister David Cameron in May 2011, had this to say of the special relationship between the United States and Great Britain:

Yes, it is founded on a deep emotional connection, by sentiment and ties of people and culture. But the reason it thrives, the reason why this is such a natural partnership, is because it advances our common interests and shared values. It is a perfect alignment of what we both need and what we both believe. And the reason it remains strong is because it delivers time and again. Ours is not just a special relationship, it is an essential relationship—for us and for the world. (Obama & Cameron, 2011)

By 2015, commentators noted strains in the relationship, especially given Cameron’s deep cuts to the British defence budget, which fell well below the 2 per cent target suggested to all NATO members. Said former British ambassador to the United States Christopher Meyer in January of that year, “Our special relationship hangs by a thread” (Meyer, 2015).

Cameron, soon sensing a rift in the relationship, pledged by July to raise the defence budget to over 2 per cent of GDP, with the explicit goal of cementing the British relationship with the United States. Said Cameron after talking with Obama, “He said this was a significant signal from their primary partner on the world stage” (Hope, 2015). Canada also has a “special relationship” with the United States, as outlined in Box 18.8.

KEY CONCEPT BOX 18.8

Canada’s Special Relationship with the United States

Like the United Kingdom, Canada has long had a special relationship with the United States. Unlike the UK, however, Canada shares the world’s largest undefended border with the world’s only remaining superpower. The Canada–US relationship is interdependent and polyvalent. On the positive side, Carment, Hampson, and Hillmer (2003, p. 12) note that the relationship has been “remarkably free of linkage, the practice of making threats and tying policy performance in one area to another.” Indeed, “Canada has pursued its policies without fearing reprisals or sanctions from its neighbor when priorities clashed. The two countries shared values, interests, and goals during the long darkness of the Cold War and into the 1990s.”

Yet the relationship is also highly asymmetrical. The United States accounts for 83 per cent of Canada’s trade; 33 states claim Canada as their major export market, and another 5 states send more than 50 per cent of their goods north of the border (Carment et al., 2003, p. 16). Canadian provinces export more to the United States than to the rest of Canada, and more to US Home Depot stores than to France. Four in ten Canadian jobs depend directly on trade with the United States (Granatstein, 2007, p. 84). Militarily, the relationship is also close, with almost 90 treaty-level agreements as well as a Canada–US Bilateral Planning Group, established in 2002 in response to 9/11 (Bercuson, 2003, p. 122).

Some policy planners in both countries have put forward the idea of hemispheric integration on the model of the European Union, known as “deeper integration.” Although some business elites welcome the idea, this is not the case with most Canadians, Americans, or Mexicans, since such a project would mean a loss of national sovereignty for all parties. As described by Robert Pastor (2002, p. 2), one of the key proponents of North American integration, the process would entail building common institutions as well as “an inclusive identity that would inspire citizens of all three countries to think of themselves also as North Americans.” Pastor proposed the formation of a “North American Commission” to develop “a continental plan for infrastructure and transportation, a plan for harmonizing regulatory policies, a customs union, a common currency” and even suggested how a unified currency system based on the “Amero” could work (pp. 5–6).

More recently, *National Post* editor at large Diane Francis argued in her book *Merger of the Century* (2013) that “a merger between the two countries isn’t just desirable but inevitable.” She cites cultural similarities, the belief that the United States is becoming more progressive in its social policies, and highlights a number of economic and military benefits for both Canada and the United States. This includes a larger continental market, which she sees as necessary given the rising power of China and Russia (Maggiore, 2014).

This project, however, is distrusted not only by many Canadian commentators, but also by many Americans, particularly conservative nationalists who also do not want to relinquish any sovereignty. Fears for Canada’s independence may help to explain why Canadians have often been wary of US foreign policy. This was especially so during the Bush administration.

It's interesting to note how Canada balances its special relationship with the United States with another special relationship. Keeping the Queen as head of state, playing a key role in the Commonwealth, and maintaining certain British institutions and practices offsets the influence of "Americanization" and stakes out a distinctly Canadian identity. While forms of economic integration will no doubt continue, formal political union seems unlikely in the foreseeable future.

KEY POINTS

- Foreign policy generally refers to the strategies that governments adopt in their dealings with other actors in the international system.
- The foreign policy behaviour of states or other actors is influenced by size, capacity, and geopolitical and historical circumstances.
- Canada has a close relationship with the United States, especially in trade matters. However, many Canadians were distrustful of the United States during the Bush era.

The EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy

The EU as a foreign policy actor represents a significant departure from the traditional sovereign state model, even though it was in Europe that the traditional model originated. In recent years the EU has been working to develop a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in which is also embedded a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). A major factor contributing to the development of the CFSP/ESDP, and indeed to the consolidation of the European movement itself, was the end of the Cold War and the perceived need for a coordinated approach to regional affairs in the wake of the Soviet collapse. Beyond the exigencies of these particular circumstances, it has also been suggested that the challenge for the European project was more fundamental: "From its origins, the ideal or 'vocation' of Europe has been to ensure peace between former warring European nation-states and to provide the conditions for geopolitical stability built on the foundations of a commitment to liberal democracy" (Dannreuther, 2004, pp. 1–2).

The CFSP was embedded in the 1993 Treaty on European Union (also known as the Maastricht Treaty). It was subsequently refined in the 1999 Amsterdam Treaty and refined again in the Nice Treaty, which came into effect in 2003. The ESDP was given an operational capability in a 2001 meeting of the European Council. Every year the council outlines the goals and achievements of the CFSP. Some of its activities are described in Box 18.9.

These objectives clearly reflect a desire to export European political norms regarding human rights, democracy, and good governance to other parts of the world. During the Bush years, the EU consciously projected itself as a qualitatively different kind of actor in the international sphere than the United States. In portraying itself as a "normative power," it staked a claim "to being a legitimate and thus a more effective international actor" (Farrell, 2005, p. 453). With Obama in power, however, the differences between the EU and United States seem far less stark.

KEY CONCEPT BOX 18.9**EU Common Foreign and Security Policy: Achievements in 2014**

The EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy contributes to global peace and security in a number of ways. First, the EU is directly involved in—and in some cases leads—international peace negotiations on behalf of the international community, for example between Belgrade and Pristina and in the Iran nuclear talks.

Second, the EU can assemble a wide range of tools—political and economic—to tackle important foreign policy challenges. In a world where security challenges are becoming ever more complex, the EU's approach to external action adds particular value by addressing all dimensions of a crisis, from its roots to its immediate manifestation. We see the benefits of such an approach in situations as diverse as EU action to address the crisis in Ukraine and in how it has dealt with countering piracy at the Horn of Africa.

Third, the EU works closely with—and materially supports—international and regional partners to deal with regional challenges where only collective efforts can deliver results, such as climate change, sustainable development, and disaster risk management and relief. [The year] 2014 was crucial in preparing the ground for negotiations within the UN framework towards post-2015 development goals, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030, and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. To promote democracy, the European Union sent election observation teams to the Maldives, Guinea Bissau, Malawi, Egypt, Kosovo, Mozambique and Tunisia. The EU also intensified cooperation with its regional and strategic partners to meet global threats and challenges. (Council of the European Union, 2015, p. 16)

Of course EU member states pursue their own foreign policies. The United Kingdom, Italy, and Spain supported the 2003 war in Iraq, for example, while France and Germany did not. Whether Turkey should enter the EU as a member is a continuing point of contention, doubly so now that Turkey's democratic credentials are in doubt. There are also disagreements in matters of trade and domestic policy. Among the areas in dispute are the Common Agricultural Policy, a European Constitution, immigration, and migration. Most prominently, there are fundamental divergences of opinion over the correct balance between EU institutions and national sovereignty.

The EU's future is especially unclear in light of the current economic crisis. Several EU members, notably Greece (and to a lesser extent Portugal, Spain, and Italy) face serious financial problems caused by a combination of bad debts, financial mismanagement, and corruption. Greece is in particularly bad trouble, but is working to stabilize its economy with a lot of help from other EU countries. In September 2015, the Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras accepted another bailout package from the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund, to the tune of €86 billion, in return for further budget cuts, increases in taxes, and other changes. While this was helpful in stabilizing the situation for the time being, the Greek economy still has serious structural problems (Daley, 2015).

KEY POINTS

- The emergence of the EU as a foreign policy actor in its own right represents a significant departure from the traditional European state model.
- EU foreign policy is designed to project “normative power.” The differences between EU and US approaches to foreign policy during the Bush years belied the notion that “the West” constitutes a coherent cultural/political entity in the international sphere.
- EU member states continue to make their own foreign policy decisions and often disagree on matters of domestic policy.

Conclusion

Diplomacy implies peaceful or at least nonviolent interaction between political actors, and “diplomatic solutions” are frequently contrasted with military ones. By the mid-twentieth century, diplomacy was generally understood as a means of maintaining an international order in the interests of peace and stability (Butterfield, 1966, p. 190), and our discussions of summit diplomacy and public diplomacy, in particular, reinforce the association of diplomacy with peace.

Yet diplomacy is not always a matter of negotiation between equals. States are not equal in their capacities or capabilities; stronger states are often in a superior bargaining position. In fact, diplomacy can also be aggressive and coercive; in “gunboat diplomacy,” for instance, negotiations take place under the threat of force. Diplomacy can certainly be accompanied by sabre rattling, and misunderstandings in negotiations can well lead to war. Still, diplomacy at its best is the opposite of war—a way of resolving conflicts and disagreements without resorting to violence. In the final analysis, peaceful diplomatic persuasion is much more likely to serve the “national interest” than the use of crude force.



See Chapter 7, p. 149, for a discussion of strong and weak states.

Key Questions

1. What distinguishes diplomacy and statecraft from other forms of political activity?
2. Are there genuinely different styles of diplomacy determined by cultural factors, or is the influence of culture in this respect sometimes exaggerated?
3. What role did deterrence play in “nuclear diplomacy” during the Cold War?
4. Under what circumstances is summit diplomacy likely to be effective?
5. Would you agree with the critics who charge that public diplomacy is little more than propaganda on an international scale?
6. Can one use diplomatic solutions to deal with ISIL?
7. In what ways does foreign diplomacy link the domestic and international spheres?
8. What is the Monroe Doctrine, and how does it illustrate the historic importance of geopolitics in US foreign policy?

Further Reading

- Bratt, D., & Kukucha, C.J. (2011).** *Readings in Canadian foreign policy: Classic debates and new ideas*. Toronto: Oxford University Press. A comprehensive introduction to nearly every aspect of Canadian diplomacy and foreign policy.
- Cooper, A.F., Heine, J., & Thakur, R. (Eds.). (2013).** *The Oxford handbook of modern diplomacy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. This book combines theoretical and historical perspectives on various styles and modes of diplomacy and a theoretical treatise of primary characteristics of the modes of diplomacy.
- Cross, M.K., & Melissen, J. (Eds.). (2013).** *European public diplomacy: Soft power at work*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. This work offers a comprehensive overview of the European Union's multilevelled public diplomacy, including its successes and challenges.
- Kennedy, P. (1989).** *The rise and fall of the great powers: Economic change and military conflict from 1500 to 2000*. London: Fontana. A classic text in the general field of international history that provides valuable context for this chapter's themes of diplomacy, statecraft, and foreign policy.
- Nathan, J. (2002).** *Soldiers, statecraft, and history: Coercive diplomacy and international order*. Greenwood: Praeger. A wide-ranging study that sets contemporary diplomatic practices against the historical backdrop of the rise of the modern state system, with particular emphasis on the use of force and coercion.

Web Links

www.opencanada.org

Billed as Canada's hub for international affairs, this website has information on Canadian foreign policy and publishes an academic journal.

www.international.gc.ca

The official website of Global Affairs Canada.

www.cdfai.org

The official website of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute, a right-of-centre policy institute based in Calgary.

www.cartercenter.org/index.html

The website of the Carter Center, founded by former US President Jimmy Carter to promote peace and eradicate poverty.

www.state.gov

The official website of the US Department of State.

http://europa.eu/pol/index_en.htm

The index of the official EU website that provides a gateway into different aspects of the EU's affairs, including foreign and security policy.

<http://english.hanban.org>

The home page for the Hanban, which oversees the Confucius Institutes around the world.