

1990. When the Marxist state disappeared, the Soviet strategic foothold on the Arabian Red Sea and Gulf of Aden coasts disappeared with it.

Sub-Saharan Africa

In the Horn of Africa, the Marxist regime in Ethiopia, led by Mengistu Haile Mariam, remained in power. However, it was beset by famine and bitter rebellions in Tigre and Eritrea, placing in peril the Soviet African Red Sea bases. Moreover, as economic aid from Moscow and Havana declined during this period, the Ethiopian regime had to look to other sources for economic help.

Elsewhere on the continent, and especially in West Africa, Soviet influence declined rapidly as Marxist regimes were overthrown in many countries and severely weakened in others. The diminished military and economic support of the Soviet Union and its Cuban ally forced African Marxist regimes to turn to the West economically, thus rebuilding the region's geostrategic ties to the maritime realm. Moscow continued to strongly support the Communist regimes in Angola and Mozambique as well as the Cuban troops who continued to fight side by side with governmental forces against the rebels, who received considerable aid from South Africa.

Toward the end of the decade, however, the Marxist fervor of the Angolan regime weakened as it began to implement land and industrial privatization programs. In addition, the United States entered the scene directly by providing arms to the UNITA rebels. In Mozambique, as Soviet and Cuban influence faded, the Communist government turned to Zimbabwe for help. The radical leftist regime there responded by sending troops to guard the railway and oil line that extended into Zimbabwe from the port of Beira.

Latin America

During much of the 1980s, Communist attempts to penetrate Latin America had some successes. However, by the end of the decade, these also had largely dissipated. While Cuba remained the Soviet's major power base, in Nicaragua right-wing guerrilla actions and a US trade embargo undermined the economy of the Sandinista government. Economic distress and dissatisfaction with the repressive regime led to the ouster of the regime in the general election held in 1990. In Grenada, the Marxist regime of Maurice Bishop was toppled in a coup following the invasion and occupation of the island by the United States.

The 1980s were a period of rising strength for leftist rebel movements in Colombia and Maoist guerrilla forces in Peru. However, these terrorist groups were internally generated and directed, offering little scope for the Soviet Union and Cuba to extend their influence within the western Andes. Without outside aid, the guerrillas became increasingly dependent on the drug trade to finance their endeavors.

THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN

Afghanistan was the major focus of Soviet military energies abroad during phase III. While only one of several factors that eventually contributed to collapse of the Soviet empire, the Afghan war had a traumatic effect upon the Soviet military. The conflict began in 1979, when thirty thousand Soviet troops entered Afghanistan to save the Marxist regime that had seized power the previous year and aligned itself with the USSR. Moscow installed Babrak Karmal

as prime minister and gradually increased the number of its troops so that at the height of the conflict as many as one hundred thousand members of the Soviet armed forces were engaged in the fighting. Immense technological power was brought to bear against the outnumbered mujahideen, who depended upon arms originating from the United States, Saudi Arabia, and China and funneled through Pakistan, which also provided the rebels with their main training bases. In the course of the war, over one million Afghans were killed, and over five million (one-third of the prewar population) fled the country as refugees. Soviet losses were fifteen thousand killed and thirty-seven thousand wounded.

By the time that Mikhail Gorbachev rose to power in 1985 and instituted his policies of *glasnost* (openness) and *perestroika* (restructuring), it was too late to save the situation. The Soviet Union had exhausted both its capacity and rationale for pursuing the war. Recognizing its futility and burdened by the enormous cost of trying to maintain in power an unpopular Afghan regime, Gorbachev withdrew the Soviet troops in 1988–89, leaving the way clear for the mujahideen to sweep into power.

For Moscow, the price of the Afghan war was political as well as economic and military. The unpopularity of the war at home fueled the popular dissatisfaction with the Soviet government's repressiveness and economic failures. The latter had become patently evident with Gorbachev's liberalization policies. Abroad, much of the developing world viewed the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as an imperialist venture, undermining Moscow's credibility as the patron of anticolonialism.

The Collapse of the Soviet Superpower

While these events were taking place in the Soviet Union, its grip on its Eastern European satellites was weakening. In 1989, democratic movements had gathered stunning momentum. By the end of the year, the Communist governments had been toppled in every one of those countries and the Berlin Wall had fallen, wrenching the European near-periphery of the Soviet heartland from its grasp.

The following year, the Baltic republics demanded independence from the USSR, and Moscow signed a pact accepting the reunification of Germany. Thus the heartland's Eastern European strategic adjunct was lost without a shot being fired, the mighty nuclear arsenal that the USSR had built up having proved valueless. Now the continental Eurasian realm has shrunk inland toward the continent's center, and geographically it resembles the "pivot area" that Halford Mackinder described a century ago.

The dogged determination of the Soviet Union to pursue its strategy of deep penetration of the maritime realm proved to be a geostrategic blunder of the greatest magnitude. In extending the Cold War to arenas where the West had an overwhelming military, logistical, and economic advantage, the USSR played to its enemy's strength.

Could the Soviet Union have maintained its superpower status? One alternative strategy for doing so would have been to concentrate on its near-periphery and develop the Eurasian continental realm into a cohesive unit on a partnership basis. Such a strategy might still have failed, given the sociopolitical rot and the economic weaknesses of the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary state. Indeed, the Brezhnev regime widened the schism through confrontational policies that assumed that Mao could be brought into line by pressure.

The Soviets failed to recognize that Chinese and Soviet Communism had emerged from fundamentally different cultures, refusing to respect the ideological legitimacy of Maoism,

which focused on its agricultural peasant base and the principle of continuing revolution. Mao's policies of dispersing industry into the interior in the Great Leap Forward of 1958 and the Cultural Revolution of 1966 were clearly resounding failures. The famine of 1958–62 was brought on by a combination of inefficient farm methods, waste, and bad weather. It resulted in the deaths of millions by starvation. But from the point of view of Moscow, recognition of the principle of separate revolutionary pathways might have cemented a Sino-Soviet partnership and not led the two powers into seeking to play one another off against the United States.

A strategy that sought to craft alliances of equals between the USSR and Eastern Europe and the USSR and China would have altered the course of the Cold War. From this perspective, one may conclude that Soviet policies had more to do with losing the Cold War than United States policies had to do with winning it.

Thus geographical factors shape events but are not deterministic. Within those parameters, it is the policies and decisions of political leaders that determine the geopolitical structures of the globe.

Transition into the Twenty-First Century

THE DECADES OF THE 1990S AND EARLY 2000S

The end of the Cold War brought a reordering of the world's geopolitical structures and concomitant changes in expectations and attitudes toward international relations. Three transformations characterized the period. This reordering is in contrast to the instability imposed upon the system by the competition between the two superpowers. There had been important changes in the geopolitical spheres of influence during the Cold War, but the two superpowers knew the limits that mutual nuclear deterrence placed upon them. They avoided direct military conflict, which would have thrown the world into chaos. Today's dynamic system is more complex, but its multilateral great and regional powers provide the base for regional cooperation that contributes to greater global equilibrium.

The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, followed by the disintegration of the Soviet Union, left only one world superpower—the United States. Many expected the United States to impose a Pax Americana on the world. It has tried to do so but has stumbled in its effort. Although turmoil and conflict have continued, it is not among great and regional powers that this takes place and is therefore more limited in scope and geostrategic implications. More open borders allow globalization and regionalization to flourish, with both positive and negative consequences. The negative is the absence of great-power control combined with ease of communications, movement, and capital flows, all of which give more scope to international terrorism.

These transformations effected change in the world geopolitical structures. With the shrinking of the Eurasian realm through the implosion of the former Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia, the status of Eastern Europe and Central Asia was significantly altered. In the East Asian realm, the weakening of Russian pressures enabled China to become more assertive in its relations with the Asia-Pacific Rim and to draw Indochina into its orbit geostrategically. Vietnam has become a strong economic competitor with China and is in dispute with Beijing over the sovereignty of offshore islands. Nevertheless, it remains strategically subordinate. Within the maritime world, expansion of NATO as well as the enlargement of the European

Union has affected the existing balance between maritime Europe and the United States as well as between Europe and the Russian heartlandic realm.

During this decade, Sub-Saharan Africa and South America became geostrategically marginal to the maritime powers, even though they were still within the maritime realm. The Western powers have stood by passively as Central Africa has broken into a compression zone, its internal divisions being reinforced by the intervention of neighboring eastern and southern states.

At the onset of the post-Cold War era, the world's sole remaining superpower—the United States—assumed the mantle of global leadership. It quickly met the first international challenge—Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. Washington organized and led the coalition of forces that pushed the Iraqis out of Kuwait in January 1991 and, through an unprecedented demonstration of electronic air power, devastated Iraq's major military installations, ports, and cities.

However, in Iraq, Saddam Hussein continued in power behind his Republican Guard, which escaped virtually intact from the massive Allied air bombardment of the Gulf War. In 1992, Saddam ruthlessly crushed the US-encouraged Kurdish rebellion in the north and the Shia uprising in the south.

When the Somali military warlord Mohamed Siad Barre was overthrown in 1991, the country fell into chaos, and the American response was rapid. Somalia was swept by inter-tribal warfare and then devastated by the worst drought that Africa had experienced during the century. To protect relief supplies and restore order, Washington dispatched US troops to the stricken country.

These early American initiatives were widely heralded as harbingers of a stable “new world order” guaranteed by a Pax Americana imposed by US global economic, military, and informational hegemony. What followed instead was the turbulence that is characteristic of systems undergoing fundamental structural change. The American superpower could neither prevent nor easily put an end to the conflicts that broke out during the 1990s and escalated in the first decade of the twenty-first century.

In 1994, the US expeditionary force was shocked by an ambush during street fighting in Mogadishu in which eighteen rangers were killed and seventy-five wounded. The troops were quickly withdrawn, as the American public made it clear that it had little stomach for interventions of a humanitarian nature that would cost American lives. The following year, the UN forces also pulled out. Elsewhere, wars in several of the former Soviet republics, especially Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, were followed by the dismemberment of Yugoslavia, with bloody conflicts in Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo.

Where conflict has broken out as the aftermath of the Cold War, its geographic scope has been generally limited. Even in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Rwanda, and in the bloody civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone, all of which caused extensive casualties, the conflicts did not spread beyond their own regions. In Rwanda, the genocide of hundreds of thousands of Tutsis by the ruling Hutus was followed by the expulsion of equal numbers of Hutu, who fled to eastern Congo and Burundi.

In Afghanistan, the fighting between the Taliban and its tribal opponents did not result in the deaths of hundreds of thousands or the displacement of millions of refugees, as occurred in that country during the Soviet invasion. Nonetheless, the optimism that had given birth to the idea of a new world order quickly gave way to pessimistic scenarios. Zbigniew Brzezinski promoted the view of a world in perpetual turmoil; I. Lukacs predicted that the international system would be ruled by intransigent nationalism; Samuel Huntington saw a

future marked by bloody global struggles between great world civilizations and culture; and Robert Kaplan predicted global chaos.⁸

Events since the 1990s suggest that neither the optimists nor the pessimists are correct in their reading of the world geopolitical map. There has indeed been considerable turmoil as the result of the profound changes that the international system has undergone. That turmoil, especially the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as global terrorism, do threaten global stability but are not likely to lead to global chaos because all of the great and most of the regional powers have stakes in containing it.

A balanced perspective of the Cold War's aftermath must also take into account the many peaceful transitions of rule and territorial reconfigurations that have taken place. These include secessions from the FSU by Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic states, and the former Soviet Central Asian republics; from Yugoslavia by Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Macedonia; and from Czechoslovakia by Slovakia. The reunification of Germany was accomplished with minor economic or political disruption, and the changeover from Communist regimes was relatively smooth in Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, and Mongolia.

Elsewhere, South Africa's transformation to a black government was peaceful, as democracy has taken root in that land. As the twenty-first century unfolds, seemingly intractable conflicts have wound down in Angola, Sierra Leone, Aceh, Northern Ireland, Peru, Sri Lanka, and Nepal. An agreement was also reached to end the conflict between North and South Sudan in 2005, but it was not immediately honored. It took six years for the division of the two countries to be formalized following a referendum that the southerners overwhelmingly approved. South Sudan then became an independent state and a member of the United Nations. However, the 1,250-mile border between the two countries has not yet been ratified owing to a dispute over control of Abyei. This is a 4,000-square-mile region, the majority of whose population is Ngok Dinka southern black farmers. The northern part of the province is populated by nomadic Arab Misseriya tribes, who come with their herds only during the dry season. Abyei also has oil reserves, but their production has declined significantly in the past few years, so the intractable nature of this border dispute is now principally demographic rather than over energy resources.

While major wars continued to rage in Afghanistan and Iraq, conflict continued to plague the African Horn, Sudan's Darfur, Georgia, Israel and Arab Palestine, and Lebanon. The war in Iraq wound down with the withdrawal of US troops in 2011, and most US/NATO troops are scheduled to withdraw from Afghanistan at the end of 2014. Nevertheless, the future of these two countries is bleak. Iraq continues to be torn by sectarian conflict. An independent, tribally dominated Afghanistan is likely to be wracked by instability. The turmoil in Egypt and Libya as well as the rebellion in Syria takes place in the absence of strong great-power involvement.

Other significant elements of post-Cold War transformation, globalization and regionalization, were present in the 1980s but could not develop fully until systems became more open and borders could be more easily crossed in those parts of the world that bore the brunt of Cold War competition. Networks of economic and cultural interaction have expanded exponentially since then, bringing prosperity to parts of the developing world. In such areas, international capital flows have facilitated investment and stimulated the outsourcing of manufacturing. The information revolution has broadened the horizons of individuals and made it easier to challenge entrenched authority.

Some of these same factors have their negative aspects. The open system makes it more difficult to contain arms and drug smuggling and to prevent the spread of international terrorism across more open borders. The transfer of technology has speeded the emergence of

India and Pakistan as nuclear powers and enhanced the abilities of North Korea and Iran to develop their own nuclear and biological weapons and advanced missile systems. Corruption and the ease with which capital can be illegally expatriated initially undermined the Russian economy, but its recovery has been unexpectedly rapid thanks to its energy wealth and restoration of political stability. Opposition to incursion of foreign cultures has deepened the fissures within traditional societies, leading to the spread of Islamic fundamentalism in such countries as Turkey, Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, the states of Central Asia, Nigeria, Mali, the Philippines, and Indonesia. Egypt, in contrast, has ousted the Muslim Brotherhood government.

Absent the Cold War competition that stirred up so many wars, conflict mediation has become more widespread. Russia has become involved in helping to mediate regional crises. The first Gulf War was contained with Russian collaboration, and Moscow's influence also helped to moderate Serbia's behavior in its fighting with Croatia and, in the latter stages of the war, in Bosnia. It played an important part in bringing Slobodan Milošević to the negotiation table and eliminating in 2013 Syria's stock of chemical weapons. NATO, Russia, and China have been supportive of the United States in its conduct of the war in Afghanistan. They have also participated in negotiations with North Korea to halt production of nuclear weapons, which the North later repudiated.

The United States has played a key mediating role in Northern Ireland. In the Middle East, it has organized "the Quartet"—the United States, EU, UN, and Russia—in the commitment to achieve a two-state solution in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The EU has cooperated with Washington in the imposition of heavy sanctions which brought Tehran to the nuclear weapons negotiation table in 2013. South Africa has taken the lead in mediating the conflict in Congo. Governments at all levels, as well as the United Nations and regional bodies, are all more fully engaged in the process.

GLOBAL TERRORISM

Terrorism, both domestic and international, is an age-old phenomenon. Its purposes have ranged from grasping for political power and struggles for national freedom, to the exercise of ideological and religious beliefs, to sheer brigandage. It has been practiced by individuals and small groups, national and transnational movements, empires and states. Practitioners employ surprise and increasingly lethal weapons and techniques to produce widespread panic and fear within the target publics. Kidnappings and ambushes are traditional stratagems, but aircraft and other vehicular hijackings, suicide missions, and the use of planes as weapons of direct assault are of recent origin. Even more potentially lethal are biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons of mass destruction.

Approximately one hundred states have been targeted by terrorist attacks since the end of World War II. Terrorism, war crimes, and violations of human rights, ignored during the Cold War, have become important items on the international agenda, although the international community is often notably slow to act. Table 4.1 lists countries that have been exposed to major terrorist actions during this period, nearly two-thirds of which have taken place within the past two decades, or remain highly vulnerable to them. Thirty-four of the countries enduring terrorism are Muslim dominated, a reflection of the vulnerability of Muslims themselves to Islamic terrorism.

Despite historic episodes of assassination and other terrorist activities, it was not until the 1980s and 1990s that American citizens and facilities became exposed to large-scale terrorist activities. For the most part, they occurred overseas—in Beirut; in West Germany; over

Table 4.1. State Targets of Major Terrorist Actions since World War II

<i>Region</i>	<i>Countries</i>
North and Middle America	El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, United States
South America	Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay
Maritime Europe and the Maghreb	Algeria, Austria, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Morocco, Netherlands, Spain, United Kingdom
Eastern Europe	Albania, Croatia, Cyprus, Kosovo, Macedonia
Heartlandic Russia and Periphery	Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan
Middle East and African Horn	Afghanistan, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Palestine (West Bank and Gaza), Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, S. Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, Yemen
South Asia	Bangladesh, Burma, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal
East Asia	Cambodia, China, Laos, Vietnam
Asia-Pacific Rim	Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Timor-Leste
Sub-Saharan Africa	Angola, Burundi, Chad, Congo, Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zimbabwe

Lockerbie, Scotland; in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania; in the Khobar barracks, Saudi Arabia; in the harbor of Aden, Yemen; in the Westgate Mall of Nairobi, Kenya; and in Moscow. Bombings and other terrorist attacks took more than one thousand lives in fourteen major incidents, with embassies, aircraft, airports, and vessels as major targets. While there was much public surprise and concern within the United States over the attacks, the response from Washington was relatively muted as it failed to recognize the danger of international terrorism to the stability of the global system.

Nor did scattered incidents at home serve as wake-up calls. The terrorist bombings of Fraunces Tavern and the federal courthouse and the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center, all in New York, as well as a fray outside CIA headquarters in Virginia cost a limited number of lives and minimal physical dislocation.

It took the events of September 11, 2001, for Americans to feel the agony of terrorism and to recognize that it was also their problem. September 11 severely shook the American public and government. The loss of an approximately three thousand lives and the devastation wrought upon the country's financial and military nerve centers, as well as the boldness of an attack using terrorist-seized aircraft, had a stunning psychological effect. The Atlantic and Pacific moats, which had lulled the nation into a feeling of security, had been breached. The terrorism that the English, Italian, French, Irish, Israeli, Spanish, Somalian, Pakistani, and Indian people had so long endured, not to speak of the atrocities perpetrated upon innocent civilians throughout the developing world, had suddenly become part of the American experience.

The 2012 bombing of the US consulate in Benghazi, Libya, which resulted in the killing of the American ambassador and three others, brought renewed attention to this threat. This was followed by the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing that killed three and injured many others, further heightening public concern.

Under the US Anti-terrorism and Death Penalty Act of 1996, the secretary of state is required to designate foreign terrorist organizations that threaten the country's interests and

security. In 2000, twenty-nine such organizations were identified. The largest number of these are Muslim groups, mostly with Arab roots.⁹ With the killing of Osama bin Laden and most of his leading confederates, al-Qaeda, the most lethal of terrorist organizations, has become an increasingly loose network whose cells operate in thirty-seven countries (some estimates go as high as sixty countries). This decentralized system of jihadist movements has increased the difficulty of coping with international terrorism.

Organized terrorist groups do not operate in a geographical vacuum but are based in certain countries from which they reach out to others. They derive much of their strength from support obtained from states that sponsor them or offer safe havens. The US State Department's most recent list of such sponsors cites Cuba, North Korea, Iran, Sudan, and Syria. US law requires that sanctions be imposed on these states. On the list to be sanctioned, although they control areas that are not states, are Hezbollah in southern Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza. Pakistan, Lebanon, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Somalia sponsor, finance, or knowingly shelter terrorist groups. Ironically, the United States sought to engage such backers of terrorism as Syria and Iran in developing a regional approach to stabilizing Iraq. Beyond the military expedience of seeking support from these states, the position of Washington is that coalition building provides an opportunity to wean some of them away from the support of terrorism. Examples are Libya and Yemen. With the overthrow of Gaddafi, Libya has reverted to being a source of terrorism, and American withdrawal has given room for al-Qaeda in Iraq to operate.

For the global war on terrorism to succeed, states that support or turn a blind eye to it will have to be pressured to change their behavior or be isolated by the world community. Collective world action is required to address the easy availability of communications, financial instruments, and weaponry to the perpetrators as well as the economic and political conditions that breed terrorism.

The multilateral approach taken by the United States in its war against the Taliban and the various al-Qaeda and other jihadist movements has enlisted not only most nations of the maritime world but also Russia, China, and Muslim nations, especially Saudi Arabia. The rejection by Saudi Arabia of a Security Council seat, for which it had lobbied, reflects its deep disappointment at the inability of the council to mediate the Syrian rebellion. They all have much to fear from home-grown and neighboring terrorist groups. Self-preservation is an imperative for every sovereign state. A state's own vulnerability to terrorism as well as its desire for economic support and trade with the economically advanced countries of the world are incentives to act against terrorism.

Since September 11, 2001, some states that sponsor or harbor terrorists have announced a change of direction. Despite the devastation and hardship that they incur, the number of wars and armed conflicts throughout the world has declined by nearly half since its peak in the early 1990s.¹⁰ This is a hopeful sign in the long-term campaign against global terrorism, provided that the United States stays the course in leading the effort.

Notes

1. B. Liddell Hart, "The Russo-German Campaign," in *The Red Army*, ed. B. Liddell Hart (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1956), 100–126.

2. Andrew J. Pierre, *The Global Politics of Arms Sales* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), 256–62.

3. Paul H. Nitze, Leonard Sullivan Jr., and the Atlantic Council Working Group on Securing the Seas, *Securing the Seas* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1979), 31–118.