

this devolution comes about only after conflict. More than one hundred former colonies and territories have achieved self-determination either as sovereign states or through association with other states. There are approximately sixty remaining dependencies, many of which have very small populations or provide their administering powers with strategic military bases so that the latter are reluctant to give up control. Others are so highly dependent economically that they cannot afford the luxury of national independence. Those non-self-governing territories most likely to opt for independence are ones that are sufficiently resource rich, have favorable tourist bases, or are financial havens. As the world becomes a more open system, the advantages that such territories currently enjoy from retaining colonial ties decreases.

POTENTIAL NEW STATES AND QUASI STATES

Table 3.2 identifies states that are possibilities for independence or quasi statehood. For many separatist movements, the high degree of autonomy that may be offered to them through quasi statehood is likely to be accepted.

Those territories whose prospects for independence are greatest contain peoples who have operated from historic core areas in which they have maintained their cultural, linguistic, religious, or tribal distinctiveness. Many of the prospective states and quasi states listed in table 3.2 are economically viable because of the strength of their resource bases—for example, in Indonesia, Aceh’s oil and natural gas; in West New Guinea, Irian Jaya’s copper and gold; Democratic Republic of Congo’s eastern province of Shaba’s copper, tin, uranium, diamonds, and fertile grasslands; South Nigeria’s oil and gas; Scotland’s offshore North Sea oil; and the grain of Punjab, known as the “granary of India,” where the Sikh majority aspires to create a separate country known as Khalistan. The trade, tourism, and revenue from smuggling enjoyed by some Caribbean islands are also bases for national status.

Those states that achieve only qualified forms of sovereignty thus become quasi states both because they lack the military capacities to gain their full objectives and because they are too important to the home country to be allowed full independence. Spain’s approval of greater autonomy for Catalonia in 2005 offered promise as a useful model for resolving other separatist conflicts. The revised autonomy law recognizes the Catalan nation, increases to 50 percent its share of income and VAT that are collected within the province, and guarantees that national investments in Catalonia will be equal in proportion to the region’s contribution to the national GDP. In addition, the region is given jurisdiction over culture, education, health, local government, and police. However, this law has not been fully implemented. As a consequence, increased Catalan pressures for an independence referendum poses a major challenge to the unity of Spain.

Political latitude might offer special diplomatic status, including UN membership to quasi states, as was the case for Belarus and Ukraine when they were within the Soviet Union. Such status might be especially appropriate for Taiwan, although it would surely be opposed by Beijing.

Another form of organization for some quasi states could be the “condominium,” whereby two larger powers share oversight for such functions as defense and foreign relations. The Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan might be resolved by such an arrangement.

In maritime Europe, the proliferation of quasi states in such countries as Spain, Italy, France, and the United Kingdom could reinforce the developmental process of regional specialization and integration. These semi-independent entities would be free of some of the restraints that currently limit their specialized potential, thus strengthening the EU rather than being impediments to integration.

Table 3.2. Gateways and Separatist Areas

<i>Present Region</i>	<i>Present Gateway</i>	<i>Potential Gateway</i>	<i>Independent/ Quasi States</i>
North and Middle America	Bahamas Trinidad Jamaica Guyana Cayman Islands Honduras	Bermuda	Puerto Rico* Quebec*
South America			S. Brazil*
Maritime Europe and the Maghreb	Malta Lampedusa Monaco Finland Canary Islands Azores	Gibraltar**	Crete* Catalonia* Greenland N. Ireland‡ Euskadi* Scotland* Galicia* Brittany* Corsica* Faero Islands* Madeira Islands* Flemishland* Trentino-Alto Adige Adige* Wales* Wallonia* Kabylia (Algeria)*
Asia-Pacific Rim	Taiwan Singapore	Guam S.W. Australia* Unified Korea	S. and W. Mindanao* Aceh* Irian Jaya S. Moluccas
Heartland		Russian Far East*	Chechnya* Tuva* Sakhlin*
Caucasus/ Central Asia China	Turkmenistan Uzbekistan Hong Kong	China "Golden Coast"*	Tibet* Xinjiang*
Indochina South Asia		Pakhtoonistan	Kashmir‡ Nagaland* Kalistan* N. Afghanistan* E. and S. Afghanistan*
Middle East	Bahrain Cyprus Dubai Qatar		Arab Palestine Kurdistan (Iraq)* W. Iraq*
Central and Eastern Europe	Austria Estonia Finland Slovenia	Ukraine	Transnistria* Abkhazia**
Sub-Saharan Africa	Djibouti Cape Verde	Zanzibar	Puntland* Somaliland‡ Shaba N.E. Nigeria*

*Quasi state (statelet)

**Condominium

‡Two stages: quasi state to independence

‡Two stages: condominium to independence

One unfortunate consequence of the proliferation process has been the creation of “failed” nation-states. These are deeply divided, war-torn states, lacking in national cohesiveness, whose governance institutions have collapsed to the point of anarchy or near anarchy. Some divisions are so entrenched and long-standing that they defy international and regional efforts at amelioration. Somalia, which was patched together from three colonial territories and then unified as an independent state, has once again fallen apart.

One index for measuring such states is the Failed State Index of 2013.¹² It includes such indicators as demographic pressures, refugees, uneven economic development, deterioration of services, violation of human rights, and political factionalism. In this index, ten of the top fifteen states are located within Africa, all but one (Zimbabwe) within the region’s compression zones. Four are located within the Middle East and one (Haiti) in the Americas. Somalia leads the list, followed by the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Models for addressing the “failed state” syndrome include full-scale nation building, as attempted by the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the NATO peacekeeping effort in Bosnia. It remains to be seen how successful these remedies can be. For the most part, the international community lacks the capacity and geopolitical motivation to mount such operations in most of the world’s failed states. It is more likely that massive intervention will continue to be pinpointed for lands that are global geopolitical flash points and that elsewhere the burden will be left to regional powers to try to mediate conflicts and restore domestic stability.

A strategy of early identification of emerging states would permit advance action by international and regional bodies to mount comprehensive infrastructure development programs within prospective states. This could help ward off potential political instability and prepare them to become viable members of the world community when they gain independence. Timely and effective international action could include commitment to technological and capital support for building and maintaining water, sanitation, health, transportation, communications, and education infrastructures. Such comprehensive development efforts would require that when new states emerge, their fledgling governments demonstrate a “best effort” to share responsibility for these programs, with agreed-upon international monitoring and auditing. This is especially critical for countries with valuable resources that might be siphoned off by ruling cliques.

This continuing struggle for independence has profound implications for US foreign policy making. Concomitant with the objective of eradicating global terrorism, it will be necessary for Washington to promote new approaches that will encourage separatist movements to negotiate their goals peacefully. In many cases, American pressures, sanctions, and rewards by themselves will not be able to dictate peaceful resolutions of irredentist conflicts. Neither is the United Nations equipped to shoulder such a burden. However, a hands-off policy by Washington that simply awaits the implosion of many countries is a recipe for global instability.

The challenge is to find new mechanisms for mediating these separatist disputes, based upon a partnership of effort among the United States in alliance with the EU and Japan, other major and regional powers, and regional organizations. Afghanistan and Iraq are evidence that outside military force alone cannot resolve disputes. A confederation of highly autonomous Shiite, Sunni, and Kurdish areas appears to be the only alternative to a Shiite-dominated Iraq. A similarly loose confederation may be the optimal solution to the struggle in tribalized Afghanistan, with its Pashtun population in the east and south and Tajiks and Uzbeks in the north. Alternatively, an independent Pakhtoonistan, linking the Pashtuns of Afghanistan and western Pakistan, could emerge, leaving the rest of Iraq to a new Tajik-Uzbek state.

State proliferation is a stage in the evolution of the global system toward specialized integration. States now trying to break away might one day seek confederal ties with their for-

Table 3.3. Potential Confederations

<i>Region</i>	<i>Potential Confederations</i>
North and Middle America	"Westindia"
Maritime Europe and the Maghreb Heartland	N. and S. Cyprus <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan • "Greater Turkestan" (Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan) • GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova) • China, Taiwan
China	<i>or</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continental China, the "Golden Coast," Taiwan
Middle East	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Afghanistan, Pashtun E. and S., Tajikistan and Uzbekistan N. and W. • Saudi Arabia, Gulf States, Syria, Lebanon, W. Iraq • W., Central, and N. Iraq • Israel and Independent Palestine
Central and Eastern Europe	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) • Former Yugoslav states (Serbia, Croatia, Montenegro, Bosnia, Kosovo)

mer hosts, especially to fulfill mutual economic self-interest. Table 3.3 suggests possible future confederations.

The creation of up to fifty additional fully independent or quasi states over the coming few decades will change the territorial outlines and functions of many major and regional powers. With the exceptions of Nigeria, Indonesia, Iraq, Syria, and Pakistan, these changes are likely to have only limited impact on the power rankings of these states or on world equilibrium.

Geopolitics and General Systems

Treating the geopolitical world as a general system provides a model for analyzing the relationships between political structures and their geographical environments. These interactions produce the geopolitical forces that shape the geopolitical system, upset it, and then lead it toward new levels of equilibrium. To understand the system's evolution, it is useful to apply a developmental approach derived from theories advanced in sociology, biology, and psychology.

The developmental principle holds that systems evolve in predictably structured ways, that they are open to outside forces, that hierarchy, regulation, and entropy are important characteristics, and that they are self-correcting.

In 1860, Herbert Spencer was among the first to set forth a development hypothesis that drew an analogy between the physical organism and social organization. His evolutionary ideas came from physiology and the proposition that organisms change from homogeneity to heterogeneity. Using the organic growth analogy, Spencer argued that social organizations evolve from indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to relatively definite, coherent heterogeneity. In this hypothesis, state and land meant the combination of social organization and physical organisms.¹³