





Week 8: Leadership continues; Military Leadership



18 MILITARIES AND POLICE FORCES

what may amount to a civil war to achieve this end. In 1969, UK troops were despatched to Northern Ireland, initially to defend the Catholic community, but increasingly to contain a campaign of sectarian terrorism waged by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and other republican groups. The Ulster Defence Force (UDF) and other republican groups such as the Golden Drum and the Ulster Defence Force (UDF) have been used on a number of occasions to counter civil unrest and riots in the Golden Temple at Amritsar in 1984 as the result of Sikh separatists from the Indian army. In 1984, the Indian army was used to suppress the seizure of the Babri Masjid mosque in Ayodhya. In 1992, following the destruction of the Babri Masjid mosque, Indian troops were despatched to the republic in a full-scale war, later developing into an ongoing guerrilla struggle.

In cases in which political legitimacy has collapsed altogether, the military may become the only prop of the regime, safeguarding it from popular rebellion (see p. 279) and consent is abandoned as the government becomes an outright dictatorship. Thus, in May 1989, the survival of the Chinese communist regime was only maintained by the military assault on Tiananmen Square, which effectively neutralised the growing democracy movement. Such circumstances place a heavy strain on the loyalty of officers and the obedience of troops required to inflict violence on brought in from the countryside whose political loyalty could be counted on. In Romania, in December 1989, soldiers ordered to quell popular unrest went over to the demonstrators, effectively bringing about the collapse of the Ceausescu regime.

Interest group

The military has been seen above largely as an instrument of policy, that is, as a device through which governments can achieve their foreign or domestic ends. However, armed forces are not neutral bodies that have no interest in the policy issues to which they are put. Rather, like bureaucracies, militaries can act as interest groups that seek to shape or influence the content of policy itself. In this respect, the military has a number of clear advantages. First, it possesses considerable technical knowledge and expertise. Although armed forces are usually constrained by formal subordination to civilian politicians and the requirements of political neutrality, it is difficult for governments not to listen to, and often heed, the advice of senior members of the military on strategic, defence and broader foreign policy matters.

Secondly, the military is an 'insider' group in the sense that it is represented on key policy-making bodies and so possesses an institutional power-base. The US military, for instance, is able to exert influence through the Department of Defense ('the Pentagon') and the National Security Council, as well as through appearances before the congressional Armed Services Committees. Thirdly, the military benefits from its status as the guarantor of national security and state integrity, and from the fact that the public normally attaches to the issue of defence. Governments may thus calculate that there are votes in strengthening military capacity and increasing defence spending.

Just as public choice theorists (see p. 256) claim that civil servants are essentially concerned with career self-interest, it is possible to argue that the senior military is concerned with career self-interest, that is, with policies that enhance the size and status of the armed forces, or likely to 'push' policies that enhance the size and status of the armed forces, or

Dictatorship

A dictatorship is a form of rule in which absolute power is exercised by one individual, in this sense, dictatorship is synonymous with autocracy. Originally, the term was associated with the concentrated emergency powers granted to a sovereign magistrate in the early Roman Republic, which created a form of constitutional dictatorship. In the modern usage of the term, however, dictators are seen as being above the law and as acting beyond constitutional constraints. Early examples of dictators were Julius Caesar and Augustus Caesar in Rome, and Robert Catesby and John Throckmorton in England. More generally, dictatorship is characterised by the arbitrary and unbridled exercise of power, as in Nazi Germany, the 'party dictatorship' of the Soviet Union, and 'personal dictatorship'.

Rebellion

A popular uprising against the established order, usually spontaneous, aimed at replacing rulers rather than the political system itself.

Alternative to civilian rule

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It is difficult, however, for military rule to exist in a stable and enduring political form. While military leaders may highlight the chronic weaknesses, intractable divisions and endemic corruption (see p. 347) of civilian government, it is unlikely that military rule will provide a solution to these problems or that it will be perceived as legitimate, except during temporary periods of national crisis or political emergency. This is why military regimes are typically characterised by the suspension of civil liberties and the suppression of all potential sources of popular involvement in politics. Protests and demonstrations are curtailed, opposition political parties and trade unions are banned, and the media are subjected to strict censorship. As a result, the military often prefers to rule behind the scenes and exercise power covertly through a civilianised leadership. This occurred in Zaire under Mobutu, who came to power in a military coup in 1965, but later allowed the army to withdraw progressively from active politics by ruling through the Popular Movement of the Revolution, founded in 1967. In the 1940s and 1950s, Egypt's transition from the monarchy to a republican form of government was achieved under Gamal Nasser and Anwar Sadat, both military figures. The appointment of civilian cabinets and the emergence of parties and interest group politics not only strengthened the regime's legitimacy, but also gave Nasser and Sadat a greater measure of freedom from their own militaries.

Military regimes may come to a more dramatic end by collapsing or being overthrown when the authority of the armed forces is fatally compromised, usually by military defeat. This may also happen when military rulers are confronted by levels of popular opposition that can no longer be contained through repression (see p. 369)

Civil liberty

Civil liberty refers to a person's freedom of movement, belief, and expression. In the context of the military, it refers to the freedom of movement, belief, and expression of military personnel. This is often restricted in military rule, as seen in the case of the military juntas in Latin America, where civil liberties are suspended.

Repression

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THE MILITARY AND POLITICS

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A similar model of civil-military relations can be found in the UK. The UK prime minister and cabinet, via the Ministry of Defence. Not since the English Civil War of the seventeenth century and the rule of soldier-statesman Oliver Cromwell, with the army exerted a direct influence on British political life. Indeed, in common with most other liberal democracies, the professionalism of the military in the UK is largely founded on its determination to keep out of politics. Only on very rare occasions has this self-restraint been tested. During the First World War, for instance, the soldier and administrator Lord Kitchener used his appointment as Secretary of State for War to instigate the raising of a vast volunteer army. Sir Douglas Haig, Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary Force, had a crucial influence on the decision to use costly and exhausting trench-warfare tactics on the Western Front. He was able to exert this influence because the prime minister, H. H. Asquith, believed that it was the generals' job to run the war, and because King George V sometimes backed the military in its struggle against civilian politicians. No similar problems occurred under Churchill during the Second World War. Indeed, the general rule has been that developed western states with a history of constitutional stability and an entrenched democratic culture have experienced little difficulty in maintaining a liberal model of civil-military relations.

A very different form of civilian control has been employed in dictatorial or one-party states. Instead of relying on 'objective' mechanisms to establish the supremacy of civilian authority, the military is controlled by 'subjective' methods which bind it to the civilian leadership by imbuing it with the leadership's values and ideals. Whereas the liberal model operates through the exclusion of the armed forces from politics, the penetration model uses the opposite approach of systematic and thoroughgoing politicisation. This has been achieved in various ways, and with differing degrees of success. Hitler attempted to turn the German army into 'political soldiers' through the personal oath of allegiance sworn to him as Führer in August 1934. At the same time, he declared himself Head of the Armed Forces, and in 1941 he assumed the post of Supreme Commander. However, the army's loyalty was based more on the overlap between its authoritarian nationalism and the expansionist goals of the Hitler regime, than on its penetration by Nazi dogma. This was reflected in Hitler's growing reliance on the Waffen SS as a politically reliable army. Before committing suicide in April 1945, Hitler declared Admiral Dönitz the next Führer, because he believed that, of the various armed services, only the German navy had not abandoned him.

18. MILITARIES AND POLICE FORCES

A substantially more brutal approach was adopted by Stalin in the USSR in the 1930s. Moves towards greater professionalisation in the Soviet armed forces, reflecting concern about the expansionist intentions of Nazi Germany, were abruptly ended in 1937 with the inauguration of a series of bloody purges. These led to the execution of three out of every five Soviet marshals and 13 out of 15 army commanders. In total, 90 per cent of all generals, 80 per cent of all colonels, and an estimated 30 000 officers of lower rank lost their posts, and often their lives. This effectively robbed the Red Army of its military expertise and threw it into almost total disarray, just at the time when it was being used to wage war against Finland, 1939-40, and was supposedly being prepared to defend the USSR against a possible German invasion.

In most instances, however, the penetration model entails not so much the ousting of politically 'unreliable' members of the military as the promotion of politically 'correct' views and values through constant propaganda and agitation. For example, the Iraqi army, especially since Saddam Hussein assumed power in 1979, has been infused by the pan-Arab nationalism of the Ba'ath party. Ba'athism is committed to the unification of the Arab nation and to freeing it from western imperialism and Zionism. These goals provided an ideological justification for the invasion of Iran in 1980 and the annexation of Kuwait in 1990.

The institutional penetration of the armed forces has been developed in its highest form in communist states. In China, an elaborate network of party bodies parallels the structure of the military, offering leadership and guidance in areas of political and ideological significance. Civilian control is thus maintained through a level of interpenetration between the party and the armed forces that virtually obliterates any distinction between civil and military responsibilities. Party affiliation creates a record of political commitment and loyalty to the communist regime as a precondition for the appointment and promotion of officers in the PLA. To the extent that the party operates in and through the military, however, the military also gains a voice in the policy process and is able to exert influence through an integrated party-state-military elite. In the USSR, this approach sometimes allowed the senior military to play a decisive political role, as it did in 1957 in backing Khrushchev and helping him to foil an attempted coup by the so-called anti-party group, and again in 1964 when, in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, it withdrew its support from Khrushchev, so contributing to his fall.

When does the military seize power?

The most dramatic political manifestation of the power of the armed forces is, of course, the removal of a civilian government through a military coup d'état. The military can seize power either to displace the civilian leadership and establish a form of direct military rule, or to replace one set of civilian leaders by another through whom it is able to rule indirectly. In other cases, effective military government can be established without a formal bid for power on the part of the armed forces, as occurred in the Philippines under President Marcos, especially after the declaration of martial law in 1972. In certain parts of the world, military intervention in politics has become a normal occurrence, and military regimes have achieved such a degree of stability that they can no longer be classified as exceptional or transitory phenomena. The military coup thus becomes the principal device for bringing about the transition of government power from one group of leaders to the next.

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When does the military seize power?

The most dramatic political manifestation of the power of the armed forces is, of course, the removal of a civilian government through a military coup d'état. The military can seize power either to displace the civilian leadership and establish a form of direct military rule, or to replace one set of civilian leaders by another through whom it is able to rule indirectly. In other cases, effective military government can be established without a formal bid for power on the part of the armed forces, as occurred in the Philippines under President Marcos, especially after the declaration of martial law in 1972. In certain parts of the world, military intervention in politics has become a normal occurrence, and military regimes have achieved such a degree of stability that they can no longer be classified as exceptional or transitory phenomena. The military coup thus becomes the principal device for bringing about the transition of government power from one group of leaders to the next.

This regularly happened in the nineteenth century in Latin America (particularly in Mexico, Peru and Chile), in Spain, and in the Balkan states. In the twentieth century military intervention has largely been confined to developing states in Africa, Latin America and parts of Asia. Military coups appear to be associated with particular circumstances. The most significant of these are the following:

- economic backwardness
- loss of legitimacy by civilian rulers
- conflict between the military and the government
- a favourable international context.

There is a clear link between the incidence of military coup and economic underdevelopment. Pinkney (1990) pointed out that, of the 56 countries that have experienced military government since 1960, the vast majority are in the third world. Moreover, particular coups can be linked to economic downturns. The overthrow of four years of civilian rule in Nigeria in 1983, for example, occurred after a de-stabilisation in the economy caused by falling oil prices. By the same token, growing prosperity appears to be an antidote to military intervention, as demonstrated by the tendency in Latin America since the 1970s for the military to return to the barracks. Widespread poverty and deep social inequality are clearly of significance in that they weaken support for the incumbent government and provide the military with a pretext for stepping in with a promise to deliver economic development. However, economic factors alone cannot explain military takeovers. India, for instance, suffers from serious levels of material deprivation, but its armed forces have maintained strict political neutrality and have never openly challenged the authority of civilian governments.

Part of the answer to the question why do military coups occur is surely that they occur because they can occur. In other words, the military is likely to intervene in politics only when it senses that the legitimacy (see p. 193) of existing institutions and the ruling elite is challenged, and when it calculates that its intervention is going to be successful. The armed forces thus rarely interfere directly in politics when a stable democratic culture has been successfully established. This is because military rule can only operate through a level of systematic repression, which, in turn, may be difficult to sustain because it strains the unity and discipline of the military itself. It is therefore not surprising that the most of the successful military regimes have been established in parts of the world that have had a long history of colonial rule: Latin America, the Middle East, Africa and South East Asia. The political weakness and instability on which the military attempts to capitalise is certainly most acute in relatively new states. This stems not merely from an unfamiliarity with democratic politics, but is also linked to

Concept

A coup d'état (the French word for 'blow') is a sudden and illegal seizure of government power through force or the threat of force. Coups are usually carried out by or with the help of the military. In some countries, the military is a powerful institution. In others, it is relatively weak. In the latter case, coups are less likely to occur. First, they are typically carried out by the state for example, the bureaucracy and the police. Secondly, they are often carried out by the military in order to replace the incumbent government with a more stable one. This is often done in order to prevent a change of leadership.

Concept

Repression is the use of force to suppress or control a group of people. It is often used by governments to maintain order and control. Repression can be physical, such as the use of force, or psychological, such as the use of fear and intimidation. Repression is often used to suppress dissent and opposition to the government. It is a key feature of authoritarian regimes. Repression can also be used to suppress social movements and protests. It is a key feature of military rule.

the heightened expectations that independence brings, the poorly embedded nature of new political institutions and, sometimes, regional and ethnic tensions that have inherited from the colonial past.

A good example is Nigeria, which has enjoyed only two brief periods of civilian government since gaining independence from the UK in 1960. The colonial government had attempted to weaken and split the nationally based movement by politicising regional and ethnic divisions, particularly those between the Hausa in the north, the Yoruba in the west, and the Ibo in the east. This left Nigeria with a fractured and national and ethnic divisions, particularly those between the Hausa in the north, the Yoruba in the west, and the Ibo in the east. This left Nigeria with a fractured and national and ethnic divisions, particularly those between the Hausa in the north, the Yoruba in the west, and the Ibo in the east. This left Nigeria with a fractured and national and ethnic divisions, particularly those between the Hausa in the north, the Yoruba in the west, and the Ibo in the east.

The third factor associated with military intervention is the degree to which the goals and interests of the armed forces differ from those of the broader society. For example, despite widespread poverty and deep religious, linguistic and regional divisions, the Indian army has been prepared to leave politics to the politicians because of its engrained respect for the principles of liberal constitutionalism. When military interests or values are threatened, or because they think that their actions are justified. In many newly-independent developing states, the military has taken over to 'save the nation', seeing itself as a 'westernising' or 'modernising' force confronting a traditionalist, rural, hierarchical and frequently divided political elite.

This has occurred in Nigeria, Indonesia and Pakistan. In other cases an authoritarian conservative military elite, often working in alliance with big business and enjoying support amongst the middle classes, has challenged the authority of reformist or socialist governments. The bloodless coup in Brazil in 1964 was largely a consequence of the army's suspicions about President Goulart's left-wing leanings. The Chilean president, Salvador Allende, was overthrown and killed in 1973 by the army, which was led by General Pinochet. While the military is usually anxious to demonstrate that its intervention in politics is motivated by, for example, a desire to end corruption, heal divisions, or defend the nation, narrow selfish considerations are never entirely absent. Military coups are often an attempt to preserve the privileges, independence and prestige of the armed forces, or they may be a vehicle for the pursuit of political ambition.

Finally, the military's decision to seize power may also be affected by international considerations. There are few countries in which a military takeover does not have implications for neighbouring states, regional and international organisations, or the larger international community. In some cases, international pressures undoubtedly encourage military action. This was clearly the case with the Pinochet Cuban communist in Chile and elsewhere in Latin America. Not only did Pinochet receive covert advice and encouragement from the CIA, but he was also

guaranteed US diplomatic support, once his new military regime was established. On other occasions, the prospect of an adverse diplomatic reaction has been largely passive as communist regimes collapsed in the face of mass demonstrations and popular pressure. In addition to a loss of political will on the part of communist leaderships, the armed forces recognised that military action would receive no support from the USA and the USSR, and that it would be fiercely condemned by international regimes to diplomatic pressure. Saddam Hussein was little affected by international criticism of his military expansion of the Kurds and the Shi'ite Moslems following the 1991 Gulf War. Similarly, General Abacha of Nigeria was unmoved by Commonwealth pressure in 1993 intended to prevent the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and other human rights protesters.

The police and politics

The police force, like the military, is part of the coercive state. However, whereas the principal function of the military is to uphold national defence, the central purpose of a police force is to maintain domestic order. Police forces came into existence in the nineteenth century, largely as a result of the higher levels of social unrest and political discontent that industrialisation unleashed. For instance, in the UK, a paid, uniformed, full-time and specially trained police force was established by Robert Peel in London in 1829 following the Peterloo Massacre of 1819 in Manchester, when cavalry had been used to break up a large but peaceful working-class demonstration. This type of police system was introduced throughout the UK in 1856 and was later adopted by many other countries. Although police forces and militaries are similar in that they are both disciplined, uniformed, and (to different degrees) armed bodies, important differences can be identified.

In the first place, whereas the military's essentially external orientation means that it is called into action only rarely, for example, in times of war, national emergency, and national disaster, the police force's concern with domestic order means that it has a routine and everyday involvement in public life. The police force is also more closely integrated into society than is the military, its members and their families usually live in the communities in which they work, although, as discussed below, a distinctive police culture often develops. Furthermore, the police typically use non-military tactics: because of their reliance on at least a measure of consent and legitimacy, they are either usually unarmed (as in the UK), or their arms are primarily a form of self-defence. To some extent, however, modern developments have tended to blur the distinction between the police and the military. Not only have armed forces been called in to deal with domestic disorder, as during the Los Angeles riots of 1992, but police forces have also tended to develop an increasingly paramilitary character. This is reflected in their access to progressively more sophisticated weaponry, and, in many states, their adoption of a quasi-military mode of operation.

Roles of the police

There are three contrasting approaches to the nature of policing and the role that it plays in society: the liberal, conservative and radical perspectives. The liberal

Concept

Order is the state of a community in which there is no serious disturbance. It is a state of peace and stability. Order is often used to describe a well-organized and controlled society. It is a key feature of authoritarian regimes. Order is often used to describe a well-organized and controlled society. It is a key feature of authoritarian regimes. Order is often used to describe a well-organized and controlled society. It is a key feature of authoritarian regimes.

perspective regards the police as an essentially neutral body, the purpose of which is to maintain domestic order through the protection of individual rights and liberties. In this view, police forces operate within a broad consensus and enjoy a high measure of legitimacy, based on the perception that policing promotes social stability and personal security. The police are essentially concerned with upholding the rule of law (see p. 284), it has no broader political function.

The conservative perspective stresses the police's role in preserving the authority of the state and ensuring that its jurisdiction extends throughout the community. This view, which is rooted in a more pessimistic view of human nature, emphasises the importance of the police as an enforcement agency capable of controlling social unrest and civil disorder. In this light, police forces are inevitably seen as mechanisms of political control.

The radical perspective advances a much more critical view of police power. This portrays police forces as tools of oppression that act in the interests of the state, rather than the people, and serve elites rather than the masses. In the Marxist version of this theory, the police are seen specifically as defenders of property and upholders of capitalist class interests.

The role of the police force is also shaped by the nature of the political system in which it operates and the ways in which the government uses the police. Civil policing tends to be distinguished from political policing, and divisions are usually identified between liberal states and so-called police states.

Civil policing

Civil policing refers to the role of the police in the enforcement of criminal law. This is the aspect of police work with which the general public is usually most familiar and which dominates the public image of the police force: the police force exists to 'fight crime'. Clearly, however, the maintenance of civil order is a very different undertaking in, say, rural India than it is in modern cities such as New York, Paris and St Petersburg. It is widely accepted that, while small and relatively homogeneous communities are characterised by a significant level of self-policing, this changes as societies become more fragmented (socially and culturally), and as large-scale organisation de-personalises relationships and interaction. The spread of industrialisation in the twentieth century therefore brought about a measure of convergence in police organisation and tactics in different parts of the world. Police forces everywhere tend to confront similar problems in the form of, for example, traffic infringements, car theft, burglary, street crime and organised crime.

However, various contrasting styles of civil policing have been adopted. On the one hand, there is the idea of community policing. This relies on a constant police presence within the community to ensure public cooperation and support in the investigation of crimes, and to encourage the development of values and attitudes that help to prevent law breaking in the first place. This system has traditionally been exemplified by the UK concept of policing - the 'bobby on the beat' - and has been particularly well developed in Japan. Japanese police officers are expected to know and visit the various families and workplaces that fall within their area of jurisdiction, operating either from police boxes (koban) or residential police stations (chuzaiho). The success of this method, however, depends on the police being regarded as respected members of the local community and citizens accepting that their lives will be closely monitored. Pressure for efficiency and cost cutting led

strike to coordinate police operations across the country. Centralisation was also fostered in the 1990s by the reduction of the influence of elected members of police authorities. Moreover, much politically sensitive policing is subject to little or inadequate democratic control. This is particularly true of MI5, whose remit was extended in 1996 to include intelligence related to crime and law enforcement as well as 'national security'. All MI5 operations are secret, its budget is not subject to parliamentary oversight, and alone amongst UK security agencies it is allowed to be 'self-tasking'. This means that, in theory, it can target who it likes, when it likes.

Summary

- ◆ The military is a political institution of a very particular kind. It is distinguished by its virtual monopoly of weaponry and substantial coercive power, its high level of internal discipline and strict hierarchical organisation, a set of values and a culture separate from those of civilian society, and the perception that it embodies the national interest and so is 'above' politics.
- ◆ The central purpose of the military is to be an instrument of war that can be directed against other political societies. However, the military may also operate as a powerful interest group that influences defence and foreign policy in particular. In addition, it may help to maintain domestic order and stability when civilian mechanisms are unable or unwilling to act, and it may, in particular circumstances, displace civilian government with a form of military rule.
- ◆ Two contrasting mechanisms have been used to exert control over the military. Liberal, or 'objective', methods rely on keeping the military out of politics by ensuring that it is subordinate and accountable to civilian leaders. Protection, or 'subjective' methods, on the other hand, attempt to bind the armed forces to the civilian leadership by imbuing them with the leadership's political values and ideological goals.
- ◆ Military coups have tended to be associated with particular circumstances. The most significant of these are economic backwardness (which weakens support for the incumbent government), a loss of legitimacy on the part of existing institutions and the ruling elite, a conflict of interests or political values between military and civilian leaderships, and an international context that favours, or at least tolerates, the advent of a military regime.
- ◆ The central role of the police is to enforce criminal law and maintain civil order. The police force may nevertheless have a political character if social or other biases operate within it, if it is deployed in the event of civil unrest or political disputes, and if there is a police state in which the police force is turned into a private army that only serves the interests of the ruling elite.
- ◆ The control of the police relies on an appropriate balance between accountability and politicisation, which, in turn, depends on whether the police force is organised on a centralised or a decentralised basis. Decentralised police forces enjoy a healthy independence from central government and a high measure of local responsiveness. However, centralisation better meets the needs of national governments, and also holds out the prospect of greater administrative efficiency and increased police effectiveness.

