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# ARMY RULE IN PAKISTAN:
# A CASE STUDY OF A MILITARY REGIME

A Thesis Presented

By

Marguerite Maude Riley

Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts in
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

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Political Science

# ARMY RULE IN PAKISTAN:
# A CASE STUDY OF A MILITARY REGIME

A Thesis Presented

By

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August 1978

FOR MY MOTHER

# ACKNOWLEDGMENT

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# PREFACE

During the last two decades there has been an increase of military interventions within, and military rule over, states in the third world. There was a rush of military interventions in 1958--Pakistan, Iraq, Burma, etc. Military governments today control about half the developing states. The forcefulness with which military officers justify their coups in terms of eliminating the chaos, inefficiency, and corruption of their civilian predecessors, and the need to get on with the modernization of society, might suggest that the military were a progressive force. They offer to regenerate the society in short order and to reconstruct the polity along more just lines. Do they succeed? Do they bring about national unity, progress, and modernity? Do they pursue policies of socio-economic change and reform? Or do they inhibit social and economic development? These are only some of the questions that are of obvious interest because of the number of military governments in the developing states.

In this thesis, we shall focus on the military regime which existed in Pakistan and examine the actual workings of its policies and institutions. We do so because the

military regime in Pakistan provides a very adequate example of military government, and also meets the selected criteria necessary in studying military governments.

A military regime is an appropriate case study if it has been in power for considerable time. Also it should have run its course. This does not mean that the regime must have fallen before it can be studied, but that something of a landmark must have passed that clearly distinguishes the period before from that after. The military regime in Pakistan existed for a decade which is an adequate enough time in which to observe its accomplishments and liabilities.

Various data sources, covering the years 1958-1971, have been employed. They include primarily newspapers, government and research publications. The data obtained from these sources is subjected to an interpretative analysis. We shall attempt to question certain views about the military as a nation-building, modernizing, and stabilizing agent. We shall examine the nation-building activities of the military and its role in the politics of Pakistan during 1958-1971. Perhaps we can learn the major limitations of military regimes and the factors which limit their political capacity by studying an

example, i.e., Pakistan. The failure of modernization and political development has been evidenced in many developing states that have civilian regimes. Our concern would be to show that the militaries are subject to failures too, and that their failures can be traced to specific consequences of military coup and rule.

# CHAPTER I

## THE MILITARY AND THE NEW NATIONS

One characteristic of Asian politics over the last twenty years, has been the influence of the military on the course of political change. The military has either actually assumed political power or is playing a political role in collaboration with political elite. Out of twenty independent states of Asia there have been successful coups in Pakistan, Thailand, Burma, South Korea, South Vietnam, Laos, Indonesia, Cambodia and insurgencies and uprisings in most of the remaining Asian countries. A look at the African map shows a similar picture of an increasing number of military take-overs. Algeria, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Togo, Uganda, Nigeria, Dahomey, have witnessed successful coups. The military has also been playing a vital political role in a number of Middle Eastern countries, as evidenced by coups in Turkey, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Yeman and the Sudan. In Latin America few countries have escaped military rule. Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, and Peru are

are amongst those Latin American countries which have suffered coups and counter-coups at one time or another.

According to S. Finer, as of December 31, 1974 the countries governed by men who came to power as a result of military intervention numbered thirty-eight. This represented twenty-five percent of the world's one-hundred and fifty independent states and comprised some fifty-five percent of the population of Latin America, nearly two-thirds of the population of the Arab states of North-Africa and the Middle East, and a like proportion of the population of sub-Saharan Africa.[1]

Despite diversity in the impact of military intervention in politics, most political scientists agree that there is a great similarity in the political culture and socio-economic conditions of the states witnessing the rise of the military to political power. These states are popularly known as the developing nations or the underdeveloped nations or the new nations.

The very terms "new nations" and "underdeveloped" or "developings areas" reflect an assumption that similar political, economic, and social problems and goals characterize a host of states in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

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[1]For a detailed chronological checklist of military interventions 1958-1974, see Samuel Finer, The Man On Horseback-The Role of The Military in Politics, Harmondsworth-Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1975, (paperback edition) pp. 269-273.

These are socities with low levels of economic productivity and high degrees of social cleavage. These nations are marked by horizontal and vertical cleavages in their social structure. On the horizontal level, linguistic, ethnic and regional diversities create problems in the political system. On the vertical level, there is a wide gap between the Westernized elites and the illiterate masses, between the rich and the poor.[2]

The lack of unity in the new nations manifests itself in a number of ways. Certain sections of the population refuse to submit to the authority of the central government or they demand special safeguards to protect their rights. There is also a demand for maximum autonomy or independence. These manifestations reflect mutual distrust and lack of national identity which raises its head once nationalist sentiments developed in the last phase of the independence movement start disappearing. The basic objective of the leaders of the new nations is not to convert these diversities into a uniformity but a congruence of diversities leading to a unity in which both varieties and similarities are maintained.

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[2]For a discussion of gaps, see Edward Shils, "The Military in The Political Development of New States," in John J. J. Johnson, ed., The Role of The Military in Underdeveloped Countries, Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1962, pp.14-33.

The lack of unity challenges the hold of the government over certain areas. On occasions the government has to resort to force to keep the fabric of the state intact. Such actions do not always produce the desired results. Burma, Indonesia, Pakistan, India and numerous other nations have been seriously threatened by ethnic, regional and linguistic challenges. Pakistan's experiment in nation-building, unique in the history of the new nations, failed in 1971 when East Pakistan broke away and transformed itself into Bangladesh.

## The State of The Literature

The increase of military interventions within and military rule over states in the third world has led to an increase in scholarly works on the military in politics. There have been a number of essays on the military in new states [3] and studies in detail and depth of the military in a particular country. Most of the latter have been published as essays on the military of a geographic area.[4] There have also been selections devoted to the military

in anthologies dealing with modernization or development

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[3]Among the works which have taken a broad look at militaries in new nations and developing areas are: William Gutteridge, Armed Forces in The New States, (London: Oxford University Press, 1962); Morris Janowitz, The Military in The Political Development of New Nations, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964); Edward Shils, "The Military in The Political Development of The New States," in John J. Johnson, ed., The Role of The Military in Underdeveloped Countries, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962); Lucian Pye, "Armies in The Process of Political Modernization," Ibid.; Samuel Finer, The Man On Horseback, (New York: Praeger, 1962); Jacques van Doorn, Armed Forces and Society,( The Hague: Mouton, 1968); Wilson C. McWilliams (ed.,) Garrisons and Government-Politics and The Military in New States, (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1967); Henry Bienen, ed., The Military Intervenes, (New York: Russell Sage, 1968) and The Military and Modernization, (Chicago: Aldine, 1971) ; Robert E. Dowse, "The Military and Political Development," in Politics and Change in Developing Countries, Colin Leys, ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969); Claude E. Welch and Arthur K. Smith, Military Role and Rule, (Massachusetts: Duxbury Press, 1974); Amos Perlmutter, The Military and Politics in Modern Times, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977.)

[4]Among the country studies of the military are: P.J. Vatikiotis, The Egyptian Army in Politics, (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1961); Edwin Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin America, (New York: Praeger, 1961); J.C. Hurewitz, Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension, New York: Praeger, 1969); Ellis Joffe, Party and Army: Professionalism and Political Control in the Chinese Officer Corps, 1949-1964, Harvard East Asian Monographs, No. 19 (Cambridge,Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967); J. M. Lee, African Armies and Civil Order, (London : Chatto and Windus, 1969); Alfred Stepan, The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971); Phillippe Schmitter,

in new nations. Also collections of essays on the military in non-western areas have flowered.[5]

While the literature on civil-military relations is voluminous, most of the writings on military regimes do not emphasize military rule as government. Although much of the literature on the military is devoted to analyses of the preconditions and situations of military coups and take-overs, there has been little effort to relate the conditions of intervention to the subsequent performance of military regimes.

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Military Rule in Latin America, (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1973); Alan Wells, "The Coup d'etat in Theory and Practice: Independent Black Africa in the 1960's" American Journal of Sociology, 79: 871-887, (1974).

[5]See for example: Jacques van Doorn, ed., Military Professions and Military Regimes, (The Hague: Mouton, 1970); Bengt Abrahamsson, Military Professionalization and Political Power, (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1972); A.R. Luckham, "A Comparative Typology of Civil-Military Relations, " Government and Opposition 6 (Winter): 5-35, (1971); Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Morris Janowitz and Jacques van Doorn, eds., On Military Intervention, (Rotterdom: Rotterdam University Press, 1971); Edward Feit, The Armed Bureaucrats, (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1973); Catherine Kelleher, Political-Military Systems: Comparative Perspectives, (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1974); Kenneth Fidel, Militarism in Developing Countries, (New Brunswick: Transaction Inc., 1975).

Increasingly, attention has been shifting to analysis of the consequences of military intervention in the development process. Observers now try to evaluate the performance of the military as a ruling group; the militaries' capacity for maintaining stability, creating political institutions and achieving economic development and national integration are being studied. The role of the military as a modernizing force in society is now being examined. Some of this literature criticizes past approaches and some of it, on the other hand, confirms or even elaborates upon them, and some of it is raising issues to which little attention has been devoted at all.

The use of aggregate data and statistical analysis, for instance has been abundant. There is a growing case study, theoretical, and data-based literature dealing with military regimes and the consequences of military rule.[6]

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[6]Typical examples are: Eric Nordlinger, "Soldiers in Mufti: The Impact of Military Rule upon Economic and Social Change In the Non-Western States," American Political Science Review, 64 (December):1131-1148, (1970); Richard Li, "The Coup Contagion Hypothesis," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 19 (March): 63-68, (1975); R. Neal Tannahill, "Military Intervention In Search of A Dependent Variable," Journal of Political and Military Sociology, 3 (Fall): 219-228, (1975); Lee Sigelman, "Military Intervention: A Methodological Note," Journal of Political and Military Sociology, 2 (Fall): 275-281, (1974).

Recent studies also deal with civic-military relations, organizations and/or structures including bureaucratic aspects, and primary group relations (military roles, effectiveness, etc.) Studies of social origins and demographic character of armies and the officer corps as a profession have also been important.[7]

The middle class and modernization theses were put forth by students of development and stratification in the early 1960's as reasons for military intervention. Also a number of social scientists eulogized and exalted the modernizing ability of the military in the non-western nations, but by the early 1970's this view has lost its

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[7]See Joseph Strauss, "Historical Trends of Military Sociology," Paper presented at the Pacific Sociological Association meetings in April 8-10, 1971; Alan R. Millett, "Arms Control and Research on Military Institutions," Armed Forces and Society, 1(November): 61-78, (1974); George A. Kourvetaris and Betty A. Dobratz, Social Origins and Political Orientations of Officers Corps in a World Perspective, Monograph Series in World Affairs, Vol 10, Monograph No. 4/1972-73, Denver: University of Denver Press.

[8]See Lucian Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization," in John J. Johnson, ed., The Role of The Military in Underdeveloped Countries , op. cit.; Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin America, op. cit.; Edward Shils, "The Military in The Political Development of the New States," in John J. Johnson, op. cit.

appeal. More recently these theses have been criticized by many students of civil-military relations[9] who contend that there is no empirical evidence to substantiate the claim that the military more than the civilian elites are the carriers of middle class aspirations and modernization in their respective societies.

Most studies on military intervention examine the active role of the military in national politics and probe into its causes or consequences. Intervention of the military into politics is a multi-dimensional, persistent, and recurrent phenomenon. Many of the efforts to explain the underlying causes that predispose the military to take over the government have been inadequate. Most analysts ignore or are unable to penetrate into the covert ways and processes in which military managers lean to become coup-makers, rationalizers and usurpers of legal authority.

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[9]See for example: Charles C. Moskos and Wendell Bell, "Emerging Nations and Ideologies of American Social Scientists," The American Sociologist, 2 (May): 67-72, (1967); Irving L. Horowitz, "The Military Elites," in Lipset and Solari (eds.) Elites in Latin America, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967); Henry Bienen, The Military and Modernization, (Chicago: Aldine, 1971); Gabriel Ben-Dor, " The Politics of Threat: Military Intervention in the Middle East," Journal of Political and Military Sociology, 1 (Spring): 57-69, (1973).

One of the major debates about the consequences of intervention concerns the ability of the military regimes to serve as effective agents and brokers of social change and modernization in their respective societies. Regarding the latter, two general but opposing views have been offered, one which sees the military as an energizing and modernizing force and the other which stresses the inability and limitations of the military in creating a viable political institution for economic and social development.

This indicates that the political role of the military in the developing areas is not adequately analyzed by the simple characterizations currently employed in many scholarly studies as well as in popular works. Too often, military intervention in the politics of these nations is dismissed as "military dictatorship" or rule by the "military strongman" without full inquiry into the nature and dynamics of the political systems within which these phenomena appear.

One scholar stresses that if we can show that the military intervenes in a specific situation because it feels its own professional values are threatened and its corporate identity is at state, then we may be some distance toward explaining its subsequent actions as a ruling group. Similarly, if it can be shown that the

military, or an element of it, makes a coup because it has a specific program for modernizing society that it feels only it can carry out, then one may be able to more fully understand military performance as a governing elite.[10]

We are now at the point where important theoretical arguments against the position that the military is either an ideal or relatively good ruling organization to bring modernization to developing areas are being heard. And a number of case studies of military regime performance are casting doubt on some of the statements of the early 1960's. There has not yet emerged any clear synthesis of positions or arguments that have been dominant, and at no time has consensus been complete. When the reasons for military interventions are understood and the links between the military and other political institutions and social groups have been explored, one can better assess the prospects for the future evolution of the armed forces in society and can better judge their capacities to deal with specific problems.

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[10] See Henry Bienen, The Military and Modernization, (New York: Russell Sage, 1971), p. 28.

## Definition of Basic Concepts

Before we proceed any further, a clarification of basic concepts used in this study becomes necessary.

Military rule or Military regime. A country is under military rule when officers have seized power and made themselves politically supreme. Such power may be overt, in which case the generals or colonels make themselves the official rulers, or it may be covert, where real dominance by officers is masked by civilian puppets.[12]

The regime in Pakistan was a mixed civil-military administration. It is regarded as a military regime for it came to power through a military coup and the military remained the main supporting base of the regime. Two phases can be discerned in Pakistan's military period. The takeover by General Ayub Khan in 1958 represents the first phase. During 1958-1962 the regime was visibly military while after 1962 the military generally remained in the background. The second military takeover by General Yahya Khan in 1969 represents the second phase. The whole period will be analyzed because the regime's top leadership and overall performance remained unchanged.

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[11] Edward Feit, The Armed Bureaucrats, (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1973,) p. 5.

Military political power. Is defined as the overcoming of resistance in the making of decisions that have (or may have) consequences for the military establishment. Military political power is a multiplicative function of (a) resources, and (b) their mobilization. Resources are of two kinds, (1) structural and, (2) quantitative. The former having to do with the location of the military in relation to executive, legislative, and judicial positions in the state (the existence of paramilitary forces and the relationship between them and the military; and the relative unity or disunity of the military establishment); the latter with e.g., the amount of men, material, and economic investments with the military sector. The proportion of the gross national product spent on the maintenance of the military; the military participation ratio; and the proportion of industrial production devoted to the manfucturing of military goods [illegible]bilization here has to do with the multiplicative function of values, objectives and expectancy.[13]

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[13] See Bengt Abrahamsson, Military Professionalization and Political Power, (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1972,) p. 140. Abrahamsson formulates his definition of military political power from Blalock's Toward a Theory of Minority-Group Relations, (New York: Wiley, 1967,) p.110

Political development here refers to several dimensions of political performance, not just a single political role but multiple ones. We shall be concerned with major types of political roles and aspects of political behavior as the promotion of national unity and cohesion, consolidation of power, the building of formal political institutions and organizations, i.e., local government and village participation, political parties, and constitutions. We shall also direct our attention toward communication, representation, negotiation of interests and demands, the building of mass support for a regime with its goals and its policies.

Modernization here refers to a number of distinct and related processess of social and economic change: industrialization, urbanization, literacy, broadening of political participation, and increase in mass media circulation. Economic change here implies dimensions as the rise in per-capita income, increased production, increasing rates of productivity, broader distribution of national income, and so forth.

Effectiveness -- "The actual performance of a political system, the extent to which it satisfies the basic functions of government as defined by the expectations of most members of a society..."[13] We shall limit the

definition to the actual working of the military regime's policies and institutions.

## Variables Explaining the Coup d'etat

The focus of much research on the military in developing nations has been the military coup d'etat. The responsibility for this has been attributed to many interrelated factors and variables.

One is a set of variables relating to the susceptibility of the political system to the forcible seizure of power. Included are variables which refer to the general pattern of legitimacy within the society attaching to existing institutions of government and defining the appropriate means by which authority within the system may be transferred. Samuel Finer's summary of the political regimes vulnerable to military coups is typical. He suggests a classification of the countries according to the maturity of their political culture. He discusses countries of "developed," "low," and "minimal" political culture.[14]

Other studies have emphasized variables which refer

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[13] Seymour Lipset, " Some Social Requisites of Democracy," in Roy C. Macridis and Bernard Brown eds., Comparative Politics, (Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1972,) p. 129

[14] Finer, The Man on Horseback, op. cit., Chapters 7, 8, & 9.

to broad and fundamental transformations of the system producing instability and thereby placing a greater premium on the use of force in politics.[15]

Or variables related to susceptibility of the system to forcible seizure of power may refer to specific phenomena more limited in scope or time, such as the emergency of an external threat to the system, or an event which discredits a civilian regime, or removes from the scene key elements. For example, in Pakistan, the death of the revered Mohammed Ali Jinnah in 1948, followed by the death of his protege, Liaquat Ali Khan, in 1951, were events which deprived the civilian government of their key leaders; these losses contributed to growing discontent and instability which were some of the factors which culminated in the military coup of 1958.

A second set of variables is that relating to the capacity of the military to execute a coup d'etat. The development of military establishments with modern skill, equipment, and weapons is a characteristic of the transitional societies of Asia. Such skills, equipment, and weapons--along with size--comprise what Lovell and Kim terms "political resources."[16] Coupled with other resources

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[15] John P. Lovell and C.I. Eugene Kim, "The Military and Political Change in Asia," in Henry Bienen, ed., The Military and Modernization, (New York: Aldine, 1971,) p.106

[16] Ibid., p. 107

prevalent among military establishments of contemporary Asia, such as relatively disciplined, cohesive organization, their political resources have given the military a capacity for forcible intervention in politics.

Case studies show that a unified military can take power with relative ease in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The military is thus a "heavy institution" in underdeveloped countries,[17] and can act with authority because it is first and foremost an institution of force with organizational features that give it the capacity to be effective in intervening against a civilian regime. Furthermore the military, is often, but not always, the most modern institution in terms of its advanced technology, educated elite, absorption of rational norms, and exposure to western influence.[18]

The military has then, become a critical institution and power bloc. In many new nations coups succeed because the public is relatively narrow and weakly organized, and public attachment to their political institutions is so fragile that they hardly question the legitimacy of takeover.[19]

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[17] Henry Bienen, The Military and Modernization, op. cit., p. 10.

[18] See Fred Greene, "Toward Understanding Military Coups," African Report, Vol. 2, Feb. 1966, pp. 10-14.

[19] Samuel Finer, op. cit., p. 118.

## Political Perspectives of The Military

Undoubtedly, the coup d'etat is the most dramatic form of participation by the military in politics. Yet seizure of the reins of government is by no means the only, or the most important, way in which military men and military groups influence politics. Perhaps more important are the roles which military groups play in the functions of political recruitment, political socialization, political communication, and the articulation and aggregations of political interests and demands.

During the 1960's emphasis was placed on the virtues of the military in non-western countries, Morris Janowitz argued that is is easier for the military to accumulate power than to govern as a ruling group.[20] He argued that while the militaries of new nations are more politicized than their western counterparts and may produce a cadre of political activists, the military does not have the appropriate political ideologies for rule. Janowitz maintained that pressure toward political involvement did not necessarily imply the development of skills appropriate

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[20] See Morris Janowitz, "Organizing Multiple Goals: War Making and Arms Control," in Morris Janowitz, ed., The New Military: Changing Patterns of Organization, (New York: Norton, 1964,) p. 29.

for ruling. It is difficult to disagree with Janowitz's contentions.

According to Von der Mehden, these military groups, inculcated with the values of order, efficiency, and discipline, wish to see these values applied to political life. Where the army has been in the vanguard for the struggle for independence, as in some parts of Asia, it may enter the political arena because of a belief that the ideas of the independence movement have been betrayed by self-seeking and corrupt civilian politicians whose factional quarrels have led to confusion and turmoil. Where reform, rather than independence, is the issue, the military often claims that it is only under conditions of stable government--such as the military can provide--that the desired level of economic and social advance may be achieved.[21]

Nevertheless, Lovell and Kim assert that there is not a direct link between the political behavior of the military and their political capability. Rather, in order to explain their political behavior one must examine also their political attitudes and beliefs.[22] Salient among these

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[21]Fred R. Von der Mehden, The Politics of The Developing Nations, (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1969,) p. 93.

[22]Lovell and Kim, op. cit., p. 106.

beliefs are the images which they develop of their own appropriate role and status within the society, and their perceptions of civilian elites and of the political system as a whole.

While there has been a trend toward "civilianizing" the military profession, the difference between military management and the skills of political leadership is still marked. Political leaders are men who specialize in verbal skills and in mass appeals. Military officers have limited contact with the outside public, and it is difficult to transfer military skills to a civilian political career. The argument is that specific military characteristics give the military establishment potential to assume political power but limit its ability to exercise such power.

In summary, the military of the new nations are more politicized than their western counterparts, and they may even produce a cadre of political activists. The process of education, recruitment, and the attendant emergence of professional cohesion all work to support this politicization of the military. Life career and indoctrination lead military personnel to a broad identification with national interest, but the military do not have

appropriate political ideologies. Janowitz contends that:

> While they are strongly nationalistic and orientated to collective and governmental enterprise, military officers are skeptical and even hostile to organized politics. They must learn the meaning of politics by actual experience. What is lacking in new nations is a basis of mutual trust between politicians and the military profession.[23]

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[23] See Morris Janowitz, " The Military in The Political Development of New Nations," in Wilson C. McWilliams, ed., Garrisons and Government-Politics and The Military in the New States, (SanFranscisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1967,) p. 78.

## The Positive and Negative Qualities of The Military as an Agent of Modernization

To understand the reasons for the military's success or failure, one must try to locate and analyze its main advantages and disadvantages as an agent engineering change and or modernization.

The scope of either success or failure to serve as an agent of modernization is primarily a function of the scope of the problems being faced by the political center. In this respect, there is no difference between military or civilian elites. Other things being equal, the military has some advantages and disadvantages.

By deducing from attributes assumed to be inherent in military organization, theorists have argued that military men have a greater predisposition to a modernizing outlook than members of other elites.

Many of the arguments about the organization and efficiency of the military are related to the assumption that members of the military are recruited from a comparatively modern, rational, and cohesive middle class.[24]

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[24]See Bienen, op. cit., p. 11.

Officer corps, it is stated, are generally recruited from bright and ambitious men from small towns and the countryside and from the middle and lower-middle class. Therefore they are inferred to be anti-aristocratic and opposed to special privilege, progressive-minded, and open to change and innovation.[25]

Generalizations about the social background of military officers are hazardous, since these can vary from country to country and within a country over a period of time. Statements such as the above may be based upon inadequate knowledge of class stratification in transitional societies. They are not correct for Pakistan for the majority of officers have been recruited from the upper strata of this society.

As Ann Willner points out, "even where officers may be predominantly from other than traditional elites, they may be less interested in effecting change and in reforming the existing class structure than in ensconing themselves in the existing elite."[26] She further stresses, that it

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[25]See Janowitz (1964,) op. cit., p. 28; Lucian Pye (1962,) op. cit., p. 83; Edward Shils (1962,) op. cit., p. 17.

[26]Ann Willner, "Perspectives on Military Elites as Rulers and Wielders of Power," Journal of Comparative Administration, Vol. 2, No. 3, November 1970, p. 271. For a sumarry of arguments against the validity of predictions of political behavior of the military on the basis of social background, see Bengt Abrahamsson, op. cit., pp. 57-58.

can be argued and probably demonstrated for a number of countries that military establishments import, adapt, and utilize technological innovations more quickly than other indigenously controlled organizations, but, the possession and operation of jet planes and radar equipment do not necessarily lead to the substitution of power looms for handlooms and mechanized farming for the hoe and bullock-drawn plough.[27]

Huntington argues that "modernization is not the product of any one particular group, however modernized that group may be in comparison with the rest of society. Rather it is the product of coup and countercoup in which military elements play important roles inaugurating both conservative and radical regimes."[28] His argument does not depend on the military being a comparatively modern organization in society. He states "that the Latin American experience suggests that the militaries are neither harbingers of modernization nor the defenders of entrenched oligarchies."[29]

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[27] Willner, op. cit., p. 272. For additional analysis of some of the arguments presented here in favor of or against the military as an agent of modernization, see Amos Perlmutter, "The Praetorian State and The Praetorian Army: Toward a Taxonomy of Civil-Military Relations in Developing Polities." Comparative Politics, 1(April): 382-404, (1969); Moshe Lissak, Military Roles in Modernization: Civil-Military Relations in Tailand and Burma, (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1976,) pp. 29-33.

From the foregoing analysis, it is not quite correct to say that the argument for the military as a modernizing force rests on the proposition that military groups have more modern attitudes and are more advanced than civilian elements. McWilliams reports that:

> Military organizations are vary rarely innovators, and that at best they follow changes initiated in other states or other sectors of society. Especially if the military organizations are isolated from external pressures for change, they tend to become bastions of organizational conservatism. All organizations show some tendency to defend established routines, techniques, and patterns of authority. But the military precisely because it is able to rule by force, if far more able to perpetuate such patterns than are civilian organizations. [30]

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[28] Samuel P. Huntington, " Patterns of Violence in World Politics," in Huntington, Changing Patterns in Military Politics, (New York: Glencoe, 1962,) p. 36.

[29] Ibid., p.36.

[30] Wilson McWilliams, Garrisons and Government, op. cit., p.20.

## Political Takeover

Janowitz distinguishes between two types of takeover: the first is designed militarism which is the premeditated search for political power, and the second is reactive militarism, which is the expansion of military power that results from the weakness of civilian institutions and the pressures of civilians to expand the military role.

The situation of takeover is crucial to the ability of a new military regime to consolidate itself in power and will affect the relative priorities of the regime. One way of specifying the conditions of takeover is according to the ease or difficulty and to the extent of acquiescence or resistance by other major political actors and by the general populace.[31]

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[31] Willner, "Perspectives," op. cit., p. 264-65. She gives the following specification in order of descending degrees of ease:

(1) Positive acquiescence. The military is invited in, and its entry is facilitated by the civilian head of of the previous regime. Thus, a certain amount of legitimacy is accorded to it by virtue of the conditions of transfer. Examples are Pakistan and Burma in 1958.

(2) Minimal or no resistance. The military is either welcomed in or its entry easily acquiesced in because of disaffection with the previous regime. Examples are Burma in 1962 and Ghana in 1966. Acquiescence and limited resistance may also be the consequence of partial de facto control by the military during the previous regime.

Finer suggests that there are four levels of military intervention in politics; influence, blackmail, displacement and supplantment. These levels of intervention are attained by various methods, alone, or in conjunction with one another. According to him, influence is a perfectly legitimate and constitutional method of convincing the rulers to accept their point of view. This is done through persuasion. When the military leaders threathen to use some sanctions, i.e., threat of violence or non-cooperation, should their advice not be followed, influence changes into blackmail. Displacement of one civil government by another civil government or supplantment of civilian regimes is achieved by threats to revolt, refusal to defend the government against civil disorder. The supplantment of

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(3) Limited resistance. There is actual resistance, although it is not necessarily violent, tacit resistance, or potential resistance by supporters of the old regime, mainly comprising civilian groups. An example is Egypt in 1952-1954.

(4) Considerable resistance. There is resistance to the takeover either by military elements other than the coup group, in addition to civilian resistance, or by other elements of the armed forces loyal to the old regime or competitive with and antagonistic to the coup group. In extreme cases, this situation can lead to civil or subcivil war. An example is Indonesia in 1965-1967.

civil government can also take place through military take-over with or without violence, commonly known as coup.[32]

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[32] See Samuel Finer, The Man On Horseback , op. cit., pp. 140-162. In addition to Finer's typology, the literature includes some other classifications: Janowitz's typology classifies all civil-military relations in four major models: aristocratic, democratic, totalitarian, and garrison state (see Janowitz, Military of New Nations, app.). Janowitz also distinguishes among the military as the instrument of sovereignty, the military as a partner in a political bloc, and the army as a ruling group. Kurt Lang distinguishes between limited intervention, occult intervention, and military takeover (see Military Institutions and The Sociology of War, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1972.) Henry Bienen describes the initial act of intervention (i.e., coups, rebellions, revolts,) the period after the seizure of power and the institutionalization of power. Similarly Edward Feit proposes a cyclical model through which military regimes pass: The military take-over, the military-civilian administrative alliance, cohesion without consensus (the praetorian regime), and finally the downfall and replacement ( see The Armed Bureaucrats, Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1973). For other typologies, see Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, pp. 195-237; I.L. Horowitz, " The Military Elites," in Elites in Latin America, S. Lipset and A. Solari, p. 168; David C. Rapport, " A Comparative Theory of Military and Political Types," in Samuel Huntington, Changing Patterns of Military Politics, New York: Glencoe, 1962, pp., 71-100.

The first consideration before the military after the takeover is to see that a firm control has been established all over the country and the decrees issued by them are effective. If it is not able to consolidate its position, it cannot take measures to fulfill the promises made at the time of takeover. The military either enters as a caretaker government or to introduce far reaching changes in the political, social and economic structure of the society and to give what they consider suitable form of government.

When the military acts as "constitutional caretaker," it generally does not try to effect any basic changes in the structure of political institutions. Rather it regards its role as that of establishing the conditions within which existing constitutional arrangments can be made effective. This situation is to be distinguished from those in which the military assumes power and endeavors to create new political institutions that, in the long run, will provide for effective civilian government.[33]

It cannot be taken for granted that armed forces are indeed perceived by their populations as the carriers of nationhood. The prestige of an army may not be transferable into legitimacy for rule. It is not simply that the

[33] See Fred Von DerMedhen, op. cit., pp. 94-100, where he distinguishes among: "The military as constitutional caretaker," "The military as spearhead of reform or revolution," and "The military as backer of civilian gov't."

army is ineffective as a ruler; the indigenous political cultures of traditional or modern sectors of a country may militate against army legitimacy.

Whether the army acts in a premeditated way or reacts to a breakdown of civilian rule affects its legitimacy as ruler. And whether an army coup calls into question the rule of a particular leader, a government, or the legitimacy of a state system determines in part the new pattern which will emerge.[34]

As agents of political change, the military cannot avoid the popular goal of increased economic activity and a higher standard of living. In fact, modernization is a more overriding political objective than establishing a claim to legitimate authority. But to modernize the economy of a new nation it is necessary to develop mass participation in new forms of social organization, ranging from village cooperatives to professional associations. If a prime political objective is persuasion rather than coercion, it becomes necessary to judge the effectiveness

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[34]See Janowitz, op. cit., p. 16,85, and 113.

of a military oligarchy in domestic politics in terms of the military's ability to develop or permit the development of a mass political base.[35]

How much political talent and legitimacy specific armed forces have is a matter for investigation in each case. Bienen suggests that what we can perhaps generalize about is the ability of the military to get down to the grass roots. If the military cannot do this, then by definition rule is limited. Also if the military is to rule, it cannot stand above politics but it must be a political actor. Thus, a major claim for the military--that it represents the entire nation and is perceived by citizens to be above political strife--ceases to be viable once the military gains power. It loses legitimacy as its claim to stand above conflicting groups is called in question. No longer can the military be convincing in its assertion that it embodies the essence of nationhood, for it appears to act simply as another claimant for power beset by its own internal divisions.

The decline of confidence in the government enhances the position of the military. The Generals, who despise the governments' handling of affairs, can resort to blackmail or overthrow the discredited regime as was done by their predecessors. Thus the story of military inter-

vention in a country does not end with one coup. Once the tradition of civilian supremacy is eroded and the military intervenes in politics, it cannot adopt apolitical posture.

# CHAPTER II

## THE MILITARY IN PAKISTAN

The military in India was organized on the modern lines by the British. It was in 1895 that the three armies of the presidencies of Bombay, Calcutta and Madras were amalgamated and put under the C-in-C of India.

The Governor-General-in-Council exercised executive authority over the army which, under the Charter Act of 1833, was responsible for the superintendence, direction and control of the civil and military affairs in India. The C-in-C was the head of the army and ex-officio member of the Governor-General's Executive council. In addition to the C-in-C, the Executive Council had a military member, who was advisor to the Governor-General (Viceroy) and was in charge of the Military Department.

The Government of India Act, 1919 brought about no change in the control of defense affairs of India. The Governor-General-in-Council, responsible to the British Parliament through the Secretary of State for India, had the control over the military and defense affairs. He was assisted by the C-in-C, who was also a member of the Executive Council and was entitled to attend the meetings of both the Houses of the Indian legislature established

by the act of 1919. The Indian legislature had no control over defense and defense expenditure. It served only as a platform where the Indian political leaders reviewed the government policy of excluding legislative control over defense, the use of the army to control political agitation and its use outside the sub-continent, and the pace of Indianization of the commissioned ranks of the army. They could not compel the government to accept any particular demand.

The Indian political leaders frequently demanded that the legislature be given control over the defense expenditure and the Defense Department be transferred to a Minister who would be responsible to the legislature. The British government, however, was not willing to depart from the existing pattern of military administration.

The Government of India Act, 1935 made no change of any consequence in the organization and administration of the military of India. During the British rule, subordination to the civil authority was emphasized as the cardinal principle of the organization of the military. The military served as an instrument to pursue the policies laid down by the civil government--the government in London through the civil authorities in India. The

military performed four major functions: The defense of India from external aggression, particularly from the passes of the north-west; the control of the Pathan tribes; participation in the military expeditions of the British government outside Indian territory; and the provision of assistance to civil administration to maintain law and order and restore authority.[1]

The Indian troops were used by the British government in military expeditions outside India. Prior to 1914, the Indian Army units had fought in Abyssinia, Afghanistan, Burma, China, Egypt and East Africa. During World War I, India's formations participated in the war in France, Egypt, Palestine, Iraq, Persia and East Africa. The story of World War II was not much different. The Indian army rendered outstanding service in Italy, North Africa, Abyssinia, Syria, Iraq, Burma, Malaya and Hong Kong.

Various social, political and educational reforms introduced by the British government created a class of people orientated to western ideas. The growth of an Anglo-India press, the introduction of local self-government and the railways brought about a mental revolution amongst this class of people. With the turn of the century, various other influences entered the Indian

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[1]Hasan Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1974), p. 24.

The experience of World War I and the ambition for Dominion status made the political leaders of the Congress and the Muslim League give serious thought to the problem of national defense. They stressed that their goal of Dominion status for India could not be realized if defense was permanently left in the hands of the British government. They demanded control over defense, resented the military expenditure--which constituted the largest single item in the budget--and demanded a speedy Indianization of the army. Despite their continuous efforts, however, Indian influence in defense matters remained minimal until the end of the British rule; and they had no direct experience in handling the affairs of the military.[2]

The Division and Nationalization of The Armed Forces

In 1940, the Muslim League formally adopted the idea of a seperate homeland for the Muslims of India as its objective. This was an expression of the desire of the Muslims to preserve and promote their culture and civilization and safeguard their national interests. The movement gained such a momentum that by the end of 1946 the

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[2] See Hasan Askari Rizvi, op. cit., p. 21.

the creation of Pakistan had become inevitable. This raised the question of the future of the armed forces of British India--whether the sub-continent would continue to be treated as one unit so far as defense was concerned and the new states of India and Pakistan would have a joint control of the armed forces; or the armed forces would be divided along with the division of the sub-continent.[3]

When the Muslim League put forward the idea of the division of the Indian armed forces, the British government did not welcome it. The Military High Command was of the opinion that the division of the armed forces would be suicidal for and institution which they and their predecessors had established with the hard labor of nearly two centuries. They claimed that the two armed forces would not be able to attain the degree of effeciency which marked the organization of the British Indian armed forces.

The Muslim League leadership was firm in its demand for the division of the armed forces along with the partition of the sub-continent. They were conscious of the fact that the new state of Pakistan would be dangerously enfeebled if she did not possess her own armed forces.[4]

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[3] Ibid., p. 25.

[4] Ibid., p. 26.

All efforts to keep the armed forces united proved useless. The British government not only acceded to the partition of India but also decided to divide the armed forces between India and Pakistan. The political leadership agreed to divide India into two states. The division of the troops was completed without much difficulty. By August 15, 1947, the future of the units had been decided.[5]

Characteristics of Pakistan's Army--Past and Present

As Fazal Muqueem Khan has pointed out, the Pakistan army in an "army young in years, but rich in tradition."[6] In Morris Janowitz's classification, it is an"ex-colonial army as contrasted with a "national liberation" or "post-liberation" army.[7] The Pakistan army, formed August 14, 1947 when Pakistan achieved independence, was created with approximately 150,000 officers and men previously part of Britian's Indian army.[8]

The military inherited the high standard of British training and experience of the two world wars. It was

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[5]Hasan Askari Rizvi, op. cit., p. 28.

[6]Fazal Muqueem Khan, The Story of The Pakistan Army, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 1.

[7]Morris Janowitz, The Military in The Political Development of New Nations, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 10-11.

[8]The figure is taken from "The Pakistan Army", Asian Review, Vol. LV: January 1959.

disciplined and cohesive and was perhaps one of the most organized institutions in Pakistan. According to Edward Shils, "of the new states, only India and Pakistan inherited large, well-trained armies experienced in warfare and governed by an officer class with a modern military tradition."[9]

Another factor making the Pakistan army tradition rather than revolutionary in outlook is that the leadership of the army has tended to be political conservative. Many officers are landowners or come from large landowning families.[10] Janowitz reported that "only two of a sample of fifty-three nation-states, Pakistan and, to a lesser degree, Egypt, could be said to have a significant number of officers recruited from aristocrats or landed gentry groups at the time of national independence."[11]

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[9] Edward Shils, "Armies in The Process of Political Modernization," in J.J. J. Johnson, (ed.) The Role of The Military in Underdeveloped Countries, Princeton: Princton University Press, 1962, p. 40.

[10] See Raymond Moore, "The Army as a Vechicle For Social Change in Pakistan", Journal of The Developing Areas, II (October 1967), p. 59.

[11] Morris Janowitz, op. cit., p. 50.

In spite of its traditional orientation, the Pakistan army was called upon to fulfill a wide variety of non-traditional duties. A series of national emergicies after independence contributed to the army's non-military activities. Floods and cyclones, locust invasions, crop devastation by wild boars, food shortages in East Pakistan and even smuggling operations all required army handling after civilian authorities found themselves unable to cope with these problems.[12]

The army was willing to support any government, and it helped the civil administration in the restoration of law and order. An important reason the army was called upon to involve itself in non-military affairs was that its public image was respected as compared with that of most other groups in the country. The army was apart from and above politics. It was honest and disciplined. The people, and even the politicians, regarded the army as patriotic, helpful and firm but fair.[13]

The army got the first chance to run civil administration directly in 1953, as a consequence of the outbreak of the anti-Ahmadi riots in the Punjab. In the

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[12]See Raymond Moore, op. cit., p. 60.

[13]<u>Ibid</u>., p. 60.

former province of West Punjab, religious disturbances were staged by a coalition of the Ulama and several political groups and punitive measures against the minority sect of Qadianis were demanded. Politicians, both for political and genuine religious reasons, were incapacitated from taking any decisive action. When mobs led by their leaders resorted to open lawlessness and destruction of public property, the army was called out and martial law was imposed in Lahore on March 6, 1953.

The martial law that was introduced ushered in a clean and efficient administration with prices under control, with goods available in the shops and with the streets and roadslooking clean. The army successfully brought the situation back to normal within a few days. Martial law was withdrawn on May 14, and the city was handed over to the civil administration.[14]

Thus, it is clear from the previous survey that the military had become involved in civil administration but did not assume a direct political role. The only instance which showed the direct interest of a section of the

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[14] Khalid B. Sayeed, "The Role of The Military in Pakistan," in Armed Forces and Society: Sociological Essays, edited by Jacques Van Doorn, The Hague: Mouton, 1968, p. 288

of the military in politics was what became known as the "Rawalpindi Conspiracy of 1951." On that occasion, a group of senior officers was discovered plotting seizure of government power, setting up a military dictatorship patterned after the Communist model, and allegedly planning the military conquest of Kashmir. Fourteen members of the conspiracy were found guilty and sentenced to terms of up to twelve years after the trial went on for eighteen months.[15] Later, because of public sympathy and the legal invalidation of the act under which they were tried, all were set free in 1955. The conspiracy had no effect on the morale of the armed forces, and the army as a whole remained loyal to the government.[16]

Thus, it may be concluded for a variety of reasons, that the traditional army of Pakistan had been called upon to perform a wide variety of non-traditional and non-military activities in order to help preserve, stabilize and build a new nation. With the passage of time, the dependence on the military increased. The limited but continued participation of the military in the civilian affairs made the military an important factor in Pakistan.

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[15] The accused were tried under: "The Rawalpindi Conspiracy (Special Tribunal) Act, 1951."

[16] For a discussion of "The Rawalpindi Conspiracy," see Keith Callard, Pakistan A Political Study, London: Allen & Unwin, 1958, p. 279.

Pakistan's Aid Relationship with the U.S.

In the early 1950's U.S. foreign policy was designed to "contain" communism throughout Europe, Asia and Latin America. To prevent Communist inspired "take-overs", the U.S. attempted to establish a series of defense systems designed to stregthen the capabilities of several "free world" nations to resist communism. The principal incentives employed by the U.S. to secure allies were economic assistance and military hardware, and training.[17] In February 1951 and February 1952, Pakistan received and increasing amount of aid from the United States, with the stipulation that it was to be used only in conculta-tion with the American government and with their approval. The agreement also made clear that Pakistan could not accept technical assistance from other countries "without the consent of the U.S. government."[18]

In exchsnge for a U.S. commitment to modernize the Pakistani armed forces, Pakistan agreed to allow the U.S. to use Pakistani territory for surveillance activities of

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[17] Robert LaPorte, Power and Privilege: Influence and Decision-Making in Pakistan, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975, p. 150.

[18] Tariq Ali, Pakistan: Military Rule or People's Power, London: Jonathan Cape, 1970, p. 72.

of the Soviet Union. In addition, Pakistan became a member of both CENTO and SEATO--defense arrangements intended to "contain" both the U.S.S.R. and the People's Republic of China.[19]

After the Sino-Indian Border war of 1962, Pakistan reassessed its relations with the U.S. The Chinese threat to India initiated a massive U.S. economic and military assistance effort to India. Aid to India and U.S. discussions of a "protective air umbrella" for India were seen by Pakistan as "acts of betrayal" by the U.S.

Even before 1962, Pakistan's military officers resented the fact that the U.S. kept a tight control over the flow of military aid so that Pakistan's military units were never kept in a state of full operation for more than a month or so. The officers complained that they were "beggars", completely dependent on the U.S.[20]

The U.S. military aid to Pakistan and India was cut off following the outbreak of war in 1965. This decision hit Pakistan harder than it did India because the Pakistan Air force was equipped entirely with American aircraft,

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[19] Robert LaPorte, op. cit., p. 150.

[20] Khalid B. Sayeed, op. cit., p. 286.

whereas India had started receiving American arms only since 1962.[23] With the traditional sources of supply cut off, Pakistan looked for new sources to secure equipment for the three services of the military. Besides purchasing arms from European countries, Pakistan secured military equipment through Iran and Turkey. China became an important source supply of weapons to Pakistan.

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[23] After India and Pakistan won their independence, they became involved in a bitter dispute over the status of the provinces of Kashmir and Jammu (now called Kashmir). Open fighting broke out. In 1949, the United Nations Security Council set up a five-nation special committee, which negotiated a cease-fire, set up truce lines and arranged for the demilitarization of the disputed area. This ceased the crisis only temporarily. The tension existing between the two countries burst out into a large-scale war in September of 1965. Fighting broke out between the armies of India and Pakistan in the Rann of Kutch on the frontier between the Indian state of Gujrat and the Sind area of West Pakistan. Pakistan succeeded in pushing back the Indian forces from the disputed area. The war came to an end on September 23, 1965, when India and Pakistan accepted the Security council resolution of September 20, 1965, calling upon India and Pakistan to cease fire. In January 1966, the contending leaders (Ayub Khan and Shastri) flew to a neighboring Soviet republic to sign the Declaration of Tashkent, agreeing to withdraw their troops from the disputed territory.

Defense expenditure rose more rapidly during 1962-70 than during the period of direct military rule in Pakistan (1958-62). During 1958-62, the peak level of defense expenditure was RS. 1112.4 million (1960-61), which represented a rise of 11% over the defense expenditure of 1958-59. The defense expenditure registered a steady increase from 1962 untill it reached its peak level in 1965-66, which represented a rise of about 199% over the defense expenditure of 1962-63. Although the percentage of defense expenditure to total expenditure was less than 50% during 1963-64 and 1964-65, the amount spent on defense was higher than in the previous years. After 1965-66, the defense expenditure went down from its peak level but it was more than double the expenditure of 1962-63. (See Tables 1 and 2) Defense expenditure has invariably been kept between 55 to 60% of the country's total revenue.[24]

The U.S. provided the bulk of military and economic assistance extended to Pakistan since independence. During the 1950's and 60's decisions taken in Pakistan, both in foreign and domestic policy areas, were made within the constraints posed by U.S. economic and military assistance. The bilateral relationship that developed between the U.S. and Pakistan since independence was cyclical in nature

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[24]Hasan Askari Rizvi, op. cit.,p. 159.

TABLE I

Defense Expenditure (1958-62)

| Year | Defense Expenditure (in million Rupees) | Percentage of the total expenditure |
|---|---|---|
| 1958-59* | 966.5 | 50.9 |
| 1959-60 | 1,043.5 | 56.51 |
| 1960-61 | 1,112.4 | 58.73 |
| 1961-62 | 1,108.6 | 55.80 |

* Covers the period of 15 months from April 1, 1958 to June 30, 1959.

Source: Hasan Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan, Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1974, p.160.

TABLE II

Defense Expenditure (1962-70)

| Year | Defense Expenditure (in million Rupees) | Percentage of the total expenditure |
|---|---|---|
| 1962-63 | 954.3 | 53.16 |
| 1963-64 | 1,156.5 | 49.49 |
| 1964-65 | 1,262.3 | 46.07 |
| 1965-66 | 2,855.0 | 53.67 |
| 1966-67 | 2,293.5 | 60.92 |
| 1967-68 | 2,186.5 | 53.63 |
| 1968-69 | 2,426.8 | 55.62 |
| 1969-70 (revised) | 2,760.0 | 53.35 |

Source: Hasan Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan, Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1974, p. 160.

with definite peaks and valleys. 1962 through 1965 was the period during which Pakistan received the largest amount of U.S. aid per capita, although the late 1950's and the first two years of the 1960's have been described as the zenith in U.S.-Pakistan cooperation and relations. Another high point in the relations (the early 1970's) coincided with a period in which only minor military assistance and a reduced economic assistance program (in per capita terms) existed.[25] (See Table III)

East Pakistan and The Armed Forces

As we have see, Pakistan inherited its military from the British Indian Military, one of its legacies being the recruitment policy from the so-called "martial races." These martial races were the Pathans, the Punjabi Muslims, the Sikhs, the Rajputs, the Dogras, the Garhwalis, and the Mahrattas. All these races lived in the northern and northwestern part of India with the exception of the Mahrattas.

The political and military experience in India and keeness shown by the inhabitants of certain areas to join the military profession, convinced them that certain races (i.e., the above) furnished fine fighting men and that

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[25]Robert LaPorte, op. cit., p. 143.

TABLE III

U.S. Government Grants and Credits to Pakistan

1953-1971

| Year | Amount (in U.S. millions) |
|---|---|
| pre-1953 | 8 |
| 1954 | 99 |
| 1955 | 12 |
| 1956 | 67 |
| 1957 | 154 |
| 1958 | 100 |
| 1959 | 145 |
| 1960 | 142 |
| 1961 | 229 |
| 1962 | 218 |
| 1963 | 323 |
| 1964 | 380 |
| 1965 | 377 |
| 1966 | 349 |
| 1967 | 221 |
| 1968 | 331 |
| 1969 | 282 |
| 1970 | 209 |
| 1971 | 239 |
| Total | 4, 101 |

Source: Robert LaPorte, Power and Privilege-Influence and Decision-Making in Pakistan, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975, p. 145.

certain races exhibited little or no aptitude for military service. They found it convenient to recruit the bulk of their army from the north and northwest of India. By the time power was transferred to the new dominions of India and Pakistan, it was generally believed in the military circles of British India that the South Indians (particularly the Madrasis) and the Bengalis were not as good soldiers as the Punjabis, the Pathans and the Gurkhas. This made the Pakistani military overwhelmingly West Pakistanian by origin.

The Bengali in East Pakistan formed the largest ethnic group (54% of the population). They are also very different from the people of the western wing in language, culture, social structure, demographic features and historical traditions. Bengal with a population of forty-five million (in 1930), provided 7,000 combatant recruits; the Punjab with a population of twenty million provided 349,000 suchrecruits.[26]

At the time of independence, there was no Bengali infantry, and no Bengali officer held the rank above that of a colonel.[27] Partition of the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent and the establishment of Pakistan further reduced the number of Bengalis in the army. The non-Muslim Bengali officers and men opted for India. Thus, East Pakistanis formed only 1% of the total strength of the armed forces in 1947.[28]

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[26] Report of the Indian Statutory Commission, Vol. I, London: His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1930, p. 61&97.

[27] Fazal Muqueem Khan, op. cit., p. 51.

The government attempted to do away with the British recruitment policy so that the people of all regions could have an equal opportunity to take part in the defense of the country. It was bogged bogged down, however, by the large number of political, administrative and financial problems immediately arising after the independence. With these conditions, the government did not make bold experiments for the realization of its objective; it adopted the policy of gradual induction of East Pakistanis in the armed forces.

After the 1965 war between India and Pakistan, publicity measures were increased to step up recruitment from East Pakistan. The Government also agreed to fix a quota for East Pakistanis in all regiments, but the details of the quota were not disclosed.

The government decided to raise the first exclusively Bengali infantry regiment. By 1968, four such exclusive regiments had been raised. These regiments had the distinction of being exclusively Bengali regiments. Ten more such Bengali battalions were raised in 1967-69. At the same time, recruitment in other areas of arms and services was also opened to East Pakistanis. These measures increased the number of East Pakistanis in the three services of the armed forces, but their representationtation was never in proportion to their population. (See Table IV)

[28] Hasan Askari Rizvi, op. cit., p. 176.

TABLE IV

EAST PAKISTANI REPRESENTATION IN THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT, 1963, (percentage of total)

| | Commissioned Officers | Junior Commissioned Officers | Warrant Officers | Other Ranks |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Army | 5% | 7.4% | | 7.4% |
| Air Force | 17% | | 13.2% | 28% |

| | Branch Officers | Chief Petty Officers | Petty Officers | Leading seamen and below |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Navy | 5% | 10.4% | 17.3% | 28.8% |

Source: Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan-Failure In National Integration, New York: Columbia University Press, 1972, p. 62.

The political leaders of East Pakistan criticized the government's recruitment policy and the measures adopted to strengthen the defense of East Pakistan. They characterized it as a deliberate attempt to keep the eastern wing dependent on West Pakistan in matters of defense and exclude East Pakistanis from defense services. They also took exception to defense expenditure, a large part of which was spent on the saleries of the soldiers and officers (most of whom were West Pakistanis) and the defense of West Pakistan.[29]

The debate on defense expenditure and general discussions on the budget in the National Assembly clearly reflected their displeasure over the policy of gradual induction of East Pakistanis in the armed forces. They became more bitter in their criticism after Ayub's martial law. The Ayub regime did not adopt any special policy to make the military more nationally representative. The military was interpreted as the symbol of West Pakistani or, rather, Punjabi domination. This widened the gap between the military and East Pakistanis.

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[29] Ibid., p. 178.

# CHAPTER III

## PAKISTAN AS A NATION STATE

The period from 1947 to 1958 has been labeled as that of parliamentary politics by many authors. An examination of this period's political and decision-making processes will provide clues to sucessive periods.

Power was formally transfered by the British on August 14, 1947, to a Pakistan Constituent Assembly. The Assembly was a small body elected indirectly by the provincial legislatures or the basis of one member for the population of a million. It comprised seventy members; of these forty-four were from East Bengal (later to become the province of East Pakistan), seventeen from West Punjab, five from Sind, three from Northwest Frontier Province, one from Baluchistan, and one each from Bahawalpur, Khairpur, and the NorthWest Frontier Province states. The first meeting of the Assembly was held on August 10, 1947, in Karachi. The next day it elected the founder of the new nation, Quaid-i-Azam (great leader), Muhammad Ali Jinnah, as its president.[1]

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[1] See Keith Callard, Pakistan-A Political Study, London: Allen & Unwin, 1968, p. 118.

While the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan was engaged in framing a constitution, the Assembly was also to act as the country's legislature. M. A. Jinnah was appointed Governor-General and Liaqat Ali Khan Prime Minister.

With the creation of Pakistan, Muhammed Ali Jinnah remained the leader above all others. According to one scholar:

> "As long as Jinnah was alive (he died September 1948), he was Pakistan. He held the position of Governor-General, but the powers and influence that he exercised were far beyond those normally associated with that office. The Cabinet rarely functioned without his directives. He was the supreme arbitrator between the Center and the provinces. His Prime Minister, Liaqat Ali Khan, emerged as de facto Prime Minister only after his death."[2]

Jinnah's decisions and desires became binding on the new nation-state of Pakistan. His personal style was incorporated into the new office of Governor-General, which established that office as one of unlimited and unquestioned power and authority.

In organizing the national government in the early days of 1947 and 1948, Jinnah relied heavily on the viceregal system developed by the British in pre-partition India. Under this system, heavy reliance was placed upon

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[2] See Khalid Bin Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967, p. 62.

the civil servants. Here the Civil Service (the bureaucracy) exercised their power with little interference from politicians.[3]

Jinnah's death on September 11, 1948, provided the first major shock to the country and a loss that proved irreparable. He was succeeded as Governor-General by Khwaja Nazimuddin, the Chief Minister of E. Bengal, but the real authority now moved to Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan, who was second in popular esteem to Jinnah.

After Jinnah's death, Liaqat, as Prime Minister, continued in attempting to establish a parliamentary format for politics nationally. He maintained his position as the leader of the Muslim League; and during his tenure as both party and national leader, the Constituent Assembly was the focus for national debate and decision-making. However, he was not able to achieve any real success in solving Pakistan's main problems. He was unable to institute a program of economic and social reform and unable to supress disruptive forces that had begun to emerge.[4]

Liaqat was assassinated October of 1951. After his death, Pakistan began to drift toward disruption, corruption and inefficiency. There was no obvious political successor to Liaqat. Khwaja Nazimuddin took over the

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[3]Khalid Bin Sayeed, op. cit., p. 63.

[4]See Damodar P. Singhal, Pakistan, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1972, p. 79.

Prime Ministership; and Ghulam Muhammed, a former civil servant and the Finance Minister, became Governor-General.

After four years of existence, Pakistan began to show signs of restlessness. The consitution had not been framed, and the Constituent Assembly had become a battle-ground of factional and regional disputes. The economy was in decline, there was a shortage of food, the dominant Muslim League had lost influence and politicians engaged in intrigue and squabbles. There was tension between East and West Pakistan, and a sense of disillusionment prevailed

In April 1953, Governor-General Ghulam Muhammed dismissed Prime Minister Nazimuddin on the grounds of incompetence following repercussions from the anti-Ahmadiya riots. Nazimuddin was replaced by Muhammed Ali Bogra. The Assembly, whose confidence Nazimuddin enjoyed, was hastily prorogued and was not recalled until September, by which time the new ministry was well established. Nazimuddin's unceremonious dismissal was the beginning of political instability that lasted for the next five years, and the emergence of the decline of parliamentary democracy in Pakistan. The political, legal and psychological repercussions of this action were far-reaching.[5]

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[5]Damodar P. Singhal, op. cit., p. 82.

The first major clash between East and West Pakistan came about in 1952 over the question of a national language. West Pakistan wanted Urdu, alone, to be the national language because it had become a symbol of Muslim nationalism and historical past. Proud of their own Bengali literary tradition, the East Pakistanis (Bengalis) were deeply disturbed at that claim and sought instead a recognition of Bengali as a national language. They asserted that more Pakistanis spoke Bengali than Urdu.[6] Only about seven percent of Pakistanis spoke Urdu, and it was not the language of any region of Pakistan.[7] The attempt was abandoned in 1954 after strong Bengali opposition, and both Bengali and Urdu were recognized as national languages.

The political situation at the Center was also unsatisfactory. Central politics could not be separated from provincial politics. Politicians participated at both levels and held membership in both the national and provincial assemblies. Consequently, a small group of about twenty individuals made all important political and governmental decisions at every level. In particular, they controlled the posts of central cabinet ministers, provincial governors and provincial chief ministers.[8]

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[6]According to the Census of Pakistan 1951, 54.6% spoke Bengali, 28.4% Punjabi, 7.2% Urdu, 5.8% Sindhi, 7.1% Pushto, and 1.8% Englsih.

[7]See Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan: Failure in National Integration, New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1972, p. 13.

[8]Keith Callard, op. cit., p. 26.

The proceedings of the Constituent Assembly were characterized by factional and regional rivalries; in particular, the Punjabi and Bengali groups engaged in a fierce struggle for political ascendancy. Relations between Governor-General Ghulam Muhammed and the Constituent Assembly became worse. The Assembly wanted to curb the power of the Governor-General. On September 20, 1954, it repealed the Public and Representative Offices (Disqualification) Act of 1949 (PRODA), which provided for the debarring from public life for a specified period of time, persons found guilty of misconduct in any public office or representative capacity.[9] They also rushed a bill without the prior knowledge of the Governor-General to amend the Government of India Act to ensure that he would not use the Act in any way to dismiss any other ministry. The Governor-General, upon knowing this, reacted sharply and dissolved the Constituent Assembly.[10] This resulted in the country being thrown into a serious political-legal-constitutional crisis. Concurrently with the dissolution of the first Constituent Assembly, the

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[9]See Hasan Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan, Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1974, p. 67.

[10]The Governor-General, while dissolving the Constituent Assembly, took the plea that it failed to produce a constitution in seven years and had transformed itself in a perpetual body, which had lost the confidence of the people.

Muslim League cabinet headed by Muhammed Ali Bogra was also dismissed. The Governor-General appointed a new cabinet, Muhammed Ali was asked to serve as Prime Minister. Nine other members, including Commander-in-Chief General Ayub Khan, Dr. Khan Sahib, H. S. Suhrawardy, and Major-General Iskander Mirza, were appointed to the cabinet. The army was brought closer to the administration; and the Civil Service, which was already a force in Pakistan politics, gained greater power.[11]

After more than seven years of existence, Pakistan was in a precarious condition. There was no legislature, no constitution, no unity among provinces and no political stability or recognized leadership. Most of this period was spent in trying to reach a constitutional consensus. During these years, the only institutional developments which occurred took place with the civilian and military bureaucracies; cabinents and prime ministers came and went, but the civil servants and the military leadership retained their positions of importance and power in the new state.[12]

Political parties were shifting combinations of political leaders, whose loyalty to a particular party were not based on principles but political and ministerial gains.

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[11] Rizvi, op. cit., p. 68.

[12] Robert LaPorte, Power and Privilege: Influence and Decision-Making in Pakistan, Berkeley: Univ. of Calif. Press, 1975, p. 41.

Keith Callard observed that:

> "Politics in Pakistan was made up of a large number of leading persons, who with their political dependents, form loose agreements to achieve power and to maintain it. Consequently, rigid adherence to a policy or a measure is likely to make a politician less available for office. Those who lacked fixed ideas but who control legislatures, money or influence have tended to prosper."[13]

The weak political leadership and ceaseless struggle for power shifted real political power from the National Assembly to the head of state (Governor-General previously, and President since 1956), and had a strong tradition of violating the norms of parliamentary democracy was established. The politicians were divided in so many camps that they were not able to adopt a united stand to restrict the greater concentration of powers in the hands of the head of state.

The composition of the second Assembly was quite different from that of the first in which E. Bengal had had the majority of seats; in the second, the two wings of the country were given equal representation. The seats totalled eighty--forty to be filled by East Pakistan and the remainder by the various units of West Pakistan. The members were to be elected by the existing provincial legislatures. The elections were held in June 1955, and the Assembly had its first meeting in July.[14]

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[13] Keith Callard, op. cit., p. 67.

[14] See Damodar Singhal, op. cit., p. 86.

No single party commanded a majority in the second Constituent Assembly. The Muslim League was still the largest group with twenty-six members, followed by the United Front (sixteen seats) and the Awami League (twelve seats). Chaudhri Muhammed Ali, elected leader of the Muslim League, formed a coalition ministry, comprising the Muslim League and the United Front.[15] The second Assembly functioned in much the same way as the first. In July 1955, Muhammed Ali Bogra was replaced as prime minister by Chaudhri Muhammed Ali; and in September 1955, Governor-General Ghulam Muhammed resigned due to illness. His replacement was Iskander Mirza.

An important measure of this new assembly was the establishment of the West Pakistan Act, passed in September 1955, which provided for the merger of the princely states, Karachi and four provinces--the Punjab, the Northwest Frontier, Sind and Baluchistan--into one unit called West Pakistan. A major consideration was to "balance" the political strength and maneuverings of East Pakistan by working out a solid West Pakistan against a solid East Pakistan. The one unit plan, met with widespread opposition, especially

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[15] The United Front was a loose coalition of the major parties--the Krishak Sramik and the Awami League--and several minor parties. All were united in their desire for autonomy for East Bengal (the province of East Pakistan) and their determination to secure the defeat of the Muslim League.

in the Northwest Frontier and Sind. The opponents contended that the plan would extinguish local cultures, and political identities, and that the largest group in the unit (Punjabis) would dominate West Pakistan. There was so much opposition that in October of 1954, the Governor-General dismissed the provincial governments of the Punjab and Sind. Agreement was finally reached on the basis that for the first ten years the Punjabis would get less representation than that to which their number entitled them--forty percent--the rest, sixty percent, to be equally divided between the Sindhis and Pathans.[16]

On February 29, 1956, the second Assembly adopted a constitution that came into force on March 23. The final debate and proceedings were marked by bitterness from those who were not members of the governing coalition. A number of opposition leaders and parties walked out of the Assembly in protest.[17] The constitution provided for a federa, unicameral and parliamentary system of government with a strong center, adult franchise and direct elections. The National Assembly was to have three hundred members divided equally between East and West Pakistan. An electoral college consisting of the national and provincial

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[16]Damodar Singhal, op. cit., p.172

[17]Keith Callard, op. cit., p. 121.

assemblies was to elect the president, in whom was vested executive authority in the conduct of which he was advised by the Prime Minister and the cabinet.[18]

The political situation in Pakistan did not improve after the introduction of the constitution. Pakistan still had no organized political life, and there were hardly any national political parties. Politics continued to be marked by strife and rivalries. The instability of the parliamentary period is witnessed by the frequent changes of prime ministers that occured. From 1947 until the coup in 1958, Pakistan had a total of seven prime ministers. From September 1956 until October 1958, four individuals occupied this position.[19]

In East Pakistan, the same conditions prevailed. All Bengalis were united in their resentment of the Center and West Pakistan, but they were divided into various groups. The United Front, Which consisted mainly of the Awami League and the Krishak Sramik Party, had collapsed; and both engaged in political rivalry.

The political scene became one of chaos. Both the Central and Provincial governments were short lived and

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[18]Singhal, op. cit., p. 87.

[19]Robert LaPorte, op. cit., p. 41.

ineffective, political parties declined and broke up into factions, and violence and corruption in public life gathered strength. The Punjabi politicians fought among themselves, as well as with Sindhis and Pathans. In West Pakistan, Khan Sahib, a political leader, was assassinated in May 1958; and in the East Pakistan legislature, the Deputy Speaker Shahed Ali was fatally injured in September of the same year during a fight between rival groups in the Assembly. The Speaker had already been declared insane and ejected from the House.[20]

Political confusion gave rise to a general feeling of economic insecurity, and by late 1958 the country was in the grip of an economic crisis. The rich hoarded food and smuggled gold. Foreign exchange holdings descended to the danger point. Food riots broke out in East Pakistan and labor strikes became common. Public morale and respect for political institutions lowered. The lack of leadership and regional tensions brought about the collapse of the short-lived experiment in Pakistani parliamentary government.

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[20]Hasan Askari Rizvi, op. cit., p. 92.

# CHAPTER IV

## THE MILITARY REGIME 1958-1962,

### Phase I

The disintegration of political life in Pakistan ultimately led to the military coup in October 1958. The military take-over and the declaration of Martial Law was completed in two phases. The first began on October 7, 1958. President Iskander Mirza abrogated the Constitution; dissolved the Central and Provincial Assemblies, dismissed the Central and Provincial Cabinets, banned political parties, and appointed General Ayub Khan as the supreme commander of the armed forces and Chief Martial Law Administrator.

Twenty days later the second phase started when the Army Generals forced Iskander Mirza to resign the office of the President so that "the new regime could dissociate with a person who was closely connected with the conditions which led to political confusion in the country." On October 27, 1958, General Ayub Khan combined in himself the offices of the President and the Chief Martial Law Administrator. He became the undisputed ruler of the country. He relinquished the office of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and appointed General Muhammed Musa as the new Commander-in-

Chief the same day.[1]

The military take-over in Pakistan was neither a revolution nor a revolutionary coup. It was a classic case of a "reform coup."[2] It was brought about by men who were already participants in the existing political system and who had had institutional bases of power within that system. Long before the coup, the military had been working as a partner in the civil-military bureaucratic coalition that held the key decision-making power in the country.[3]

A reflection of Ayub's experience as Commander-in-Chief of the Army was seen in his conviction that Pakistan's problems could be solved if things were properly investigated; right decisions made and enforced. When ever there was some serious problem concerning the reorganization of the army, he appointed an expert committee to study the problem. After the receipt of the report, he issued the necessary orders. He adopted this same method to eradicate problems of the political system. He appointed various commissions

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[1] Rizvi, op. cit., p. 94.

[2] S. P. Huntington, "Patterns of Violence in World Politics," in Changing Patterns of Military Politics, p. 33. According to Huntington in a reform coup "a combination of military and civilian groups seizes power intending to make reforms in the political, economic or social structure."

[3] Rounaq Jahan, op. cit., p. 52.

and committees to report on different matters and he sought to implement the recommendations of those commissions by Martial Law orders.[4]

Although martial law remained in force, the troops were soon relieved of their civil duties and ordered back to their barracks on November 10, 1958. The army largely depended on the civil administration (the bureaucracy), the steel frame of the old British administration, to run the country.[5] Their dependence on the civil administration was partly due to the limitations of the military to run the civil administration exclusive of the civil servants and partly due to the fact that the army consolidated its position without any difficulty. The civil servants who had in fact, run the government in the past, easily shifted their loyalties to the new leaders.

The military decided to remain in the background, while the civil bureaucracy was very visible. The civil servants were assigned to influential positions. "Of the two-hundred and eighty members of the thirty-three major commissions formed by the regime for the purpose of suggesting substantive policy changes, nearly 60 percent were

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[4]See Hasan Askari Rizvi, op. cit., p. 100.

[5]Lawrence Ziring, The Ayub Khan Era: Politics in Pakistan, 1958-1969, Syracuse N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1971, p. 12.

members of the civil-bureaucracy; only 6.4 percent were military; and 5 percent each were lawyers, judges, and scholars. Politicians comprised barely 1.4 percent of the comission's membership."[6] Civil servants not only had a monopoly over the policy-making jobs in the central and provincial governments but also gradually took over the differnet corporations and autonomous bodies. This operation of martial law through the civil machinery did not mean that the real power was in the hands of the civil service, rather "the army served as the brains and the civil servants as the hands of the new regime."[7]

The composition of the President's eleven man cabinet reflected a mixture of civil and military leadership and did not include any prominent politicians. Excluding General Ayub Khan, the cabinet included three Lieutenent-Generals, three public servants; one businessman; an educationalist, one former ambassador, a well known practicing lawyer from Lahore, and a young lawyer from Sind.

Martial law remained in force until June 8, 1962. During this time dissent was muted. President Ayub issued regulations prescribing severe punishment for anti-social activities including, smuggling, hoarding, black-

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[6]Rounaq Jahan, op. cit., p. 58.
[7]Hasan Rizvi, op. cit., p.100

marketeering, and abduction of women and children. Bank balences of the abolished political parties were frozen. Prominent politicians were detained. Anti-corruption councils were set up to hear charges brought against members of the civil service, and a Land Reforms Commission was organized in West Pakistan, to break the hold of the landed gentry. A rehabilitation committee was organized to tackle the refugee problem, and 40,000 new quarters were constructed in a new town called Korangi. Ayub set up the Law Reforms Commission on November 23, 1958 and on December 12 he announced the appointment of a commission on national education.[8]

One change in the elite structure under the new regime was the virtual removal of the political elite from power. As pointed out earlier, with the coup the constitution was abrogated, political parties abolished, and the established political process was completely halted. The regime held a very dim view of the politicians motivations and capabilities, and did not expect to share power with the political elite. In fact, some of the early measures of the regime were directed specifically against prominent political leaders. To eliminate their influence and to keep the

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[8]Lawrence Ziring, op. cit., p. 14.

politicians out of offices of responsibility, two orders, the Public Offices (Disqualification) Order (PODO) and the Elective Bodies (Disqualification) Order (EBDO) were promulgated in 1959. The terms of the PODO were not much different from the PRODA of 1949. It applied to all those who held public offices and were found guilty of misconduct and corruption. It was applied with retroactive effect from August 14, 1947. The former ministers, deputy ministers, parliamentary secretaries and members of legislative bodies charged for misconduct had the option to retire from public life for a period of six years beginning January 1, 1960 or to take their case to a special tribunal under the EBDO. The majority accepted the option to disqualify themselves and withdrew from public life. On March 5, 1960, the EBDO was amended to include all persons who had retired, resigned, or been dismissed from government service. Karl Von Vorys claims that "approximately 7,000 persons were excluded from political life."[9]

According to Lawrence Ziring, a constant theme remained during the Ayub era:

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[9]See Karl Von Vorys, Political Development in Pakistan, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965, pp. 189-90.

> Ayub was fully aware that the intelligensia equated "democracy" with parliamentary systems, and the fear now persisted that the abandonment of parliamentary government would mean the end of self-government as well....Convinced that parliamentary government in Pakistan's socio-cultural milieu was synoymous with political instability, he steadfastly refused to consider its reinstatement. Hence holding his critics at bay absorbed much of his energy. 10

The President then moved to reduce the remainder of the opposition, the press. On April 26, 1960, the Press and Publications Ordinance was issued. The ordinance covered the whole of Pakistan and specified the conditions under which a newspaper could be commandeered by the authorities. All journals adhered to the dictates of the Martial Law regime and refrained from making critical judgements on government policies.[11]

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[10] See Lawrence Ziring, op. cit., p. 10.

[11] See Khalid Bin Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan, Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1967, p. 123.

After the assumption and consolidation of power, it becomes essential for the military rulers to justify their action. First, they attempt to convince the people that they were not interested in politics, but since, conditions had deteriorated to such an extent they could no longer sit and watch the ruination of the country as silent spectators. Second, they take certain steps to reform the social and political structure and introduce measures to improve the living conditions of commen men. The military leaders of Pakistan found ample material available to justify their assumption of power. They successfully created the impression that they assumed power to eradicate the evils which had crept into the economic, social and political life of Pakistan during the last eleven years and to introduce a system of government keeping in view the country's circumstancws and conditions. The new regime claimed it was determined to solve the problems facing the political system of Pakistan.

According to the Ayub regime, the previous political institutions had failed in Pakistan because they were alien institutions borrowed from the west and superimposed on a traditional society. The regime therefore started building new political institutions. The regime developed two

major political institutions, the Basic Democracies and the Constitution of 1962. The following discussion will center on these two institutions.

The regime's first attempt at political institution building was the establishment of the system of local bodies known as the Basic Democrats. According to their author it was designed to give a more meaningful participation to the rural areas.[12] The Basic Democracies were designed to accomplish multiple political objectives. They were expected to mobilize the masses of the people, especially in rural areas for development activities, and to give the people a sense of active participation in local affairs. Ayub gave the following rationale behind the program:

> First, this type of democracy will not be foisted upon the people from above. Instead it will work from below gradually going to the top. Second, the people will not have to go far from their neighborhood to elect their representatives....The third factor which is of considerable significance is that the council which will be formed will be free from the curse of party intrigues, political pressures and politicians that characterized the assemblies in our country in the past. 13

The Basic Democracy scheme was formally introduced in October 1959. The country was divided into 80,000 con-

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[12] See Ayub Khan, Speeches and Statements, Volume II, pp. 24-25.

[13] Ibid., p. 25.

stiencies (later raised to 120,000), each with an average population of about 1,000. Both provinces--East and West Pakistan--were given an equal number of seats. Each constituency elected on the basis of universal suffrage a representative called a Basic Democrat. About ten such constituencies formed a Union Panchayat or Council, which became the basic or lowest unit of a four tiered administration. At each level the elected representatives of the people or their delegates were mixed with the nominees of the government and given limited authority to be exercised under the guidance of government officials, who were designated as "controlling authorities" in the Basic Democrats Ordinance of 1959. They possessed unlimited power to suspend resolutions, prohibit decisions, and enforce directives.[14]

A major rationale behind the Basic Democracies was that they would help to legitimate the Ayub regime. As a first step toward civilianization, the regime needed a support base seperate from the military. It was hoped that the new cadre of rural leadership created by the Basic Democracies would be imbued with the regime's ideas and

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[14] See Damodar Singhal, op. cit., p. 95.

would mobilize mass support for the regime's policies and programs. The Basic Democracies were to work in cooperation with the government officials in the local councils and would thus help to create a link between the urban areas and the countryside. Thus the Basic Democracies were expected to do what political parties do.[15]

The Basic Democracies did not form a national body as political parties do in other countries. There were no horizontal links between the Basic Democracies in the two wings. There was no built-in mechanism to develop a consensus on national issues or to train and promote national leaders. A major limitation of the Basic Democracies plan was that participation was limited by domination of government officials and council chairmen. Structurally, except for the lowest tier, in the other tiers, government officials and the appointed members out-numbered the elected members. An early study of the Basic Democracies found that "eighty-five percent of the items on the agenda for discussion at the Union Council meetings were initiated by letters and visits from government officials." Also most of the council resolutions were taken as a "face saving device

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[15] Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan Failure in National Integration, op. cit., p. 112.

[16] See KarlVon Vorys, op. cit., p. 154-55.

[17] See A.T.R. Rahman, Basic Democracies At The Grass Roots, Comilla: PARD, 1962, p. 31.

to show compliance with the government directive." [18]

Also, popular participation as distinct from participation by the Basic Democrats was very restricted. One study found an actual decline in popular participation. According to the report:

> ...Officers and Union Councillors agreed to dispense with the villages and to take the total burden of the works program on their own shoulders. In many Unions, no meetings were held in the project areas to discuss the audit reports...In some thanas only one meeting was held. [19]

Moreover, due to fear of being victimized and a desire to win favor, the members did not take steps to displease the bureaucrats associated with these institutions. The ignorance of the members to run the affairs of their councils increased their dependence on the bureaucrats. "In East Pakistan eighty-one percent of the Chairmen, and seventy percent of the Union Councillors admitted that the Circle Officers had helped them in framing their budget."[20]

Another observer notes that "the Union Councils did a useful job in improving the conditions of villages,

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[18] A.T.R. Rahman, op. cit., p. 59.

[19] See A.T.R. Rahman, An Evaluation of The Rural Works Program-East Pakistan, 1963-64, Comilla: PARD, 1964 pp. 18-19.

[20] See Khalid Bin Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan, op. cit.,p. 253.

construction of roads, culverts and various other projects. But the Basic Democracies system could not produce a class of new leaders, independent in their outlook. Generally power remained concentrated in the hands of those already enjoying it."[21]

By 1964 the Basic Democracy system had demonstrated its tremendous economic and political patronage. Wealthy farmers reeemerged due to an increased interest in the Basic Democracy system. The 1964 election saw the return to power of a higher income group, a new rural elite. The old elite had been thelanded aristocracy--the Zamindars (landlords) and the Talukdars (petty landlords)--the Basic Democrats were generally from non-traditional, nouveau riche families. They were rich farmers, not landlords.[22] Also the Basic Democracies saw a rise in the participation of a new moneyed class--businessmen and contractors. The regime was thus partially successful in fostering the growth of a new rural elite whose economic and political power was dependent on the regime's policies.[23]

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[21]See Rizvi, op. cit., p. 134.

[22]See Rounaq Jahan, op. cit., p. 122.

[23]Both the rich farmers and the businessmen and contractors benefitted economically from the regime's policies. As we shall discuss in a subsequent chapter, the regime's development policies helped rich farmers more than landless labor.

How far was this new elite successful in recruiting political support for the regime? As for this question, some observers of Pakistani politics noted that the Basic Democracies and works program succeeded in recruitin at least rural East Pakistani support for the regime and they pointed to the outcome of the 1965 election.[23] But did this rural support imply only support of rural Basic Democrats or of the rural populace at large? Even though the Basic Democracies may have recruited support, the fact remains that the regime depended more on government officials than on the Basic Democrats. As pointed out earlier, the different tiers of the Basic Democracies werelinked not through their own political hierarchy but through the administrative hierarchy. The Basic Democracies were thus more like a government agency. Instead of recruiting support for the regime it depended on the regime for survival. It is posited here also, that even if the Basic Democracies program mobilized the people in the rural areas, that mobilization was more economic, than political. It is also

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[23]See Khalid Bin Sayeed, "1965 an Epoch Making Year in Pakistan," Asian Survey, Vol. VI (Feb. 1966), p. 79. Rehman Sobhan, Basic Democracies, Works Programs and Rural Development in East Pakistan, Dacca: Oxford University Press, 1968, p. 257.

important to point out a crucial and controversial aspect of the Basic Democracies, and that was their use as the electoral college for Presidential and Assembly elections. As demonstrated this left them open to government pressure and manipulation.

Rounaq Jahan analyses the Basic Democracies system as achieving only limited success in its goal of closing the elite mass gap, and as a device for overhauling the political structure of the country. She states:

> It succeeded in limiting urban participation, but failed to fully mobilize the rural areas. The new rural elite created by the Basic Democrats had a narrow social base and limited capability in recruiting mass support for the regime. The rural poor were probably better off in absolute terms. But they were not won to the regime, since rich farmers, businessmen, and contractors made more visible and greater gains. By disfranchising the urban areas, the Basic Democracies alienated the previously mobilized and semi-mobilized groups, and the groups it enfranchasized were not large enough to counteract urban dissatisfaction. Finally, by monopolizing electoral rights the system alienated all groups who looked upon it as the mechanism by which the regime perpetuated itself. [24]

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[24] Rounaq Jahan, op. cit., p. 126.

The Constitution of 1962 was the second part of Ayub's political institution building. After securing a vote of confidence of the Basic Democrats through a form of referedum, on February 17, 1960, the President appointed an eleven-member Constitution Commission. It consisted of eminent judges, lawyers and others. The Commission was asked to examine the progressive failure of the parliamentary government in Pakistan and to submit proposals.[25]

The Constitution Commission toured both wings of Pakistan and issued a questionnaire. In all 6,269 replies to the questionnaire were sent and five-hundred and sixty-five persons were interviewed.[26] A member of the intelligentsia, former Prime Minister Choudhri Muhammed Ali, was one of the respondents. His reply was considered very significant and received great publicity. It appeared in the Pakistan Times of Lahore on June 13, 1960 and stressed the importance of reviving the parliamentary system. He cautioned that the Presidential system would lead to a personal dictatorship. When more responses to the Commission's questionnaire revealed substantial opposition

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[25] D. Singhal, op. cit., p. 96.
[26] H. Rizvi, op. cit., p. 136.

to some of the regime's concepts, public debate was discouraged.[27]

The Commission's recommendations were short of the President's objectives, far from his public statements, and in conflict with his own thinking. They were mainly against writing the Basic Democracies scheme into the constitution and declared:

> We would have included it in the constitution under the heading "local government," had it not been for the fact that, even for minor changes, which may become necessary as experience of the working of the scheme is gained, amendment of the consitution would be required. We would therefore, regard it only as an existing law. 28

According to Ziring, having been disfranchised by the proclamation of martial law, the Consitutional Commission may have appeared to afford the intelligentsia their last opportunity to alter the Basic Democracies system before it became "enshrined in a constitutional document." Ayub was distressed to witness the Commissions' low regard for his Basic Demociacies and other preferences. Accepting its report would mean accepting limitations on his authority.[29]

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[27] Dawn (Karachi), July 6, 1961.

[28] See: Report of The Constitution Commission, Karachi: Government of Pakistan Press, 1961, p. 70.

[29] See Lawrence Ziring, op. cit., p. 24.

While the Constitutional Commission went along with the idea of a presidential system, the legislative institution again would be dominant. The Commission was opposed to the banning of political parties and the continuance of Martial Law.[30] To the President such recommendations implied the loss of the revolution and a reversal to the older pattern of government with all its latent conflicts. It was in this light that the Commission's report was eventually rejected.

The Consitution, as finally announced, had the stamp of Ayub's political views and his experience gained during the martial law period. It included most of the features of the memorandum presented by him in 1954.[31]
Ayub stated:

> My own analysis led me to the conclusion that Pakistan needed a strong government capable of taking decisions which might not be popular but which are necessary for the safety, integrity and in particualr, development of the country. We could not afford the luxury of a system which would make the existence of the government subservient to the whims and operations of pressure groups. On this part, I was not prepared to make any compromise. 32

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[30] Report of The Constitutional Commission, op. cit., p. 78.

[31] See "A short Appreciation of Present and Future Problems of Pakistan" (Memorandum written by General Muhammed Ayub Khan, Defense Minister, October 4, 1954), reproduced in KarlVon Vorys, Political Development in Pakistan, op. cit., pp. 299-306, and in Hasan Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan, op. cit., pp. 277-306

Ayub was convinced that the future of the nation rested on mobilizing the rural people and the Basic Democracies scheme was the only device ready at hand. At the same time he was not oblivious to the reactions of the sophisticated urban elite and its following. In his Constitution speech of March 1, 1962, he said:

> I am conscious of the fact that some section of intelligentsia and those with vested interests may have cause to complain. I do not see any reason why a suitable formula cannot be evolved later which will give them a feeling of full participation. [33]

The President could not be dissuaded from the view that the country required political stability and continuity of leadership before anything else. He respected the parliamentary system but did not believe that Pakistanis could afford another try at it, while the preconditions for its constructive employment were missing. In their absence, the parliamentary system meant a return to older conflicts.

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[32] See Mohammed Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters-A Political Autobiography, Oxford University Press, 1967, p. 213.

[33] The Constitution: The President's Address to the Nation, Government of Pakistan, The Bureau of National Reconstruction (Karachi: 1962), p. 12.

Thus, the 1962 Constitution was an attempt to institutionalize one-man rule through a strong Presidential form of government. In Ayub's words:

> The President should be made the final custodian of power on the country's behalf and should be able to put things right both in the provinces and the centre should they go wrong. Laws should be operative only if certified by the President....No change in constitution should be made unless agreed to by the President. [34]

We shall discuss the nature of the political system under the 1962 Constitution in the following chapter.

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[34] See "A Short Appreciation of Present and Future Problems of Pakistan," op. cit.,

# C H A P T E R V

## THE MILITARY AND POLITICS

## PHASE II

The end of direct military-rule and the return of the armed forces to their barracks does not mean that the military will revert to the pre-coup position in relation to politics. Once the armed forces enter the political field, it becomes difficult for them to dissociate themselves from politics. An assertion and promise of returning the country to civilian rule as soon as possible does not mean that they will abandon interest in politics. First, upon experiencing and exercising power, they desire to keep it. Secondly, after introducing changes in the political, social, and economic structure of the society, they do not want those changes abandoned, and instead want to see their objectives achieved. Thirdly, they acquire confidence that they can handle the affairs of state better than their predecessors whose inability to run civil government brought them to power. Therefore, in preparing a framework of political action for the post-military rule period, they carefully devise a plan which will not take away their benefits of exercising political authority, and undo their reforms.

The military leaders continue to play an important role in the political field after constitutional life is restored. They may establish a puppet civilian government and control the levers of power from the background. Here ultimate power rests with the generals. Or they may let the political leaders run the civil government and watch politics carefully, keeping the possibility of their re-entry open. They may press the government to take or not take any particular step. Also the general who leads the coup may resign military rank and run the government as a civilian. This changes the nature of rule from the military to civil but the real decision-making power still rests with the new leader (who resigned from the military), the bureaucracy and the serving generals. Their goal is to run the administration effeciently and keep their entrenched position safe from encroachment by those who do not agree with them.

The 1962 Constitution made it clear that the military leaders, who led the 1958 coup in Pakistan, wanted to retain their privileged position. Military rule under Martial Law was brought to an end but the political power remained concentrated in the hands of Ayub Khan.

The martial law period (October 1958-March 1962) was a period of unchecked executive rule by President Ayub Khan. During this period, the central government attempted to discourage anything approaching parliamentary politics and succeeded in encouraging certain participants in overt political decision-making--the newly emerging industrialist class, military turned-civilian politicians, and the rural based Basic Democrats. Ayub also continued to rely on the Civil Service as an instrument of the viceregal, colonial-style regime he inherited and encouraged.[1]

In the words of one scholar, "the Constitution of 1962 established a constitutional autocracy."[2] The Constitution introduced the Presidential system of government which gave almost all authority to the President, making him virtually a constitutional dictator. He appointed ministers and governors and enjoyed extensive authority in legislative, financial, and administrative matters. He was supreme commander of the armed forces, and he appointed the Attorney-General, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Chief Election Commissioner, and other important officials

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[1]Robert LaPorte, Power and Privilege: Influence and Decision-Making in Pakistan, op. cit., p. 56.

[2]Khalid Bin Sayeed, op. cit., Chapter 5.

who were traditionally kept independent of executive authority. The judiciary's power to rule on the legality of law passed by the legislature was limited. Decision-making was an exclusive function of the President and his chosen advisors. Provincial autonomy was reduced drastically. While stressing centralization, the regime recognized the people's need for a sense of participation in the system, but that of a controlled participation. Urban areas were disenfranchised and the rural areas were mobilized as a counterweight.

After the 1962 Constitution was introduced, the regime was obliged to come to terms with the political elite and include politicians in the cabinet. But even then, none of the important cabinet portfolios--Defense, Planning, Finance, Home,--were given to politicians. Ayub's key advisors throughout his rule remained non-political.

The change in power structure brought about by the coup--especially the loss of power of the political elite--meant that the East Pakistanis (the Bengalis, who formed the largest ethnic group, 54% of the population) had insufficient representation. Even after years of a quota system Bengali representation in the higher Civil Services remained less than 40 percent. As late as 1966, Bengalis

constituted less than 30 percent of the Class I officers of the Central Secretariat.[3] In the military elite, as I emphasized this point elsewhere, Bengali representation was as poor during the Ayub decade as during the previous era.

While Bengali representation in the entrepreneurial class increased during the decade, none of the top twenty or thirty families (who controlled 66% of industrial profits, 97% of the insurance funds, and 80% of the banks), who benefitted most from Ayub's economic policies, were Bengali. Clearly, the Bengalis were marginally represented in the policy-making and political support groups during the Ayub period. Their nonrepresentation in the elite in an elitist system deepened their sense of alienation. It pointed out that the regime needed to devise policies and institutions which would give the Bengalis a sense of participation in and identification with the system.[4]

The landed aristocracy was another group that lost some of its power under the Ayub regime. Before 1958, it was a dominant interest group, owning not only villages but also the votes within them. After the coup with the abolition

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[3] See Rounaq Jahan, op. cit., p. 61.

[4] Ibid., p. 62.

of the old electoral process, the landlords control of the rural vote lessened and so did their influence. The rising Zaminders the owners of large farms, replaced the landed aristocrats, as the dominant interest group during the decade.

During this period, the retired military officers emerged as the class to occupy top posts of public and private enterprises. The military became a ladder for respectable jobs in the society. A number of retired Lieutenant-Generals, Major-Generals and Brigadiers, and equivalent ranks in the other services, were provided with top positions in Government and semi-governmental companies, autonomous bodies and boards. These appointments also kept them loyal to the regime.[5] The military were more the support base of the regime, rather than actual participants in public policy-making, which was left to the civil bureaucracy.

The entrepreneurial elite emerged as a powerful interest group before 1958, and also made significant gains under the Ayub regime. The regime's policy of economic development through private enterprise helped consolidate the power of this group. The participation and influence of these

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[5] Ibid., p. 62.

industrial entrepreneurs in the policy-making process was informal and covert, but they did achieve economic and fiscal policies which were advantageous to their interests, as we shall discuss in a subsequent chapter. Their growing ascendancy was also reflected in their increased representation in the national and provincial assemblies. Nearly 32 percent of the East Pakistani members and 19 percent of the West Pakistani members of the national and provincial assemblies of 1962 and 1965 were businessmen, industrialists, and contractors.[6]

From the foregoing discussion, we see that Ayub drew his support first and foremost from the military, then from the civilian bureaucracy, the new industrial/entrepreneurial class and part of the traditional rural elite (large landowners in West Pakistan and the middle-class, Basic Democrats in East Pakistan).. His opponents included the legal profession, former parliamentarians and other politicians, university students and most of the intellectual community, some large landowners in West Pakistan, a few religious leaders, the urban middle-class in both wings, and the urban and rural proletariat.

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[6]See Rounaq Jahan, op. cit., p. 60.

Those who sought the restoration of democracy were mainly led by the urban intellectuals. They argued that the Ayub regime was fundamentally un-democratic and dictatorial and demanded the introduction of the parliamentary system, drastic reduction of the powers of the President, direct elections instead of Basic Democracy, which they charged was vulnerable to official pressures, constitutional freedoms and rights, and removal of all restrictive controls on political activities and on the press.[7]

With increased pressure he gave in on some issues. One issue was, the reintroduction of political parties. Political parties were legalized in July 1962. They were not deliberately planned as were the Basic Democrats and the Constitution. They were reintroduced with reluctance and with certain limitarions. They were to be founded on Islamic ideology, and the disqualified politicians under the EBDO and dismissed government officials were excluded from participation. Soon a party system developed in the country and opposition emerged.

Ayub was not ready to join any existing party or start a new one. He assumed the role of supra-party leader and left his supporters to organize a party for him. Instead

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[7] Singhal, op. cit., p. 100.

of building a party from the bottom up as Ayub suggested, they decided to take over an already existing party. Their choice was the Muslim League and they managed to capture a section of the Muslim League in the party convention of September 1962.

The first Presidential elections under the 1962 Constitution were held in January 1965. They were preceeded by the elections of the Basic Democrats during October and November 1964. The 1965 election evoked tremendous enthusiam in the country.

The opposition parties were divided in their ideology and program, and no candidate could be found from among the party leaders who was acceptable to all parties in both regions of the country. On July 21, 1964, the opposition political parties formed an electoral alliance, called the Combined Opposition Parties (COP),[8] and put forth Miss Fatima Jinnah, sister of the founder of the state, as their

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[8]The COP included: Awami League, National Awami Party, Jamat-i-Islami, Nizam-i-Islam Party and Council Muslim League. It was also supported by the National Democratic Front (NDF) which was a loose alliance of opposition elements numering fifty-two who were major political leaders of East Pakistan, and prominent politicians from the West wing.

Presidential candidate. The COP's election manifesto was a nine point program, which featured the restoration of parliamentary system of government with direct election and universal adult franchise, and a promise to democratize the 1962 Constitution. The issue dividing the two camps was stability versus democracy. To Ayub the alternative to his regime was chaos; to his opponents his regime was a dictatorship and they sought democracy.

The results of the election showed that the Basic Democrats aligned with the Ayub regime giving him a mandate for the next five years. (Table V indicates the number of votes cast for the two major candidates) The results of the elections to the National Assembly showed that the (Convention) Muslim League won an over-whelming majority in the elections. (Table VI indicates the final party positions in the 1965 elections)

The Basic Democrats preferred Ayub to Jinnah, who, in her pledges to restore democracy, created the impression that under the system of adult franchise the Basic Democracies would be scrapped, and would lose their importance, funding and attention they they received under Ayub. It was not merely bureaucratic influence which won support for Ayub. It has been suggested that he was able to persuade the East Pakistani voters that their interests were looked

after better under his regime than under his predecessors.[9] But by casting their votes for the opposition candidates, some East Pakistani voters demonstrated that they wanted spokesmen in the assemblies who would put across their viewpoints and interests.

Since the 1965 National Assembly was completely dominated by the ruling party the opposition members had little hope of effectively challenging the regime. Also the West Pakistani component of the opposition was smaller that it was before and this gave the opposition in the National Assembly a regional aspect.[10]

Two important problems of internal affairs faced the newly constituted government of Pakistan. The first was the expanding demand for full restoration of democracy; the second was the growing alienation of East Pakistan from the West.

As mentioned earlier East Pakistani participation in the political system established under Ayub's constitution was limited. Also, because many of the leading political leaders of East Pakistan were either disqualified under EBDO or imprisoned, they couldn't participate in the system at all.[11]

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[10] Khalid Bin Sayeed, op. cit., p. 113.
[11] Rounaq Jahan, op. cit., p. 156.

TABLE V

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS (1965)

RESULT

| Candidate | Votes Polled | | Total | % of votes polled |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | E. Pakistan | W. Pakistan | | |
| F.M. Ayub Khan | 21,012 | 28,939 | 49,951 | 63.31 |
| Miss Fatima Jinnah | 18,434 | 10,257 | 28,691 | 36.36 |

Source: Hasan Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics In Pakistan , Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1974, p. 152.

TABLE VI

PARTY POSITION IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

| Political Party | Seats Won | | Total |
|---|---|---|---|
| | E. Pakistan | W. Pakistan | |
| Pakistan Muslim League (Convention) | 55 | 69 | 124 |
| The C.O.P. | 14 | 1 | 15 |
| Independent | 9 | 8 | 17 |
| Total | 78 | 78 | 156 |

Source: Hasan Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics In Pakistan, Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1974, p. 153.

Political movements in East Pakistan changed from movements for competitive participation in the national system to radical provincial autonomy movements. In this period Bengali demands for autonomy became more radical and polarization between the left and the right grew. Political movments in the East wing took on a regional aspect. One observer suggests that, the actual workings of the center-province relationship under the 1962 constitution, and the war with India contributed toward exacerbating Bengali isolation and frustration.[12]

Relations between East and West Pakistan continued to deteriorate creating a sense of insecurity in the country.

During the Indo-Pakistan war in September 1965, East Pakistan was cut off from the west and left almost defenseless. The break in communication between the two wings, and East Pakistan's actual physical isolation, left it with a deep sense of insecurity. "The war exposed more than ever some of the practical disadvantages of the regime's centralization policy."[13] Left only with one army division, and limited military supplies the Bengalis realized that East Pakistan wouldn't be able to defend itself in the event of

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[12] Ibid., p. 159.

[13] Singhal, op. cit., p.104.

foreign agression. They also resented the fact that they were exposed to the danger of Indian occupation for the sake of Kashmir. They also realized the economic difficulties involved in depending too much on the center. With this the East Pakistanis now doubted the relaibility of West Pakistan.[14]

This led Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the leader of the Awami League, to put forward his six-point program in February 1966 for East Pakistan's regional autonomy.[15] The Awami Leagues' Six Points were:

1) The character of the Government shall be federal and parliamentary, in which the election to the Federal Legislature and to the legislatures of the federating units shall be direct and on the basis of universal adult franchise. The representation in the federal legislature shall be on the basis of population.

2) The Federal Government shall be responsible only for defense and foreign affairs and subject to the conditions provided in (3) below, currency.

3) There shall be two seperate currencies mutually or freely convertible in each wing for each region, or

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[14] Ibid., p. 104.

[15] Golam W. Choudhury, The Last Days of United Pakistan, Bloomington: Indiania University Press, 1974, p. 22.

in the alternative a single currency, subject to the establishment of a federal reserve system in which there will be regional federal reserve banks which will devise measures to prevent the transfer of resources and flight of capital from one region to another.

4) Fiscal policy shall be the responsibility of the federating units. The federal government shall be provided with requisite revenue resources for meeting the requirements of defense and foreign affairs, which revenue resources would be automatically appropriable the basis of the ratio to be determined by the procedure laid down in the Constitution. Such constitutional provisions would ensure that Federal Governments revenue requirements are met consistently with the objective of ensuring control over the fiscal policy by the Governments of the federating units.

5) Constitutional provisions shall be made to enable seperate accounts to be maintained of the foreign exchange earnings of each of the federating units. The foreign exchange requirmenets of the Federal Government shall be met by the governments of the federating units on the basis of a ration to be

determined in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Constitution. The regional governments shall have power under the Constitution to negotiate foreign trade and aid within the framework of the foreign policy of the country, which shall be the responsibility of the Federal Government.

6) The Government of the federating units shall be empowered to maintain militia or para-military force in order to contribute effectively towards national security.[16]

The regime adopted a policy of total opposition toward the six-points movement. This gave the movement a kind of martydom. Ayub regarded the program as designed to break up the country's unity, and reacted sharply. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was arrested under the emergency regulations on May 9. This caused violent demonstrations in East Pakistan. At Dacca and elsewhere, supporters of the Awami League clashed with the police, and several people were killed and injured.[17]

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[16] Extract from Awami League Manifesto. Quoted in Rushbrook L. Williams, The East Pakistan Trajedy, London: Tom Stacey, 1972, Appendix 2, pp. 117-118.

[17] See D. Singhal, op. cit., p. 104

Discontent against Ayub and the movement for democracy was reinforced in 1967. The ban on the politicians, disallowing them from taking part in political life under the Elective Bodies (Disqualification) Order of 1959, expired at the end of 1966. Long debarred from active politics, these politicians entered the arena with vigor and resentment against Ayub.

Five opposition parties: the Awami League (Nasrullah group), the Muslim League (Council), the Jamaat-i-Islami, the Nizam-i-Islam, and the National Democratic Front--formed a united front, the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM), in May 1967.[18] The PDM adopted an eight-point formula which proposed greater autonomy than that provided for by the 1956 Consitution but less than that demanded in the Awami League's six-points. In general, the six-point program attempted to take power away from the center, while the PDM's program concentrated on devising equal participation at the center.[19]

Unrest in the country continued to spread. Strikes in railways and jute mills, involving thousands of workers

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18 The PDM did not accept the six-point program of the Awami League for regional autonomy. Hence the Awami League under acting President Nazrul Islam refused to join the PDM. However a small group under Nasrullah Split with the Awami League and joined the PDM. The National Awami Party led by Maulana Bhashani did not join.

became frequent. In 1967, the National Awami Party actively campaigned for the breakup of West Pakistan into seperate units. The government took repressive measures, prohibiting meetings and processions. This raised further suspicion that the President intended to suppress political activity.

In 1968, Ayub aggravated the feeling of the oppositon further by celebrating the tenth anniversary of his regime as the Decade of Reforms. The government propaganda machinery told the people how much better off they were, which caused further resentment.[20]

The government alienated the opposition further by announcing the discovery of an anti-national plot in East Pakistan, which became known as the Agartala Conspiracy Case.[21] The regime thought that a public trial would terrorize the radical autonomists into silence and would win over the mass of the people, but the exact opposite happened, and the accused were made heroes.

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[19] Lawrence Ziring, op. cit., p. 98.

[20] Ibid., p. 89.

[21] The Argatala Conspiracy Case, charged thirty-three East Pakistani politicians, civil servants, and army men with conspiring to bring about East Pakistan's secession from the center in collusion with India. The list of alleged conspirators included three high-ranking East Pakistani civil servants and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.

Discontent against Ayub flared up into a major political crisis by November 1968. In October, students in West Pakistan launched an agitation demanding educational reforms. Their demonstrations coincided with the Decade of Development celebrations. Thousands of persons, including prominent leaders of the opposition, such as Bhutto, Khan Abdul Wali Khan, and Maulana Bhashani, were arrested. The intelligentsia and the bourgeoisie also took an active part.[22]

When disaffection spread to the military circles, the situation became critical. Air Marshal (retired) Asghar Khan announced his decision to enter politics to work for a more liberal regime. He gained popularity in speaking out against the regime.[23]

On December 7 the National Awami Party called a general strike in Dacca. Two persons were killed and twenty injured as a result of firing by the police. The opposition parties in protest called a general strike throughout East Pakistan on December 14, which brought life in Dacca to a standstill. After this uprising, agitation in East Pakistan gained its own momentum and distinct character.[24]

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[22]Singhal, op. cit., p. 108.
[23]Rizvi, op. cit., p. 199.
[24]Ibid., p. 200.

In this situation, the leaders of eight opposition parties met in Dacca on January 8, 1969, and formed the Democratic Action Committee to provide a united leadership to the mass movement.[26] The D.A.C. decided not to participate in upcoming elections and demanded: freedom of the press, full autonomy for East Pakistan, the restoration of democracy based on direct elections and adult franchise, the nationalization of banks, insurance companies, and large-scale industries, the immediate termination of the emergency regulations which prevented detention with trial, and the institution of an independent foreign policy.[27]

After street rioting continued for over four months in both wings of the country, Ayub offered to hold talks in a Round Table Conference with responsible political parties of the opposition to discuss constitutional changes and a solution to the political crisis. Bhutto and Bhashani refused to participate in the conference. The DAC was willing to talk provided emergency rule was revoked and all political prisoners, including Sheikh Mujib and Bhutto were released. Ayub acceded to the demands.

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26 The eight parties were: the six-point Awami League, the National Awami Party (Requistionists), Jamiat-ul-ulema-i-Islam, Nizam-i-Islam, the National Democratic Front, the Awami League (Nasrullah), the Muslim League (Council), and Jamaat-i-Islami. Bhashani's National Awami Party and Bhutto's PPP were not included.

The Round Table Conference took place on March 10. Nasrullah Khan, put forward the two points upon which there was agreement among the eight opposition parties--a federal parliamentary system of government with regional autonomy, and the election of legislatures by direct adult franchise. In addition to more autonomy for East Pakistan, Mujibur Rahman, wanted a dominant position at the center. He also urged the division of West Pakistan into the former provinces of Sind, the Punjab, the Northwest Frontier, and Baluchistan. The regime was willing to concede parliamentary government, direct elections, and federalism, but rejected the regional autonomy demands, which were the essence of the movement in East Pakistan. The PDM members of the D.A.C. supported the regime on this, but the Awami League and the pro-moscow National Awami Party insisted on full regional autonomy.

The Round Table Conference became deadlocked and failed to reach any agreement. On March 13, Ayub announced his own formula which included, restoration of the parliamentary and federal system and a direct method of elections. He wanted to restore the status quo as it had existed before the coup of 1958.[27]

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[27]Golam Choudhury, op. cit., p. 39.

After the talks on political settlement failed, there occured an almost complete breakdown of governmental machinery, and conditions in the country became semi-anarchic. In the meantime, changes in the power and political relationships between Ayub and his support coalition had worsened.

By the fall of 1968, Ayub could no longer depend on the unified, solid support of the military. The erosion of this support was one of the major reasons behind his announcement to retire. Resentment against him in the military started with the Tashkent Declaration and continued to grow. When the regime faced the serious political crisis of 1968-69, the military dissociated itself from Ayub.[28]

A major indication of the military's disenchatment with Ayub was seen in the emergence of Asghar Khan and a few other retired Generals who became vocal opponents of the regime. It is unlikely that he entered politics in opposition to Ayub without some indication, that a segment of the military agreed with and supported his activities. The military was also disasstisfied with Ayub's decision to withdraw the Agartala Conspiracy Case, which then put them in an embarassing position.

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[28]Rizvi, op. cit., p. 212.

After Ayub announced his decision not to seek re-election, neither the military nor the bureaucracy were willing to go out of the way to support him. The 1968-69 violence in the streets and Ayub's reaction to it reflected his precarious standing vis-a-vis the military. Facing all the realities, Ayub retired from the Presidency on March 25, 1969 and appointed General Yahya Khan as Chief Martial Law Administrator. Yahya abrogated the 1962 Constitution, banned all political activity (not parties), dissolved the National and Provincial assemblies, dismissed the central and provincial cabinets and declared Martial Law throughout the country. On March 31, Yahya assumed the Presidency.[29]

In his "farewell broadcast", Ayub presented the same dismal picture of the country as he had done when the army coup took place on October 7, 1958. Then, Ayub justified the army's take-over on grounds of what he termed "total administrative, economic, political and moral chaos in the country."[30] After eleven years of almost absolute rule, he confessed that the country was on the verge of total collapse and declared: "I cannot preside over the destruction of my country."[31]

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[29]See D. Singhal, op. cit., p. 114.

[30]Dawn, (Karachi), October 9, 1958.

[31]See Ayub's last broadcast on March 25, 1969, in Dawn, March 26, 1969.

The political system introduced by Ayub Khan, established an authoritarian system with guided democracy in Pakistan, which ensured stability and continuity rather than people's participation in the affairs of the state. the country-wide revolt against the Ayub regime was a revolt against injustices suffered by the people and growing economic disparity, which encouraged frustration and alienation. The people's uprising also revealed the inadequate development of political institutions in the decade. In both wings the uprising was a spontaneous popular movement, with little leadership from the political parties. The parties and leaders joined the movement after it was already a success, and therefore were in no position to counter or guide the uprisings.

# CHAPTER VI

## THE REGIME'S ATTEMPT AT NATION-BUILDING THROUGH ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Economic growth during the Ayub years was outstanding by quantitative measures. Macro-growth was about six percent per year for the decade of the 1960's. In examining the data, one finds that from 1959-60 to 1966-67, Pakistan averaged a yearly growth in GNP of about 5.17 percent.[1] Compared with the eight-year period from 1950-51 to 1957-58, in which the average increase was 2.19 percent per year, claims of quantitative economic growth are justified. A look at another gross indicator, per capita income, shows that there was no growth during the years 1950-51 to 1957-58, but there was a 20.1 percent increase from 1959-60 to 1966-67. Also important, during the four years prior to 1957-58, population increase equaled or surpassed the increase in GNP, while during the Ayub period this did not occur. In short, a look at the statistics, indicates that Pakistan was making progress.[2]

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[1]Statistics reported in, Ministry of Finance, Pakistan Economic Survey, 1966-67, Karachi: Government of Pakistan, 1967, pp.1-5

[2]Ibid.

The gross measurements do not, however, tell the whole story, for the statistics emphasize only GNP growth. A look at qualitative inequalities as reflected in income distribution among social/economic classes more accurately reveal actual pattern of redristribution. Significant gains were made in all sectors, but little advantage filtered down to poor urban and rural people. The plight of the industrial worker was worse than that of the average Pakistani.[3]

Wealth and economic power remained concentrated in the few families drawn from the trading communities. The chief economist of the Planning Commission, Dr. Mahbub-ul-Haq, revealed at the 1968 convention of the Pakistan Management Association that 66 percent of the entire industrial capital of the country was concentrated in the hands of twenty families who controlled 80 percent of the banking and 97 percent of the insurance of the country.[4]

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[3]Lawrence Ziring, op. cit., p. 88.

[4]In addition, the twenty families had direct control of the bulk of large-scale business and commerce activities and indirect control of a number of other concerns. For additional information on these families, see Gustav Papanek, Pakistan's Development: Social Goals& Private Incentives, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967; Hanna Papanek, "Entrepreneurs in East Pakistan," in Robert Beech, ed., Bengal Society, East Lansing: Asian Studies Center, Michigan State University, 1971; "Pakistan's New Industrialists and Businessmen: Focus on the Memons," unpublished paper, 1970.

fostered through government subsidized private industrial development. The concentration of capital was justified on the grounds that profits were being plowed back into the economy.[5] The government's economic plans benefited only those who already had a lare share of the economic pie. This resulted in the rich becoming richer and the poor poorer.

Despite impressive improvement in the economy, Pakistan did not make a breakthrough in any sector. Self-sufficiency in food production was yet to be achieved. Rising trends in prices were not arrested, nor the concentration of economic wealth into the hands of the few. The problem of poverty still remained.

Economic disparity between the two wings of Pakistan continued to increase because much of the investment, especially private, was made in West Pakistan. This was a major reason of East Pakistan's hatred for West Pakistan--its long and deep sense of economic oppression.

Although East Pakistan earned most of the country's exchange, the economic benefits accrued to West Pakistan. The bulk of foreign exchange earnings, as well as foreign

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[5]See L. Ziring, op. cit., p. 88.

aid and loans, were used to import machinery and raw materials to strengthen West Pakistan's industrial complex. Although both wings started from the same level in 1949-50, the rate of industrial development was greater in West Pakistan than in East Pakistan. This was possible because East Pakistan's foreign exchange earnings were utilized for the benefits of West Pakistan through import controls and bank credit policies which favored West Pakistan, investment of foreign aid and loans in the west wing, and by utilizing the vast East Pakistan market for the manufactured goods of West Pakistan.[6] Between 1947 and 1967 Pakistan exported goods worth about Rs. 36 billion and imported goods worth about Rs. 50 billion. Of these, the share of East Pakistan in export was about Rs. 21 billion to West Pakistan's Rs. 15 billion; in imports, about Rs. 15 billion to West Pakistan's 34 billion.[7] Thus, West Pakistan exported much less than East Pakistan but imported much more and there was a net transfer of resources from East to West Pakistan through foreign, as well as interwing trade. Between 1960-61 to 1966-67,

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[6]Damodar P. Singhal, op. cit., p. 173.

[7]See Stephen R. Lewis, Pakistan: Industrialization and Trade Politics, pp. 142-43.

Of the $400 million of foreign aid received each year; about two-thirds of it went to West Pakistan.

The second Five-year Plan, acknowledged awareness of the economic disparity, but it did not make any commitment to remove it. The plan aimed at spending Rs. 13,500 million in West Pakistan against Rs. 9,500 million in East Pakistan. Forty-seven percent of Pakistan's total public sector expenditure and thirty percent of the private sector's were planned for East Pakistan, but the result was that only thirty-two percent of the total expenditure of both the sectors was spent. During this period the realized rate of growth was 4.4 in West Pakistan and 2.6 percent in East Pakistan.[7]

Under pressure from East Pakistan, the principle of regional parity was instituted in Pakistani politics and economy. The regime adopted a series of economic steps designed to improve the East wings's economy. In December 1961, the National Finance Commission was established to recommend redistribution of resources between the center and the provinces. In January 1962, the Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation (PDIC) was bifurcated, followed by bifurcation of the railways.[8]

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[7]Ibid., p. 175

[8]Jahan, op. cit., p. 68.

the total value of foreign exchange earned by East Pakistan was Rs. 9,061 million and the foreign exchange spent on them for importing capital goods and industrial materials was Rs. 8,683 million--Rs. 378 million less than it earned. During the same period West Pakistan earned Rs.7,426 million in foreign exchange and received imports costing Rs. 20,268 million; Rs. 12,840 million more than what it earned. The excess expenditure was met from the balance of East Pakistan's share and foreign grants, aid, and loans. This was an example of the consequence of the government's centralized management of the economy of Pakistan.[5] The government failed to provide the same facilities for the development of large-scale industries in East Pakistan as it did in West Pakistan. This resulted in the structure of East Pakistan's economy in the 1960's remaining about the same as it was during 1949-50. While the share of large-scale manufacturing industries in Gross National Product (GNP) increased in West Pakistan over a twenty-three year period, that of East Pakistan did not increase to any significant extent.[6]

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[5]See Muzaffar Ahmed Choudhury, "Measures of Disparity," Forum, 30 January, 1971, p. 11.

[6]See D. Singhal, op. cit., p. 174.

In March 1962, the new constitution was introduced which declared the removal of economic disparity a constitutional obligation. According to article 145 (4) of the constitution:

> A primary object...in formulating the plans... shall be to ensure that disparities between the provinces, and between different areas within a Province, in relation to income per capita, are removed, and that the resources of Pakistan... are used and allocated in such a way as to achieve that object in the shortest possible time.[9]

But the constitution fell short, by continuing to grant most of the elastic sources of revenue to the center. The third Five-yean Plan allocated 53 percent of the public sector expenditure and 50 percent of the private sector expenditure to East Pakistan, but again the major sources of revenue were granted to the center. In actual performance only 36 percent of all Pakistan's total, both sectors were spent for East Pakistan.

Consequently, West Pakistan was well ahead of East Pakistan in economic development, and the gulf widened. By June 1968 the gap between the per capita incomes of the East and West wings had increased greatly. In 1960-1961, West Pakistan's per capita income was 31 percent higher than that of East Pakistan. By the end of the

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[9]Pakistan, Ministry of Law, The Constitution of The Republic of Pakistan , 1962, p.76.

decade in 1969-70 the gulf widened to 61 percent.[10]

The continuation of disparity led to demands for alternative strategies of economic development. An example of this was seen in the two-economy thesis. The two-economy theorists suggessted that as Pakistan was "geographically two countries", there should be two distinct economies. These economists argued that the economic union of the two wings was of no purpose because the benefits of development in one wing could not be shared by the other and the surplus labor force in one area could not migrate to the other. They sought complete control over their own foreign exchange earnings and trade, and asked for seperate taxes, tarrifs, and industrial policy.[11]

Measures to combat the disparity and promises to increase East Pakistan's share of public sector development failed to mollify the East Pakistanis and to convince them of the government's sincerity. It led the Bengalis of East Pakistan to discredit the regime.

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10Jahan, op. cit., p. 81.

11 Ibid., p. 85

Attempts to institute land reform in West Pakistan were not very successful, mainly because there was a large concentration of landownership in a few persons who wielded great political power and influence. In West Pakistan nearly one-third of the total area was held by owners who each possessed one-hundred acres or more, half of these owned more than five-hundred acres. About six thousand persons owned land to the extent of five-hundred acres or more; they held about 7.5 million acres of land among them. Overall average land-holding was twelve acres.[12]

East Pakistan was ahead of West Pakistan in the field of land reform. There most of the big landlords were Hindus, who migrated to India. After their migration a land reform was carried out. The Acquisition and Tenancy Act was passed which abolished all rent receiving interests between the tenants and the state.[13]

The problem of land distribution and tenure was attended to with the establishment of the Land Reform Commission on October 19, 1958. According to the reforms no landlord could own more than five-hundred acres of irrigated or 1,000 acres of unirrigated land, and one-

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[12]See D. Singhal, op. cit., p. 126.
[13]See Hasan Askari Rizvi, op. cit., p. 124.

hundred and fifty acres of orchard. Landlords were to receive substantial compensation for land surrendered in the form of government bonds. Many large land holders, anticipated reform and decreed land to relatives, thereby avoiding the ceiling on their landholding. The land that became available for redistribution was far below expected; only 2.2 million acres to be distributed among 150,000 tenants; 6.4 million acres were retained by 6,000 landlords.[14]

Thus, the reforms offered only mild remedies to tackle the major problems involved. Some of the more archaic, feudal aspects of landlord-peasant relationships were abolished, but there occured no large-scale land expropriation and redistribution. Few large landowners lost land. However, the landlords who did sell portions of their holdings enabled middle-sized farmers with available funds to purchase land. The Third Five-year Plan, 1965-70 emphasized the development of middle and upper middle-class farmers, while reassuring the status of the already powerful landowners. This gradual modernization from above approach to agricultural development illustrated

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[14]Khalid Bin Sayeed, op. cit., p.97.

the conservative character of Ayub's land reform. Social change in terms of land tenure revisions and redistribution was practically nonexistent under Ayub.[15]

The regime also gave attention to improving the position of women in Pakistani society and to protecting children from exploitation within the family. The result was the enactment of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance of 1961. It discouraged the practice of polygamy, promoted women's rights, and was regarded as the first step towards modernization of family life. The new law represented the growing influence of modern ideas in the social consciousness of Pakistan.

In a third area, education, the Ayub regime was most unsuccessful. If the literarcy rate is used as a measure, the Ayub regime barely kept up with the population increase. The goal of universal education was not achieved. Disparity in education between the two wings existed. East Pakistan claimed that the central government

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[15]The third Five-year Plan emphasized tube-well construction, use of fertilizers, use of improved "miracle seeds", and other technical input solutions. This approach did not consider redistribution of land or other social justice criteria. See planning Commission, The Third Five Year Plan, 1965-70, Karachi: Government of Pakistan, 1965.

made no serious efforts to remove disparities. A look at enrollment indicates that the disparity existed in the enrollment of students at various levels, in the number of educational institutions, in the number of staff and staff-student ration, and in expenditure.[16] Development of the education sector in West Pakistan far outstripped East Pakistan's growth during this period. Enrollment in primary schools increased by 1,153 in East Pakistan and by 16,412 in West Pakistan. The increase in secondary school, college and university enrollment was 419,001, 81,103, and 5,065, respectively, for East Pakistan, and by 568, 711, 167820, and 14,616, respectively for West Pakistan.[17]

Thus in the above three areas of social change--land distribution and socio-economic relations, family and social relationships, and education--planning reflected a preference for preserving and extending elite privileges. Changes that did occur were gradual and minor, and did not antagonize the middle-class coalition that supported Ayub.

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[17]See Dr. Abu Obaidul Haque, "Educational Disparity in Pakistan," Forum, 20 December, 1969.

# CHAPTER VII

## THE YAHYA REGIME

After the collapse of the Ayub regime, Yahya Khan, then commander-in-chief of the Pakistani army, was brought to power by the ruling elite of the civil-military bureaucracy. The second martial law of March 1969 was very much a defensive maneuver on the part of the ruling elite to maintain its position, which had been threatened by the mass movements of 1968-69. The task of the Yahya regime, therefore, was to seek a new political order which could maintain the status quo, although granting concessions to the counter elite. Here an attempt will be made to discuss briefly the policies of the post-Ayub period and their impact on the eventual disintegration of Pakistan.

The new martial law authorities did not find any great difficulty in controlling the situation and restoring law and order. Conditions in West Pakistan improved but in East Pakistan they never fully came under the control of the administration.

In spite of parallels with 1958, certain things distinguished the circumstances of Yahya's martial law. The situation inherited by him was much worse than on the

eve of the martial law in 1958. The mood in the country was not that of 1958, when, sick of the political leaders, people welcomed martial law. Now the political leaders had re-emerged on the political scene and succeeded in building public support for themselves. The five months of rebellion against the Ayub regime had produced total chaos. The atmosphere was charged with left-right confrontation, regional emotionalism and other political issues. There was a strong movement for maximum autonomy in East Pakistan.

The policies pursued by the Yahya regime differed from those of Ayub. After the mass movements of 1968-69 it became obvious to the ruling elite that some of the demands of the more vocal groups in the mass movement would have to be met. Yahya therefore adopted a number of conciliatory policies specificially designed to placate the groups that spearheaded the mass movement. New education and wage policies were announced to meet the demands of students and labor, and the payscale of salaried professionals was improved.[1]

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[1] Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan Failure in National Integration, op. cit., p. 186.

Unlike Ayub, who disdained politicians and wanted to stay above politics, Yahya recognized the necessity of both politics and politicians, and decided to play the role of arbitrator among conflicting groups. Unlike Ayub, he did not ban political parties, nor did he adopt restrictive political measures like EBDO or the arrest of opposition leaders. He could not remain neutral, however; the regime's policy was to maintain the fundamental interest of the ruling elite through the roles of mediator and power broker.[2]

The transfer of power from Ayub to Yahya did not shift political power from the hands of the military and the bureaucracy. On the other hand, it provided another opportunity to exercise political power without any popular and constitutional restrictions.

The regime's organization was such that civilian functions were performed alongside military ones. Yahya continued to be the Commander-in Chief of the army. According to his own order of precedence, he described himself first as Commander-in-Chief then Chief Martial Law Administrator and lastly President. He retained his post of Commander-in-Chief in the expectation that it

[2]Damodar P. Singhal, Pakistan, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1972, p. 187.

would enable him to have direct access to and links with the General Headquarters (GHQ); as Ayub had lost the confidence of GHQ by becoming an "elective" president and ceasing to be Commander-in-Chief.[3]

Yahya Khan had limited, if any, experience of politics. He had been C-in-C since 1966 and was overshadowed by Ayub Khan. When he assumed the office of President, his ideas about the future of Pakistan were not as clear as were those of Ayub in 1958. One author described him as "a man having no vision of a bold initiative."[4]

Within twenty-four hours of coming into power; in his first nation-wide broadcast as head of the government Yahya assured his countrymen that:

> I wish to make it absolutely clear to you that I have no ambition other than the creation of conditions conducive to the establishment of a constitutional government. It is my first belief that a sound, clean and honest administration is a prerequisite for sane and constructive political life and for the smooth transfer of power to the elected representatives of the people. It will be the task of these elected representatives to give the country a workable constitutional and final solution to all other political, economic and social problems that have been agitating the minds of the people. [5]

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[3]Golam Choudhury, op. cit., p. 50.

[4]Golam Choudhury, "The Emergence of Bangladesh and the South Asian Triange." Yearbook of World Affairs, London, 1973, p. 75.

The men immediately next to the President were Lieutenant General Peerzada, as the Principal Staff Officer (PSO), and General Abdul Hamid Khan, the Army Chief of Staff. Access to the President was usually through them. Other people around the President were Lieutenant General Gul Hasan, Chief of the General Staff, and Major General Ghulam Umar, Chief of National Security.[6] Major decisions were discussed and arrived at by them, in a highly informal manner. Formal procedures were usually by-passed. Under the PSO were two brigadiers given charge of martial law affairs and civil affairs. These two were the "super secretaries"; no secretary of any ministry could send a file to the President without going through these two, who were under the direct control and supervision of the PSO.[7]

The various ministries were divided as follows: Yahya was in charge of Defense and Foreign Affairs. General Hamid, the Chief of Staff and number two in the

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[5]See the text of Yahya's broadcast on March 26, 1969, in Dawn, March 27, 1969 and also in Hasan Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan, op. cit., pp. 303-305.

[6]Kenneth E. Bauzon,"Breakdown of A Military Regime: The Case of Pakistan (1969-71), Asia Quarterly, Vol. 2, January 1977.

[7]Golam Choudhury, op. cit., p. 50.

armed forces, took the home ministry. The rest was divided between the two chiefs of the Air Force and the Navy: Nur Khan, the Air Commander-in-Chief, became the overlord of the ministries of education, labor, health, social welfare, while the navy chief, Ahsan, was given finance, planning, industry and commerce. Yahya, Hamid, Peerzada, Nur Khan, and Ahsan constituted a small cabinet known as the council of administration.[8]

An analysis of the careers of the members of Yahya's cabinet appointed in August 1969, indicated that the powerful combination of the civil and military elite, which was the main cause of Ayub Khan's failure, still shared power with Yahya Khan.

Professor Golam Choudhury, who served as a constitutional adviser and minister of communications in Yahya's cabinet, had this to say concerning the role of the cabinet:

> Never in my two years as a member of the cabinet did I find any real and meaningful discussion on vital matters such as defense, foreign affairs, administrative or political policies and programs. The cabinet was a ceremonial body, its members often touring as v.i.p.'s in the principal cities inaugurating public functions, presiding over innocuous meetings, etc. A cabinet minister's role in the military regime depended primarily on his relation-

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[8] Ibid., p. 51.

> ship with the President, the President's own assessment of the minister's effectiveness and ability to do a particular assignment, as well as the minister's links with other influential members of the ruling junta. [9]

Fazal Muqueem Khan reports:

> The ministers were nominated, represented no one but themselves, and were responsible to the President only. They were not from amongst the best or most qualified men available. However, it was not the men but the jobs that were unimportant, any stooge could have done them. [10]

The role of the bureaucrats, which reached its zenith during the Ayub era, suffered a temporary eclipse. Peerzada, the Principal Staff Officer remarked: "We took the blame last time when everything was done by the civilians. This time we will do everything and take the credit too."[11] The new regime terminated the services of three-hundred and three civil servants, including some top CSP officers. There were few who believed that the mass dismissal of senior civil servants would end corruption in the civil services or that the rest of the officers had never induldged in unfair and corrupt practices.

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[9] Choudhury, op. cit., p.56.

[10] Fazal Muqueem Khan, Pakistan's Crisis in Ledership, Islamabad: National Book Foundation, 1973, p. 20.

[11] Ibid., p. 19.

Yahya Khan made it clear in the beginning that he had taken over to enable the political leaders to evolve a democratic framework. He reiterated that he would arrange elections to the Constituent Assembly on the basis of direct adult franchise.[12] But as we shall see, the lack of political insight and his inability to keep a balence between the diverse political/economic/ social and regional forces which threatened the political system, plunged the country into a civil war. Instead of restoring democratic institutions, he presided over the disintegration of Pakistan.

Apart from complex political and constitutional issues, Pakistan was beset with gargantuan problems in the socio-economic sphere. The great debate on the synthesis of economic growth and social and distributive justice had already begun. The issue was whether such a synthesis could be achieved without fundamental changes in the political and economic order. Yahya's government being a "temporary one", was neither capable nor willing to undertake such revolutionary changes in the economic system. The crucial questions were: first, would West Pakistan

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12 See"General Yahya Khan's first news conference",The Guardian, April 11, 1969.

pay the economic and political price needed for the viability of a united Pakistan? The bulk of the rupee capital could come from only one source: West Pakistan. And West Pakistan industrialists were also expected to bear the burden of the new measures to correct social inequities. As one foreign expert pointed out, the prospects were not hopeful: "At best, East Pakistan development will be painful. At worst, the task may be completely impossible even with a monumental effort."[13] Secondly, would the Bengalis be prepared to wait for an evolutionary process to remove the economic disparity by "step-by-step concessions"? The political climate in East Pakistan in 1970 was not indicative of any compromise or waiting.

The National Economic Council met on June 2, 1970, to finalize the fourth five-year plan with the two divergent reports from the East and West Pakistan economists. The Planning Commission, in its final assessment on the plan, pointed out to the National Economic Council that to secure the widest possible support in both wings of the country any pattern of

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13 From a review paper by Dr. Ralph Smuckler, former representative of the Ford Foundation in Pakistan, dated September 16, and 17, 1969.

regional allocations must, in its judgement, fulfill at least two important criteria:

> 1. The total allocation of development expenditure taking the public and private sectors together, must be larger in East Pakistan than the combined allocations for the four provinces of West Pakistan.
>
> 2. While ensuring maximum feasible acceleration in East Pakistan, the allocation for West Pakistan must nevertheless provide for a minimum necessary acceleration to permit a larger social program and to meet the needs of the less developed areas of West Pakistan. [14]

The fourth five-year plan (1970-75) was launched on July 1, 1970. It reflected the desire of the Government to bring about wider distribution of economic development. It proposed a development program of Rs. 7, 500 crore; of this 4,900 crore was allocated to the public sector and Rs. 2,600 crore to the private sector. (See Table VII for the shares allocated to the two wings).

These estimates were reached before the outbreak of the civil war in East Pakistan and the fourth five-year plan very soon became the victim of the political crisis which gripped Pakistan in 1970-71.

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[14] Choudhury, op. cit., p.62.

TABLE VII

DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM IN THE FOURTH FIVE-YEAR PLAN

| Region | Public Sector | Private Sector | Total |
|---|---|---|---|
| East Pakistan | 2,940 crore (60%) | 1,000 crore (39%) | 3,940 (52.5) |
| West Pakistan | 1,960 crore (40%) | 1,600 crore (61%) | 3,560 (47.5) |
| Total | 4,900 crore | 2,600 crore | 7,500 |

Source: Golam Choudhury, The Last Days of United Pakistan, Bloomington: Indiania University Press, 1974, p. 63.

Yahya Khan believed that before the resumption of political activity there should be general agreement on the fundamentals of political conduct and behavior and on such basic questions as the degree of regional autonomy and the basis upon which the two wings of Pakistan should be represented in the national parliament. Divisions among the political parties were many, ranging from ideology to local issues. Even on the nature of constitutional government, which they all sought, they seemed to be far apart.

There were three basic issues which Yahya had to decide. The first was the Bengali demand for representation on the basis of "one man, one vote" in an unqualified way and without any reservation such as a second parliamentary chamber or a special voting procedure requiring more than a simple majority in the national assembly. The second and most complicated issue was the relationship between the center and provinces; according to Choudhury, "this was the crux of the whole constitutional quest for a viable political order in Pakistan."[15] The third issue related to the breakup of "one unit" and the restoration of the old provinces in West Pakistan.

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[15] Ibid., p.82.

After extensive discussions with the leading politicians of both wings, Yahya pointed out three issues which would not be allowed to become election issues. Firstly, the question of representation on the basis of population or the existing mode of parity between the two wings, secondly, the future of one unit in the West wing and thirdly, the problem of autonomy for East Pakistan.[16]

In his address to the nation on November 28, 1969, he declared the first two issues resolved. One unit was to be dissolved and the four provinces of West Pakistan reconstituted.[17] The democratic principle of one man one vote was accepted and would form the basis of elections, thus giving the Bengalis a majority in the assembly. The most important issue for East Pakistan, that of autonomy, was left open--for the people's representatives to decide. In the same address he spelled out the time table for the transfer of power to the elected representatives of the people. He announced that in October 1970, elections would be helf to elect members of the

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[16] Fazal Muqueem Khan, op. cit.,p. 33.

[17] The four provinces of West Pakistan, the Punjab, Sind, Northwest Frontier Province, and Baluchistan started functioning from July 1, 1970.

National and Provincial assemblies, and that to facilitate electioneering, free political activity would be permitted after January 1, 1970.[18]

Golam Choudhury posits that the whole plan was based on three fundamental premises:

> First, Mujib would modify his six point plan, and would be satisfied with genuine provincial autonomy and not aim at secession; secondly, the West Pakistani leaders, both the politicians and the big industrialists, would be willing to make the necessary sacrifices and concessions to satisfy the legitimate aspirations, political demands and economic dues of the Bengalis as a condition for keeping Pakistan united; and thirdly, the military junta must give up the power to which it had become accustomed since 1958. 19

In conformity with this program, full political activity was allowed in the country with effect from January 1, 1970. Three months later, the Legal Framework Order (the L.F.O.) provided the guidelines for the general elections and outlined the principles which the military leaders thought the National Assembly must keep in mind while framing the constitution. Besides containing instructions about how the Assembly would

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18 See President's Address to The Nation: General A.M. Yahya Khan, President of Pakistan, November 28, 1969, Published by the Dept. of Films and Publications, Government of Pakistan, Karachi.

19 Choudhury, op. cit., p. 89.

come into being, its strength, rules of procedures and other related matters, it clearly defined some basic principles of consitution making. The L.F.O. provided that the National Assembly must complete its task of framing the constitution within one-hundred twenty days, while the President reserved the right to authenticate the constitution.

In spite of certain restrictions in the L.F.O., the policies adopted by Yahya included major concessions to the political opposition; and the Bengali autonomists decided once again to work through Yahya's system.

Thus, the regime maintained two mechanisms through which it could have a decisive say in the future constitutional order in Pakistan. First, since the elections were expected to return a multiparty system to the assemblies, and since the National Assembly was given only one-hundred and twenty days to frame the constitution, the regime hoped to play a key role in balancing the different parties. Secondly, even if one paaty were to obtain an absolute majority in the National Assembly, Yahya still retained the power to refuse validation of the constitution.

The elections of 1970, the first general election held in Pakistan on the basis of universal adult franchise, worked as a catalyst to sharpen the east-west confrontation. Twenty-four parties participated in the 1970 elections, many of which were of very small significance. A total of eight-hundred candidates, belonging to various parties, contested one-hundred and thirty-eight seats (138) in the National Assembly from the four provinces in West Pakistan, while seven-hundred and eighty-one candidates contested (781) one-hundred and sixty-two (162) seats from East Pakistan. Under the provisions of the L.F.O. no member of the Yahya cabinet or ruling party was permitted to seek election.[20]

The parties participating included religiopolitical rightest parties, i.e., Jama'at-i-Islami, Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Pakistan; and democratic, social-democratic, and leftist parties such as the Pakistan Democratic Party (PDP), the three factions--Council, Qayyum, and Pakistan--of the Muslim League, the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), the Awami League, and the National Awami Party.[21]

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[20] Choudhury, op. cit., p. 112.

[21] The National Awami Party was formed as a result of a split with it's parent body, the Awami League, over differences of foreign policy in 1956-7. It divided into two factions: one group known as "pro-Peking" and the other known as "pro-Moscow."

In East Pakistan the Awami League was the major contestant. It faced opposition from both the left, i.e., the two factions of the National Awami Party, and the right, i.e., Jama'at, PDP, and the Muslim League factions. The Awami League's (AL) aim was to win a commanding majority in the National Assembly by maximizing support in East Pakistan. The League's major campaign theme was a pledge to frame the constitution on the basis of the six-points. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman emphasized his image as a Bengali nationalist to undercut support for both the left and right. In West Pakistan the AL's strategy was to depend on the regional autonomists.

Choudhry reports that : Mujib's election campaign strategy were simple--their sole purpose was to carry the gospel of Bengali nationalism and the idea of Bangladesh everywhere in Pakistan. His main theme was the exploitation of Bengal by the West Pakistanis; his ideal was that of a "sonar" (golden) Bengal, which was a successful appeal to the seventy-five million poverty stricken people of East Pakistan.[22] The six-point program became the rallying cry for the A.L. during the campaigns, virtually

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22 Choudhury, op. cit., p.117. For a good discussion of the Awami Leagues' position and the positions of the other East Pakistan parties and leaders, see:

serving the function of anideology during all the stages leading to the birth of Bangladesh.[23] Cries of Joy Bangla (victory to Bangladesh) were heard everywhere.

In West Pakistan, no one party was in commanding position similiar to that of the Awami League. There was also no single issue comparable to autonomy. The election campaign in West Pakistan was overshadowed by the sharp polarization of the left and the right. The major schism was between the "old guard" leadership and youth, between the established parties and social groups that had participated in the mass movement against Ayub. The Pakistan People's Party, itself new and led by a youthful leader, attracted these newly mobilized groups. the party's slogan--Islam our faith, democracy our polity, socialism our economy--and its plank of Roti , Kapra, aur Makan (food, cloth & shelter), grew popular and attracted most of the progressive forces to its fold. The party's chairman, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, had acquired

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M. Rashiduzzaman, "The Awami League in the Political Developement of Pakistan," Asian Survey, (10,No.7), July 1970. Also by the same author, "The National Awami Party of Pakistan: Leftist Politics in Crisis," Pacific Affairs (Vancouver), XLVIII, No. 3, Fall'70.

[23] Kenneth E. Bauzon, "Breakdown of A Military Regime", op. cit., p. 132.

international stature as a foreign minister of Pakistan under Ayub. The PPP promised Islamic socialism but the precise nature of that socialism was not spelled out. Bhutto's electoral strategy was to coalesce all the anti-regime forces, mobilize the new social groups, and voice the demands brought to the surface during the mass movement of 1968-69.[24]

The rightest political parties which were divided amongst themselves, also put forward their manifestos which aimed at improving the lot of the common man, and campaigned on the slogan "Islam in danger". Their position seemed better initially in West Pakistan than in E. Pakistan. The same was the case with parties like the Council Muslim League and the P.D.P. The old guard's appeal to "Islamic Ideology" and "strong central government" were of little interest to the newly awakened masses in West Pakistan.[25]

The Awami League acquired an absolute hold in East Pakistan but had no support in the West, while the emerging West Pakistani leader Bhutto, did not dare to set up even a single candidate in East Pakistan. Regional polarization became increasingly evident as the election campaign developed.

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[24] See Shahid J. Burki, Social Groups and Development:

The election results saw the Awami League and the People's Party sweeping polls in East and West Pakistan respectively. The Awami League won an absolute majority in the National Assembly (160 out of 300 seats). It won a landslide victory in East Pakistan, receiving all but two of the one-hundred and sixty-two seats; and received 74.9% of the votes polled in East Pakistan. But in West Pakistan it did not secure a single seat and the percentages of votes secured by the Awami League in the four provinces of West Pakistan were: 0.07 (Punjab), 0.25 (Sind), 0.22 (N.W.F.P.), and 1.0 (Baluchistan).[26] Bhutto's People's Party was the second largest party in the National Assembly, winning eighty-one (81) out of one-hundred and thirty-eight (138) seats for West Pakistan. Bhutto's main support came from the Punjab. He captured (62) seats out of the (82) in the Punjab. In Sind, his home province, he won nineteen of the twenty-seven seats.[27]

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A Case Study of Pakistan for a detailed discussion of of these groups. For a concise account of various parties and their programs see: G.G.M. Budruddin, Election Handbook, Karachi, 1970.

[25] Rizvi, op. cit., p. 227.

[26] Jahan, op. cit., p.190.

[27] Singhal, op. cit., p. 192.

Other political parties did not do well and some did suprisingly poorly. For instance, the Council Muslim League, led by Mian Mumtaz Daultana, which was expected to emerge as the largest single party in West Pakistan, won only seven seata. In fact the election virtually eliminated from the scene the Muslim League, which had brought about the founding of Pakistan. The Qayyum Muslim League won nine seats, Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam seven, Markazi Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Pakistan seven, Jama'at-i-Islami four, the National Awami Party (Wali Khan pro-Moscow group) six, the Pakistan Muslim League two, the PDP one, and independents sixteen seats.[28]

The provincial elections , which took place a few days later on December 17, confirmed in all five provinces the dominance of the two parties in their respective wings. The Awami League won another victory (288 out of 300 seats). The People's Party won a majority in the Punjab (113 out of 180 seats) and Sind (28 out of 60). In the Baluchistan and North-West Frontier Province assemblies there was a plurality of parties, with the National Awami

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28 For an analysis of the election see Craig Baxter, "Pakistan Votes--1970," Asian Survey,(11 No. 3, March 1971). Also for a full discussion and analysis of the various political parties and the election results see Mushtaq Ahmad, Politics Without Social Change, chapters 3,4, and 5, Karachi: Space Publishers, 1972.

Party ( Wali Khan group) being the dominant one.[29]

The election results as far as they related to East Pakistan, caused no suprise to the ruling elite or to any serious observer of political development there. After Yahya's decision to hold the elections following the violent anti-Pakistan feelings which had arisen after the cyclone in East Pakistan, there was not the slightest doubt that Mujib would monopolize all the seats there.[30]

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[29] Craig Baxter, op. cit., p. 211.

[30] The elections due to be held on October 5, had to be postponed to December 7, 1970 because of colossal damage caused by floods occuring in East Pakistan in August. During the last stages of the election campaign in November 1970, the coastal region of East Pakistan was hit by an unprecedented cyclone and tidal bore. About 200,000 people were killed and many more rendered homeless. The relief operations were badly handled by the government, which at first played down the magnitude of the disaster. This gave rise to criticism abroad and to serious political repercussions in East Pakistan. It helped the Awami League to focus attention on the need for self-rule in East Pakistan. Most observers agree that the Awami League's landslide was made possible by the party's exploitation of the cyclone issue. Also the fact that Bhashani's National Awami Party did not participate in the elections is said to have given Mujib's Awami League a better chance of gaining seats.

It was the results of the election in West Pakistan which caused greater suprise, particularly the total defeat of the right wing and orthodox parties there and the emergence of a non-Punjabi, Bhutto, as the leader of West Pakistan or more precisely, of the Punjab. The People's Party victory marked the successful assertion of the new groups in West Pakistan politics.

Thus Bhutto emerged as the leader of West Pakistan, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman of East Pakistan. On a national plane the Sheikh thus emerged as the prospective leader of the government and Bhutto the leader of the opposition. The elections crystallized the polarization between East and West Pakistan.

After the Awami League's overwhelming electoral victory, the mood in East Pakistan was one of confidence, and there was no talk of secession. Mujib himself played up his image as the leader of the majority party in the National Assembly. But for Bhutto, as one observer remarks and indeed for the West Pakistani leadership in general, "it was psychologically difficult to accept Mujib's domination of the center."[31]

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[31]Jahan, op. cit., p. 195.

The emergence of the Awami League and the People's Party as clear winners upset the Yahya regime's plan concerning post electoral alignments. The regime had expected that the election would either brings such parties to power as the PDP or the Islam Pasands (Islam loving), who would not fundamentally threaten the ruling elite's position, or that it would result in such a plurality of parties that no party would have absolute command, and the military would be able to consolidate its position by working as a mediator. However it still hoped to play the role of mediator especially so because the two dominant parties in the two wings could not agree on a number of points.[32]

On February 13, 1971, the President announced that Pakistan's National Assembly would meet on March 3, 1971 at Dacca.

Mujib's posture became more and more militant. In his post-election speeches from January to March 1971, there was no trace of any compromise or any modification of the extreme aspects of his six points. He now declared that the six-point plan was "the property of

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[32]See K.E. Bauzon, op. cit., p. 135.

the people of Bangladesh" and that there could be no compromise on it.[33]

In his post-election speeches Mujib declared:

> Our people have recorded a historic verdict... a constitution on the basis of the six-point formula has to be framed and implemented in all its aspects...The resounding victory of the Awami League is, in fact, the victory or...Bangladesh. [34]

Then again on December 20 he repeated:

> There can be no constitution except the one which is based on the six-point program. [35]

Turning to Bhutto, one found that in his post-election speeches he was no less uncompromising and provocative. In one speech he declared:

> No constitution could be framed, nor could any government at the center be run without my party's cooperation. The PPP was not, prepared to occupy the opposition benches in the National Assembly... [36] Majority alone does not count in national politics.

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[33] Choudhury, op. cit., p. 145.

[34] See Bangladesh, My Bangladesh: Selected Speeches and Statements by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, New York, 1972 pp. 20-21.

[35] Ibid., pp. 22-7.

[36] Pakistan Times, Lahore, December 22, 1970.

Mujib's determination to maintain the six-point platform was matched only by Bhutto's intransigence.

After failing to arrive at an agreement with Mujib, Bhutto adopted a new strategy to bring about a political settlement. He dicided to adopt a hard line towards the six-point formula with the hopes that it would compel Mujib to come to a compromise with the P.P.P. Fearing that his voice in the assembly would not mean anything to Mujib and the Awami representatives, Bhutto announced on February 15, 1971 that he had decided to boycott the National Assembly session of March 3, 1971. He demanded postponement of the assembly and threatened to launch a movement"from Khyber to Karachi"[37] if that were not done or if any West Pakistani politician traveled to Dacca to attend the assembly. This, as expected, precipitated a serious crisis and made any compromise impossible. The Sheikh's Awami League and the minor political parties in West Pakistan were willing to meet in the assembly with or without Bhutto's men.[38]

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[37]See Z.A. Bhutto's statement at Press Conference in Peshawar on February 15, 1971 as reported in Dawn, Karachi, February 16, 1971.

[38]Of the eight West Pakistan parties represented in the National Assembly, five did not respond to Bhutto's call to boycott the Assembly. These parties together held twenty-six seats of the one-hundred and thirty-six the west wing held in the National Assembly.

Succumbing to the pressure from Bhutto, who was supported in his move by several army generals,[39] President Yahya announced on March 1, 1971 his fateful decision to postpone the National Assembly session citing Bhutto's unwillingness to participate in the National Assembly.[40] All political parties in West Pakistan except Bhutto's party and the Qayyum Muslim League protested the postponement of the National Assembly session . The strongest resentment was expressed in East Pakistan, where there arose a wave of violent protest, as the postponement was interpreted as a conspiracy.

Under cross-pressures from the military and the political radicals,[41] Mujib decided to chart a middle course. He rejected the options of unilateral declaration of independence or bowing down under military threat. Instead he chose to launch a nonviolent non-cooperation

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[39] Bhutto was now regarded by the hawkish generals like Hamid, Omar, and Gul Hasan, as well as by his "trusted friend" Peerzada, as the defender of the "national interests" of Pakistan as interpreted by the ruling elite.

[40] See Dawn, March 2, 1971.

[41] In the next few weeks Mujib was to come under pressure both from other parties and from radicals of his own party to declare independence. After Yahya's announcement of the postponement of the N.A. session, the pro-Moscow faction of the National Awami Party was the first group to call for a declaration of indepen-

movement, giving him the opportunity to combat the military on his own strong ground. His strategy was to build up such unprededented popular pressure to deter military action and to force the regime to negotiate with him.

On March 5, Yahya issued an invitation to the political leaders for a Round Table Conference to be held on the 10th. He also attempted to retrieve the situation by withdrawing his order of postponement and announced that the assembly would meet on March 25. At the same time, however, he warned against attempts to disrupt the unity of the country.

While Bhutto accepted the invitation, Mujib rejected it on the grounds that was bound to fail, following the pattern of failure set by a similiar Round Table Conference in 1969 under Ayub. Mujib responded that he would participate in the assembly only if the following demands would be satisfied: (1) that Martial Law be lifted; (2) that the soldiers be sent back to their barracks; (3) that an investigation be made into the killings on March

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dence. The pro-Peking Bhasani faction also did the same, as did other parties. Mujib at first urged a constitutional movement, but the radicals of his party and the student league did not want to fall behind the popular mood. After a period of initial hesitation the radicals of the student league supported and, in fact, overshadowed the other groups demanding independence.

2, and 3rd; and (4) that power be immediately transferred to the elected representatives of the people.[42] To keep up pressure on the regime he announced on March 7, 1971 that effective on the 8th, a week long "non-violent, non-cooperation program," or hartal (strike), would commence. This hartal resulted in the paralyzation of government functions in the entire eastern wing of the country. The whole of East Pakistan administration, even Bengalis serving in central government agencies and in the civilian branch of the armed forces, complied with Mujib's call for non-cooperation. The Awami League as an organization became virtually the government, through the organization of Sangram Parishad (council of action) in the sub-division and district levels under the guidance of local AL units. The central government's writ did not run in East Pakistan and in fact, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman became the de facto ruler of East Pakistan.[43]

As readers will have realized, prospects of framing a constitution on the basis of Yahya's transfer of power plan as formulated in 1969-70 ceased to exist. The choice before the regime was between recognizing the de facto

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[42]Fazal Muqueem Khan, op. cit., p. 60-61.
[43]K. E. Bauzon, op. cit., p. 137.

independent status of Bangladesh and challenging Mujib; or between presiding over the dismemberment of the country. This was the dilemma before Yahya.

Yahya agreed in principle to Mujib's four pre-conditions; and on March 20, the combined advisers of Yahya and the Awami League agreed on a draft proclamation to be issued by Yahya containing the outlines of an interim arrangement for power transfer. Fearing that he might be placed in a losing end if he did not participate in the talks, Bhutto flew to Dacca on March 21, and quickly registered his objections.[44]

Yahya had his own difficulties during this period also. There were some military and civil officers and other advisers who misguided him to safeguard their own interests. Fazal Muqueem Khan reports: " that he himself was getting fed up with Mujibur Rahman, who it looks, now began to be treated as an adversary. The civil as well as the military officers who had gathered around Yahya Khan goaded him to

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[44] Published accounts of the Yahya-Mujib talks include: White Paper on The Crisis of East Pakistan, (Islamabad: Gov't. of Pakistan Press, August 1971), which gives the regime's side of the story; Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, The Great Tragedy, (Karachi: People's Party Publication, 1971), which gives Bhutto's version and the press reports; Rahman Sobham, Bangladesh Documents, pp. 277-80, (New Delhi: Government of India, 1971), gives the Awami League's account. Another view from the standpoint of the PPP may be found in A.H. Karder, People's

to take action. In their opinion the Awami League did not enjoy the support of the majority of the population of East Pakistan and the people did not have the stamina necessary for prolonged opposition. Therefore Bengali nationalism and their demands would cool down in a few days after military action."[45]

Even in this hopeless and dismal situation, Yahya and Mujib still talked in terms of a political settlement, while Yahya's militant army generals were getting ready for a confrontation and Mujib's militant supports were similarly opposed to compromise. The fate of the country's one-hundred and twenty million people was in the hands of the vested interest groups--the western big business and senior civil servants, who always dominated the political scene in Pakistan--and two ambitious politicians.

On March 23, 1971 Mujib presented his own draft proclamation, rejecting the one offered by Yahya which granted full autonomy on the basis of the six-points minus dismemberment of the country.[46] The Awami League

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Committment: Politics in Pakistan, (Lahore: A,H. Karder, 1971). See also K.A. Kamal, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and the Birth of Bangladesh, (Dacca: Kazi Giasuddin Ahmed, 1970).

[45] Fazal Muqueem Khan, op. cit., p. 51.

[46] The text of the new Mujib plan can be studied in the White Paper, (Islamabad: 1971). Also see Golam Choudhury, Last Days, op. cit., pp. 172-177.

pressed for quick acceptance of the draft proposal and warned that "unless it were issued within forty-eight hours, even that would be too late."[47] On the evening of March 25, 1971 while the Awami Leaders still hoped to hear the draft proclamation, Yahya suddendly left Dacca, without formally breaking the talks, thus signalling the breakdown of the negotiations. Almost immediately upon his departure the military plan code-named "blitz" was activated supposedly for the purpose of meeting "serious internal contingencies."[48] On that night units of the Pakistan army attacked the Dacca University campus, the headquarters of the East Pakistan Rifles and police, and offices of the Awami League Newspapers. About an hour after midnight,of the 26th, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was arrested and the Awami League banned. As a spontaneous reaction several armed segments of the population, collectively known as Mukti Bahini (liberation forces), engaged the government soldiers in bloody clashes, thus signalling the militant phase of the entire episode.

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[47]See Rounaq Jahan, op. cit., p. 196.

[48] See F.Z. Khan, op. cit., p. 53.

The military action destroyed the last hope of saving the unity of Pakistan. On April 17, Bangladesh was formally declared an independent and sovereign nation. On December 3, 1971, India entered the war against Pakistan. On December 6th, India formally recognized Bangladesh. Ten days later, Dacca fell to Indian and Mukti Bahini forces. On December 19, 1971, Yahya quit his post and asked Bhutto to form a civilian government.

# CONCLUSION

Thus, in the post-Ayub period a number of factors converged which accelerated the process of disintegration. Ayub's successor Yahya at first followed a different policy and it appeared for a time that the policy might hold the the two wings of Pakistan together. He adopted a conciliatory attitude toward the Bengali autonomists, and by granting representation on the basis of population, he increased the Bengalis stake in the union. But, he presumed that he had the "gun" in his hand and he would achieve the solution of the East Pakistan problem, if need arose, by the use of brute force.

Yahya's failure spoke also for the failure of the whole generations of leaders that preceded him. When he stepped into power, he found no basic institution developed enought to persist through the crisis that was to come. This was so because no systematic efforts were exerted by his predecessors to create and develop them. The use of outright coercion by the state drove the social wedge wider. Furthermore, the rising expectation of the people and particularly the political parties to have a share of political power was beyond the ability of the regime to

accomodate. This reflected the regime's low level of institutionalization. The constraints imposed upon the regime emanated from internal and external sources. The organizational weakness, along with the questionable competence of the men in authority, were the main internal factors. The external ones were created by the limited capacity of the dominant political forces to accomadate each others demands.

Bhutto's inordinate ambition was to acquire power at any cost. Having realized that Mujib would not agree to any amendment to his six-point formula, Bhutto adopted a hard line to cow him down. His boycott of the National Assembly in March 1971 created an explosive situation and a point of no return. Mujibur Rahman was not in favor of immediate declaration of independence and wanted to delay it for some time. He was not sincere or straight-forward in his political negotiations in 1969-70; he pledged to modify his six-points and to maintain the unity of Pakistan.

What happened in East Pakistan was tragic but not suprising. It was the outcome of the failure of the political leaders and the generals to arrive at a political settlement; the Soviet support of India, and the Indian

invasion of East Pakistan. Basically it represented the failure of Yahya Khan, Z.A. Bhutto and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.

The experience of Pakistan, suggest that it might be easy for a disciplined army to take over the reigns of government in a developing country which is facing the crisis of modernization and suffers from horizontal and vertical cleavages but the military cannot solve all the problems facing the new nations. It may check political instability, introduce certain social and economic reforms and accelerate the rate of economic growth but it cannot tacke the real problem which leads to a coup d'etat--creation of a viable framework of political action which can function smoothly without the backing of military commanders.

Once the military enters politics it becomes difficult for them to dissociate from politics and revert to their previous apolitical position. The military commanders watch politics closely even after the restoration of constitutional life. If the new political system does not resolve the problem of political change and succession in

an orderly way or the government is paralyzed by the agitation of the discontented elements, they again step into the political field. (Witness the re-emergence of the military in the politics of Pakistan; whereupon a mass movement protesting a rigged election returned Pakistan to military rule in July 1977).

It seems plausible to suggest, therefore, that the extent of the military's role in politics depends on the performance of the civil government in solving the multifarious political, social, and economic problems and the degree of public attachment to the civilian institutions. There is an urgent need to set up stable civilian institutions which can create a sense of participation amongst the people of all classes and provinces. Simmering discontent and growing lawlessness weakens the civilian base. The military intervened in the politics of Pakistan because the civil leadership was impotent and the public attachment to the civilian institutions was fragile. Unless necessary methods are devised to remove the causes of discontent and a balence is kept between diverse social, political, and economic forces working in the political

system of Pakistan, chances of the military assuming political role will continue to be considerable.

In addition, the frequent use of the military for the police function should be discouraged. It is suggested that intervention in politics ruins the military as an organization for defense. It becomes corrupt, soft, and incompetent.

The political malaise which marred the prospects of democracy in Pakistan during 1947-58 has not been rectified. Besides a dominant political party, there are numerous opposition parties which are regional in composition and parochial in outlook. If elections are held regularly and a sense of participation is created amongst the people of the smaller provinces the tendencies of regionalism and parochial outlook can be arrested. The government must solve the problems of the people or at least convince them that it is working for their betternment.

Thus, from our analysis one may reasonably conjecture, that in safeguarding against military intervention in politics, a major responsibility falls on the shoulders of the political leadership. Their inability to establish

and run the civilian institutions and failure to keep a balance between diverse forces working in the political system, generates political ambitions in the minds of the generals. If the civilian institutions are not capable of asserting themselves on the military, the military by virtue of their qualities will dominate the civil institutions.

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