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**MODELS AND EXPLANATIONS FOR MILITARY ORGANISATION.
AN UPDATED RECONSIDERATION**

by

Marina Nuciari

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1. Model and explanations in the classic sociological tradition. The military in the sociological theory.

The classic approach to the consideration of the military as a social phenomenon is not different from the one applied to every other sector of social life. Classic sociology has a total and comprehensive conception of “society”, and within the classics we find general analysis of the various social institutions as considered not only in their peculiarities but mainly in their connections with the general society. The military is one of the many, and basic, institutions considered by classic sociologists according to the various sociological schools, and its features are seen as a distinct set of behaviours, rules, norms and values, coordinated around a defensive or offensive goal (or both) defined by a given society (but generally typical of every society) in their relationships with other, external, societies. The military is considered and explained within the different sociological theories, so that we have a positivistic explanation of the role of the military as a basic feature of the human society since its origins – as in Comte -, or an evolutionary consideration of the military structure as a first stage in the society evolution – as in Spencer -. Both Comte and Spencer consider the inevitable decline of the military structure and function as a consequence of the development of human society from its primitive features to its highest manifestation, the industrial society (as it was seen and intended in the XIX century).

As it happens many times with the works of the classics, many subjects are considered which will become areas of research for the posterity of sociologists who will invent military sociology. One example among many is the natural divergence between military society and civil society, manifesting itself as long as the process of development proceeds toward its accomplishment within the industrial society. This is true not only for Comte or Spencer, but especially for Tocqueville, who considers also the growing democratic consciousness as a possible solution of the dangerous separatedness of armed forces from their parent society.

In Weber a not only deeper but also a much more articulated analysis of the structure and evolution of the military can be found, where some basic concepts for description and explanation of structural features and processes are given. Concepts like discipline, obedience to formal norms, formal authority, rationale division of roles and attributes, competence and loyalty to an impersonal legitimate power, in a word, the bureaucratic ideal-type of organisation, are all tools provided by Weber in the consideration of the military as a social institution, and applied to the understanding of a general process such as rationalisation and bureaucratisation of western society.

It is not the goal of this chapter to consider the classic tradition of sociology in order to enlighten the “sources” of the military sociology of today, since a task as such has been already done in a previous chapter by Giuseppe Caforio. What it seems important to stress here is that, with a development similar to that of many other specialised fields, also the military is considered by sociologists firstly within the framework of a general conception of society, and subsequent research topics which will give birth to a military sociology can find an original link in the classic tradition of general sociology.

But to distinguish a classic tradition from a contemporary science is a too sharp division. Military sociology of today does not rely on the classics, but on a second generation of general sociologists who at a certain time in their life began to define the military social field as a peculiar environment, thus acting as “founding fathers” of this discipline. To maintain this distinction, here a “modern” sociological tradition has been defined, which it could appear to be a terminological as well as a conceptual contradiction. This new tradition begins with the possibility to do social research in the armed forces, and with the correlate possibility to define the true first lines of a theoretical framework over which to base a new and autonomous sociological discipline.

2. A modern sociological tradition. From “the military in the sociological theory” to the “social research on the armed forces”.

The contemporary stage for the study of the military by the sociological discipline begins with Second World War. It is not only a matter of historical dates, it is a question related to the entry of sociologists (among other social scientists) within the military institution with all their tools and equipment for empirical research. The development of an empirical sociology based on strict methodological support was already a reality since the publication of Lazarsfeld's work (1963). This “second foundation” of sociology as a scientific discipline means a detachment from general typologies and the search of more limited research objects, easier to be empirically measured and analysed by means of quantitative tools. Strictly related to this scientific development there is the possibility of existence of an *applied sociology*, which opens the door to a long debate over the role of sociology (better, of sociologists) within society and with regards to politics. Leaving aside the main topic, which overrides the capacity of this essay, the fact remains that the first example of sociological research empirically conducted over the military, the four volumes' *opera* “The American Soldier” (Stouffer et al., 1949) had explicit operative goals¹ (Madge, 1962), and it provided an enormous amount of empirical findings apt to be treated (and to make exercise and experience, I would say) with quantitative methods.

But these developments do not exhaust the variety of topics and “headings” under which contemporary military sociology can be distinguished. If the empirical military sociology dates from Second World War and it takes place mainly in the United States -thus giving rise to a strong prominence of American researches- , by the end of the Sixties an “European military sociology” begins to emerge. Scientific production becomes wide, and research paths differentiate according to various problematics and theoretical orientations of scholars.

In a first tentative to give a systematic arrangement to the mass of researches and studies on the military, Morris Janowitz proposed a threefold thematic distinction (Janowitz, 1979): studies dealing with the military organisation and the military profession; studies dealing with the relationships armed forces and society; and studies pertaining to conflicts and war in particular. In this essay, only the first theme in the Janowitzian distinction will be considered, in order to avoid overlapping with subsequent essays presented in the following sections of present volume; furthermore, only topics where some general theory has been developed will be considered, thus avoiding a mere inventory of research areas, more or less randomly chosen. But a more articulated distinction will be used, which permits a better description of the variety of thematic issues and a deeper discussion of proposed and applied theoretical models. For the same reasons, we need to put some time departure points, thus covering more or less the last thirty years of XX century. Thus, thematic areas have been defined, where the majority of studies can be located, even though overlapping are present and single authors could be attributed to more than one area. The areas are the following:

- a) soldiers in combat and non-combat situations;
- b) soldiers as a professional group and its changing trends;
- c) the military as a formal organisation;

These points will be systematically presented in the following pages.

3. Soldiers in combat and non-combat situations.

Under this heading we find the continuation and the development of the paths already established in the classic works of the first Janowitz, Stouffer et al., that is the development of a micro-sociology of the military, where soldiers are considered in their very position of combatants, a situation where adjustment is necessary, stress is normal, and effective performance becomes crucial. After second World War, what has been called “the American School” of military sociology finds in this field many empirical occasions to reflect over combat performance, and these occasions are given by the limited conflicts where western (but mainly American) armies are involved during the peaceful period of the cold war. Korea, Vietnam, Falklands become for the sociology of the military not only “battle fields” but also “research fields”, where theories and concepts can be repeatedly tested and developed. The key problem could be summarised by the word “combat effectiveness”, and “cohesion” becomes the related social situation to be favoured and maintained within the troops².

The first attempt to establish a theory of cohesion and effectiveness within combat troops belongs to Edward Shils and Morris Janowitz (Shils and Janowitz, 1948), with their study on German Army prisoners during World War II. An updated reading of the essay published just after the end of the conflict, in 1948, gives evidence to the fact that factors influencing combatants behaviour had been all already considered by the two sociologists, notwithstanding the emphasis given to the “discovery” of the primary group function, which has somehow obscured the relevance of many other cohesive factors. In this pioneer piece of research, the two military sociologists *ante litteram* Shils and Janowitz outlined factors influencing soldiers’ behaviour in combat and able to positively impact over their willingness to fight:

- a) The nature of group relations. In the combat unit, special relations arise among soldiers so that the individual perceive his personal security and survival’s chance as dependent on security and survival of his unit as a whole. The military group tend to substitute civilian

primary groups (such as the family), and it gains a capacity to provide soldiers with physical as well as psychological sustain, help and affection; the military primary group plays a general function of sustain for the individual, who feels attached to it and responsible for the group's fate. Positive functions of group relationships as such would have been, according to Janowitz and Shils, firstly combat stress relieving, and secondly the avoiding of the search of individual "solutions" such as escape, desertion, surrender, which would have undermined group's survival.

- b) Officers' behaviour. Qualities and skills of German officers were examined, underlining their ability to consider and take care of their soldiers as of their "children", to give importance of their well-being, and to act in order to be an example for them. The severe importance of the quality of leadership is emphasised, to trigger off and maintain group cohesion between soldiers and their immediate leader (what Etzioni defines *rank cohesion*, in order to distinguish it from the *peer cohesion* among soldier), so that both horizontal and vertical cohesion be assured within military organisation³.
- c) Organisational patterns. Recruitment and rotation system (in the case of the Whermacht, entire divisions were rotated) was structured in order to maintain group cohesion, avoiding the rupture of cohesive bonding among soldiers.
- d) Ideology in a broad sense. So-called secondary symbols were considered, such as the attachment to the nation (patriotism), political ideals (national socialism), devotion to Hitler's person. These factors, according to Janowitz and Shils, did not have a direct and autonomous impact over German soldiers' willingness to fight, but they functioned anyway until they could be linked to the effective functioning of primary groups.
- e) Discipline and military values. Of course discipline and obedience to norms were found to be relevant factors, being armed forces anyway also a coercive organisation; to this the conception of the "soldierly honour" was added, which it was not confined to officers but it

extended its importance to every soldier: “For the German, being a soldier was a more than acceptable status. It was indeed honourable”.

In the subsequent research on the same subject, cohesion is analysed in order to better enlighten the nature of primary group relationships, but it is evident the “discovery” of other factors that are, even though sometimes differently named, largely included in the Janowitz/Shils’ research. A deeper analysis of group bonding is made on American soldiers engaged in the limited conflicts following the end of the Second World War. Here another “classic” work is the anthropological research done by Roger Little on an infantry (fusiliers) unit of the U.S. Army in the Korean War⁴. In his study, based on participant observation, Little goes deeper into the analysis of buddy relationships, considered as dyadic relations between two soldiers: this special bonding between two soldiers create a reticular network of links, which is the true structure of the group. Each soldier feels affection and responsibility toward his personal buddy, but since each soldier in the unit could function as a potential buddy, then the structure of personal relationships can cover the entire group in this reticular network able to control personal behaviour and reduce combat stress.

Rightly the definition of buddyship is put under observation during the Vietnam War by Moskos in his field research on the American enlisted men in Vietnam (Moskos, 1975). The role of buddyship is in some way reduced by the explanation of that special kind of bonding as stemming more from a social contract stipulated between soldiers on a rationale basis in order to assure reciprocal survival in an extreme environment such as field battle, than as a set of feelings based on friendship, altruism and humane solidarity as it was depicted in previous studies.

But the strength of such male bonding is anyway recognised as effective in producing cohesion, so that when it is lacking cohesion is endangered. In their harsh criticism of

the American military organisation in Vietnam, Paul Savage and Richard Gabriel put in evidence the breaking of buddy relationship, caused by the individually-based enlistment and rotation system, as one of the reasons for the U.S. *débaclé*⁵.

This is by no means the only cohesive factor: all elements stressed by Shils and Janowitz are recalled by Savage and Gabriel on the one side, and by Moskos on the other. According to Savage and Gabriel, in Vietnam the US Military has suffered of a true organisational failure, being unable to keep its structure and functioning separated from, and in a certain way not permeable by, civilian society changing values and attitudes toward the military and the war. Inadequate leadership, crisis of traditional military values, group relationships' breakdown, were all factors acting against (and not in favour of) units cohesion and related combat effectiveness.

In the Moskos' study, moreover, the relevance of the ideological factor is stressed: not only a manifest *political ideology*, whose impact is relevant when an ideological orientation is really shared by soldiers (for instance in Liberation Armies or *guerrilla* units), but a more *latent ideology*, shared by a soldier as a citizen of a civil society to which he feels attached and for which he thinks fighting to be worthwhile; this was the type of ideological commitment latently present among American soldiers in Vietnam, and considered by Moskos able to "inspire" soldiers on the battlefield.

The last valuable research considering cohesion and effectiveness in combat units deployed in real combat situations can be that conducted by Nora Kinzer Stewart on British and Argentine militaries fighting the Falklands/Malvinas war in 1982 (Stewart, 1988). In this research, Stewart can draw on all the existing literature on cohesion available at that time, and in her empirical analysis she makes a precise and attentive consideration of all factors in a way or another influencing combat effectiveness. At the end of her study, a complex model is offered, where the various elements are linked together: horizontal or peer bonding (primary group relationships, buddyships), vertical bonding (rank cohesion among different ranks, officer-

NCOs-soldier), organisational bonding (relations toward the military organisation at large, military values, patriotism, military traditions and history, internal social norms and rules), and societal factors, added by Stewart as a fourth dimension. This fourth element is important in that, according to Stewart “*Societal factors which impinge on military cohesion are those of society’s attitudes towards the military, in general, or, towards a particular war, in the sense that an adequate defence budget exists for training of men, purchase of supplies and armament and staffing of military hospitals and training of officers...If the political will be absent or political strategy is incorrect, the military strategy will also suffer...*”. Thus, among societal factors we find culture, norms, values taken into the military organisation from the parent society, size of defence budget, doctrine and strategy, training, tactics, and technology affecting command-control-communication-intelligence systems, logistics, medical care and facilities.

Following to a certain extent Stewart analysis and the discussion presented by G. Harries-Jenkins in a contemporary essay⁶, and taking into consideration the literature on cohesion available until 1990, a further elaboration of a general model for cohesion and combat effectiveness has been proposed by M. Nuciari in 1990 (Nuciari, 1990). The final, and to a certain extent definite, result is an integrated model in which every factor finds its position and can be understood in its links and effects on the combat situation considered as a system.

In this model, the subject of observation is the combat unit, considered as the point where two levels of elements are able to influence unit’s cohesion. An internal level embraces the three types of bonding recalled by Stewart. This level is internal in the sense that its elements (or variables) are found directly within the military organisation, to a certain extent they are “produced” within the organisation itself. An external level embraces three other groups of variables, which belong to the parent society: cultural variables, structural variables and socio-demographic variables. The external level contains, although differently divided into cultural and structural variables, the societal factors defined by Stewart; a third group of variables is added and kept distinct, the so-called “socio-demographic variables”, where some characteristics

of the population of a given society from which military personnel is necessarily drawn are grouped (levels of education, social origin, geographic origin). The modality assumed by each variable can be positive or negative in creating and enhancing unit cohesion, and the influence of the external level is not direct but interacting with the modalities assumed by the variables forming the internal level.

The study of unit cohesion was crucial because of its not linear link with unit performance. When performance means effective combat behaviour, the understanding of factors influencing cohesion, and of the effect of cohesion on combat performance, are evidently of extreme importance for military organisation. But cohesion is important as a general factor affecting group performance, in military as well as in non-military situations. It is not surprising, then, that a strong impulse has arrived from the new operations other than war, where soldiers are not in situation as risky as that of warfigthing, but they suffer from deployment stress anyway. As it will be cleared in the following pages in this chapter, operations other than war are often characterised by high vagueness and ambiguity, boredom is often a characteristics, the sense of the mission is not always clear and it can be insufficient to motivate soldiers, and sudden or latent risk remains an unavoidable mission component. In other words, stress is part of military non-conventional deployment, for reasons which are partly the same and partly different from those affecting cohesion in combat environments.

In current times, studies on cohesion are conducted more from the side of social psychology, and within medical and psychological units and institutions more or less directly linked to military organisation. A good example of this "new season" of contributions to the "old" question of military group cohesion is given by the great amount of research conducted on American units deployed in peacekeeping operations by the medical-psychological staff of the U.S. Army Medical Research Unit-Europe in Heidelberg (Germany). In these studies in particular, the tempo factor is considered, since cohesion levels can change according to the Operation Deployment Tempo (the acronym OPTEMPO is used). As one of the last results of

this on-going research programme states⁷, cohesion generally increases over the course of a peacekeeping deployment, over four months from pre-deployment to mid-deployment, and then it decreases near the end of the deployment (which in the observed unit was six months, a rather average and common deployment tempo for peacekeeping missions), but remaining anyway higher than in pre-deployment period.

In a situation where OOTW for the military are increasing, and military forces are subject to size shrinking, the deployment tempo becomes a crucial variable affecting unit cohesion and performance. As authors of the here recalled paper end their work: “the related question of how to facilitate the rapid growth of unit cohesion, and then keep it from being lost, are more important than ever”⁸

4. Soldiers as a professional group and its changing trends.

Here the subject is not anymore the soldier at the troop level, but mainly the soldier as a professional, that is, the officer, and the career officer in particular. Of course, also in the research field treated above, officers were part of the subject since leadership and leader performance were among the factors influencing combatants' behaviours. Empirical research on troops cohesion and units effectiveness makes use of conceptual definitions about *the military leader* parallelly developed in other sectors of the discipline.

But considering now this very sector as an autonomous body of research, the leading term under which to resume theoretical and empirical production in the area of the military profession in the contemporary military sociology is *change*. Point of departure remains the Janowitzian *Professional Soldier*, with its already classic typology distinguishing between the heroic leader and the manager. Janowitz himself was aware of an ongoing change affecting

structures and processes within military institutions after the Second World War, and his reference model was in fact the *constabulary force*: that force which “*is continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force, and seeks viable international relations, rather than victory*” (Janowitz, 1960); such a kind of military is inscribed in a new technological framework where at the upper level of the conflicts continuum, development of nuclear weapons and strategic concepts of dissuasion means lead to a transformation of military professionals into controllers of a machine destined to remain inactive.

In these conditions Janowitz was aware of the fact that professional soldiers could suffer from a professional identity crisis, since “*the military tends to think of police activities as less prestigious and less honourable tasks*” , and “*in varying degree, military responsibility for combat predisposes officers toward low tolerance for the ambiguities of international politics, and leads to high concern for definitive solutions of politico-military problems*”(Janowitz, 1960, p. 420). Janowitz saw in these changes a challenge to the values typical of the traditional warrior, and of the *heroic leader* in particular, and the necessity of a balance between this role and the other defined as the *military technologist*:

“*The military technologists tend to thwart the constabulary concept because of their essential preoccupation with the upper end of the destructive continuum and their pressure to perfect weapons without regard to issues of international politics. The heroic leaders, in turn, tend to thwart the constabulary concept because of their desire to maintain conventional military doctrine and their resistance to assessing the political consequences of limited military actions which do not produce ‘victory’.*”(ibidem, p.424-425).

The role of the military managers, then, would have been, according to Janowitz, that of assuring the needed balance between these two roles, and the inevitable link with political actors.

The trend already envisaged by Janowitz in the Fifties and Sixties becomes more and more evident in the subsequent years, and the theoretical analysis over the military profession moves around the strains deriving from this role duality: the combat leader on the one side, the “**warrior**” with all its traditional set of values such as courage, hardiness, sense of duty, sacrifice and the like, vertically oriented to obedience and discipline within a hierarchical organisation, and the rational **manager** on the other, equipped with highly technological weapons and expertise, bound to costs-benefits evaluations, and horizontally oriented toward professional peers, military as well as civilians, and even outside the military institution.

The debate on the “Heroic leader vs. Manager” dilemma is recurrent, since it affects the very heart of the discussion about change in the definition of the military profession, as it has been stated in the other classic reference, contained in the Huntington’s *The Soldier and the State*. Here the subject becomes definitely centred around a recurrent question, pertaining to the nature of the job performed within military organisations.

The debate over the “military profession” had already found a steady point in the conceptualisations of Huntington and, further on, of Van Doorn, but it receives new insights from the enlargement of the discipline, since by many new scientists a contribution is given to the general topic of the changes occurring in the profession of arms in current times.

The discussion remains within these terms until the end of the Eighties, that is to say until the fall of the Berlin Wall. In the Nineties and forth, recurrent changes in the nature of the missions performed by armed forces, while fulfilling the Janowitzian “prophecy” of the constabulary force, make necessary and inevitable to rethink the military profession in the light of the Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTWs), otherwise called Peace Support Operations (PSOs). This new factual situation needs new conceptual frameworks, since the task performed by the military in the various kinds of international missions creates different problems within the armed forces that cannot be understood within conceptual tools at disposal.

This change does not lead to a theoretical break, but to an attempt to enlarge existing typologies so that new forms taken by the military profession could be included.

In order to avoid possible confusion, we can deal here separately with the two periods, by means of a terminology proposed by Charles Moskos for this very purpose (that is, distinguishing armed forces according to geostrategic changes): theories and concepts about the military profession in the Cold War (or late-modern) period, and new concepts for armed forces in the Post-Modern Period⁹.

4.1. Theories and concepts about the military profession in the late-modern period.

All contributions converge upon the term **profession** to define the kind of activity performed by those who practice the management of organised violence. The recurrent meaning of the concept is that defined within the field of the sociology of the professions, according to which an activity can be defined as a 'profession' when it embodies a number of characters such as: a theoretical and practical body of theory, a high degree of autonomy and control over the exercise of the activity, an ethic peculiar to the professional group and a sense of corporateness linking together the professional practitioners. Some other traits can be added, such as the control performed by the professional group upon the diffusion of the specialised knowledge and thus upon the access of new members to the profession. These special autonomy and control are recognised by the larger society to the professionals by virtue of the vital relevance of their functional fields for the same society. These functional fields are usually those pertinent to the so-called 'free' or 'pure' professionals, but, recalling the weberian

distinction into **autonomous** and **eteronomous** professional work, they also include some professional activities performed within a **bureaucracy**, that is a private or public organisation.

The two situations are actually very similar, the only relevant difference being that of the **independence** of the former (the free practitioner) and the **dependence** of the latter from a formal organisation. In this second case, the monopoly of the activity lays in the hands of the formal organisation, that rules practice and knowledge and it decides upon selection and recruitment of new members and upon practitioners' activities control patterns.

In formal organisations, moreover, professional roles are usually intertwined with a complex role system reflecting the functional structure of the organisation, so that the necessary integration of the professional activity lead to a strong limitation of the single professional practitioner's autonomy, discretionality and control. These limitations are counterbalanced, however, by the very fact that organisational top level is often formed by people belonging to the same professional group, as it is the case for "professional organisations" defined by Mintzberg¹⁰, and referring especially to public sector organisations (hospitals, universities, armed forces).

The above characteristics are especially pertinent to the military profession, which has historically developed within a formal organisation, the armed forces, holding the monopoly of organised violence on behalf of the parent society. All that means that in the case of military profession the typical traits of the **profession** are hardly distinguishable from those relating to the organisational position, so that organisation processes can determine kind, contents and boundaries of the military professional activity. The notion of **ascriptive professionalism**, recalled by Feld, is just underlining this peculiarity (Feld, 1977).

The impossibility to separate professional role from organisational role, already underlined as the peculiar character of the military profession, is testified by the various models build up to understand undergoing changes both in contents and forms of military activity in contemporary times: even though differences are noted among the various national situations,

all models relate to **armed forces** as an **institution** where military professionals necessarily perform their activity, and the common aim is the understanding of the degree of **convergence/divergence** existing between military organisation and civilian society.

With respect to this intrinsic antinomy, a distinction is made among the various role orientations of military professionals by many authors, in a way or in another referring to a similar point of view: the double nature of the true military professional role, stemming from its being at the same time a professional activity and an organisational status-role.

Trying to distinguish without losing the concept of “profession”, a difference is stated firstly by Arthur Larson between a “radical professionalism” and a “pragmatic professionalism” (Larson, 1977), where the first type defines a form of institutional professionalism, oriented toward a total organisation, the military, seen as inevitably isolated by civilian society because of its high functional specificity and political neutrality; it is the divergent pole of military professionalism. On the other side, the pragmatic professionalism is intended to define that type of moulding of professionalism (in the sense given to it by the sociology of the professions) and amateurism which can be found in the various forms of non-volunteer armies, where the citizen-soldier is preferred to the true professional soldier and receives his role definition from the parent society according to its needs and goals; the pragmatic professional, then, is by no means separated by the parent society, and it represents the convergent pole of military professionalism.

Twelve years later, the same terms are proposed again by David Segal (D.Segal, 1986), with a difference in meaning. Wishing to overcome the distinction between an institutional concept of the military from an occupational concept (the I/O model proposed by Charles Moskos and analysed here after), Segal defines the pragmatic professionalism as “a mixture of institutional and occupational concerns”, that is, a professional with a specific field of application but who also shares preferences and needs with civilian peers in other expertise

fields; the radical professionalism, on the other side, identifies the pure professional orientation of the officer concerned with the somewhat traditional image of the professional soldier.

A similar kind of distinction has been made some years later to explain findings from a cross-cultural empirical research on “The Present and Future of the Military Profession – Views of European Officers” (ERGOMAS, 1996). In this case the empirical content of the typology is extensively described and supported by research data: in their theoretical introduction to the presentation of the research section dealing with professional orientations of officers from eight European countries, G. Caforio and M. Nuciari define a four-types typology where the distinction between a radical and a pragmatic professionalism is proposed¹¹. The typology develops from a first distinction between professional and occupational orientations showed by surveyed officers. As authors state:

“Officers with a professional orientation stress factors which in their job are more linked to specifically military competence and to responsibilities related to the sense of service to the community (...) In this type, professional satisfaction is chosen for its intrinsic value, and for this reason highly evaluated as a goal in itself. On the contrary, occupationally oriented officers give more importance to mainly instrumental factors, such as salary or job security, or even general working conditions. These two orientations do not result, however, in two opposite poles only, since they are not mutually exclusive but coexistent (...). The typology can thus provide four types, where the professional and the occupational types are the two “pure” types.”¹²

To the two pure types, two hybrid types are added: officers who are *indifferent* both toward professional and occupational positions, and officers who have both professional and occupational characteristics; this last type has been called *pragmatic professionalism*, in order to distinguish it from the *radical professionalism* of the pure type. In the research where the typology was applied, pragmatic professionals were present in six out of eight surveyed country (in former-Czechoslovakia 34%, in Greece 26%, in Italy 20%, in France 19%, in UK 18% and

in Germany 16%), while radical professionals were majoritarian everywhere but in Greece and in former-Czechoslovakia, where occupational and pragmatic professional respectively were prominent¹³.

The results of this research were first published in 1994, and they relied on empirical findings collected in a time-span of more than one year, covering the end of 1991 to the end of 1992. To a certain extent, it could be said that it closes a research season where typologies for the military profession were intended to explore situations and changes occurred within the period that Moskos has named late-modern, rightly to distinguish it from what it would have happened just after, as a consequence of the end of bi-polarism. As we are going to see in the following paragraph, the new post-modern period is characterised, at a theoretical level, by a research trying to define brand new types of professional officer (and professional soldier in general), those pertaining to soldiers dealing with operations other than war to a much higher extent than before.

Wishing to give a general picture of research on the military profession in the late-modern period, we could say that the common core of all researches related to these models seems to lay in the generalised perception of an on-going decline in relevance, legitimacy and prestige accorded by contemporary affluent society to military profession, which can be defined as 'role crisis' or as 'deprofessionalisation' or as 'occupationalisation' of military profession. This process of change is also signalled by a change in value orientations of military professionals, who seem to be turning from reference patterns based on the assumption of definite responsibilities in favour of the community (the defence of the common good) at the expenses of the individual good, to individualistic patterns grounded on career and job security, like every other occupation; this change can be defined as a shifting from an institutional/professional orientation to an occupational/bureaucratic orientation.

A possible progressive **deprofessionalization** of military profession was seen by Cathy Downes in the dilution of its specific content into a number of contents and knowledge which

are not specific to the military, and, moreover, which have been 'invaded' by civilian 'military experts' (Downes, 1985); and even the attempt on the part of military organisations to become acquainted with these new abilities has led to the creation of 'internal' experts in non-military matters (that is to say, military professionals expert in political, administrative and financial fields) who run the risk, however, of becoming -and of perceiving themselves to have become - soldiers who have abandoned their own peculiar profession, with related outputs of confusion and ambiguity concerning professional identity.

4.2. New concepts for the military profession in the Post-Modern Period.

The end of bi-polar world gives new inputs also to military sociology, posing new questions and asking for adequate answers not always already given by existing theory. As it often happens, reality goes further and "the strength of things" imposes at a certain extent to renew subjects and explicative paradigms. As far as the field of the military profession is concerned, the repeated and increasing experience of non conventional missions, for armed forces of many countries all around the world, means a true challenge for the definition itself of the profession of arms. As Reed and Segal note for the US military forces: "*In 1993, for the first time, Army doctrine began to reflect the changing nature of military missions. Field manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, the Army basic field manual for doctrine, explicitly included a section on 'Operations Other Than War' (OOTW), which includes peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance missions – missions that Janowitz would regard as constabulary. At the same time, the Army began teaching the new doctrine to its junior and senior leaders in the officer basic courses and the senior-level staff schools and colleges.*" (Red and D.Secal, 2000, p. 60). One year later, in 1994, British military doctrine began to rely on what it was called "the

Dobbie's doctrine", explained by C. Dobbie in an essay where an attempt was made to distinguish among different types of new missions (traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement), which because of this diversity would have need drastic differences in military personnel's training systems (Dobbie, 1994). A further discussion about the Dobbie's doctrine has led C. Dandeker and J. Gow to define the type of *strategic peacekeeping* as an intermediate type of mission, thus giving further evidence to the complex and multifunctional nature of the new missions (Dandeker and Gow, 1997).

In rather all essays and contributions dealing with the new missions performed by military organisations a recall is made to new training and education needs, even though not always this topic is adequately or extensively discussed. The need for something different in knowledge and ability is felt as far as officers' education is concerned, for junior as well as for senior officers, for non-commissioned officers down to the lower levels of the command chain, emphasising the concept of bottom-up initiative and relative autonomy of lower hierarchical levels. When educational contents and behavioural guiding principles are in discussion, a reassessment of a professional field is working. When both ethics and competence are at stake, then something relevant is changing – or it has already changed - for a professional group.

Thus, what it seemed to be similar to a crises of the military profession it has turned into a new frame of reference, a different set of factors to be handled out in order to rethink the profession of arms. This new paradigm under which to consider the military role, and the professional military role in particular, has given rise to a new type of soldier, whose nature is going to receive a definite assessment within military sociological theory: the military peacekeeper.

4.2.1. From the Heroic Leader/Manager officer to the Warrior/Peacekeeper officer.

The new type is not “new”. As it happens many times, precursors can be found, and previous assessments of “new” problems are already at disposal. In 1976, Charles Moskos, in its *Peace Soldiers: The Sociology of a United Nations Military Force*, presented his findings of an inquiry over attitudes and behaviours of the various national contingents serving in the United National peacekeeping forces in Cyprus (the UNFICYP) (Moskos, 1976). In this pioneer research, Moskos explored attitudes toward change from soldiering to peacekeeping by means of interviews to officers and soldiers from Great Britain, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland and Sweden, receiving from them the judgement that military professionalism was adequate also to the new tasks requested by peacekeeping missions. This is the frame where the statement “Peacekeeping is not a soldier’s job, but only a soldier can do it” shifted from “oral tradition” to written form. To that, Moskos added that “middle powers” officers could better adjust to the constabulary ethic, which he had defined previously as based on two core principles: *absolute minimal force* and *impartiality* (Moskos, 1975).

But after that, the adequacy of military professionals to peacekeeping and other new missions has been submitted to many and highly diverse challenges, not last among them those coming from some side-effects of OOTW: peacekeeping multiple deployments’ consequences on officers’ and soldiers’ careers, and peacekeeping deployments’ training and duties effects on combat readiness. The question was not, and it is not right now, whether the new officer should become a peacekeeper, thus definitely abandoning the Heroic leader pattern, but whether the new officer could be able to include the peacekeeper role within the range of professional tasks requested by the international geo-political situation. Even though it has been taken for granted that only soldiers can do peacekeeping, time and experience have shown that peacekeeping is not simply one task among the many assigned to the professional soldier of today. The emphasis given to appropriate training and attitudes’ development by social scientists in more

recent times is the demonstration that new missions have caused an unavoidable change in the ideal-type of the professional officer (and of the professional soldier in general as well!).

An empirical science as it continues to be, sociology, and military sociology in particular, draws **from** reality its objects of study, and draws **on** reality to find plausible explanations for events and phenomena. Thus, a general theory of the “officer as a peacekeeper” is far from been definitely assessed, but a wide range of empirical research is anyway at disposal, where empirical typologies and variables’ lists are defined and employed.

There is a general agreement on some of the characters that peacekeeper should have, and a certain “conventionality” in addressing to similar references and literature when explaining one’s findings and concepts. The starting point is normally the “constabulary concept” given by Janowitz, which is by no means considered out-of-date. Reed and Segal, in one of their last researches published in the 2000, make explicit reference to it, underlining the fact that, according to Janowitz, “...with transforming the military profession into a constabulary force...the modern professional soldier must be able to maintain an effective balance among a number of different roles, and to do this, must develop more of the skills and orientations common to civilian managers” (Red and D.Segal, 2000, p. 58).

The problem of preparing military personnel was depicted by Janowitz as the necessity to include in the career pattern “more extensive general competence from its military managers and more intensive scientific specialisation from its military technologists” (Janowitz, 1960, p. 425). And Reed and Segal add that “*the prescribed career of the future should be one that sensitizes the professional soldier to the political and social consequences of military action and provides the military professional with a broad, strategic perspective of the entire range of the military spectrum. Under the constabulary model, the requirement for the military professional to be well-versed in political-military affairs is critical*” (Red and D.Segal, 2000, p. 59).

When considering researches exploring attitudes toward OOTWS, it is evident that the “peacekeeping culture” has gained, or it is gaining, a definite status, not only in societies (western and westernised societies, I should say) and in the armed forces, but within military sociology as well. Thus, we already have general typologies where definitions of soldiers as peacekeepers are offered, and we can count over empirical researches where possible strains and contradictions between the *culture of the warrior* and the *culture of the peacekeeper* become evident, or they are overcome, or simply juxtaposed and summed up¹⁴. While dichotomies seem to be largely overlapping, different terms are used, because each typology is actually more an empirical than a theoretical model, having been constructed on the basis of specific empirical findings.

And furthermore, typologies apply mainly to soldiers in general, since empirical research is normally bound to explore behaviours and orientations among deployed units at the troop level. Empirical distinctions are present in the sense that rank is one of the control (independent) variables used for data cross-tabulations, but officers in themselves are not considered as a research target, with an exception about which an account will be given hereafter.

Attitudes toward peacekeeping are measured by means of various indicators, expressed as items of questionnaires where a certain comparability, and even re-iteration of the same instrument, is assured. Just to give some examples of surveys aiming at defining to various extent behaviours and orientations typical of military personnel deployed in OOTW, we can make reference here firstly to the here above cited survey on the effects of multiple deployments on U.S. soldiers, presented by Reed and Segal.

In this research, authors derive the constabulary ethic from the Moskos’ work on UN peacekeepers, and variables are intended to measure the positive/negative attitudes of American soldiers with multiple deployments. Questionnaire’s items are grouped into four categories, and

each of them can be considered the empirical expression of a trait of the constabulary (or peacekeeping) ethic:

1. Impartiality and reduced Use of Force (the typical constabulary aspects);
2. Appropriateness of Alternative Personnel Resources (peacekeeping is/is not a soldier's job);
3. Unit Appropriateness and Career Enhancement (attitudes toward the specific peacekeeper role with respect to other more traditional soldiers' tasks);
4. Agreement/Disagreement on Providing Humanitarian Relief as a task for US Army (the idea of the protective attitude of the military peacekeeper).

The aim of this survey was to analyse not simply soldiers' attitudes toward peacekeeping operations, but also the impact of multiple deployment on these attitudes, soldiers' morale and reenlistment intentions. It is interesting for our purpose here to stress that the military peacekeeper is to a certain extent "typified" according to four dimensions, taken or adapted from previous literature on the subject.

Another attempt to distinguish a "peacekeeper" type of soldier by means of empirical findings has been done very recently in a cross-cultural expert-survey where samples of officers from nine countries, with various experience of OOTW, have been asked to evaluate their preparedness for non traditional missions, difficulties encountered and adjustment, stress and job satisfaction derived from these deployments¹⁵. In a chapter, dealing with difficulties and adjustment of officers in their relationships with various actors and agencies active in the many and different deployment's theatres, I have made an attempt to demonstrate, on the basis of empirical findings, two hypotheses internally related: the first proposition indicates a relationship according to which military culture (better, the conception of military professional beard on by officers) in the various national units involved in OOTW has an influence, among other aspects, on the ability of officers (in this specific case) to cope with commitments and

expectations coming from a complex and often uncertain role set, composed by the many and various non military actors present on the operation theatre.

Also in this case, an empirical typology has been drawn from data coming from a questionnaire: a distinction has been made between *Warriors* and *Peacekeepers*, built from questions already used in defining the “good officer” ideal-type in a previous comparative research (Caforio and Nuciari, 1994b), corrected by the introduction of elements taken from this specific questionnaire. The hypothesis is that officers showing a professional orientation more inclined toward the type of the “warrior”, or more inclined toward the type of the “peacekeeper”, have different reactions to the variety of expectations coming from their role set in MOOTW theatres; in particular, “warriors” could find more difficulties in managing with diversity and environment turbulence (many different actors, uncertainty of end-states, mandate ambiguities and the like...), while “peacekeepers” could feel more at ease with flexibility and cooperative non-hierarchical relationships.

The typology is formed by three types: the *Warrior*, the *Peacekeeper*, and a mixed type provisionally called *In-Between* (but that it could be named the Flexible); it has been defined by assuming that each of the two “pure” types can be indicated by the choice of a certain mix of attributes pertaining to the “good officer” pattern (Fig. 3): for the “warrior” type, typical attributes are discipline, action readiness, decisiveness, leadership, obedience, patriotism, readiness to make sacrifices, ability to undergo physical stress, loyalty to the civil power, and a rather negative attitude toward MOOTW, considering them as not “a normal job” for a soldier; for the “peacekeeper” type, typical attributes are: empathy, expertise, cooperativeness, open-mindedness, determination, general education, sense of responsibility, sociability (ability to easily make friends), mental strength, and a positive attitude toward MOOTW, considered as normal part of a soldier’s job. The third type, defined as the “In-Between” officer, is not simply a mid-way pattern, and it should not be considered as a transitional figure: it is on the contrary

Fig. 1. The Typology Warrior / Peacekeeper¹⁶.

WARRIOR *	PEACEKEEPER **
Discipline	Determination
To be fit for action	Empathy
Decisiveness	Expertise
Leadership	Ability to easily make friends
Obedience	Cooperativeness
Ability to undergo physical stress	Mental strength
Patriotism	General education
Readiness to make sacrifices	Open-mindedness
Loyalty to the civil power	Taking responsibility
OOTW are NOT a natural part of the military's role	OOTW are a natural part of the military's role

the empirical evidence of that “flexible” type of soldier who has to cope with a job that “it is not a soldiers’ job, but only a soldier can do it”.

In our sample, peacekeepers override warriors (38% against 24% of warriors), and another 38% can be classified as “In-between”. Countries where peacekeepers are the majority are Hungary, Sweden, Poland and France, and the minimum is among officers from USA, South Africa and Italy; Bulgaria and Russia (37%) are slightly under the sample average.

To a certain extent, these findings go in the same directions as in other researches, at least for cases where a comparison is possible. This means also that we can rely upon the plausibility of our typology.

Looking at the total sample, the distinctiveness given by the typology is rather sharp, and according to country we can see cases where an In-between (Bulgaria, Russia, South Africa and

Hungary) or a Peacekeeper outlook (Italy) seems to be more adequate in reducing, if not difficulties as such, at least their perception as problems. In the other four countries, anyway, the winning strategy seems to be that of the warrior (France, Poland, Sweden and USA). To a certain extent, it seems that the better pattern be the "In-between" type of officer, who is not someone in the middle, unable to decide what to do or what to be, but a professional able to combine different qualities, some of them pertaining to the warrior model, some other to the peacekeeper model, in order to adapt his/her performance to the uncertain and variable requests coming from a turbulent environment as the OOTW theatre often it happens to be. Our first hypothesis can be considered confirmed, in that the type of military culture is able to influence the military/civilians relationships in the expected sense: officers declaring less difficulties with civilians are mainly those with an In-between or a peacekeeper outlook.

But a question remains: is there a chance that the Warrior or Peacekeeper outlook be influenced by the very experience of these unconventional missions? Can we speak of an adaptive process, or better of a learning process, so that, even though mission exposure does not really affect the ability to cope with different actors in the theatre, it anyway affects the shift from a warfighter mind to that of a true peacekeeper? This was the content of our second hypothesis. From findings there is evidence that Length of deployment and Variety of Missions experience are able to influence at least the cultural framework of officers: a shifting from the Warrior outlook to the In-between to the Peacekeeper type seems to go along the same direction of an increased and prolonged experience of Operations other than war, indicating to a certain extent the adjustment of officers to a new definition of their professional role.

The relationship between the kind and the time of deployment with the cultural pattern of officers in our sample seems to go in the expected direction, while in a rather tortuous way: experience acquired in MOOTW is able to affect the military ideal-type, giving room to more flexible and adaptive patterns in the definition of the "good" officer.

How useful, and to what extent, are the above findings for the very pragmatic question of education and training of officers for operations other than war? According to our data, we can say that military culture affects the ability to cope with an uncertain and differentiated theatre where many different actors are present, especially when they are civilians; we can say also that military culture is affected by the mix of experience acquired by officers, and it is pushed to go in a direction where a mixed, flexible, or definitely "peacekeeper" pattern is prevailing. An educational path adequate to the non conventional operative theatres should then be oriented to reinforce these attitudes, reducing without eliminating the warrior-like attitudes: the outcome should be a kind of officer able to refer to more than one pattern, to use more than one code system, so that he or she could understand and behave in an adequate way within the highly uncertain and somewhat ambiguous environments where MOOTW are "usually" performed.

5. The military as a formal organisation.

As already stated above, in the case of military profession, organisational processes can determine kind, contents and boundaries of the military professional activity, so that typical traits of the profession are hardly distinguishable from those relating to organisational position. It is not by chance then, that since the Sixties the organisational approach to armed forces develops, particularly in the United States, following theories and results stemming from research conducted in civilian formal organisations such as firms, hospitals, public bureaucracies and the like... Here the sociological tradition can be found in the continuities from *The American Soldier*, in its overall consideration of the military institution about which Edward Shils – whose contribution to research plans and implementation had been anyway relevant – said not to be considered as the mere accidental juxtaposition of thousands of

primary groups, nor regulating its functioning, as Janowitz stated, according to soldiers' preferences¹⁷, as well as in the Janowitzian theory of the convergence of military institutions with large civilian organisations. The organisational approach to armed forces is evidently nurtured by the development of organisational sociology, which follows to the progressive lessening of the Human Relations School. Organisational sociology stresses the relevance of factors conditioning motivations and behaviours, which seem to follow specific organisational rationalities, relatively independent from individual wills and manifest goals.

This approach can be considered as the most relevant and fruitful, also because of its capacity to include and integrate results stemming from research oriented to other areas, such as those here mentioned at point 4. Also in this case the distinction used above can be applied, dividing theories and models developed in the late-modern period and typologies set up for the understanding of the post-modern period.

5.1. Theories and models for the military organisation in the late-modern period.

5.1.1. The Institution/Occupation model.

The obligatory starting point is the Institution/Occupation (the well-known I/O) model proposed for the first time in 1977 by Charles C. Moskos (Moskos, 1977a). In this model a set of polarised empirical indicators is identified, ranging from an Institutional to an Occupational format of military organisation. Two **ideal types** of armed forces are defined, that can be considered to some extent as mutually exclusive, at least in the first proposal; after a great amount of discussion, even severe critics, and empirically research conducted in many different military organisations, the model has been re-proposed by Moskos himself with a new

interpretation, considering the possibility of a “pluralist” military without a zero-sum game effect between the two polar models, in the sense that institutional and occupational traits can co-exist within a given military force, shaping differently among services, branches and echelons¹⁸.

The I/O model variables list is well known. Here a version is referred to in a somewhat different sequence, and considering anyway the last version proposed in 1986 (Figure 1).

Moskos calls “institutional” a military “...legitimated in terms of values and norms: that is, a purpose transcending individual self-interest in favour of a presumed higher good” (Moskos, 1986, p. 381), and presenting the below reported “institutional” modalities as far as roles, behaviours and relationships with parent society are concerned. This is mainly the traditional image of the military, here intended as a whole, including all ranks, thus avoiding the concept of “military professionalism” as limited to the officers corps. At the other side the “occupational” modalities can be found, where the main legitimacy source is the marketplace economy, and “supply and demand rather than normative considerations are paramount...The occupational model implies a priority of self-interest rather than the interest of the employing organisation” (Moskos, 1986, p. 379). Peculiarities are evident and shape the military “as any other job”.

Since its first presentation in 1977, the I/O model has been so frequently considered, applied, tested and criticised that it has become more a classic frame of reference for conceptual definition than a ready-to-use set of indicators that can be used to measure the shift from one format to the other, as it was initially done. Moskos himself, taking into consideration the huge amount of research inspired by the I/O model, proposed an updating of the two ideal-types, underlining its capacity “to allows us to move beyond the institutional versus occupational dichotomy to examine the different degrees of institutional and occupational aspects and see where they are in opposition to each other and where they are manifest jointly. Such a dynamic

approach comprehends not merely an either-or situation, but a shifting constellation of institutional and occupational features in armed forces” (Moskos, 1986, p. 382).

In the I/O model, modalities assumed by each variable are concurrent in the determination of the whole nature of military organisation, so that a specific military organisation could be put in an institutional/occupational **continuum** depending on the modality assumed by each variable.

Fig 2. Military Social Organisation: Institutional vs. Occupational*.

VARIABLE	INSTITUTIONAL	OCCUPATIONAL
1. Legitimacy	Normative value	Marketplace economy
2. Role commitments	Diffuse	Specific
3. Basis of compensation	Rank and seniority	Skill level and manpower
4. Mode of compensation	Much in non-cash form or deferred	Salary and bonuses
5. Level of compensation	Decompressed, low recruit pay	Compressed, high recruit pay
6. Evaluation of performance	Holistic and qualitative	Segmental and quantitative
7. Legal system	Military justice	Civilian jurisprudence
8. Reference group	Vertical, within organisation	Horizontal, external to organisation
9. Societal regard	Esteem based on notion of service	Prestige based on level of compensation
10. Post-service status	Veteran’s benefits and preference	Same as civilian
11. Residence	Adjacency of work and residence locales	Separation of work and residence locales
12. Spouse	Integrated with military community	Removed from military community

*Note: from Ch. C. Moskos, **Institutional /Occupational Trends in Armed Forces: An Update**, "Armed Forces and Society", 12, No. 3, Spring 1986, 377-82.

These variables, however, do not have the same nature and the same **specific weight** to determine the position of a specific military organisation at a given point of the **continuum**. As Moskos himself underlines: "...military systems are differently shaped, depending upon a country's civil-military history, military traditions, and geopolitical positions. Moreover, I/O modalities will interface in different ways even within the same national military system. There will be differences between military services and between branches within them. I/O modalities may also vary along internal distinctions, such as those between officers, non-commissioned officers, and lower ranks; between draftees and volunteers; and so on." (Moskos, 1986, p. 381).

These variables, in fact, could be divided into **outer variables** and **inner variables** with respect to military system, in that some of them are linked to the type of society and are dependent upon the dominating cultural patterns and their change, while some other are peculiar to the military organisation and linked to cultural and organisational patterns typical of military institutions. We could generally refer to the former as **cultural**, and as **subcultural** the latter. Cultural variables such as *Legitimacy* and *Societal regard* are 'outer' in that their place of definition is the civil society and its institutionalised value patterns; structural variables such as *Basis, Mode and Level of compensation, Evaluation of performance, Legal system and Post-service status* are 'inner' in that they define performance rules, but they are anyway influenced by general norms of social regulation, so that they could be considered as 'boundary' subcultural variables; psycho-social variables such as *Role commitment* and *Reference group* are the 'inmost' subcultural variables, in that they are strongly influenced by peculiar military subcultural patterns; daylylife variables such as *Residence* and *Spouse Integration*, lastly, come directly from military subcultural patterns, which traditionally shape a strongly integrated community exercising wide-ranging control over members' activities and demanding obedience to community norms.

If we consider the I/O model as a kind of cybernetic model, acting diachronically, we could imagine a range of situations assigning I or O values to each variable, starting from the basic assumption that general society cultural patterns have an influence on military organisation inner patterns, so that a change in the former would cause a tension and a readjustment in the latter. Thus, a shifting from I to O modalities in var. 1 and 9 could cause tensions on 'peripheral' or 'boundary' variables [nos. 3,4,5,6,7, and 10] forcing the institution to assume O modalities. Such a change means a noticeable situational change for the members of the organisation, who may suffer from the role identity inconsistency deriving from the contradiction between diffuse role commitment [I] and vertical reference group [I] and the new 'O-shaped' situation. The reaction could follow two different paths of re-adjustment: a) assuming O modalities in role commitment and reference group [specific and horizontal respectively], followed, as a consequence, by the re-adjustment of daylylife variables [residence separated from workplace and spouse removed from military community]; or b) resisting change and trying to come back to I modalities in vars. 3,4,5,6,7 and 10 [what it can cause internal conflicts among roles and ranks, owing the different advantages/disadvantages distribution coming from the shifting from I to O and any reverse movement], until the inconsistency between O patterns in cultural variables and I patterns in subcultural variables becomes a problem. This possibility is mentioned by Moskos when he says that "... There may even be trends toward 'reinstitutionalizing' the military, either across the board or in specific units" (Moskos, 1986, p. 381).

The applicability of the I/O model has been tested in a wide range of empirical researches in many different military organisations all around the world, so that it has become a tool to measure not only the shift from one asset to another, rather a measure of the relative presence of organisational traits belonging to the institutional and/or the occupational pole in military forces of current times.

With regard to the Janowitzian theory of the convergence between military and civilian organisations, the Moskos model is rather critical: if the fully institutional military is problematic because of its radical divergence from civil society, nevertheless its occupational side, if fully realised, bears strong risks of inadequacy and ineffectiveness for the specific function assigned to the military. As a consequence, the unavoidable specificity of the military organisation is reaffirmed, at least in some of its subsystems, whose maintenance of some institutional divergence from civil society is crucial for the very functional purpose assigned by the same civil society to armed forces.

To conclude with the examination of this model, its application could be adequate also to changes occurred in the postmodern period, since these are changes in the definition of the spheres of critical relevance for the collectivity, which means a change in the legitimacy basis of different roles and in their social prestige as well. A change as such means a new pattern of legitimacy given to the military organisation, based not only on its conventional purpose but also (and sometimes even more) on its “new” tasks. The new type of professional soldier, the “peacekeeper”, opens to a partial ‘reconstruction’ of the role pattern, on the basis of different tasks contents, values and norms, both traditional and new, according to which Institutional and Occupational variables can be applied. And this is what it has been proposed by Moskos himself with a new typological framework, about which we shall discuss later in this paper.

5.1.2. Armed forces as a two-subsystems organisation. The career strategies interactionist model.

With partly different factors, another model to explain structure and processes within military organisations is proposed in the same time period. It is worthwhile to mention it here, since for a number of years it has remained parallel to but relatively unknown with respect to the I/O

model, notwithstanding its capacity to explain rightly the coexistence of the two patterns which Moskos had called as Institutional vs. Occupational.

Proposed by a French sociologist, and officer as well, Jean-Paul Hubert Thomas, this model is known as the **four strategies model**. Here two analytical levels are present, the micro level, the actor, and the macro level, the system [the military organisation]. The two levels are considered in their interaction, seen as a strategic interaction between actor and system where both can define and redefine their intentions on the basis of a limited rationality linked to specific definite goals. The synchronic approach offered by Thomas¹⁹ and confronted with the Moskos model by B. Boene²⁰ (1984), makes possible to consider **the different contents** defining military roles as the discriminative variable of **two different rationalities** within military organisations, linked to the different **kinds of goals** pursued.

The micro observation point is the individual and its career strategy, and the typology applies to those who enter the institution as volunteer servants at various levels and specialities. Briefly, four career strategies are defined, that means four ideal types: a] an **institutional strategy**, with longlasting or lifetime career, low task transferability to civilian life, inner reference group, dominating traditional military values and norms; b] an **individual or industrial strategy**, with brief service in view of a second civilian career, high task transferability, outer reference group, dominating individualistic values; c] a **communitarian or initiatory strategy**, with the choice of membership in small, exclusive and demanding communities such as commandos, parachuting, flying combat aircraft, marines, reference group restricted to the community, values and norms are those of the community's unwritten code; d] an **unstable or non-existent strategy**, with brief-term and erratic career orientation, no definite reference group or stable values.

To the above four strategies, empirically tested on a large NCOs sample, Boene affirms that a fifth type could be added, defined as **professional strategy**, with a strong initial and longlasting career involvement, high role commitment, ethical code based on the idea of service in favour of the

collectivity, high level of expectations in terms of self-realisation and moral rewards; this fifth type could apply to the professional officer, thus making the model applicable to the whole military organisation.

The four or five strategies have varying degrees of congruence with the articulation of the system, considered at the second analytical level. Military organisation as a system is articulated into two subsystems with different rationalities: a **combat-oriented subsystem** and a **technical/administrative subsystem**. Both can be considered as two different types of conflicting logic of collective behaviour, operating simultaneously within military institution. The two subsystems have different functional goals, so that the combat-oriented subsystem is led by an essentially **ethical rationality** [even if combined with some instrumental logic], mainly turned to mission accomplishment without costs calculus, a kind of absolute thinking, an emphasis on the military uniqueness and on the officer/warrior, authoritarian organisational control styles, emphasis on rank and seniority. The technical/administrative subsystem is on the contrary entirely ruled by an **instrumental rationality**, turned to the optimisation of the primary task (that is the goal of the first subsystem). Legitimacy criterion is efficiency, negotiation and technical labour division prevail, hierarchical authority is tempered by collaborative outlook, innovation and out-referred orientation shape a role identity based on the pattern of the technician and of the manager.

The interaction between actor and system produces consistencies and inconsistencies depending on the type of strategy and subsystem: institutional and communitarian strategies are consistent and prevailing with the combat-oriented subsystem, while industrial strategy is more congruent with the other subsystem. The relationship could be reversed by saying that where an instrumental logic prevails, industrial strategies are considered more remunerative, while when the ethical logic is prevailing institutional strategies have higher consideration. The two rationalities are not anyway mutually exclusive, since both subsystems answer to different functional imperatives of the whole military system.

The professional strategy could be consistent with both subsystems: a lifetime career orientation, an ethical basis of role commitment are not in contrast with the logic of the combat-oriented subsystem, while specific and high knowledge and skill, professional peers-referred orientation, emphasis on efficiency and performance optimisation are characteristics peculiar to the professional orientation which are coherent with the instrumental logic of the technical/administrative subsystem.

What can be drawn from this model is, to conclude, the possibility of different individual behaviours interacting with the articulation of the military system, the prevailing of the one over the other being strictly dependent on the relative importance achieved by the rationality of one or the other subsystem at a given time.

5.2. Models of military organisations for the post-cold war era. From the Modern to the Postmodern military.

The end of bi-polar world, by adding new levels of complexity to the international arena, has given a new impulse to military sociologists in order to find some general trends and definitions adequate to understand changes occurring in military organisations as consequences of global situation following the fall of Berlin Wall.

In 1992, in a Workshop on Sociocultural Designs for the Future Army at the University of Maryland, Charles Moskos proposed for the first time a list of variables aiming to distinguish three time periods within this “brief century” (in the words of Eric Hobsbawn). These periods, or phases, were named then “Early Cold War”, “Late Cold War”, and “Post-Cold War”, and were a first systematic tentative to clarify the changes undergoing in the American military organisation²¹. In a later version, published in 1994, Moskos presented a new list, where the periodisation has changed names, not simply because of a nominalistic choice, but because a somewhat different frame of reference was adopted to distinguish changes in the armed forces (Moskos and Burk, 1994). Military variables taken under observation were less than in the first version: the perceived threat, the structure of force, the orientation of the public opinion toward the military, the impact on defence budget, the main organisational tensions, the dominant military professional pattern, the number of civilian employees, the women’s role in the military, the role of military spouse within the military community, the position of homosexuals in the military, the mode of treating conscientious objection. The distinction into three periods, respectively named Early Modern (corresponding to the first version Pre-Cold War), Late Modern (Cold War), and Postmodern (Post-Cold War), is now determined by the choice to consider undergoing changes in military institutions under a historical perspective. Moskos & Burk address the topic in this way:

“Students of military history have never embraced the stereotypical view that modern military organisation is a rigid, hierarchical, and unchanging bureaucracy... The history of modern military organisation is a history of flux. The critical problem for historians and social scientists and for policy makers is to discern the underlying patterns of change and their significance for defining the military social’s role, and evaluating its capacity for fighting wars.” (Moskos and Burk, 1994, p. 141).

In order to ascertain these patterns of change, authors continue by stressing the fact that no explanation is possible by means of a unique cause, so that many factors of different nature should be taken into consideration under a systemic perspective:

“For this purpose, we undertake a systemic institutional analysis, a perspective that tries to account for the organisational importance of long-term historical developments”(Moskos and Burk, 1994, p. 141-142).

Taking Harold Lasswell’s “garrison state” model as a reference, Moskos and Burk intend to identify critical periods of transition in military organisation, in order to understand *“whether now is another similar period of transition and, if so, what is the new idea of military organisation and purpose”* (Moskos and Burk, 1994, p. 142). And they continue:

“Our working hypothesis is that we are indeed in a period of transition away from the ‘modern’ mass army, characteristic of the age of nationalism, to a ‘postmodern’ military, adapted to a newly forming world-system in which nationalism is constrained by the rise of global social organisations. Much of our analysis will consist of a comparison of these two types of military organisations along a variety of dimensions” (Moskos and Burk, 1994, p. 142).

These dimensions are defined in order to give evidence to the main phenomena affecting armed forces in current times, which can be considered both as “new” and as “occurring under different forms” with respect to the past. Changes in military organisation are seen as affected (if

not simply ‘determined’) by changes in social organisation, so that specific type of military organisations could be distinguished according to specific historical periods.

Moskos and Burk “posit three type of relations between the military and society”. The first, called the *modern type*, defines the situation as it was since the end of eighteenth century to the end of the Second World War, that is, the social organisation corresponding to the birth and consolidation of the Nation-State; the mass army was the corresponding military organisation in all that period. The second type of military-society relation is named *postmodern*, it emerges in present days, after 1989, and it is considered to “persist into the indefinite future”; its corresponding military organisation is exactly the topic under discussion, considered not fully realised. The third type is added to better enlighten the transition from the modern to the postmodern type, and it is called *late modern type*, dating from the end of World War II to early 1990. Authors are aware that their proposal is drawn from historical experience of Western world -and of United States in particular I would add- so they try to keep patterns’ dimensions in a form suitable for cross-cultural application.

In this version, the eleven variables under exam and their modalities in each of the three types of military-society relations are presented in the following Figure 3.

A slightly different and, in my knowledge, last version of this model has been published in the 2000 in a volume whose goal was rightly the cross-cultural application of the model itself. In this renewed version, variables are always eleven, but some have disappeared while some other have been added (Moskos and al., 2000). The evaluation of the impact on Defence budget and Organisational tension are no more considered, but a Major Mission Definition and a Media relations variables have been entered. In the following Figure, the last version is presented, and the two old variables are added at the end in italics.

Fig. 3 . Armed Forces and Postmodern Society (Moskos, Williams, Segal, p. 15).

Armed Forces Variables	Early Modern (Pre-Cold War) 1900-1945	Late Modern (Cold War) 1945-1990	Postmodern (Post-Cold War) Since 1990
Perceived Threat	Enemy Invasion	Nuclear War	Subnational (e.g. Ethnic violence, terrorism)
Force Structure	Mass army	Large professional army	Small professional army
Major Mission Definition	Defence of homeland	Support of alliance	New Missions (e.g., Peacekeeping, Humanitarian)
Dominant Military Professional	Combat Leader	Manager or Technician	Soldier-statesmen; soldier-scholar
Public Attitude toward Military	Supportive	Ambivalent	<i>Skeptical or Apathetic</i> Indifferent
Media relations	Incorporated	Manipulated	Courted
Civilian Employees	Minor component	Medium component	Major component
Women's role	Separate corps or excluded	Partial integration	Full integration
Spouse and Military Community	Integral part	Partial	Removed
Homosexuals in the Military	Punished	Discharged	Accepted
Conscientious Objection	Limited or prohibited	Permitted on routine basis	Subsumed under civilian Service
Impact on Defense Budget	<i>Positive</i>	<i>Neutral</i>	<i>Negative</i>
Organisational Tension	<i>Service Roles</i>	<i>Budget fights</i>	<i>New Missions</i>

Moskos defines this typology as developmental:

“A developmental construct posits an ideal-type at some point by which past and present trends can be identified and appraised. The Postmodern military is a developmental construct based on the observation of the past. What is presented is a model, not a prophecy, and may help explain what has happened and predict what is likely to happen.” ²²

Looking at the variables contained in the model, they are of different nature, and pertain to the military organisation and to the civil society as well. The model, actually, is bound to give evidence not of the changes within one single actor (the military on the one side, or the society on the other), but of the changes in the system formed by armed forces and society, that is in the special set of relationships binding a society with its military. We could say then, that some variables pertain to the society, in the sense that society is the place where their modalities are shaped, and some other pertain to the military, in the sense that the military is the place where their modalities are shaped.

Variables **pertaining to the society** are the following:

- **the nature of the perceived threat**, shaped by cultural values and orientations and by the relative position of the national society in the international context;
- **the force structure**, conscription or AVF and force size are decided in the society;
- **the major mission definition**, is partly derived from the perceived threat, and it is culturally legitimated by the parent society;
- **the public attitude toward the military**, comes evidently from the societal values and orientations toward military organisation and military affairs.
- **Conscientious objection** depends on cultural values of the society and on formal norms ruling the phenomenon.

Variables **pertaining to the military** are the following:

- **the dominant military professional**, while determined by societal variables, it is anyway constructed within the military organisation;
- **the media relations**, are defined within the military as far as means and rules are concerned;

- **the number of civilian employees** depends on the *make or buy* strategy chosen by armed forces to cope with budgetary restriction and rationalisation of resource allocation.

The remaining variables (women's role, spouse position in the military and homosexuals' acceptance) are to my opinion strongly dependent on changes in the society, but changes in their modalities must cope more than other aspects with structural as well as cultural patterns shaping the military organisation. This is the reason why I would consider these variables as **pertaining both to the society and to the military**.

The application of this model to a variety of national *society & military systems* have made clear its usefulness at a comparative level, since situations are very different in the various western countries where the model has been applied. The impact of specific historic and cultural factors is evident in the different stages at which each variable is found in the investigated countries²³. Even though some general trends are evident, such as the postmodern nature of the perceived threat, the major mission firmly and increasingly defined by operations other than war, the structure of force shifting from conscription (the mass army of the Modern type) to the professional military on a voluntary basis, the acceptance of conscientious objection to military service or the entry of women as soldiers, there is a differentiated situation in many countries. Modern as well as Late modern coexist with Postmodern characters, and this is the demonstration that the process of change has a discontinuous nature. The set of variables of the Postmodern set shapes the future, or at least one possible (and plausible) future, but this is not a unilinear path.

The fact that many among the countries where the model was tested show an apparent contradiction in the co-existence of characters belonging to the three periods means that the three military and society systems are not mutually exclusive nor sequentially determined: each modality assumed by each variable is influenced by history and culture on the one side, and by the choices of

decision-makers at any level on the other. But the coexistence of a number of traits belonging to the same pattern is an evidence of the fact that some variables are internally linked and conditioning each other: a certain perception of threat is logically (and also empirically) related to the force structure and to the major mission of a given military institution, and induce changes in the dominant military professional and also in the civilian employees component. Other variables are not necessarily linked, such as the position of spouse, attitudes of publics toward the military, or the acceptance of homosexuals, and can vary greatly among countries where the other characters become similar.

The model has anyway a good descriptive capacity, and it permits to keep under control a number of elements giving to each of them a clear definition; on the side of cross-cultural studies, it has proved its usefulness for the comparison of different military and society systems, a thing of great importance in a time frame where globalisation, far from homologue societies, cultures and -consequently- armed forces, creates new needs for a greater ability to cooperate among diversities for shared goals.

FOOTNOTES

¹ S. Stouffer et al, 1949. For comments on the background of this research project see J. Madge, *The Origins of Scientific Sociology*, New York, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962.

² Studies on cohesion and morale cover a very huge amount of literature, and the topic is a major concern more for social psychology and psychiatry applied to the military than for military sociology. In this chapter, only the main studies which can be defined as pertaining to a sociological domain have been recalled, and among them only those who could be considered as key essays, either because proposing theoretical innovation or advancement, either because of their “state-of-the-art” studies purpose.

³ A. Etzioni, *A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organisations*, Revised and enlarged edition, The Free Press, New York, 1975.

⁴ Roger W. Little, *Buddy Relations and Combat Soldier Performance*, in M. Janowitz (ed.), *The New Military*, Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 1964, pp. 195-224.

⁵ Paul L. Savage and Richard A. Gabriel, “Cohesion and Disintegration in the American Army: An Alternative Perspective”, *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 2, 1976, pp. 340-376.

⁶ G. Harries-Jenkins, *Cohesion and Morale in the Military: The Regimental System*, ISA RC No. 01 Interim Meeting, Munich, 1988, published in an Italian translation in M. Nuciari, *Efficienza e Forze Armate*, Angeli, Milano, 1990.

⁷ Paul T. Bartone and Amy B. Adler, “Cohesion Over Time in a Peacekeeping Medical task Force”, *Military Psychology*, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2001, pp.85-107.

⁸ Ibid. p. 105.

⁹ For these definitions, treated also here in further paragraphs, see Charles C. Moskos, J. A. Williams and D.R. Segal, *Armed Forces after the Cold War*, in Moskos, Williams, Segal (eds.), *The Postmodern Military. Armed Forces after the Cold War*, New York, Oxford U.P., 2000, pp. 1-13.

¹⁰ Henry Mintzberg, *The structuring of organisations*, Prentice-Hall, 1979

¹¹ The first publication of this research's results is in *Current Sociology*, Vol, 42, N. 3, Winter 1994 (G. Caforio ed., *The Military Profession in Europe*). The typology is discussed in G. Caforio & M. Nuciari, "The Officer Profession: Ideal-Type", *Current Sociology*, cit. pp. 33-56.

¹² G. Caforio & M. Nuciari, "The Officer Profession: Ideal-Type", cit. p. 34.

¹³ Ibidem, p. 37.

¹⁴We mention here only the most interesting contributions to the development of a "military peacekeeper" theory.

Segal D. R., Harris J., Rothberg J.M., Marlowe D.H., 1984. Segal D. R. and Meeker, B. F., 1985c. Miller L. and Moskos C.C, 1995. Segal D. R., 1996a. Battistelli, F.1997. Segal, D. R., Reed B. and Rohall D. E., 1998. On Italian units deployments see Ammendola, T., (ed.), 1999. Reed B. J. and Segal D. R., 2000.

¹⁵ Research results, published in the volume titled *The Flexible Officer: Professional Preparation and Military Operations Other Than War*, (G. Caforio editor), are forthcoming. A presentation of some results was made by some of the authors in a panel on the same subject at the IUS Biennial International Conference in Baltimore (Ma), October 19-21, 2001.

¹⁶ In the three-types typology, Warriors are those selecting 4 or 5 items from the "warrior list" and "NO" in the last cell; Peacekeepers are those selecting 4 or 5 items from the "peacekeeper list" and "YES" in the last cell. The third type, In-Between or "Flexible", is formed by those selecting 3 items on the one and 2 items on the other list (and the opposite), and "YES" or "NO" in the last cell.

¹⁷ Edward Shils, *The American Soldier and Primary Groups*, in R.K. Merton and P. Lazarsfeld (eds.), *Continuities in Social Research: Studies in the Scope and Method of "The American Soldier"*, Glencoe, The Free Press, 1950, p. 19; Morris Janowitz, *Sociology and the Military Establishment*, Sage, 1959, p. 26.

¹⁸ C. C. Moskos, *The Emergent Military: Institutional, Occupational or Plural?*, Italian translation in “Forarmes”, 1, n. 1, 1985, pp. 67-89. Critics and redefinitions of the I/O model are presented in M. Nuciari, *Instituciòn vs. Ocupaciòn: discusiòn, y tentativa de adaptaciòn del modelo I/O a las fuerzas militares italianas*, “Iztapalapa”, 5, 10/11, 1984, pp. 75-80; M. Nuciari, *Professione militare e modelli interpretativi. Alcune note di discussione*, “Forarmes”, 1, n. 1, 1985; D. R. Segal, *Measuring the Institutional/Occupational Change Thesis*, “Armed Forces and Society”, 12, n. 13, Spring 1986, pp. 351-376.

¹⁹ Jean-Pierre Thomas, “Fonction militaire et système d’hommes”, *Stratégiques*, Vol. 12, No. 8, pp. 18-41; see also Jean-Pierre Thomas and C. Rosenzweig, “French NCO’s career Strategies and Attitudes”, *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 8, No. 4, 1982, pp. 275-301.

²⁰ Bernard Boene, “The Moskos and Thomas Models Contrasted”, in J. Kuhlmann (ed.), *Military and Society: The European Experience*, SOWI-Forum Serie, 1984, pp. 35-66. See also on the same subject M. Nuciari *Professione militare e modelli interpretativi. Alcune note di discussione*, “Forarmes”, 1, n. 1, 1985.

²¹ Charles C. Moskos, *Armed Forces in the post-Cold War era with special reference to the United States Army*, Paper presented at the Workshop on Sociocultural Designs for the Future Army, University of Maryland, College Park, March 1992.

²² Charles C. Moskos, *Toward a Postmodern Military: The United States as a Paradigm*, in Moskos, Williams and Segal, 2000, p. 14.

²³ Country studies comprised in the volume are: United States, United Kingdom, France, The Netherlands, Denmark, Italy, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Switzerland, Israel, South Africa.