

4

The Global Context of Urbanisation and Urban Change

Preview: global urbanisation trends; the changing distribution of world urban population; causes of urban growth; the size of the world's settlements; megacities and million cities; the relationship between urbanisation and economic growth; the urbanisation cycle; stages of urban development; urbanisation; counterurbanisation; reurbanisation; suburbanization; exurbanisation; types of urbanised regions

INTRODUCTION

The global urban pattern is changing in three main ways as a result of:

1. *urbanisation*: an increase in the proportion of the total population that lives in urban areas;
2. *urban growth*: an increase in the population of towns and cities;
3. *urbanism*: the extension of the social and behavioural characteristics of urban living across society as a whole.

In this chapter we first examine recent patterns of urbanisation and urban growth at the global scale in order to provide a framework for subsequent discussion of regional, national and local patterns and processes of urban change.

THE URBANISATION OF THE GLOBE

As we have seen in Chapter 3, the current high level of urbanisation at the global level is a relatively recent phenomenon. At the end of the nineteenth century the extent of world urbanisation was limited, with only Britain, North-West Europe and the USA more than 25 per cent urban in 1890.¹ With less than 3 per cent of the world's population living in towns and cities, levels of urbanisation elsewhere were insignificant. In the USA, urban development was confined primarily to the cities of the east coast and emerging Midwest.

An indication of the rapid progression of urbanisation across the globe is provided in Figures 4.1– 4.4. The spread of urbanisation in Europe, North America and the Middle East is apparent, as are the rising levels of urbanisation in Africa and Asia, which were almost wholly rural in 1950. Figure 4.5 confirms that for most countries of the world urbanisation is a contemporary and ongoing process. Over the course of the past half-

century, a world in which most people lived in rural areas has been transformed into a predominantly urban world. This trend has influenced not just the physical location of population but also the organisation and conduct of economic and social life of most people on the planet both urban and rural dwellers.

Figure 4.5 also reveals the differential incidence of urbanisation in the world. As Table 4.1 indicates, the more developed regions (MDRs) exhibit high levels of urbanisation. More than 75 per cent of the population of Europe, North America, Japan and Australia New Zealand were urban dwellers in 1994, and by 2025 at least eight out of every ten people in these regions are expected to live in urban areas. Accordingly, in the developed countries the pace of urbanisation has slackened and has in some instances gone into reverse, as is indicated in the **demographic-transition** model (Box 4.1). By contrast, the less developed regions (LDR) are characterised by rapid urbanisation that is expected



Figure 4.1 The Urban world in 1890



Figure 4.2 The urban world in 1950

to continue for decades (Figure 4.5 and Table 4.1). As Table 4.1 shows, in 1970, 25 per cent of the population of LDRs lived in urban areas. By 1994 almost 40 per cent were urban dwellers. Since the urban population is growing at an average rate of 3.5 per cent per annum while its rural counterpart grows at less than 1 per cent per annum, it is estimated that by 2025 almost 60 per cent of the population of LDRs (i.e. 4 billion people) will live in towns and cities.



Figure 4.3 The urban world in 1900



Figure 4.4 The urban world by 2025

THE CHANGING DISTRIBUTION OF THE WORLD'S URBAN POPULATION

The rapid growth of the world's population has been accompanied in most countries by the multiplication and growth of urban places. The United Nations estimates that between 1950 and 2025 the number of urban dwellers will increase nearly sevenfold, from 738 million to 5.1 billion. But the world urban population is not distributed evenly among regions. As Table 4.1 reveals, in 1970 the more developed regions and less developed regions had a




Figure 4.5 The urban population of world regions (%), 1970, 1994 and 2025

Source: United Nations (1995) World Urbanization Prospects: The 1994 Revision New York: United Nations

similar number of urban dwellers, 677 million and 676 million respectively. The year 1970 represents a 'tipping point' in the global distribution of urban population. Prior to 1970, most urban dwellers lived in the MDR but this dominance has been declining since 1950, when 442 million (60 per cent) of the 737 million urban dwellers worldwide lived in the MDRs. Since 1970 the number of urban dwellers in LDRs has overtaken that of MDRs, and the gap continues to widen. Currently 1.7 billion urban dwellers (60 per cent of the world urban population) live in the LDRs while 868 million live in the MDRs. By 2025 4 billion of the 5 billion urban dwellers are expected to live in the LDRs.

The distribution of urban population is also changing within the LDRs and the MDRs. In the former realm, Asia is a major region of urban growth. Whereas in 1970 Asia was home to 503 million urban dwellers (37 per cent of the world total), by 1994 1.2 billion (46 per cent) of the 2.5 billion global urban dwellers were Asian. It is anticipated that 2.7 billion (more than half the world's urban dwellers) will live in Asia by 2025. This trend is in marked contrast to the situation in Europe. As Table 4.1 shows, with 423 million urban dwellers in 1970 Europe was second only to Asia. Between 1970 and 1994 Europe added

110 million urban dwellers with a further 65 million expected by 2025. During the period 1994–2025 Asia is expected to add 1.5 billion urban residents—or about 23 new urban Asians for every new European urban resident.

Latin America and the Caribbean are also growing rapidly, with their urban population more than doubling from 163 million in 1970 to 349 million in 1994. The urban population of the region is expected to reach 601 million by 2025, slightly more than the number projected for Europe (598 million). Africa exhibits the fastest urban growth rate of any major world region. From 84 million urban residents in 1970 Africa by 1994 had 240 million, and by 2025 the number of urban dwellers is expected to reach 804 million. All these trends are confirmed by the analysis of urban growth rates (Table 4.2 and Figure 4.6).


TABLE 4.1 URBAN POPULATION AND PERCENTAGE URBAN IN MORE DEVELOPED AND LESS DEVELOPED REGIONS, 1970, 1994 AND 2025

<i>Region</i>	<i>Urban population (million)</i>			<i>Urban share (%)</i>		
	<i>1970</i>	<i>1994</i>	<i>2025</i>	<i>1970</i>	<i>1994</i>	<i>2025</i>
More developed regions	677	868	1,040	67.5	74.7	84.0
Australia-New Zealand	13	18	26	84.4	84.9	89.1
Europe	423	532	598	64.4	73.3	83.2
Japan	74	97	103	71.2	77.5	84.9
Northern America	167	221	313	73.8	76.1	84.8
Less developed regions	676	1,653	4,025	25.1	37.0	57.0
Africa	84	240	804	23.0	33.4	53.8
Asia ^a	428	1,062	2,615	21.0	32.4	54.0
Latin America	163	349	601	57.4	73.7	84.7
Oceania ^b	1	2	5	18.0	24.0	40.0

Source: adapted from United Nations (1995) World Urbanization Prospects: The 1994 Revision New York: United Nations
Notes: ^aExcluding Japan. ^bExcluding Australia-New Zealand

BOX 4.1

The demographic-transition model



This model describes the main stages of population change that accompany industrialisation and urbanisation:

1. Birth rates and death rates are both high, leading to fluctuating population growth determined more by mortality than by fertility. This is associated with conditions in pre-industrial society and in some developing areas today (e.g. sub-Saharan Africa), where most people live in rural environments at a subsistence level.
2. In the early stage of development, death rates begin to fall, owing to improvements in medicine and public health. Family and religious values can contribute to maintain a high birth rate, leading to rapid population growth. Many of the population migrate from rural to urban areas, feeding city growth and urbanisation. This phase is typical of many Third World countries today.
3. With the move to cities, large families are less of an economic asset than they had been in rural society, and more of an expense on the family budget. Birth rates fall to a level more in line with the death rate, leading to a slowdown in population growth. Europe and North America have passed through this phase.
4. This stage has been reached in highly developed countries, such as the UK and the USA, where both birth and death rates are low and population growth rates are near zero.

THE CAUSES OF URBAN GROWTH

The increasing levels of urbanisation and urban growth identified are the result of a combination of natural increase of the urban population and net in-migration to urban areas. The two major processes reinforce each other, although their relative importance varies. Findley (1993),² for example, found that for twenty-four developing countries between 1975 and 1990 the average contribution of migration to urban growth was 54 per cent. This underestimates the real situation, however, since many migrants who live and work in the city do not move there permanently (see Chapter 23). Finally, it is important to note that although it is often assumed that the largest migration flows are in the countries of the South, more migration takes place in the USA, where one person in five moves each year, albeit between urban areas, than in all the LDRs. As we shall see in the following chapter, the restructuring of the urban system in the USA during the 1980s was more rapid and fundamental than that taking place in most countries of the LDRs.

SETTLEMENT SIZE

The world's urban population is distributed among settlements of differing sizes along a continuum from small towns with several thousand people to giant cities with populations of tens of millions. Most of the urban population live in settlements with fewer than 500,000 inhabitants.³ Most of these intermediate settlements function as links between town and country where agricultural surpluses are exchanged for manufactured goods and services in accordance with the precepts of central place theory (see Chapter 6).

The distribution of urban population in terms of settlement size is shown in Table 4.3. In 1950 only one city (New York) had a population of 10 million or more, accounting for 1.7 per cent of the world urban population. By 1990 twelve cities had attained this size and shared 7.1 per cent of the world urban population. It is anticipated that by 2015 twenty-seven cities will reach the 10 million mark, accommodating 10.9 per cent of the world urban population. In absolute numerical terms this represents a rise from 12 million people living in a single city in 1950 to 450 million in several giant cities by 2015. Between 1990 and 2015 nearly all the population growth in the largest urban agglomerations is expected to occur in the LDRs. At the other end of the population-size continuum, cities with fewer than 500,000 inhabitants were home to 63.7 per cent of the world urban population in 1950. While their share is expected to decrease

TABLE 4.2 AVERAGE ANNUAL RATE OF CHANGE OF URBAN POPULATION, 1965–70, 1990–5 AND 2020–5 (%)

<i>Region</i>	<i>1965–70</i>	<i>1990–5</i>	<i>2020–5</i>
World	2.64	2.53	1.93
Less developed regions	3.58	3.51	2.33
Africa	4.64	4.38	3.34
Asia ^a	3.28	3.68	2.31
Latin America	3.97	2.60	1.26
Oceania ^b	2.26	3.13	3.32
More developed regions	1.74	0.75	0.45
Australia-New Zealand	2.35	1.32	1.05
Europe	1.68	0.84	0.24
Japan	2.20	0.37	–0.06
North America	1.63	1.29	0.99

Source: adapted from United Nations (1995) World Population Prospects: The 1994 Revision
 New York: United Nations
 Notes: ^aExcluding Japan. ^bExcluding Australia-New Zealand



Figure 4.6 Average annual rate of urban population growth, 1990-5

slowly in the future, more than 50 per cent of world urban population is still expected to live in such cities in 2015 (Table 4.3).

MEGACITIES AND MILLION CITIES

One of the most striking features of the global urban pattern is the degree to which the urban population lives in giant cities that dominate the global urban and economic systems. Against the background of a general increase in the number of people living in urban places, it is the metropolitan regions that are proliferating and expanding most rapidly.

While noting the difficulties of urban definition and cross-national comparison, we can identify a number of significant trends in the geographical distribution of megacities. Table 4.4 lists the fifteen largest urban agglomerations at different points in time, and enables us to map the major changes over the post-Second World War period. Tokyo, with a population of 27.9 million in 2000, has been the largest city in the world since 1970 and is projected to retain that rank (Box 4.2). By contrast, New York is projected to continue to slip down the ranking over the next twenty-five years. Other expected changes include the entry of Lagos, Karachi, Delhi and Dhaka to replace Rio de Janeiro, Osaka, Buenos Aires and Seoul by the year 2015. By then, Lagos is expected to be the third-largest city in the world after Tokyo and Bombay. Comparison of the lists for 1950 and 2000 demonstrates the remarkable shift in the global distribution of largest cities from the MDRs to the LDRs, a trend that will continue for the foreseeable future.

TABLE 4.3 URBAN POPULATION, NUMBER OF CITIES AND PERCENTAGE OF URBAN POPULATION BY CITY-SIZE CLASS: WORLD, MORE DEVELOPED REGIONS AND LESS DEVELOPED REGIONS

Size class	World				More developed regions				Less developed regions			
	1950	1970	1990	2015	1950	1970	1990	2015	1950	1970	1990	2015
10 million or more												
No. of agglomerations	1	3	12	27	1	2	4	4	0	1	8	23
Population	12	44	161	450	12	33	63	71	0	11	98	378
% urban	1.7	3.2	7.1	10.9	2.8	4.8	7.5	7.2	0.0	1.7	6.9	12.0
From 5 million to 10 million												
No. of agglomerations	7	18	21	44	5	8	6	8	2	10	15	36
Population	42	130	154	282	32	61	44	56	10	69	110	226
% urban	5.7	9.6	6.8	6.8	7.2	9.0	5.2	5.7	3.5	10.2	7.7	7.2
From 1 million to 5 million												
No. of agglomerations	75	144	249	472	43	73	98	120	32	71	151	352
Population	140	265	474	941	84	136	191	240	56	129	283	701
% urban	19.0	19.6	20.8	22.7	19.1	20.1	22.7	24.2	19.0	19.0	20.4	22.2
From 500,000 to 999,999												
No. of agglomerations	105	175	295	422	59	85	104	123	46	90	191	299
Population	73	122	203	293	42	61	72	84	31	61	132	209
% urban	9.9	9.0	8.9	7.1	9.5	9.0	8.5	8.5	10.5	9.0	9.2	6.6
Fewer than 500,000												
Population	470	792	1,284	2,178	272	386	472	540	198	406	812	1,638
% urban	63.7	58.5	56.4	52.6	61.5	57.1	56.1	54.5	67.0	60.0	56.6	52.0
<i>Source: adapted from United Nations (1995) World Urbanization Prospects: The 1994 Revision</i>												
New York: United Nations												

Also, the largest cities are becoming larger; the average population of the world's largest cities was over 5 million inhabitants in 1990, compared with 2.1 million in 1950,

and less than 200,000 in 1800. The number of megacities (defined by the United Nations as cities with 8 million or more inhabitants) is increasing rapidly, particularly in LDRs. Whereas in 1950 only New York and London had a population of 8 million or more, by 1970 eleven cities had become megacities (Table 4.5). Three were located in Latin America and the Caribbean (São Paulo, Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro), two in North America (New York and Los Angeles), two in Europe (London and Paris) and four in Asia (Tokyo, Shanghai, Osaka and Beijing). By contrast, in 1994 sixteen of the twenty-two megacities were in LDRs, and by 2015 it is expected that twenty-seven of the thirty-three megacities will be located in LDRs. The geographical shift in the focus of megacity growth is repeated in the distribution of 'million cities' (Table 4.6). Some of these giant cities have emerged as global or 'world cities' (see Chapter 14).

URBANISATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

Regional differences in rates of urbanisation throughout the world provide clear evidence of the relationship between urbanisation and industrialisation. As we saw in Chapter 3, prior to the industrial revolution urban development was restricted by the amount and value of surplus product that could be generated and accumulated in a single place. The low level of economic growth imposed a ceiling on the number of people who could be sustained in urban places.

The key role that cities play in dynamic and competitive economies and the relationship between the scale of a national economy and the level of urbanisation is illustrated by the fact that most of the world's largest cities are in the world's largest economies.⁴ In 1990 the world's twenty-five largest economies had over 70 per cent of the world's 'million cities' and all but one of its twelve agglomerations with 10 million or more inhabitants.

Despite such categorical evidence, the relationship between urbanisation and level of economic development is complex, with many factors at work, and while economic growth may result in increased levels of urbanisation, higher levels of urbanisation in turn can stimulate more economic growth. We can illustrate this in the context of the Third World, where a number of factors can mediate the relationship between urbanisation and economic growth. These include the following:

1. The nature of economic activity within each sector of the national economy can affect urbanisation. For example, the type of agricultural enterprise can affect the scale of urban settlement. High-value crops that provide good incomes for farmers and workers within intensive farming systems can support rapid growth of local urban centres to the point where agricultural surpluses support a relatively urbanised population.
2. The nature of land ownership is important in determining whether profits are spent or invested within the country or taken abroad.
3. Cultural preferences for a type of lifestyle can influence the level of urbanisation.
4. Government policies and the activities of state institutions are also important. An increasing share of national income is controlled by the public sector. Since most government employees are urban residents, most public spending flows to towns and

cities. Some observers have equated this trend with 'urban bias' in the investment strategies of Third World governments and have argued that this

TABLE 4.4 THE FIFTEEN LARGEST URBAN AGGLOMERATIONS, RANKED BY POPULATION SIZE, 1950, 2000 AND 2015

<i>Rank</i>	<i>Agglomeration and country</i>	<i>Population (million)</i>
1950		
1.	New York, USA	12.3
2.	London, UK	8.7
3.	Tokyo, Japan	6.9
4.	Paris, France	5.4
5.	Moscow, Russian Federation	5.4
6.	Shanghai, China	5.3
7.	Essen, Germany	5.3
8.	Buenos Aires, Argentina	5.0
9.	Chicago, USA	4.9
10.	Calcutta, India	4.4
11.	Osaka, Japan	4.1
12.	Los Angeles, USA	4.0
13.	Beijing, China	3.9
14.	Milan, Italy	3.6
15.	Berlin, Germany	3.3
2000		
1.	Tokyo, Japan	27.9
2.	Bombay, India	18.1
3.	São Paulo, Brazil	17.8
4.	Shanghai, China	17.2
5.	New York, USA	16.6
6.	Mexico City, Mexico	16.4
7.	Beijing, China	14.2
8.	Jakarta, Indonesia	14.1
9.	Lagos, Nigeria	13.5
10.	Los Angeles, USA	13.1

11. Calcutta, India	12.7
12. Tianjin, China	12.4
13. Seoul, Republic of Korea	12.3
14. Karachi, Pakistan	12.1
15. Delhi, India	11.7
2015	
1. Tokyo, Japan	28.7
2. Bombay, India	27.4
3. Lagos, Nigeria	24.4
4. Shanghai, China	23.4
5. Jakarta, Indonesia	21.2
6. São Paulo, Brazil	20.8
7. Karachi, Pakistan	20.6
8. Beijing, China	19.4
9. Dhaka, Bangladesh	19.0
10. Mexico City, Mexico	18.8
11. New York, USA	17.6
12. Calcutta, India	17.6
13. Delhi, India	17.6
14. Tianjin, China	17.0
15. Metro Manila, Philippines	14.7
Source: adapted from United Nations (1995) World Urbanization Prospects: The 1994 Revision New York: United Nations	

BOX 4.2

Tokyo: global megacity

Tokyo is the largest urban agglomeration in the world and is approaching the threshold of a 30 million population super-city. It has long been the dominant urban centre in Japan. As early as 1700 Tokyo had a population of over 1 million, when the population of London was 650,000. Following the Second World War, the city's population grew from 6.9 million in 1950 to 16.5 million in 1970, reaching 26.5 million in 1994. The outer limit of the urbanised area now reaches 100 miles (160km) from the urban core.

Tokyo meets all the criteria of world-city status. The city dominates the Japanese urban system. It is the major commercial centre, housing the headquarters of all major Japanese companies; a manufacturing and wholesaling centre; the chief financial centre;

the seat of government; the cultural capital; the centre for media and advertising industries; and has the largest concentration of institutions of higher learning in the world. The Tokyo metropolitan region is also the world's largest consumer market.

The unprecedented growth of the city has led to urban problems, including escalating land prices, shortage of office space, high-cost housing, congestion and excessive commuting journeys. In recent years the government has sought to encourage decentralisation through the construction of technopoles, small cities of around 50,000 built for high-technology industries, research institutes and colleges near existing medium-size cities. It has also discussed the relocation of capital functions to other parts of the Tokyo metropolitan region. This ties in with the long-range plan for the region, which has among its goals the development of a multi-core urban structure in which the functions of the city are dispersed to reduce distances between place of employment and place of residence.

has encouraged the migration of people from rural to urban areas, thereby leading to over-urbanisation (Box 4.3).

In general, although there is a close relationship between the level of urbanisation and national levels of economic development, the range of potential influences suggests that different factors may be of importance in different national settings. Furthermore, the relative importance of factors that influence levels of urbanisation may change over time as a country becomes more urbanised.

THE URBANISATION CYCLE

The simplicity of the logistic-growth urbanisation curve (Box 4.4) should not be taken to mean that urbanisation is a unidirectional (low to high) process. In a large number of advanced countries the level of urbanisation actually decreased between 1965 and 1990. Although this can be a result of statistical underbounding of urban areas (see Chapter 2), it is now generally acknowledged to indicate a process of population redistribution which involves either the relatively faster growth of smaller urban places or the absolute decline of the largest cities.⁷ The shift in the incidence of strongest population growth away from the largest cities in the national urban system has been termed 'polarisation reversal'⁸ or, more commonly, 'counterurbanisation'.⁹ Geyer and Kontuly (1993)¹⁰ have incorporated these concepts into a theory of differential urbanisation which postulates that large, intermediate-size and small cities go through successive periods of fast and slow growth in a cycle of development. The main stages of this urbanisation cycle are summarised in Figure 4.7.

THE PRIMATE CITY PHASE

During the initial phase of urbanisation, the primate city phase, an increasing proportion of economic activity and population in a country concentrates in a limited number of rapidly growing **primate cities** (Box 4.5). This phase can be sub-divided into three stages:

1. First is an *early primate city* stage in which a primate city attains spatial dominance of the urban system, attracting a large proportion of net inter-regional migration.
2. An *intermediate primate city* stage follows, in which the rapidly growing primate city is still monocentric in form but with suburbanisation a prominent feature. Suburban nodes, the nuclei of a future multinodal primate city, may emerge. As a result of favourable locational

TABLE 4.5 NUMBER OF MEGACITIES, 1970, 1994, 2000 AND 2015

<i>Region</i>	<i>1970</i>	<i>1994</i>	<i>2000</i>	<i>2015</i>
World	11	22	25	33
Less developed regions	5	16	19	27
Africa	0	2	2	3
Asia ^a	2	10	12	19
Latin America	3	4	5	5
More developed regions	6	6	6	6
Europe	2	2	2	2
Japan	2	2	2	2
Northern America	2	2	2	2

Source: adapted from United Nations (1995) World Urbanization Prospects: The 1994 Revision New York: United Nations Note: ^aExcluding Japan

TABLE 4.6 REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE WORLD'S POPULATION IN 'MILLION CITIES' AND THE LOCATION OF THE WORLD'S LARGEST 100 CITIES

	<i>Proportion of the world's:</i>				<i>No. of the world's 100 largest cities in:</i>		
	<i>Urban population</i>		<i>Population in 'million cities'</i>		<i>1800</i>	<i>1950</i>	<i>1990</i>
	<i>1950</i>	<i>1990</i>	<i>1950</i>	<i>1990</i>			
Africa	4.5	8.8	1.8	7.5	4	3	7
Eastern Africa	0.5	1.7	–	0.8	–	–	–
Middle Africa	0.5	1.0	–	0.8	0	0	1
Northern Africa	1.8	2.8	1.8	3.2	3	2	5
Southern Africa	0.8	0.9	–	0.8	0	1	0

Western Africa	0.9	2.6	–	2.0	1	0	1
Americas	23.7	23.0	30.1	27.8	3	26	27
Central America and the Caribbean	2.8	4.2	2.2	3.5	2	2	3
Northern America	14.4	9.2	21.2	13.1	0	18	13
South America	6.5	9.7	6.7	11.1	1	6	11
Asia	32.0	44.5	28.6	45.6	64	33	44
Eastern Asia	15.2	19.7	17.6	22.2	29	18	21
South-East Asia	3.7	5.8	3.4	5.6	5	5	8
South-Central Asia	11.2	14.8	7.0	14.6	24	9	13
Western Asia	1.8	4.1	0.6	3.3	6	1	2
Europe	38.8	22.8	38.0	17.9	29	36	20
Eastern Europe	11.8	9.3	7.7	6.3	2	7	4
Northern Europe	7.7	3.4	9.0	2.1	6	6	2
Southern Europe	6.5	4.0	6.7	3.2	12	8	6
Western Europe	12.8	6.2	14.6	6.2	9	15	8
Oceania	1.1	0.8	1.6	1.3	0	2	2

Source: adapted from United Nations (1996) An Urbanising World: Global Report on Human Settlements Oxford: Oxford University Press

BOX 4.3

Overurbanisation

The concept of overurbanisation in less developed countries implies that economic growth is unable to keep pace with urban population growth, thereby leading to the major social and economic problems evident in most large cities of the Third World. It is also argued that Overurbanisation is detrimental to national economic growth, since, with limited investment available to most Third World states, the political influence of cities and resultant high level of investment in urban areas will reduce investment in other productive sectors of the economy.

The concept of overurbanisation is not accepted by those who reject the implication that the form of urbanisation in the North represents a model for the South and that any departure from this pattern represents 'overurbanisation'. Despite the simplicity of the logistic curve (see Box 4.4) urbanisation is not a single process followed by all countries in the process of development, and it would be surprising if urban trends in the South mirrored patterns in the North. The much weaker position of most developing countries in world markets, and the fundamental differences between the world in the nineteenth century and late twentieth century must affect the social, economic and political factors

that influence levels of urbanisation.

The notion of overurbanisation is useful to the extent that it emphasises the dynamic links between different economic sectors and areas of a country. Given that there are 600,000 agricultural villages in India where the infant mortality rate is still 100 per thousand, literacy is less than 40 per cent, malnutrition is widespread, the supply of drinking water is inadequate, electricity is lacking and half the population live in mud huts,⁵ it is little wonder that rural-urban migration is a feature of many Third World nations. In such situations the problem of 'over-urbanisation' might be addressed via rural development policy, which could also benefit the national economy in countries such as India where a significant part of GDP comes from the agricultural sector.

Although it is not inappropriate to use the term 'overurbanisation' to describe a situation of high levels of primate city urbanisation, rapid in-migration, saturated urban labour markets and overburdened urban services, in seeking explanations we must look beyond these urban problems to national and international economic and political forces.

attributes, certain intermediate-size cities develop faster than others.

3. Phase 2 is followed by an *advanced primate city* stage in which the primate city becomes so large that owing to agglomeration diseconomies, such as congestion costs, a monocentric urban structure becomes unwieldy. By means of intra-regional decentralisation the primate city develops a multcentred or megalopolitan character, and dominates the rest of the urban system economically and spatially. Expansion of the urban system as a whole may lead to one or more intermediate-size cities becoming as large as existing cities. At some point in the development history of most countries the growth rate of the primate city slows and a process of spatial deconcentration commences.

THE INTERMEDIATE CITY PHASE

The slowing growth rates of the primate city and spatial deconcentration of urban population are often accompanied by growth of intermediate-size centres close to the primate city. This 'population turnaround' or 'polarisation reversal' has been documented in a number of countries including the USA, the UK, France, Greece and Brazil.¹² This phase can be subdivided into two stages:


1. An *early intermediate city* stage characterised by the uneven growth of a limited set of intermediate-sized cities that are close to but not contiguous with the primate metropolitan region. Although the primate city is still gaining population in absolute terms, it is starting to lose in relative terms to the intermediate cities. Suburban centres within the primate metropolitan region are now growing faster than the central city.

BOX 4.4

The urbanisation curve

Urbanisation is a process of population concentration whereby towns and cities grow in relative importance through first an increasing proportion of the national population

living in urban places and, second, the growing concentration of these people in the larger urban settlements. It has been suspected that all nations pass through this process as they evolve from agrarian to industrial societies. For Davies (1969)⁶ the typical course of urbanisation for a nation is represented by a logistic curve.



The first section of the curve is associated with very high rates of urbanisation associated with large shifts of population from rural areas to towns and cities in response to the creation of an urban economy. This is followed by a longer period of consistent moderate urbanisation. As the urban percentage reaches above 60, the curve begins to flatten, approaching a ceiling of around 80 per cent. This is the level at which rural and urban populations appear to reach a functional equilibrium. At any one time individual countries are at different stages in the urbanisation curve.

2. An *advanced intermediate city stage* in which the suburbanisation process that characterised the development of the primate city during the advanced primate city stage is reproduced in the fastest-growing intermediate-size cities but on a smaller scale. In addition, in contrast to the early intermediate city stage, all centres within the primate metropolitan region begin to lose population in absolute terms, with the central city losing more than the suburban centres.




Figure 4.7 Generalised stages of differential urbanisation

Source: H.Geyer and T.Kontuly (1993) A theoretical foundation for the concept of differential urbanization *International Regional Science Review* 17(2), (2), 151-11

THE SMALL CITY PHASE

The small city phase represents a continuation of the previous stage during which deconcentration takes place from the primate and intermediate-size cities towards small urban centres which may eventually grow at a faster rate than either the primate city or the intermediate-size cities. By the end of this phase the urban system has reached a 'saturation point' where the rural population cannot be reduced much further (see the logistic curve in Box 4.4) and rural-urban migration ceases to be a major contributory factor in the urbanisation cycle. Since population growth through natural increase may also be very low in advanced societies (see the demographic transition model in Box 4.1), urban growth in general may be slow.

However, as the model shows (Figure 4.7), the 'small city phase' marks not only the end of the first cycle of urban development but also the beginning of a new one which follows the sequence of major metropolitan, intermediate-size city, and small city growth. Significantly, the set of major metropolitan areas experiencing the highest rates of net in-

BOX 4.5

The law of the primate city

The law of the primate city refers to a situation in which a single city accommodates a disproportionately large number of a country's population. In some instances the primate city size distribution is the result of outside or foreign influences on the settlement pattern. In many present-day Third World countries, for example, primate cities developed as a result of the intervention of a colonial power. Bangkok is one such example.

Jefferson (1939)¹¹ argued that, in the early stages of a country's urban development, the city that emerges as larger than the rest develops an impetus to self-sustaining growth that enables it, over time, to attract economic and political functions to such an extent that it dominates the national urban system. Capital cities such as Paris or Vienna occupy this niche.

In some countries a variety of forces, such as nationalism in Spain and territorial size in the USA, have led to several cities growing to comparable size rather than the emergence of a single primate city.

The law of primacy is most relevant to countries that have a relatively simple economy and spatial structure, a small area and population, low incomes, economic dependence upon agriculture and a colonial past.

migration during the urbanisation phase of the second cycle may or may not be the same set of large urban areas from the first cycle (as indicated by differential urban growth rates in the rustbelt and sunbelt areas of the USA). Large urban centres able to retain their dominant position in the national and international urban hierarchy, along with a limited group of rapidly growing intermediate-size urban areas from the first cycle, will constitute the new set of major metropolitan centres.

A 'STAGES OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT' MODEL

The concept of a cycle of urbanisation has also been employed by Klaassen *et al.* (1981) and van den Berg *et al.* (1982) to study the growth patterns *within* individual urban agglomerations.¹³ As Figure




Figure 4.8 The stages of urban development model

Source: A.Champion (2000) Urbanization, suburbanization, counter-urbanization and reurbanization, in R.Paddison and W.Lever (eds) *Handbook of Urban Studies* London: Sage

4.8 shows, four stages of urban development are envisaged:

1. *urbanisation*: when certain settlements grow at the cost of their surrounding countryside;
2. *suburbanisation* or *exurbanisation*: when the urban ring (commuter belt) grows at the cost of the urban core (physically built-up city);
3. *disurbanisation* or *counterurbanisation*: when the population loss of the urban core exceeds the population gain of the ring, resulting in the agglomeration losing population overall;
4. *reurbanisation*: when either the rate of population loss of the core tapers off, or the core starts regaining population with the ring still losing population.

As Figure 4.8 indicates, the model is based on changes in the direction and rate of population movement between urban core and urban ring (which together comprise a functionally related daily urban system). The two types of change are absolute shifts when the directions of population change in the two zones differ, and relative shifts when change occurs in the same direction but at different rates. These trends are summarised in Table 4.7. We have already examined the processes and patterns of urbanisation. Here we

TABLE 4.7 STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT OF A DAILY URBAN SYSTEM

<i>Stage of development</i>	<i>Classification type</i>	<i>Population change characteristics</i>			
		<i>Core</i>	<i>Ring</i>	<i>DUS</i>	
I Urbanisation	1. Absolute centralisation	++	-	+	} Total growth (concentration)
	2. Relative centralisation	++	+	+++	
II Suburbanisation/ Exurbanisation	3. Relative decentralisation	+	++	+++	
	4. Absolute decentralisation	-	++	+	
III Disurbanisation/ Counterurbanisation	5. Absolute decentralisation	---	+	-	} Total growth (deconcentration)
	6. Relative decentralisation	---	-	---	
IV Reurbanisation	7. Relative centralisation	-	---	---	
	8. Absolute centralisation	+	---	-	

TABLE 4.8 GREAT BRITAIN: POPULATION CHANGE, 1951-91, BY FUNCTIONAL REGION ZONE (PER CENT)

<i>Zone type</i>	<i>Rate for decade</i>				<i>Deviation from GB rate</i>			
	<i>1951-61</i>	<i>1961-71</i>	<i>1971-81</i>	<i>1981-91</i>	<i>1951-61</i>	<i>1961-71</i>	<i>1971-81</i>	<i>1981-91</i>
Great Britain	4.97	5.25	0.55	2.50	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Core	3.98	0.66	-4.20	-0.09	-0.99	-4.59	-4.75	-2.59
Ring	10.47	17.83	9.11	5.89	5.50	12.58	8.56	3.39
Outer area	1.74	11.25	10.11	8.85	-3.23	6.00	9.56	6.35
Rural area	-0.60	5.35	8.84	7.82	-5.57	0.10	8.29	5.32

Source: adapted from A.Champion (2000) Urbanization, suburbanization, counterurbanization and reurbanization, in R.Paddison and W.Lever (eds) Handbook of Urban Studies Beverly Hills, CA: Sage

focus on population movements associated with the other major dimensions of urban change identified in Table 4.7.

REURBANISATION

The empirical evidence for reurbanisation is mixed. A study of 241 functional urban regions (FURs) in Europe found that between 1981 and 1991 the proportion of urban cores gaining population reached 47 per cent, compared with only 22 per cent over the period 1975–81.¹⁴ However, it was mainly the smaller FURs (particularly those with ancient cathedrals and universities) that exhibited reurbanisation, not the larger, older urban regions. In the UK reurbanisation occurred in only four of thirty-six FURs (Glasgow, Oxford, Cambridge and Canterbury), with only Glasgow confirming model expectations.

On the other hand, there is a growing body of case-study evidence that indicates a recovery of large cities from the high levels of population loss experienced in the 1970s era of counterurbanisation. As Table 4.8 shows, the rate of population loss for all 280 of Britain's urban areas fell from 4.2 per cent in 1971–81 to 0.1 per cent for 1981–91, while the growth rate for the urban rings declined from 9 per cent to less than 6 per cent. In the USA the 1980s witnessed the re-emergence of the larger metropolitan areas as the fastest-growing elements of the urban landscape¹⁵ (Table 4.9). Overall, metropolitan areas with 1 million or more residents grew by 12 per cent in the 1980s compared with 8 per cent in the previous decade. While much of this growth was in the South and West even the North's large metropolitan areas switched from a population decline of 0.9 per cent between 1970 and 1980 to a 2.7 per cent increase in the 1980s.

TABLE 4.9 TYPES OF POPULATION CHANGE IN METROPOLITAN AREAS OF THE USA, 1980–90 AND 1990–96

Type	1980–90		1990–6	
	No. of cities	%	No. of cities	%
1	39	17.0	15	6.6
2	54	23.5	53	23.3
3	40	17.4	31	13.7
4	60	26.1	85	37.4
5	37	16.1	43	18.9

Source: adapted from J.Mercer (1999) *North American cities: the micro-geography*, in F.Boal and S.Royle (eds) *North America: A Geographical Mosaic* London: Arnold, 191–206

Notes: Type 1 cities: central-city decline added to metropolitan decline. Type 2 cities: central-city decline and metropolitan growth. Type 3 cities: central-city stagnation (equal to a less than 5% population change over the period) and metropolitan growth. Type 4 cities: strong central-city growth (between 5.1–19.9% over the period) and metropolitan growth. Type 5 cities: booming central-city growth (20.0% or more over the period) and metropolitan growth

The population growth that has occurred in the central areas of US cities was fuelled by two principal migration streams. First, new migrants, primarily from Latin America and Asia, moved into lower-value areas of cities such as New York and Los Angeles as well as into other metropolitan areas on the west coast (San Diego and San Francisco), in the South-West (Houston) and Florida (Miami) that historically had attracted relatively fewer migrants (see Chapter 5). The second stream comprised a flow of 'baby-boomers' (those born just after the Second World War and during the affluence of the 1950s and early 1960s), investing in high-status residential areas. During the 1980s the strongest magnets for adult 'boomers' were metropolitan areas with expanding high-tech and defence-oriented economies, including coastal cities such as Boston and Seattle and sunbelt locations like Dallas and Atlanta. Australia and Canada also provide evidence of strengthening metropolitan areas and inner-city growth in the 1980s.¹⁶ Evidence for US cities over the period 1990–2000 indicates that the occurrence and extent of downtown 'population rebound' varies considerably (Table 4.10). While in some cities the downtown contribution to metro growth is small, in others it represented a significant proportion of total population growth, and in others downtown population growth offset citywide population decline.

In general, these empirical observations suggest that:

1. There are widespread signs of renewed growth or reduced population decline for larger metropolitan areas, as well as a population recovery for urban cores.
2. There is no evidence of suburban-ring areas losing out to core areas, not even in relative terms, let alone in accordance with the absolute change associated with the later phase of reurbanisation specified in the 'stages of urban development' model.

Reurbanisation as defined by Klaassen *et al.* (1981)¹⁷ has not yet emerged as a significant feature in the urban systems of advanced economies. There is also considerable disagreement over the extent to which the inner-city revitalisation that took place in the 1980s will be able to continue and lead to a fundamental change in the form of the Western city. The process of decentralisation, on the other hand, is likely to continue as a major feature of post-industrial urbanisation, albeit in a form very different from the dormitory-style suburbanisation of the early post-Second World War period.

We can identify two main forms of population decentralisation. The first, counterurbanisation or urban deconcentration, is characterised by net population movement from metropolitan regions into smaller urban regions and rural areas that lie beyond the primary commuter-sheds of the major cities. The second, suburbanisation, reflects a long-established centrifugal movement of population which progressively has involved a broader range of urban functions than just housing taking place over longer distances as personal mobility has grown and urban centres have expanded to embrace their previously rural hinterlands.

TABLE 4.10 CITY AND DOWNTOWN POPULATION CHANGES IN THE USA, 1990–2000

Cities where downtown population growth contributed to city population growth							
	<i>Downtown population</i>			<i>City population</i>			<i>Downtown share of city growth (%)</i>
	<i>1990</i>	<i>2000</i>	<i>Increase</i>	<i>1990</i>	<i>2000</i>	<i>Increase</i>	
Miami FL	15,143	19,927	4,784	358,548	362,470	3,922	122.0
Boston MA	77,253	80,903	3,650	574,283	589,141	14,858	24.6
Atlanta GA	19,763	24,931	5,168	394,017	416,474	22,457	23.0
San Francisco CA	32,906	43,531	10,625	723,959	776,733	52,774	20.1
Chicago IL	56,048	72,843	16,795	2,783,726	2,896,016	112,290	15.0
Seattle WA	12,292	18,983	6,691	516,259	563,374	47,115	14.2
New York	153,927	170,708	16,781	7,322,564	8,008,278	685,714	2.5
Dallas TX	11,858	15,198	3,340	1,006,877	1,188,580	181,703	1.8
Los Angeles CA	34,655	36,630	1,975	3,485,398	3,694,820	209,422	0.9
Houston TX	7,029	7,565	536	1,630,553	1,953,631	323,078	0.2
Cities where downtown population growth reduced city population loss							
	<i>Downtown population</i>			<i>City population</i>			<i>Downtown offset of city loss (%)</i>
	<i>1990</i>	<i>2000</i>	<i>Increase</i>	<i>1990</i>	<i>2000</i>	<i>Decrease</i>	
Detroit MI	34,872	35,618	746	1,027,974	951,270	−76,704	1.0
Baltimore MD	28,579	30,067	1,470	736,014	651,154	−84,860	1.7
Norfolk VA	2,390	2,881	491	261,229	234,403	−26,816	1.8
Washington DC	26,597	27,667	1,070	606,900	572,059	−34,841	3.0
Milwaukee WI	15,039	16,359	1,320	628,088	596,674	−31,114	4.1
Philadelphia PA	74,686	78,349	3,663	1,585,577	1,517,550	−68,027	5.1
Cleveland OH	7,261	9,599	2,338	505,616	478,403	−27,213	7.9
New Orleans LA	6,988	8,051	1,063	496,938	484,674	−12,264	8.0
Pittsburgh PA	6,517	10,216	3,699	369,879	334,563	−35,316	9.5

Jackson MS	5,253	6,762	1,509	196,637	184,256	-12,381	10.9
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Source: adapted from E. Birch (2002) Having a longer view on downtown living Journal of the American Planning Association 68(1), 5-21

COUNTERURBANISATION

Signs of a population reversal in rural areas were first identified in the USA,¹⁸ but similar trends were soon detected in other advanced nations, including Canada,¹⁹ Australia,²⁰ Western Europe²¹ and Britain.²² Counterurbanisation in Britain dates from the early 1960s, when for the first time areas situated well away from metropolitan influence began to grow faster than the main conurbations and their dependent regions. Population growth in rural Britain was particularly strong in the late 1960s and early 1970s but has continued over recent decades, with net out-migration from the main metropolitan areas to the rest of the UK averaging around 90,000 people per year, a rate of 0.5 per cent.²³

The reasons for this reversal of long-established trends are so multifaceted that any attempt to apply a single explanation to the widely diverse changes under way in different regions would be unduly simplistic. Synthesising findings from a range of investigations provides a useful inventory of contributory factors. These include:

1. continuing growth of metropolitan centres and their spillover into adjacent non-metropolitan counties;
2. decentralisation of manufacturing in pursuit of lower land and wage costs;
3. increased employment in service occupations;
4. early retirement coupled with higher retirement incomes not tied to a particular location;

TABLE 4.11 CHANGING POPULATION AND EMPLOYMENT DISTRIBUTIONS IN THE USA, 1950-2000

	<i>Census year</i>					
	<i>1950</i>	<i>1960</i>	<i>1970</i>	<i>1980</i>	<i>1990</i>	<i>2000</i>
Central cities as percentage of:						
Metro population ^a	57	49	43	40	37	38
Metro employment	70	63	55	50	45	37
Suburbs as percentage of:						
Metro population	43	51	57	60	63	62
Metro employment	30	37	45	50	55	63

Source: US Census Bureau statistics
Note: ^aMetro refers to the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) as defined by the US Census at each census date

centred on amenity-rich areas outside the daily range of metropolitan commuting;

5. increased per capita disposable real income;
6. increased pursuit of leisure activities at all ages,
7. increased enrolments in rural colleges and universities in the USA, especially in the late 1960s and early 1970s as a result of the post-war 'baby boom';
8. growth of state government in the USA;
9. levelling off of the loss-of-farm population;
10. growth of an anti-materialist perspective among the young;
11. narrowing of the traditional gap between urban and rural lifestyles with the extension of electricity, water and sewage systems, telecommunications and access to modern facilities;
12. more long-distance commuting;
13. growth associated with energy and extractive industries;
14. completion of the interstate highway system in the USA;
15. lower cost of living in rural areas;
16. growth of anti-urbanism as characterised by increased fear of crime and concern with urban disamenities such as congestion and pollution;
17. growth in importance of military establishments in some US counties during the 1960s;
18. residential preference for lower-density rural living;
19. government decentralisation policies in some countries such as Sweden, France and Britain (in the case of the last-named, via the New Towns programme; see Chapter 9).

The list of factors is diverse and many are interrelated. The extent to which each contributes to the population turnaround will depend on local conditions.

THE SUBURBANISATION WAVE

The suburbanisation process began on a significant scale in the 1920s and accelerated after the Second World War, especially in North America. The USA is the world's first predominantly suburban nation.²⁴ As Table 4.11 shows, by the early 1960s the suburbs held 51 per cent of the US urban population, by 1980 they accounted for half of total metropolitan employment, and by 1990 about two-thirds of the metropolitan population and 55 per cent of metropolitan employment. By the last of these dates, US suburbia contained more than half the entire national population, having expanded from 41 million to 115 million since 1950 (an increase of 180 per cent). In 2000 the **suburbs** accommodated 140 million Americans (50 per cent of the total population).

The suburban wave was driven by the following factors:

1. The rapid growth of urban population and rising disposable incomes enabled people to meet both the cost of new housing and the associated transport costs.
2. Widespread diffusion of the automobile enhanced individual mobility. The number of US automobiles rose from under 1 million in 1910 to 27 million by 1930, the latter amounting to one for every five persons.
3. New suburbs started to resist annexation by central cities through legal incorporation, which enabled them (and their residents) to shield themselves from the problems of the central city (such as low-quality housing, rising taxes, congestion, racial tension

and crime), and to provide the particular living environment they desired and could pay for.

4. There was a huge pent-up demand for housing.
5. There was a need to generate employment after fifteen years of low investment during the Depression of the 1930s followed by the war years.
6. These goals were promoted by public policies that favoured new house-building over rehabilitation and highway construction over mass transit.

Consequently, in the USA, the 1950s represented 'the largest suburban decade ever'.²⁵

In the UK the most ubiquitous form of new rural residential development has been the residential subdivision or housing estate located as an adjunct to an existing rural settlement within commuting distance of an urban workplace. These dormitory settlements, growing almost solely because of out-migration from central cities, have been termed **metropolitan villages**, defined as settlements where more than one in five of the workforce is employed in towns or cities.²⁶ In the USA the suburbanisation process has created transit- and freeway-dependent dormitory subdivisions, infill developments and automobile-dependent dispersed suburbia. The functions of suburbs range from undifferentiated residential areas to a more recent mix of specialised retail corridors, high-technology industrial clusters, and high-density office and commercial nodes or 'edge cities'²⁷ (Box 4.6). The impact of suburbanisation on central cities has been profound. Most strikingly, in the 1960s several US cities, notably New York, became technically bankrupt and unable to finance their current expenditure on services. Rising local taxes and deteriorating local services merely served to accelerate the flight of better-off residents and footloose firms into the suburbs, leaving behind the less dynamic economic sectors and less wealthy people, notably African-Americans and recent immigrants from overseas. Even in the more stable 1980s, when New York City's population grew by 3.5 per cent, its white non-Hispanic population fell by 11.5 per cent and the proportion of its total residents accounted for by the 'minority population' rose to over 60 per cent in 1990. As Table 4.12 indicates, similar patterns of 'white flight' were

BOX 4.6

Edge City, USA: Tyson's Corner VA

The post-Second World War movement of housing, industry and commerce to the outskirts of urban areas has created perimeter cities that are functionally independent of the urban core. In contrast to the residential or industrial suburbs of the past, these new cities contain along their superhighways all the specialised functions of a great metropolis: commerce, shopping malls, hospitals, universities, cultural centres and parks. This new peripheral urban form is referred to by various names, including technoburb, post-suburbia, cyberbia, stealth city or edge city. Driving time, not space, determines its fluid boundaries. Garreau (1988)²⁸ defined an edge city as a place that has 5 million ft² (460,000 m²) or more of leasable office space, 600,000 ft² (56,000 m²) or more of leasable retail space, more jobs than bedrooms, is perceived by the population as one place, and that grew from practically nothing in the early 1960s.

Tyson's Corner, just beyond the Beltway around Washington DC, is the archetypal edge city. In the mid 1960s Tyson's Corner was a rural corner of northern Virginia

marked only by the intersection of Interstate 66, the Washington Beltway and the access road to Dulles International Airport. Administratively it is still rural, an unincorporated 6,000 acre (2,400 ha) area that contains 30,000 residents and over 75,000 jobs, all under the jurisdiction of Fairfax County but split between three different county supervisory districts and three county planning districts. Tyson's Corner does not exist as a postal address; residents' mail must go to either McLean or Vienna. Within this framework in 1990 was the ninth largest concentration of commercial space in the USA, including more than 20 million ft² (1.9 million m²) of office space, 3,000 hotel rooms and parking for more than 80,000 cars. The area was also the largest east-coast retail concentration outwith Manhattan. Yet it had little of the apparatus of urban governance or civic affairs.

Source: J. Garreau (1991) *Edge City* New York: Random House

recorded by other major cities of the USA. While the exodus of white-flight population from New York and Chicago slowed during the 1990s in other major cities, the rate of white out-migration from

TABLE 4.12 POPULATION CHANGE IN US CENTRAL CITIES, 1960-2000

City	2000 population (000)	Population change (%)				White population change (%)		Minority share of total population (%)	
		1960- 70	1970- 80	1980- 90	1990- 2000	1980- 90	1990- 2000	1990	2000
New York	8,008	1.4	-10.4	3.5	-9.4	-11.5	-6.6	60.5	55.3
Chicago IL	2,896	-4.7	-10.7	-7.4	-4.0	-17.2	-3.8	62.7	58.0
Philadelphia PA	1,518	-3.1	-13.5	-6.1	3.2	-12.3	-19.5	48.4	55.0
Detroit MI	951	-8.5	-19.2	-14.6	7.5	-47.7	-47.6	79.7	89.5
Baltimore MD	651	-2.8	-12.5	-6.4	11.5	-15.8	-28.4	61.6	69.4
Cleveland OH	478	-14.3	-23.6	11.9	5.5	-19.0	-20.7	52.5	58.5
Pittsburgh PA	335	-14.1	-18.5	-12.8	9.5	-14.9	-15.2	28.5	32.4
Cincinnati OH	231	-9.8	-15.0	-5.5	9.1	-11.2	-20.3	39.9	47.0

Source: US Census Bureau statistics
Notes: Data refer to central cities only. Cities are ranked by 2000 population size. Hispanics are included in the minority population

BOX 4.7**The changing ethnic composition of US central cities**

A combination of 'white flight' and an influx of Hispanic populations have left US whites as a minority in nearly half the 100 largest cities. According to the 2000 census non-Hispanic whites are now a majority in only fifty-two of the largest 100 cities, compared with seventy a decade earlier. Whites now account for 44 per cent of the 58,441,915 people in the largest 100 cities (compared with 52 per cent in 1990). Some 2.3 million whites or 8.5 per cent of the white urban population left the largest cities between 1990 and 2000. Birmingham AL lost 40 per cent of its white population. Other cities where whites have become a minority include Anaheim CA and Riverside CA where immigration from Mexico is particularly strong. Cities experiencing economic difficulties such as Rochester NY saw 'white flight' to the suburbs. The Hispanic population of the 100 largest cities grew from 17.2 per cent to 22.5 per cent, an increase of 3.8 million. The Asian population grew by 1 million, from 5.3 per cent to 6.6 per cent. The black population increased by 876,000 but as a proportion of the urban population fell slightly from 24.6 per cent to 24.0 per cent.

the central core increased (Box 4.7). In Detroit the loss of almost half the white population of the central city during the 1990s matched the rate of the previous decade, with the result that nearly nine out of ten residents of central Detroit are from minority ethnic groups (Table 4.12).

Although attempts have been made to classify suburbs, they are better viewed as dynamic entities with a diversity that reflects their role in the post-modern city. The diversity of the suburbanisation phenomenon is encapsulated by Bourne (1996)²⁹ in a list of ten differing interpretations (Table 4.13). The first and more traditional interpretation views suburban development as a 'natural' process of accommodating growth by extension of the urban margin, and is characterised by the classical ecological models of the city.³⁰ The second perspective sees the suburbs as an escape route from the social and environmental problems of cities either via individual decisions or through centralised planning initiatives.³¹ The third and fourth views are based on a structural or political economy perspective which interprets suburbanisation as a tool of government macro-economic policy and a means of generating employment and promoting capital accumulation for the land development, building and financial sectors.³² The fifth characterises suburbanisation as social engineering, as a means of rescuing the poor from themselves and perhaps as an indirect means of inculcating an assumed superior moral order of the past.³³ The sixth and seventh explanations are market-driven and derive from micro-economic theory and the capitalist logic

TABLE 4.13 ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF THE SUBURBANISATION PROCESS

1. Suburbs as *natural ecological extensions*: suburbanisation as a natural process of organic and evolutionary growth; expansion takes place from the inside outward to the fringe, but is still tied to the urbanised core for jobs and services.
2. Suburbs as a means of *escapism*: as a means of escape from the health, housing and environmental problems of the industrial inner cities.
3. Suburbs as *macro-economic policy tools*: suburbs as Keynesian policy instruments of macro-economic management and regulation, and for generating local employment multipliers.
4. Suburbs as vehicles for *capital accumulation*: as a means for landowners, the financial sector and the property industry to capture the social surplus, deriving from the profits from the development of newly built suburban environments on the fringe.
5. Suburbs as a means of *social engineering*: as a means of rescuing the poor and the disadvantaged from themselves, and of re-establishing a traditional and presumed superior moral order of earlier times and communities.
6. Suburbs as the logical outcomes of *rational locators*, reflecting the rational decisions of firms and households seeking lower-cost locations and more efficient and less regulated landscapes, within a competitive urban environment.
7. Suburbs as maps of *consumer preferences and choices*, emphasising the dominant role in suburbanisation of the preferences of individual consumers for more space, new housing, social homogeneity and certain public goods.
8. Suburbs as *socio-political strategies*: Strategies building on manipulation of the political fragmentation of the metropolis, entrenched local autonomy and the demands for social exclusiveness.
9. Suburbs as *asylums*: as defensive strategies, driven by fear of others, of the inner city and by uncertainty over property values, and stressing security and exclusion.
10. Suburbs as *rural nostalgia*, reflecting a desire to return to the countryside and rural roots, but without also severing

Source: L. Bourne (1996) Reinventing the suburbs: old myths and new realities *Progress in Planning* 46(3), 163–84

of individual utility maximisation. One views suburban sprawl as the expected outcome of rational individuals, households and firms seeking more efficient and less costly environments; the other emphasises the dominant role of consumer preferences for more space, new housing, privacy and private consumption.³⁴ The eighth sees suburban development as a socio-political strategy of exclusion designed to satisfy demands for local autonomy, social homogeneity and differential consumption of collective goods and services.³⁵ The final two perspectives return to the view of suburbs as a defensive strategy that is driven either by fear of 'others' who are different and who may pose a threat to a preferred lifestyle, or by a desire to recapture an assumed simple rural way of life but without losing the advantages of urban living.³⁶ Suburbs are open to all these

interpretations, with the applicability of each ranging from place to place, and over time. Nowhere else is the postmodern message of difference, and the difficulty of generalisation, more relevant than in suburbia.

EXURBANISATION

The suburbanisation wave reaches its greatest extent in the phenomenon of extended suburbanisation or exurbanisation. Nelson (1992)³⁷ identified four principal factors to explain exurbanisation:

1. continued deconcentration of employment and the rise of exurban industrialisation;
2. the latent anti-urban and rural location preferences of US households;
3. improved technology that makes exurban living possible;
4. an apparent policy bias favouring exurban development over compact development.

These developments on the margins of suburbia represent a transition state between urban and rural life akin to the second-home phenomenon. Exurbia tends to be dominated by middle-class residents, many of whom commute long distances to work in the city or in the newer suburbs, but other groups are also present, including retirees and young households seeking social status, more land and new housing at a lower cost than is available in the suburbs. In the USA the **exurbs** have captured as much as one-quarter of recent national population growth and 60 per cent of recent manufacturing investment.³⁸ For some this heralds a 'post-suburban' era characterised by inner suburban population loss and relative income decline, an increase in suburban employment, a reduction in suburban out-commuting, an increase in exurban population and income, and increased farmland conversion to urban use.³⁹

The acid test for any model is how well it corresponds with reality. The first three stages of population change indicated by the model shown in Figure 4.8 accord well with the pattern of urban development in North America and Western Europe. Urbanisation followed by central city decline and suburban growth have been characteristic features of the US city for several decades, and national urban systems in Europe also appear to have followed the model sequence.⁴⁰ There is, however, less evidence for the final stage of the model. This casts doubt on the hypothesised progression through all stages. Despite many examples of gentrification and 'urban renaissance' in cities of the MDRs, the weight of demographic evidence seems to indicate the continuing dominance of centrifugal trends

within urban regions rather than a general shift into a reurbanisation stage.⁴¹ In contrast, as we have seen, urbanisation remains the dominant process in the LDRs.

TYPES OF URBANISED REGIONS

The increasing scale of urbanisation, urban growth and development of national urban systems has given rise to a number of different forms of urbanised regions:



Plate 4.1 The exploding postmodern metropolis of Los Angeles CA with its restricted high-rise central business district surrounded by low-density suburbia reaching into the mountains

1. *The city-region.* This is an area focused on the major employment centre in a region and encompassing the surrounding areas, for which it acts as the primary high-order service centre. The functional relationship between a city and its region was a key feature of central place theory (see Chapter 6). The city-region remains an appropriate description of monocentred urban areas of up to a million people found in the less densely populated parts of even the most highly urbanised countries. Variants employed for statistical purposes include functional urban regions (FURs) and standard metropolitan statistical areas (SMSAs) (see Chapter 2).
2. *Conurbation.* This is the term coined in 1915 by Geddes to describe a built-up area created by the coalescence of once-separate urban settlements.⁴² With improvements in transportation and communications the functional influence of the conurbation has spread beyond the limits of the built-up area, so the term is now widely used in the UK and elsewhere to describe multi-nodal functional urban units. The functional relationships within a conurbation differ from those of a city-region; in essence, while there is a degree of dominance by the largest city, the other urban places also have their own functional linkages.
3. *The urban field.* This is a unit, similar to the conurbation, used in the USA. An urban field is generally regarded as a core urban area and hinterland of population at least 300,000, with an outer limit of two hours' driving time. Defined in this manner, urban fields range in population size from 500,000 to 20 million and cover one-third of the USA and 90 per cent of the national population. Urban fields are more spatially extensive than European conurbations, since they are based on higher levels of personal mobility. The southern California 'urban field' extends 150 miles from north to south and includes Tijuana in Mexico (in the process creating a transnational city in which the largest 'Mexican' city is Los Angeles). The concept may become increasingly relevant for understanding the functional reality of urbanised regions outwith the USA as similar levels of mobility are achieved through improvements in

transport and communications. The urban field is one form of polycentric urban region.⁴³ A second is the polynucleated metropolitan region or megalopolis.

4. *Megalopolis*. This is the term introduced by Gottmann in 1961 to describe the urbanised areas of the north-eastern seaboard of the USA encompassing a population of 40 million oriented around the major cities of Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore and Washington DC.⁴⁴ Gottmann subsequently defined a megalopolitan urban system as an urban unit with a minimum population of 25 million. The central importance of transactional activities (in terms of international trade, technology and culture) would indicate a location at a major international 'breakpoint' (such as a port city). A megalopolis would typically have a polynuclear form but with sufficient internal physical distinctness for each constituent city to be considered an urban system in its own right. The cohesiveness of the megalopolitan system depends on the existence of high-quality communications and transportation facilities.⁴⁵ This megalopolitan phenomenon was identified initially in six zones: the archetype model of the North-Eastern USA, the Great Lakes area extending from Chicago to Detroit, the Tokaido area of Japan centred on Tokyo-Yokohama and extending west to include Osaka Kobe, the central belt of England running from London to Merseyside, the North-West European megalopolis focused on



Figure 4.9 Megalopolises of the USA

Amsterdam Paris Ruhr, and the area around Shanghai. Since then, twenty-six growth areas of the USA have exhibited megalopolitan patterns (Figure 4.9), while similar trends are evident in Brazil (between Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo), in China⁴⁶ and in Europe⁴⁷ (Figure 4.10).

5. *Ecumenopolis*. This is the term employed by Doxiades in 1968 to describe a projected urbanised world or universal city by the end of the twenty-first century⁴⁸ (Figure 4.11). Although highly speculative, the ecumenopolis concept does focus attention on the potential consequences of unrestrained urban growth and underlines the importance that is currently being attached to the concept of sustainable urban development (see Chapter 30).

In the next chapter we switch our scale of analysis to provide a detailed examination of recent processes and patterns of urban change within the major regions of the world.




Figure 4.10 The megalopolitan trend in Western Europe