

financial markets; and by the media. These forces can also be turned to advantage by the state in advancing its own goals. In the last analysis, the national state remains the glue of the international system, the major mechanism that enables a people to achieve a self-realization inextricably bound with its sense of territoriality. Even the breakup of existing national states, while upsetting the status quo temporarily, is testimony to the power of nationalism, not its decline.

ORDERS OF NATIONAL POWER

The state system consists of five orders or levels. The first consists of major powers—the United States, the collectivity of states embraced by the European Union, Japan, Russia, and China. These all have global reach, serving as the cores of the three geostrategic realms. India, the core of an independent geopolitical region, is en route to forging a South Asian realm. Brazil has the potential of becoming the core of a South American realm, although currently its control is limited to the eastern part of the continent.

The second order of states consists of regional powers whose reach extends over much of their respective geopolitical regions and, in specialized ways, to other parts of the world (see figure 3.2). The third, fourth, and fifth levels are those states whose reach is generally limited to parts of their regions only. In assessing the strategic importance of states, policy makers need to recognize their appropriate levels of power, still keeping in mind that lower-order states are capable of upsetting the system by serving as terrorist bases.

The rank of a nation in this hierarchy can be assessed through a number of socioeconomic, political, and military measures, including possession of nuclear weapons. While power rankings suffer from being somewhat mechanistic, they are commonly used in international assessment. The ranking system used here includes value and political behavior characteristics that reach beyond the traditional emphasis on population, area, economic resources, and military expenditures and technology. Such a ranking method cannot account for idiosyncratic factors, like the length to which the dictator of an impoverished country such as North Korea, or fanatics like the Taliban, will go to influence regional and even global events through threats of war, support of rebellions, and offerings of a base for terrorism. For the most part, however, “rogue” state leaders must have either access to resources, such as oil, or patrons who will provide them with the needed backing to intervene in affairs outside their borders, for example, Cuba and North Korea’s dependence upon the USSR during the Cold War.

The increased importance of second-order, or regional, states has come at the moment in world history when major powers have begun to distance themselves from regions they no longer consider vital to their own national interests (see figure 3.1). Second-order powerdom is a reflection of the inherent military and economic strength of a state relative to that of its neighbors. It is also a function of its centrality or nodal role in regional transportation, communication, and trade. As important as any of these factors, however, is the ambition and perseverance of the state not only to impose its influence on others but also to persuade them of their stakes in regional goals and values. Egypt’s leadership in the Middle East has derived in great measure from its espousal of the pan-Arabism to which the other Arab states also subscribed. This leadership has been eroded by the chaotic conditions that have beset the country since the overthrow of the Mubarak and Morsi regimes. Saudi Arabia’s influence comes from its use of petrodollars to support rigid Islamic law, while Venezuela’s has been based on its willingness to spread its oil wealth within the Caribbean and the Andes.

Another criterion for measuring the strength of a regional power is its ability to gain sustenance from one or more major powers without becoming a satellite or through extrare-




Figure 3.2. The World's Major and Regional Powers

Table 3.1. Second-Order Power Rankings

<i>High</i>	<i>Medium</i>	<i>Low</i>
Brazil	Indonesia	Algeria
Canada	South Korea	Thailand
Turkey	Vietnam	Argentina
Australia	Israel	Taiwan
Iran	Mexico	
South Africa	Pakistan	
Nigeria	Egypt	
	Venezuela	
	Saudi Arabia	

Note: States are also ranked within categories.

gional political-military alliances, trade links, or ideological links. When India took the lead in fostering the concept of Third World neutrality, its inherent power was increased, just as South Africa's attempts to be a leader of peace movements is part of its inherent strength.

Not all regional powers are equal. Table 3.1 is an attempt to rank them in three categories. Members of the European Union are omitted, as the EU is treated collectively as a major power. Were they to be included, Germany would rank as a great power, while France, Britain, and Poland would be regional ones.

Certain regions contain more than one regional power, and some states in such regions have developed highly complementary relations with the first-order powers located within the region. This is the case for the US relationship with Canada and Mexico; both of the latter states have gained in strength as a result of their close ties to the North American superpower. Others vie with major powers located within the same realm, for example, Vietnam with China. Still others are heavily influenced by support received from distant first-order states—for example, Israel and Egypt by the United States, Nigeria by the EU. Proximity is important in the capacity of first-order states to influence second-order states militarily and politically psychologically, but it is less of a factor in extending economic influence because trade more easily spans distance.

Although second-order states may have regional hegemonical aspirations, their goals are constrained by geopolitical realities. With the exception of Brazil and India, which have the capacity to become first-order powers, second-order powers are unlikely to achieve dominance over an entire geopolitical region. Rather, they can hope to exercise broad regional influence, with hegemony having practical significance only in relation to proximate states.

Third-order states influence regional events in special ways. They may compete with neighboring regional powers on ideological and political grounds or by having a specialized resource base, but they lack the population, military, and general economic capacities of second-order rivals and depend on more powerful patrons for support. Examples of third-order states are Ethiopia, Cuba, Ukraine, Angola, Chile, Argentina, Colombia, North Korea, and Malaysia. Oil-rich Qatar also belongs in this category because it derives influence from supplying military weapons to Sunni groups throughout the Middle East, especially Syria.

Fourth-order states such as Sudan, Ecuador, Zambia, Morocco, and Tunisia have impact only on their nearest neighbors. Fifth-order states, such as Nepal, have only marginal external involvement.

Membership in the various orders is fluid. China is now a first-order power. It has gained economic strength through the opening of its system to world market forces, and its military strength has grown through expansion of its air power and its drive to create a "blue ocean"

navy. India is moving from second-order status to that of a major power, especially since Pakistan is rapidly losing its stability and cohesiveness due to the clash between its Islamic fundamentalists and its military regimes. Some Western foreign policy makers downgraded Russia as a great power because of the economic chaos that prevailed after the fall of Communism. However, its rapid economic recovery, political stability, nuclear arsenal, armaments industry, energy resources, and strategic centrality within Eurasia have enabled it to maintain its first-order status.

Morocco, the Democratic Republic of Congo (then Zaire), and Cuba have fallen from the ranking or never attained it. The German Democratic Republic and a greater Yugoslavia have disappeared altogether from the map. At the same time, South Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, and Thailand have now achieved regional power status. Among the most prominent regional states that are extending their influence to neighboring areas are South Africa, Turkey, and Nigeria. However, Turkey has failed in its efforts to become peacemaker in the Arab world, and Nigeria has not been able to sustain its regional influence because of its domestic instability.

Third-order status is also ephemeral. Tunisia, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Ghana, and Costa Rica have enjoyed and then lost such ranking with the waning of their ideological influence.

The impacts of major powers and second- and third-order states give regionalism increasingly important geopolitical substance. States that are ideologically at odds with the other states in the region play a special role. They promote turbulence by challenging the norms and injecting unwelcome energy into the system. Examples are pre-1990 revolutionary Cuba, Titoist Yugoslavia, and the market-oriented Côte d'Ivoire of the 1970s.

GATEWAY STATES AND REGIONS

Gateway states play a novel role in linking different parts of the world by facilitating the exchange of peoples, goods, and ideas (see table 3.2). Should Russia and the EU come to a compromise over Ukraine, the latter would become a gateway. This applies also to an independent Palestinian state, which could be a bridge between Israel and the Arab world.

The characteristics of gateway states vary in detail but not in the overall context of their strategic economic locations or in the adaptability of their inhabitants to economic opportunities. They are distinct politically and culturally and may often have separate languages or religions as well as relatively high degrees of education and favorable access to external areas by land or sea.

Small in area and population and frequently lying athwart key access routes, gateways usually possess highly specialized natural or human resources upon which export economies can be built. Lacking self-sufficiency, they depend upon trade with other countries for many of their raw materials, finished goods, and markets, as well as on specialized manufacturing, tourism, and financial services. Especially when they are sources of out-migration because of their overpopulation, they acquire links to groups overseas that can provide capital flows and technological know-how. The models for such states have existed in such ancient centers as Sheba, Tyre, Nabataea, and Palmyra; in the medieval Hanseatic League and Lombard city-states; in Venice (twelfth to fifteenth centuries); in Manila (seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries); and in Zanzibar (nineteenth century). In the twentieth century, Lebanon was an important gateway until torn apart by civil strife and war.

Among today's most prominent gateways are Singapore, Hong Kong, Monaco, Finland, Bahrain, Dubai, Qatar, Djibouti, Trinidad, and the Bahamas. The latter two, because of

their focal location within the Caribbean, proximity to the United States, ease of access to Western Europe and South America, and favorable climates, have become centers for tourism, offshore financial services and banking, and international corporate headquarters as well as, unfortunately, the drug trade. The Cayman Islands also serves as an offshore financial address.

Hong Kong, although now part of China, continues to play its powerful gateway role, owing to its special political status. As economic relations between Taiwan and China have greatly expanded and Taipei has become the major source for capital investment on the mainland, Taiwan's role as a gateway linking the maritime and East Asian realms has taken on added significance.

The emergence of gateways helps to convert former barrier boundaries to borders of accommodation. Estonia is beginning to serve such a role as a link along the geostrategic boundary between the European portion of the maritime realm and heartlandic Russia, and Slovenia plays such a role between Central and Southeast Europe.

The concept of gateway regions is a logical extension of the gateway state concept. Such regions do not yet exist. But Eastern Europe, for example, could develop into a gateway region between heartlandic Russia and maritime Europe rather than into the shatterbelt that it once was if it is treated by the major powers as an area of cooperation and not of competition. The countries of such a gateway, especially the Baltic states and Poland, have successfully made their transitions to market economies. Ukraine is already a gateway for Gazprom pipelines to the EU. A forward-looking Russia would build on Ukraine, the Baltic states, and Poland as a trade bridge to the West, including the development of joint enterprises with Western companies.

Gateways, for the most part, play positive economic or social roles. Some, however, may be more problematic. For example, Spain's Canary Islands are jumping-off places for West African illegal immigrants seeking to enter maritime Europe through Spain. The perilous journey taken by these "boat people" all too often ends in drowning at sea or being sent back upon reaching the islands. Similarly, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan serve as the gateways through which much of Afghanistan's heroin is exported through various routes to Europe. Jamaica and the Cape Verde Islands are gateways for the transfer of Andean cocaine for the European market. Honduras, Mexico, and Puerto Rico are gateways for South American cocaine destined for the US market as well as sources of immigration to the United States.

Proliferation of National States

The number of national states in the world has trebled in the past half-century. In 1945, there were sixty-eight states and the United Nations had fifty-one members, including three memberships allotted to the USSR. In 1991, there were 165 states, and currently there are close to 200, including a few claimants which have not been internationally recognized. As of 2013, the United Nations' formal membership numbered 192. The increase in the number of national states is likely to continue to slow down as central governments offer separatist areas high degrees of autonomy rather than risk the loss of important territories. Paradoxically, the continuing devolution of existing states will also provide long-range opportunities for new kinds of loose confederations as smaller units feel driven to come together in cooperative frameworks.

State proliferation is the consequence of two forces—the drive of dependent territories for independence and the division of existing sovereign states. Often, although not always,

this devolution comes about only after conflict. More than one hundred former colonies and territories have achieved self-determination either as sovereign states or through association with other states. There are approximately sixty remaining dependencies, many of which have very small populations or provide their administering powers with strategic military bases so that the latter are reluctant to give up control. Others are so highly dependent economically that they cannot afford the luxury of national independence. Those non-self-governing territories most likely to opt for independence are ones that are sufficiently resource rich, have favorable tourist bases, or are financial havens. As the world becomes a more open system, the advantages that such territories currently enjoy from retaining colonial ties decreases.

POTENTIAL NEW STATES AND QUASI STATES

Table 3.2 identifies states that are possibilities for independence or quasi statehood. For many separatist movements, the high degree of autonomy that may be offered to them through quasi statehood is likely to be accepted.

Those territories whose prospects for independence are greatest contain peoples who have operated from historic core areas in which they have maintained their cultural, linguistic, religious, or tribal distinctiveness. Many of the prospective states and quasi states listed in table 3.2 are economically viable because of the strength of their resource bases—for example, in Indonesia, Aceh's oil and natural gas; in West New Guinea, Irian Jaya's copper and gold; Democratic Republic of Congo's eastern province of Shaba's copper, tin, uranium, diamonds, and fertile grasslands; South Nigeria's oil and gas; Scotland's offshore North Sea oil; and the grain of Punjab, known as the "granary of India," where the Sikh majority aspires to create a separate country known as Khalistan. The trade, tourism, and revenue from smuggling enjoyed by some Caribbean islands are also bases for national status.

Those states that achieve only qualified forms of sovereignty thus become quasi states both because they lack the military capacities to gain their full objectives and because they are too important to the home country to be allowed full independence. Spain's approval of greater autonomy for Catalonia in 2005 offered promise as a useful model for resolving other separatist conflicts. The revised autonomy law recognizes the Catalan nation, increases to 50 percent its share of income and VAT that are collected within the province, and guarantees that national investments in Catalonia will be equal in proportion to the region's contribution to the national GDP. In addition, the region is given jurisdiction over culture, education, health, local government, and police. However, this law has not been fully implemented. As a consequence, increased Catalan pressures for an independence referendum poses a major challenge to the unity of Spain.

Political latitude might offer special diplomatic status, including UN membership to quasi states, as was the case for Belarus and Ukraine when they were within the Soviet Union. Such status might be especially appropriate for Taiwan, although it would surely be opposed by Beijing.

Another form of organization for some quasi states could be the "condominium," whereby two larger powers share oversight for such functions as defense and foreign relations. The Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan might be resolved by such an arrangement.

In maritime Europe, the proliferation of quasi states in such countries as Spain, Italy, France, and the United Kingdom could reinforce the developmental process of regional specialization and integration. These semi-independent entities would be free of some of the restraints that currently limit their specialized potential, thus strengthening the EU rather than being impediments to integration.