

IDS Working Paper 172

**Co-producing citizen security: the Citizen-Police Liaison
Committee in Karachi**

Mohammad O. Masud

October 2002

INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
Brighton, Sussex BN1 9RE
ENGLAND

Summary

Beginning in 1989, the Citizen Police Liaison Committee (CPLC) has become an important component of policing in Karachi, the largest city in Pakistan. Rooted in the business community, and dependent largely on private donations and on the volunteer labour of business people, it has taken on core police intelligence functions. The CPLC works very closely with the police, and focuses on improving police performance through supportive engagement with their work. It has established a number of crime databases that are used operationally by the police, and manages them on a day-to-day basis. The organisation conducts crime analysis, plays an important role in the investigation of kidnappings, and provides a range of police-related services directly to poor and rich alike. With offices in police stations and its headquarters in the office of the Governor of Sindh Province, the CPLC has become deeply integrated into the apparatus of government.

The CPLC is an example of the kind of “hybrid” arrangement for the provision of public services that, we are beginning to realise, may be widespread where there has been a breakdown of conventional governance arrangements. This we term *co-production*: the provision of public services through an institutionalised, long term relationship between state agencies and organised groups of citizens, where both make substantial resource contributions. Unconstrained by conventional assumptions about how public services “ought” to be provided, the paper addresses the following questions. How did a substantially “private” organisation like the CPLC come to play such a large role in the performance of a core government function like policing? What strategies have its leaders pursued to protect this role in a politically very unstable environment? How have they ensured the continuing integrity of their organisation and its members in the face of temptations to abuse their influence?

Contents

	Summary	iii
	Acknowledgements	vi
1	Introduction	1
2	Context: policing and insecurity in Karachi	2
	2.1 Crime and police in Karachi	2
	2.2 The political context of policing	3
	2.3 The involvement of the Federal Government and the business community	4
3	The CPLC: origins and organisation	5
	3.1 Origins	5
	3.2 Functions	6
	3.3 Changes in roles	8
	3.4 The structure of the CPLC	9
	3.5 Membership	10
	3.6 Funding	11
4	The impact of the CPLC on policing in Karachi	12
	4.1 Problem identification and solution	12
	4.2 Improving police procedures	14
	4.3 Improving the economics of investigation	14
	4.4 Improving the monitoring of law enforcement on the ground	15
	4.5 Setting standards	16
	4.6 Putting accountability mechanisms in place	16
	4.7 Providing access to justice for the poor	16
5	Explaining the CPLC-police partnership	17
	5.1 Incentives for the police to cooperate with the CPLC	18
	5.2 Building trust	20
	5.3 An enabling legal framework	22
	5.4 Organisational structure, membership and culture	22
	5.5 The support of provincial governors and the federal government	24
	5.6 Office location	25
	5.7 The excluded elite	26
	5.8 The support of the business community	26
	5.9 Overlapping law enforcement authorities	26
	5.10 Putting it all together	27
6	What is the CPLC? Contracting out, community policing, and co-production	27
	References	30

Acknowledgements

The research for this paper was undertaken while the author was enrolled for a Masters Degree in Governance and Development at the University of Sussex. The Centre for the Study of the Future State, based at IDS, supported the field research.

He wishes to acknowledge the cooperation of Mr. Mohammad Javed Masud, Cabinet Secretary, Government of Pakistan without whose assistance it would not have been possible to conduct the research in time. Mr. Afzal Ali Shigri former Inspector General of Police, Province of Sindh currently Director National Police Research Bureau Islamabad and Mr. Jameel Yousaf, Chief of the Citizen Police Liaison Committee, Karachi were critical resource persons in providing insights into the working of CPLC and police in Karachi. Mr. Azhar Hassan Nadeem, Deputy Inspector General (Hq), Punjab and Mr Asad Jahinger Capital City Police Officer, Karachi helped in understanding the problems of policing at the operational level.

Finally many field officers of Karachi police and members of CPLC willingly shared their experiences and gave their precious time.

At the Institute of Development Studies my supervisor Dr Anuradha Joshi and Professor Mick Moore were a constant source of help and encouragement and provided crucial advice and suggestions in the final revision of the paper

Special thanks to Tanya my wife who cheered me up in the long hours of writing and editing.

1 Introduction

This paper examines how an organisation of citizens assists in the core function of law enforcement in Karachi by collecting, processing and analysing crime data for the police. The Citizen Police Liaison Committee (CPLC) has employed the latest information technology to provide these vital services. Starting from the computerisation of vehicle crime data in 1992, the CPLC has moved on to computerise the entire crime data of the city along with the complete prison records of the province, Sindh, in which it is located. More recently, the CPLC has started performing spatial crime analysis for the police. The name of the organisation might suggest a temporary arrangement that is limited to a few instances of police-citizen cooperation. It is however a relatively large organisation working on a 24 hour basis and engaging almost all levels of police officers. Police and other law enforcing agencies now rely upon CPLC resources and expertise in detection of serious crimes like kidnappings for ransom and vehicle crime. The CPLC does not restrict itself to providing critical information to combating these crimes. In some cases its members and volunteers are directly and personally involved in actual police operations.

The CPLC describes itself as a non-political statutory institution, operationally independent, managed by volunteers and offering its services through the police to all citizens irrespective of caste, creed, status or wealth. But how can an organisation with a very small and limited membership, comprising mostly of business persons, stay non-political and operationally independent, and claim to be non-discriminatory in a city which is riven with ethnic, political and economic divisions? One might expect the narrowness of its representation to lead to limited management capacity and possible cooption by traditional power holders or political factions. The CPLC has managed to avoid these pitfalls and at the same time built a productive relationship with a powerful state agency, the police, which is reputed to be politicised, inefficient and corrupt. How did this citizen organisation grow to become an integral part of the law enforcement regime in Karachi? This achievement is all the more remarkable because the services that CPLC is actually performing have not been explicitly delegated or contracted out to it by the state. This is not a case of conventional “contracting out”. In fact, the financial dependence of the CPLC on the government is limited and has been declining. Any investigation into the causes of the origins and sustenance of police-CPLC cooperation should go well beyond any economic notion of “public-private partnerships”.

This paper focuses on the factors that sustain this partnership in spite of changes in government and police administration in a politically volatile city. Section 2 provides the context, including a brief background on the law and order problems faced by the police in Karachi, and a sketch of the political context of policing. The situation has generated a negative perception of the police among the citizens, and helps explain the growing involvement in law and order of two agencies that previously remained on the sidelines, i.e. the business community and the federal government. In Section 3 I explain in some detail what the CPLC is: its origin and history; how it evolved from an oversight body to a crime fighting organisation; and its structure, functions, membership and funding. Section 4 deals with the impact of the CPLC on police performance and accountability in Karachi. Section 5 is an attempt to explain why the partnership between the CPLC and the Karachi police has been long lasting and successful. Finally, in

Section 6 I deal with the question of how we characterise the CPLC. What kind of organisation is this, and how does it relate to government? It contains some elements of familiar organisational models and relationships – Neighbourhood Watch committees, police oversight bodies, the contracting out of public service, and community policing. But those elements are slight. CPLC does not fit into any familiar categories. We can best begin to understand it in terms of the notion of co-production. It is part of a family of co-production organisations, which do not conform to most norms for the organisation of public services in poor countries, but nevertheless sometimes do an impressive job in very difficult circumstances.

2 Context: policing and insecurity in Karachi

2.1 Crime and police in Karachi

Karachi, with a population of 14 million people, is the largest city in Pakistan. It is the commercial capital. It is also the chief city of Sindh province. The law and order problem in Karachi has both political and criminal dimensions. In the last 17 years there have been a number of ethnically motivated terrorism incidents. A major cause was the inability of *Mobajirs* – Urdu speaking immigrants who came to Pakistan from India at the time of independence – to secure a share in power at the level of the province despite the fact that they form a majority of Karachi's population. *Sindhis* belonging to the interior of Sindh Province have dominated provincial government. This acute polarisation eventually led to organised gang warfare between radical elements of the *Mobajir* community and other ethnic groups living in Karachi. In 1995 alone there were 1742 terrorist killings in the city. Proliferation of sophisticated weapons, narcotics and illegal immigrants as a fall out of war in Afghanistan provided fertile ground for organised criminals to flourish, conduct ethnic killings and promote their own interests at the same time. The presence of organised criminals led to a boom in mafias engaged in manipulating land records and in drug peddling, which directly affected the poor and middle class citizens. It also contributed to a rash of kidnappings for ransom and to vehicle crime.

In 2001 Karachi recorded 24,246 incidents of crime against persons and property. This figure included 565 cases of murder, 788 cases of house robbery, 1192 cases of burglary and 927 cases of car theft among others.¹ In addition there were 493 cases of rioting. The total police force of Karachi is about 18,000 against the sanctioned strength of 28,000. The government does not have funds for additional recruitment. Pakistan is a federal state. Law and order is a provincial responsibility. Control of the police lies with the provincial government, which is headed by the Chief Minister. Unlike in many metropolitan cities, there is no independent police force for Karachi.

The crimes listed above do not include the international terrorism incidents that have occurred during the past few years. These have absorbed more scarce police resources. To bolster security in Karachi, the federal government has deployed the Rangers, a paramilitary force under its direct control.

¹ The figures are from the Central Police Office, Karachi.

Presently there are 23,000 Rangers in Karachi. They outnumber the police. Their duties are limited to patrolling and providing security in sensitive areas of the city. Frequent rioting also requires deployment of police on anti-riot patrols. The top management of the police force is over-stretched. Constables comprise 88 per cent of the police force,² and a large number of low ranking officers, including Assistant Sub-Inspectors, have been recruited on political grounds.

Operational police work is performed from 96 Police Stations located all around the city. The Police Station is the only police body that is mentioned in the Criminal Procedure code. The officer in charge of the Police Station, who has the rank of Inspector, is known as the Station House Officer (SHO). Police Station staff are expected to perform all police duties, including patrolling, criminal investigations and any other emergency tasks. The SHOs report to the five Superintendents of Police (SPs) who head the five police districts of Karachi. The SP is responsible for the performance evaluation of SHOs and has the power to transfer them and initiate disciplinary proceedings against them. The Police Stations and SPs offices are the two key offices around which the operations of police in Karachi and Pakistan revolve. They are public offices and citizens have frequent contacts with them. All other superior offices in the police hierarchy are primarily supervisory in nature. Despite their operational importance, neither Police Stations nor SPs offices are given an independent budget. They are allocated funds on a quarterly basis from the provincial budget allocation for the police made by the Home Department of the province.

The working and living conditions for SHOs and subordinate officers are very poor. According to Karachi's police chief, 45 police stations are housed in buildings that are not designed as police stations and have been forcibly occupied by the police. Only 5 per cent of police officers in Karachi are provided with subsidised government accommodation.³

2.2 The political context of policing

Beside Mohajirs, who are the largest ethnic group in Karachi, there are large groups of *Punjabis*,⁴ *Pathans*⁵ and *Sindhis* settled in Karachi, as well as many small minorities. Historically the police have been recruited from *Punjabis* and *Pathans*. The better-educated *Mohajirs* generally aspired to other jobs with better pay, and anyway remain a minority in the police because of ethnic recruitment quotas. When serious ethnic violence began in Karachi in 1986, the composition of the police force became one of its biggest handicaps. It was perceived to be dominated by one ethnic group (Shigri 1991: 219).

Politicians view the police as an instrument of political control and a source of patronage. Police jobs are considered to be an important lever for local politicians to secure political support. The ability to transfer SHOs and SPs according to their liking establishes the power of the local politicians over their opponents. Over time a patron-client relationship develops and the police force becomes an instrument of political harassment. The practice has become so common that the police in Pakistan are referred to as

² Report of Focal Group on Police Reforms (2000), Government of Pakistan, pp.36

³ Interview with Mr. Asad Jahangir Capital City Police Officer, 13/07/02, Karachi.

⁴ Settlers from Punjab province.

⁵ Settlers from North Western Frontier province.

“politicised”. Politicisation is more acute when the provincial government is a coalition or possesses a narrow majority in the legislature. It is most irksome for senior police officials who have to defend the performance of their department in the press to counter the allegation of politicisation. The senior officers believe that the use of the police force to harass and terrorise political opponents through illegal means has deprived it of its moral credibility in the face of crime (Shigri 1991: 236).

In the last 13 years there have been six changes of government in the province of Sindh. Different political parties have come to power on very thin majorities. Traditionally, *Sindhi*-dominated parties have held control of the provincial government and through it the police, contributing further to ethnic polarisation. Every change of government has brought about a spate of politically motivated transfers in the police force. Police officers in Karachi find it very difficult to escape the tag of being politically or ethnically biased and to claim neutrality. The current policy debate over police reforms emphasises the need for “depoliticisation” (Report of the Focal Group on Police Reforms 2000: 2).

The combination of scarce resources,⁶ organised crime and politicisation has contributed to an image of a police force that is inefficient, unaccountable and corrupt. The rich and middle classes believe that the police have failed in law enforcement. The poor view it as an instrument of harassment answerable only to its patrons. This produces distrust and non-cooperation with the police. In defence of the police it should be said that the problems they face are not entirely of their own making. Land mafias flourished because of the corruption of officials responsible for land records. The police often became involved in land disputes under political pressure. Similarly, the proliferation of arms and narcotics was due to the failure of other law enforcement agencies to prevent smuggling across the Afghan border.

2.3 The involvement of the Federal Government and the business community

The federal government and the local business community have not historically been much involved in law enforcement in Karachi. The dangerous combination of political violence and organised crime in the later 1980s and 1990s changed this. Both the federal government and the local business community have a strong interest in the economic prosperity of the city. Karachi contributes 60 per cent of the total revenue collection of the federal government. The peak of violence and insecurity came in the mid 1990s. It typically revolved around ethnic killings of *Mohajirs*, and subsequent protest strikes organised by the *Mohajir* political party, the *Mohajir Quami Movement* (MQM). The Karachi Chamber of Commerce and Industry calculated that a working day lost to a city-wide strike cost the city \$38 million. In 1994 a total of 34 working days were lost to strike action (Moonis 1996: 1035). Although strikes were directly economic and political, the business community noted the connections with the security situation. Kidnappings for ransom became widespread, and were mostly targeted at the business community. In 1990 there were 79 cases of kidnapping for ransom in the city (CPLC figures). The 1990s also saw a big increase in incidents of car theft and car snatching, from 2033 in 1992 to 2652 in 1998.

⁶ The Access to Justice Programme of the Asian Development Bank recently reported the average police station in Pakistan has an annual recurrent budget, additional to staff costs, of only 8,000 Rupees (US\$120).

In 1995, industry largely ground to a halt because of the combination of ethnic violence and strikes. Frustrated at the inability of the government to provide security, the Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry of Pakistan threatened to stop payment of taxes under the slogan “No Peace, No Taxes”, and to withhold advertising from government-owned newspapers and television (Nadeem 2002: 127). Although the threat never materialised, it raised the situation in Karachi to the top of the federal government’s agenda. The federal government promised the business community that it would take action. The Rangers, a paramilitary force under the federal government, were posted to Karachi in much larger numbers in 1995. The federal Home Ministry began to monitor the security situation in Karachi on a day to day basis. In 1996 the Prime Minister visited the CPLC office and offered more funding to expand their activities. In 1999 the federal government took the extreme action of imposing direct federal rule on the province under the emergency provisions of the constitution.

3 The CPLC: origins and organisation

This section examines in some detail how CPLC was set up and identifies some of the salient characteristics of its functions, structure, membership and funding. It supports the analysis of factors behind the successful partnership with the police discussed in Section 5, and helps explain how the CPLC differs from more conventional models of community policing (Section 6). I briefly describe some key events in CPLC’s history that were important in establishing its credibility and in expanding its mandate from modest beginnings in 1989.

3.1 Origins

The Governor of Sindh Province, Mr Fahkruddin G. Ibrahim, conceived the idea of *Thana* (Police Station) Committees in 1989 to bridge the gap between citizens and the police. The primary aim was to restore citizens’ trust in the police. His inspiration came partly from the idea of “neighbourhood watch committees”, established in the UK and elsewhere, where volunteers act as conduits for information between police and ordinary citizens. Mr. Ibrahim expected more than this: active groups of concerned citizens who would take the time to develop an understanding of the police and help make the police more responsive to the citizens. As a first step the Governor arranged, through an ordinary administrative order, the setting up of separate Citizen Police Liaison Committees in four police stations of the city. Three were in affluent localities and one in an industrial area. The Governor took a personal interest in nominating citizens for membership of these committees. Almost all members belonged to the business community. These committees had a close interaction with their local police stations and begun to understand the resource and management constraints under which the police operated. Being well to do and respected citizens, the CPLC members personally were able to provide or raise money and other resources to improve the working conditions in their police stations and serve as a bridge between the

community and the police.⁷ In a short period there was remarkable improvement in the relationship between the local community and the local police.

The Governor realised that sustaining these committees in a politically unstable environment required their immediate institutionalisation to prevent them from being smothered by any future government. CPLC members were unaware of police laws. The Provincial Law Secretary played a crucial role in nesting the CPLC within the existing legal framework. He ingeniously incorporated the CPLC by making a single page amendment to the Police Rules. To this day, Amended Rule 1.21A provides the legal framework for the interaction of the CPLC with the police. Pressure from the Governor insured that the provincial legislature ratified the amendment in 1990. The Governor then took the unusual step of setting up a CPLC Central Reporting Cell (CRC) in the premises of the official Governor's residence to demonstrate his personal support and help empower CPLC members. The CRC was given a broad mandate of overseeing the function of any CPLC in the entire province. The CRC is run by CPLC members and staff and not by government officials.

These steps tied in the future of CPLC with the office of the Governor. Subsequent Governors have always supported CPLC and helped to strengthen it. In 1993 another Governor, Mehmood Haroon allowed the CPLC to work at the district level and allowed setting up of District Reporting Cells (DRCs) in all the five districts of Karachi. These DRCs reported to the CRC at the Governor's residence. In 1996, the CPLC was given a charter by Governor Kamal Azfar that provided a stronger legal status and a permanent board of governors to oversee its affairs. The charter is yet to be approved by the Home Department of the provincial government.

3.2 Functions

The functions of CPLC are key to understanding the organisation and the factors which contribute to its success. Its actual functions differ from its officially prescribed functions. I first list its officially prescribed functions and then explain the true situation.

The amended Rule 1.21 of the Police Rules 1934⁸ assigned the following functions to the CPLC:

- 1 To satisfy that First Information Reports (FIRs) on crime are duly registered and no FIR is refused illegally. (The FIR is an important element in criminal procedure in Pakistan. Essentially it sets the criminal justice system in motion. Any citizen who is a victim or witness to a criminal offence has the right to lodge a FIR with the nearest Police Station for the police to investigate the offence. Investigation of all serious offences requires a FIR.)
- 2 To find out if dilatory tactics are being adopted by the police officers in investigating cases.
- 3 To collect statistics of various kinds of criminal cases registered and disposed of during a specified period.

⁷ This included, for example, providing furniture and water supplies and repairing and decorating police stations and police living quarters.

⁸ Government of Sindh Notification V111(3)SOJ/90 dated 15/04/90.

- 4 To check if all the registers in a Police Station are being properly and regularly maintained.
- 5 To insure that no person is unlawfully detained at any Police Station.
- 6 To assist the Police in preserving peace and assist in detection and prevention of crime.
- 7 To report any misconduct or neglect of duty on part of any police officer.
- 8 To perform such other functions as may be assigned by the Government.

These formal functions are largely of an “oversight” nature. In practice, the CPLC has focused on improving the shortcomings of the police as a law enforcement and public service agency by providing critical inputs in law enforcement. It has often consciously refrained from exercising its formal powers of oversight for fear of jeopardising its close working relationship with the police. It has in practice concentrated on supporting operational policing in four main roles:

(i) Information collection

The CPLC manages online computer databases ranging from a record of registered and stolen vehicles in Karachi to a comprehensive and up-to-date register of all criminal cases recorded in all police stations of Karachi from 1990. It also maintains a database of all convicted and under-trial prisoners in Karachi and Sindh province, including an optical imaging and storage system for their photographs. All these databases are connected online to CPLC’s District Reporting Cells located in the offices of the Superintendent of Police of each district.

(ii) Information analysis

The CPLC is not only a storehouse of information but also provides valuable crime information analysis to the police helping it to do more proactive planning and make better use of its scarce assets. Using its various databases, CPLC generates a monthly crime analysis for police and other law enforcement agencies that indicates the frequency of different crimes in different police stations and districts of Karachi. These reports seek to identify patterns of crimes like car theft and kidnappings. The CPLC has managed to link its crime database to a geographic information system that superimposes crime incidents over a digitised map of the city’s districts and individual police stations. This allows the CPLC to perform spatial crime analysis and generate maps showing “hot spots” of various crimes. Once this information is viewed against the pattern of deployment of police resources on the digitised map, it provides a powerful visual and analytical tool for the police manager to try to prevent crime before it happens. The crime information on the map is updated on a daily basis.

(iii) Direct participation in police operations

Unlike in conventional community policing operations, CPLC members and staff play an active role in crime operations, especially against kidnappers and extortionists. The police accept the CPLC’s expertise

in these operations, especially in hostage negotiation and tracking down phone and cellular communications.⁹ It is common practice for the police to ask for CPLC assistance in kidnapping cases.¹⁰

(iv) Assistance to citizens

The role of the police in law enforcement is not only catching criminals but providing assistance to citizens in ordinary tasks, like registering First Information Reports, providing information on recovery of stolen vehicles, and helping to identify suspects. Citizens are discouraged from approaching the police due to police attitudes, inaccessibility or simple lack of trust in the police. The working of CPLC offices resemble that of a citizen-managed police station, with around the clock operation. Here the aggrieved citizen finds friendly staff, easy registration of First Information Reports, information on stolen property and facilities for making computerised sketches of criminal suspects. The CPLC offices also lodge citizens' complaints in cases of refusal to register a First Information Report or harassment by police officers. There are many other citizens' problems which fall in a no-man's-land somewhere between civil litigation and crime: money disputes, landlord-tenant disputes, land grabbing and domestic disputes, etc. CPLC members assist in resolution of these issues, thus lessening the workload on the police.

The pattern of CPLC activities differs widely from its notified functions. In practice it has focused more on some of these formal functions and ignored others. For example, members never visit police stations or check police registers. The CPLC has become more involved in providing policing services than in monitoring the police force. Let us look briefly at some key events and external interventions that led to this evolution of its role.

3.3 Changes in roles

The army was the first public agency to actively use CPLC. This occurred in 1990. The army had been called into Karachi as an emergency measure to stop the wave of kidnappings. Army teams started using CPLC members, initially for liaison purposes, and later in actual operations against kidnappers. There were spillover effects: some CPLC members became quite expert in investigating kidnappings.¹¹ This expertise helped prompt the police to use them more widely.

The entry of the CPLC into computerised data management was not envisaged when it was set up. CPLC initially lobbied the provincial Excise and Taxation Department, which holds motor vehicle registration records, to computerise its records so that the police could easily verify whether or not a particular vehicle was stolen, and thus curb vehicle theft. The government agreed to the computerisation, and in 1992 CPLC was provided a parallel online terminal and allowed to download data on a daily basis

⁹ The CPLC has identified the location of all public call offices in Karachi on the digitised map. It maintains a database of all phone and cellular numbers with the owner's name and location. The Telephone Department and private cell phone operators provide the information.

¹⁰ Interview, Mr. Afzal Shigri, former Inspector General of Police, National Police Research Bureau, Islamabad, 01/07/02.

¹¹ Up to 2000 the CPLC had handled 234 cases of kidnapping, solved 190 and apprehended 75 gangs. The highest number of cases – 75 – were in 1990 (Yousaf : CPLC Concept Paper and Guide).

to assist the police in quick verification of the status of vehicles outside the office hours of the Excise and Taxation Department. In 1995 the main server in the motor vehicle registration office mysteriously burnt down, with no back-up in place. It was CPLC's server and data that not only allowed registration of motor vehicles to continue but provided police with 24 hour information access for more than a year until the Excise and Taxation Department set up their system again.

Impressed by CPLC's performance in the area of vehicle crime while visiting the organisation, the Prime Minister decided to entrust it with the task setting up a crime record management system for Karachi police, and partially to fund the project. This cooperation between the federal government and the CPLC in turn insured the cooperation of the provincial government and bureaucracy. The provincial bureaucracy found it difficult to turn down CPLC because the federal government had a stake in the project. Other key federal government departments like the Telephone Department were willing to provide non-exchange lines for this network. Because the CPLC had been allowed to collect crime statistics under its original mandate, this move towards setting up a crime record management system did not encounter any problems of access to information. Similarly, the Economic Affairs Division of the federal government allowed the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) to provide technical expertise to CPLC in setting up a spatial crime analysis system. In short there was a gradual build up of data processing capability that eventually became CPLC's comparative advantage in law enforcement.

3.4 The structure of the CPLC

The CPLC essentially has a simple two tier structure. The first tier comprises the Central Reporting Cell (CRC), that oversees the working of the District Reporting Cells (DRCs) attached to each district of the city. The CRC is the hub of all information. This is where all the main servers are installed. The CRC is supervised by the Chief of the CPLC (a CPLC member) and in his absence by the Deputy Chief (also a CPLC member). They are supported by a staff of 18 CPLC employees working in two shifts for 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. The staff includes Controllers, Deputy Controllers, Data Processing Officers and Computer Operators. In addition to these employees, police officers of the rank Sub-Inspector and Assistant Sub-Inspector are manning the shifts in all CPLC offices. One of them acts as a Police Complaint Officer and is legally empowered to register a First Information Report (FIR) if any police station has refused to register one, and to handle any other complaints relating to the police. This person is answerable to the CPLC official in charge of his shift – a Controller or Deputy Controller. The second police officer is a Police Radio Operator, whose function is to keep the CPLC plugged in to all police communications taking place on the radio and to maintain a proper record off all messages that are relayed over it. This officer reports to the Police Communication Control and the CPLC Controller or Deputy Controller in charge.

In the second tier there are 5 District Reporting Cells (DRCs) located in the offices of every district Superintendent of Police of Karachi. The DRCs have three main functions. The first is to collect all crime information in their respective districts and pass it to CRC for collection and analysis. Crime data are collected through police stations, the office of the Superintendent of Police and reports from citizens. The

second function is to liaise with local police officials and the third is to provide assistance to citizens who are victims of crime. The DRCs are provided with computer terminals connected on line to the CRC.

Every DRC has a Chief and Deputy Chief, who are members of the CPLC, and seven CPLC members attached to it to oversee the work and liaise with the citizens and the police. The District Chief is expected to liaise with the Superintendent of Police of the district while other members are expected to liaise with lower level police officers and Station House Officers in charge of local police stations. It is up to the members how they distribute their liaison work, but they are not supposed to communicate with the Superintendent of Police without going through their District Chief. Similarly, District Chiefs are not supposed to liaise directly with the Inspector General of Police or the Home Secretary as that is the function of the Chief of CPLC. This hierarchy of communication is tightly enforced within the CPLC structure.

DRCs are organised like CRCs. Each has a staff of 12 persons working in two shifts for 16 hours a day, 365 days a year: a Controller, Deputy Controllers, Police Complaint Officers, Radio Operators and Telephone Operators. DRCs are located within the premises of the office of the Superintendent of Police of every district.

While the basic organisational structure of the CPLC is two tier and geographical, there are additional elements. Almost all the members of the CPLC, with the exception of the Chief and the Deputy Chief, are attached to specialised projects on which CPLC is currently working. For example Mr. Hanif Moosa currently is the member in charge of a project reporting on and analysing stolen and snatched vehicles. He has five other CPLC members, one from each district, working with him in this activity. The Crime Record Management project has a similar team attached to it. There are other CPLC projects which are equally important but do not require that many members so they are constituted as single person project teams – e.g. spatial crime analysis. Ordinary members, who hold no special position in the organisational hierarchy, can head projects. The Kidnapping and Extortion Team works directly under the Chief of the CPLC. It is the largest team due to the nature of the crime and the resources required for its detection. It is divided into a Field Operational Unit and an Exchange Unit.

The members are constantly occupied in supervising their projects or doing liaison work with the police. It is common for all members to come to CPLC offices in the evenings or afternoon on a daily basis.

3.5 Membership

There are only 40 CPLC members in Karachi. The Home Department has placed a maximum limit of seven members for each district. Experience with larger memberships created problems of internal monitoring and accountability, and of lack of interest because individuals were not heavily involved in CPLC activities. High levels of continuous commitment are required. CPLC members have no evident political affiliations. They are from middle class or higher social strata, and nearly all belong to the business community. The CPLC Chief has been conferred with the powers of an Honorary First Class

Magistrate while all other members have been made Justices of Peace.¹² These powers are derived from the nineteenth century Criminal Procedure Code that is still in operation in Pakistan. They allow members to conduct investigations on their own and summon people against whom a complaint has been filed. In reality these powers have rarely been exercised.

The law lays down criteria to be followed by the government when nominating members for the CPLC. It requires that a person should either be a retired member of the judiciary, a lawyer or any person 'of eminence having prominent standing in business, finance, education or public service'. The drafting of the law was done by civil servants and it appeared to give the government an upper hand in the relationship with citizens. So strong was the government role that any member of CPLC was to hold office 'at the pleasure of the Government', i.e. the state had arbitrary powers of dismissal. How can a civic organisation flourish and remain independent when it is subject to such controls? The answer is that the CPLC has much more autonomy, including the autonomy to nominate its own members, than the law prescribes. Members are nominated by the Governor, but on recommendation of the CPLC itself. Informal networks of social relations in the business community play an important role in selection and in peer monitoring. The CPLC itself has a rigorous formal procedure for selecting potential members. After careful scrutiny of applications, there are two panel interviews, with three District Chiefs in each panel. This prevents the selection procedure from being dominated by any particular person within the CPLC. Nomination does not guarantee life-time membership as the government still has the discretion to de-notify any member. CPLC's charter also requires the renewal of membership after every three years and the organisation itself can recommend members to be removed. The organisation has started inducting honorary members who are officially not members and do not have legal powers but are in line to succeed a CPLC member in the event any one is de-notified or removed. There is also a pool of volunteers who are keen to become members and are willing to assist CPLC whenever required. Insecurity of tenure and availability of substitutes induces current CPLC members to perform and conform to the rules.

Any applicant for membership should prove that he or she will be available on short notice 24 hours a day whenever required, does not have a controversial reputation, has no criminal record, is not a bank defaulter and above all has no political affiliations. CPLC has decided to exclude journalists, lawyers and retired public servants on grounds of conflict of interest. Including a journalist would allow unfair access to a particular publication and including a lawyer might result in soliciting of clients through CPLC. Businessmen dominate.

3.6 Funding

The major chunk of CPLC funding comes through public donations. Public donations have taken the form of financial as well as physical donation of capital equipment, e.g. furniture, computer hardware and

¹² Justices of Peace have the power of arrest like any other police officer and the power to call for assistance from any police officer within their jurisdiction for prevention of crime in general. They also have power to make inquiries into the commission of a criminal offence within their area. See Section 22A and 22B of Pakistan Criminal Procedure Code.

other office equipment. Multinational companies and local corporate sector have donated some of the equipment. There are also individual donations from well-wishers and local business associations. The government provides an annual grant to the CPLC for its operational expenses. The government contribution has fallen from 60 per cent in 1991 to around 20 per cent in 2000. Currently the annual operating expenses of CPLC are about 5 million Rupees, while the total annual expenditure is 6.4 million Rupees (US\$1 = about 60 rupees). Since its inception the cumulative total expenditure of CPLC has been just over 38 million Rupees. The federal government has allowed tax exemptions on all donations to the CPLC (Yousaf 2001: 21). Donations of computer hardware and software by the local corporate sector have been especially valuable and allowed the CPLC to quickly develop its data processing capacity without going through a long drawn out procurement procedure.¹³ The assistance of the United Nations Development Programme has not been monetary, but technical expertise for developing its data management capacity.

At the moment the CPLC has a high level of financial autonomy: enough funds to operate at its current level for the next three years without any public or private donations.

4 The impact of the CPLC on policing in Karachi

It is one thing to provide additional inputs into policing. It is another to improve police performance, especially in a country like Pakistan where there are important issues of police harassment and neglect of the poor. My research suggests that the CPLC has contributed to improved performance in at least seven areas, which are each treated under separate sub-headings below:

- 1 Problem identification and solution
- 2 Improving police procedures
- 3 Improving the “economics of investigation”
- 4 Improving the monitoring of law enforcement on the ground
- 5 Setting standards
- 6 Putting accountability mechanisms in place
- 7 Providing access to justice for the poor

4.1 Problem identification and solution

The best example of CPLC work of this type is in the area of car crime. ‘It is all a problem of coordination and information’ according to Mr. Hanif Moosa, the member heading the CPLC’s vehicle crime project, who has been associated with this area for the last four years. The recovery of the stolen vehicle depends upon the prompt reporting and dissemination of correct information. The interaction of CPLC members

¹³ It is likely that some of the donors have also benefited indirectly, because this provides opportunities to develop and test software relating to policing and security operations, and may open up opportunities to market products and services to the public sector in Pakistan more broadly.

and staff with victims of vehicle crime and local police stations revealed that there was a big information gap between the victim and the police. The victims were not providing the correct description of their vehicle to the police and the police were unable to use information provided in an effective manner.¹⁴

Before the CPLC got involved in monitoring vehicle crime, the police in Karachi had no procedure to deal with the issue. ‘The stolen vehicle would be plying under our nose and we would not know’ remarked one police officer.¹⁵ This reinforced the public perception that the police were inefficient. Vehicle crime was reported at various police stations and communicated to the police communication control where it was logged along with all other criminal incidents taking place during the day. The Superintendents of Police in the districts were made aware of the overall situation when crime figures from police stations under their control were consolidated. The reporting time might run into days depending on the workload of each police station. There was no centralised database of stolen vehicles and no quick method to cross check a suspected stolen vehicle against motor vehicle registration data. Recovering a stolen vehicle depended on the hunches and expertise of individual police officers.

The police officers patrolling the streets and manning checkpoints are key in apprehending car thieves and recovering stolen vehicles. But they lack reliable and prompt information. The situation is made more complicated when you have 96 different police stations looking after different jurisdictions of a large metropolitan city. Car crime is taking place all over the city and criminals are moving around in stolen vehicles. Even if the police at a checkpoint have got information on a stolen vehicle, it may only be the registration number, which can be easily changed by car thieves. The police officers require immediate verification of a vehicle chassis number and engine number if they stop a vehicle on the suspicion of being stolen. If the information is not available in real time the police officers usually let the vehicle go.

CPLC decided to purchase the hardware and software for operating a stolen vehicle database that was connected online to the database of the Motor Vehicle Registration Office, police communication control and all District Reporting Cells of CPLC (see Section 3). The CPLC got assistance from the Telephone Department in getting non-exchange lines or hotline numbers for this system, minimising the chances of it being busy. The objective was to immediately record vehicle crime as it occurred, promptly pass on the information to all concerned, and provide police on the ground with a reliable facility to verify if a vehicle is stolen. CPLC also organised and financed an advertising campaign in the press requesting the public to supply information to the CPLC if their vehicle had been stolen in the past and advising what steps to take in reporting vehicle crime.

Now whenever a vehicle is stopped for checking, the police officer on the ground contacts the CPLC’s Central or District Reporting Cell on his radio set and passes on the information on the vehicle. The CPLC operator enters the information on the computer. It will immediately indicate if the vehicle is

¹⁴ Properly to identify a vehicle, its registration plate should match with its chassis and engine numbers. These are embossed on the chassis and engine of the vehicle and are difficult to alter. The motor vehicle registration authority has the complete and authentic data on this. Victims of car crime do not usually have records of all these numbers.

¹⁵ Interview with Abdur Razak Cheema, SP Anti Car Lifting Cell, Karachi, 09/07/2002.

stolen or there is a discrepancy between the physical description and information available on the database. The operator then instructs the police officer to take the vehicle into custody for further verification.

4.2 Improving police procedures

‘CPLC is very good at developing better procedures’ said a police officer who has worked with it.¹⁶ There are many small but important processes that the CPLC has helped to improve, through redesign, not by investing money. There were frequent complaints that the police emergency number “15” does not respond when used. The police explanation was that the Telephone Department was not keeping the line in order. Instead of asking for more resources and technology, the CPLC requested the Telephone Department to provide a status report on the functioning of the number twice a day and at the same time asked the police to provide a duty roster of officers operating the line. This not only improved the process but also set up a bilateral accountability mechanism between two agencies, with the CPLC as monitor. Similarly, in kidnapping cases the police did not possess any plainclothes expertise or techniques to track the kidnappers. The police sometimes used to trace a call to a public call office, identify the owner of the office and haul him up without realising that the culprit had got away. CPLC performs a call pattern analysis on its geographic information system. Through this the movements of the culprit can be traced and patterns established. Hostage negotiation is another area where CPLC has a lot of expertise. It has cassettes of actual hostage negotiations that it uses for training purposes.

4.3 Improving the economics of investigation

Until very recently the Pakistani police had no separate budget for investigation. It is not uncommon that the victim informally bears some of the expenses for the police investigating team, especially transport costs. In serious crimes like kidnappings for ransom, where apprehension of organised gangs is effective in preventing future incidents, the cost of investigation is high. A police officer explained to me that trapping a kidnapper might require simultaneous physical monitoring of 40 public phone booths in a locality of the city. This requires the mobilisation of considerable manpower, transport and communication resources in a short time frame. While the police establishment may spare resources for a high profile kidnapping case, it is unable to provide the same resource commitment for every case. There is no money earmarked in the police budget for an outright purchase of these resources. Thus the budgeting procedure and the lump sum nature of the expenditure leaves the investigating officer with no option but to curtail his investigation. The officer referred to this as the “economics of investigation”. CPLC members and volunteers help in such cases, engaging in joint stake-outs with the police and providing transport and cell phones or pager facilities for communications purposes. Naturally under the law the police are required to apprehend the criminal, but these are considered to be joint Police-CPLC operations.

¹⁶ Interview with Sardar Majeed, SP, Karachi, 07/07/2002.

4.4 Improving the monitoring of law enforcement on the ground

CPLC reports on crime patterns and on the outcome of criminal cases registered in every police station provide powerful tools to the Superintendent of Police and higher police officials to monitor the performance of their staff. Using spatial crime analysis, CPLC generates maps of police stations and police districts, identifying the “hot spots” of different types of crimes. It provides the Superintendent of Police with an immediate analysis of the performance of every Police Station. It should be understood that, due the multiple tasks that the Superintendent of Police performs, he or she has little time to do analysis. That is one reason why traditional law enforcement is reactive and short term in nature.

The CPLC produces a report analysing patterns of vehicle crime on a monthly basis, comparing the performance of all police stations. This can inform district Superintendents of Police and the Station House Officers in charge of police stations about their performance. The report is so detailed that it indicates the date of every incident, the hour in which it occurred and the police station in whose jurisdiction it took place. CPLC reports have indicated patterns in vehicle crime which were not previously perceived. These reports reveal which make and colour of vehicle is being stolen most frequently and the time of the month and day when theft most often occurs. The first people to make use of this information analysis are not the police but CPLC members themselves, especially those who are dealing with vehicle crime. They in turn convey this information to local police officers in their districts.

Interestingly, the distribution of these crime reports is not limited to the police. They are sent to all other law enforcing agencies, eighteen in total, including federal government agencies like the Rangers, Federal Investigation Agency and the Army.¹⁷ One purpose of wide dissemination is that, if any one of the agencies uses the information, others are likely to follow. In this way a degree of competition will develop among the agencies.

It is interesting to see how CPLC is improving monitoring of agents on the ground i.e. police officers manning the police stations. Vehicle crime figures reported by the police differ sharply from CPLC’s figures. The difference is accounted for by the fact that CPLC records a crime as soon as it is informed of it on the police radio, by a citizen phoning in or through the Police Emergency “15” telephone line. The local police station records a crime when a formal First Information Report is made. Here the discretion of the individual police officer comes into play. The officer may discourage a citizen from filing a complaint because he does not want his workload to increase or does not want to be evaluated negatively by his superior. This is a common practice and afflicts police forces all over the world. However in the case of Karachi there are sharp differences in the reporting of car crime among police stations.¹⁸ The CPLC views it as an indicator of how keen individual police officers are on the ground in combating crime. It is able to identify police stations that are reporting vehicle crime at a higher rate and those that are lagging behind. This allows CPLC to identify high performers within the police force.

¹⁷ Interview with Mr. Jameel Yousaf, Chief CPLC, Karachi, 12/07/2002.

¹⁸ CPLC Monthly Report for June 2002, CPLC, Karachi.

4.5 Setting standards

The CPLC vehicle database is used not only by the Karachi police but by police forces all over the country when they want final confirmation of the status of a vehicle. ‘CPLC has become a benchmark against which to measure our performance’.¹⁹ When the Karachi police decided to set up an independent vehicle crime unit it designed it on the pattern of CPLC and asked that CPLC data be transferred to its computers.²⁰ Now vehicle crime figures are compiled daily by the police and CPLC and cross-checked with each other. Police officers sometimes come to the CPLC with lap-top computers to download data when they are going to do spot checks on vehicles in areas lacking cellular phone communication. CPLC crime figures have become a yardstick against which to monitor police performance. They are frequently quoted by the police.²¹ The federal Home Ministry is looking at the option of replicating nationally CPLC crime reporting and recording software.

4.6 Putting accountability mechanisms in place

Registration of a First Information Report is one of the most difficult tasks in citizen-police interaction. The problem has become so serious that the Report of the Focal Group on Police Reform described it as the “most critical irritant” in the relationship between the police and the public.²² The CPLC not only provided citizens the option to lodge a First Information Report at its offices in case of refusal by any police station but, by sending a daily report on such cases to the Home Secretary and Inspector General, set up an automatic accountability mechanism for the Station House Officers. The CPLC believes that since the procedure came into place there are now very few instances of police refusal to register a criminal complaint.

4.7 Providing access to justice for the poor

Public security is a public good. Almost everyone, except criminals, benefits from improved security. It would be very difficult to allocate the benefits of CPLC activities across different income groups. The organisation is run by wealthy people, and was in large part motivated by crimes that affect the rich, notably kidnapping. But even its other main focus, car theft, is not so directed at the elite as one might at first suspect. The main beneficiaries are more middle class. The rich person’s car is well protected with anti-theft devices and secure parking, and is insured. It is the middle class who cannot afford anti theft devices or insurance premiums that are at maximum risk. According to the reports that the CPLC produces for the police, the largest number of vehicles being stolen in Karachi are the smallest and cheapest 800 cc vehicles, and not top of the line models. Private security companies now patrol the rich neighbourhoods of the city, providing them with some security. One CPLC member described how rich

¹⁹ Interview with SP Abdur Razak Cheema, 09/07/2002, Karachi.

²⁰ *Dawn* dated 01.06.2002. Inspector General’s interview to the APP.

²¹ *Dawn* dated 13.06.2002 “SP Anti car lifting Cell stated that according to CPLC figures car crime has dropped to 1.77 per cent of total registered vehicles in 2000 as compared to 4.8 per cent of registered vehicles in 1992.”

²² Report of the Focal Group on Police Reform, February 2000, Government of Pakistan.

victims of crime would call the Inspector General of Police or the Home Secretary rather than the local police station. CPLC is the only private organisation that has kept a presence in all the districts of Karachi regardless of income profile of the district.²³

The poor and marginalized are not only at risk of crime but also at risk of police harassment, which can take the form of illegal detention and torture. The scrutiny committees of CPLC, comprising CPLC members and local police officials, have been effective at identifying and remedying such cases because they enjoy the respect of not only the citizens but also of the police officials to whom they provide valuable support in fighting crime and political pressure. Any case of illegal detention or torture is resolved at the district level by the scrutiny committee, mostly within a day and to the satisfaction of all concerned.

The poor are also deprived of justice when they are denied the opportunity to register a criminal case due to political pressure on police station officers not to register a First Information Report. The CPLC provides an alternate mechanism to register a criminal complaint. Registering the complaint at the Governor's house or the office of the Superintendent of Police may also provide some reassurance to poor people that something will be done about their cases.

CPLC offices also provide a forum for dispute resolution to the poor who cannot afford the tedious and costly judicial process. The disputes revolve around financial transactions, landlord-tenant issues, instances of land grabbing, and domestic relations. The parties in these disputes either do not want to involve the police or the police feel that they have no jurisdiction in the matter. The police usually refer such cases to the CPLC. The image of political neutrality and high personal standing attached to individual CPLC members encourages people to approach them for resolution of their disputes.

It is likely that the benefits of CPLC activities are more evident to richer than to poorer families. It is equally understandable that the CPLC should wish to stress the extent to which everyone, rich and poor alike, benefits. The very fact that the organisation is run in wealthy businessmen, many of them from small business communities whose first language is Gujarati rather than Urdu or Punjabi, puts them under a strong pressures to serve – and to be seen to be serving – poor and rich alike.

5 Explaining the CPLC-police partnership

The CPLC has been in existence since 1990 and has carved out a substantial role for itself in an activity – law enforcement – that is conventionally very much a state monopoly. This has been achieved despite frequent changes in provincial and national politics and the overtly “elitist” composition of the CPLC? How do we explain all this? What factors account for this sustained record of achievement? Why have the police been willing to cooperate with an organisation run by private citizens that has made such deep inroads into their own organisational terrain? How can a group of citizens picked by a state agency address the issue of resource constraints, trust and accountability within the police without themselves being tempted into a clientelism or abuse of power? These are the questions I set out to answer in this section.

²³ Interview with Mr. Hanif Moosa, member CPLC, Karachi, 11/07/2002.

As always in such cases, there are many factors entering into the answer, and we cannot be sure of their relative significance. I organise them under the following headings:

- 1 Incentives for the police to cooperate with the CPLC.
- 2 Building trust.
- 3 An enabling legal framework.
- 4 Organisational structure, membership and culture
- 5 The support of provincial Governors
- 6 Office location
- 7 The excluded elite
- 8 The support of the business community
- 9 Overlapping law enforcement authorities

5.1 Incentives for the police to cooperate with the CPLC

Members of a corrupt and politicised police force might have many objectives that bear little relationship to improved policing. But let us not be totally despairing or cynical. Many police personnel would like to do a better job, whether for reasons of ethics, personal self-esteem, professional pride, or because they find existing practices uncomfortable or dangerous. How can the CPLC help them do a better job?

First and most important, the CPLC has provided information processing systems that greatly empower the police and would perhaps never have become available through the police service itself. One police officer remarked that ‘There are a lot of disincentives in going through dusty old registers to identify a criminal when you can have a computerised sketch and criminal history available from the CPLC. It saves time’. Why can the police not have their own computerised information systems? The obvious explanation of “shortage of funds” is inadequate because in the past the police had acquired computers but they were not put to productive use. Police officers have a different explanation that has more to do with the police organisation. In Karachi transfers of police officers are frequent. They are often irregular. According to one officer, there is a lack of continuity in implementing any type of computerisation. The unexpected transfer of an officer breaks continuity. His successor may not be as enthusiastic about information technology. Expertise is not accumulated. Similarly, the vagaries of public sector budgeting lead to deficiencies in the funding of information technology programmes, especially to the scarcity of funds to operate and maintain systems once they are installed.²⁴ The CPLC does not have these problems. Its members are not transferred but are dedicated to projects. It has ample funds at its disposal to insure smooth operations of its systems.

²⁴ Similar problems occur for example in the UK, prompted by career trajectories that require rotation of officers through all departments (Ackroyd *et al.* 1992: 86). In the UK as in Pakistan, there has also been no explicit strategy in implementation and funding of IT programmes and IT initiatives have been ad hoc in nature (Ackroyd *et al.* 1992: 79).

The centralised and hierarchical structure of the police organisation also affects the implementation of information technology programmes, in two ways. First, such a structure makes it difficult to establish the kind of project management team needed to take responsibility for the planning, implementation and timely introduction of new systems (UN 1992: 33). Second, it skews decisions towards those things that occupy the minds and time of top management. These tend to be personnel issues – accommodation, transport, transfers, salaries etc. – rather than information systems. ‘Our demands are so many that we too ask for the sky and lose our focus in the process’ remarked the Police Chief of Karachi. All police organisations are labour intensive. Even in the USA 85–90 per cent of the costs of policing are in personnel (Bayley 1994: 48). Police managers have a tendency to allocate funds on the basis of predetermined formulae, which are related to staff numbers. This reduces managerial discretion at lower levels and incentives to try to save labour. Policing is micro managed and investment decisions are made on the number of personnel, institutional traditions and tacit understandings, not actual priorities (Bayley 1994: 55).

The cost of purchasing an information system is higher in the police because the police requirement is so large that only a few big suppliers can compete. This leads to “tender cartels” and higher prices. Corruption in procurement is also likely, because it is difficult for governments to monitor quality and value in large information technology projects (Peterson 1994: 21). Further, the internal police budget guidelines have yet to be updated. Small consumables related to computers – floppy disks, printer cartridges etc. – are not treated as recurrent expenses, but as major bulk supply items that are purchased periodically. This leads to periodic shortages. All these problems are endemic in public sector information technology projects.

The success of information technology reforms depends on the presence of reformers within the government and insulation of the information system from tampering, apathy and subterfuge (Peterson 1994: 28). There were too few reformers and inadequate insulation in the Karachi police. The CPLC has the advantage of a membership that has had a longer exposure and better understanding of information technology by virtue of coming from the business sector. Its business funders also tend to be knowledgeable in this field, creating further incentives for honesty and transparency. Because the CPLC was outside the regular police bureaucracy, it provided the insulation needed to protect the nascent information system. Because information processing is the CPLC’s strongest selling point, it has incentives to remain in the forefront in this field. Finally, the CPLC was able to develop expertise and software on an incremental basis, and avoid the problem that tends to stymie public sector initiatives: attempting massive, integrated leaps in technology (Peterson 1994: 24). The CPLC crime record management system has taken six years to perfect. The organisation has much better information technology than the police, and has acquired, developed and operated it more cheaply than would be possible in the police.

Apart from access to effective information systems, what other advantages do the police obtain from cooperating with the CPLC? Two stand out in particular. One is that CPLC staff have expertise in investigations that is not always available to the police. The frequent and irregular transfer of police

officials tends to dissipate expertise and inhibit the building of effective teams. In comparison CPLC members and staff are relatively permanent, have years of experience in particular crimes, and can provide useful input to the police in criminal investigation. For example, the CPLC member in charge of car crime has been working on the issue for the past four years. During that time there have been several changes of Superintendents of Police. The CPLC anti-kidnapping team has ten years of experience in dealing with kidnapping and extortion cases, far outweighing the experience of any single police officer in the field.

Second, as the CPLC has become more established and respected, it has been able to provide some indirect respectability for the police also, and some protection for them against political interventions. The top management of the police view the CPLC as a third party between the public and the police. The CPLC is widely known in Karachi as an organisation of respectable citizens with clean reputations and no partisan political connections. The police benefit by association. They also perceive that this association helps mitigate the image of the police as a politicised organisation. Indeed, the CPLC can help them reduce political interventions. Station House Officers have started using the CPLC when they find themselves in a political bind. They have told local politicians that they cannot deliver on particular demands because the CPLC is on to them, while at the same time informing the CPLC about the issue. On occasion a police officer that has submitted to pressure and done a wrongful act has informed the CPLC about it to try to get it reversed.²⁵

5.2 Building trust

We can see why the police might cooperate with the CPLC. But why should the CPLC cooperate with the police? At one level the answer is very obvious. This cooperation justifies the very existence of the CPLC. Without it, the organisation would not exist. Let us re-phrase the question slightly. Why does the CPLC maintain such a cooperative attitude towards the police? Why has it rarely used its formal powers of monitoring and oversight of the police, often turned a blind eye to irregularities in policing, and focused instead on developing trust and joint activities? Why does the CPLC never criticise the police in public? Why did it not pursue the kinds of strategies implied by the fashionable term of “amplifying client voice” in public service delivery?

According to the CPLC Chief, only on few occasions did the organisation pursue disciplinary action against police officers. Errant officers were identified, but within the system, with a “quiet word” in the ears of superior officers. Enforcing discipline was left to the police. The logic was simple: if CPLC had taken up the task of bringing to book corrupt and inefficient policemen, they would have cut seriously into the functions and authority of senior police officers, in an organisation where the chain of command is considered paramount. The CPLC did not use its authority to inspect police station records. The Superintendent of Police usually performs that task. Any duplication by the CPLC would have broken the hierarchy of command and control and alienated the Station House Officers and Superintendents of Police. Slowly the message got out into the ranks that CPLC was not working against the police. Officers

²⁵ Interview with Jameel Yousaf, Chief CPLC 12/07/2002.

began to feel confident in sharing information with them.²⁶ The CPLC realised that publicly pointing out the flaws in the police would further erode public confidence and make its own task even more difficult. It has not held a single press conference in its thirteen years and not resorted to the naming and shaming which could have been a powerful handle on the police. In fact the organisation has become a powerful voice for giving more resources to the police and improving police officers' working conditions. The CPLC was represented on the Focal Group on Police Reforms set up by the federal government. Whenever a case is resolved the CPLC allows the police to claim the credit for it. 'We let them have the limelight' remarked the Deputy Chief of CPLC.

The efforts of the CPLC to improve police working and living conditions, although relatively small and symbolic, have been targeted at lower ranks of the police. These activities come under the rubric of Police Welfare projects and have consisted of mundane tasks like provision of gas connections to family quarters of police officers and provision of water connections to police residential quarters through the Karachi Water and Sewerage Board. These gestures have contributed to a more benign image of the CPLC within the police ranks and helped in building trust.

Much of the reason why the CPLC pursued the strategy of cooperation and building trust with the police is that this seemed the sensible strategy. The leaders thought it more important in the long term to gain the trust of the police, understand their problems, and find ways of working with them, rather than try to enforce standards in the short term through using their formal powers of monitoring and oversight. But there is some structural explanation for the choice of that sensible strategy. The CPLC is small. Its members were selected for their lack of partisan political affiliations. Many come from minority business communities that have little political power. The police had many political engagements. Had the CPLC pursued with any vigour the more confrontational route, using their formal powers to monitor and publicly report on police deficiencies and misdemeanours, it is likely that politicians quickly would have been brought in to cut the ground from under their feet.

Instead, the CPLC took the cooperation route to the extent that they are deeply interdependent with the police in their daily operations. The CPLC vehicle database would be useless without the provision of police radio operators in its offices. The CPLC Crime Reporting programme would not serve the purpose if the offices of the Superintendents of Police did not supply daily crime figures. Its programme of spatial analysis of crime would not have got off the ground had not the *Moharrars* – senior head constables usually assigned to clerical tasks – from all 96 police stations in Karachi spent hours going over the digitised map of Karachi and marking boundaries of their police stations with the CPLC members. The cooperation of the prison service clerical staff and computer literate prisoners made possible the entry of 70,000 prisoners' records into a CPLC database.

²⁶ Bayley has highlighted the negative impact of external control mechanisms on police pride, self esteem and the capacity of an institution to self discipline itself. He describes it as a self perpetuating cycle which weakens the institution (Bayley 1990: 179).

5.3 An enabling legal framework

The effective functioning of the CPLC implies a considerable blurring of standard formal divisions between public and private. It is potentially highly problematic in legal terms. Yet the organisation has functioned within a legal framework. The main reason for the absence of serious problems lies not so much in what was contained within that legal framework, but in what was inadvertently omitted. The law allowed the CPLC flexibility in its day to day operations and permitted it to determine its own priority activities. Rule 1.21A allows the CPLC to ‘collect statistics on various kinds of cases registered and disposed off’. The leaders saw in this not an opportunity to perform a monitoring function, but scope to establish an online database. The formal power to take ‘steps to detect crime’ was interpreted not solely in terms of advising the police but as authority physically to help the police in catching kidnappers or to provide information on crime patterns.

The operational independence is the result of the flexible legal framework under which CPLC operates. Even under its charter, only the main priority areas have been identified. It has freedom to determine its own working procedure, recommend members for nomination to the Governor, and determine what output it is going to produce. The law allows CPLC to determine its own rules of engagement with the police and does not prescribe any limitation except that members should not be influenced by politics and personal gain in performing their duties. It is the flexibility in the legal framework that has allowed the CPLC to establish various task and project teams.

The idea of making CPLC members Justices of Peace may hold only symbolic value but it provides legal cover to the body to engage in police investigations and prevents the police from raising any objection of illegal intervention in its affairs by private citizens. While the Justices of Peace had been appointed in the past, the practice had come to be used as a source of political reward for party workers or local notables. Justices of Peace usually exercised their powers in attesting and verifying documents or demanding services of the police to enhance their own prestige. They had not been directly engaged in supporting policing. In the present case the combination of Justices of Peace, with ample resources of their own, sitting in the Governor’s House and the offices of the Superintendents of Police, resulted in formation of a formidable law enforcement body.

The value of the legal framework governing CPLC does not lie in defining the details of its operations but in empowering the organisation. It is a flexible and enabling legal framework. Feeny has highlighted the latent cost involved in evolving a legal framework and implementing it in new institutional arrangements (Feeny 1989: 184). By pursuing gradual piecemeal changes in the legal framework at various points in time, the CPLC was able to secure support of successive national governments in its development, thus providing many politicians with some stake in the organisation.

5.4 Organisational structure, membership and culture

Part of the reason for the effectiveness of the CPLC, and its successful avoidance of partisan politics or the pursuit of individual self-interest by members lies in features of its structure, membership and culture.

5.4.1 Organisational structure

One's first impression is that CPLC is very centralised around the office of its Chief. In fact, it is better described as having an effective team or task culture (Handy 1985: 193). Since its inception CPLC has set up many project or task teams. It has evolved into a matrix with every member not only possessing geographic responsibility by belonging to a District Reporting Cell, but also possessing responsibility for specific projects by being a member of a project team. This allows most members to have some type of "expert power", which provides them with a degree of independence. Reliance on particular individuals is also reduced. The CPLC chief was once an expert in car crime. This task now has been taken over by another member, who has become the expert. This team or task culture does away with most status and style differences and promotes easy working relationships. More importantly it allows individual members to identify with the norms of the organisation. In a small group of 40 members, building such norms is not too difficult. A task culture is appropriate where there is need for flexibility and sensitivity to the changing environment. Crime fighting is this kind of activity.

5.4.2 Organisational culture

The members of the CPLC are unpaid volunteers who devote a great deal of time to their duties. It is, not surprisingly, a "strong-culture" organisation: behaviour is very much shaped by positive attitudes to and affiliations with the organisation and its mission. The integrity of the organisation is however vulnerable to political interference from outside and to the temptations faced by members or staff to take advantage of their considerable potential power and influence for personal gain. To reinforce the positive culture and protect the organisation against adverse pressures, the leadership have developed and vigorously promote a code of conduct. This demands neutrality, honesty and no misuse of office on the part of members and staff. Members are forbidden to become involved in cases relating to their family, relatives and friends. The code is very similar to those prescribed for civil servants. The current charter of the organisation even borrows words and phrases from civil service rules e.g. "misconduct", "corrupt practice", "sedition", and "moral turpitude". The most important provision of the code is not to bring any political influence into the organisation in any form or shape. This extends to injunctions against associating closely with political figures at social and public events, or being photographed with a police officer. One member was removed for infringing this latter rule, and appearing in a newspaper identified as a CPLC member. Members can be removed on violation of the code either by the Governor or by a majority of the Central Committee comprising all District Chiefs of CPLC.

5.4.3 Selection of members

The government laid out criteria for selecting CPLC members and placed a limit on numbers. Perhaps inadvertently, the government has contributed to the development of a meritocracy of elite citizens by making the membership of CPLC a prized appointment. The limit on membership and the actual ability of the existing CPLC to recommend new members for appointment by the Governor prevented the organisation from being deluged with political appointees. The culture of the organisation also drove the

selection process: it sought individuals who were non-political, committed, motivated, hardworking, available on short notice 24 hours a day and ready to commit their resources and time.

The authority of CPLC members, their access to high public officials and the good reputation of the organisation have resulted in active competition for membership. This has allowed the CPLC to tap into a pool of honorary members and dedicated volunteers who assist the CPLC in its operations and also serve as primary candidates for membership whenever a membership slot becomes available. Currently about 100 volunteers are working with CPLC on various projects. The knowledge that there are other people eager to occupy their posts is yet another incentive for members to perform well.²⁷

A common criticism of the CPLC is that its members are nearly all rich or elite. That is factually correct. It is the implications that are disputed. The situation may be defended on at least two grounds. One is that, to be effective, members need to put in unpaid time that poorer people could not afford and have the high level business and personal contacts that poorer people rarely enjoy. The second is that the relative autonomy of the CPLC from politicians and government depends on its primary dependence on funding from a discerning business community. Those donors will only entrust large sums of money to a group of wealthy people not subject to ordinary temptations who have proved their competence.

5.5 The support of provincial governors and the federal government

Governors of provinces have few formal powers under the Constitution. The Governor is appointed by the federal government and retains office at its discretion. Executive power lies with the Chief Minister who is elected by the Provincial Assembly. Governor appointments sometimes go to politicians. At the same time, because they are not subject to election, Governors enjoy some independence from the daily political pressures to which a Chief Minister is subject. Further, the Governor is a representative of the federal government and has both high status and access to the President and Prime Minister. An effective Governor can be a check on a Chief Minister. Since the advent of military rule in late 1999, the office of the Governor has become more powerful as it has acquired the executive powers of the former Chief Minister.

The CPLC has been well served by the fact that it is under the authority of the relatively non-political Governor. In turn, the close proximity of the CPLC to the office of the Governor has contributed to building a more positive image of the latter. Governors of the province have benefited from the reputation of the organisation. The CPLC has enjoyed the support of 10 different Governors in its 13 years. There have been industrialists, a retired judge of the High Court, a lawyer and a retired general among them. This has improved relationships with the CPLC, since many of its members have similar social and professional backgrounds. This close relationship with Governors has also helped gain for the CPLC the support of the federal government. This support includes formal visits of presidents and prime ministers to the CPLC, the award of a gallantry medal to CPLC Chief, financial grants to build the criminal record management system, and encouraging external donors like the UNDP to provide technical

²⁷ For a comparable case, see Tendler (1997: 30).

assistance. At a more mundane level, the assistance of the Telephone Department and permission of the Surveyor General to do digital mapping of the city was forthcoming because they were federal government offices.

5.6 Office location

In the course of my research I discovered how much CPLC values the location of its offices. The location of the Central Reporting Cell within the premises of the Governor's house not only adds to the prestige of the organisation but provides easy physical access to and communication with all government departments.²⁸ According to CPLC Chief, the most important aspect in the location of the CRC is that to the outsider it conveys an image of power and political neutrality, away from the cut and thrust of local and provincial politics which are so evident in the offices of the Chief Minister, provincial ministers and the provincial secretariat.²⁹

Similarly, the location of CPLC's District Reporting Cells (DRCs) within the premises of the offices of the district Superintendents of Police places the organisation in close proximity with an important communication node. The office of the Superintendent of Police (SP) is an important field office. All police plans, strategies and policies from above are executed through here. The office of the SP is also public: ordinary citizens frequently visit their local SP office when they feel their complaints are not being properly addressed by the local police station. Important criminal cases are also pursued directly from the office of the SP. On an average day, the premises of the SP office is frequented by several subordinate Station House Officers visiting to attend meetings, report developments on a particular case or to discuss personal or administrative matters. The subordinate police station staff also visit the SP offices in connection with disciplinary matters, salary, sanctioning of leave or requests for transfers. Sitting in the premises of the SP's office, any lay person can gauge the problems faced by the citizens and the police on a daily basis. This location provides the CPLC a good opportunity to have a face to face contact with street level police officials and ordinary citizens without having to spread its resources too thin by locating itself in every police station.

The government's decision to allow the CPLC to operate from the premises of the Governor's residence and offices of Superintendents of Police has inherent advantages for the organisation. Most important is the access to the Governor or Superintendent of Police that can allow rapid resolution of problems. The government incurs no extra expense in allowing CPLC to utilise its office space as its maintenance is done by the CPLC through its own funds. In turn, the District Reporting Cells provide the SPs office with online access to its crime databases and criminal sketching programmes. The pressure is on CPLC to retain these prime locations. Rapid rotation in the posts of Governors and SPs has always

²⁸ CRC occupies an area of only 3,000 square feet and is only 50 yards within the Governor's house. It is accessed through a back entrance. All important government offices are located within a two kilometre radius of the Governor's House.

²⁹ As a police officer remarked 'When a call comes from the Governor House it makes a difference' (Interview, Rana Altaf, DIG Hq., Karachi, 10/07/02).

prompted the organisation to demonstrate its value to the new occupants of these premises through its performance. ‘Where we are now, we have earned it through our work.’ remarks the CPLC chief.³⁰

5.7 The excluded elite

CPLC members are from the elite. However, because many are from minority business communities, they are politically vulnerable. They are very conscious of allegations that they look after the interest of the moneyed class. Political instability increases this vulnerability. This is why CPLC claims to offer support to all irrespective of “caste, creed, status or wealth”,³¹ and makes a great effort continuously to project an image of neutrality and dedication to public service.³² The effort put into maintaining and projecting this positive image has been very worthwhile from a long term perspective. And one reason that the CPLC has been under strong pressure to pay great attention to this issue is that its own policies in recruiting members have effectively created a critical countervailing elite: the local politicians, lawyers and journalists who are not eligible to join its ranks. They are well placed to continually raise questions, in political circles and in public, about whether the CPLC is doing its job or exceeding its authority.

5.8 The support of the business community

The business community is the biggest contributor to the CPLC. Most of the CPLC members are active businessmen – with very few women. They are able to tap into the resources of the business community more effectively than a government servant or a non-business person. The corporate sector is helping the CPLC in many different ways. Insurance companies have provided vehicles and free medical cover to CPLC staff. Oil companies provide fuel for these vehicles. Most of the office equipment was donated by the corporate sector. The assistance of the corporate sector had the greatest impact in developing CPLC’s data management capacity. IBM agreed to provide the hardware and also develop the software for the crime reporting system at a reduced cost. Servers were provided free of cost. The digitised mapping of Karachi for spatial crime analysis was done free of charge by two software companies. There have been mutual benefits for both parties in this endeavour. By assisting a civil society organisation, IBM and other multinationals could claim to be fulfilling their corporate social responsibility. Software companies gained experience in developing crime data systems, and may be well placed to do future business with the police. For CPLC, the assistance of business community allowed them quick delivery of results. It took only six months for CPLC to become operational because of the support of the business community.

5.9 Overlapping law enforcement authorities

While CPLC primarily works with the police, it was set up by the provincial Home Department, which is manned by civil servants. The legal framework of the CPLC has been drafted by the provincial Law

³⁰ Interview with CPLC chief, 12/07/2002.

³¹ CPLC Concept paper and guide, pp.1.

³² For example, *Dawn*, Letter to Editor by CPLC against allegation of Member of Parliament that police works for CPLC only. 21/04/2001.

Department, which is run by legal professionals. In law enforcement operations CPLC has to secure the cooperation not only of the provincial police force but also a host of law enforcement agencies that report directly to the federal government. To be successful the CPLC has to establish a working relationship with all these departments and cannot afford to ignore any one of them.

This complex overlap of organisations with authority and responsibility for law enforcement in Karachi poses many operational challenges for the CPLC on a day to day basis. This kind of overlap is not necessarily a good thing. But it is also one reason the CPLC has been able to thrive in the long term. It has been a fruitful environment for an organisation that has little political power or formal bureaucratic authority, but is not generally perceived as threatening by other government organisations and has a highly developed capacity to negotiate between and among them. This environment has prevented the CPLC either from being dominated by any single agency or developing too cosy a relationship with one. Conversely, the overlap of agencies in law enforcement has helped when support from any particular agency was lacking. CPLC is not guaranteed automatic police assistance every time. There have been problems in the relationship. In some cases, the CPLC has been able to call instead on the Army or other federal law enforcement agencies for assistance. The key to exploiting this overlap is to maintain a balanced relationship with all at all times and avoid favouring or ignoring any particular agency.

5.10 Putting it all together

CPLC provides information analysis to the police but it needs the cooperation of the police to collect the information and retain its comparative advantage. The police require the inputs provided by the CPLC to improve its performance in law enforcement. They also need the CPLC to improve their image and help it in fighting political pressure. The CPLC is able to operate smoothly because it is supported and protected by the Governor and the federal government and is funded by the business community. However, it can stay in this position only if it delivers tangible results and retains its credibility as a non-partisan and non-discriminatory body. Its small size permits internal accountability and careful selection of good members. The “excluded local elite” provide a powerful external accountability mechanism. The overlap among law enforcing agencies prevents the CPLC from becoming too close or too distant to any agency, and to make use of a wide range of connections. Rapid turnover of governments, Governors and police officers keeps testing CPLC’s commitment to neutrality and delivery of results.

6 What is the CPLC? Contracting out, community policing, and co-production

I have described the CPLC above. But how do we define it? What kind of organisation is this? How does it fit within our menu of familiar forms of organisation and of inter-organisational relations? It contains some elements of familiar organisational models and relationships. The CPLC was originally inspired in part by the idea of local Neighbourhood Watch Committees: quasi-formal local citizen bodies that act as eyes and ears for the police, alerting them to local problems. But the CPLC is very little like a

Neighbourhood Watch Committee in practice. It is not local in the same sense, and is a relatively powerful, well-resourced and institutionalised body that interacts with the police and other government agencies at a relatively high level. The law under which the CPLC is incorporated appears to place it in the category of oversight bodies, partly or wholly constituted of prominent citizens, which monitor and report on the activities of the police and related agencies such as the prison service. But, as I have emphasised above, the CPLC has to a large degree refrained from using their powers of oversight. Since the CPLC is principally engaged in providing policing services and obtains some of its funding from government, it is tempting to view it as some kind contractor for the provision of public services. But, if it is engaged in “contracting out”, it is of a very unusual kind. There is no contract or specification of services. The CPLC to a significant degree sets its own agenda. And most funding comes through donations from business sources. Is this a variant of community policing? If it is, then we are very much stretching the term. It does not involve additional police officers on patrol or any effort to develop a new style of interaction between police and public at local level. The focus is not on the kinds of relatively “soft” and highly local crimes that tend to drive community policing (drugs, local violence and intimidation, burglary etc.), but on the harder crimes like car theft and kidnapping that take place over a wider physical terrain and require a different kind of police intelligence.

We can for the present most usefully conceive of the CPLC as a co-production organisation, as defined in the research programme that supported this study.³³ I use the term here to refer to the provision of public services (broadly defined, to include regulation) through an institutionalised, long term relationship between state agencies and organised groups of citizens, where both make substantial resource contributions. It is almost a defining feature of co-production arrangements that the conventional or legal boundaries between public and private become very blurred. “Private” actors become involved in government activities, in an institutionalised way, to a degree that would have shocked Max Weber, the arch-exponent of the importance of separating government and private domains. My account of the CPLC illustrates vividly this blurring – and the measures that are taken to prevent that blurring leading to misuse of influence over public agencies by actors who retain a quasi-private status.

Co-production arrangements are not unusual. The CPLC is not even unique in the way in which a non-state body has won great influence in the performance of one of the core regulatory functions of the state – policing. Joshi and Ayee (2002) describe a parallel case in Ghana, where the power to levy taxes (on the road passenger transport sector) has been devolved to the “private” trade association representing transport operators. In each case, this apparent sharing of core state authority with non-state actors evolved as a response to a crisis of governance. The solution may not be ideal from every perspective, but it may be the best available in situations of crisis where government agencies are unable fully to perform core roles. We may not need to concern ourselves too much with the precise categorisation of the

³³ The Centre for the Study of the Future State. This definition was provided by Dr Anuradha Joshi and Professor Mick Moore. The term co-production here does not refer simply to an earlier definition: the production of services by more than one organisation (Ostrom 1996: 1073). That is hardly an incisive or useful concept: most services are probably co-produced in this sense.

relationship that the CPLC has with law enforcement in Karachi. The arrangement seems to work. It matters that we should not dismiss it because it is “irregular” in several senses, but should instead focus on why it works, how it could be improved, and whether we can draw lessons or inspiration for other circumstances where “citizen security” is a rare commodity.

References

- Ackroyd, S., Harper, R., Hughes, J.A., Shapiro, D. and Soothill, K., 1992, *New Technology and Practical Police Work: the social context of technical innovation*, Philadelphia: Open University Press
- Altaf, R., Deputy Inspector General of Police, interview, 10/07/02, Karachi
- Asian Development Bank, 2001, *Report and Recommendations on the Proposed Loan for Access to Justice Program in Pakistan*, RRP PAK 32023, November, www.adb.org/Documents/RRPs/PAK/rrp_32023.pdf
- Bayley, D.H., 1994, *Police for the Future*, New York: Oxford University Press
- 1990, *Patterns of Policing: a comparative international analysis*, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press
- Bennett, T., 1998, 'Police and Public Involvement in the Delivery of Community Policing' in J.-P. Brodeur (ed.), *How to Recognize Good Policing: problems and issues*, California: Sage Publications: 107–22
- Brodeur, J.-P., 1998, 'Tailor Made Policing A Conceptual Investigation', in J.-P. Brodeur (ed.), *How to Recognize Good Policing: problems and issues*, California: Sage Publications: 30–51
- Cheema, A.R., Superintendent of Police, interview, 09/07/02, Karachi
- Dawn, 2002, 'Vehicle registration in a day ordered: anti car lifting steps reviewed', 13 June, Karachi
- 2002, '35 dacoits killed in encounters, says IGP', 1 June, Karachi
- 2001, 'ACLCs performance', *Letter to the Editor*, 21 April, Karachi
- Feeny, D., 1989, 'The Demand and Supply of Institutional Arrangements' in V. Ostrom, H. Picht and D. Feeny (eds), *Rethinking Institutional Analysis and Development: issues, alternatives and choices*, San Francisco: International Center for Economic Growth: 159–209
- Friedmann, R.R., 1992, *Community Policing Comparative Perspective and Prospects*, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf
- Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Interior, 2000, *Report of the Focal Group on Police Reform*, February, Islamabad
- Handy, C.B., 1985, *Understanding Organisations*, 3rd edn, London: Penguin Books Ltd
- Jahangir, A., Capital City Police Officer, interview, 13/07/02, Karachi
- Joshi, A. and Aye, J., 2002, 'Taxing for the state? Politics, revenue and the informal sector in Ghana', *IDS Bulletin*, Vol 33 No 3, July
- Majeed, S., Superintendent of Police, interview, 07/07/02
- Moosa, H., member CPLC, interview, 11/07/02, Karachi
- Moonis, A., 1996, 'Ethnicity and state power in Pakistan: the Karachi Crisis', *Asian Survey*, Vol XXXVI No 10, Institute of East Asian Studies, The University of California Press, Oakland, California
- Nadeem, A.H., 2002, *Pakistan: the political economy of lawlessness*, Pakistan: Oxford University Press
- Ostrom, E., 1996, 'Crossing the Great Divide: co production, synergy and development', *World Development*, Vol 24 No 6: 1073–87
- Pakistan Criminal Procedure Code 1898
- Pelser, E., Schenetter, J. and Louw, A., 2002, 'Not everybody's business: policing in SAPS' priority areas', *Monograph Series 71*, March, Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies

- Peterson, S.B, 1994, 'Saints, demons, wizards and systems: why information technology reforms fail or under perform in public bureaucracies in Africa', *Development Discussion Paper* 486, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard Institute for International Development, Harvard University
- Shigri, A.A., National Police Research Bureau, interview, 01/07/02
- 1991, 'Policing in Karachi – Present Day Challenges', *Research Paper*, Lahore: Pakistan Administrative Staff College
- Tendler, J., 1997, '*Good Government in the Tropics*' Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press
- United Nations, 1992, 'Guide to computerization of information in criminal justice', *Studies in Methods, Series F* 58, New York
- Yousaf, J., Chief CPLC, interview, 12/07/02, Karachi, Cassettes 1 and 2
- 2001, *Concept Paper and Guide for Establishing*, Karachi: CPLC