

from thinking about lots of other things as well as thinking about ethics. There may be a Machiavellian 'world-view' because nothing is easier to attribute to a great thinker than a view of everything. (It is as if having a world-view is part and parcel of *being* a great thinker.) But what should not be assumed is that whatever Machiavelli thinks about things in general is necessarily 'Machiavellian'. His view of politics is, but it simply does not follow that his view of everything is 'Machiavellian'. Commentators on Machiavelli have always been impressed by his intellectual range. Machiavelli might be Renaissance man writ very large indeed, but that does not mean that he has to be Machiavellian over the whole range; nor does it even mean that his thoughts about everything have to be particularly original. It may even be that Machiavelli is a rather conventional kind of Renaissance humanist in everything except politics.

THE ADVICE TO PRINCES IN *THE PRINCE*

The Prince is above all else what we would now call a work of political psychology. Machiavelli is always interested in what goes on inside people's heads. He always asks what political actors are likely to be thinking in specific political situations, and then goes on to ask whether they are wise to be thinking as they are. This applies particularly, as one might expect, to princes. Princes, no less than other men, are apt to react to situations in perfectly understandable and natural ways, but these ways are not always advantageous to princes. Part of being a prince is learning to react in ways which might seem unnatural, but the one thing Machiavelli never pretends is that the life of a successful prince is going to be easy.

The 'natural' reactions of men are likely to be especially automatic at moments of elation. This is why Machiavelli is particularly concerned with advising new princes, that is to say princes who have been successful in conquering new territories and are faced with the problem of what to do next. A prince in the first flush of victory is likely to make perfectly understandable human mistakes. Victory might make him feel warm and generous, qualities which Machiavelli thinks might lead to carelessness. Above all, the new prince must not think his problems are over just because he has won the battle and the defeated prince has been killed or has fled, because it is only then that his problems as a ruler begin. Machiavelli's advice to the new prince in these circumstances is based on a shrewd estimate of what his new subjects are likely to be thinking.

They can be divided into three distinct groups. The first group consists of those who remain loyal to the family of the old prince. Perhaps they are already dreaming of a government in exile which will one day return to claim its own. The new prince's problem is not so much the existence of such a group, which is entirely predictable, but the existence of members of the old prince's family around whom this dangerous opposition will eventually coalesce. The new prince cannot even identify the malcontents, who do not advertise their hostility and are content to bide their time. However, the prince can identify the likely members of the old prince's family who might become the focuses for resistance. Therefore the new prince must exterminate the ousted dynasty if he can. Leaving men alive to whom one has done injuries is always

dangerous, and so the prince must not be generous to his conquered enemies. He should kill them to prevent future troubles.

The second group consists of a kind of fifth column which supported the new prince in the days of the old. Machiavelli praises the ancient Romans highly for never entering a new territory without receiving an invitation first. The invitation shows that the state to be invaded is internally divided, and therefore weak, and it gives the invader a show of legitimacy if he can pretend to be not so much a conqueror as a guest invited in to help sort out a problem. The people who invited him in present a new prince with a serious difficulty. They are likely to regard themselves as kingmakers, and they have not been kingmakers for nothing. They are likely to regard the principedom as being in their gift, and they will expect rewards commensurate with what they have given. The best thing a new prince can do is to ignore them. This will no doubt make them discontented, but this does not matter very much because they have no-one to turn to as a rallying point for that discontent. The rest of the native population will regard them as traitors, and so will the family of the ousted prince. Their only hope is the new prince. They have in fact been very foolish, because they are in the new prince's hands rather than he being in theirs. Besides, how could a new prince reward them sufficiently when their expectations are so high? He could either despoil his new subjects to reward people they regard as traitors, or he could reward them with resources from his old state. The first would make him even more enemies in his new state and the second would make him unpopular at home because he would have to increase domestic taxes to reward foreigners. He could reward his allies out of his own resources in a moment of grateful generosity, but that would be to forget why he bothered to conquer new territory in the first place. Princes do nothing except for gain, so what would be the point of a new prince begging himself to acquire what is his by right of conquest?

The third group in his new principality that the prince has to deal with are those who watch his entry into their country with sullen acquiescence. These might be minor oligarchs or gentry, people with something to lose. They have good reason to be frightened. They are not of the party which invited the new prince in, and they know perfectly well what to expect after a defeat because to the victor belong the spoils. They cannot even be certain of their own lives and they expect trouble. Machiavelli warns the new prince to be very careful in dealing with them. The prince must never forget that one day he wants them to feel that they are *his* subjects, and, as always, Machiavelli thinks they can be brought round if the prince does the opposite of what they expect. It is a Machiavellian axiom that doing good to those who expect injuries magnifies the gift. Real kings are supposed to be generous, and rewarding those who expect injuries gives the new prince the opportunity to act like a king at very little cost to himself. The greatest reward you can give a man is his own life, and the gift is increased in value if you give a man his life when others are losing theirs. The new prince will have to do some killing, and this makes all men fearful. The way to reward fearful men with their own lives is to make a clear signal that at a particular moment the killing has stopped. Get the killing over quickly, and preferably do it through a deputy who can be blamed later for 'over-zealousness' or 'exceeding his orders'. Better still, kill the killer, for there is no better way of showing that executions are over than hanging the hangman.

It does not especially matter that not everybody will be convinced of the prince's good intentions straight away, though Machiavelli appears to think that human gullibility is at its most exploitable in a conquered people, and it is easy to see why. Many Renaissance princes were monsters and many were new princes. The history of Renaissance politics is the history of gaining and losing states, the politics of the public massacre, not to mention the discreet poignarding or the hidden poisoning (even the *possession* of poison was a capital offence in some states). Conquered peoples often had very good reason to expect the worst. Very anxious faces would be watching the triumphal entry of a new prince at the head of his army, and it is not likely that there would be much cheering. Anxious eyes would be looking for *any* sign of humanity in the new prince to tell them that their situation was not entirely hopeless. Men wish to believe in their prince's good will almost despite themselves, because the opposite is unthinkable. This is what makes them willing to be deceived. (The victim looks for signs of humanity in the torturer in much the same spirit, and the fact that he *is* a torturer makes the victim even keener to see kindness in his face; not *despite* the torturer's profession but *because* of it.) The manipulability of the psychology of the conquered makes them clay in the hands of a skilful prince. He leaves them their lives and this has all the effect of a pardon on a condemned man. It does not occur to the prisoner in his gratitude that those who pardon him and those who put his life in jeopardy in the first place are the same people. Quite the reverse. The fact that the pardon comes from those about to execute him is what convinces the condemned man that the pardon is genuine. And it is.

A skilful prince can do much to make psychologically vulnerable men potential allies by always doing the opposite of what they expect. This will at least have the effect of confusing them and therefore they would be less likely to combine against him. Machiavelli makes much of the apparently minor question of whether a prince should reside in an acquired territory, and there are strong practical reasons for the prince's being on the spot where trouble is likely to occur. But there is also a psychological bonus which is by no means negligible. The conquered are likely to expect their new prince to be haughty. By being on the spot the new prince makes himself approachable to his new subjects, thus fulfilling one of the traditional expectations of a legitimate king, which is to listen to his people's grievances. Petitioning the monarch is the most ancient of all the rights of subjects.

It cannot be stressed too often that Machiavelli's new prince is wise to use any resources cheaply available to him to create the legitimacy which by dint of his newness he does not in fact possess. It is very hard for him to avoid being generous because kings, like fathers of families, are expected to be munificent from time to time, and negative rewards do not last for ever. You can buy just so much by giving men their lives. The memory of the gift fades because gratitude never lasts. The prince's problem over the giving of positive rewards is simple: he wants to get as good value for his money as he can. Machiavelli's solution to the problem would work over the medium term. Giving men their lives will work for a bit. What the prince must then do is to reward slowly, piece by counted piece, so that everyone may live in the expectation of reward. The new prince's motto should therefore be: kill quickly and reward gradually. This will convert sullen acquiescence to the new prince's rule into something more positive as his new

subjects begin to look to him as the source of possible advantages. It goes without saying that a prudent prince would not beggar himself to reward everyone, and in the long term this will dawn on his subjects. Machiavelli's command of the principles of the psychology of a conquered people can easily accommodate the fact that eventually the prince's new subjects will catch on to what he is doing, because he thinks that by the time his new subjects do catch on, they will already have other reasons to thank him. In the long term those who have not been rewarded will come to realise that it is greatly to their advantage to live under a rather miserly prince because the prince's financial prudence means that he does not have to raise taxes in his new principality overmuch. Even the unrewarded will see themselves as the recipients of negative rewards. They retain their lives and fortunes more or less intact, and not being altogether stupid, the prince's subjects begin to think that the new prince is not after all going to change everything.

If the new prince doesn't increase taxes much and if he also has the sense to leave as much of the ancient laws in place as he can, then even initially frightened and discontented subjects can begin to relax, and some will become the new prince's supporters. Conquered peoples cannot avoid asking themselves questions about why the old regime was defeated, and part of the answer is always corruption in its moral or political senses. Either the ancient princes were too lazy to attend properly to affairs of state and so lost their thrones, or the ancient systems of rule were so putrified that they were dying a natural death, or both. It might well occur to people beginning to think like that that there is much to be said for being ruled by a prince who, though not of their choosing, none the less knows the business of statecraft. And so the new prince's subjects, or some of them, gradually begin to come round, perhaps only a few at a time, but each one is a potential assassin less.

The third group the new prince has to deal with is the people at large. They constitute the prince's real long-term problem. At first they are leaderless, a mere crowd; they have lost their old ruling family, and they observe the measures the new prince takes against nobles and leading citizens to neutralise them as possible leaders of resistance. But where does that leave the people? And why should the prince care? Machiavelli argues that a prudent prince will regard his new people as a long-term investment because one day he will have to ask them to fight for him. Machiavelli's love affair with his citizen militias is legendary. If the Romans could conquer the world with farmers conscripted into the legions, then why should the same not be true of a modern state? (Machiavelli ignores the objection that the art of war has improved so much since Roman times, when battles were simply a matter of pushing and shoving, that the day of the citizen-soldier has long gone.) The causes of Rome's greatness can be reproduced in modern conditions by a prince who has enough knowledge of the ancient world and enough foresight to put the ancient wisdom into practice. What might prevent a prince from seeing the truth of the ancient wisdom is rashness. A new prince entering a conquered and hostile territory might easily come to the conclusion that the best way to deal with his new people is to enslave them. Not literally, perhaps, but in the sense of screwing them down so efficiently with threats and taxes that it is unlikely that they will ever rebel. This is certainly an option open to a new prince, but it is fatally short-sighted.

The new prince must never forget that he acquired his new state by war, that in the

future he will want to acquire additional territories by war and that other princes on the lookout for conquests of their own are bound to be casting an eye on his territories. War is not an option but a necessity for princes, so a prudent prince will not waste his time asking himself *whether* he should go to war, but *when?* and *how?*, and of the two questions the ‘how’ question is the most important. Machiavelli deals with this question with his customary clarity. There are three ways of going to war: with forces of one’s own, with allies, or with mercenaries, and there are special problems with allies and mercenaries both during the war and after it. (Always assuming one is successful, that is; if you lose, your problems are over because by that time you will probably be dead.) Allies are always more or less reliable, because they are commanded by another and you can never be quite sure of them. However, the real problems of making successful war with allies come after the war, because what you win through the arms of others you hold by the arms of others. All kinds of jealousies can arise over the division of the spoils, and allies might even begin to think that what they have taken from others they can just as easily take from you. There is little enough security in a world in which kingdoms are being won and lost by the hazard of battle without having to worry about the predatoriness of allies. This is not to say that allies are useless, but the implication seems to be that an alliance in which a single ally predominates is dangerous for a prince.

Mercenaries are a menace both in peace and in war. Machiavelli is hard on mercenaries, and it seems probable that he makes them appear less reliable than they actually were in order to boost his case for citizen militias. Mercenaries serve only for pay, and they are naturally reluctant to fight because death is no more attractive to them than it is to any other man who practises a risky trade. Every mercenary captain will put off war as long as he can, because being paid while not actually having to fight is every mercenary’s dream. Professional soldiers love to look warlike, partly out of professional pride and partly because employers are unlikely to hire pacific-looking weedy types, but they are just as shy of the battlefield as civilians. Mercenaries do not come cheap, and from their employer’s point of view they are likely to appear as if they are eating him out of house and home while not actually doing very much for their money. On the other hand, their reluctance to fight makes their employer doubt whether mercenaries are likely to be much good in a real battle. Part of this doubt arises from a certain chuminess in the world of mercenaries as a whole. Mercenaries no more hate those they fight than they love those whom they fight for. They know perfectly well that in any war between mercenary armies they might well have been on the other side, and it is perfectly possible that in previous wars they have been the comrades-in-arms of today’s enemies. It is hard to work up any genuine ferocity against others just doing a job as you are, unless the rewards are very high indeed. The last thing you would want would be a high butcher’s bill after the battle, and so you would expect there to be all kinds of official and unofficial deals between opposing mercenary armies about quarter and ransom; you would expect battles of manoeuvre with few casualties, and you would expect a fair number of honourable draws.

These would be expectations only. Nobody actually knows what is going to happen in a battle, and much that is unexpected can happen in the heat of the moment. None the less, these are reasonable expectations for an employer of mercenaries, and he would be a

fool if he were to cast them entirely from his mind. And suppose mercenaries do all that is expected of them: they rout and slaughter the enemy. Where does that leave their employer? Could they not easily turn on him in the moment of victory? Every mercenary captain dreams of retiring one day to a little state of his own. Why not yours? This may not happen, but it is always something to think about. What the employer of mercenaries can be certain of is that the captain of a mercenary band will raise his fees after a successful war. This puts the prince in a ticklish position. To refuse a pay-rise to a successful mercenary captain looks like ingratitude and meanness, and a prince has his reputation in the world to consider. On the other hand, war is expensive and all princes wage war for gain, so a winning prince who has to pay out his gains to keep his mercenaries happy can end up on the losing side after all. Besides, mercenaries are bound to have found out on the mercenaries' grapevine whether a prince is generous or not, so that, if their employer is mean, they are likely to take in plunder what they are uncertain of receiving in pay. However, no prince wants to take possession of a ravaged land, because there is nothing in it for him. Whichever way you look at it, mercenaries are always bound to be a problem.

A wise prince would consider problems like these when he begins to consider how a newly conquered people should be treated. Allies are dangerous and mercenaries are dangerous and expensive, so the far-seeing prince should always see a future citizen militia even in a cowed and abject people. This will affect what arrangements the prince will make for securing his new territories in the short and medium term. He will resist the easy option of holding his new state by garrisons, because these will consist of expensive professional troops whose pay will have to be wrung out of his new subjects, thus giving them greater cause to hate the prince while grinding them down still further. The best way to secure oneself in a new state is by colonists: yeoman farmers from one's old state who are given land in return for military service. Their loyalty is guaranteed by the gift and by the fact they are, like their prince, strangers in a foreign country. Each knows that the other depends on him. Colonists are planted neither too thickly nor too thinly: too thickly and the dispossessed are concentrated enough to resist; too thinly and the colonists cannot concentrate quickly enough for effective defensive action. This is a matter of fine judgement, and the prince had better get it right. What he is ultimately aiming for is intermarriage. The colonists are meant to become a kind of breeding cadre for a future militia and not a uselessly closed expatriate community longing for the old country while living off the fat of the new. Social integration will be that much easier if the conquered people is of the same religion, manners and language as the prince's own people. If not, then considerable care must be taken with the cultural sensibilities of new subjects. (Napoleon hit the right note when he said that if he were governing Jews he would rebuild the temple of Solomon.)

Machiavelli wants the new prince to regard his conquered people as a potential future asset. He wants them eventually to be able to regard the prince as *their* prince and so be able to think once again of the country as *their* country. These originally resentful and recalcitrant subjects must be seen as future patriots willing to die for king and country. This is a tall order. How can a conquered people ever really believe that the conqueror really is their king when they can still remember their real king and can probably still

remember their real king's murder at the hands of the man who is now illicitly occupying the throne? And this is just as much a problem for the notables as it is for the people in general, and, what makes it worse, the prince knows that it is a problem. Every time a courtier bends his knee the prince sees a man for whom the act of obedience is something of a charade. He must be thinking that *he*, the courtier, could have been king if things had turned out differently. Luck (*fortuna*) always plays her part in the game of winning and losing kingdoms. Often, being the right man in the right place at the right time secures a principedom. It could have been *me*; it just happened to be *you*. The prince is forced to see that the courtier on his knees sees in the new prince a man not very different from himself who just happens to have been luckier. How different from a hereditary prince of the legitimate line, secure in his right to succeed to the throne of his fathers. All the new prince's 'acting like a king' cannot obscure the fact of the illegitimacy of his own origins.

The new prince is therefore faced with the most intractable of all problems, which is how to create his own legitimacy when the creation of one's own legitimacy is by definition impossible. Legitimacy is created by succeeding those who have gone before and is not created by oneself. Machiavelli's treatment of this problem is a brilliant *tour de force*. He turns the prince's luck into a legitimacy-creating agency, so that in the end the courtier on bended knee—and the people at large—begin to think that the prince's luck is of such a kind that he really is a creature apart, in his own way as different from ordinary men as an anointed king.

The successful new prince is a man who is *consistently* lucky. Machiavelli invokes the ancient Roman goddess of luck, Fortuna, as the successful prince's guiding spirit. Fortuna is a woman, so she likes her votaries to be young, handsome and masterly, combining the warlike quality of Achilles with the cunning persistence of Odysseus. Fortuna is a bit of a bitch, flighty and treacherous; she needs constant wooing, and sometimes she needs to be roughed up, but keep her sweet and there is nothing she won't do for you. Rough trade about sums it up, and this makes her the ideal mate for a prince on the make in the rough business of state-making. Fortuna can take the chance element out of luck, at least for a time—and perhaps for a long time as she did with her ancient Roman favourites. Some princes are so consistently lucky that their luck begins to appear to be uncanny. Observers begin to think that there is something not quite human, or at least quite out of the ordinary, about the prince whose luck holds through all the vicissitudes of high politics. It also does the prince no harm to spread the word that more than human agency is at work in his career. By degrees, Fortuna begins to show that her favourites are men apart. They become like the ancient heroes in whose fate the gods took an immediate and constant interest. Indeed, that is what made them heroes and created the distance between them and ordinary men. Who except another hero would dare to tangle with Hector? Only a fool would stand up to Achilles without some kind of divine protection. Successful princes are a bit like that. Taking them on is to take more on than a mere human being, and you would yourself have to be very sure of your own exceptional abilities before you even tried.

Fortuna does for new princes what God's anointment did for legitimate Christian kings. Traditional hereditary legitimacy was a way of setting kings apart from even the mightiest of their subjects. The courtier on bended knee to a legitimate king keeps his

self-respect by saying to himself that *he* could never have been king. The courtier might be a better man than the king. The courtier might easily be the man who really does the king's business for him, rules his realm or conquers his enemies. None the less, the courtier cannot think of himself as the king's rival because, no matter what happens, the king is still king. This works from the king's side too. The legitimate king may see a better man on his knees than he is, but the king has no reason to be jealous because he sees in front of him a man who could be what the king is.

That sense of distance is what creates legitimacy in traditional kingship. What Machiavelli has done through the notion of Fortuna is to re-create that legitimate distance in a non-Christian way. The new prince's courtiers—and his subjects at large—are supposed to think that the prince is a man who has been touched by the divine. Yes, he has been lucky, but his luck is not entirely fortuitous, and his luck would probably enable him to survive any plot that a malcontent might get up against him. Something very like awe in the face of majesty begins to form in the minds of those who surround the prince, and this awe is by no means uncongenial to them. They begin to discover a new sense of self-respect in themselves. They now feel that there is nothing in the least demeaning in bending their knee to their prince. The sense that they and the prince are on the same level begins to fade as they begin to think that only a fool would try to compete with a prince whose luck never seems to run out, and men are generally content with the thought that they themselves are not fools.

Machiavelli was a playwright and there is plainly an element of play-acting in all this. The prince is on stage, and if he plays his part well enough then the other actors and the audience will begin to suspend their disbelief. They gradually come to believe that the actor in borrowed robes really is a prince. The stage setting helps. Renaissance drama was often set in princely courts, and the prince usually gets the best costume, the best place on stage and the best lines. The court drama is really a play within the play. In the Machiavellian drama of *The Prince*, the prince's subjects at large stand for the audience and the prince's closest associates stand in for the actors. Ordinary folk see the prince's friends treat him like a real king and so insensibly the ordinary folk come to believe that the prince is himself the real thing.

The prudent prince does not have to be reminded that you can't fool all of the people all of the time. The prince is a deceiver who must never allow himself to be self-deceived. These things take time, and they are never definitively complete. There can never come a moment when the new prince can say to himself that he has been completely successful. And besides, the suspension of disbelief can itself be suspended; any regular theatre-goer will tell you that any brilliantly successful actor in a long-running play has a dreadful night from time to time.

Machiavelli deals with this problem with his usual realism. The new prince really has to deliver, and that means success in war. Machiavelli has a very shrewd idea of the connection between the internal politics of a state and foreign policy. War is the trade of princes and it is in war that Fortune smiles or frowns. The prince might as well retire to a monastery if he can't cut the mustard on the battlefield. War is sexy where sex is about power, and it is in war that the prince really needs to have good fortune. The prince's *virtu* is put to the test, and each time he is not found wanting he adds to his prestige. If he

has had the good sense to go to war with his own citizen militia, his subjects begin to feel the glow which comes from being part of a winning team. They begin to feel that they can't lose under their new prince, and any lingering affection for the old princely line becomes less as they begin to reflect what it was like to be ruled by losers. There are strong practical advantages to add to the psychology of winning. Machiavelli advises princes always to go on the offensive as the old Romans did. Attacking means that you go to war when you are ready and your opponent may not be, and in addition to the element of surprise there is the considerable advantage that the attackers fight on another's territory and not on their own. This advantage will not be lost on the prince's soldiers. Somebody else's house gets burned, somebody else's wife gets raped and somebody else's farm gets laid waste. The prince can easily allow his own soldiers a little plunder, because what he loses by plunder he makes up negatively by not having to pay wages to his own citizens.

The word 'citizens' is used deliberately here as a substitute for 'subjects' because it is a feature of good princely rule that there should be a transition from the one to the other. Subjects in original subjection are supposed to feel the prince's yoke less and less, until they begin to feel like citizens of a state which is truly theirs. This is, of course, highly advantageous to the prince. He gets soldiers free who feel that their country is worth fighting for. The prince begins to thank God he took Machiavelli's advice and did not enslave his people.

A citizen army returning victorious from its country's wars will not put up with being bossed about at home. Tyranny of a petty-minded and rapacious kind would be the least appropriate form of government for men conscious of their own strength and who had arms in their hands. The fact that a prince can trust his people enough to arm them shows that they have become partners. Partners regulate their relations with each other on the basis of consent. Machiavelli knows his ancient authors well enough to know that government by consent means government by law in the interests of all, and not government by force in the interest of the tyrant only. Good arms and good laws entail and imply each other, and a wise prince would be well pleased when his people began to think of the laws as *their* laws. That is one of the reasons why Machiavelli thinks a prudent new prince should alter the existing laws as little as possible. There is nothing people find more irksome than having laws imposed on them by foreigners. A prince should *add* to existing law whenever possible, and should be glad to acquiesce in the continuance of those local customs which over time have acquired the force of law.

Properly considered, princely government consists of the union of the interests of prince and people. Machiavelli anticipates Hobbes in believing that the glory of a prince can consist of nothing but the prosperity and contentment of his people. Subjects like these will follow the prince anywhere. Simple common sense might dictate that it is men with nothing to lose who will cheerfully put their lives at risk on the battlefield, but this is just another case where Machiavelli thinks that common sense is wrong. It is citizens with a good deal to lose that you can lead to war with confidence, and even losing cannot alter the fact that a citizen army still has a good deal left which is worth defending. Citizen armies cannot simply melt away after a defeat. Quite the reverse. They re-form with renewed determination to defend what is theirs, and the chances are that, if their

prince has not been cowardly or incompetent, the citizen army will re-form around him. And the nearer they get to home the more determined they will become.

Machiavelli thinks that there is no reason in principle why a prince well-versed in statecraft and with luck on his side should not be able to unite the warring principalities of Italy. The kings of the French have managed to unite the various French provinces into a single kingdom, so why not Italy? The short answer is, of course, the papacy, which Machiavelli regards as the real Italian problem. The papacy enjoys a prestige so enormous that even Borgia popes have failed to destroy it. (Machiavelli has no inkling of the Reformation shortly to come.) On the other hand, the papacy has no real forces of its own. Even Cesare Borgia ultimately failed to produce a militia out of the peasantry of the Papal States. Popes, as secular princes, have their wars to fight. The only way they can do this is to invite allies to invade Italy, and the papal allies are no less dangerous than the allies of other princes. The French, the Spanish, the Swiss and the Germans do nothing but follow Machiavelli's own advice to princes when they descend upon Italy: they come by plausible invitation and they fight on another's land. In Machiavelli's own terms the foreigners would be fools *not* to come. What Italy needs is a prince who can knock some sense into Italy as a whole, perhaps forming an alliance strong enough to expel all the barbarians. No wonder that Machiavelli was to be a hero of Italian national unification in the nineteenth century. The history of the eventual unification of Italy could be written on the Machiavellian theme: When will the prince come and who will it be? Garibaldi? Cavour? Even Mussolini claiming to complete the Risorgimento?

NOTES ON SOURCES

People are still trying to puzzle out the meaning of Machiavelli's *Prince*, so, as you would expect, there is a huge Machiavelli literature. It can't be emphasised enough, though, that *all* study of Machiavelli must begin with *The Prince* and the *Discourses*, both of which exist in various English editions. For the life, R.Ridolfi, *The Life of Niccolo Machiavelli* (1963), is still essential. Q.Skinner, *Machiavelli* (1981), is a workmanlike introduction; S.Anglo, *Machiavelli: A Dissection* (1969), is brilliant and eccentric. Herbert Butterfield, *The Statecraft of Machiavelli* (1955), and Felix Raab, *The English Face of Machiavelli* (1964), have still got a lot to teach us, as has the characteristically careful account of Machiavelli in J.Plamenatz, *Man and Society*, vol. 1, (1963). Anybody who is going to take Machiavelli seriously has eventually to make the acquaintance of *Machiavelli—the Chief Works and Others*, trans. and ed. A.Gilbert (2 vols, 1965).