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Citizenship

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Published by
Ashgate Publishing Limited
Wey Court East
Union Road
Farnham
Surrey GU9 7PT
England

Ashgate Publishing Company
Suite 420
101 Cherry Street
Burlington, VT 05401-4405
USA

Ashgate website: http://www.ashgate.com

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Citizenship. -- (Library of contemporary essays in
political theory and public policy)
1. Citizenship.
I. Series II. Bellamy, Richard (Richard Paul) III. Palumbo,
Antonino.
323.6-dc22

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data: 2009934253

ISBN: 978 0 7546 2812 5

Mixed Sources
Product group from well-managed
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www.fsc.org Cert no. SGS-COC-2482
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Printed and bound in Great Britain by
TJ International Ltd, Padstow, Cornwall

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Acknowledgements

The editor and publishers wish to thank the following for permission to use copyright material.

Cambridge University Press for the essay: Desmond S. King and Jeremy Waldron (1988), ‘Citizenship, Social Citizenship and the Defence of Welfare Provision’, *British Journal of Political Science*, **18**, pp. 415–43.

Oxford University Press for the essay: Jeremy Waldron (1993), ‘A Right-Based Critique of Constitutional Rights’, *Oxford Journal of Legal Studies*, **13**, pp. 18–51. Copyright © 1993 Oxford University Press.

J.G.A. Pocock for the essay: J.G.A. Pocock (1992), ‘The Ideal of Citizenship Since Classical Times’, *Queen’s Quarterly*, **99**, pp. 33–55.

The editors of *The Review of Politics*, University of Notre Dame for the essay: Joseph H. Carens (1987), ‘Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders’, *Review of Politics*, **49**, pp. 251–73.

Sage Publications for the essays: Michael Mann (1987), ‘Ruling Class Strategies and Citizenship’, *Sociology*, **21**, pp. 339–54. Copyright © 1987 British Sociological Association; Bryan S. Turner (1990), ‘Outline of a Theory of Citizenship’, *Sociology*, **24**, pp. 189–217; Mary G. Dietz (1985), ‘Citizenship with a Feminist Face: The Problem with Maternal Thinking’, *Political Theory*, **13**, pp. 19–37. Copyright © 1985 Sage Publications, Inc.; Andrew Linklater (1996), ‘Citizenship and Sovereignty in the Post-Westphalian State’, *European Journal of International Relations*, **2**, pp. 77–103.

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Series Preface

The normative appraisal of public policy – both the process of policy-making and the substance of the policies themselves – is becoming ever more salient for politicians, public officials, citizens and the academics who study them. On the one hand, the wider population is better informed than ever before of the activities of those that govern them and the consequences of their decisions. As societies have become more wealthy, so the expectations of citizens have grown and with it their tendency to criticise those who work on their behalf. On the other hand, though committed to the ideal of democracy, these same citizens have become ever more disillusioned with its actual working as a means for holding politicians and bureaucrats to account. In part, that disillusionment reflects the shift from government to governance both within and beyond the state, which has weakened or dispersed in complex ways the responsibility of politicians for many key areas of public policy. In part, it also reflects the desire for citizens for more individually tailored and particularistic forms of accountability that address their specific concerns rather than those of the collective welfare. As a result, a whole new machinery for standard setting and monitoring political behaviour has developed. The purpose of this series is to explore and assess the normative implications of this development, appraising the efficacy and legitimacy of the procedures and mechanisms used, and the outcomes they aim to achieve.

These issues are at the heart of many of the most exciting new areas of research and teaching in moral and political philosophy, politics and international relations, public administration and law and jurisprudence. The essays chosen reflect this disciplinary mix and the interdisciplinary work that has arisen in this area as a result. The volumes will be suitable for Masters and Professional courses in public policy, political theory and international relations; jurisprudence, international and public law; applied ethics and political philosophy; as well as a useful resource for scholars doing research or those teaching in these areas.

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Introduction

THE IMPORTANCE AND NATURE OF CITIZENSHIP[1]

Interest in citizenship has never been higher. Politicians of all stripes stress its importance, as do church leaders, captains of industry and every kind of campaigning group – from those supporting global causes, such as tackling world poverty, to others with a largely local focus, such as combating neighbourhood crime. Governments across the world have promoted the teaching of citizenship in schools and universities, and introduced citizenship tests for immigrants seeking to become naturalized citizens. Types of citizenship proliferate continuously, from dual and transnational citizenship, to corporate citizenship and global citizenship. Whatever the problem – be it a decline in voting, increased teenage pregnancies or climate change – someone has canvassed the revitalization of citizenship as part of the solution.

The sheer variety and range of these different uses of citizenship can be somewhat baffling. Historically, citizenship has been linked to the privileges of membership of a particular kind of political community – one in which those who enjoy a certain status are entitled to participate on an equal basis with their fellow citizens in making the collective decisions that regulate social life. In other words, citizenship has gone hand in hand with political participation in some form of democracy – most especially, the right to vote. The various new forms of citizenship are often put forward as alternatives to this traditional account with its narrow political focus. Yet, though justified in some respects, to expand citizenship too much, so that it comes to encompass people's rights and duties in all their dealings with others, potentially obscures its important and distinctive role as a specific kind of political relationship. Citizenship is different not only to other types of political affiliation, such as subjecthood in monarchies or dictatorships, but also to other kinds of social relationship, such as being a parent, a friend, a partner, a neighbour, a colleague or a customer.

Over time, the nature of the democratic political community and the qualities needed to be a citizen has changed. The city-states of ancient Greece, which first gave rise to the notion of citizenship, were quite different to the ancient Roman republic or the city-states of renaissance Italy, and all differed tremendously from the nation-states that emerged in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries and that still provide the primary context for citizenship today. In large part, the contemporary concern with citizenship can be seen as reflecting the view that we are currently witnessing a further transformation of political community, and so of citizenship, produced by the twin and related impacts of globalization and multiculturalism. In different ways, these two social processes are testing the capacity of nation-states to coordinate and define the collective lives of their citizens, altering the very character of citizenship along the way.

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[1] This introduction draws on Ch. 1 of Richard Bellamy (2008), *Citizenship: A Very Short Introduction*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

These developments and their consequences for citizenship provide the central theme of this collection. The rest of this introduction sets the scene and lays out the collection's rationale. I shall start by looking at why citizenship is important and needs to be understood in political terms, then move on to a more precise definition of citizenship, and conclude by noting some of the challenges it faces – both in general, and in the specific circumstances confronting contemporary societies.

Why Political Citizenship?

Citizenship has traditionally referred to a particular set of political practices involving specific public rights and duties with respect to a given political community. Broadening its meaning to encompass human relations generally detracts from the importance of the distinctively political tasks citizens perform to shape and sustain the collective life of the community. Without doubt, the commonest and most crucial of these tasks is involvement in the democratic process – primarily by voting, but also by speaking out, campaigning in various ways and standing for office. Whether citizens participate or not, the fact that they can do colours how they regard their other responsibilities, such as abiding by those democratically passed laws they disagree with, paying taxes, doing military service and so on. It also provides the most effective mechanism for them to promote their collective interests and encourage their political rulers to pursue the public's good rather than their own.

Democratic citizenship is as rare as it is important. At present, only around 120 of the world's countries, or approximately 64 per cent of the total, are electoral democracies in the meaningful sense of voters having a realistic chance of changing the incumbent government for a set of politicians more to their taste. Indeed, a mere 22 of the world's existing democracies have been continuously democratic in this sense for a period of 50 years or more. And though the number of working democracies has steadily if slowly grown since the Second World War, voter turnout in established democracies has experienced an equally slow but steady decline. For example, turn out in the United States in the period 1945 to 2005 decreased by 13.8 per cent from a high of 62.8 per cent of eligible voters in 1960 to a low of 49.00 per cent in 1996, and in the UK went down by 24.2 per cent from a high of 83.6 per cent in 1950 to a low of 59.4 per cent in 2001. True, as elsewhere, both countries have experienced considerable fluctuations between highs and lows over the last 60 years depending on how contested or important voters felt the election to be, while in some countries voting levels have remained extremely robust, with Sweden experiencing a comparatively very modest low of 77.4 per cent in 1958 and a staggering high of 91.8 per cent in 1976. The downward trend is nevertheless undeniable. Yet, despite citizens expressing increasing dissatisfaction with the democratic arrangements of their country, they continue to approve of democracy itself. The World Values Survey of 2000–2002 found that 89 per cent of respondents in the US regarded democracy as a 'good system of government' and 87 per cent the 'best' in the sense of 'the best available', while in the UK 87 per cent thought it 'good' and 78 per cent the 'best' (in Sweden it was 97 per cent and 94 per cent respectively). Interestingly, the proportions who find it 'good' have begun to decline slightly even as those who designate it the 'best available' have slightly increased, thereby suggesting that disenchantment with actual democracy may reflect a more critical appraisal of the reality against the ideal. Whatever the perceived or genuine shortcomings of most democratic systems, though, most members of democratic countries seem to accept that democracy matters and that it is the prospect of influencing government policy according to reasonably fair rules and on a more or less equal basis with others that forms the distinguishing mark of the citizen. In those countries where people lack this crucial opportunity they are at best guests and at worst mere subjects – many, getting on for 40 per cent of the world's population, of authoritarian and oppressive regimes.

Why is being able to vote so crucial, and how does it relate to all the other qualities and benefits that are commonly associated with citizenship? All but anarchists believe that we need some sort of stable political framework to regulate social and economic life, along with various political institutions – such as a bureaucracy, a legal system, courts, a police force and army – to formulate and implement the necessary regulations. At a bare minimum, this framework will seek to preserve our bodies and property from physical harm by others and provide clear and reasonably stable conditions for all the various forms of social interaction which most individuals find to some degree unavoidable – be it travelling on the roads, buying and selling goods and labour, or marriage and co-habitation. Many people believe we need more than this bare minimum, but few doubt that in a society of any complexity we require at least these elements and that only a political community with properties similar to those we now associate with a state is going to provide them.

The social and moral dispositions that increasingly have come to be linked to citizenship, such as good neighbourliness, are certainly all important supplements to any political framework, no matter how extensive. Rules and regulations cannot cover everything, and their being followed cannot depend on coercion alone. If people only acted in a socially responsible way because they feared being punished otherwise, it would be necessary to create a police state of totalitarian scope to preserve social order – a remedy potentially far worse than the disorder it seeks to prevent. But we cannot simply rely on people acting well either. It is not just that some people may take advantage of the goodness of others. Humans are also fallible creatures, possessing limited knowledge and reasoning power, and with the best will in the world are likely to err or disagree. Most complex problems raise a range of moral concerns, some of which may conflict, while the chain of cause and effect that produced them, and the likely consequences of any decisions we make to solve them, can all be very hard if not impossible to know for sure. Imagine if there were no highway code or traffic regulations and we had to coordinate with other drivers simply on the basis of all possessing good judgement and behaving civilly and responsibly towards others. Even if everyone acts conscientiously, there will be situations, such as blind corners or complicated interchanges, where we just lack the information to make competent judgements because it is impossible to second guess with any certainty what others might decide to do. Political regulation, say by installing traffic lights, in this and similar cases, coordinates our interactions in ways that allow us to know where we stand with regard to others. In areas such as commerce, for example, that means we can enter into agreements and plan ahead with a degree of confidence.

Now any reasonably stable and efficient political framework, even one presided over by a ruthless tyrant, will provide us some of these benefits. For example, think of the increased uncertainty and insecurity suffered by many Iraqi citizens as a result of the lack of an effective political order following the toppling of Saddam Hussein. However, those possessing no great wealth, power or influence, the vast majority of people in other words, will not be satisfied with just any framework. They will want one that applies to all – including the government – and treats everyone impartially and as equals, no matter how rich or important they may be. In particular, they will want its provisions to provide a just basis for all to enjoy the freedom to pursue their lives as they choose on equal terms with everyone else, and in so far as is compatible with their having a reasonable amount of personal security through the maintenance of an appropriate degree of social and political stability. And a necessary, if not always a sufficient, condition for ensuring the laws and policies of a political community possess these characteristics is that the country is a working electoral democracy and that citizens participate in making it so. Apart from anything else, political involvement helps citizens shape what this framework should look like. People are likely to disagree about what equality, freedom and security involve and the best policies to support them in given circumstances. Democracy offers the potential for citizens to debate these issues on roughly equal terms and to come to some appreciation of each other's views and interests. It also promotes government that is responsive to their evolving concerns and changing conditions by giving politicians an incentive to rule in ways that reflect and advance not their own interests but those of most citizens.

The logic is simple, even if the practice often is not: if politicians consistently ignore citizens or prove incompetent, they will eventually lose office. Moreover, in a working democracy, where parties regularly alternate in power, a related incentive exists for citizens to listen to each other. Not only will very varied groups of citizens need to form alliances to build an electoral majority, often making compromises in the process, but they also will be aware that the composition of any future winning coalition is likely to shift and could exclude them. So the winners always have reason to be respectful of the needs and views of the losers. At its best, democratic citizenship comes in this way to promote a degree of equity and reciprocity among citizens. For example, suppose the electorate contains 30 per cent who want higher pensions, 40 per cent wanting to lower taxes, 60 per cent desiring more roads, 30 per cent who want more trains, 60 per cent supporting lower carbon emissions, 30 per cent who oppose abortion, 60 per cent who want better funded hospitals, 30 per cent who desire improved schools, 20 per cent who want more houses built and 35 per cent who support hunting. I have made up these figures, but the distribution of support across a given range of political issues is not unlike what you find in most democracies. Now, note how several policies are likely to prove incompatible with each other – spending more on one thing will mean spending less on another, improving hospitals may mean less spending on roads or schools, and so on. Note too how it is unlikely that any person or group will find themselves consistently in the majority or the minority on all issues – the minority who support hunting, say, are unlikely to overlap entirely with the minority who oppose abortion or the minority who want more houses. So I may be in a minority so far as my views on abortion are concerned and a majority when it comes to fox hunting, in a minority on schooling and a majority on roads and so on. And each time I will be allied with a slightly different group of people. Meanwhile, even where people broadly agree on an issue, they may disagree strongly about which policy best resolves it. So, a majority – say 60 per cent – may agree we need to lower carbon emissions, but still disagree about how to do so – 30 per cent may favour nuclear energy, 30 per cent wind power, 20 per cent measures for reducing the use of cars, 20 per cent more green taxes and so on. As a result, most people may in fact support very few policies that enjoy outright majority support – they will mainly be in different minorities alongside partly overlapping but often distinct groups of people. If a party wants to build a working majority, therefore, it will have to construct a coalition of minorities across a broad spectrum of issues and policies and arrange trade-offs between them. That makes it probable that most people will like some bits of the programmes of opposing parties and dislike other bits: a US voter might prefer the attitude towards abortion of most Democrats and the economic policies of most Republicans, say, and a UK voter the health policies of Labour and the EU policies of Conservatives. They will cast their vote on the basis of a preponderance of things they like or dislike, appropriately weighted for what they regard as most important. Over time, as issues and attitudes change, party fortunes are likely to wax and wane and with them the extent to which the preferred policies of any individual voter coincide with a majority or a minority. One person, one vote means that each person's preferences get treated in an equitable fashion, while the need for parties to address a range of people's views within their programmes forces citizens to practice a degree of mutual toleration and accommodation of each other's interests and concerns.

One can imagine circumstances where you could enjoy an equitable political framework without being a citizen. If someone is holidaying abroad in a stable democratic state, she will generally benefit from many of the advantages of its legal system and public services in much the same way as its citizens. The laws upholding most of her civil liberties will be identical, offering her similar rights to theirs against violent assault or fraud, say, and to a fair trial in the event that she is involved in such crimes. Likewise, she shall have many of the same obligations as a citizen and will have to obey those laws that concern her, such as speed limits if she is driving a car, paying sales tax on many goods and so on. Most of the non-legally prescribed social duties that have become associated with citizenship will also apply. If she believes a socially responsible person should pick up litter, help old ladies across the road, avoid racist and sexist remarks, and only buy fair trade goods, then she has as much reason to abide by these norms abroad as at home. Indeed, similar considerations will lie behind her recognizing the value of following the laws of a foreign country, even though she has had no role in framing them. Likewise, to the extent the citizens of her host country are motivated by such considerations, they should act as civilly to visitors as they do towards their co-citizens. If she likes the country so much she decides to find a job and stay on for a while, then she will probably pay income tax and be protected by employment legislation and possibly even enjoy certain social benefits. Of course, in practice a number of contingent factors can put non-citizens at a disadvantage compared to many citizens in exercising their rights – especially if they are not fluent in the local language. But these sorts of disadvantages are not the direct result of not possessing the status of a citizen. After all, naturalized citizens might be in much the same position with regard to many of them. Nor need they prevent her, as a hardworking and polite individual, who is solicitous towards others, from becoming a valued pillar of the local community, respected by her neighbours. Why then be bothered with being able to vote, do jury duty and various other tasks many citizens find onerous – especially if she may never need any of the additional rights citizens enjoy?

There are two reasons why she ought to be concerned – both of which highlight why citizenship in the political sense is important. First, unlike citizens, she does not have an unqualified right to enter or remain in this country, and if she fell foul of the authorities could be refused entry or deported. This is a core right in an age when many people are stateless as a result of war or oppressive regimes in their own countries, or are driven by severe poverty to seek a better life elsewhere. But in a way it still begs the question of why she should want to become a citizen rather than simply a permanent resident. After all, most democratic countries acknowledge a humanitarian duty to help those in dire need and have established international agreements on asylum seekers to prevent individuals being turned away or returned to countries where their life would be in danger. Increasingly, there are also internationally recognized rights for long-term residents, or ‘denizens’ as they have come to be called. If she has lawfully entered the country and is a law abiding individual, so there are no prospects of her being deported, then why not just enjoy living under its well-ordered regime? The second reason comes in here. For the qualities she likes about this country stem in large part from its democratic character. Even the quasi-citizenship status she has come to possess under international law is the product of international agreements that are only promoted and reliably kept by democratic states. And their being democracies depends in turn on at least a significant proportion of citizens within such states doing their duty and participating in the democratic process.

As I noted above, increasing numbers of citizens do not bother participating. They either feel it is pointless to do so or are happy to free ride on the efforts of others. They are mistaken. It may well be that as presently organized democracy falls far short of the expectations citizens have of it, they feel their involvement has little or no effect. Yet that view is not so much an argument for abandoning democracy as for seeking to improve it. One need only compare life under any established democracy, imperfect though they all are, with that under any existing undemocratic regime to be aware it makes a difference from which the majority of citizens draw tangible benefits. People lack self-respect and possibly respect for others too in a regime where they do not have the possibility of expressing their views and being counted, no matter how benevolently and efficiently it is run. Rulers need no longer see the ruled as equals, as entitled to give an opinion and have their interests considered on the same terms as everyone else. And so they need not take them into account. Democratic citizenship changes the way power gets exercised and the attitudes of citizens to each other. Because democracy gives us a share in ruling and in being ruled in the ways indicated above, citizenship allows us both to control our political leaders and to control ourselves and collaborate with our fellow citizens on a basis of equal concern and respect. By contrast, the permanent resident of my example is just a tolerated subject. She may express her views, but is not entitled to have them heard on an equal basis to citizens.

The Components of Citizenship: Towards a Definition

Citizenship, therefore, has an intrinsic link to democratic politics. It involves membership of an exclusive club – those who take the key decisions about the collective life of a given political community. And the character of that community in many ways reflects what people make it. In particular, their participation or lack of it plays an important role in determining how far, and in what ways, it treats people as equals. Three linked components of citizenship emerge from this analysis – membership of a democratic political community, the collective benefits and rights associated with membership, and participation in the community’s political, economic and social processes – all of which combine in different ways to establish a condition of civic equality.

The first component, membership or belonging, concerns who is a citizen. In the past, many have been excluded from within as well as outside the political community. Internal exclusions have included those designated as natural inferiors on racial, gender or other grounds; or as unqualified due to a lack of property or education; or as disqualified through having committed a crime or becoming jobless, homeless or mentally ill. So, in most established democracies women obtained the vote long after the achievement of universal male suffrage, before which many workers were excluded, while prisoners often lose their right to vote, as does – by default – anyone who does not have a fixed address. Many of these internal grounds for exclusion have been dropped as baseless, though others remain live issues, as does the unequal effectiveness of the right to vote among different groups. However, much recent attention has concentrated on the external exclusions of asylum seekers and immigrants. Here, too, there have been changes towards more inclusive policies at both the domestic and international level, though significant exclusionary measures persist or have been recently introduced. Yet, the current high levels of international migration, though not unprecedented, have been sufficiently intense and prolonged and of such global scope as to have forced a major rethink of the criteria for citizenship.

As is stressed in many of the essays reproduced in this volume, none of these criteria proves straightforward. Citizenship implies the capacity to participate in both the political and the socioeconomic life of the community. Yet, the nature of that participation and the capabilities it calls for have varied over time and remain matters of debate. Citizens must also be willing to see themselves as in some sense belonging to the particular state in which they reside. At the very least, they must recognize it as a centre of power entitled to regulate their behaviour, demand taxes and so on, in return for providing them with various public goods. How far they must also identify with their fellow citizens is a different matter. A working democracy certainly requires some elements of a common civic culture: notably, broad acceptance of the legitimacy of the prevailing rules of politics and probably a common language or languages for political debate. A degree of trust and solidarity among citizens also proves important if all are to collaborate in producing the collective benefits of citizenship, rather than attempting to free ride on the efforts of others. The extent to which such qualities depend on citizens possessing a shared identity is a more contested, yet crucial, issue as societies become increasingly multicultural.

The second component, rights, has often been seen as the defining criterion of citizenship. Contemporary political philosophers have adopted two main approaches to identifying these rights. A first approach seeks to identify those rights that citizens ought to acknowledge if they are to treat each other as free individuals worthy of equal concern and respect. A second approach tries, more modestly, simply to identify the rights that are necessary if citizens are to participate in democratic decision-making on free and equal terms. Both approaches prove problematic. Even if most committed democrats broadly accept the legitimacy of one or other of these accounts of citizens' rights as being implicit in the very idea of democracy, they come to very different conclusions about the precise rights either approach might generate. These differences largely reflect the various ideological and other divisions that form the mainstay of contemporary democratic politics. So neo-liberals are likely to regard the free market as sufficient to show individuals equality of concern and respect with regard to their social and economic rights, whereas a social democrat is more likely to wish to see a public supported heath service and social security system as necessary too. Similarly, some people might advocate a given system of proportional representation as necessary to guarantee a citizen's equal right to vote, others view the plurality first past the post system as sufficient and even, in some respects, superior. As a result of these disagreements, the rights of citizenship have to be seen, somewhat paradoxically perhaps, as subject to the decisions of citizens themselves.

That paradox seems less acute, though, once we also note that making rights the primary consideration is in various respects too reductive. We tend to see rights as individual entitlements – they are claims individuals can make against others, including governments, to certain standards of decency in the way they are treated. However, though rights attach to individuals, they have an important collective dimension that the link with citizenship serves to highlight. What does the work in any account of rights is not the appeal to rights as such but to the arguments for why people have those rights. Most of these arguments have two elements. First, they appeal to certain goods as being important for human beings to be able to lead a life that reflects their own free choices and effort – usually the absence of coercion by others and certain material preconditions for agency, such as food, shelter and health. Second, and most importantly from our point of view, they imply that social relations should be so organized that we secure these rights on an equal basis for all. Rights are collective goods in two important senses, therefore. On the one hand, they assume that we all share an interest in certain goods as important for us to be able to shape our own lives. On the other hand, these rights can only be provided by people accepting certain civic duties that ensure they are respected, including cooperating to set up appropriate collective arrangements. For example, if we take personal security as an uncontentious shared human good, then a right to this good can only be protected if all refrain from illegitimate interference with others and collaborate to establish a legal system and police force that upholds that right in a fair manner that treats all as equals. In other words, we return to the arguments establishing the priority of political citizenship canvassed earlier. For rights depend on the existence of some form of political community in which citizens seek fair terms of association to secure those goods necessary for them to pursue their lives on equal terms with others. Hence, the association of rights with the rights of democratic citizens, with citizenship itself forming the right of rights because it is ‘the right to have rights’ – the capacity to institutionalize the rights of citizens.

The third component, participation, comes in here. Calling citizenship ‘the right to have rights’ indicates how access to numerous rights depends on membership of a political community. However, many human rights activists have criticized the exclusive character of citizenship for this very reason, maintaining that rights ought to be available to all on an equal basis regardless of where you are born or happen to live. As a result, they have sometimes argued against any limits on access to citizenship. Rights should transcend the boundaries of any political community and not depend on either membership or participations. Though there is much justice in these criticisms, they are deficient in three main respects.

First, the citizens of well-run democracies enjoy a level and range of entitlements that extends beyond what most people would characterize as human rights – that is rights that we are entitled to simply on humanitarian grounds alone. Of course, it could be argued with some justification that many of these countries have benefited from the indirect or direct exploitation of poorer, often non-democratic, states and various related human rights abuses, such as selling arms to their authoritarian rulers. Rectifying these abuses, though, would still allow for significant differentials in wealth between countries. For, second, rights also result from the positive activities of citizens themselves and their contributions to the collective goods of their political community. In this respect, citizenship forms the ‘right to have rights’ in placing in citizens’ own hands the ability to decide which rights they will provide for and how. Some countries might choose to have high taxes and generous public health, education and social security schemes, say, others to have lower taxes and less generous public provision of these goods, or more spending on culture or on police and the armed forces. Finally, none of the above rules out recognizing the ‘right to have rights’ as a human right that creates an obligation on the part of existing democratic states to aid rather than hinder democratization processes in non-democratic states, to give succour to asylum seekers and to have equitable and non-discriminatory naturalization procedures for migrant workers willing to commit to the duties of citizenship in their adopted countries.

So membership, rights and participation go together. It is through being a member of a political community and participating on equal terms in the framing of its collective life that we enjoy rights to pursue our individual lives on fair terms with others. If we put these three components together, we come up with the following definition of citizenship: *Citizenship is a condition of civic equality. It consists of membership of a political community where all citizens can determine the terms of social cooperation on an equal basis. This status not only secures equal rights to the enjoyment of the collective goods provided by the political association but also involves equal duties to promote and sustain them – including the good of democratic citizenship itself.*

The Paradox and Dilemma of Citizenship

Earlier I suggested that citizenship involves a paradox encapsulated in the view of it as ‘the right to have rights’. That paradox consists in our rights as citizens being dependent on our exercising our basic citizenship right to political participation in cooperation with our fellow citizens. For our rights derive from the collective policies we decide upon to resolve common problems, such as providing for personal security with a police force and legal system. Moreover, once in place, these policies will only operate if we continue to cooperate to maintain them through paying taxes and respecting the rights of others that follow from them. So rights involve duties – not least the duty to exercise the political rights to participate on which all our other rights depend. This paradox gives rise in its turn to a dilemma that can affect much cooperative behaviour. Namely, that we will be tempted to shirk our civic duties if we feel we can enjoy the collective goods and the rights they provide by relying on others to do their bit rather than exerting ourselves. And the more citizens act in this way, the less they will trust their fellow citizens to collaborate with them. Collective arrangements will seem increasingly unreliable, prompting people to abandon citizenship for other, more individualistic ways, of securing their interests.

This dilemma proves particularly acute if the good in question has the qualities associated with what is technically known as a ‘public good’ – that is a good, such as street lighting, from which nobody can be excluded from the benefits, regardless of whether they contributed to supporting it or not. In such cases, a temptation will exist for individuals to ‘free ride’ on the efforts of others. So, if the neighbours either side of my house pay for a street light, they will not be able to stop me benefiting from it even if I choose not to help them with the costs. In many respects, democracy operates as a public good of this kind and so likewise confronts the quandary of free riding. The cost of becoming informed and casting your vote is immediate and felt directly by each individual, while the benefits are far less tangible and individualized, as are the disadvantages of not voting. You will gain from living in a democracy whether you vote or not, while any individual vote contributes very little to sustaining democratic institutions. And the shortcomings of democracy – the policies and politicians people dislike

– tend to be more evident than its virtues, which are diffuse, and in newly democratized countries, often long-term. As a result, the temptation to free ride is great. In fact, political scientists used to be puzzled why citizens bothered to vote at all – it seemed irrational. Given the very small likelihood any one person's vote will make a difference to the election result, it hardly seems worth the effort. Even the fear that democracy may collapse should have little effect on this self-centred reasoning. As an individual, it still pays the free rider to rely on the efforts of others. After all, if others fail to do their part, there will be little point in the free rider doing so. In the past, it seems that citizens simply were not so narrowly instrumental in their reasoning. They appear to have valued the opportunity of expressing their views along with others. The growing fear, symbolized by the decline in voting, is that such civic-mindedness has lessened, with citizens becoming more self-interested and calculating in their attitudes not just to political participation but also to the collective goods political authorities exist to provide. They have also felt that their fellow citizens and politicians are likewise concerned only with their own interests. American national election studies, for example, reveal that over the last forty years the majority of US citizens have come to feel that government benefits a few big interests rather than everyone, although the percentage has fluctuated between lows of 24 per cent and 19 per cent, in 1974 and 1994 respectively, believing it benefitted all, to highs of 39 per cent and 40 per cent in 1984 and 2004. Likewise, a British opinion poll of 1996 revealed that a staggering 88 per cent of respondents believed Members of Parliament served interests other than their constituents' or the country's – with 56 per cent contending they simply served their own.

This change in people's attitudes and perceptions presents a major challenge to the practice and purpose of citizenship. Most of the collective goods that citizens collaborate to support and on which their rights depend are subject to the public goods dilemma described above. Like voting, the cost of the tax I pay to support the police, roads, schools and hospitals will seem somehow more direct and personal than the benefits I derive from these goods, and a mere drop in the ocean compared to the billions needed to pay for them. Like democracy, these goods also tend to be available to all citizens regardless of how much they pay or, indeed, whether they have paid at all. True, these goods do not have the precise quality of public goods – some degree of exclusion is possible. However, it would be both inefficient and potentially create great injustices to do so. Moreover, in numerous indirect ways we all do benefit from a good transport system, a healthy and well-educated population, and from others as well as ourselves enjoying personal security. That said, people will always be naturally inclined to wonder whether they are getting value for money or are contributing more than their fair share. Such concerns are likely to be particularly acute if people feel no sense of solidarity with each other or believe others to be untrustworthy, especially when it comes to the sort of redistributive measures needed to support most social rights. Consequently, the inducements to adopt independent, non-cooperative behaviour for more apparently secure, short-term advantages will be great – even if, as will often be the case, such decisions have the perverse long-term effect of proving more costly or less beneficial not just for the community as a whole but even for most of the defecting individuals.

This tendency has been apparent in the trend within developed democracies for wealthier citizens to contract into private arrangements in ever more areas, from education and health to pensions and even personal security, often detracting from public provision in the process. So, people have opted to send their children to private schools, taken out private health insurance, employed private security firms to police their gated neighbourhoods and sought to pay less in taxation for public schemes. But the net result has often been that the cost of education, health and policing has risen because a proliferation of different private insurance schemes proves less efficient, while the depleted public provision brings in its wake a number of costly social problems – a less well-educated and healthy work force, more crime and so on.

Governments have responded to this development in four main ways. First, they have partly marketized some of these services, in form if not always in substance. One consequence of it being either technically impossible or morally unjust to exclude people from the benefits of ‘public goods’ is that standard market incentives do not operate. Companies have no reason to compete for customers by offering lower prices or better products if they cannot restrict enjoyment of a good to those who have paid them for it. Governments have tried to overcome this problem by getting companies periodically to compete for the contract to supply a given public service and by trying to guarantee citizens certain rights as customers. In so doing, they have stressed the state’s role as a regulator rather than necessarily as a provider of services. The aim is to guarantee that given standards and levels of provision are met, regardless of whether a public or a private contractor actually offers the service concerned. In this way, governments have tried to reassure citizens that as much attention will be paid to getting value for money and meeting their requirements as would be the case if they were buying the service on their own account. Their second response has complemented this strategy by stressing the responsibilities of citizens – especially of those who are net recipients of state support. For example, a number of states have obliged recipients of social security benefits to be available for and actively seek work, engage in retraining and possibly do various forms of community service. By such measures, they have tried to reassure net contributors to the system that all are pulling their weight and so retain their allegiance to collective arrangements. Third, they have adopted an increasingly marketized approach to the very practice of electoral politics. They have conducted consumer research as to citizens’ preferences and attempted to woo them through branding and advertising. Finally, they have attempted to overcome cynicism about using state power to support the public interest by depoliticizing standard setting and the regulation of the economic and political market alike to supposedly impartial bodies immune from self-interest, such as independent banks and the courts.

These policies have had mixed results. By and large, they have been most successful for those services that can be most fully marketized, such as some of the former public utilities like gas, electricity and telephones, and where there are reasonably clear, technical criteria for what a good service should be and how it might be obtained. For other goods – particularly those where the imperatives for public provision are as much moral as economic, and defection into private arrangements is comparatively easy, such as health care or education, a partial withdrawal from, and a resulting attenuation of, public services has occurred in many advanced democratic states. Meanwhile, disillusion about politics has grown. Citizens have increasingly felt politicians will do anything for their vote and once in power employ it selfishly and ineptly. Civic solidarity has decreased accordingly as inequalities have grown between social groups. While the better educated and wealthier sections of society have pushed governments and politicians to do less and less, the poorer sections, who find it harder to organize in any case, have increasingly withdrawn from politics altogether. The problem seems to be twofold. On the one hand, citizens have adopted a more consumer-oriented and critical view of democratic politics. They have taken a more self-interested stance themselves assuming that others, their fellow citizens, politicians and those in the public sector more generally, do so too. On the other hand, politicians have likewise treated citizens more like consumers and both marketized the public sector where possible and acted themselves more like the heads of rival firms. Commentators differ as to which came first, but most accept these two developments have fuelled each other, producing increasing disillusionment with democratic politics. Instead of being viewed as a means of bringing citizens together in pursuit of those public interests from which they collectively benefit, it has come to be seen as but an inefficient mechanism for individuals to pursue their private interests.

Globalization has been widely perceived as further promoting both these sources of political disaffection. That many public goods, from security from crime to monetary stability, can only be obtained through international mechanisms has added to civic disaffection and the belief in the shortcomings of political mechanisms. International organizations are inevitably much more distant from the citizens they serve. Size matters, and it is much harder to feel solidarity with very large and highly diverse groups with whom one has few if any shared cultural or other references and hardly, if ever, interact with directly. As a result, short-term individualized behaviour is much more likely. Put simply, cheating on strangers is easier than cheating on people you meet every day and will continue to interact with into the foreseeable future. The more complex and globalized societies are, the more we all become strangers to each other. It also becomes much harder to influence or hold politicians to account. Your vote is one in millions rather than thousands, and it is more difficult to combine with others in groups sharing one's interests and concerns that are of sufficient size to influence those with power. Again markets and weak forms of depoliticized regulation have come to be seen as more competent and impartial than collective political solutions. The European Union (EU), the world's most developed international organization, reflects these dilemmas and responses well. Despite having elections and a parliament, European politicians are both little trusted and scarcely known, while electoral turn out is far below that for national elections of the member states and likewise on the decline. By and large, citizens have remained tied to their national or subnational allegiances and mainly, and increasingly, view the EU in narrowly self-interested terms as either beneficial or not to their country or economic group. European political parties exist largely as voting blocks of national parties within the European Parliament, while the vast majority of trans-European civil society organizations are small, Brussels-based lobby groups, with few if any members and invariably reliant on the EU for funding. Meanwhile, the EU has increasingly sought to legitimize itself through non-political means, notably appeals to supposed 'European' values, such as rights, on the one side, and as an efficient, effective, equitable and depoliticized economic regulator, on the other.

Developments in the EU mirror what has happened in most established democratic states, including those outside Europe, such as the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Worries about a decline in civic attitudes and voting has produced a concern with the collapse of 'social capital' – the habit of collaborating and joining with others, summed up in Robert Putnam's observation that Americans no longer go ten pin bowling in teams or groups but more and more 'bowl alone'. Increased immigration and growing multiculturalism are also feared to have reduced community feeling based on a common culture. As a result, governments have sought to inculcate a sense of national and civic belonging through an enhanced emphasis on citizenship education in schools and for immigrants seeking to naturalize. This teaching has usually emphasized national culture broadly conceived rather than political culture in the narrower, democratic sense. Likewise, they have increasingly claimed to have depoliticized important decisions – handing the setting of interest rates over to national banks, emphasizing deference to constitutional courts in matters of protecting rights and using independent regulators to oversee not only the former public utilities, such as gas and water, but also many other social and economic areas too, such as sentencing policy. In these ways, they have tried to separate membership and rights from participation. Yet, it is dubious that such attempts will be effective. Political communities and rights alike are constructed and sustained by the activities of citizens. People only feel bound to each other and by the law if they regard themselves as involved in shaping their relationships with each other and the state through their ability to influence the rules, policies and politicians that govern social life. Indeed, they have good grounds for believing they are not civic equals without that capacity. So appeals to political community or rights will not of themselves create citizenship because they are the products of citizenly action through political participation. People will not feel any sense of ownership over them. The three components of citizenship – belonging, rights and participation – stand and fall together.

Outline of the Volume

The essays in this volume explore further the nature and development of citizenship and the challenges it confronts. We start in Part I with two essays sketching its historical development from the city-states of ancient Greece to the nation-states of the twentieth century. In many respects this history provides the resources for our ways of thinking about citizenship today. As J.G.A. Pocock notes in Chapter 1, his account of 'The Ideal of Citizenship Since Classical Times', ancient Greece and Imperial Rome offers not just the models of citizenship of the classical era of history, but also 'the' classic models of what citizenship could be today. In particular, a distinction arises between a 'republican' view of citizenship based on political participation and a rights-based model of citizenship, which was to prove influential in later 'liberal' thought, which emphasizes citizenship as a legal status that can be separated from any involvement in decision-making. To these two classic models we need to add a third which sought to unite the two in the liberal democratic regimes of the nation-states that came into being from the mid-eighteenth century onwards in the wake of the American and French revolutions and the undermining of feudalism by commerce. This model was given its classic theoretical expression in the sociological analyses of T.H. Marshall and Stein Rokkan , to which Michael Mann offers his own critical contribution in Chapter 2. The next two essays in this section look at contemporary developments in citizenship theory. In Chapter 3 Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman explore the ways that political philosophers and theorists have developed both the republican and liberal models, especially with a view of the challenges posed by multiculturalism, neo-liberalism and globalization. Meanwhile, in Chapter 4 Bryan Turner builds on and updates the sociological theories of Marshall and Rokkan.

Part II addresses an issue at the heart of the sociological and legal models: namely, to what extent does citizenship require social and political as well as civil rights. It had been key to Marshall's analysis that 'full membership' of the community depended on all three. However, from the 1980s this argument has come under attack. On the one hand, libertarian neo-liberals began to assert that market rights offered better mechanisms for citizens to exert influence on the delivery of services than market mechanisms, while social rights lacked the same status as civil rights – indeed, were potentially in conflict with them, most notably in undermining property rights and rights to the results of one's labour. On the other hand, while social democrats criticized these arguments, they became to some degree influenced by them. Post-libertarian arguments accepted both the worry that democratic mechanisms might not treat individual interests equitably and might even overlook some individuals' concerns altogether, and the criticism that welfare might undermine individual responsibility. As a result, they came to advocate forms of social welfare aimed at preventing social exclusion rather than equalizing outcomes, and legal forms of citizenship that prioritized judicial over electoral mechanisms as offering the best protection for individual interests. In Chapter 5 Desmond King and Jeremy Waldron defends Marshall's idea of social citizenship against New Right critiques, while in Chapter 6 Jeremy Waldron argues against legal conceptions of citizenship that it is political participation that forms 'the right of rights'.

These arguments about rights nonetheless leave open the question of who is a citizen. The struggle for inclusion and the constant renegotiation of who is a citizen and the ways they are treated equally has always been at the heart of the practice of citizenship. It was central to the acquisition of the vote by workers and the subsequent debates about social and economic rights; it remains at the heart of feminist debates long after women obtained the vote; and in recent years has been key to discussions about multiculturalism and immigration. The essays in Part III explore each of these three last topics in turn, offering in each case a contrast between those who believe the liberal democratic norms of states must change radically to incorporate the demands of feminists, multiculturalism and be open to immigrants, and those who believe more modest revisions suffice.

Part IV then turns to the nature of political participation. It looks at two debates that have been prominent in the recent literature. Among the political theorists there has been a discussion as to whether the demands of citizenship may not be too burdensome in contemporary societies – a return to the argument of Benjamin Constant about the inappropriateness of the liberties of the 'ancients' in modern times. Modern liberty is said to be 'rights-based', leading to a legal form of citizenship, whereas political citizenship depends on a high degree of civic virtue and duties that are too onerous for most individuals. This argument is discussed by Adrian Oldfield in Chapter 13. Similar considerations underline a parallel debate among political sociologists about the dependence of political participation on 'social capital' – a network of social relationships and the experience of being involved in communal activities. Again, some analysts have voiced the fear that as such networks have lessened and societies become more individualistic, so the conditions that might foster and enable civic behaviour have been eroded. Russell Dalton explores this analysis in Chapter 14 though the work of its main proponent, Robert Putnam, and argues that the evidence points to the emergence of new forms and bases of citizenship.

Finally, perhaps the keenest debate regarding citizenship at present concerns the extent it now does (or should) reach across the borders of states. Political citizenship has always been an exclusive status, denoting the privileged membership of a particular, territorially circumscribed community: in the past city-states, today mainly nation-states. By contrast, cosmopolitan citizenship seeks to make us 'citizens of the world'. This is an idea associated with the Roman Stoic philosophers and it was in their minds linked to the spread of Empire and a notion of 'legal' citizenship. On this view, the conquered peoples of the Roman Empire acquired the legal status of Roman citizens but not the right to participate in political decision-making. However, the Greek derivation of this term suggests an even stronger meaning for the term whereby we view the world (*Kosmos*) as a polity (*polis*). Modern cosmopolitans tend to waiver between these two positions. For some, it is arbitrary to view our moral and legal obligations and entitlements as stopping at the borders of any given state. For others, while accepting this argument, it is also necessary to institute arrangements that might allow all inhabitants of the globe to participate in political decision-making, at least for some purposes.

The essays in Part V address this topic by looking at two cases that have been used to explore these arguments. The European Union has been seen as the prototype of a fully fledged global political community that transcends national borders. This argument is put from different perspectives by Jürgen Habermas, Andrew Linklater and Seyla Benhabib, in Chapters 15, 16 and 17, respectively, but disputed by Richard Bellamy in Chapter 18. He argues that citizenship cannot be detached from the sense of belonging only likely to be achieved within national communities, while rights and participation become undermined within very large political units among people who feel few if any communal bonds to each other.

The environment offers the other case study for global citizenship. Pollution clearly crosses state borders, while threats such as global warming are unlikely to be tackled without considerable transnational cooperation and action. In Chapter 19 Simon Hailwood argues that the need to tackle environmental problems at a global level suggests the need to extend citizenship upwards too. By contrast, in Chapter 20 Andrew Mason suggests that we can recognize our global environmental obligations without advocating transnational citizenship.

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