
THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION: The Role and Contribution of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini

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
THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION

The Role and Contributions of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini

ABSTRACT

This paper intends to explore the role and key contributions that Ayatollah Ruhollah played in the Iranian Revolution. Based on the scholarly literature, the study argues that it was only Ruhollah's key thinking that led and formed the foundations of modern Iranian society at a time when there was no hope but worries. Furthermore, the indispensable contributions that Ruhollah played in the transformation of Iranian society are rarely reflected in the recent history of modern revolutions.

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THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION

The Role and Contribution of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini ¹

"Our goal is to implement Islamic international goals in the world of poverty and hunger. We say that there will be fighting as long as there is polytheism and disbelief and as long as there is a fight we will be there. We do not have any [complaint] between any city and nation. We have decided to raise the flag of 'La ilaha ilallah.'"

(Addressing a public gathering in Tehran, Iran in 1980)

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The Revolution in Iran is termed by the historians as one of the biggest historical event in the past 100 years. A revolution is a mass movement that aims to establish a new political regime by violently transforming the existing government. The Iranian Revolution of 1978–1979 violently ended the monarchy of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi (1919–1980) and replaced it with an Islamic republic, the theocracy of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (1901–1989).

The shah's reign had been briefly interrupted between 1951 and 1953 with the interlude of Prime Minister Mohammed Mossedeq (1881–1967). This revolution is regarded as the main turning point of the Islamic World as it opened the eyes of those Islamic states although being powerful with the riches of oil are still being played under western powers.

We have to take a look at the historical elements that lead up to the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Post World War II created a very different world. Colonial (English, French, Dutch, and other) control of much of the Mid-East, Asia, Africa, South American (the Third World) was on the wane. Two superpowers emerged, the United States and the USSR (Russia).

The USSR leaving regimes were based on a military government with socialist tendencies and a strong tribal, regional or ethnic minority base; this was the case in Algeria, Syria, Iraq, South Yemen and Egypt.

BACKGROUND

Different to popular western misconceptions, the Iranian Revolution of the late 1970s was remarkable in that it was motivated by a large alliance of classes and religious groups within Iran; each with similar social, economic, political, and religious agendas. These groups were united in majority in their initiative to topple the Shah Kingship due to his heavy handed, and dictatorial style of rule (Friedman, 2009).

Additionally, these various groups and organizations were deeply dissatisfied with restrictions on access to the political process, the tight concentration of Iran's huge oil revenues into the hands of a very small, elite group orbiting around the Shah, as well as a growing perception that Iran was becoming too westernized and had lost her grounding in Iranian traditional values and cultures.

It explains that, in 1979, millions of Iranians succeeded in removing Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi (1941-1979), the Shah of Iran and forced him to leave the country. While the Shah was known as a 'darling to the West', he tried to authoritarian modernize too rapidly and did not adapt his political institutions sufficiently to the economic and social changes he had brought about.

Although inspired by hopes for democracy, economic prosperity for all classes, gender equality and a leadership that would not allow Iranian culture to be destroyed by the Western values; many Iranian women joined the rebellion (Ibid).

The world was surprised and astonished by the Iranian Revolution, which was led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in exile in Paris. The proposal relates that the Muslims believed that the modern age was 20th century remake of the Jahiliyya of ancient times that had to be destroyed as Mohammed the prophet had destroyed its predecessor. That is why Ruhollah Khomeini and his

team bore the seeds of this revolution to overthrow the non-Islamic and tyrant rule of the Shah (Seyed, 2002)

PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION

The Iranian Revolution of 1979 has been described as one of the epochal events of the twentieth century, inaugurating a period of Islamic revivalism and struggles against "modernization" in many nations where Islam is the predominant religion. In discussions of the 1979 Revolution, the significance of Islamic fundamentalism, the use of political repression by the regime of Mohammed Reza Shah (heretofore referred to as the monarchist regime), particularly the violence perpetrated by SAVAK (the secret police), widespread corruption by individual public officials and members of the oligarchic economic elite, as well as official favoritism, rising income inequality, and the impact of "Western" imperialism have all played causal roles.

However, there has been a marked paucity of discussions of the way the 1979 Revolution was shaped by struggles over class processes, defined as the particular forms in which surplus labor was produced and distributed. In particular, discussions of the 1979 Revolution have failed to recognize;

- i) The role of internecine conflict within the ranks of capitalist appropriators, and
- ii) The importance of ancient (or self-exploiting) direct producers and their allied agents in the collapse of the monarchist regime. It is the argument of this chapter that struggles over class processes were a significant factor in shaping the crises that culminated in the 1979 Revolution and of subsequent struggles over the specific form of economic and non-economic relationships in the post-revolutionary Islamic republic.

The primary thesis of this chapter is that the efforts of the monarchist regime to create a particular form of capitalism, herein described as oligarchic Capitalism that would serve as catalyst for Iran's rapid economic growth created a range of social crises that threatened the survival of ancients (or self-exploitation) and non-oligarchic capitalism.

The policies of the monarchist regime sometimes referred to as the modernization programme had a definite impact upon class processes in Iran, created and then deepened the social crises that threatened pre-existing configurations of surplus appropriation, particularly the prevalence of self-exploitation in the rural villages and urban bazaars, resulting in complex forms of resistance (Gabriel, 2001).

Among those with self-interest in opposing the modernization program were a wide range of social agents who desired an end to these crises, including non-oligarchic capitalist appropriators, ancient direct producers, and social agents allied to one or the other or both of these groups of appropriators, including the Shi'a Islamic clergy.

In so far as the monarchist regime's modernization program was designed to displace self-exploitation, which was arguably the most widespread form of surplus appropriation in terms of numbers of direct producers involved, with oligarchic capitalist exploitation, the 1979 Revolution might better be described as a counter revolution, i.e. a change in the political relationships constituting the state designed to avert a gradually progressing economic revolution. On the other hand, capitalist exploitation was clearly dominant in terms of the total value of produced commodities in Iran (Ibid).

In this sense, capitalist exploitation was prevalent and the adjective capitalist seems most appropriate when referring to Iran as a social formation. In so far as Iran was a capitalist social

formation, with a significant presence of self-exploitation, under the monarchist regime, it remained such a social formation after the 1979 Revolution, although the trajectory of change may have been altered. This point will be discussed in the concluding section of this chapter.

PROBLEM STATEMENT

The statement of problem is that majority of people are of the view that the Great Iranian Revolution has only been a tragedy for the Iranian nation because fundamentalist Islamic rule has been just as repressive and brutal. They think that the revolution's only accomplishment was to replace one regime of domination with a different but same dictatorship and brutal regime. People are unable to understand the basic purpose of the Iranian Revolution which I term as the start of True Islamic Revolution around the world.

According to my views, the Iranian Revolution is summarized into the following five points which clearly indicates the purpose, reason and motivation before or after it.

- 1. A complete dissatisfaction of the Iranian people with the Shah's modernization efforts.
- 2. The Shah's authoritarian government rule.
- 3. Disenchantment with the influence of Western views;
- 4. A return to traditional Islamic values which were set 1400 years before by our Prophet Muhammad (P.B.U.H).
- 5. The inspirational leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The research was based on the following questions:

- 1. Was the personality of Ayatollah Khomeni the sole purpose of making the revolution possible in Iran?
- 2. To overcome the doctorial regime of Raza Shah to the traditional values of the Islamic State?
- 3. To introduce the thought of the historical Islamic Values in the people of Iran especially the youth?

OBJECTIVES

First, this revolution - more than any other in history - relied not on force, military insurrection or guerrilla war but on politics. This is true in particular with regard to the two instruments that European revolutionaries had themselves long dreamed of using - the mass mobilization of people in the streets (in the Iranian case, the largest such opposition demonstrations ever recorded anywhere) and the political (as opposed to industrial) general strike (which, from October 1978, paralyzed the economy and foreign trade).

This, not the religious garb, was perhaps the most paradoxical and original aspect of the Iranian revolution: in its political form and process, and despite its religious and "traditional" guise, it was the first modern revolution.

Second, Iran's experience departed from the norm prescribed by both historical precedent and textbooks of historical sociology: namely, that a revolution's indispensable precondition was the weakening of the state, usually as a result of foreign pressure - either defeat in war or by invasion,

or via the withdrawal of support from an external patron (in the case of China and Cuba, this was the United States).

RATIONALE / SCOPE OF THE STUDY

The Study has surely benefited historically as there has been various disputed misconceptions about the Iranian Revolution trying to influence the population of the country especially the youth. This move from the west has been targeted to weaken the spiritual unity amongst the people against the Jewish Lobby. These types of studies will improve the Iranian Studies and a common man's concepts.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

THE UNDISPUTED PERSONALITY OF AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI

The personality of Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini was a critical element in defining Iran's war role. Khomeini's background, charisma, and thirst for revenge on those who inflicted personal injury upon him influenced the atmosphere leading to the war. One can understand Khomeini's personality and beliefs by examining his background. Khomeini's paternal origins were not Iranian, but Indian, and he spent a substantial part of his life outside Iran.

His devotion to Shia Islam, reflected by his simplistic ascetic lifestyle focused on spiritual matters, attracted the majority of Iranian peasant-oriented society. Many of these traditional citizens flocked to the modern cities seeking opportunity, only to wind up crowded into slums.

Khomeini's Islamic ideology countered the former Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's Iranian nationalism associated with the glory and affluence of the pre-Islamic Persian Empire of Cyrus the Great. Khomeini's connections outside Iran inhibited his adoption of Persian nationalist ideology in the war. But for many Iranians the Iraqi invasion reignited anti-Arab historic feelings dating from the medieval Islamic conquest. For Khomeini, his religious faith enabled him to confront stronger opponents in hostile environments (Gabriel, 2001, Shahi, 2009)

Khomeini's charisma drew followers of Islam, especially in Iran, Iraq and Lebanon, where Shia'ism dominates. The Shiites for centuries served as a low caste of underprivileged heretics throughout the Sunni dominated Moslem world. Shia'ism emphasizes martyrdom and suffering

along with the belief in a messianic era entering upon the return of the Twelfth Imam, a descendant of Mohammad. Khomeini's life of suffering and final return to Iran replicated a legacy of the Shiite experience.

Khomeini's life paralleled in many ways the sect's medieval founder, Imam Hussein, whose army of followers was defeated by a mightier Sunni-led Umayyad Army. In the aftermath of his defeat, Hussein, the model of martyrdom, was beheaded and his followers were left persecuted and oppressed. Although Khomeini denied assertions of being the messianic 12th Imam returning to bring world redemption, Shiites called him "Imam," alluding to his religious stature of messiah among the illiterate poor.

Khomeini's record of overpowering enemies such as the Shah, President Jimmy Carter, and Saddam Hussein through the Iranian Revolution, the American Hostage Crisis, and the Iran-Iraq war was viewed by his followers as miraculous and a reward for his piety (Society, 2011).

There was a revengeful side to Khomeini's personality which was cast in religious terms of good overcoming evil among his faithful. Khomeini sought personal revenge on those who wronged him by equating personal enemies with enemies of the Iranian state. Khomeini's targets for revenge were the Shah, Jimmy Carter, and Saddam Hussein. Khomeini suffered harassment and expulsion both under the Shah and Saddam Hussein. He finally died in 1989.

Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi has the unhappy distinction of being the last royal ruler of Iran, the last in an ancient line of great Persian monarchs before the rise of the current Islamic Republic. Born in 1919 he grew up in the tumultuous world of Iranian politics. In 1925 his father overthrew the last Shah of Qajar dynasty and made himself Emperor with Mohammad proclaimed as "Crown Prince of Persia" (his father would later request all nations refer to the country as Iran). He studied in Switzerland before returning home to begin his military training (Society 'a', 2012).

Within a few years he was thrust on to the world stage when British and Soviet forces invaded Iran and deposed his father in order to secure supply lines through the country and stop Iranian trade with Germany. On September 26, 1941 Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was formally declared "King of Kings, Light of the Aryans and Supreme Warlord". His reign would be one of great social and technical progress for Iran but also one of great trouble and unrest.

Early on the Shah had growing problems with the Shiite clerics who objected to his modernization efforts and the increase in social freedoms; especially for women. An alliance began to emerge between these fundamentalists and the nationalists who opposed the Shah's friendship with the West and his recognition of the State of Israel. They also resented Western meddling in Iran which was happening.

The Soviets were supporting the communists in Iran but the US and UK took a more active role in bringing down the Prime Minister who nationalized Iran's oil reserves in 1951. The PM, Mohammad Mossadegh, had believed that the West was supportive of his nationalist movement but the CIA and SIS funded a coup against him.

When it failed the Shah was forced to leave the country for Rome. Later he was able to return, remove Mossadegh and restores himself. The communist elements in the country had supported Mossadegh and attempted a coup which forced the Shah to leave the country again though the effort failed and the Reds turned against the former PM. Their success in street violence frightened the Islamic leadership into switching back to the Shah's camp. The Shah also survived several assassination attempts, some of which originated in the Soviet Union.

One of the best things about the late Shah was that he was a monarchists' monarch. He supported the royalists against the republicans in the civil war in Yemen, helped the Sultan of Qaboos stop communist rebels in his country, maintained good relations with the Kingdoms of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Morocco and the Gulf emirates while fighting the socialist and Baath party republican regimes in Iraq. However, radical elements still plotted against him because of the social progress he pushed and his continued good relations with the US and United Kingdom (Ibid).

During his reign education was massively expanded, healthcare was expanded, women were given the right to an education and the right to vote and the national economy improved greatly. This brought new outside trends to Iran like modern fashion, Hollywood movies and dance clubs all of which the radical clerics vehemently opposed. It had taken some time but the Shah's rule seemed secure, the regime stable and Iran was quickly becoming a modern, prosperous and well educated country. It was then quite a surprise when demonstrations flared up against the monarchy in 1977 orchestrated by the Ayatollah Khomeini.

The US government under President Jimmy Carter pressured the Shah not to take action against the radical elements, promising support but never delivering on it and indeed denying the Shah vital material assistance. By 1978 strikes were gripping the country and the Prime Minister prevailed upon the Shah to leave Iran for a short time until things stabilized. After he left his security forces were dissolved and the Ayatollah organized his own government, refused to deal with the Prime Minister and announced the Islamic Revolution.

On February 11, 1979 the ancient Iranian monarchy formally came to an end and the Shah would never see his homeland again. The Shah spent the rest of his life in exile, living in various countries around the world as the revolutionary regime continued to demand his return and that of his family to face execution. His health grew worse and though he lived to see many of the governments who had failed to support him regret their previous policies he always insisted that it gave him no satisfaction. He only wished things could have been different. He died in Egypt in 1980 (Alan et al, 2012; Britannica, 2012; Society 'a', 2012).

SHAH'S WHITE REVOLUTION

Imam Khomeini first became politically active in 1962 (Society 'b', 2012). When the White Revolution proclaimed by the Shah's government in Iran, called for land reform, nationalization of the forests, the sale of state-owned enterprises to private interests, electoral changes to enfranchise women, profit sharing in industry, and an anti-illiteracy campaign in the nation's schools. All of these initiatives were regarded as dangerous, westernizing trends by traditionalists, especially the powerful and privileged Shiite 'ulema ("religious scholars") who felt keenly threatened (Ibid).

The Ulema instigated anti-government riots throughout the country. They found it a sustainable ideological framework to support a particular relation of domination, in this case the monarchy of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. This was above all a hegemonic project intended to portray the Shah as a revolutionary leader through the utilization of social and historical myths reinterpreted through the prism of contemporary, often conflicting ideological constructs, such as nationalism and modernism.

In January 1963, the Shah announced a six-point program of reform called the White Revolution, an American-inspired package of measures designed to give his regime a liberal and progressive façade (Society, 2011). Imam Khomeini summoned a meeting of his colleagues (other Ayatollahs) in Qom to press upon them the necessity of opposing the Shah's plans.

Imam Khomeini persuaded the other senior marja's of Qom to decree a boycott of the referendum that the Shah had planned to obtain the appearance of popular approval for his White Revolution. Imam Khomeini issued on January 22, 1963 a strongly worded declaration denouncing the Shah and his plans. Two days later Shah took armored column to Qom, and he delivered a speech harshly attacking the Ulema as a class.

Imam Khomeini continued his denunciation of the Shah's programs, issuing a manifesto that also bore the signatures of eight other senior scholars. In it he listed the various ways in which the Shah allegedly had violated the constitution, condemned the spread of moral corruption in the country, and accused the Shah of comprehensive submission to America and Israel.

He also decreed that the Noroz celebrations for the Iranian year 1342 (which fell on March 21, 1963) be cancelled as a sign of protest against government policies. On the afternoon of Ashoora (June 3, 1963), Imam Khomeini delivered a speech at the Feiziyeh Madresah in which he drew

parallels between Yazid and the Shah and warned the Shah that if he did not change his ways the day would come when the people would offer up thanks for his departure from the country.

Following Imam Khomeini's public denunciation of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi as a "wretched miserable man" and arrest, on June 5, 1963 (Khordad 15, on the Iranian calendar) (Vakili-Zad, 1990) three days of major riots erupted throughout Iran with nearly 400 killed. Imam Khomeini was kept under house arrest for 8 months and was released in 1964.

Also this was a turning point in political viewpoint of Shi'a. The clergies had supported Shiite monarchy since establishment of Safavids and this was the main source of legitimacy of monarchs. Shiite clergies had advised them to be just and obey jafari's jurisprudence. Also monarchs didn't enforce religious rules which restricted or threatened religious life and institutions and defended the Shiite territory of Iran.

However, Reza Shah transformed the Iranian monarchy into a modern dictatorship. The modernizing programs of Pahlavi dynasty restricted and threatened religious life and made clergies be against monarchy and finally Imam Khomeini decide to fight with them and build another state comparable to religious rules (Britannica, 2012; Wolfe, 2012; Ansari, 2001; Watson, 2006)

IMAM KHOMEINI'S POLITICAL THOUGHT AND LEGACY

- o Imam Khomeini adamantly opposed monarchy, arguing that only rule by a leading Islamic jurist would insure Shariat-e-Muhammadi was properly followed (velayat-e faqih).
- o Imam Khomeini believed that Iran should strive towards self-reliance. He viewed certain elements of Western culture as being inherently decadent and a corrupting influence upon the youth. As such, he often advocated the banning of popular Western fashions, music,

- cinema, and literature. His ultimate vision was for Islamic nations to converge together into a single unified power, in order to avoid alignment with either side (the West or the East), and he believed that this would happen at some point in the near future.
- O Imam Khomeini expressed support for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; in Sahifah-e-Noor (Vol. 2, page 242), he states: "We would like to act according to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We would like to be free. We would like independence."
- o Imam Khomeini led an ascetic lifestyle, being deeply interested in mysticism, and was against the accumulation of land and wealth by the clergy.
- Many of Imam Khomeini's political and religious ideas were considered to be progressive and reformist by leftist intellectuals and activists prior to the Revolution.
- Imam Khomeini's definition of democracy existed within an Islamic framework. His last will and testament largely focuses on this line of thought, encouraging both the general Iranian populace, the lower economic classes in particular, and the clergy to maintain their commitment to fulfilling Islamic revolutionary ideals (Shraghi, 2009; Wikipedia, 2012).

THE SIX MAJOR POINTS IN THIS REVOLUTION

i) First, a broad coalition of opposition forces came together to overthrow a dictatorial regime, building on longstanding social grievances but also energizing nationalist sentiment against a state and ruler seen as too compliant to foreign interests. The coalition mobilized under Ayatollah Khomeini's leadership ranged from liberal and Marxist to conservative and religious forces: in effect a classic populist alliance.

- ii) Second, the victory of the revolution both required and were facilitated by the state's weakness of leadership and internal divisions. The Shah was ill, his advisers and generals were uncertain. The resemblance to other figures and regimes in a time of crisis Louis XVI and Czar Nicholas II, as well as Charles I of England is evident.
- Third, the revolution possessed the quality that distinguishes mere coups d'état or rebellions from major revolutions: namely, it was not just political (in the sense of changing the political elite and the constitution or legitimating system of the country but had profound and ongoing social and economic consequences. Because of it, Iran today has a new social order and a new set of social values even as a new revolutionary elite, an Islamic nomenclature, united by ties of power, business and marriage, controls state revenues.
- iv) Fourth, the revolution's core ideology may have propounded the need for a new, radical and egalitarian order; but it was supplemented by pre-existing ideas that were crucial to sustaining domestic support (above all nationalism and a sense of the country's historic standing and mission). Ayatollah Khomeini at first refused to use the word fatherland, and denounced secular nationalism as an insult to Islam. But with the invasion by Saddam Hussein's Iraq in 1980 all this changed, and he and other leaders adopted the Iranian version of the term used by French revolutionaries in the 1790s.
- v) Fifth, the explosion of revolution at the center of a multi-ethnic country and driven especially from within its dominant ethnic component had profound reverberations on the relations between the Iran's different national components. In particular, it led not to the era of fraternal cooperation and solidarity anticipated in much of the political rhetoric of the time, but to conflict and war.

- vi) Here again, the pattern a revolt at the heart of a plural country and the consolidation of a new authoritarian regime provoking contrary forces in the periphery has rich historical precedents. The Young Turk revolution of 1908, the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, and the Ethiopian revolution of 1974 are prime examples; their echo in Iran concerned, above all, the Kurds. The hopes of this significant part of the population, of an autonomous Kurdistan within a democratic Iran (and they knew the first was impossible without the second) were to be dashed.
- vii) Sixth, the revolution in Iran had explosive international consequences. There were persistent attempts to export the revolution to neighboring countries, which intensified regional rivalries and fostered conditions that led to inter-state war. The Iranian revolution's efforts to promote its state interests and extend itself soon acquired resemblances to a reviving empire with traces of France and Russia in particular, not least the contradictory trends whereby some forces in the region were inspired by the revolution while others drew on older antagonisms (such as Saddam Hussein's excoriation of Khomeini as a magus [Zoroastrian priest] and more recent concerns about a powerful new Shi'a "crescent") (Halliday, 2009).

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

Books, Internet Blogs, Journal articles etc. were consulted to complete this research paper.

SAMPLE SIZE

The survey regarding this research was taken from different institutes across Islamabad. A sample size of approximately 80 people is targeted in this survey to find out the exact evaluation of the research.

UNIT of Analysis

Students, Teachers, Research Analysts of different institutes were consulted to gather relevant data and information about the historical event of the Iranian Revolution in 1979. The Research Team and the Monitoring and Evaluation Department at the National Democratic Institute was be targeted to get some valuable input regarding this topic.

TARGET INDUSTRY

This topic being a very historical event will be consulted with different people belonging to the field of history and social studies. People from Institutes like Quaid-e-Azam University and Bahria University was used to complete this study. Organizations like the National Democratic Institute and other foreign study institutes will be visited to extract some valuable information regarding this historical topic.

PROCEDURE

The data is collected by taking an overview of the information provided in the Questionnaire and Interviews. There will be no separate data entry software required for this research.

DISCUSSIONS:

The major points discussed in this research are as follows:

- Comprehensive case study about revolutions who have completely changed the entire course of time
- o What Islam has taught us about its freedom and dignity
- o Change of views about the personality and charisma of Ayatollah Khomeini
- o The true meaning of the Islamic Revolution
- Iranian Revolution came because of the westernization of thought and extermination of faith
- o The revolutionary period was not a brutal time as compared by the Shah's regime
- o The Independence of the World's first Islamic Republic nation
- o To feel and understand the concept that how a person living in exile for the past 12 years brought revolution without even visiting that place in those days
- What exactly was the purpose of the Iranian Revolution?
- o How it became possible?
- Was there any external help involved?
- o Is preaching so powerful that it can entirely change a person's thought?

Shah had a tremendous international support throughout the revolutionary time but couldn't stop the nation's transformation period. This was Ayatollah Khomeini's Charisma which made them to follow the right path of life.

CONCLUSION

This revolution (more than any other in history) did not rely on force, military rebellion or guerrilla war but on politics. This is true in particular with regard to the two instruments that European revolutionaries had themselves long dreamed of using The mass mobilization of people in the streets (in the Iranian case, the largest such opposition demonstrations ever recorded anywhere) and the political general strike to identify.

The non-acceptance of the Shah's decision (which, from October 1978, paralyzed the economy and foreign trade with foreign national particular American). This was perhaps the most consistent and original aspect of the Iranian revolution: in its political form and process, and despite its religious and traditional appearance, it was said to be the first modern revolution.

Iran's experience departed from the standard prescribed by both historical example and textbooks of historical sociology: namely, that a revolution's crucial requirement was the weakening of the state, usually as a result of foreign pressure - either defeat in war or by invasion, or via the withdrawal of support from an external supporter (in the case of China and Cuba, this was the United States). Some people (majorly from the West and Middle East) argue that this revolution was initially a Worker's Revolution which was later on hijacked by the extremist Islamic Clerics of the country.

This revolution was termed as the Islamic Revolution as the country had lost its Islamic Ideology throughout the Shah's Rule and struggle was to re-instate the Islamic Values and the Sharia't Law in the Country. So the accusation stands false on its ground rejected by ever concerning source.

It was the Ayatollah's effort that the country (the people and all Clerics belonging to different sects and ethics) collectively made him the country's Supreme Leader of the country (a person who is

responsible for the election of the government and the Islamic Constitution) where he remained till his death in 1989. It was said that his funeral was attended by 6 Million people approximately which is the biggest in history until now.

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