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Mediating Civil War Settlements and the Duration of Peace

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In this article, we examine the impact of international mediation attempts during civil war on the duration of peace once the war has ended. We include several aspects of the mediation attempt in our theoretical framework and our empirical tests, but we also control for other characteristics of the conflict and the country. While studies often find that decisive victories lead to a more durable peace, we expect that different types of mediation attempts have a distinct impact on the duration of peace after a civil war. In empirical tests on civil wars from 1945–1995 with Cox and Weibull event history models, we find the presence of mediation leads to a longer peace, while mediated agreements and superpower mediation attempts shorten the peace. In addition, several characteristics of both country and previous conflict impact how long the peace will last.

KEYWORDS mediation, civil war, event history, peace settlement, conflict resolution

Factors that influence when and how civil wars end can be quite different from the causes of civil war onset (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Similarly, a disparate set of factors is likely to account for the post–civil war situation and, in particular, the duration of peace after the cessation of war. Empirical research on the post-civil war environment has, with some early exceptions (e.g., Licklider; 1995), only quite recently begun to emerge (e.g., Doyle and Sambanis, 2000; Hartzell et al., 2001; Walter, 2002; Fortna, 2004b; and Quinn et al., 2007). At the same time, the difficulties of maintaining domestic peace have become increasingly apparent in the past decade or so, while international peacebuilding efforts have increased dramatically.

The member states of the United Nations have increasingly become aware of the necessity for peacebuilding in post-conflict situations, exemplified in their December 2005 decision to establish a Peacebuilding Commission. Indeed, the 2005 Human Security Report (Mack et al., 2005) argues that increased conflict management efforts, by the UN and others, have led to a decline in many forms of political violence since the early 1990s. Recent work has begun to look beyond the end of civil wars to the peace thereafter. Taken together, findings on the short-term stabilization of peace after civil wars, the presence of credible commitments by external parties, and the structure and implementation of cease-fire agreements provide a larger picture of the post-conflict environment. Scholars examining the factors impacting civil war onset have distinguished between greed and grievance (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). Although the situation after a civil war is inherently different than before a conflict, when rebel groups have to form and overcome collective action problems, greed and grievance might be helpful concepts to analyze post-conflict situations and the behavior of governments and opposition.

In this paper, we are concerned with an aspect of quantitative civil war research that has yet to be fully explored—mediation in the context of domestic violence. The goal of this paper is to add to this growing field of civil war research by examining the impact of mediation on the duration of peace after civil wars. We employ Bercovitch's definition of mediation in international conflicts and apply it to civil wars. Mediation is broadly defined "as a process of conflict management where disputants seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from an individual, group, state or organization to settle their conflict or resolve their differences without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of the law" (Bercovitch et al., 1991, p. 8). A mediation attempt is successful if it brings about a partial or full settlement as coded in Bercovitch's International Conflict Management data set (1997). For this study, however, we are interested in the long-term impact of mediation. Therefore we define long-term mediation success as the duration of peace between the two parties following the end of a civil war. In empirical tests, we examine how the long-term success of different mediation attempts varies, and how it compares to the duration of peace following one-sided military victories.[1]

We propose a series of hypotheses on the impact of mediation characteristics, while controlling for characteristics of the country and the conflict, and test them with a duration model assessing the impact of variables representing these hypotheses on the 'survival' of peace from one year to the next after civil wars have been settled. While studies often find that decisive victories lead to a more durable peace, we expect that the characteristics of mediation attempts vary and that different types of such conflict management have a distinct long-term impact. Specifically, we expect the presence of mediators, mediation attempts that reached an agreement, repeated mediation efforts, mediation by superpowers, and UN peacekeeping in post-conflict situations to improve the prospects of peace after the war. In empirical tests on civil wars from 1945–1995 with Cox and Weibull event history models, we find the presence of mediation efforts leads to a longer peace, while mediated agreements shorten the peace, just as superpower mediation does. In addition, several characteristics of both country and previous conflict impact how long the peace will last.

LITERATURE

What factors lead to a successful mediation? How are the characteristics of the dispute, the disputants, and of the mediators themselves associated with mediation success? The mediation literature has produced a number of findings on the context under which mediation is likely to occur and likely to be successful. However, the focus has primarily been on interstate conflicts (e.g., Bercovitch and Schneider, 2000; Regan and Stam, 2000; Greig, 2001 2005). The mediation of domestic conflicts, however, might be considerably different from mediation conducted during interstate disputes.

Ideally, mediation in international conflict is assumed to help the disputants to perceive procedural justice. Mediators aim at overcoming information barriers, they provide exit options so that representatives of the conflicting parties do not lose face, and they propose solutions to the underlying issues. In addition, mediation—in contrast to arbitration—is a nonbinding conflict management tool, defined by the absence of enforcement mechanisms to impose an agreement.

Although a number of studies on post–civil war reconstruction have been conducted in the last decade, few have emphasized mediation as a means to reaching a durable agreement. These studies have mainly focused on three sets of factors: peacekeeping missions, power-sharing arrangements, and third-party credible commitments.

First, Doyle and Sambanis (2000) find multilateral peacekeeping missions to be associated with more peaceful outcomes after the end of a civil war. They define two measures of success—a "lenient" and a "strict" one and find some positive impact of peacekeeping missions. While the lenient

definition focuses on whether violence was ended, the stricter measure also takes into account whether a democratization process was initiated. Postwar peacekeeping also seems to be associated with longer durations of peace (Fortna, 2004a).

Second, Hartzell and Hoddie, in a series of papers (Hoddie and Hartzell, 2003; Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003; Hartzell et al., 2001; Hartzell, 1999), have focused on the presence of power-sharing arrangements as part of the negotiated settlement and whether these devices were actually implemented. Using time duration models, they find that implemented power sharing arrangements on four dimensions—political, territorial, military, and economic—may have a positive impact on the duration of domestic peace (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003).

Third, also emphasizing the implementation of power-sharing arrangements, Walter (1997, 1999, 2002) develops a theory of credible commitments. She expects third-party commitments that secure the peace to be an important feature in accounting for success in implementing peace settlements, and finds empirical support for her hypothesis. Walter conceptualizes conflict management efforts to end a civil war as a three-phase process. She finds different factors significant in influencing moves to the negotiation, agreement, and implementation phase, respectively. Walter (2002) empirically compares six different hypotheses with her credible commitment theory and finds support mainly for factors associated with the concept of a "hurting stalemate," mediation, and the credible commitment theory. Mediation, however, was only found important at the second stage, enhancing the chances for reaching an agreement (i.e., mediation enhances the likelihood of ending a conflict in the short term). Considering practical policy implications, the latter two findings are of importance, since these are the factors that can be manipulated by third-party actors. It would be clearly undesirable to wait until a stalemate is reached if successful intervention is possible at an earlier stage. Operationalizing mediation as a dummy variable (2002) or as a count variable (1997), however, Walter might have missed important differences between various types of mediation attempts.

Mediation efforts, as any forms of third-party conflict management, have to take into account the characteristics of the conflict that is being mediated and the country in which it occurs—the environment in which mediation takes place. The different ways in which civil wars are brought to an end, whether through a peace agreement or through one-sided victory, and the impact of the civil war outcome on the duration of the peace afterwards, have received much scholarly attention in recent years. Several distinct theories have received empirical support and a number of factors have been found to affect the timing and character of civil war terminations. Mason and Fett present a rational choice approach and find the same factors to be of importance that can be associated with the "hurting stalemate" hypothesis (Mason and Fett, 1996; Mason et al., 1999). While they use "type

of termination"—military victory versus negotiated settlement—as their dependent variable, Balch-Lindsay and Enterline (2000) examine the duration of civil wars, 1820–1992. Here, stalemates seem to be associated with longer wars; but also balanced third-party interventions are related to longer rather than shorter civil wars (see also Regan, 2002a, 2002b). Multilateral peacekeeping missions, on the other hand, seem to shorten civil wars (Enterline and Kang, 2002; see also Regan, 2002a, chap. 5). The way in which a civil war is ended likely has important consequences on the sustainability of the peace thereafter. Thus, we incorporate the most important of these factors to control for the environment in which mediation efforts occur into our theoretical framework below.

A number of other factors related to mediation efforts or the mediation environment have been found influential in accounting for mediation success in international conflict, including the timing of the mediation and previous mediation attempts by the same party, the number of fatalities during a war, and the issue and complexity of the conflict (Regan and Stam, 2000, Bercovitch and Langley, 1993). Research on how civil wars are ended has identified several factors influential in affecting the duration and outcome of the conflict. Both these aspects are important to mediators, as they need to know when best to step into which kind of conflict. Thus, these factors describe the environment in which mediation efforts occur. Balch-Lindsay and Enterline (2000) have found the issue and costs of the civil war, as well as outside interventions, important in accounting for its duration. Walter (2002, p. 78) found the presence of third-party security guarantees and the presence of a mediator influential in accounting for the outcome of a civil war (whether or not an agreement was signed). Some of these variables are similar to those isolated by research on international conflicts, but it is important to keep in mind the fundamental difference between domestic and interstate conflict. Civil wars, Licklider (1995, p. 681) argues, "will be more difficult to end than interstate wars" (see also Walter, 2002). Specifically with regard to mediation, Zartman (1997) compiles a long list of reasons why it should be more difficult to formulate an agreement that will effectively end a civil war, than it is the case with international conflicts, although negotiation, rationally, should be the "best policy" to both government and rebels. He, similar to Fearon (2004) and Walter (2002), sees the credible commitment problem as one of the main obstacles. Another reason, we believe, is the role of the status quo ante. In an interstate war, the retreat to the status quo ante— both armies retreat to their countries and leave the international border as it was—is one exit option, which is usually not available in civil wars, or at least not to both parties. A successful resolution of a civil war will often include power-sharing arrangements (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003), i.e., the rebels will enter the polity, thereby creating a new political situation.

However, some civil wars are significantly harder to end than others. Balch-Lindsay and Enterline (2000) found that balanced third-party interventions tend to increase the duration of civil wars. Fearon (2004) finds that civil wars fought about land conflicts and those where rebel groups finance themselves by controlling contraband trade last "much longer than others." The disputants in a civil war have to live with each other after the agreement is signed, overcoming their greed and grievance, factors that might have led to the outbreak of the war in the first place. In an interstate dispute the parties might stop fighting without actually resolving the dispute issue. A mediation effort might be considered effective as long as the parties do not restart shooting at each other. However, in civil wars an effective mediation effort should stop the fighting and should provide strong incentives to both sides to coexist peacefully.

Collier and Hoeffler (2004), researching the factors impacting on civil war onset, have found it useful to distinguish between greed- and grievance-related factors. Generally, they find more empirical support for greed-related factors, meaning that greedy rebels start civil wars with a view to realizing political or economic gains when the political structure provides them with an opportunity to do so. The importance of political opportunities was especially highlighted by Fearon and Laitin's (2003) study on civil war onset, which concentrates on economic, political, and military aspects of state weakness. The situation after a civil war differs, depending on whether the conflict was ended through a one-sided victory or through an agreement. While a military victory might make it impossible for the losing party to regroup and take up the fighting again, the greed or grievances that led to the conflict will remain in place. An agreement, on the other hand, leaves both sides with the military capabilities of taking up their arms again, but if intelligently drafted or well mediated, can address the wish of an opposition party for greater political power or economic participation, as well as their grievances due to ethnic discrimination, political repression, or other reasons.

To summarize, while the empirical research field of post-civil war reconstruction is a relatively new one, emphasis on mediation in terminating civil wars has been relatively rare. This gap is mirrored in the body of literature on mediation, where not many scholars have exclusively looked at mediation in the domestic context. In the following section, we propose a theoretical framework that we hope links these two bodies of literature and closes gaps in both. Other than many studies, we are interested in the long-term consequences of mediated agreements on the duration of peace, and how important these are in comparison to other characteristics of the country that might change over time.

THEORY

Two aspects of a mediation attempt are crucial in increasing or reducing the chances of an effective outcome: characteristics of the mediation attempt

itself and characteristics of the environment in which it is conducted. The environment of a mediation attempt includes features of the parties, the conflict, and the country in which it is taking place. The timing of a mediation attempt is vital for its outcome and conceptually links the mediation attempt and its environment. This categorization of causal factors is important for the effectiveness of a mediation attempt can be interpreted according to Most and Starr's (1989) conceptualization of opportunity and willingness. In the long run, mediation will only be effective if all three actors (the two adversaries and the mediator)[2] grasp moments of opportunity and if the conflict parties are all willing to commit to peace (Kleiboer, 1994). In the short run, however, the warring parties may agree to a settlement on paper, without being willing to solve the underlying issues of the conflict or without being able to implement them. This will likely be the case, when the parties have "devious objectives" (Richmond, 1998), like gaining international recognition, or just time, from participating in the mediation process; or when commitment problems prevent parties from trusting each other and implementing a reached deal (Walter, 2002; Fearon, 2004). In this section we offer a theoretical framework that ties these issues together.

If mediation efforts are to be both short- and long-term successful, they have to address the issues underlying the conflict, which can be classified according to Collier and Hoeffler's (2004) broad distinction between greed- and grievance-related factors that motivate citizens to rebel against their government. When civilians are politically repressed, ethnically discriminated against or economically deprived of their livelihoods, they might rise up against the government because of these grievances. On the contrary, when potential rebel leaders' aim is to gain political power—through secession or through overthrowing the government, or to control economic means—they might stage a rebellion out of greed. In both cases, political opportunities have to present themselves to allow the armed opposition to organize itself and to perceive at least some chance of succeeding. Such an opportunity is usually present when the state is extremely weak, a point that is underlined by Fearon and Laitin (2003), by Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and, especially with regard to the stability of the political system, by Hegre et al. (2001).

While any attempt to end a civil war short of a one-sided military victory has to aim at addressing the issues that led to the start of the civil war in the first place, the motivations of the two sides sometimes evolve over the time of the conflict. An atmosphere of distrust might arise between the two parties where they will not agree to or honor a peace agreement without outside guarantees. In other cases, conflict economies develop where small but influential groups benefit from the violence (through trade with diamonds, tropical wood, or drugs) and have little interest in ending the war (Collier et al., 2004; Fearon, 2004). While these issues should ideally be

addressed during the conflict management phase, other characteristics of the post-conflict environment will impact the likelihood of a recurring war, by providing new openings in the political opportunity structure.

Building on existing theory on mediation in international conflicts and on civil war research, the proposed causal relationships are grouped into three conceptually separate but interacting levels: Our main theoretical interest lies in the factors that describe the timing, characteristics, and outcomes of mediation efforts but we also include characteristics of the conflict and the country to control for the environment in which mediation occurs. As the latter two describe the environment of a mediation attempt, and thus create opportunities to reach and honor a settlement, the mediation characteristics may be interpreted as affecting the willingness of all three actors. Our focus of interest in this study is on the willingness part (i.e., whether third parties intervene in a consistent and vigorous manner, whether adversaries are willing and able to create a durable agreement, and whether third parties again back up such an agreement by committing themselves to ensuring the peace). The best intentions, however, might not bear fruit if the environment is too hostile. Thus we also have to include control factors related to the conflict—the weight of the past former opponents have to deal with—and characteristics of the country that might lead to a new civil war pretty much in the same way they allowed a first war to break out. These conflict and country characteristics have been established in existing studies, even if sometimes with diverging empirical results or interpretations, and we therefore only briefly explain our theoretical expectations with regard to the opportunities provided by conflict history and country environment, after laying out our theoretical expectations with regard to the factors associated with conflict management efforts.

WILLINGNESS: MEDIATION ATTEMPTS
AND CREDIBLE COMMITMENTS

Our main theoretical interest lies in whether mediation can contribute to make the peace after a civil war more durable. The mere presence of an outside party as a mediator itself is an indication of international commitment. By acting as mediators, third parties show warring factions that they want the conflict to end. Further, mediators can provide the ground for negotiations between parties that otherwise would not come together to discuss conflictive issues. For example, adversaries might use the presence of a mediator as a face-saving tool to enter talks or even end the conflict. The occurrence of mediation attempts should in most cases indicate a willingness on the part of all three actors to find a solution to the issues underlying the conflict. On the other hand, mediation efforts, especially if the adversaries are pressured into accepting a settlement that they do not

consider satisfactory, may end a conflict too early without a substantial commitment from the warring factions to honor the peace settlement. This counterargument would lead one to expect some mediated agreements to be followed by shorter durations of peace, in comparison to conflicts ended through one-sided military victories. Generally, we expect different characteristics of mediation attempts to have a long-term impact on the duration of peace after a civil war, as outlined in Hypotheses 1a – d below.

While the skills of the mediator have a substantial effect on the outcome of the mediation (Bercovitch et al., 1991), in-depth information about both the characteristics of the conflict and the disputants provides immense advantages to a mediator to manage the conflict. One of the most important ways to get information about the characteristics of an ongoing war is experience from previous mediation efforts. These efforts can provide information to mediators about what works and what does not. At the same time, mediators gain valuable experience with different aspects of the conflict. Moreover, previous mediation attempts clarify the demands of the two sides. What the fighting parties really want can provide a road map to the mediator that takes into account the underlying issues (Holbrooke, 1999). There is, however, a counterargument: The most difficult and protracted conflicts might receive more international attention. Thus, the number of mediation attempts could seem to decrease the duration of peace (assuming that protracted conflicts are more likely to recur). However, since we control for conflict costs and duration, we feel comfortable to propose the following hypothesis.

Hypothesis 1a: The greater the number of prior mediation attempts in a dispute, the longer the duration of peace after the dispute has ended.

Next, the identity of the mediator is crucial. The problem of implementation is more important in civil wars since the quarreling parties cannot simply withdraw to their respective countries as in an international conflict. Without being able to address the root causes of the civil war, it is difficult to convince the parties to end the war and abide by the rules of peace negotiations. Even if they agree to stop the actual fighting, the recurrence of the war will be more likely. Representatives of major powers have both politically and economically more power than small states and especially individuals. They are also more likely to mediate conflicts in the international area (Bercovitch and Schneider, 2000). Because of their greater resources and of the strong signal that superpower involvement sends to the adversaries, these are more likely to conclude a peace deal, and hopefully a sustainable one that addresses core issues.

Hypothesis 1b: Superpower involvement in mediation efforts will lead to a longer duration of peace after civil wars.

However, this may not be enough. Walter (2002) suggests that settlements have to be backed by credible commitments from third parties. These include actual troop deployments or strong promises that a violation of the settlement by either side will not be accepted. The importance of credible commitments is a direct consequence of the uniqueness of civil wars, as described above. Adversaries cannot simply retreat to their respective territories, thereby stopping the fighting without resolving the underlying causes. A solution to these causes has to be found during the negotiation process. Its implementation is made much more likely, when third parties provide credible commitments.

Hypothesis 1c: Third-party credible commitments increase the durability of mediated settlements.

Regan and Stam's (2000) study on mediation in international relations emphasizes the importance of timing. They found that mediation attempts that occurred toward the beginning and end of a conflict were followed by a relatively shorter period of violence than those that occurred in between. This finding is closely related to the literature on conflict ripeness. Mediation attempts at the beginning of a conflict profit from an environment that has not yet reached the highest levels of hostility. Bercovitch et al. (1991, pp. 12–13), on the other hand, argue mediation will be unlikely to yield success if attempted too early or too late. Long conflicts mean that neither of the parties had the ability to incur a swift military victory and will therefore be less likely to start a new war, as they know that the chances of winning are slim. We expect that the longer the duration of a conflict, the longer will be the peace following the conflict.

Hypothesis 1d: The longer the duration of a conflict, the longer will the peace following the conflict endure.

Walter (2004) finds that the recurrence of civil war depends less on characteristics of a previous war (and, by extension, its settlement) than on general country characteristics like the level of economic development and the openness of the political system. This provides a counterargument to our hypotheses centered on the long-term effectiveness of mediation attempts in civil wars, and we control for these and other factors related to the post-conflict environment as described in the next section.

OPPORTUNITIES FOR PEACE: CONFLICT HISTORY AND COUNTRY ENVIRONMENT

A number of causal factors characterizing the specific conflict that is sought to be ended appear to be of importance and are included in our study to

control for the environment in which mediation efforts occur. First, characteristics of the conflict constitute a burden of the past which can weigh heavily on the prospects of a sustainable peace, providing more or less ample opportunities for former adversaries willing to coexist (in case of a settlement) or being forced to do so (in case of a military victory). The issue over which the war is fought influences the chances of a resolution (see Fearon, 2004 for civil wars or, for instance, Wall et al., 2001 and Greig, 2001 for international conflicts). Ethnic wars have been found to often pose intractable problems (Horowitz, 1985). Ethnic issues, if exploited and instrumentalized by political elites, oftentimes create irrational hatred between the groups, creating grievances. This makes mediation more difficult since agreements can more easily be reached over tangible issues, while hatred and prejudices are only indirectly affected. Civil wars over ethnic issues have a higher level of perceived hostility, which makes it harder to reach durable agreements through mediation. Further, as Zubek et al. (1992) argue, the intangible character of ethnicity is likely to endanger short-term success, and will make it especially hard to reach an agreement in the first place. As a consequence, we include a variable on ethnic conflict in our empirical model.

More deadly conflicts may increase the level of hostility and might often entail feelings of hatred and vengeance that linger on after the end of a war, thereby reducing the willingness of the parties to honor a peace agreement if one exists. Even if a conflict is temporarily ended, through victory or settlement, hostile parties may only await a new opening in the political opportunity structure to strike again, especially if they feel that the underlying issues have not been addressed. Walter (2004, p. 373), for instance, argues that "wars that inflict high costs on combatants and supporters could exacerbate animosity between them and create a strong desire for retribution even if the war ends" (also see Fortna, 2004a; Quinn et al., 2007). A greater number of people killed may therefore reduce the duration of peace. As for many other variables, data on deaths is only available at the national level, and not separately for government and opposition. While the distribution of deaths is often highly skewed, we believe that this may be a good approximation to factors that produce lasting feelings of hatred and vengeance. Thus, it is important to include the number of deaths as an indicator of the intensity of a conflict.

Finally, and working against our mediation hypotheses above, a decisive victory should lead to a longer peace. When one of the parties is militarily beaten, it is unlikely to reemerge as a threat to the (old or new) government. Further, a military victory—by either the government against the rebels or by the rebels against a former government that they then replace[3]—signals military strength to other possible contenders. Yet, a one-sided military victory does not address the wish of both sides for political or economic power that might have led to the conflict in the first place, in contrast to an agreement that can address such issues.

To control for the environment in which mediation occurs, on a second level, we look at variables that characterize the country in which the conflict is taking place, and its political system. These factors characterize another dimension of the environment of a possible mediation attempt and provide wide or narrow opportunities for former adversaries to honor an agreement, quite similar to factors that might have led to a civil war in the first place. In addition, these factors can change during the peace spell.

Low levels of economic development increase the likelihood of civil war to recur in four ways. First, low economic development can be perceived as an indicator of poor government performance. Poor performance, in turn, decreases the legitimacy of the government and may attract competing claims to political power. Second, low economic development indicates that fewer resources are available to the government to fight and defeat the rebels. A rebel victory seems more likely if faced with a weak government. Fearon and Laitin (2003) find that weak states have a higher probability to experience the outbreak of a civil war, arguing that potential rebels perceive state weakness as a political opportunity that they seize upon. Third, low income levels decrease the opportunity costs for potential rebels and facilitate recruiting. This would make it easier to overcome the collective action problem or "rebel's dilemma" (Lichbach, 1995). Fourth, low economic development means that the government has few resources available to accommodate opposition groups economically (Mason and Krane, 1989). Thus, even if they would want to honor an agreement on sharing economic revenues, there might be too few to deliver on these promises. Several studies on civil war onset, including Collier and Hoeffler (2004), Fearon and Laitin (2003), Sambanis (2004), and Hegre and Sambanis (2006) found the level of economic development to be one of the most important factors impacting the likelihood of a civil war to start.

In addition to economic resources, military resources are important. A large government army should be able to prevent beaten rebels from merely withdrawing, regrouping, and attacking the government anew. A large army signals the military strength of the state and provides little opportunity for potential rebels to mount an insurgency, similar to the effects of a large government army in international politics (e.g., Vasquez, 1993).

Democratic governments will, we predict, find it both easier to implement some of the far-reaching terms of an agreement (like political power-sharing) and harder to cheat on them. Parallel to economic accommodation, democracy provides institutions and mechanisms for a political accommodation of diverging claims within a single political system (Dahl, 1998). Thus, both the government and the rebels have lower incentives to restart the war. Furthermore, democratic institutions are built on a value system that makes it easier to legitimate comprehensive agreements, which should also increase their duration, even if these democratic, peaceful conflict

resolution mechanisms have already broken down in a country that experienced a civil war. Wantchekon (2004) comments on the paradoxical finding that, in some cases, the level of democracy even increases during civil wars. Democracy operates through two channels, affecting cost-benefit calculations and providing norms adverse to violent conflict. Greig (2001) finds that democratization processes have an impact on the prospects of mediation success in interstate conflicts. However, we are aware that in many studies, democracy has not been found to be an important factor in accounting for civil war onset (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon and Laitin, 2003) and civil war recurrence (Walter, 2004). On the contrary, Hegre et al. (2001) make a point for a 'domestic democratic peace' and find that especially anocratic countries "in the middle" that mix aspects of a democratic and authoritarian political system are at danger of experiencing civil war. In addition, countries that have recently gone through political change, that is, their level of democratic development has de- or increased, are prone to civil war. Snyder (2000) reports similar findings with regard to democratizing countries where democracy has not yet been consolidated.

Having outlined our theoretical framework based on the provision of conflict management efforts in civil wars, as well as factors controlling for the environment in which mediation occurs—we proceed to describe our operationalization of these variables and the research design to empirically test the hypotheses.

RESEARCH DESIGN

In this study we apply a very broad definition of mediation success or effectiveness: The (long-term) success of a mediated agreement that ended a civil war is determined by the duration of peace that follows it. Such an understanding of mediation effectiveness emphasizes the long-term consequences rather than the short-term outcomes of mediation (see Regan and Stam, 2000, p. 246). Our theory spells out those mediation characteristics that should contribute to mediation effectiveness and those that should contribute to its failure.

Operationalization. In general, we use data from Bercovitch's (1997) International Conflict Management (ICM) dataset, from Fearon and Laitin's (2003) Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War dataset, from Doyle and Sambanis's (2000) and from Fortna's (2004a) datasets. All four datasets are publicly available.[4]

Dependent Variable. Our dependent variable is measured as the number of years that peace lasts after the end of a civil war. The duration of peace after mediated agreements is compared to the duration of peace after civil wars that ended without those settlements.

One crucial reason for empirical difficulties to measure the impact of mediation attempts on ongoing conflicts is the absence of a consensus on what exactly "success" means and how it should be measured. A mediation attempt might be considered successful if it stops the fighting between the parties. Yet, there are differences between mediation success in interstate versus intrastate wars. In interstate wars a mediation attempt can be counted as a success if it can stop the actual fighting.[5] The fact that interstate war disputants do not have to live with each other makes such a solution acceptable. On the other hand, if an agreement is reached, but the fighting cannot be stopped, this could hardly be considered a substantive success.

Civil war disputants have to live with each other, thus a successful mediation requires both ending the war and making the disputants to sign an agreement acceptable by both parties. More specifically, a mediation attempt is defined "short-term successful" if it (1) actually stops the fighting and (2) makes the warring factions settle on the conflict issues. Based on Bercovitch's ICM dataset a mediation attempt is coded "1" (short-term successful) if it leads to partial or full settlement among the disputants. All other categories, e.g., unsuccessful ceasefire, are coded "0." In the long term, and this is the dimension of mediation success we are interested in for the purpose of this study, a successful mediation attempt will have led to an agreement that guarantees the peace over a long period of time. Empirically, we define mediation success as the duration of peace following a civil war that ended with a mediated settlement and we examine how important the way a civil war ended is in explaining peace duration in comparison to characteristics of the country.

Further, the duration of post–civil war peace after a mediated settlement is compared to those civil wars that ended without a mediated settlement. At the same time, some variables allow us to make comparisons among the group of mediated settlements. The degree to which those settlements are effective is defined and operationalized, in this study, as the duration of peace[6] after the war has ended.

We mostly apply Sambanis's (2004) list of civil wars. Peace duration was calculated as either the time span between the end of a first civil war and the beginning of a second subsequent one, or as the time span from the end of a civil war until 1995, our exit year.[7] A variable called "recurrence" is coded "0" for the last year of each civil war and each subsequent peaceful year, and "1" for the first year of a recurring civil war in the same country, involving the same parties. Our unit of analysis is therefore the "post-civil war country year."

Scholars have assembled and employed a number of civil war datasets to test their hypotheses. We adopt Sambanis's (2004) civil war definition for several reasons. First, the definition, although it builds upon other widely used civil war datasets and shares some commonalities with them such as emphasizing the organized nature of armed conflict by at least one dissident

movement against a recognized nation state, provides some important components that we find it useful for our purpose. Sambanis's coding, unlike that of Correlates of War (COW) project, uses a more flexible coding rule that enables the researcher to include cases that caused less than 1,000 deaths. A war starts when it causes at least 500 to 1,000 deaths and it ends when a peace treaty is signed between the protagonists that produces at least six months of peace, or when rebels topple the government and establish a new regime (for details see Sambanis, 2004, pp. 829–831). This coding fails to capture low-level conflict (i.e., conflicts that cause less than 500 deaths). However, because we would like to delineate the effect of a set of mediation variables on the durability of peace following the end of an intrastate conflict, for our purpose, we believe that low-level conflicts are less likely to draw the attention of the mediators. This, obviously, might create a selection bias problem: the coding criteria we have adopted might have led us to analyze those cases that have caused relatively high casualty rates. However, it should be noted that the direction of such bias should be downward: it should be less likely to find support for our central propositions.

We further compared the sample with an alternative armed conflict data set: the Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset. This dataset adapts a much lower threshold (25 deaths per year) to identify the onset of a conflict and identifies three conflict categories (minor, intermediate, and war) based on the number of deaths they cause (for details, see Gleditsch et al., 2002). We tested the robustness of our empirical results by taking into account violence below the civil war threshold. The two variables—civil war and minor conflict—in some cases led to very different peace spells: The armed conflict between the Kurds and the Turkish government serves a good example. Sambanis's (2004) data set identifies one conflict that started in 1984 and ended in 1999. The Uppsala/PRIO dataset, on the other hand, divides the conflict into two subcategories: the conflict, according to the Uppsala/PRIO dataset, started in 1984 (similar to Sambanis's dataset) yet it did not cross the threshold of 1,000 deaths until 1991 to be identified as a war. Therefore, the Uppsala/PRIO dataset codes another war onset in 1991 for Turkey. For our robustness tests, we defined a second variable to identify recurring conflict based on the Uppsala/PRIO dataset. Using their threshold to identify the failure of post-conflict peace often leads to shorter peace spells yet yields similar results.

Independent Variables. We include mediation characteristics in our empirical model to test our hypotheses. First, we include a binary variable that is coded "1" if a mediation attempt occurred during the last year of a civil war, according to Bercovitch (1997), and "0" otherwise. A second dichotomous variable is coded "1" if the mediation attempt was short-term successful in that a partial or full agreement was reached and signed by the fighting parties. Data for the total number of previous mediation attempts is also derived from Bercovitch's (1997) ICM dataset. The long-term perspective

of our measure of mediation effectiveness allows us to examine the cumulative effect of a series of mediation attempts (Regan and Stam, 2000). Prior mediation attempts may be judged ineffective if they produced no agreement and did not reduce the intensity, frequency, costs, or duration of conflict. However, they might lay the groundwork without which subsequent mediation attempts would not have been effective.

Data for a dummy variable denoted "1" if a major power mediates, and "0" otherwise, are obtained from Bercovitch's dataset. Major powers are defined according to the COW definitions, including (in the post-World War II period) the United State, the Soviet Union/Russia, China, France, and Great Britain. These are the five countries with permanent seats in the UN Security Council.

The main hypothesis of Walter's (2002) "credible commitment theory" is that post-civil war peace will only be durable when a third party provides credible commitments to both fighting parties. To model credible commitments, we use Doyle and Sambanis's (2000) measure—an ordinal variable—ranking missions from enforcement mission (4) to traditional peacekeeping mission (3), observer mission (2), mediation (1), and no peacekeeping mission (0), according to the robustness of the mission's mandate. A dichotomous variable is defined to capture the effect of UN peacekeeping on the peace duration. We define a time-constant peacekeeping variable equaling "1" if traditional or enforcement missions were present at any given time in a peace spell, "0" otherwise (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000; Fortna, 2004a; Sambanis, 2004, and the website of the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations).[8]

The duration of a civil war is simply measured as the number of years elapsed until the war ended and, if the case, a mediation attempt was conducted. We include a binary variable for civil wars that ended in one-sided military victories rather than in settlements or truce agreements.

We primarily relied upon Fearon and Laitin's (2003) dataset to identify ethnic wars. Fearon and Laitin (2003, p. 79) code conflicts as ethnic conflicts, when "fighters were mobilized primarily along ethnic lines" and when the country's population included an ethnic minority numbering at least 5 percent of the total population. However, to eliminate the possibility of the results being driven by the case selection and the coding criteria, we compared the list of ethnic wars, as identified in the Fearon and Laitin's (2003) dataset, with the detailed notes provided by Sambanis (2004). With very few exceptions these two sources match. Where we failed to find a clear evidence to code a conflict as "ethnic" we coded it otherwise (i.e., nonethnic).[9] Of the 87 cases, that we were able to analyze, 50 are coded as ethnic wars. The number of accumulated total deaths in a conflict is derived from Sambanis's (2004) database. Total deaths include both civilian and battle deaths. Sambanis builds on the earlier study by Doyle and Sambanis (2000), but corrects some of their data.

Data on the size of the government military forces is obtained from the COW Capabilities dataset. While the costs of a conflict matter, countries with very large armies may be in a more favorable position to pay these costs. The variable is logged. Country characteristics are modeled as time-varying covariates (TVCs), i.e., their values may change during the post-war period. The level of economic development is measured as per capita income. Data are obtained from Fearon and Laitin's dataset and originally come from the World Bank (World Development Indicators 2001) and the Penn World Tables 5.6. Per capita income is measured in 1985 constant U.S. dollars, and is logged. To measure democracy we use a dichotomous variable that is coded "1" if a country received a score of 6 or higher on the Polity2 scale.[10] The Polity2 measure is constructed by subtracting the 11-point autocracy scale from the 11-point democracy scale, yielding a 21-point scale that ranges from −10 (least democratic) to +10 (most democratic).[11]

Finally, we distinguish between wars fought against different rebel groups and do not consider a civil war involving one group as being a resumption of an earlier war involving another group. However, even if a war is fought between different combatants it may be affected by other wars the same country has experienced. To control for the effects of other civil wars we define a war count variable, which indicates the number of civil wars that a country has experienced.

After having laid out our research design and the operationalization of our dependent and independent variables, we present the results and our interpretation of these results in the next section.

THE MODEL

The appropriate design for such a research question is a time duration or event history model. This kind of model estimates the instantaneous rate of "failure" at any given moment, given that "failure" has not yet occurred (for a detailed discussion see Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004, 1997). In this context, the model measures the likelihood of civil war recurrence in each year after a civil war has ended. This likelihood of recurring war over the probability of continuing peace, the "hazard rate," is estimated as a function of the conflict, country, and mediation characteristics. Variables that entail a longer duration of peace decrease the hazard rate in any given year after the end of a civil war, whereas variables that decrease the duration of peace, increase the hazard rate, making failure (i.e., the recurrence of war) more likely. While some countries may not experience a subsequent civil war until the cut-off date of 1995, time duration models take account of this by defining these cases as "right censored."

We specify and test both Cox and Weibull models. While the semi-parametric Cox model makes no assumptions about the underlying basic

hazard rate, the Weibull model assumes a constant hazard rate and a constantly decreasing or increasing impact of the covariates. However, only with a Weibull model can we calculate estimated durations for different types of cases, which make the interpretation of our results more intuitive (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004; Cleves et al., 2002).

From a methodological point of view there are two different types of independent variables to be included in the model: those that stay constant over the whole postwar period and those that vary from year to year, so-called time-varying covariates (TVCs). The conflict and mediation characteristics do not change once the civil war has ended, with or without a mediated settlement. These variables are measured in the last year of the civil war, which is the first year included in our analysis. In all subsequent years (until 1995 or until a new war starts), the values of these variables do not change. Country characteristics (e.g., level of democracy or economic development), however, may change from year to year over the duration of the postwar period. Moreover, these changes may influence the likelihood of seeing a new civil war occur. A democratization process, for instance, may decrease the probability of renewed civil war substantially, regardless of the characteristics of the previous war. Consequently, country characteristics are modeled as TVCs in the time duration model, whereas conflict and mediation characteristics are not. TVCs, as well as the hazard rate, are measured on a yearly basis. The inclusion of TVCs can cause temporal dependency problems since the data consist of multiple records for each unit. To deal with this problem we use robust standard errors and cluster same-country observations (see Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004).

One potential problem from using time duration models arises from the possibility that the influence of some of the independent variables may disproportionately vary over time (Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn, 2001). The impact of some conflict or mediation characteristics may decline more rapidly over time than the impact of some others. We empirically test for this problem.

RESULTS

Our models are based on 1,357 observations (i.e., 1,357 post-civil war country years). We are able to include 87 civil wars from Sambanis's (2004) list. In 28 cases (31.46%), mediation occurred during the last year of the civil war; in 11 cases (12.37%), mediation attempts were successful in reaching an agreement between the parties.[12] The summary statistics for these and the other independent variables, based on the country years included in the analyses, are presented in Table 1.

The results from duration analyses with both a Cox and a Weibull model are summarized in Table 2.[13] In general, we find several factors related to mediation efforts, as well as characteristics of the country and conflict, significant in impacting the duration of peace after civil war.

TABLE 1 Summary Statistics for the Independent Variables

Variable	Min	Max	Mean	St.dev.
Ethnic Civil War	0	1	0.452	0.498
Battle Deaths, unlogged	1000	2125000	185868.5	436466.9
Battle Deaths, logged	6.908	14.57	9.85	2.183
War Duration	1	36	3.942	4.69
Victory	0	1	0.847	0.36
Democracy (binary)	0	1	0.237	0.426
GDP, not logged (in 1000$)	0.048	10.61	2.219	1.916
GDP, logged	−3.037	2.362	0.433	0.894
Army Size, not logged (in 1000)	1	4750	474.515	972.511
Army Size, logged	0	8.466	4.634	1.825
Mediation	0	1	0.236	0.425
Mediated Agreement	0	1	0.092	0.289
Superpower Mediation	0	1	0.116	0.320
# of Med. Attempts	0	78	2.770	8.514
UN Peacekeeping (time-constant)	0	1	0.033	0.179
War Count	1	5	1.368	0.753

Note: Summary statistics are based on only those country-years included in the analyses below.

TABLE 2 Event History Analysis for the Duration of Peace after Civil War, 1945–1995

	Cox Model		Weibull Model	
	Hazard Ratio [robust se]	P > |z|	Hazard Ratio [robust se]	P > |z|
Mediated Agreement	2.59 [1.66]	0.139	**3.03 [1.97]**	**0.09**
Mediation	**.26 [0.21]**	**0.09**	**.21 [0.16]**	**0.05**
Super Power Mediation	**3.19 [2.24]**	**0.10**	**4.52 [3.15]**	**0.03**
Total Number of Mediation Attempts	1.01 [0.02]	0.57	1.007 [0. 02]	0.70
UN Peacekeeping (time-constant)	1.3 [1.2]	0.78	1.16 [.93]	0.85
Ethnic War	**4.76 [3.16]**	**0.019**	**6.04 [4.31]**	**0.01**
Log of Total Deaths	**1.33 [.11]**	**<0.01**	**1.34 [.10]**	**<0.001**
War Duration	1.009 [0.05]	0.83	1.04 [0.05]	0.43
Military Victory	1.18 [0.56]	0.72	1.07 [0.52]	0.90
Democracy	**.28 [.21]**	**0.09**	**.25 [0. 19]**	**0.07**
Log of GDP	1.01 [.39]	0.97	.99 [0.47]	0.98
Log of Army Size	**.66 [0.09]**	**0.006**	**.61 [0. 09]**	**0.001**
War Count	.85 [.19]	0.48	.89 [0.23]	0.66
Number of Subjects	87		87	
Observations	1,357		1,357	
Wald chi2(13)	66.01		99.88	
Prob > chi2	<.001		<.001	

Note: Robust standard errors clustered on country in parentheses (two-tail).

Three of the mediation variables are found to significantly impact the duration of peace across both models—and two of them reduce the duration of peace. Mediated agreements increase the probability of a new war. The coefficient for this variable suggests that it increases the odds of peace failure by more than 200%. This finding underlines the differences between short-term and long-term mediation success and the necessity to distinguish between these two aspects conceptually. Possibly, powerful mediators sometimes drive the antagonists into concluding an agreement without them being sufficiently committed to peace. In line with this, superpower mediation is found to reduce the duration of peace (superpower involvement as a mediator increases the odds of peace failure by 219% and 352% in the Cox and Weibull models, respectively). Superpowers, with their greater political, military, and economic resources, but also their own interests, might drive the fighting parties into concluding a relatively superficial peace agreement that only holds in the short run but does not address core issues of the conflict—neither those related to greed nor to grievances. An alternative explanation would be that antagonists sometimes do have "devious objectives" (Richmond, 1998) and use mediation to gain time or international recognition.

The mere presence of mediators, on the other hand, is significantly related to a longer peace. Its effect on the peace duration is substantially important (it decreases the odds of war resumption by more than 75%). Our last mediation variable, the total number of mediation attempts, seems to have no discernible effect on the peace duration. Likewise, the presence of UN peacekeeping forces does not have a noticeable influence on the outcome. Finally, the variable that controls for the number of civil wars a country experienced (war count) yields no significant results.

The results suggest that the presence of third-party mediators seems to entail a longer peace, but that mediated agreements as such seem to make things worse. Mediated agreements, especially those that do not address core issues, create a situation of what Tilly (1978) calls "dual sovereignty." This concept depicts the structural conditions that facilitate the onset or resumption of a civil conflict. Our findings suggest that mediated agreements might help former protagonists to preserve their power and thus increase the odds of war resumption. These findings counter our initial expectations and we can only offer this ad hoc explanation.

Of the characteristics of the previous conflict, ethnic war and a total number of people killed both significantly decrease the duration of peace following the war. The coefficients for the ethnic war variable suggest that ethnic wars increase the odds of peace failure by more than 300%. Although our primary goal is to identify the link between mediation features and the sustainable peace following the end of civil wars, the significant finding on the ethnic variable sheds light on the recent debate over the role of ethnicity on the onset of civil war. Following Fearon and Laitin's (2003) work, in which the authors argue that state strength (measured, among others, as

GDP per capita) accounts for the onset of civil war and ethnicity fails to explain the phenomenon, some have challenged this conclusion. Cederman and Girardin (2007, also see Blimes, 2006), for instance, argue that the measure used by Fearon and Laitin (an ethno-linguistic fractionalization index) does not fully capture the effect of ethnic division on the onset of civil war. Employing an alternative index of ethnic division that emphasizes the interactions between an ethnic group and the state apparatus, Cederman and Girardin (2007) find that ethnicity helps to explain for political violence.[14] Our results suggest that ethnicity is an important factor that brings about the collapse of the peace following the end of a civil war thereby indirectly providing support for the negative effect of ethnicity on the onset of civil wars. More intense conflicts with higher casualties increase the odds of peace failure. Both results underline the importance that hostility plays in leading to renewed conflict. Rather than tiring the fighting parties, a high number of people killed seems to increase the willingness to restart the fighting, perhaps because as a vengeance for the incurred mutual losses. Further, we do not find conflicts that ended with a military victory by one side to be significantly less likely to recur than wars that ended in settlements or truce agreements. Both the duration of a civil war and its outcome are not significant in either of the two models.

Of the country characteristics, we find democracy to significantly increase the duration of peace after civil war, if only at a nominal confidence level of 10%. Nevertheless, democratic countries are substantially less likely to experience another war (the odds of war resumption are decreased by more than 70%). Other than the conflict and mediation characteristics, the level of democracy may change over the duration of the peace spell. While democracy has not been found to play a major role in several studies on other aspects of civil war (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004, and Fearon and Laitin, 2003, for instance, do not find democracy to significantly reduce the probability of civil war onset), this finding emphasizes the importance of political factors in civil war research. It might also be interpreted as another aspect of a "democratic civil peace" (Hegre et al., 2001), even though this finding only applies to countries that have experienced a civil war. Surprisingly, the level of economic development is not significantly related to the duration of peace. One possible explanation might be that countries that have already experienced a civil war are mostly relatively poor and that once a civil war has broken out, economic standing no longer plays an important role. The level of economic development is often found to be one of the most important factors in explaining civil war onset (e.g., Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Sambanis, 2004; Hegre and Sambanis, 2006). The government army's size, however, is significantly linked to an increase in the duration of peace and a reduction in the probability of recurring war. In accordance with arguments that emphasize the importance of opportunities to wage an insurgency, a large army seems to scare potential rebels away.

To test for the robustness of these results, we ran the same models (i.e., with an identical set of independent variables) while coding failure not only if a civil war already recurred but also when domestic political violence (between the same adversaries) below the civil war threshold broke out and obtained very similar results (not reported). The variable for mediated settlements is statistically significant in both the Cox and the Weibull models with this alternative dependent variable. We used data on minor conflicts from the Uppsala/PRIO dataset as described above for these robustness tests.

CONCLUSIONS

Similar to Walter's (2004) study, we find factors on different levels important in accounting for the duration of peace and the probability of recurring war. Characteristics of mediation attempts to solve a conflict, but also factors related to the environment in which such conflict management efforts occur, significantly impact the duration of peace. Ethnic and bloody wars are often followed by an unstable peace, whereas a high level of democracy and a large army increase the duration of post–civil war peace. The effects of mediation are more complex. While some characteristics of mediation attempts we included in our model do not show significant results, the mere presence of mediators helps ensure a longer peace. Mediated agreements and superpower mediation, to the contrary, reduced the duration of peace. We find that the effects of mediation during civil wars deserve further scholarly attention. Ending civil wars is difficult, often even more difficult than ending interstate disputes.

There are some caveats to these findings. Since the analysis is restricted to the time period from 1945 to 1995, the full effect of the increasing international interest in civil wars after the end of the Cold War may not be fully captured in our model. In addition, the data we use is relatively crude and more fine-grained data might lead to different results. Still, we believe that the findings presented here provide interesting puzzles for future research and for practical policy.

Our results have some practical implications and could inspire further, more in-depth research into the long-term effects of mediation. Although we find mediated agreements to reduce the duration of peace following a civil war, it is obvious that the international community should continue to provide resources to mediation attempts rather than letting the adversaries fight it out by themselves. What is also clear, however, is that much more attention needs to be paid to the quality of an agreement. Judging from our results, it is not enough to send in a superpower or to conduct a series of mediation attempts. Other characteristics of a mediation attempt might play a bigger role and deserve more attention by policymakers—like the complex interaction patterns between adversaries and mediators, whether information barriers are overcome, whether procedural

justice is achieved or whether the underlying conflict issues are resolved. Yet, such aspects are hard to quantify for large-n empirical studies and are better dealt with in in-depth case or comparative case studies. Hartzell and Hoddie (Hoddie and Hartzell, 2003; Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003; Hartzell et al., 2001; Hartzell, 1999) have emphasized the importance of power-sharing arrangements. For future research, it would also be interesting to examine how mediation attempts impact the quality of such arrangements—or whether they do at all. This might also be better done using small-n research designs.

In sum, the present study is a first step toward a better understanding of long-term consequences of mediation attempts. We have found the presence of mediators to lead to a longer duration of peace, but mediated agreements to shorten it. We hope, though, that future studies will further explore the nexus between civil war termination and the duration of peace, leading to more and more concrete policy implications.

NOTES

1. For interstate conflicts, Greig (2001) finds that factors favoring short-term mediation success are substantially different from factors conducive to long-term success.

2. It is important to realize that the mediator has its own preferences and agenda, and its own set of reasons to offer and conduct mediation (Bercovitch and Schneider, 2000; Greig, 2005).

3. The binary distinction between the government and the rebels is apparently a simplifying one that does not always represent the actual situation. However, it is commonly used in the civil war literature for reasons of clarity.

4. Bercovitch's dataset is available at http://www.posc.canterbury.ac.nz/staff_pages/jbercovitch/mediation.html Fearon and Laitin's dataset is available at www.stanford.edu/group/ethnic; and Fortna's dataset is available at www.columbia.edu/polisci/faculty/fortna.htm; all accessed October 2004. For Doyle and Sambanis's data set, see http://www.worldbank.org/research/conflict/papers/peacebuilding/datanotes_final.pdf

5. For example, a mediation attempt to reduce the tensions between India and Pakistan and/or to stop the actual fighting between these two states does not necessarily require the two states to agree on the terms of the settlement.

6. The word *peace* in this study, refers to negative peace only (i.e., the absence of civil war), not the absence of violence on a lesser scale, although we also conducted robustness tests with a stricter definition of peace (see below).

7. Comparable to Fortna (2004a), Doyle and Sambanis (2000), and Walter (2002), we coded war recurrence as "1" if the fighting parties were the same.

8. The data were also analyzed with a time-variant peacekeeping variable with similar results being obtained. The website was accessed at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/index.asp in June 2005.

9. For instance, Fearon and Laitin code the war in Guatemala as ethnic. Unlike Fearon and Laitin, Sambanis (2004) identifies two wars for Guatemala. However, despite its ethnic dimensions, ideological issues primarily dominated the conflict. Therefore we coded this conflict as non-ethnic. Sambanis (2004) reports a war for Thailand between 1966 and 1982. Fearon and Laitin do not report any war for this period. Further despite its ethnic dimensions as reported in Sambanis's (2004) notes, ethnicity was not the dominant feature. This war hence was coded as nonethnic. Finally, despite some ethnic dimensions in the war in Namibia, the evidence is weak, hence coded nonethnic. Lastly, neither Fearon and Laitin (2003) nor Sambanis (2004) report any significant ethnic dimension for the war in Iraq in 1959 (Shammar). This war is also coded as nonethnic.

10. While 6 points on the Polity2 scale may seem a low standard for democracy—Jaggers and Gurr (1995, p. 479), for example, suggest a cutoff at 7 points—few former civil war countries are very democratic. When examining the subset of countries that have experienced a civil war, it may therefore make more sense to use this slightly lower threshold.

11. The Polity data were derived from Fearon and Laitin (2003).

12. We also analyzed the models with an interactive term of mediation and UN peacekeeping forces. Nonetheless, since all UN peacekeeping missions, with the exception of Iraq (1991–1993, Shiite uprising) and Haiti (1991–1995), followed a mediation attempt the interaction term was dropped. On the other hand, of the cases that were used to estimate the models, 19 cases saw mediation with no UN peacekeeping forces.

13. We tested for violations of the proportional hazards assumption but could not find any problems.

14. For a response to Cederman and Girardin (2007) see Fearon, Kasara, and Laitin (2007).

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