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**Military Politics in Pakistan**

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**Abstract**

The Pakistani military has occupied an important role within the Pakistani political system since the independence of Pakistani state in 1947 until now. Therefore, this is made the military to play important roles within its political system. The political history of Pakistan can be summed up as a story of repeated coupes followed by protracted periods of military government, briefly punctuated by elected civilian government. Pakistan is once again at a critical juncture in its political history as it undertakes an uncertain journey toward democratization. The key question Pakistan faces today is whether it will be able to put in place a new stable democratic order or it will slip further into a political turmoil that has characterized most of its history. There are three factors deserve attention in this regard. First, Pakistan has been under military rule for more than half the years of its existence. The country has witnessed three coups. The military in Pakistan has come to exercise a formidable influence in the spheres of the Pakistani political, economic and social. Second, Pakistan has been plagued by exceptional political turbulence since its inception and has had a poor record of democracy. Third, and possibly of the greatest significance is the equilibrium that has come to characterize civil military relations in Pakistan. In reality, the military rulers while seeking political legitimacy have steadily entrenched their control over key sectors of the Pakistani polity. On the other hand, successive democratic dispensations in Pakistan, while seeking to curtail the power of the military have inevitably hobnobbed with it to remain in political power.

**Introduction**

Pakistan formed part of the Mughal Empire, and more recently, together with India and Bangladesh, was part of the British Empire .On independence in 1947 the state of Pakistan was formed with two wings, West and East. In 1971, after a war, East Pakistan seceded and became the separate country of Bangladesh. Islamic Republic of Pakistan has approx. 97% of the population are Muslim, with the majority[[1]](#footnote-1). The Government is made up of a bicameral federal legislature containing 2 houses: the Upper House is the Senate and the Lower House is the National Assembly. The President is the head of State and must be a Muslim to take this position. The President is elected by an electoral college consisting of members from the 2 governmental houses. The Prime Minister is the head of Government and appointed by the President from the members of the National Assembly.

The perception of military interventions in politics has laid down on the basis of two types of factors which has need to explain the participation of military in the politics of developing countries. The first way of military interventions in the politics is the military professionalism. It organizes a special training and equipping program for the improvement of all the forces against the enemy. These developments are move towards for the involvement of military in the politics. Second factor of military interventions in the politics is the socio political matter which stressed the military to take part in the politics of country for their own class benefits[[2]](#footnote-2). In this regard, the military explore themselves among the several institutions that are opponent for power. These two kinds of features are the main sources of military involvement in the politics of Pakistan which has always overthrows the civilian government.

The hypothesis of the research is Pakistan has democratic deficit because of its historical conflicts and contemporary issues that made its democracy more complicated.

The research questions is Dose the military intervention in politics had moved towards democracy in Pakistan?

**Literature Review**

The military in both developed and developing countries is considered one of the most powerful institutions because of their internal polity. Moreover, when it comes to defining, formulating and executing external or security policies. There are many studies, articles and books that discussed about Pakistani military and their role in political system. Therefore, there are a discussion of the work of three leading theorists about civil-military relations, namely Samuel P. Huntington, Morris Janowitz, and S.E. Finer in case of Pakistan.

Huntington’s view, “objective civilian control achieves reduction of military power by professionalizing the military and rendering them politically sterile and neutral. This produces the lowest possible level of military political power with respect to all civilian groups.[[3]](#footnote-3)

S. E. Finer offers a more comprehensive set of generalizations on why the military intervenes in politics. According to Finer, the dynamics of military intervention depend on the factors of “disposition” and “opportunity.”[[4]](#footnote-4)

Janowitz explains, Pakistan intervention of the military is reactive and spontaneous. In the case of Ayub, the intervention could be considered that of designed militarism, while with Zia it is a reactive one. It is premature to decide whether the present intervention is of the reactive or designed type, as the process of reaching such conclusions depends heavily on the disclosure of facts and information that have yet to surface.[[5]](#footnote-5)

What are distinguishes for this research from previous studies is it will focus on the history of military intervention in politics in Pakistan and how it was successful leadership until current situation. Moreover, it will display the relation between Islamization and military. Also, the relationship between Prime minster and military leadership and the general decisions making.

**Research Methodology**

This research drew upon mostly primary sources including articles, books, studies, and thesis. It had adopted the historical and political methodology, which is based on the descriptive and analytic means. It is almost dealt with the information and the historical and political truths, which is being related to military intervention in Pakistan and how are the military leadership personality and their relations with citizens and prime minister.

**Historical Background**

The history of military intervention in Pakistani politics went through five main stages:

**Stage of Establishment the state**

After the independence of Pakistan in 1947, Muhammad Ali Jinnah was established the basis of state. Consequently, Pakistanis military establishment as main institution in state. Pakistani political forces suffer from weakness of state, especially when Islamic forces were plagued by division and the lack of educated people challenge to manage modern state institutions.[[6]](#footnote-6) However, military institution with its leadership was able to practice effectively. One of the most names emerged in military institution was Ayub Khan, who joined the Indian army in 1928, and fought on different fronts during World War II. He choose to join Pakistani army after Pakistan's independence. In 1954 he was the minister of defense, and by his authority he played a key role in negotiations to enter Pakistan in military alliances, which was led by the United States. In 1958, he did a military coup supported by the United States of America.[[7]](#footnote-7)

Ayub Khan's rule in Pakistan was welcomed because of political concerns were facing the state he solved many social problems, adding to his popularity, and many economic reforms. The capital was moved from Karachi to Islamabad. Ayub Khan was secular does not embrace the idea of an Islamic state, he said once that: "We are not only Muslims, we are also Pakistanis".[[8]](#footnote-8)

The rule of Ayub Khan stiff opposition, but in second India-Pakistan war in 1965, Ayub Khan declared a holy war against India[[9]](#footnote-9). However, Pakistani army has not been able to achieve victory in this battle, which forced Ayub Khan to sign the Tashkent agreement with the Indian side in 1966. He has been criticized by many of people for this Convention. In 1969, Ayub Khan resigned and the power transferred to Mohammad Yahya Khan.[[10]](#footnote-10)

In 1958 under new international circumstances "bipolar system", Pakistan sided was with Western support, but with the changes that have occurred at the international level in the late sixties fell relative importance of Pakistan. Then, the western support to Pakistan is not available in its war with India in 1965, which forced Ayub Khan to sign the Tashkent Agreement.

**Stage of separation of state**

There was escalation during this stage because of the problem of East Pakistan with its majority of Bengali wanted to have autonomy. India supported the Bangladesh and Pakistan has lost its area and about seven and a half of its population[[11]](#footnote-11). Therefore, President Yahya Khan resigned and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto took over the rule.

Bhutto had many reforms in areas of economy, education and he controlled over of productive sectors in the country. He reached to agreement with India which Pakistan could return all its lost territory in 1971 war, except Kashmir region, which remained dispute between the parties because India refuse to evacuate its troops[[12]](#footnote-12). He achieved the foundations of Pakistan's nuclear program. However, it was a socialist and Islamic group opposed him strongly.

When the unrest has increased in the country, President Bhutto asked army for helping and to act by violence and support his regime. However, some were refused that was nucleus created the opportunity for Zia's military to do coup against President Bhutto in 1977.[[13]](#footnote-13)

This stage shows the intervention between military and political role in Pakistan. The direct role of military decline at the beginning of this stage, however, Pakistani political forces failed to manage country. That led to spread East Pakistan and Bangladesh. This opened the door for military to practice in political level.

**Stage of the military direct political role and political Islam correlation**

The political role of military in Pakistan connected with Islamic politics. There was strong ties with the Islamic group that participate in the first form of Zia ul-Haq, who announced that the government's mission is to apply government with Islamic Sharia.[[14]](#footnote-14)

Zia ul-Haq played mediator role between Government of the United States and Afghan Mujahideen who supported them from the Pakistani army and ISI against Soviet Union. He announced that the Islamic Sharia is the top source of law in Pakistan.[[15]](#footnote-15)

This trend has angered the Shiites in Pakistan they were then about 8 million people and declared that they do not accept the new laws. Zia's rule ended with his death in an explosion plane crash, according to Pakistan's constitution recognizes Ghulam Ishaq President of the National Assembly presidency temporarily until the new elections.

This stage shows direct correlation between political role of the military in Pakistan and the increase or decline in the relative importance of Pakistan in the context of the US strategic relationship. Islamic orientations of Pakistani society play a specific role for level alliance relationship with the US.

**Stage of return indirect political role of military**

There was election 1988, with the participation of the Pakistani political forces including the Islamic group, and resulted in the victory of the People's Party led by Benazir Bhutto[[16]](#footnote-16). She faced strong opposition from party of Muslim League led by Nawaz Sharif, and other conservative Islamic forces. In 1990 the head of state Ishaq Khan gave her resignation. [[17]](#footnote-17)

Elections were held in 1990 by Muslim League, led by Nawaz Sharif, also face corruption charges. In 1993 there was elections wining People's Party back to power, headed by Benazir Bhutto, who was allied with the military in the face of the Islamists, but she lose the 1996 election and win PML led by Nawaz Sharif, who served as prime minister in February 1997 until 1999 when Musharraf the army chief withdraw him and was exiled to Saudi Arabia.[[18]](#footnote-18)

From 1988 to 1999 it is clear that there was absence of political stability and indirect intervention of military in political system. It has seen four elections, and five dissolution of Parliament that’s didn’t complete any legal duration of the Parliament. Also, dismiss of prime minister and resolve the Council, premiership took by both Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. It was the main reason to dismiss the government and dissolve parliament of corruption and mismanagement of the national economy. The army intervention in 1993 to resolve the conflict by making new elections and with arrival of Nawaz Sharif to power again in 1997. There was a constitutional amendment reducing the authority of President and dismiss the Prime Minister.

**The return of the military to the rule**

After ousting the democratically elected government of Nawaz Sharif and assuming charge in 1999, Musharraf made the routine declarations about introducing "real democracy" in Pakistan and restoring the democratic processes through free and fair elections. However, once in power, he behaved exactly in the same manner as the preceding military governments under General Ayub Khan and General Ziaul Haq. He set about systematically consolidating his own power base by declaring a state of emergency and suspending the Constitution and further ensured by a special decree that his actions could not be challenged by a special court[[19]](#footnote-19). In 2002, he sought political legitimacy through a controversial referendum and secured a mandate of five years in office as President. Secure in his new position, he effected a key constitutional change, restoring the power to the President for the dismissing the National Assembly. Simultaneously, he also put in place a military dominated National Security Council, which gave the military an unprecedented institutional role in the country's governance. In the event, the new civilian government that came to power following the 2002 elections remained intrinsically important, as President Musharraf continued to exercise formidable power while holding the dual offices of President and Army Chief.[[20]](#footnote-20)

Therefore, since 1947, the military has captured the civilian government of Pakistan in four times. The first military coup was led by General Ayub Khan in October 7, 1958, which continued up to 1968 for eleven years.

The second military overthrow was led by General Yakhya Khan in 1969 and holds his power up to 1971 for two years.

The third military d’état’ was led by General Zia-ul-Haq on 5th July, 1977 and he remained a powerful dictator in the country up to 1988 for eleven years, but unfortunately, he died in the accident of airline crashed on 18th August 1988.

The fourth military takeover was led by General Pervez Musharaf on 12th October 1999 and he ruled in the country up to 2001, for twelve years.

**Democratization of military**

The purpose of military as an institution is to defend the country from the internal and external threats, but it perform the job of common things such as economic growth and political power. In this way, military creates the political environment which has become more powerful[[21]](#footnote-21). This situation is influence the military’s attitude and become the rational ruler, although the practice of military involvement is related to the politicians and bureaucrats.

In a democratic setup the construct of healthy civil military relations would mean supremacy of the elected civilian government over the military. However, the situation in Pakistan is quite different because it has been under military control for more than half of its existence. In fact, Pakistan has been one of the main military authoritarian exceptions to the global pattern of democratic resurgence. The country experienced its latest military coup in 1999, which was followed by eight years of military government[[22]](#footnote-22). Until 2013, Pakistan did not experience even one democratic transfer of power from one democratically elected government that had completed its tenure to another[[23]](#footnote-23). All its previous democratic transitions have been aborted by military coupes.

The military's prominent and long lasting role in politics has dealt major blows to the process of democratization in Pakistan. The military has either directly intervened to overthrow governments or has limited the authority and autonomy of elected governments. Military coups and rule have deepened the country's structural problems from weak state capacity to economic underdevelopment by preventing solutions through the political process[[24]](#footnote-24). In other words, the military has repeatedly intervened to arrest the normal development of Pakistani' democracy.

The first democratic transfer of power in May 2013 could well holds the key to a more democratic future. Although, the challenges including a domineering military and resource constraints are may and complex , democracy might have a better chance of consolidation if elected governments can deliver on public expectations , solidly move toward resolving Pakistan's urgent problems and together with the opposition , respect democratic and constitutional to maintain both democratic and performance legitimacy and thereby deny the military the opportunity to exploit political divisions and assume responsibility for the direct or indirect conduct of civilian affairs. [[25]](#footnote-25)

**The political decision-making process**

Focusing on the political decision-making process rather than simply "civil institutions" as accordance indicator gains relevance in Pakistan. The Pakistani armed forces initially did not want to challenge the legality and form of the British inspired parliamentary institutions. The unfortunate saga of the early Pakistani story was that there was plenty of political talent individuals who had acquired parliamentary experience under the British Raj. The Bengali community, for example, had the most experience with democracy, but even they were not successful at creating that important shift toward constitutional government. In Pakistan, there was hope among the citizenry and the initial founders that a constitutional democracy, would be preferred political decision-making process that would keep the military professional and abiding by civilian authority[[26]](#footnote-26). Pakistan's discordance and successive military coupes resulted from the governments and the military's inability to create the institutional stability, cultural and ethnic integration needed to fuse agreement over the role of the armed forces. [[27]](#footnote-27)

 Nevertheless, even after seizing power from civilian authorities in 1958, General Ayub Khan was concerned about legality of his initial action and the subsequent acts that his subordinates committed under the rubric of martial law ( Cohen, 1984). This was the situation of ten years of political interlude forced professional and Westren-trained generals to enter politics. As a result of their exposure to the concept and reality of civilian control in British India, they remained concerned about the institutional viability of the state.

Ayub's "Basic Democracies" was established to create a more effective political decision-making process and to enable the military to have a more secure role and mission. While Ayub opposed an elaborate parliamentary democracy, his new system, which resulted in a 1962 constitution, created as indirect electoral system whereby local governments and union councils would impose taxes and initiate rural development such as education and sanitation programs[[28]](#footnote-28). The urban centers had a similar structure whereby municipal laws were established to fulfill them.

The stable political institutions were sacrificed for domestic military conflict that alienated the Bengali population, fomented civil war and ultimately resulted from British colonial rule[[29]](#footnote-29). The culture of military traditions inherited from British colonial rule continued in Pakistan. This was the reflected in the recruitment of the officers and rank file soldiers. Pakistan also failed to reconcile the state's Islamic identity with its political and military infrastructure.

According to many factors that greatly contributed to strengthen the army and its political role was the underdevelopment of the political system. The military’s increasing political role in turn contributed to the weakness of civilian elites and further delegitimized them. Politicians themselves contributed to the military’s politicization by asking it to intervene to quell ethnic and religious revolts and to settle political differences. Both the Bengali revolt in 1971, and the Baluchi revolt in 1973-77 were repressed by the army.[[30]](#footnote-30) The Pakistani military gained strength also as a result of wider geopolitical circumstances. The emphasis on defense as mentioned was the product of tensions with Afghanistan and of security calculations and fears stemming from the relationship with India.[[31]](#footnote-31)

This current situation in Pakistan also illustrates the close connection between international relations and civil military relation. Pakistan's failure to contain tribal conflict and Taliban activity ultimately poses a threat to countries outsides its borders the United States, neighboring regions and other countries worldwide, all of whom see Taliban activity as a major threat to their own national security[[32]](#footnote-32). Most obviously, these conflicts create political, economic and societal tension within Pakistan itself that foster a context for discordance rather than concordance.

**Pakistan Islamization & army**

Pakistan was created on the basis of Islam and therefore the ideology of the Muslim state should logically have been Islamic in content and nature. However, Muhammad Ali Jinnah only used Islam as a tool for political mobilization or a rallying point to infuse a sense of purpose and unity among the Muslim masses of British India in order to achieve the objective of a Muslim state. As Jinnah was an acknowledged secular Muslim, Pakistan also reflected his political personality till the 1950s[[33]](#footnote-33). The advent of the Ayub era in Pakistan was also secular in character along with an emphasis on economic-development rather than politics.

Towards the end of the 1960s religion-political parties propagated the concept of the "ideology of Pakistan" when radical movements emerged to threaten the social order in West and East Pakistan. These parties articulated the view that ideology was a comprehensive one derived from Islam and therefore merited the loyalty of all Muslims[[34]](#footnote-34). This period witnessed the rise of the Jamaat- Islam's ideology among the intelligentsia.

Ziaul Haq's intentions to implement Islamicization , but he initiated this process with his own constituency namely the army. This explains the rationale over why the Pakistani army underwent Islamicization. Also, it highlights the internal and external dimensions, to the Islamicization of the Pakistan army wherein the internal aspect pertained to the imperative for legitimization of his rile and the external dimension related to Soviet military presence in Afghanistan besides Pakistan's bilateral relationship with Saudi Arabia that has a strong military element.

Ziaul Haq's successors both military and political made frequent references to Islam in public and thereby their public pronouncements amounted to an official sanction for Islam[[35]](#footnote-35). The Pakistan Army initially attempted to inculcate the Islamic spirit among its soldiers through the concept of jihad. As result, the fallout of the Pakistan Army's linkages with Islamicist groups during the 1980s and the 1990s was a coupe d'état by two senior officers. This refers to Major General Zaheerul Islam Abbassi and Brigadier Mustansir Billah who led a group of 36 army officers in their abortive attempt in 1995[[36]](#footnote-36). The fact that these officers were arrested and deemed to have broken the law proves that the state only pays lip service to Islam and dose not in reality support Islamicization and to that extent underlines the contradiction that characterizes the relationship between the state and military in Pakistan.

The Pakistan Army's Islamic orientation stems largely from its India-centric military policies. Importantly Islamization includes the use of religion by the Pakistan Army in war against a numerically superior enemy that is synonymous with Indi. This refers it the famous battles of Uhud and Bader that Prophet Mohammed fought and highlighted in the history of Islam. Importantly it assumes an added relevance given Pakistan's perception of India as an ideological and military threat coupled with the problem of numerical inferiority.[[37]](#footnote-37) To that extent, an emphasis on the holy war or Islamic wars proves useful to inspire Pakistani troops to fight their battels without taking into consideration the size of enemy force levels. Thus the Pakistan Army seeks to establish parity and equality through recourse to religion and in the process compensate for its inherent military weakness in relation to India. President Prevez Musharraf proclaimed in an interview that Pakistani soldiers and officers are molded by religion, which gives them the internal strength to defeat their enemies.

The Islamization of the Pakistan Army implies its penetration by the county's oldest most organized religion-political party and Jama'at-Islami(JI). The JI chose to develop Islamist sympathizers within the army in order to obtain support from them to establish an Islamic state in Pakistan.[[38]](#footnote-38) Similarly, it also forged bonds with individuals in the bureaucracy and the clergy who were sympathetic to their ideology.

Therefore, the Islamicization process was two fold in the sense that the Pakistani military personnel emerged as born again Muslims on one hand and on the other military at an institutional level attempted to promote Islam particularly in the battlefield.[[39]](#footnote-39) While these Islamic initiatives have a domestic dimension there is also a foreign angle to the role of religion in the Pakistan Army. The Pakistani armed forces relationship with religion has extra territorial interests and implications. [[40]](#footnote-40)

**Prime minister & military leadership relation**

The army has largely remained outside civilian control, the main democratic instrument for exercising political authority over the military has been the prime minister 'prerogative of appointing army chiefs from a list provided by general headquarters. Regardless, successive prime ministers have miscalculated by selecting officers to the post of chief of the army staff on the basis of their perceived political or ethnic affiliations and preferences. The main assumption behind such decision appears to be that officers from ethnically underrepresented groups an Urdu-speaking General Pervez Musharraf or a less influential Arian Punjabi migrant from Indi, General Ziaul Haq , will find it hard to plot against civilian government because of their inability to forge and mobilize internal support networks. An army chief's social or ethnic background or personal political views are not inconsequential for the military's involvement in politics.[[41]](#footnote-41) However, in any bureaucratic organization, where one stands depends primarily on where one sits. When the organization at hand is a disciplined army, focusing on individual officer characteristics detracts from the organizational drivers of military behavior. From the standpoint of military politics, it does not necessarily matter whether an officer is a Punjabi or a Muhajir, socially liberal or conservative, secular or Islamic.[[42]](#footnote-42) The institution often matters more. Pakistani's past military rulers General Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan, Zia and Musharraf were quite different from grounds. However, when they subverted constitution, stole elections, silenced dissidents. For example, in Yahya's case , presided over horrific atrocities inflicted on Bengalis in East Pakistan , they were all acting in their capacity as chief of the army as an institution.

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif allows the military direct access to the chief executive and enable it to assert autonomy from any ministerial supervision. In fact, event when appointed, the minister is generally kept out of the loop. According to a former defense minister, files pertaining to the military are dealt with by the security and returned to the army without ministerial input. The military considers the MoD as its administrative arm. The ineffective defense ministers is not for the prime minister to concentrate defense matters in his or her hands rather is to appoint an influential and competent politician to the post.[[43]](#footnote-43) However, the military may find it hard to believe that such politician exist in Pakistan within the broader context of democratic governance. Therefore, this would at least in theory help convince the generals that the minister derives his or her authority directly from the head of the government and respected within the ruling party and the cabinet.[[44]](#footnote-44)

**Future expectation**

Democracy cannot be safe in the long run if the military continue to hold non-democratic attitudes and beliefs. In a break from the Musharraf , military professional training no longer it instills the appropriateness of a direct governing role for the military. However, it continues to inculcate the norm among senior officers that the military has a border professional vocation, including its role as the ultimate guardian of an expandable realm of national security pivoted on India and to a lesser degree, Afghanistan. Pakistan's armed forces to civilian authorities has important international security implementation.[[45]](#footnote-45) Pakistan's military is not control national security decision making and thus blocked feedback from multiple civilian channels, including the foreign ministry. Perhaps a more damaging dimension of the military intervention in the polity of Pakistan which has had a direct impact on its democracy is the alliance between the military and the Islamist.[[46]](#footnote-46) This resulted in the building up of the Jihadi infrastructure in Pakistan, once again supported by the international community now responsible for rising religious extremism, intolerance and radicalization of the Pakistani society.

For the future of democracy in Pakistan there must be solid foundations laid in the past. This has not happened and the fault is not entirely with the politicians. Political history of Pakistan has portrayed a completely negative picture of democracy and that is why our layman has always invoked and appreciated a military regime. About 54 years of Pakistani existence, the military has been involved in politics of the country. Moreover, political regimes in Pakistan are perceived to be less capable of defining, negotiating and securing national strategic interests as compared to military regimes.[[47]](#footnote-47) Therefore, when compared with civilian ones, the military regimes tend to be more determined, assertive, decisive and risk-taking in shaping the state’s domestic and foreign policies. The present regime is no exception to that and tends to define and pursue national strategic interests in terms of a military-economic view of security.[[48]](#footnote-48) Furthermore, American demands on democratization sometimes. In this case, the military to military relations between Pakistan and the United States can be one of the key factors in explaining Pakistani relations with the United States.[[49]](#footnote-49) Consequently, this relation might support the military regime financially, politically, diplomatically and even by the international media. In the short term, military rule does provide some relief to public institutions through various political, economic, and administrative measures.[[50]](#footnote-50)

**Conclusion**

Pakistan is a nation for only fifty-five years, has had a turbulent history. Ruled by the military for half its existence. Musharraf has become the first Pakistani leader in thirty years to dare to confront the country's Islamic extremists. But can he succeed in controlling the forces that helped create the Taliban in Afghanistan. The history of Pakistan from 1947 to the present, most Pakistanis have a moderate tolerant vision of Islam and the country's central institutions are so weak that the military regime may prove incapable of rescuing the "failed state" of Pakistan. The long term success of democracy is intrinsically linked to changing the military's tutelary beliefs.

Pakistan’s military will not always get directly involved in politics. Over time, the military could become less consumed by internal challenges and regaining political space to engage more directly. In addition, public and institutional appetites for military intervention usually rise, peak and fall. The governments of military rulers Zia ul-Haq and Pervez Musharraf both lasted this long[[51]](#footnote-51). If there is indeed a "generational" quality to military rule in Pakistan, then another five years of a poorly performing civilian government could create opportunities for an unpopular military to reenter Pakistani politics.

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