



CHAPTER 10

Bureaucracies, Policymaking, and Governance

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CHAPTER OVERVIEW

In this chapter we will begin with a look at the history of the civil service and its contributions to the development of the state. We suggest that its relationship with the rest of society can be characterized as one of “embedded

autonomy.” We will then introduce theories of bureaucratic policymaking, taking the relationship between principals and agents as our starting point. A discussion of the recent proliferation of agencies created by

political leaders to implement policies at arm's length from government ministries then expands the scope of study from governments to governance. Following a

look at policy communities and issue networks, we conclude by considering what the emergence of a “network state” might mean.

The Civil Service

For many of you, bureaucracies may be among the less interesting topics covered in political science courses. They just cannot inspire in the way that political ideologies or movements can—few bureaucrats are charismatic figures or celebrities. Yet if you consider the share of GDP taken by the state in modern Western societies (see Table 10.1), you may appreciate the immense significance of ensuring that all that money is well spent. Misguided or mismanaged projects can waste hundreds of millions of dollars, leading to escalating debt. Probably no other branch of government offers the possibility of saving or losing such large sums of money for taxpayers.

As of 2015 this trend has continued, although it has certainly slowed. In 2015, 35 per cent of GDP went to US government spending, with an additional 3 per cent allocated to paying down the federal deficit (Chantrill, 2016). In Canada, this had climbed to 48.3 per cent of GDP in the same year (Heritage Foundation, 2015).

In Chapter 7 we saw how the Western state model spread across the globe during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. One important factor in that spread was the European

TABLE 10.1 | Growth of General Government Expenditure in Selected Countries, 1870–1996 (per cent of GDP)

	1870	1913	1920	1937	1960	1980	1990	1996
Australia	18.3	16.5	19.3	14.8	21.2	34.1	34.9	35.9
Austria	10.5	17.0	14.7	20.6	35.7	48.1	38.6	51.6
Canada	—	—	16.7	25.0	28.6	38.8	46.0	44.7
France	12.6	17.0	27.6	29.0	34.6	46.1	49.8	55.0
Germany	10.0	14.8	25.0	34.1	32.4	47.9	45.1	49.1
Italy	13.7	17.1	30.1	31.1	30.1	42.1	53.4	52.7
Ireland	—	—	18.8	25.5	28.0	48.9	41.2	42.0
Japan	8.8	8.3	14.8	25.4	17.5	32.0	31.3	35.9
New Zealand	—	—	24.6	25.3	26.9	38.1	41.3	34.7
Norway	5.9	9.3	16.0	11.8	29.9	43.8	54.9	49.2
Sweden	5.7	10.4	10.9	16.5	31.0	60.1	59.1	64.2
Switzerland	16.5	14.0	17.0	24.1	17.2	32.8	33.5	39.4
United Kingdom	9.4	12.7	26.2	30.0	32.2	43.0	39.9	43.0
United States	7.3	7.5	12.1	19.7	27.0	31.4	32.8	32.4
Average	10.8	13.1	19.6	23.8	28.0	41.9	43.0	45.0

Source: Tanzi, V., & Schuknecht, L. (2000). *Public spending in the twentieth century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 6–7.

state's bureaucratic mode of operation. Max Weber emphasized the innovative impact of the large modern bureaucracy, which transformed government through the consistency, impartiality, and effectiveness that it brought to policymaking; see Box 10.1.

The foundations of the British civil service were laid in 1854, when the Northcote–Trevelyan Report recommended the establishment of a government service divided between regular staff charged with routine tasks and an administrative class responsible for policy formulation. It also called for replacement of the existing recruitment system, based on personal recommendation and prone to corruption, with one based on competitive examinations. The British civil service, which was to survive more or less unchanged for a century, would serve as a model for other states setting up their own bureaucracies, including Canada.

The civil service was an important innovation in the development of the democratic state. Officials no longer served the whim of the monarch, except in the most formal sense, and were supposed to be politically neutral from the elected governments of the day. In return for abstaining from active political commitment, they were assured of protection against malicious dismissal and were guaranteed long-term permanent positions as professionals. Whichever party was in power was entitled to the best impartial advice on policy and how to implement it, even if this advice was unpalatable to the political masters of the officials concerned. This objectivity reinforced the ability of democratically elected leaders to translate their ideas into the most appropriate and most effective policy.

The British civil service model, which Canada and other countries have borrowed and implemented, puts particular emphasis on the impartiality of officials at even the highest levels. However, this principle might be seen as a problem for politicians who wish to introduce radical changes in policy, especially after a change of government. Other states have been more ready to allow political appointees to hold senior administrative posts. The French system, for instance, does allow political appointees to hold posts in the offices of ministers, especially the top post of *chef de cabinet*. The United States still operates a “spoils system” (as in “to the victor go the spoils”), which allows newly elected political leaders at various levels of government to fire and hire large numbers of officials. Currently, every incoming president has roughly 9,000 positions, listed in the US Government Policy and Support Positions (the “Plum Book”), to which he or she can appoint supporters. This is a tiny proportion of the total number of federal employees (which is close to 3 million), but it does represent all the most senior and politically sensitive posts. In continental Europe political leaders can also appoint supporters to top posts in state corporations, which in some states can include public broadcasting organizations; this practice is called *lottizzazione* (“parcelling out”) in Italy.



See Chapter 7, p. 140, for a discussion of the rise of the state system.

KEY QUOTE BOX 10.1

Max Weber on the Efficiency of Modern Bureaucratic Organization

The decisive reason for the advance of bureaucratic organization has always been its purely technical superiority over any other form of organization. The fully developed bureaucratic apparatus compares with other organizations exactly as does the machine with the non-mechanical modes of production. Precision, speed, unambiguity, knowledge of the files, continuity, discretion, unity, strict subordination, reduction of friction and of material and personal costs—these are raised to the optimum point in the strictly bureaucratic administration. (Weber, 1968, p. 973)



Giuseppe Ciccia/Pacific Press/LightRocket via Getty Images

PHOTO 10.1 | Familial connections within government and an overlap between political and business interests have a long history in Italy. In 2014 an investigation into municipal expenditures in Rome found crime syndicates misappropriating money for city services. Dozens were arrested, including the president of Rome’s parliament and the head of the city’s public-housing division. Here, a man holds a sign saying, “Go” showing his support for the mayor’s policy against the “Mafia Capitale” scandal.

Thus individual European states developed forms of state administration that reflected their own particular political, legal, and historical contexts. Whereas the British civil service required stringent separation of civil servants from political roles, the states of continental Europe—where the law had played a greater role in curbing the powers of autocratic regimes—have relied more on the law to establish the relationship between the state and the bureaucracy (Lynn, 2006, pp. 58–9). According to Ginsborg (2001, p. 217), the concept of the law-based state, or *Rechtsstaat*, is most evident in the case of Italy. In 1993, a government report on administrative reform estimated that whereas France had 7,325 laws in force and Germany 5,587 (excluding laws passed by the *Länder*), Italy had roughly 90,000 laws or regulations with legal status. These regulations placed serious constraints on the initiative of Italian civil servants; even so, they did not necessarily make for a more impartial civil service, since officials still found ways of favouring those with business or family connections. Over a 15-year period in the 1980s and early 1990s, 60 per cent of the hiring of state officials was initially made on the basis of “temporary” or “precarious” contracts that were not subject to the same strict regulations as permanent ones; these jobs were later converted into permanent employment (Ginsborg, 2001, pp. 218–19).

European states also showed a greater tendency for administrative, political, and business elites to overlap. This is most obvious in the case of France, where the *École nationale d’administration* has

trained generations of public officials, some of whom have gone on to glittering careers in the state administration and some of whom have gone into politics (Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and Jacques Chirac eventually served as presidents of the republic).

Colonial powers often transferred their own administrative arrangements to their colonies, and on gaining their independence many former colonies continued to use them. A good example of how this worked in practice can be seen in India before and after independence. An examination-based appointment system was introduced in 1853, and the Indian Civil Service (ICS) continued to attract high-quality applicants from Britain until independence, nearly a century later, though by the 1930s half of the new recruits were Indian rather than British. The service was quite small: In the early 1930s, when India had a population of approximately 353 million, the ICS employed only about 1,000 officials. Nevertheless, according to Kohli (2004, pp. 237–40) it made long-term contributions to Indian state formation for three reasons. First, it resisted regionalism, ensured consistent all-India administration, and created a unity that nationalists would later be happy to harness. Second, its competence and efficiency facilitated good, limited government. Third, it exemplified the idea that a modern state can put public interests above private ones. All these qualities justified the praise that Weber heaped on modern bureaucratic administration.

KEY POINTS

- European states developed different variants of the civil service and national traditions of administration.
- Colonial powers to some extent transferred these forms of government organization to their colonies, with varying long-term success.

“Embedded Autonomy”

The term **embedded autonomy** is borrowed from developmental political economy. Coined by Peter Evans (1995) in the context of the remarkable economic growth achieved by several East Asian states in the 1970s and 1980s, it describes the position of decision makers in Asian bureaucracies, who were influenced by the society in which they were embedded and yet at the same time maintained a degree of detachment and autonomy that allowed them to determine what was in the public interest and follow that path. There is fairly widespread agreement that Japan’s economic success can be attributed to its developmental state—specifically, the coordinating role played by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) beginning in the 1960s (Calder, 1993; Johnson, 1982). Other states in the region—South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore—followed Japan’s example, and all achieved economic breakthroughs. In the course of exploring the reasons behind the success of South Korea in particular, Evans (1995) theorized that the “embedded autonomy” of state decision makers played an important role.



See Chapter 1, p. 21, for an introduction to the developmental state.

KEY POINT

- The civil service needs a degree of autonomy if it is to pursue the public interest, but it must also be embedded in the society to know what that interest is.

Theories of Bureaucratic Policymaking

Theories of bureaucratic policymaking have always revolved around **principal-agent relations**. This term comes from microeconomic game theory and refers to situations in which the actions of two or more actors need to be harmonized, but their interests are not necessarily the same; thus incentives or rules must be devised to ensure that those interests will converge enough for activity to be coordinated. In state bureaucracies, the “principals” are the political leaders and the “agents” are the civil servants who must carry out the principals’ decisions. This relationship is always hierarchical. Of course, there are further nested hierarchies within the civil service, and varying levels of principals have the authority to issue instructions for implementation by agents below them. Theories of bureaucratic policymaking always seek to do two things: (1) clarify how bureaucracies actually implement decisions; and (2) find ways to help principals ensure that policy outcomes conform to their policy objectives.

Theories of bureaucratic policymaking have evolved over time. Graham Allison (1971) wrote an influential work on the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. In *The Essence of Decision*, he set out to analyze how the executive branches in both the United States and the USSR formulated their policies and interacted. He identified three possible paradigms. In the


first, both government as a whole and individual ministries operated as a single rational actor and the outcomes corresponded to the original objectives. Allison's research quickly showed that this was not the case, and that the rational actor model left too many developments during the crisis unexplained. In his second paradigm, which he called the *organizational process* model, Allison hypothesized that government agencies, instead of designing new structures and practices to implement new policies, adapted existing structures and practices—what Allison called “standard operating procedures” (SOPs). It seems reasonable to expect that a great deal of policymaking follows SOPs, although outsiders unfamiliar with the system are bound to have difficulty identifying them (as the Americans sometimes found when puzzling over Soviet moves that needed an urgent response). However, not all policymaking is the product of SOPs, and Allison formulated a third paradigm to take this into account. Here, policy decisions were determined by bureaucratic politics—that is, the ways in which particular institutions interacted with each other. Allison's arguments were groundbreaking for their time and shed light on many of the strange actions of both the Soviets and Americans during the conflict, which did not seem particularly rational.

Serious economic crises in the 1970s and 1980s forced Western governments to focus on reducing spending and getting better value for money. Neoliberal ideas on economic reform, which gradually spread from the United States to other parts of the world, displaced Keynesian approaches to policymaking. At the same time, the collapse of communism was opening the way for government restructuring in several countries, and the European Union was forcing member states to coordinate their administration more closely, especially in the area of economic policy.

In response to these circumstances a new paradigm developed that came to be known as **new public management** (NPM). Proponents of this new paradigm, according to Lynn (2006, p. 2), emphasized “incentives, competition, and performance” over rule-based hierarchies. As the terminology suggests, many of these ideas came from the fields of economics and business management. For some critics this new approach was fundamentally mistaken, based on a confusion over the different purposes of public and private institutions. NPM implies that “the public sector is not distinctive from the private sector” and that its practitioners are “self-interested, utility maximizing administrators” on the model of corporate executives (Olsen, 2003, pp. 511, 522). Even though it challenged the traditional notion of the impartial civil service, NPM has been an extremely influential approach to public-sector reform. For a list of its key features, see Box 10.2.

As the wave has spread, international agencies such as the World Bank encouraged developing countries to adopt the NPM model (Adamolekun, 2007). But there is a problem. As Ourzik noted in an address to the second Pan-African Congress of Ministers of Civil Service in 1998:

The role of the State has been shaped by a trend which is today universal, that of a State as an enabler rather than a doer, a State that regulates instead of manages. Like a genuine orchestra conductor of social and economic activities, the State is required to promote private initiative without stifling or restricting it. A State that is at once modest and ambitious, since the population still expects much of it: it must, while ensuring that overall balances are maintained, protect the environment, ensure proper land-use management, put in place new infrastructures, provide health and education services, etc. (Ourzik, 2000, p. 44)



See the discussion of the modern state in Chapter 7, p. 150.

KEY CONCEPT BOX 10.2

Key Features of New Public Management

Toonen (2001, p. 185) identifies six key features of NPM:

- A business-oriented approach to government
- A quality- and performance-oriented approach to public management
- An emphasis on improved public service delivery and functional responsiveness
- An institutional separation of public demand functions (councils, citizens' charters), public provision (public management boards), and public service production functions (back offices, outsourcing, agencification, privatization)
- A linkage of public demand, provision, and supply units by transactional devices (performance management, internal contract management, corporatization, intergovernmental covenanting and contracting, contracting out) and quality management
- Wherever possible, the retreat of (bureaucratic) government institutions in favour of an intelligent use of markets and commercial market enterprises (deregulation, privatization, commercialization, and marketization) or virtual markets (internal competition, benchmarking, competitive tendering)

The problem is one of context. The countries in which NPM was developed already had relatively well-established civil services, with traditions of impartiality and incorruptibility, but this is not necessarily the case in the developing world. In Africa, for example, many states suffer from widespread official corruption, but the NPM model does not take this into account.

In the case of Nigeria, Salisu (2003, pp. 171–2) reported serious problems with the internal organization of the civil service: overstaffing and poor remuneration of employees, poor assessment of labour needs, inadequate training, and lack of qualified technical support. Meanwhile, political interference in personnel administration led to a high degree of corruption. Although efforts were made to reorganize the structure and operation of the service so that incentives and performance are better aligned, corruption remained and remains a serious problem. Thus there is a real danger that following the NPM model and treating civil servants as if they were business executives will undermine efforts to establish an ethic of incorruptibility.

KEY POINTS

- Theories of public administration have always revolved around principal–agent relations.
- New public management borrowed its basic principles from business studies and economics.
- Introduction of NPM principles in developing countries may undermine efforts to eradicate corruption in public administration.

“Agencification”

One key NPM reform involves splitting government departments and dividing functions to create new agencies—a process known as *agencification*. In the United Kingdom, the creation of institutions such as the Child Maintenance Group (2012) and the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency (2007) was justified on the grounds that they simplify government administration. In a sense agencification extended the well-established principle of public administration where “policy” is separated from “implementation.” In this case, however, the result was a proliferation of external agencies that were not directly under the control of the policymakers. Most were created from portions of existing administrative structures. Implementation was to be the responsibility of different principals, who would establish distinct rules and procedures for their own agents. This undermined the homogeneity of a civil service with common standards and operating procedures. Control of the agencies’ performance was in many cases exercised by setting targets and judging the agencies on their success in reaching them. Thus target-setting became an increasingly important feature of administrative leadership.

Talbot (2004, p. 6) has concluded that there are really three dimensions to the idea of “agency”:

- Structural disaggregation and/or the creation of “task-specific” organizations
- Performance “contracting”—some form of performance target-setting, monitoring, and reporting
- Deregulation (or more properly reregulation) of controls over personnel, finance, and other management matters

Agencification has represented a move toward what Rhodes (1997, pp. 87–111) has called the “hollowing out” of the state—the reduction of state control over the various functions it is supposed to perform. In a period when decision-making authority was being devolved to Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland, the devolution of implementation authority to agencies outside the British civil service was part of a larger trend. Now actors outside the government would play a larger role in policymaking.

On the other hand, this trend was to some extent contradicted by another aspect of the NPM model, which called for a new focus on the delivery of services as an activity in its own right. Making service delivery more consumer friendly became an increasingly high priority in the early twenty-first century under Tony Blair’s Labour government (1997–2007). Michael Barber, a former key official in that government who has written an insider’s account of NPM reforms in Britain, argues that better implementation is essential if the huge sums of money spent on public services are to be politically sustainable (Barber, 2007, p. 294). For the reforms to become permanent, though, civil servants would have to internalize them and make them the basis of their official behaviour. Blair believed this could be achieved only if the Prime Minister’s Office acquired greater power to supervise the implementation processes.

In addition, the separation of policymaking from implementation added to problems of accountability. Though elaborate means were developed to make implementation agencies accountable to the policy principals (Lynn, 2006, pp. 139–40), enforcing policymakers’ accountability to parliament was more difficult. If particular targets were not met, was it the fault of the principals for setting them unrealistically high? Was it the fault of the agents (that is, the officials) for lacking sufficient commitment? Were the targets contradictory

← See Chapter 1, p. 37, for a discussion of the “hollowing out” thesis.

or incompatible? If so, whose fault would that be—and who would decide? The greater the incentives for meeting targets (and the penalties for failing to do so), the greater the danger that other important work for which targets were more difficult to specify might be neglected. The overall effect was to reduce the importance of politics in policymaking, making the policy process more technocratic and less accountable to the public.

KEY POINTS

- The creation of agencies charged with implementation of policies formulated elsewhere facilitated concentration on delivery.
- In Britain, the Prime Minister's Office became directly involved in pushing through the reforms.
- There was a heavy reliance on targets as performance indicators.
- Agencification weakened ministerial accountability.

Governance

Governance is an old word that has undergone something of a revival in recent years. Its root is a Greek word meaning “to steer,” and in its simplest sense it refers to the function of governments. Thus Pierre and Peters (2000, p. 1) use *governance* to mean “the capacity of government to make and implement policy—in other words, to steer society,” and the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP) defines it as “the process of decision-making and the process by which decisions are implemented (or not implemented)” (UNESCAP, 2012). But governance is not restricted to governments: *Corporate governance*, for example, refers to the processes by which corporations make decisions. Nonstate actors working on behalf of the state may also be said to practise governance when they take the lead in creating or implementing policies in their areas of expertise. Thus private security organizations hired to protect government offices or provide protection for a country's nationals abroad (in Iraq, for example) can have considerable input into policy because they are crucial to its implementation.

A related concept that is now widely used in international politics is **good governance**. Governments in the developing world are encouraged to practise good governance, sometimes as a condition for foreign aid. UNESCAP's discussion of the term emphasizes that government is only one of many actors with a role to play in good governance; see Box 10.3.

Kayizzi-Mugerwa (2003, p. 17) presents the concept of good governance in more concrete terms, focusing on institutions. In his view it includes the following:

- An effective state that enables economic growth and equitable distribution
- Civil societies and communities that are represented in the policymaking process, with the state facilitating political and social interaction and promoting societal cohesion and stability
- A private sector that plays an independent and productive role in the economy

As this summary suggests, the steering of society implicit in the term *governance*, and even more so in *good governance*, cannot be accomplished successfully without the active involvement of civil society and the private sector.

KEY CONCEPT BOX 10.3

The Elements of Good Governance

UNESCAP has identified eight features of good governance. It accepts that few states meet all these criteria, but emphasizes that without progress in most of them, real sustainable development is not possible:

1. **Participation:** Encouraging the involvement of a wide range of actors in making and implementing decisions; implies freedom of expression and association, as well as an organized civil society.
2. **Rule of law:** Clear legal frameworks and impartial enforcement; implies respect for human rights, an independent judiciary, and an incorruptible police force.
3. **Transparency:** Decisions are made and implemented openly, in accordance with rules; information is readily available to all those affected by decisions.
4. **Responsiveness:** Policies are formulated and implemented in ways that respond to social needs.
5. **Consensus-oriented:** The decision-making process mediates among different interests.
6. **Equity and inclusiveness:** All members of society, especially the most vulnerable, have opportunities to maintain or improve the conditions under which they live.
7. **Effectiveness and efficiency:** Policies are designed to make the best use of available resources and protect the environment.
8. **Accountability:** Procedures must be in place to ensure that decision makers, both public and private, are held responsible to society as a whole. (UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, 2012)

KEY POINTS

- *Governance* reflects a broader perspective than government alone.
- Developing states are encouraged to practise good governance, which also downplays the state–society distinction.
- Good governance requires wide societal involvement in the formulation and implementation of policy, as well as accountability to the people for policy outcomes.

Policy Communities, “Iron Triangles,” and Issue Networks

We have gradually expanded the focus of this chapter from the civil service to the totality of the policymaking and steering processes. A link between the two is provided by the concept of **policy communities**: closed, stable “subgovernments” consisting of the civil servants responsible for policymaking in particular areas and external groups with a special interest in those areas (Thatcher, 2001, p. 7940). Early proponents of the policy

community theory argue that, through long-term exchange and interaction, the views of those officials and interest groups gradually converge, and they come to see issues in similar ways. Even if the policies are ultimately formulated by the civil servants, the fact that some of the ideas informing them have come from outside the government may give them additional legitimacy.

In the United States, a particular type of policy community has been called an **iron triangle**: a group of officials, politicians, and interest groups who work together to formulate policy in a particular issue area. What differentiates iron triangles from other policy communities is their explicit inclusion of politicians. Thus it is a long-established feature of politics on Capitol Hill that members of the US Congress are subject to lobbying both by various interest groups (often business organizations) and by other members of Congress.

A variation on the theme of lobbying can be found in Japan, where the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) held power almost continuously from 1955 to 2009, and then again from 2012 onward. Over the years the LDP established powerful committees for specific areas of public policy (for example, welfare, construction, agriculture) that met regularly with both ministry officials and representatives from the sector to discuss the operation of existing policies and the formulation of new ones. For many years these policy “tribes” (*zoku*) were able not only to set the parameters for policymaking but also to resist changes proposed from outside, even by the prime minister. As a consequence they had a significant impact on Japanese policies (Kim, 2006).

Other theorists have argued that the policy community concept is too restrictive to take into account such “key aspects of policy making . . . as ideas, the distribution of power



PHOTO 10.2 | Former Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda (left) and senior officials of Japan's Democratic Party lead caucus members in a chant in August 2011. Many Japanese organizations have their own themed chants to encourage pride and solidarity.

among actors, and change” (Thatcher, 2001, p. 7940). In its place they have proposed the looser concept of the **issue network**. As Thatcher (2001, p. 7940) describes it:

An issue network consists of a large number of issue-skilled “policy activists” drawn from conventional interest groups and sections of the government, together with academia and certain professions but also comprising expert individuals regardless of formal training. Participants are constantly changing, and their degree of mutual commitment and interdependence varies, although any direct material interest is often secondary to emotional or intellectual commitment.

Building on this insight, some theorists have attempted to identify different types of networks and to show how they interact in the overall policy process.

One of the best-known network typologies was proposed by Rhodes (1997, p. 38). It has five elements that represent a continuum of organizational strength, running from weak (issue networks, which share only common ideas) to strong (policy communities, which share both ideas and organization). In general, issue networks are large, encompassing a wide range of interests; contact between members is irregular and disagreement common; group resources are limited; and powers, resources, and access vary. By contrast, policy communities are relatively small and clearly focused; interaction between members is both frequent and of high quality; and their hierarchical leadership is able to deliver support from members to government (Rhodes, 1997, p. 44).

KEY POINT

- Where officials and nongovernmental actors are jointly involved in policy formulation and implementation, their relations can be located somewhere along a continuum that stretches from issue networks to policy communities.

Conclusion: Toward a Network State?

In previous decades, civil services brought efficiency and effectiveness to government policymaking, especially in North America and Western Europe. More recently, however, their role has been questioned by policymakers as well as the public, as governments try to reduce their own size and increase efficiency. This is especially true in light of the economic crises that have hit North America and Western Europe since 2008. The result has been a widening of the focus in studies of policymaking, which now devote much more attention to nongovernmental actors, both individuals and groups, than to the state in many policy areas. Whether this shift in attention can be reconciled with the need in many developing countries to establish effective and clean administration remains to be seen.

As we noted in Chapter 1, there is growing literature that we are seeing a hollowing out of the nation-state in response to globalization. The literature on governance suggests a rebalancing of relationships between state and society, in favour of society. Various commentators have predicted a future in which the state will look more like a network than a traditional Weberian bureaucratic hierarchy (Bobbitt, 2003; Castells, 1998). This appears unlikely to happen any time soon, however, at least in the North American context, where the 2008 economic crisis has led to forms of conservatism regarding spending and government services.

See Chapter 1, p. 37, for a discussion of the “hollowing out” thesis.

Key Questions

1. Can we draw a valid distinction between the values and motivations of public administration and business management?
2. How far do the groups involved in British transport policy correspond to the different categories of issue networks and policy communities proposed by Rhodes? (See Glaister, Burnham, Stevens, & Travers, 2006, Chapters 2, 3, and 6.)
3. Compare the ways in which the British governments under Margaret Thatcher and John Major attempted to reform transport policy with those of French Presidents Jacques Chirac and Nicolas Sarkozy.
4. Is it unrealistic to expect civil servants to be politically impartial?
5. How can civil services be made incorruptible? Will new public management help?
6. Is good governance a Western imposition on the developing world? Did the West have it at similar levels of development? Did it matter then?
7. What are the advantages and disadvantages of the “spoils” system in the United States?
8. How can agencies and officials be made accountable under new public management?

Further Reading

Levi-Faur, D. (2012). *The Oxford handbook of governance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. An authoritative and comprehensive introduction to the concept of governance and its implications.

Miljan, L. (2008). *Public policy in Canada: An introduction*. Toronto: Oxford University Press. An excellent introduction to public policy in Canada that takes a hands-on approach to the subject, integrating theory and practice.

Reddick, C. (2001). *Public administration and information technology*. Burlington, MA: Jones & Bartlett Publishers. Details the prospects for state administration transformed by new technology.

Von Maravi, P., Peters, B.G., & Schröter, E. (2013). *Representative bureaucracy in action: Country profiles from the Americas, Europe, Africa and Asia*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing. A detailed comparative account of changing approaches to bureaucracy around the world.

Web Links

www.princeton.edu/csso

Based at Princeton University, the Center for the Study of Social Organization (CSSO) studies the interplay of bureaucracies, markets, and informal social networks.

www.civilservant.org.uk/index.html

A master site of information about the civil service in the UK, including a guide by Martin Stanley called *How to Be a Civil Servant*.

www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-PLUMBOOK-2012/content-detail.html

The 2012 edition of the “Plum Book”: the list of US government positions that an incoming administration is entitled to fill with political appointees.

www.psc-cfp.gc.ca/index-eng.htm

The website of the Canadian Public Service Commission, which provides information about federal government departments and careers.