

Chapter 8

Costs of Change

Social change, like everything else today, has its costs. There are various types of costs, and this chapter will examine some of the more prevalent economic, social, and psychological costs of change at different levels in society. Certain outcomes of change, such as environmental degradation, are, in one way or another, costly for almost everyone. Other changes affect groups and individuals in different ways; some will find change beneficial and others disadvantageous. As Vilfredo Pareto (1935:1472-1473; Powers, 1987) pointed out a long time ago, for every choice made or imposed, some other potential good is sacrificed. Pareto was concerned with the price that individuals as members of a collectivity have to pay when conflicting and contradictory benefits are emphasized. For example, an army protects the country from the danger of foreign invasion. At the same time, it endangers the careers and even the lives of many young persons. This is the classic case of Pareto's dilemma of utility "for a community" and "of a community." The former refers to the various individual and group interests in a community in which the emphasis is on divergent personal benefits, advantages, and satisfactions. The latter refers to the interests of a community as a collectivity, to its capacity to survive in a hostile environment through collective strength and determination. Essentially, Pareto makes a distinction between what is good for some individuals and groups in a community versus what is good for the community as a whole. Often, the choice is painful.

Contemporary illustrations abound of Pareto's dilemma of utility "for a community" and "of a community." At times, a choice has to be made for example, between air pollution and employment in a community. Because of the high cost of pollution-abatement devices, a company may be forced to close down. The costs of the resulting unemployment may be juxtaposed

with the costs of pollution. Continued employment can be seen as a "utility for a community," whereas elimination of the source of pollution is a "utility of a community." The choice can be especially difficult in a situation in which the polluting industrial firm is the principal employer in a community. Pareto's dilemma is further exemplified by the current transformations in Eastern Europe. In view of the urgency of economic development, the environment must wait. This policy decision underscores a fundamental question that Eastern Europe faces as it continues its shift to a Western-style market economy. Should antipollution devices, fines, and taxes be further postponed in order to protect factories and jobs? Or, will this bring health and cleanup costs in the future, not only to restore the havoc of the past but also the new damage still being caused today (Simons, 1994:A6)?

Pareto's notion of conflicting utilities has obvious implications for the study of the costs of change. Different groups or communities in a society are affected by change differently, and the introduction of something new will invariably result in benefits for some and losses for others. As Peter L. Berger (1974:223) correctly observes: "There can be no social change without costs. The questions to be asked with intense seriousness are just what the particular costs are, who is being asked to pay them, and whether the putative gains make these costs acceptable." It is obvious that the costs of social change are never evenly distributed. What is not so obvious in many instances is the answer to the question, Who benefits from the change and who pays for it? Multiple objectives and values of competing social groups are noncommensurable. There is really no calculus for determining "net" pains and pleasures for widely differing groups. Equality, for example, is a uniformly relative and never an absolute condition. When a foundation for a new equality is established, some other inequality by necessity is imposed. The principal question is never equality in the abstract, but which equality, at what price of some new equality.

There are, however, several large-scale changes at the level of society that extract a toll from most of us. The potential sources of costs include rapid economic growth, environmental deterioration, increased pressures on natural resources, and population growth. The costs stemming from these and other changes can, of course, be categorized in a number of different ways. For example, they may be subsumed under the major institutions, or the costs may be analyzed under the headings of "micro" and "macro" changes. For the sake of simplicity and clarity, such costs are classified under the categories of *economic*, *social*, and *psychological* costs. It should be noted, though, that these three cost categories are separated only for analytical reasons, and, as may be expected, there is a fair amount of overlapping among them. Finally, it should be recalled that the word *cost*, in addition to referring to the price of something, also implies a loss or sacrifice. In this sense, the term has a negative connotation, which may give an impression that parts of this chapter convey a degree of pessimism. In emphasizing the costs of social



change, the discussion will be obviously one-sided and biased toward material supporting the arguments although it will be devoid of what Nicholas Lehman (1997), a well-known journalist, refers to as "rhetorical overkill." There are, of course, other perspectives suggesting that it is erroneous to argue that growth leads to resource depletion, environmental and population problems, and a slate of other worries (see, for example, Sagoff, 1997). Certainly it is not my intention to paint a bleak picture of social change or to belabor the notion that "The history of mankind is a history of pain" (Berger, 1974:137). The purpose is simply to identify and analyze some of the more conspicuous costs associated with the process of change. Sociology is, at least ideally, value-free, and the interpretation of events is conditioned by evidence and not by notions of "good" or "bad," although it should be recognized that not all sociologists adhere to the notion of a value-free discipline. With this in mind, let us turn to the economic costs of change.

ECONOMIC COSTS

In the traditional credo of the economists, more is better. Indeed, the description of economic growth as a process that "widens the area of choice" would seem to favor an economic system that, over time, produces—among other things—a per-capita increase in goods and services. Such an increase presupposes economic growth, a highly debated subject that will be briefly examined in the context of the economic costs of change.

Economic Growth

The proponents of accelerated economic development argue that "growth is a necessary condition for social advance, for improving the quality of the total environment . . . it is still demonstrably true that growth in per-capita gross national product has been associated with rising levels of human well-being" (Heller, 1972:11, 29). This notion is supported by the view that "The pattern of growth in the United States in the postwar years yielded benefits to individuals far in excess of the costs it required of them. To that extent our material progress has had humane content" (Lampman, 1968:162). The benefits of rapid economic development, its advocates argue, entail an increased range of choices, greater control over the environment, more services and goods, improved status of women, a release from the drudgery of hard physical labor, greater humanitarianism, and steadily lower prices for foodstuffs and raw materials (Kennedy, 1987:30).

The benefits of economic development are undeniable. It brings about a remarkable improvement in the standard of living for the average person compared with the average individual in preindustrial or early industrial societies (Lenski, Nolan, & Lenski, 1995). The concomitants of economic

growth include greater educational opportunities, better health care, improved nutrition, increased availability of all types of goods and services, greater material comfort, more leisure opportunities, longer life expectancy, and so on.

The realization of the benefits of economic development is the subject of virtually all of the literature dealing with the problems of underdeveloped societies. The various accounts focus sharply on statistics that show the extent to which progress must be made in order to emerge as the equal of developed nations. Data on birth and death rates, literacy, rate of gross domestic product, per-capita income, percent of urbanization, and the like from underdeveloped countries are compared with those of developed nations. But the numbers do not take into account such factors as environmental pollution and dehumanization at the workplace and in the marketplace (Greenhouse, 1987). Furthermore, a large part of the literature on development deals with the strategies of development and concerns itself with whether a broad push is needed to ensure rising per-capita income, whether a basic level of investment is the key to emergence, how the generation of capital allows the progress of growth, and so forth.

Unfortunately, too little has been said about the costs of growing pains associated with rapid growth rates and economic development, and these costs can be great (see, for example, Mishan, 1977). Any society has at all times a number of possible growth rates that it may pursue under different "growthmanship" strategies. For each of these rates, there is a different cost involved, with higher and higher rates involving greater sacrifice on the part of the people and on the resources of the society. It may be said that the "proper" rate of growth for a society is the one in which the benefits of increasing the rate of growth slightly are weighed against and balanced with the costs of achieving that rate of increase. Ideally, the goal of a society should be that of optimization of the rate of development and not the maximization of that rate. Humans do not live by GNP alone. For development, the emphasis needs to be on what is the optimal (read: "best") and not the maximal (read: "largest") volume of goods and services. However, who will determine the optimal versus the maximal rate of development is another question.

An influential World Bank (1997) report on development shows that in many countries high growth rates are accompanied by increasing unemployment, rising disparities in incomes both between groups and between regions, and the deterioration of social and cultural conditions. Aspirations that may have been limited in the absence of development may rise rapidly with the emergence of the first signs of development when the people realize that things are not what they should be. Personal satisfaction may decline, not increase, especially when growth is associated with high rates of inflation and unemployment, as has happened in many parts of the world in the 1980s and 1990s (Bensman & Vidich, 1987; Hamilton & Wright, 1986;



Young and Sachs, 1994). Ezra J. Mishan (1967:171) already correctly pointed out four decades ago that the continued pursuit of economic development in the Western world is more likely "on a balance to reduce rather than increase social welfare." Similar early warning was sounded by Barry Commoner (1971:295), who associated much of economic development with ecologically faulty and socially wasteful types of production rather than with an improvement in the actual welfare of individuals. Some authors go so far as to suggest that economic activity, as currently pursued, could be approaching a level where further growth in the gross world product costs more than it is worth (Postel, 1994:3–21).

Environmental Costs

Intentionally or unintentionally, economic activity has often had a negative effect on the environment, although there is some recent evidence to suggest that governments need not sacrifice environmental quality for economic well-being in developed countries (see, for example, Adam, 1998; Ghimire & Pimbert, 1997; Smothers, 1994). From the beginning of human history, the need for basic resources, such as wood for fire and shelter, ran counter to the preservation of the natural habitat. Overgrazing transformed hundreds of thousands of acres of fertile land into barren deserts. Improper plowing techniques caused fertile soil to wash away during heavy rains. But the threats posed to the environment in earlier years are minuscule compared with the current level of damage and destruction (Hempel, 1996). In this section are presented some examples of economic costs associated with development and change as they affect the environment. The discussion will focus on solid waste, air and water pollution, and climate modification.

Solid Waste An inevitable concomitant of economic growth is *solid waste*. Every step in the production process—whether food, clothing, drugs, cars, or books—creates useless material that is discarded. Growing populations, rising incomes, and changing consumption patterns combine to complicate further waste-generation and management patterns. The United States is the largest producer of wastes in the world. Per capita generation of solid waste increased 65 percent over the last 25 years (United Nations Environment Programme, 1997:103). Throughout North America, urban centers are having increasing problems finding sites for new sanitary landfills.

In his or her lifetime, the average American accounts for the use of some 540 tons of construction materials, 23 tons of wood, 16 tons of metals, and 32 tons of organic chemicals (Young & Sachs, 1994:11); much of these will be discarded in one form or another. The volume of waste expands as the size of a community grows, for as people earn more money, they increase their consumption of food, beverages, and durable goods, and they demand more convenience items. As more women enter the labor force, for example,



the demand for convenience products grows. Frozen, canned, and vacuum-packed food packages are often used for the preparation of meals at home. In developed countries, packaging contributes roughly 30 percent of the weight and 50 percent of the volume of household waste. In the United States, more than \$1 out of every \$10 spent for food and beverages pays for packaging. In 1994, Americans spent far more for food packaging than farmers received in income. Between 1960 and 1990, the volume of waste produced each year by the average American household doubled, along with the annual tonnage of municipal solid waste (Young & Sachs, 1994:19). Currently, each American produces, on the average, 1 ton of waste per year, and, at any given time, accounts for 11 tons of steel in personal possessions (car, refrigerator, washing machine, mattress springs, etc.), most of which are designed to become junk as soon as possible. The returnable bottle and recyclable paper had become too costly by the late 1990s, and the economic costs of the "Kleenex mentality" are practically unmeasurable (Ackerman, 1997).

Much of household waste also contains hazardous or toxic materials, such as mercury from batteries, cadmium from fluorescent lights, and toxic chemicals from cleaning solvents, paints, and wood preservatives. In addition, thousands of businesses produce the equivalent of more than 1 ton of toxic waste annually for each person in the United States (Shabecoff, 1985:31) in the form of contaminated oil, solvents, acids, and sludges. This does not include wastes from service stations, dry cleaners, photo-processing laboratories, and other "small generators." Electric power plants, hospitals, and industry also produce an estimated 100,000 tons of radioactive waste annually.

Frightening incidents, such as at New York's Love Canal region in 1979 or at Times Beach, Missouri, in 1982, focused attention on a new generation of environmental hazards that defy easy solution: dangerous wastes. Some 800 families had to leave the Love Canal area after unusually high rates of illness and death resulting from chemical leaks from an old industrial dump. The Times Beach area was contaminated with deadly dioxin—one of the most toxic substances made and a suspected cause of cancer. The cost of relocating residents and removing the contamination has already exceeded \$100 million.

Only about 10 percent of toxic waste is disposed of properly. In many cases, the deadly materials have been piling up for years in dumps and pits. They have been dumped in sewers, rivers, and oceans. Most toxic waste cannot be disposed of safely because there are no available sites or else the cost of proper disposal is too great. Even for the 11 billion tons of nontoxic industrial waste, it is estimated that in the next few years, roughly half of the cities in the United States will have run out of landfill space (Young & Sachs, 1994).

Air Pollution Another costly byproduct of economic growth is air pollution. It is worst in big cities where smog alerts are daily occurrences (Elsom, 1996), but because of world air currents, it is rapidly becoming a

global concern. Los Angeles produces over 3,500 tons of pollutants each year, London 1,200 tons, and Mexico City 5,000 (*Human Development Report*, 1997). The major source of pollutants in developed countries is from transport vehicles. Singapore plans to charge cars for every meter they travel, they are restricted in many European cities, and India is thinking of banishing them from within two miles of the Taj Mahal (*Economist*, 1994a:91). Oil, coal, and natural gas used for heating and generating electricity are also major contributors. There is also coal pollution that people generate inside their homes. For example, in winter, when a sour fog makes Eastern European cities look like they "belong in an old black-and-white movie," much soot comes from the tens of thousands of domestic heaters, stoves, and boilers (Simons, 1994:A6). In addition, chemical plants, paper and steel mills, oil refineries, smelters, and trash burning spew additional tons of pollutants into the air. There is a great deal of variation from area to area in the kind and amount of pollutants. The most common pollutants include carbon monoxide, hydrocarbons, nitrogen and sulfur oxides, ozone, and an assortment of tiny particles of soot (which penetrate human lungs, where they mix with water to form a potent acid which is damaging to the tissues), ash, and other industrial byproducts. World carbon emissions from the burning of fossil fuels climbed to 6.25 billion tons in 1996, reaching a new high for the second year in a row (Brown, Renner & Flavin, 1997:58).

Air pollution is linked to a variety of illnesses and is a major factor in the increase of respiratory diseases, particularly asthma (Misch, 1994: 131-132). An estimated 1.3 billion people in the developing world live in areas that have dangerously unsafe air, and, in 1993, some 4 million third-world children under the age of five died from acute respiratory disease, brought on in most cases by air pollution (Easterbrook, 1994:60). (This is about as many people of all ages who died of all causes that year in the United States and Western Europe.) More than two decades after the passage of the Clean Air Act in the United States, one in three Americans still lives in an area where the air is too polluted to meet federal health standards (United Nations Environment Programme, 1997:101).

Some of the costlier forms of air pollution can be seen in the effects of acid rain and ozone depletion. Pollutants from coal-burning plants, automobiles, and other industrial sources include sulfur and nitrogen oxides. They are changed by a chemical process in the atmosphere, then travel great distances and fall as sulfuric and nitric acids in rain, snow, fog, or even dry particles. Acid rain has dramatic effects on the environment. Several countries in Europe have reported significant forest damage. Over half of the trees in Germany and Austria were damaged during the late 1980s and early 1990s, causing economic losses of well over \$35 billion per year (*Human Development Report*, 1997). China is in the midst of a national environmental crisis whose commutative effect is an immeasurable but unmistakable threat to continued economic growth in coming years. For instance, half of the rain in

Guangdong Province is now acidic, a problem that has become endemic in southern China (Tyler, 1994). In tens of thousands of lakes on both sides of the Atlantic, all aquatic life has been destroyed. One observer sardonically noted that the water, lacking organic material, "of an acidified lake assumed the crystal clarity of a swimming pool—a deceptive beauty indeed" (Hillary, 1984:137). Acid rain is also harmful to exposed metal surfaces, buildings made of limestone or marble, and automobile paint. Drinking water is affected, and acid rain also contributes to soil erosion and deforestation problems. It has even been known to turn blond hair temporarily green. Acid rain also poses a difficult international problem, in that pollution generated in one country often rains down on another. For example, much of the pollution created in the United States often ends up in Canada, where it creates serious environmental damages.

Acid rain represents only one dimension of the pollution problem that stems from the productive process. Another serious concern is ozone depletion, which is created by the release of chlorofluorocarbons into the atmosphere. Used as propellants in aerosol cans, as foam-blowing agents, and as coolants for refrigerators and air conditioners, the gases emitted from these sources contribute to the thinning out of the ozone layer. As this protective layer of ozone diminishes, the amount of ultraviolet and cosmic radiation that reaches the earth's surface increases, which causes increased rates of skin cancer and destroys the food sources of many marine animals. It also contributes to climatic changes by warming the earth's atmosphere. Although many industrial nations have restricted the use of freon gases, which also contribute to ozone depletion, there is an increased demand for and use of them in third-world countries. As a result, an additional 10 percent depletion of the ozone layer by the middle of the next century is projected. Such a depletion could result in nearly 2 million additional skin cancer cases each year, damage to materials such as plastic and paints worth about \$2 billion annually, and incalculable damage to crops and marine life (Postel, 1994).

Water Pollution The economic costs of water pollution are also inestimable. With 97 percent of the earth's water in the salty seas and three-fourths of the remainder locked up in glacial ice, the less than 1 percent of available freshwater appears a very small resource to serve the world's growing industrial and agricultural needs. Thus, it is not surprising that three-fourths of the world's population is without an adequate or safe water supply. In 1994, the world's supply of water, per capita, is only one-third what it was in 1970. Over 1.5 billion people lack access to clean water in the developing world, and water scarcity is increasingly becoming a factor in ethnic strife and political tension (*Human Development Report*, 1997). Freshwater supplies take a heavy load of pollution, because the lakes and rivers are the drainage systems into which industry, agriculture, and municipalities



dump their wastes. In turn, pollution reduces marine life and fisheries and ruins recreational pleasures in many key urban areas. In addition, rural areas, especially the corn belt and California's agricultural valleys, already confront serious water-quality problems as a result of nitrate runoff from the soil in heavily fertilized agricultural areas. The nitrogen content of the Midwest's water drainage system is equal to the sewage of 20 million people, or twice that of the Lake Erie basin population. This, in turn, presents serious health problems. Although compared with other countries the United States enjoys relatively good water quality, still one out of five people receives water from a facility that violates a national safety standard (United Nations Environment Programme, 1997:99). Already physicians in some areas recommend bottled water for infants. The situation is much worse in developing countries. In China, for example, an estimated 25 billion tons of unfiltered industrial pollutants enter into the waterways annually, the water in rivers turn black "like soy sauce" (Tyler, 1994), and there is more toxic water pollution in that one country than in the entire Western world (Easterbrook, 1994:61).

Another kind of water pollution is thermal discharge from factories and power plants. The higher temperature of the discharge decreases the dissolved oxygen in the water, thus increasing metabolic rates while depleting oxygen supplies. As a consequence, small organisms such as fish larvae and plankton are destroyed. This, in turn, will create taste and odor problems in municipal water supplies and will contribute to the reduction of the fish supply.

Marine life is also affected by spills from oil tankers. Accidents involving huge tankers such as the well-known Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska are becoming quite common. This problem was further augmented during the 1991 Gulf War when the Iraqi army deliberately spilled close to 10 million barrels of oil into the Persian Gulf. Dozens of ships routinely, and without much publicity, run into each other or develop accidental leaks, resulting in massive oil spills. Ruptured pipelines further contribute to pollution, and an October 1994 break in the Russian Arctic had a spill volume of eight times the amount of the leak from the Exxon Valdez, which was 240,000 barrels. The oil that had burst through the dam and flowed to the tributary of the Pechora was more than three feet deep, six to seven miles long, and fourteen yards wide (Verhovek, 1994:1). In addition, smaller spills and oil wastes routinely flushed from the tanks of ships contribute significantly to pollution. Commercial fishing fleets each year dump some 50 million pounds of packaging material into the sea and lose some 300 million pounds of indestructible plastic fishing lines and nets. The resulting annual death toll is 1 million to 2 million sea birds, about 100,000 sea mammals, and countless fish. Moreover, about 30 percent of the fish in the world's oceans have tiny pieces of plastic in their stomach that interfere with digestion (Browne, 1987).



Climate Modification Fluctuation in the earth's temperature is another environmental problem brought about by economic activity. The climate can be affected in three ways: (1) by changing the concentration of substances such as water; (2) by releasing heat into the atmosphere; and (3) by making changes in the physical and biological properties of the earth's surface (Harf & Trout, 1986:129). In 1996, the temperature of the atmosphere at the earth's surface averaged 15.32 degrees Celsius, placing it among the five warmest years since data collection began in 1866. The highest was in 1995, 15.40 degrees Celsius (Brown, Renner & Flavin, 1997:62).

The burning of fossil fuels causes a build-up of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, which produces a "greenhouse effect" by holding heat in and thus raising the earth's temperature. As the consumption of fossil fuel increases, so does the amount of carbon dioxide released into the atmosphere. In this century, close to 140 billion tons of carbon dioxide have been released into the atmosphere, and half of it is still there. Massive deforestation and desertification further compound the problem because there is no vegetation to absorb the carbon dioxide. The resulting warming effect can increase the earth's temperature from 1 to 3 degrees centigrade (Postel, 1994).

Increased temperatures could destabilize or melt polar ice caps, raising the level of the oceans. For example, as a result of a 1-meter rise in sea level (caused by global warming), the land area of Bangladesh (which produces only 0.3 percent of global emissions) could shrink by 17 percent (*Human Development Report*, 1997:32). Such a development could result in the flooding of coastal populations and agricultural areas. This, in turn, has implications for rainfall patterns, which, in turn, would have profound long-term effects on agriculture because if the trend continues, the best weather, for example, for growing food in the United States would shift northward into Canada, while farming in more southerly regions, including the Midwest and California, would require massive additional irrigation. Because of the reduction in rainfall, climate change could carry a global price tag of \$200 billion for irrigation adjustments alone (Postel, 1994:11-14). A decrease in temperature could have the opposite effect, hurting agricultural areas of the temperate zones and requiring substantially higher levels of energy for heating.

There are many other unmeasurable economic costs resulting from development. Soil depletion costs us in the form of lost nutrients and lowered production; deforestation costs us in the form of soil erosion, decline in rainfall and water supply, and loss of beauty and recreational enjoyment; depletion of fish and wildlife costs us in terms of food, ecological balance, and biological richness; pollution costs us in terms of health, recreation, and productivity. The magnitude of the total cost is unknown, although we know it is already of extensive proportions (*St. Louis Post Dispatch*, 1987a).



Dennis Gabor (1970:9) emphatically points out that "The most important and urgent problems of the technology of today are no longer the satisfaction of primary needs or of archetypal wishes, but the reparation of the evils and damages wrought by the technology of yesterday." Barry Commoner (1971:295) presciently noted over a generation ago that "Wealth has been gained by rapid short-term exploitation of the environmental system, but it has blindly accumulated a debt to nature—a debt so large and so pervasive that in the next generation it may, if unpaid, wipe out most of the wealth it has gained us. In effect, the account books of modern society are drastically out of balance, so that, largely unconsciously, a huge fraud has been perpetrated on the people of the world." The environment is undergoing a profound transformation—one with consequences that are very difficult (and painful) to grasp (see, for example, Brown, 1997).

Toward Modernity—The Costs of Transition

Economic costs stemming from environmental conditions are not the only ones that incur in the process of economic growth and development. There are other ways in which the costs of economic development might be considered. For example, one may compile a list of costs to the traditional society in moving toward a more modern society or one may consider the trade-offs involved in accepting a higher rate of development.

W. Arthur Lewis (1956:426–435), in a groundbreaking book on economic growth, has presented a basic list—cataloging some of the costs of transition to traditional societies in the process of development:

1. The economizing spirit necessary for development may lead directly to materialism.
2. Development and growth promote individualism, but in doing so, tend to break down the social structure. An individual becomes more cognizant of his responsibilities for himself and less aware of his responsibilities to family and tribe.
3. In the development of the new skills necessary for a technologically oriented society, the old handicrafts and skills will die.
4. The economies of scale inherent in development require the mobilization of capital and the separation of ownership from the use of capital. The individual becomes an employee, rather than an independent man, and is thus subjugated to the corporation.
5. Man becomes a slave of the clock and loses independence of action.
6. Large-scale production leads to the growth of cities. Cities become the homes of the slums of a country, and grow at the expense of the villages.
7. Growth and development are dependent on the inequitable distribution of income, and providing the incentives for hard work guarantees that inequalities will persist.

In cataloging the alleged costs of economic development, Lewis is very careful to point out that some of the things listed as costs are not necessarily costs at all. A change in social structure is not perforce evil. Development of the new skills, along with the division of labor, does not require that specifications for products be relaxed in mass production or that the older skills are redundant to society. The fact that large-scale production involves large organizations in which some people are employed who do not own the capital of the productive process does not necessarily mean that large industries are inherently bad. He also notes that these costs of modernization can be subjected to other interpretations and that a case may be made for their inherently negative consequences.

Another way of calculating economic costs in transition is by emphasizing the trade-offs involved in growth and development. At least three of these trade-offs are considered to be of prime importance:

1. In attempting to increase the rate of growth, we sacrifice current leisure for current work. "The high productivity and consequent high cost of labor have made people increasingly conscious of the fact that time is money; and this seems to have engendered the belief that time should be fully and efficiently utilized . . ." (Scitovsky, 1964:219)
2. In increasing the growth rate, current consumption is traded for future consumption.
3. The greater the rate of growth and change, the greater is the difficulty in changeover, with resultant temporary underutilization of resources.

The important point to recall is that the incremental cost of each equal addition to the growth rate will be higher as the growth rate increases. Sacrifice of the first units of consumption for increased growth will not be particularly painful, but further sacrifices begin to strike into "necessities" and may become very painful indeed. As long as the benefits of development are greater than the costs of achieving those benefits, a transfer to growth is in order; but when the marginal benefits of the increased flow of future goods are just equal to the (rising) marginal costs of achieving them, further shifts can only reduce society's achievements, for the cost of further increases in the growth rate will be greater than the benefits arising from it. In the next section, the social costs will be considered.

SOCIAL COSTS

The preceding section emphasized the economic and environmental costs of change. There are, however, a number of social costs borne by society that do not appear in the calculus of economic costs. *Social cost* may be defined as the cost of economic activity that affects society as a whole or the depreciation of social capital, human labor, or the environment (Stabile, 1993). Some of the



examples of social costs incurred in development and growth are painfully obvious: air that kills plant life and forces eyes to water, streams that will not support life, and the sprawl of the slum. William K. Kapp (1971:viii) is justly convinced that "the disruption of man's environment and the social costs resulting from productive activities are among the most fundamental and long-term issues mankind has ever faced."

The notion of social costs is essentially a normative concept. It cannot be satisfactorily measured. It is not reducible to single numbers and is difficult to define with any precision. It entails a wide variety of cost elements, and Kapp (1971:13–14) asserts that the term covers all direct and indirect losses suffered by third persons or the general public in the course of private economic activities. These social losses may be seen in damages to human health or in the destruction or deterioration of property values and the premature depletion of natural wealth; or they may be evidenced in the impairment of less tangible values. Some losses can be traced to individual industries, others to particular production processes or business practices. Other social costs, Kapp notes, arise in the operation of the competitive system within a given framework of generally accepted institutions and governmental policies. The notion of social costs is broad enough to include even certain "social opportunity costs"—that is, those social cost elements that take the form of wastes or inefficiencies of certain kinds.

In terms of *social opportunity costs*, Denis Goulet (1985:230) raises the issue of "sacrificed generations." He points out that throughout history, people have lived in conditions far below those objectively demanded by human dignity, and, to this extent, generations have always been "sacrificed." In the early stages of modernization and development,

consumer goods must be rationed so as to build up infrastructure, provide a pedagogy of solidarity, and increase work input even without appreciable rewards. If this happens, generations are 'sacrificed' not in any absolute sense, but in the purely relative sense that their social deprivations are prolonged. . . . Whether he is poor or rich, a man must never be allowed to become a simple object or a pure means for obtaining social goals. Underdevelopment's great misery clearly dehumanizes man; therefore, some efforts to meet minimum needs is required. But the most fundamental sacrifice of generations lies in the radical alienation, whether in abundance or misery.

Attempts are sometimes made to justify social costs, as was the case in the former eastern bloc socialist countries, and to regard them as the short-run price paid for a high level of long-run efficiency and social performance of the economic system. The argument is that social losses are justified by the change, and that not much is to be gained from a detailed consideration of social costs (Berger, 1974:71–103). Let us now turn to some specific sources of social costs, starting with the ubiquitous automobile.



The Automobile

In discussing social costs, many authors single out the automobile to illustrate their points. In 1950, there was one automobile for every forty-six people worldwide. Currently, there is one car for every twelve (Lowe, 1994:82). While the human population doubled since 1950, the car population increased nearly tenfold (Brown, Renner & Flavin, 1997:74). Throughout the world, people could hardly wait to give up rail, streetcar, subway, and other travel options in favor of the unprecedented mobility of a car. But is the exchange as beneficial as presumed? In Eastern Europe, for instance, the rush for the automobile is already eroding the vast network of trains, trams, subways, and buses, one of communism's positive legacies (Simons, 1994:A6). In many cases, the greater mobility options did not provide people with better access to their destinations. In fact, as the automobile evolved from luxury to necessity, it contributed less and less to improvements in access. Further, as societies have greatly overvalued mobility, they have underestimated its true costs. Car travel has taken an enormous toll on economies, the environment, social equity, and even human relationships. It is difficult to quantify the costs that drivers impose on society as a consequence of congestion, accidents, air and water pollution, dependence on imported oil, solid waste, loss of cropland, and climate change. These external social costs account for 2.5 percent of the gross domestic budget in many European countries and it is somewhat higher in the United States (Lowe, 1994:95-96). It is not surprising that some commentators use strong words in discussing the automobile. For example, Mishan (1967:173) is convinced that "the invention of the private automobile is one of the great disasters to have befallen the human race," and he calls it society's greatest nightmare. Barry Weisberg (1971:118) writes: "Considered by some to be one of the greatest inventions of American science and technology, in reality the automobile has been responsible for more deaths and human misery than any other single factor in American life." Weisberg is not exaggerating. In countries that are free of war, the largest cause of violent death is traffic fatalities, averaging some 500,000 annually worldwide. In Europe, car accidents kill four times as many people as homicides, and the numbers are much higher in many Latin American countries (Kane, 1994:132). The automobile is the leading cause of death for people between fifteen and thirty-four years of age. In the United States, there are annually over 60,000 fatal accidents, and some 5 million Americans are injured in auto accidents. Deaths resulting from automobile accidents exceed all the deaths from wars since 1775. The production, distribution, and care of the automobile consumes approximately 16 percent of the labor force and 13 percent of the GNP. This does not include the hospitals, police, courts, and a myriad of other agencies and institutions in its service. Nor does it include traffic congestions.



Traffic tie-ups, of course, are not new. There were probably chariot jams on the streets of ancient Rome. But now traffic congestion is pandemic, affecting hundreds of metropolitan areas and afflicting millions of people. An article, appropriately titled "Jam Sessions" (*US News & World Report*, 1987b), paints a rather dismal picture. North of Beverly Hills, California, nearly a half-million cars per day pass the intersection of the Ventura and San Diego freeways. Afternoon rush hour across San Francisco's Bay Bridge starts at 2 P.M. and ends five hours later. Commuters spend an estimated \$150 billion to travel to work and back, and time lost in traffic jams in the Los Angeles basin amounts to some 84,000 hours each day. Put a bit more graphically, if a worker is tied up in traffic twenty minutes each working day—ten minutes each way to and from work—and stays on the job forty-five years, the person will spend nearly two working years tied up in traffic! Traffic congestions cost Americans 1.25 billion vehicle-hours and 1.4 billion gallons of gas each year. At the individual level, if the St. Louis scene is illustrative of this problem, traffic congestion costs each driver in the city \$740 a year in fuel and time (Hopgood, 1997). It is worth noting that at present, Americans spend about one minute traveling for every four to five minutes spent in out-of-the-home work, leisure, and shopping activities (Schipper, 1996).

People are beginning to react to traffic jams in strange ways. Feeling furious at the steering wheel is now a recognized part of modern life. Shootings and traffic-related assaults are becoming quite common. There is a paucity of civility, rules of the road are ignored, and drivers increasingly vent their frustration by speeding; tailgating; excessive horn honking; pounding the steering wheel; making obscene gestures; commenting about the driver's ancestry; and, in extreme cases, ramming or even shooting other motorists. Such behaviors are also involved in 28,000 or so highway deaths annually. The majority of the drivers involved in aggressive driving incidents are young men between the ages of 18 and 26, and the rate of violent behavior among young women is on the rise. There are also new terms in psychiatric jargon such as traffic stress and "road rage disorder" (Wald, 1997). In its ultimate form, they can lead to physical ailments, such as neck pains, high blood pressure, and ulcers. And, the road ahead is even more discouraging.

The Quality of Life

Over the past few years, there has been a growing concern with the quality of life in the United States and abroad. The concept of *quality of life* refers to subjective self-reports on such areas as well-being, happiness, satisfaction, fulfillment, fear, worrying, morale, pain and suffering, and the like (Andrews, 1986; Lawton, 1997). On both sides of the Atlantic, pollsters have been regularly measuring both short- and long-term changes in subjective well-being. In the United States, poll data indicate that the proportion of



respondents reported to be "very happy" is decreasing as a result of health problems, work demands that interfere with nonworking time, and various environmental, social and economic problems (Martin, 1996; Rice, Frone, & McFarlin, 1992). Similarly in France, for example, half of the respondents polled felt that the quality of life had deteriorated in recent years. Since the mid-1970s, the various Euro-Barometer surveys carried out in Europe showed the same downward trend in long-term subjective well-being. The same pattern seems to prevail in the United States (Inglehart & Rabier, 1986). This means that fewer people have been reporting to be "very happy" and "happy," the proportion of those who are "dissatisfied" with life is on the increase, and about 50 percent of the adults believe that the future will be bleak for their children (Cornish, 1997).

There have been noticeable changes in other indicators. For example, fear "grew in waves throughout the 1960s" as a correlate of the rising crime rates (Harris, 1973:168-169). In the early 1960s, there was practically no concern with crime and violence as an important issue, and, as late as 1964, only 8 percent mentioned it. By 1968, however, 65 percent did so, and today it is a major preoccupation even though violent crime in the United States has been falling for several years. The majority of people reportedly live in some fear, even in their own homes. Recent Department of Justice data indicate, for example, that the majority of women in big cities are afraid to walk the streets, roughly the same proportion worry about being raped, and 82 percent of the general population feel that law and order have broken down (Maguire & Pastore, 1997:182-192). Seventy-seven percent of Americans worry about becoming violent-crime victims (Updergrave, 1994:114). There is a phenomenal growth in the security business. The installation of security systems in single family homes more than doubled during the last five years, and we have now over 25,000 gated communities in the country. Fear management is becoming a topic for self help books, and at least one, *The Gift of Fear* (Becker, 1997), made the best-seller lists in 1997. Whether or not this fear is justifiable is not the essential issue, the presence of fear is the reality. Fear, in turn, is a social cost that we unwittingly pay (Lewis & Salem, 1986).

Since the publication of an influential report more than a generation ago, *Work in America* (1973:26), the quality of life at work has not changed much. It is as bad as ever, despite optimistic comments about improvements and safety. In 1969, exposures to industrial pollutants at the workplace caused 1 million new cases of occupational disease, including 3,600 deaths and some 800,000 cases of burns, lung and eye damage, dermatitis, and brain damage. There were also for the same year some 90,000 permanent impairments and 2 million temporary disabilities. Between 1980 and 1984, a total of 32,342 Americans died traumatic deaths at work (*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 1987b). Mining and construction ranked as the two riskiest occupations. Although men account for 52 percent of the labor force, 95 percent of all on-the-job deaths occurred among males. Among female work-



ers, 42 percent of all on-the-job deaths resulted from homicide, compared to 11 percent for males. In the United States, work-related accidents and illnesses account for twice as many losses as strikes and walkouts. The most significant aspect of work-related accidents is the fact that they are avoidable. "Competent authorities have estimated that from 70 to 90 percent of all work injuries could be prevented by proper safety devices" (Kapp, 1971:65). In addition, violence at the workplace has also increased. In 1994, well over 2 million workers in the United States were physically attacked, more than 6.5 million others were threatened with violence, and over 17 million were harassed in some way. About one-sixth of the deaths on the job in 1994 were homicides (*Human Development Report*, 1997) second after workplace injuries.

In addition, more and more workers are claiming—and getting—compensation for psychological disabilities caused by mental stress on the job. Stress-related compensation cases have risen by at least 50 percent since 1980, and the cost to insurance companies and employers more than doubled in that time to \$50 million in 1986. In California, for example, though the absolute number of stress claims remains relatively small, such claims grew 462 percent from 1980 to 1986, to about 7,200 claims (*Forbes*, 1987:12). Finally, the long-term trend of reducing the average working week—from seventy hours in 1850 to less than forty hours by the 1950s—has been reversed. Since the 1970s, the number of hours clocked up by American workers have risen, to an average of forty-two in manufacturing in 1994 (*Economist*, 1994b:20). In many families, both spouses put in much longer hours than just the husbands had back in the 1950s. Ten- to eleven-hour workdays are common, and family life is brutally squeezed. In her controversial 1992 book, *The Overworked American*, economist Juliet B. Schor (1992) estimates that, in attempting to maintain their standards of living in the face of declining real compensation, workers spent the equivalent of four weeks more per year on the job in 1989 than they did two decades earlier—although at least one influential sociologist would argue that we work more because we want to, because we like it better at work than at home (Hochschild, 1997). Others note that for many professional people—lawyers, consultants, managers, engineers—working longer hours has become the way to impress the boss and get promoted (Uchitelle, 1997). A large part of the increase came from the flood of women who have entered the labor force: their participation increased to more than 57 percent from 42 percent. In many families, that has more than compensated for a decline in earnings. But the addition, clearly, has brought its own pressures, including a decline in leisure time. By contrast, although Europe is going through a "mid-life crisis" economically (*Economist*, 1997) in several countries such as France, Germany and Italy, the average working week is thirty-five hours, and most workers get six weeks' paid annual vacation; even the Japanese now take three weeks. American workers still make do with two weeks of paid vaca-

tion. One result is that the average full-time American worker now toils for more hours a year than his Japanese counterpart, and for as much as 15 percent longer than a typical Western European.

Environment and Social Costs

In addition to the decline in the quality of life, there are more specific social costs associated with change. The more disturbing ones include the rising incidence of environmentally induced illnesses, the lengthening list of endangered species, soil erosion, and the ecological undermining of the world food economy.

Environmentally Induced Illnesses *Environmentally induced illnesses* are the consequences of the introduction of toxic materials into the environment and the creation of conditions conducive to the rapid spread of certain infectious diseases. Air pollution, which is rapidly becoming a global problem, has reached serious levels in many urban areas. School children in Los Angeles are cautioned against vigorous play because of air pollution. In Tokyo, traffic police officers inhale pure oxygen from oxygen tanks every two hours to avoid carbon monoxide poisoning. In many parts of the world, air pollution is a major health problem, contributing to many chronic diseases and killing a substantial number of people each year. In the United States, the current mix of sulfates and particulates in ambient air may cause 50,000 premature deaths annually—about 2 percent of general mortality. As many as four out of ten Americans are exposed to high concentrations of ozone, which is associated with skin cancer. High sulfur dioxide concentration is primarily responsible for a higher rate of lung cancer deaths (Postel, 1994). Four million one- to six-year-olds in the United States—including two-thirds of poor, minority, inner-city preschool children—have levels of lead poisoning high enough to cause brain damage. Toxic lead exposure costs the country tens of billions of dollars in health expenditure and productivity loss (United Nations Environment Programme, 1997:102).

Another source of concern is the rapidly increasing level of toxic compounds now circulating in the biosphere. Some 70,000 chemicals are presently in everyday use, with some 500 to 1,000 new ones added to the list each year. The estimates of cancer deaths caused by these substances range from 1 percent to 10 percent. There is a lack of information on the toxic effects of an estimated 79 percent of chemicals now used. Less than one-fifth have been tested for acute effects, and fewer than a tenth for *chronic* (that is, cancer-causing), reproductive, or mutagenic effects. Given how little is known about the extent of people's exposure to these substances, their introduction to the environment is similar to playing Russian roulette with human health.

Another serious health hazard is radiation pollution. In large doses, radiation is associated with a high incidence of leukemia and other cancers.



One of the long-term effects is genetic mutation. Environmentalists are concerned that nuclear pollution will further increase as the nuclear industry expands. In spite of elaborate safeguards, accidents can occur, as evidenced by the 1979 Three Mile Island and the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear accidents. Although the long-term effects are not known, it is estimated that the Chernobyl accident will cause up to 135,000 additional cancer cases and a maximum of 35,000 deaths (Flavin, 1987:60).

Endangered Species Humans are not the only species threatened by the deterioration of the environment. Because of its irreversibility, the loss of species represents a fundamental social cost. It is estimated that more than 300 species and subspecies of animals have already vanished from the face of the earth as a result of human activities. Of the approximately 9,600 known species of birds, 6,600 are in decline and an estimated 1,000 are at the point where they are now threatened with extinction (Youth, 1994:128). The major reasons for the decline in the bird populations include pollution, hunting, and habitat destruction in the form of reductions in rain forests and the draining of wetlands. The populations of some estuarine, inshore, and off-shore fisheries have been reduced to drastically low levels in North America by overfishing, loss of habitat, and water- and land-based pollution. During the last decade, there were more than 3,650 events with disastrous impacts on fish populations with a loss of 407 million fish in coastal and near-coastal locations in the United States (United Nations Environment Programme, 1997:100). Extinctions and population declines, in turn, impact jobs and marine environments (Weber, 1994).

Soil Erosion The social costs of soil erosion, soil depletion, and deforestation are abundant. "In particular, they may give rise to social damages such as floods, the silting of streams and reservoirs, the diminution of ground-water stores, the pollution of rivers, the destruction of irrigation schemes, the harmful effects of dust storms and the disappearance of wildlife" (Kapp, 1971:127-128). For instance, despite improved conservation techniques, more acreage in the Great Plains was damaged by wind erosion in the 1950s than during the 1930s. Again, between 1976 and 1977, wind erosion damage reached comparable levels to those of the 1930s. Why? Sharply higher wheat prices, fostered by world food shortages, brought a rapid expansion of crop production on acreage that should have been left uncultivated as grassland (Lockeretz, cited in *The Wilson Quarterly*, 1979:41-42).

There are many other illustrations of human beings' abuse of the soil that sustains them. For example, North Africa, once the fertile granary of the Roman Empire, is now largely a desert, or near desert, sustained by food imports. Even the "decline of whole civilizations can in fact be traced to an overutilization of land" (Kapp, 1971:128). Globally, over 550 million hectares are losing topsoil or undergoing other forms of degradation as a direct result



of poor agricultural methods. An additional 679 million hectares are lost to overgrazing and 579 million to deforestation (Postel, 1994:9–10). In the United States, deforestation has frequently left entire industries and whole communities stranded. For example:

In the Pacific Northwest 76 ghost towns have resulted from disorderly forest liquidation, and in another 77 communities decline of population has kept steady pace with the closing of mills due to dwindling timber supply. . . . Millions of acres of cutover land have become tax delinquent and abandoned. . . .

The Ozark region of Missouri contains 35 counties originally covered with splendid stands of pine, oak, and hickory. With the cutting out of timber, forest industries moved out, leaving a large dependent population unable to support itself in decent fashion. The farmers lost both nearby markets for farm produce and the opportunity for profitable winter employment. More than 20 percent of the rural families went on relief, with the remainder eking out a sorry existence. . . . (Kapp, 1971:144)

In developing countries, 90 percent of the population depends on wood for cooking and heating. In the tropics, 80 percent of all wood harvested is used for fuel (Hillary, 1984:67–68), and half the wood is burned as fuel in developing countries in other parts of the world (Durning, 1994:34). In these areas, firewood is as vital to the local economy as oil is to the global economy. The depletion of forests has dramatically increased the price of wood in many regions. The high cost of firewood, in turn, diminishes the prospects for improved livelihood among the poor, who are forced to spend more of their small incomes on cooking fuel. It often reduces families to one hot meal per day. In India, for example, this is becoming a chronic problem. The combined effects of fuelwood need and the conversion of forests into farmlands threaten to destroy entire forest systems in some developing areas. This, in turn, brings about other unanticipated complications. For example, deforestation often results in the loss of important commodities, many of them nontimber forest products. Over half of the prescriptions filled worldwide contain active ingredients originating from wild species—particularly from tropical plants. Some 80 percent of people living in developing countries rely on traditional medicine for their primary health care needs, and 85 percent of traditional medicines use plant extracts. At the current rate of deforestation, about 14 percent of plant species are expected to be extinct (Brown, Renner & Flavin, 1997:97).

Ecological Undermining of the Food Economy The continued degradation of natural resources, shortcomings in environmental responses, and renewable resource constraints are likely to lead to food insecurity and conflict situations (United Nations Environment Programme, 1997:3). Some 800 million people around the world go hungry. In sub-Saharan Africa, 240 million

people, about 30 percent of the total, are undernourished. In south Asia, over 30 percent of the infants are born underweight, the highest ratio in the world, and a sad measure of inadequate access to food is that women are often last to eat in the household (*Human Development Report*, 1997). The growing pressure for food is beginning to undermine each of the three food-producing systems in a number of widely separated areas around the world with increasing frequency.

Increasing human demands on the world's supply of fish are becoming excessive in most parts of the world. The earth's seventeen major oceanic fishing areas have either reached or exceeded their natural limits, and nine are in serious decline (Platt, 1994:32-33). Most countries face the effects of overfishing, overpollution, and coastal habitat destruction not only in the form of shrinking seafood supplies but also in the decreasing number of jobs in the fishing industry as well. For example, evidence now shows that the heavy offtake from the anchovy fishery, off the western coast of Latin America, ranging from 10 to 12 million tons in the late 1970s and 1980s, has exceeded the capacity of the fishery to regenerate itself, resulting in its collapse. Some 200 million people worldwide depend on the fishing industry for their livelihood, and many are concerned about their jobs. In 1992 and 1993, 50,000 Canadian fishers were laid off as a result of the vanishing cod stocks in the north Atlantic waters. Evidence suggests that the current level of fishing in many areas is environmentally unsustainable and if the trends of overexploitation continue, fish will no longer be "the protein of the poor" (Brown, Renner, & Flavin, 1997:32).

Like fisheries, the world's rangelands, which support livestock such as cattle, sheep, and goats, are being grazed at or beyond their sustainable yield almost everywhere. In areas where livestock demands exceed carrying capacity, rangeland is being converted into wasteland. This is most pronounced in the pastoral economies of Africa and central Asia, where rangeland degradation is depriving herdsmen of their livelihood and reducing available meat supplies.

Croplands, two-thirds of which are used to produce grains, are also becoming unsustainable in many parts of the world, leading to extensive soil erosion (Brown, et al., 1994:20). Deforestation is another concern. For example, ecological overstress is quite evident in much of the Indian subcontinent. During the last generation, as human and livestock populations have expanded, the subcontinent has been progressively deforested. Deforestation, in turn, can undermine the food-producing capability by contributing to the incidence and severity of flooding. This is what happened in 1973, when the worst flood in Pakistan's history destroyed a large share of the spring wheat crop in storage on farms as well as much of the standing crops. "Entire communities were washed away. Since the deforestation is continuing, the incidence and severity of flooding in Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh seems certain to worsen in the future" (Brown, 1974:73). Lester Brown's prediction was correct. Over a

period of two months, in September and October 1978, four successive floods affected much of northern India. In West Bengal, the worst-hit state, an area of about 21,000 square miles (more than four times the area of Connecticut) was ravaged. Some 15 million Bengalis had to leave their homes, and the floods ruined 6.5 million tons of wheat and rice in the fields and godowns, and killed 1.5 million cattle. In Bangladesh, one of the most flood-prone countries in the region, as many as 80 million people remain vulnerable to flooding each year and in India 40 million hectares remain at risk annually at an average estimated damage of \$1.5 billion (United Nations Environment Programme, 1997:57). There is a growing body of evidence to suggest that human activities are responsible for the severity of the floods (Brown, 1997).

Reduction of Options

Another way of looking at the social costs is in terms of the reduction of options open to individuals. As a result of resource limits, abuses, and mismanagement, the need to regulate and coordinate human activity increases. The regulation of options, in turn, affects lifestyles, including what we eat, where we live, and where we travel.

Generally, economic development brings about dietary changes (Stevens, 1994). The trend during the course of development is from a diet heavily dependent on a few starchy staples to one greatly enriched with high-protein livestock products. However, this trend may be arrested by the growing pressures on food resources and unprecedented rise in feed-grain prices (Brown, Renner & Flavin, 1997:30). Already, some nations are experiencing at least a temporary downturn per-capita intake of livestock products. In Argentina, for example, a country famous for its meat products, per-capita consumption of beef has declined from nearly 200 pounds to less than 140 pounds in recent years. Whether or not less beef consumption can be construed as a social cost is secondary. The cost comes about in terms of the reduction of options.

The choice of where one lives is also beginning to diminish throughout the world. Not long ago, opportunities for migrating from one country to another were quite plentiful. In recent years, however, migration has become increasingly subject to various restrictions as nations become concerned with overcrowding and more selective about the immigrants they consider economically and socially unacceptable. In some areas, even the movement from rural to urban communities is becoming more difficult. Even in the United States, there are calls for measures to stem the growth of big cities, to check and reverse the decades-old trend of migration from rural areas to the cities and from smaller cities to larger ones. In policy-making circles, there are more and more references to the terms "national population dispersal policy" and "population distribution policy" (Sundquist, 1975:6-12).

Social costs incur also from the restrictions on human mobility—how frequently and how far we are able to travel from home. The restrictions on



the automobile already impinge on mobility. In terms of international travel, some countries are already unwilling or unable to accommodate the large influx of people that unrestricted international travel brings them. Even in the United States, in terms of domestic travel, some states, such as Oregon, have stepped up psychological campaigns to discourage visitors from lingering too long. Those having a second home at a lake, the seashore, or in the mountains face problems and difficulties that did not exist a few years ago. There is also a decrease in the opportunity to own land and the freedom to utilize it in a way one desires. Inevitably, there will be little choice but to restrict various individual freedoms.

There are also social costs involved in the choices and trade-offs that stem from emerging pressures on resources of various kinds. At the community level, it is increasingly necessary to make choices as to how freshwater lakes are used. In many instances, the choice is between recreation, irrigation, waste absorption, or the production of fish. Obviously, not all of these uses are compatible. If a lake is used for waste absorption, it is not suitable for fish production or recreation purposes. Similarly, strip-mining coal desolates the countryside and is an abomination, but strip mining is four times safer for the miner than shaft mining; hence, its direct cost in human life is only one-fourth that of shaft mining. Macklin Fleming (1974:7) raises the question, "Do we outlaw strip mining at the cost of the extra expenditure of human life that shaft mining entails?" This is only one of the questions involved in the trade-off between the destruction of the natural topography and the desire for cheap energy. Such balancing of relative values and weighing of the costs of alternatives takes place in all human activity. Obviously the decisions are hard, and in many instances judgmental righteousness does not coincide with the exigencies of a situation.

There are no easy answers to this dilemma. In a now-classic essay, "The Tragedy of the Commons," Garrett Hardin (1975:250-264) captures the essence of the problem. According to Hardin, humankind is caught in a situation akin to a classic tragedy. Although each individual apparently has no ill will toward others, all humans acting in self-interest move inexorably toward self-destruction. Hardin uses the example of animals being kept on a commons, an area open to all villagers for pasturing their stock. There are no problems on the commons as long as the number of animals is small in relation to the size of the pasture. From the perspective of each herder, however, the optimal strategy is to enlarge one's herd as much as possible. If one herder's animals do not eat the grass, someone else's will. Thus, the size of each herd grows and the density of stock increases until it exceeds the carrying capacity of the commons. The result is that everyone eventually loses as the animals die of starvation. The sum of a set of apparently rational individual strategies equals social irresponsibility, leading to disaster. The tragedy is that even though the eventual result should be perfectly evident, no one acts to avert disaster. As yet, there are no socially acceptable ways to keep the size of the herd in line.

Urban Living

Although the social costs are more pronounced in the domain of changes brought about in the environment as a result of increased size, affluence, and energy requirements, there are many other areas of social life that have been also affected. For example, most urban areas in the United States are faced with a high crime rate, vandalism, relatively poor-quality public schools, lack of adequate mass-transportation, and the already mentioned serious traffic congestion. As a result of the dismal state of many cities' finances (caused in large part by the mass exodus of large employers that reduces the tax base), public services such as street cleaning, garbage removal, street repair and maintenance, and fire and police protection are being reduced (Spates & Macionis, 1987:359-400). The plight of urban areas is further compounded by the presence of abandoned cars and buildings not yet demolished and the poor property maintenance and upkeep of many occupied structures. For many people, housing is at a premium, and there is a high concentration of households on welfare. There are households that exist in a non-child-oriented environment that lacks open space suitable for playgrounds because of the high-rise dwellings that make watching over children difficult. Such an environment is generally more oriented to adult activities than to those of children. There is tension between whites and ethnic and minority groups (Takaki, 1994). The proportion of ethnic and minority groups, fueled by large waves of Asian and Latin American immigrants, is increasing in urban areas, accompanied by a downward shift in average incomes, which is most pronounced when neighborhoods undergo a transition from middle-income to low-income residents. There is a growing concern with social marginalization of native Americans and Alaskan natives in urban areas. Both groups have much higher death rates from injuries and alcohol-related causes than other urban residents (World Resources Institute, 1996:48).

At the same time, selected urban areas are being revived through the process of *gentrification* (the movement of more affluent Americans back into older, often decaying, parts of the city). This increases property values, which, in turn, often forces poorer residents in the area to relocate. Urban dwellers, regardless of where they live, pay higher insurance rates than do their suburban or rural counterparts, as well as higher security costs that stem from the use of burglary systems and other crime-control devices.

A balance sheet of costs and benefits to individuals, families, and society that took into account the changing conditions in urban areas would be exceedingly complex even if all the factors could be identified and measured. The calculation is further complicated by the presence of many factors that defy quantification. For example, no figure has been placed on many important costs, including the time lost by millions of workers in their daily commutation journeys, limited access to outdoor recreation, high levels of



air and noise pollution, and the consequences of crowding. The social costs of these conditions have yet to be measured by social scientists. As Claude S. Fischer (1984:201) observes, "Perhaps the psychic or social pains of city life are too subtle, too camouflaged, or too spiritual in character to be measured by the crude instruments of social science. Plausible arguments along this line can be constructed. But plausibility is promiscuous, and will couple readily with most theories that come by, no matter how incompatible the theories are with one another."

Reasonable arguments about social costs could be made concerning the consequences of the lack of social ties, the prevalence of fear that was previously noted, isolation, and the friction among heterogeneous populations in urban areas. Urban living adversely affects social well-being by undermining traditional primary group relations, especially those based on the family, extended kinship ties, and the neighborhood (Milgram, 1970; Wirth, 1938). Urbanism as a way of life is characterized by anomie and an absence of both moral consensus and social responsibility. Louis Wirth (1938) suggests that such conditions of social disorganization give rise to individual psychological disturbances and to increased crime, delinquency, and corruption. Urbanites have contact with many people, most of them strangers, and public encounters are usually formal, brief, and superficial. By way of protecting themselves from becoming involved, city dwellers often discourage interaction by being formal, unfriendly, and brusque. But the cost of this disengagement from others is high. It results in a tendency to disregard the personal needs of people encountered in public places, especially when the burden of social responsibility is shifted to formal agencies. For example, the police are expected to respond to the injured in a traffic accident, and welfare agencies are expected to deal with the poor and the homeless. Two highly publicized classic examples of the absence of social responsibility and the tendency of most city dwellers to not involve themselves in the affairs of others will illustrate this point. The first involves the murder of Catherine Genovese in Queens, New York, in 1964. She was repeatedly stabbed for an extended period of time. Investigators discovered that thirty-eight neighbors either heard her screams or actually witnessed the attack. But no one did anything to help her. The second involves the gang-rape of a woman in a bar in New Bedford, Massachusetts, in 1983. Again, no one came to the woman's aid, although many customers witnessed the attack. Only when she ran out naked into the street did a motorist call the police. There are, of course, many similar examples.

Underutilization of College-Educated People

Social costs stemming from changes in the domain of education are becoming more pronounced. During the past two decades in particular, the educational system in the United States has continued to expand and diver-



sify, with a number of consequences. Most important is the fact that a consistently increasing proportion of the population has had the opportunity to pursue higher education. These educational experiences have significantly influenced levels of aspiration and expectation in a number of areas, including lifestyles and satisfaction derived from work. Although the educational system has expanded and diversified, the occupational pyramid has remained relatively rigid in terms of the capability of offering the range of options that could effectively provide "interesting work" to all. There are now more qualified people looking for jobs in the upper echelons of organizations than the present occupational pyramid could possibly accommodate. The bachelor's degree, like the high school diploma before it, is no longer the ticket to a rising standard of living (Uchitelle, 1994). While aspirations and expectations about work have been generally rising, it is obvious that ongoing technological change has served to imbue much work with routine and repetitive qualities. The price of this is work dissatisfaction and alienation.

Greater social costs result, however, from the underutilization of the educated population. As Ivar Berg and Marcia Freedman (1977:30) comment: "A significant degree of underutilization is undoubtedly inevitable in a society in which the occupational structure has stabilized while educational achievements have bounded upward; neither the occupational structure's shape nor the educational achievements of the work force are realistically amenable, at this late date, to much amelioration by the nation's employers." Depending on the assumptions and standards used, underutilization at the present time affects between one-quarter and one-half of the college graduate labor force. The plausible social costs of this underutilization of educated people include alienation and political cynicism and a "kind of intellectual atrophy in which people whose education is underutilized, who are not challenged by the work they do, fall to the level of their jobs" (1977:28). The problems stemming from this underutilization are enormous and at the late-1990s there are no indications of major changes at the workplace to accommodate the growing number of college-educated workers.

The Dilemmas of Scientific Specialization

Even those college-educated workers who are not underutilized are confronted with a series of dilemmas. In general, more education is associated with greater specialization. Scientists, in particular, whether they are employed in institutes, research establishments, or universities, are subjected to a growing pressure on their time and on their ability to keep up with developments in their fields. Not only are they expected to keep abreast of the avalanche of journal literature, in which, inevitably, the writing is increasingly concentrated and increasingly technical, but, in most instances, they are expected also to contribute an article or two from time to time to the



accumulating weight that is bearing down on them. Perhaps more than other professions, "the ordinary academic tends to become overextended, his faculties too polarized to respond fully to other aspects of life, be they intellectual, aesthetic or emotional. Like all too many of us today, he may seek gaiety but is hard put to generate any" (Mishan, 1967:139). We recall from an earlier chapter that contemporary academics are expected to contribute to their discipline in the form of research or publication as a condition for better jobs, promotions, raises, and for many the most sought-after objective, tenure. Consequently, they package their resumes with publication credits and count their published works "as a miser counts his gold. They are his kudos, his claims to recognition. Above all, they are his certificates encashable in the world he moves in" (Mishan, 1967:140-141).

The pressure for research and publication further reinforces specialization and has the unsurprising consequences that only a handful of people know more than a fraction of the broader discipline in which they work, or are competent to judge the work of their colleagues over a wide field. Editors of scholarly journals already find it difficult to find scholars able to appraise the quality of some of the highly specialized papers submitted to them. Moreover, because of the demands upon one's time and capacity, no scholar is able to read more than a fraction of the output of professional papers in one's own field. Mishan (1967:140) mentions an estimate that "the average scientific paper is read by about 1.3 people—while many are read by several people and a few by hundreds, a large number are read by nobody but their authors (if we exclude the editors)." Often, five or six scholars write for each other and nobody knows or cares what it is all about (Honan, 1994). The emphasis on the number of publications is so great that many people use the "salami method"—slicing every paper into six or seven separate papers before publication. Uncoordinated knowledge is growing at a rapid rate. The number of technical journals in the world exceeds 100,000, and the annual output of books is rapidly approaching that number. Some 18,000 professional journals are published in the United States (Honan, 1994). In a sense, we are faced with an overload of information (Klapp, 1986). Some 142 periodicals are now available in the United States on the subject of sociology alone (*The New Republic*, 1987:7). In sociology and related fields, there are more than 350 journals in English (Sussman, 1978). One could indulge in a bit of rough calculation, assuming that each of these 350 journals appears four times a year containing, on the average, a dozen articles annually. That would come to 16,800 articles a year, averaging about 46 articles a day. Obviously, Professor Mishan's observation is not too far-fetched. Even dedicated graduate students preparing for their Ph.D. qualifying examinations would find the digestion (or even the reading) of that many possibly "relevant" articles a task beyond their endurance. In the next section, the psychological costs of change will be considered.





PSYCHOLOGICAL COSTS

In addition to the economic and social costs, change also entails a series of psychological costs. Perhaps most noticeable is the loss of the individual's ability to understand and control his or her environment. People have become utterly dependent upon the operation of complex technological and social organizations that they can neither understand nor control. Generalized knowledge and practical problem-solving abilities are being undermined, leaving in their absence the specialists and experts with their set of instructions and push-button solutions. "We may use many materials of whose provenance we know next to nothing; we are surrounded by household implements we know how to operate but whose working principles we ignore; and we are more and more at a loss when trying to answer the simplest questions of our children concerning the nature of the everyday objects around them. This applies not only to the atom but even to the shirts on our backs. Hence man's feeling today of the utter dependence of his everyday life on a complex technical and social organization about whose working, outside his own narrow sphere, he is largely in the dark; and this, too, contributes to his feeling of impotence in relation to organized society" (Sci-tovsky, 1964:227). As a result of people's loss of control and utter dependence, Samar Amin (1974:1) offers an extreme view, which is nevertheless worth noting, of the personality in the making: "These beings no longer speak—they have nothing to say, since they have nothing to think or feel. They no longer produce anything, neither objects nor emotions. No more arts. No more anything. The electronic machine produces—the word itself has lost all meaning—everything, these beings included."

Although Amin's description of the personality in the making is a bit far-fetched, there are many other "psychological victimization syndromes" of social change in the literature. Theodore Roszak (1973) talks about the "automatization of personality" as a result of technological changes. Jacques Ellul (1964) argues that technological changes lead to the "systematization" of all aspects of social life, and humans will be alienated not only from their work but from their recreation as well, as that is also becoming increasingly technical. Others contend that the realization of victimization with the ability to identify and verbalize the symptoms that bring about certain deleterious psychological or social conditions (real or imaginary) which can be used to excuse behavior—anything from insanity and alcoholism to depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, battered woman syndrome, "football widow" syndrome, nicotine withdrawal syndrome, premenstrual syndrome, parental alienation, black rage, and even "rotten social background" (Dershowitz, 1994; Wilson, 1997).

These voices are merely the latest additions to a tradition that includes such names as Herbert Marcuse and even Sigmund Freud, the general point being that modern technological civilization fragments human personality,

forces people to repress essential needs, deprives people of the experiential gestalt enjoyed by primitive beings, and thus reduces individuals to a mechanized and dehumanized entity. Anton C. Zijderveld's (1971:64–68) concept of "intellectual Taylorism" eloquently summarizes the modern individual's intellectual predicament as perceived by many authors. He posits that automation is taking place not only in industry, but also in thought. It is a characteristic of modern science. As Western societies become automated, bureaucratized, and pluralized (that is, fragmented), Zijderveld argues, they move away from "the common human pattern." As a consequence, human experience in Western societies is becoming increasingly unnatural or abstract.

Robopathology

An image of the ideal type of humanistic personality is what psychologist Abraham Maslow calls a *self-actualized* person. Such a person, Maslow suggests (1959:127), has the following attributes: clear and efficient perception of reality; an openness to new experience; integration; wholeness and unity of the person, spontaneity; expressiveness; aliveness; a firm identity; autonomy; uniqueness; objectivity; detachment; creativeness; ability to fuse concreteness and abstractness; a democratic character structure; and ability to love. The attainment of these ideal characteristics are, however, hampered by the conditions created by accelerated technological and social changes. Instead of self-actualization, Lewis Yablonsky (1972:16) argues that we have *robopathology*, which emerges when people "cop out or sell out their humanistic drives of excitement, joy, and courage to the cultural press of social machines because of fear and often an instilled sense of inadequacy. They often trade their more spontaneous creative potentials for familiar regularized rituals. . . . In the process of a dehumanized society they live in familiar, routine, and predictable patterns of behavior. Thus they cop out on their humanistic motivations and become part of the social machine." In 1990s parlance, they become "politically correct" and succumb to the "dictatorship of virtue" (Bernstein, 1994). An example of this would be the proclivity of the publishing industry to reject works of great academic importance and integrity because they violate some politically correct tenets. A controversial illustration of this is Arthur Jensen's 'The G Factor,' which examines racial differences in intelligence levels (Lamb, 1997).

Robopathic behavior, Yablonsky contends, is found in many aspects of life. Many creative people are often corrupted by the rewards of the plastic society. They find a comfortable place and stay there. A multitude of writers, teachers, and artists, after an initially courageous and creative productive life, "cop out and become robopathic in their later creative attempts. They find a successful mold, receive their rewards, and ritualistically stick



to it for the rest of their lives. . . . Their fears and lack of courage freezes them into static, uncreative roles, where they lock into a robopathic existence" (1972:18).

A number of social roles in contemporary society lack opportunities for humanistic expression, spontaneity, creativity, and compassionate action. These include such roles as file clerk, assembly line worker, and the like. Yablonsky calls these "robot roles" whose monotony, boredom, and dehumanizing qualities are exemplified "by the daily monotony of work on an assembly line in a factory. The robot role occupants rise at the same time, go through their ritualized breakfast, turn the screws at work, watch TV, make ritualistic love on a prescribed night, take their two-week vacation—and become increasingly frustrated and bored by their routinized lifestyle. Increasingly their zest for life, and capacity for spontaneity and creativity, is reduced to zero. One common consequence of this malaise is a simmering, underlying feeling of hostility and aggression toward others" (1972:19).

Yablonsky concedes that modern societies have produced enormous advantages for people. Time and space dimensions have been changed for their benefit; leisure time possibilities have increased; the health, wealth, and welfare of many people have been grossly improved by technocratic systems; and this is reflected in a longer life span. But, "Despite these and other apparent gains from modern technology, a chorus of questions and issues have been posed and amplified about the price paid for 'technological' progress" (1972:57).

Yablonsky contends that the psychological costs of progress are indeed high. Individuals' coherent self-identities have been fragmented or rendered anonymous by their work roles in modern society. Their relationship to nature, their natural state of existence, and their enjoyment of nature's beauty have been seriously impaired by the overdeveloped machine society. The dehumanizing aspects of contemporary life have escalated crime and various forms of alienation. Current conditions are largely responsible for the acceleration of various routes of escape from self through drugs, alcohol, mysticism, superreligions, and growing fantasy states of existence. Finally, the mass media have confused people's sense of reality and personal identity, and there is a confused blur between mass media news, drama, and live experience (see, for example, Haag, 1994). According to this view, life has increasingly become a spectator sport.

Anxiety and Insecurity

To what extent people's emotions, spontaneity, creativity, personal identity, and ability to become compassionate are reduced to a set of robopathic responses is hard to tell. Much of the literature supports these impressions and indeed there seems to be an escalation of tension, discontent, and anxiety in the face of social change. For example, Robert H. Lauer and Rance





Thomas (1976) investigated the relationships among change in individual life circumstances, perceived rate of social change, and anxiety level in England and in the United States. In both societies, the authors found a positive correlation between both kinds of change and anxiety level, with the perceived rate of social change being more significant as a predictor of anxiety level than change in life circumstances. In particular, the greater the number of changes in life circumstances in a year and the greater the perceived rate of change, the greater the likelihood of a high anxiety level. The data in general support the argument that a high rate of change generates psychological reactions, which, in turn, require adjustment on the part of individuals. They point out, however, that when the changes are defined as desirable, the deleterious effects are minimized.

At times anxieties produced by change may carry over into group relations and when there are no agreed-upon measures to mediate the stress, there is a possibility that hostility will erupt within or among groups. Cyril E. Black (1966:24) observes, for example, that insecurity and anxiety may also interfere in the relationship between countries: "... the growing sense of insecurity ... can be traced to the tensions resulting from the simultaneous development of nationalism and interdependence. Indeed, this sense of insecurity has been such a pervading force that one may venture to interpret the various forms of imperialism, alliance relationships, wars, and experiments in political integration that have characterized international relations in modern times as a search for security that is significantly more urgent than in earlier times." Insecurity and anxiety may also explain, in part, the rise of ethnic tensions in several nations, resulting in ethnic clashes with brutal results. For example, since the late 1980s, over 130,000 people were killed in what is called "ethnic cleansing"; in Somalia in 1993, there were more than 10,000 casualties; and, in 1994 in Rwanda, close to 1 million lives were lost as a result of clashes between rival ethnic factions.

The rise of anxiety and insecurity in modern society is generally attributed to the increased emphasis on competition and achievement; the sacrifice of individuality to organizational purposes; to the demand for emotional constraint and self-control; and to the inability of comprehending one's material surroundings. As a consequence, Tibor Scitovsky (1964:228) points to "man's need to compensate for his increasing remoteness from the material world around him." This compensation may take several forms. For example, there is a renewed interest in the United States in handicrafts, in a country where they have become the most obsolete and unprofitable. He notes that schools put the greatest stress on the teaching of handicrafts, and handicrafts as a hobby are becoming the most popular. He remarks: "Let us hope that making one's own ashtrays, finishing one's own furniture, and doing one's own plumbing, painting and papering accomplish this. But even if they do, they do it at the cost of time—and a lot of time—being diverted from more intellectual pursuits. This is especially true of school, where pot-

tery, weaving, glove making, etc., divert time and energy not only from the humanities but probably also from the three Rs" (1964:228).

There are other signs of compensation for the increased sameness and homogeneity of contemporary life. For example, the notion that a house reflects the personality of its occupant is new to this century. Traditionally, houses reflected the *class* of their occupants. With all the utensils, artifacts, and folk art we put in our homes, we cannot hide the fact that we are living not in a farm house, or Greek peasant huts, or potty Victorian collectors' parlors, but in a technologically developed society where things do seem to be getting more and more the same. As our habitations grow more and more alike (our clothes are already alike), does it necessarily follow that we ourselves will be less individual and distinguishable from one another? Most authors discussed in this section would tend to agree that the answer is yes. One, of course, can always question this interpretation.

Mental Illness

Thus far, it has been noted that social change is associated with a number of psychological costs such as anxiety, insecurity, stress, a reduction in spontaneity, creativity, personal identity, and the ability to be compassionate. It is now appropriate to raise the question: Does social change lead to a variety of debilitating kinds of states and of behavior, and does it extract a cost in terms of mental health? Marc Fried (1972:451) notes that only a few epidemiological studies dealt directly with the effects of social change on mental illness. He describes one important group of studies that investigated the changes over periods of time in rates of psychiatric hospitalization. The studies considered admissions between 1840 and 1940 and showed that, with appropriate adjustments, age-specific first-admission rates for ages under fifty were just as high during the last half of the nineteenth century as they are today. There were some short-term fluctuations associated with wars and depressions, but the long-term trends revealed no marked increase that might correspond to this century of urbanization and industrialization in Massachusetts. He points out that other longitudinal studies draw a similar conclusion. The frequency of hospitalization for psychosis, for example, has remained strikingly constant over time. In spite of the evidence that rates of psychiatric hospitalization have not risen substantially in the United States over long periods of time, Fried notes that there are suggestions of increased rates of other forms of emotional disturbances (1972:453). Fried refers to studies that make an excellent case for both the rise of psychosomatic disorders and changing distributions of physical illness according to age and sex, which "suggest the increasing importance of stress in impaired functioning" (1972:453). His observation is supported by recent data that indicate that rates of some disorders are going up and the incidence of depression among the baby boomers, those who were born after World War

II, is particularly serious. Over the past two generations, the rates of depression have increased about tenfold, and it is striking the younger generation at an earlier age (Klerman, 1986). However, a rise in rates for one disorder caused by the stress of social change may be, hypothetically, offset or compensated by a decline in other types of disorders. It is worth noting in this connection that recent studies on mental health indicate that in the United States there is no difference between rural and urban residence in terms of mental disorders (Fischer, 1984; Robins & Regier, 1991).

Fried also refers to several comprehensive reviews of the literature on mental illness in developing societies that support the view that acculturation to Western patterns leads to increased rates of psychopathology, and suggests that "we cannot dismiss the possibility that acculturation experiences, particularly those entailing a very rapid and uncoordinated change only for some members of a society, may lead to increased impairments in functioning" (1972:453). This possibility indeed exists, and accelerated change conceivably disrupts basic social ties, breaks down social controls, and thus produces a train of personal disorientation, confusion, and uncertainty, which, ultimately, leads to misery and could produce mental breakdown among some individuals.

On the other hand, there is evidence in the literature that modernization does not produce mental disorders and does not lead to mental breakdowns. Alex Inkeles and David H. Smith (1974:262), in a study of modernization in six countries, found:

Of the modernizing experiences frequently identified as likely to induce individual disorganization by disrupting personality, creating strain, introducing disturbed stimuli, and the like, none consistently and significantly produced increased maladjustment as measured by the Psychosomatic Symptoms Test. In contrast to our experience in studying the impact of the same independent variables on other psychological scales, such as our measures of modern attitudes, the patterns observed in relation to adjustment were not only weak but decidedly lacking in consistency across six countries.

They also wrote, "Whatever may cause psychosomatic symptoms in younger men in developing countries, it is apparently something other than the exposure to the modernizing institutions such as the school, factory, the city and the mass media" (1974:263). They have, furthermore, found no evidence that migration itself brings about psychic distress in developing countries.

The modernization experience may cause some emotional problems, but, based on the Inkeles and Smith study at least, it can safely be assumed that the experience is not associated with mental disorders or breakdowns. In some instances, as in the case with India, increased exposure to modernizing influences actually brought with it a decrease in the number of psychosomatic symptoms. In this sense, one may even argue that modernizing influences actually improved personal adjustment. As the authors say,



"Quite contrary to popular expectation, therefore, one is forced to conclude that, if anything holds in this realm, it is that the more modern the individual, the better his psychic adjustment as measured by the Psychosomatic Symptoms Test" (Inkeles & Smith, 1974:264).

It should be noted in the context of social change and mental illness that often the medicalization of certain behaviors are the result of interest group pressures. For example, less than two decades ago, there were 106 mental disorders listed in the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders*, known as the *D.S.M.* It is prepared by the American Psychiatric Association and used by psychiatrists and other therapists to identify a set of behaviors as a mental illness. The current fourth edition of the *D.S.M.* contains more than 300 disorders certified as mental diseases. One of the major reasons for the increase is that many new disorders develop powerful lobbies in the therapeutic and political worlds because *D.S.M.*'s significant influence on health care spending. Insurance companies and Health Maintenance Organizations require inclusion of disorders in the Manual before they compensate health care providers. This provides a motive for defining new mental disorders and marketing psychotropic medications (Kutchins & Kirk, 1997).

SUMMARY

This chapter examined the economic, social, and psychological costs of change. It was noted that the costs of social change are never evenly distributed and that it is very difficult to determine the "net" pains and pleasures for widely differing groups. There are, however, several broad societal changes that extract a toll from most of us.

The proponents of economic development argue that growth is an essential condition for social advance and for improving the standard of living. The realization of economic benefits is a major preoccupation of the literature dealing with the problems of underdeveloped societies. However, too little has been said about the costs of growing pains associated with rapid growth rates. It has been noted that continued pursuit of economic development is more likely to reduce than to increase social welfare, and development, in many instances, entails ecologically faulty and socially wasteful types of production. Progress often comes about at the cost of environmental deterioration and an increase in air and water pollution. However, there are few individuals who would give up a convenient airport or their automobile for the sake of a cleaner atmosphere. Not many people would endure for long a decrease in standards of income or return to more primitive economic forms in exchange for either a clean atmosphere or clean water. In addition to environmental considerations, there are economic costs incurred in the transition from traditional to a more

modern society, and such a transition invariably entails a number of trade-offs.

The notion of social costs is essentially a normative concept and it cannot be satisfactorily measured. Many authors single out the automobile in their illustrations of social costs. More pronounced, however, is the decline in the quality of life as evidenced by a number of indicators and poll data. Social costs are also brought about by the rising incidence of environmentally induced illnesses, the lengthening list of endangered species, the progressive pollution and depleting of lakes and streams, and the ecological undermining of the world food economy. In addition, environmental changes result in the reduction of options in terms of what we eat, where we live, and where we travel, and such changes often pose difficult dilemmas involving complex choices and trade-offs. It was noted also that social costs incur from urban living, the increased underutilization of college-educated people, and scientific specialization.

There are many psychological costs of change in addition to economic and social costs. Perhaps most noticeable is the loss of the individual's ability to comprehend and control his or her own environment. Dehumanization, automatization of personality, and systematization of all aspects of social life are recurrent themes in the literature. The symptoms of "robopathology" are becoming more pronounced as many social roles lack opportunities for humanistic expression, spontaneity, creativity, and compassionate action. The psychological costs of change are also evidenced in increased anxiety and insecurity, and, at times, they may carry over into group relations, increasing the possibility of hostility. Finally, it was noted that change is not associated with an increase in mental disorders, although there are good possibilities for other forms of emotional disturbances, such as depression. The experience of modernization does not lead to mental breakdowns, and, in some instances, modernizing influences actually result in a decrease in the number of psychosomatic symptoms. In the next chapter, strategies of change will be considered.

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Chapter 9

Strategies of Change

This chapter considers the ways of bringing about change at various levels in society. At no other period in history has there been so much preoccupation with social change as today. Accompanying this preoccupation with change is a marked theoretical and practical interest in change strategies and tactics. In many areas of social life in which change is not occurring, or taking place too slowly, there is often a great concern about how to stimulate or accelerate change. Demands for social change come from a variety of sources, and there is a growing emphasis on creating, guiding, directing, and managing change. There are also demands to develop new methods, to refine existing ones, and to translate theoretical knowledge into practical applications. At the outset, it should be remembered that strategies and tactics are neutral processes, with value judgments entering into the picture during their applications. More often than not, leading social change at any level can be a difficult and politically dangerous act. These risks increase if a change effort under consideration challenges established societal or organizational norms and values or considered controversial (See, for example, Austin, 1997). Finally, the various ways of creating changes in society may be approved or deplored (is revolution "good" or "bad?"), or considered with scientific detachment. But there is no way of denying their importance.

The consequences of a particular change may be beneficial to one party and detrimental to another. The concepts of benefits and detriments are often relative and are also value judgments on someone's part, and "any manipulation of human behavior inherently violates a fundamental value, but that there exists no formula for so structuring an effective change situation that such manipulation is totally absent" (Kelman, 1972:575). People often feel that things are just not quite the way they ought to be and advo-



cate and express a need for change. Invariably, there will be others who oppose that advocated change. For example, population control is debated, advocated, and resisted both at the village level in underdeveloped countries and in high government offices. In some areas, court-ordered school desegregation is found to reinforce what it was intended to abolish. Heated and emotional discussions abound on both sides of the gun control and abortion issues. At the same time, as a result of purposive, directed change efforts, important strides have occurred in the delivery of health care; there is a noticeable decline in sex discrimination and in infant mortality; and important advancements have been made in reducing racial discrimination, at least in the United States.

This chapter will examine a series of social-change *strategies* (plans of action or policy) and *tactics* (specific means or techniques that stem from a strategy) used in a variety of change efforts at several levels. The chapter is designed to provide a greater understanding of the general targets, agents, and methods of planned social change and to analyze the roles of violence and nonviolence, social movements, and the law in creating change.

TARGETS, AGENTS, AND METHODS OF PLANNED SOCIAL CHANGE

Planned social change refers to deliberate, conscious, and collaborative efforts by change agents to improve the operations of social systems (Bennis, Benne, & Chin, 1985:3). In the social-change literature, planned change has been referred to as social planning, social engineering, change management, or social marketing (Zaltman, Kotler, & Kaufman, 1972:2). Three fundamental issues are involved in the analysis of planned social change. The first has to do with the target of the change, the second with the agents of the change effort, and the third with the methods that will be utilized in the change effort. In the following pages, these three components of planned social change—targets, agents, and methods—will be examined.

Targets of Change

Planned social change usually begins as an effort to solve a problem or to rectify a situation. After the identification of the type of change desired, it is necessary to give attention to the system level on which the change is sought. Change may be sought on the individual level, or, at the other extreme, it may be change of social structural arrangements rather than simply of individuals. There is an infinite number of gradations between the individual and societal levels, and it is therefore helpful to designate the level of the system that is to be changed—that is, to identify the target system. Obviously, the nature of the target system is related to the methods to



be used in bringing about change. For example, strategies used to effect change in an organization may be utterly ineffective in producing changes in individual behavior.

Various target systems have been identified for planned social change. Roland L. Warren (1977:56) incorporates four target systems—individuals, organizations, communities, and societies—in his model of purposive change. Harvey H. Hornstein and associates (1971) discuss a number of change targets, including individuals and organizational structures. They have identified five aspects of individual functioning that are frequent targets of change strategies: feelings, values, attitudes, perceptions, and skills and actions (overt behavior) (1971:15). They broke down the target system of organizational structure into three common targets of change: (1) social characteristics, including group size and composition in terms of identifiable individual features such as intelligence, manual dexterity, and authoritarianism, structure of authority, status hierarchy, incentive systems, and formal channels of communication; (2) environmental characteristics, including spatial relations among group members and other features of physical setting; and (3) task characteristics, such as special task demands (that is, manual skill, knowledge, or creative ability), task difficulty, and the degree to which the task is specific or vague in prescribing behavior necessary for its completion (1971:149).

Gerald Zaltman and Robert Duncan (1977:10–11), in *Strategies for Planned Change*, include time dimension in addition to the level of society that is the target of the change. The time dimension is obviously arbitrary, and can range from a short term of a few days or months to a long term of several months or years. Table 9.1 recapitulates the six types of change identified on the basis of these two dimensions.

At the micro, or individual, level, there may be short-term changes in attitudes and behavior (Type 1). An illustration of this change would be the use of sensitivity training to alter a person's attitudes. An illustration of a more long-term type of change at the microlevel (Type 2) is the training and socialization process of new recruits in an institution. Priests, for example, when they start their training program, learn a new set of attitudes and behavior that affects their entire lives. At the group or intermediate level of short-term change, normative or administrative change may be brought about. *Normative changes* take place when a group alters its norms temporarily to experiment with an innovation (Type 3). For example, in a corporation a team sets up a novel computerized information bank. Team members are given freedom to experiment, and they can bend established organizational rules. The change agent—in this case, the manager responsible for the innovation—encourages the team. Once the innovation has been tried and found useful, it is institutionalized (Kanter, 1983:234). At this point, it will become a more long-term change (Type 4) at the organizational level. The original participants in the change effort will be rewarded, this process then providing incentives for others to experiment.



TABLE 9.1 Time Dimensions and Target Levels

Time Dimension	Level of Society		
	Micro (Individual)	Intermediate (Group)	Macro (Society)
Short term	Type 1 (1) Attitude change (2) Behavior change	Type 3 (1) Normative change (2) Administrative change	Type 5 Inventions or innovation
Long term	Type 2 Life-cycle change	Type 4 Organizational change	Type 6 Sociocultural evolution

At the societal level of change, short-term (Type 5) change is often the result of innovations or inventions. For example, the introduction of birth-control technology in a receptive society can alter birthrates and population size in a relatively short time period. In the long run, these changes could result in major changes in the social structure of the society. The long-term consequences are (Type 6) sociocultural change—that is, the facilitation of the modernization process in an underdeveloped nation.

In the literature on planned social change, there is also a distinction between *change target system* and the *change client system*. The former is seen as the unit in which the change agent is trying to alter the status quo such that the individual, group, or organization must relearn how to perform its activities. The latter is the individual or group requesting assistance from a change agent in altering the status quo. At times they are identical. In other instances, they can be separate entities, such as parents seeking psychiatric help for their child. In this case, the parents represent clients, the therapist the change agent, and the child the change target. The important point in distinguishing between the change target system and the change client system is that change agents may try to influence some system in which there is no support or wish for assistance in any change (Zaltman & Duncan, 1977:18).

There is no commonly accepted typology of change targets in the literature. Most typologies, however, include an individual level; an intermediate level dealing with groups, communities, and organizations; and macrolevel target systems. Let us consider each of them separately.

Individuals as Change Targets There are two ways of looking at individuals as change targets. In the first instance, it can be assumed that individual change is the principal mediator of social and organizational change. Changing of the various aspects of the individual is considered as a stepping-stone to other types of changes—particularly in groups and organizations. The assumption is that, because groups and organizations are made up of individuals, it is individuals who can bring about change in the



systems in which they are members. Thus, a change on an individual level can be evaluated in terms of its possible benefits and usefulness to the system of which they are members.

When the individuals are the target of planned change, a number of diverse strategies may be deployed. As an extreme illustration, "At Atascadero State Mental Hospital in California, homosexual child molesters are trained to cruise in gay bars so they will not have to resort to children; heterosexual child molesters are taught to pick up women at parties; and rapists are coached in sex techniques to improve their relationships with their wives" (Sage, 1977:79). This strategy of planned change is labeled behavior modification. Three general techniques are involved in behavior modification: those that work with negative reinforcers (punishments for undesirable behavior); those that use positive reinforcers (rewards for desirable behavior), and those that attempt to undermine the subject's character structure. In addition, behavior-modification programs may include drugs, hypnosis, electroconvulsive shocks, brainwashing, and, in extreme cases, psychosurgery. Behavior modification is being used in a variety of institutional settings, such as schools, mental hospitals, and prisons, to change a large assortment of behavior "with remarkable success" (Albrecht, Chadwick, & Jacobson, 1987:17).

Behavior modification is obviously only one of the many strategies for changing individuals. Depending on the kind of change desired, and whether or not it is to be implemented on a one-to-one basis or in a small-group situation, one may choose from the arsenal of psychoanalytical, social-psychological, or educational strategies. The social sciences can offer a broad spectrum of technologies, stemming from several theoretical assumptions, which can be used with varying effectiveness with individual change targets.

Intermediate Target Systems The group has come to occupy a strategic place both as a medium and as a target of planned social change in recent years (Benne, 1985:75). The link between the individual and the larger social system is the group. This is particularly true in a formal organization such as the army. The individual's membership in a squad or tank crew is one's link to the larger army. Similarly, students are linked to the larger school system through the classroom, student government, or a varsity sports team. In a less obvious fashion, the same is true of individuals' linkage with less formally organized systems such as the community, racial, and ethnic groupings. Therefore, the group is a medium for influencing both the individuals who are its members and the larger system of which their group is a part.

Kenneth D. Benne (1985:75) points out that larger social systems usually depend on small groups in formulating and shaping their policies and programs, whether it is a committee, cabinet, or board. Change in the composition and functioning of such a group can also produce change in the



wider social system that is dependent upon that group for direction and guidance. Consequently, the management of small-group activities and processes is an important target in planned social change.

At the community level, intergroup relations are often the target of planned social change (Kettner, Daley, & Nichols, 1985). In many instances, the object is to change the relations between racial, ethnic, and religious groups. These relationships are often marked by strong feelings of fear and hostility and by historically embedded stereotypes. At times, changes can be effective in such intergroup relations by changing the composition of group members. For example, an important study on "Interracial Housing" by Morton Deutsch and Mary Evans Collins (1965) shows that integrated housing projects had a positive impact on relations between the races and on the attitudes of white women toward their black neighbors. White women in the integrated projects were more likely to have contacts with black women, to have black friends, and to engage in neighborhood activities with blacks than were white women in segregated projects. In addition, women in the integrated projects were more likely to express positive attitudes toward blacks and, on the basis of recall, were more likely to report a positive change in attitude since living in the projects. Deutsch and Collins note that the success of such changes is enhanced when supportive attitudes from the wider community are forthcoming.

In many cases, the target of planned change is the organization, where attempts are made to improve internal communications, increase efficiency, work satisfaction, and productivity (Hall, 1995). Of course, the various organizations can have specific client systems as change targets. For example, family-planning associations see the mothers and the public at large as the target, and the various antidrug groups view actual and potential users as the targets. The American Heart Association sees smokers and overweight people, among others, as targets.

Macrolevel Target Systems Affecting changes in macrosystems or in the structure of society are obviously much more difficult than in microlevel or intermediate-level target systems. Targets at that level would include attempts to change national policies, cultural patterns, resolving issues between nations, attempts at modernization, industrialization, urbanization, nation building, altering statuses of minority groups, and the like. At the macrolevel, in many instances, there are highly complex target systems. In many cases it is very difficult to identify such complex target systems except in the most general terms. This dilemma is epitomized in the popular expression, "Let's change the whole system." In some instances, however, target systems at the macrolevel may be clearly identified. This is the case, for example, of national policies dealing with certain aspects of society such as agriculture, the economy, or formal educational systems. At times, efforts are directed only at a segment of one of these factors; for example, energy poli-

ther discussed under the headings of Social Movements, and Law and Social Change, in this chapter.

Change Agents

In planned social change, change agents are professionals who influence, promote, and implement innovation decisions in a direction considered desirable by an organization or a community (Indergaard, 1997). Change agents may be external or internal to the social system in which change is desired, and the change desired may also be classified as external or internal in origin (Zaltman & Duncan, 1977:187). To achieve change, there must be organization. Ideally, the change effort should be compatible with the values of the target population, and the organization itself should be accepted by society (Hall, 1995).

Philip Kotler (1972:177–178) points out that change agents fall into two groups: leaders and supporters. The *leaders* include six types of persons: (1) the *directors*, who started or head the organization and wield the power; (2) the *advocates*, who wield the pen rather than the power but are close to those in power; (3) the *backers*, who provide the purse and supply the financial resources to keep the organization going; (4) the *technicians*, who, as employees or volunteers, provide professional advice or service, for example, public relations specialists, professional fund raisers, advertising practitioners, community organizers, lawyers, and management consultants; (5) the *administrators*, who run the day-to-day affairs of the organization; and, finally, (6) the *organizers*, who have effective skills in enlisting supporters and running the programs and campaigns.

The *supporters* include: (1) the *workers*, who are committed enough to the particular change efforts to give their time to it; (2) the *donors*, who make contributions of money rather than time to the cause; and, finally, (3) a much larger group of *sympathizers*, who neither work nor give much money to the cause but talk about it supportively.

Everett M. Rogers (1972:196–197) identifies several functions of the change agent, including developing a recognition for need for change among the clients; establishing a change relationship with them; diagnosing the client's problem; examining the client's goals and alternatives, then creating the intent to change in the client; encouraging the client to innovate; stabilizing the change behavior so as to prevent discontinuance; and, finally, achieving a terminal relationship with the client.

In addition, Zaltman and Duncan (1977:185–224) note that in situations where an organization has defined the problems for the change agent and

established the objectives of the change effort, the change agent should be sensitive to the needs and perspectives of the change target system in seeking solutions to change situations; should always seek the simplest solution when working with a change problem; should have administrative capabilities; should strive to maintain good interpersonal relations with persons and the change target system; should be sensitive to and tolerant of constraints; should have self-confidence and a positive self-image to accept setbacks; should be able to define the change program in a fashion that is effective to the various participants of the change program; and, finally, should try to maximize cooperation with members of the change target system.

Methods of Planned Social Change

In the literature on planned social change, there is no definitive method for categorizing the various strategies of change. Consequently, various authors on the topic use labels that are somewhat arbitrary and, on many occasions, overlap. Moreover, in many change situations, the change agent is likely to utilize multiple change strategies to accomplish the desired objective in the context of unique configurations and characteristics of change targets (see, for example, Robertson and Seneviratne, 1995). It is also conceivable that a change agent may resort to a sequence of strategies over time, again depending on the particular change situation. With this in mind, let us now examine some of the principal change strategies.

A most comprehensive review of change strategies for affecting changes in human systems is presented by Robert Chin and Kenneth D. Benne (1985). They emphasize that a common element in all approaches to planned change is the conscious utilization and application of knowledge as an instrument for altering patterns and institutions of practices. Although their orientation is primarily toward educational change, the strategies they discuss are applicable to many different types of planned change situations. They identify three broad categories of strategies: empirical-rational, normative-reeducative, and power-coercive.

The *empirical-rational* strategies are based on the assumption that people are rational and that they follow their rational self-interests once these are revealed to them. The emphasis of this category is on changing individuals. With regard to educational change, empirical-rational strategies include such activities as basic research and dissemination of knowledge to general education, personal selection and replacement, the use of systems analysts as staff and consultants, and applied research and the development of linkage systems for diffusing its findings. They also include utopian thinking as a strategy of change in the form of future scenarios and an emphasis on more adequate communication on interpersonal relationships.

The *normative-reeducative* strategies are based on the assumption that change will occur only as the individuals involved are brought to change



their normative orientations to old patterns and develop commitments to new ones. Such changes involve changes in attitudes, values, skills, and significant relationships. Such approaches to effecting change "bring direct interventions by change agents, interventions based on a consciously worked out theory of change and of changing, into the life of a client system, be that system a person, a small group, an organization, or a community" (Chin & Benne, 1985:32). These change strategies have a number of common elements. For example, the emphasis on the client system and its perception of its own problem and the need for change; an assumption that such problems are seldom purely technical, having a group dynamic component; the notion of a change agent collaborating with the client who is the change target; the attempt to uncover nonconscious elements that are impeding the problem solution, so that they may be dealt with; and the selective use of knowledge from the behavioral sciences. "These approaches center in the notion that people technology is just as necessary as thing technology in working out desirable changes in human affairs" (Chin & Benne, 1985:33). They are used, for example, at the organizational level to improve problem-solving capabilities, methods of conflict resolution, and communication, and to increase organizational effectiveness and efficiency.

The *power-coercive* strategies are based on the application of economic, political, or moral power. Although the accent is more often on political and economic sanctions, Chin and Benne point out that strategies of nonviolence fit this category through the application of moral power. They also include the use of political institutions and law to achieve change. Similarly, they include efforts to manipulate or reconstitute "power elites." It is suggested that this last approach is justified only when it is necessary to remove barriers to accomplishing change through democratically and scientifically oriented methods.

As a refinement of one of the three strategies discussed by Chin and Benne, Ronald Lippitt and his associates (1958) apply the normative-reeducative strategy to four different types of client systems: individuals, small groups, large organizations, and communities. It should be noted that their method of change is limited to situations in which an individual, group, organization, or community engages a consultant as change agent in order to help it change itself. They developed a model to fit this relationship between a client system and a change agent acting as consultant. It is based on five phases: (1) development of a need for change ("unfreezing"); (2) establishment of a change relationship; (3) working toward change ("moving"); (4) generalization and stabilization of change ("freezing"); and (5) achieving a terminal relationship (Lippitt, Watson, & Westley, 1958:130).

From a different perspective, Richard E. Walton (1972) distinguishes between the power strategy and the attitude change strategy. The *power* strategy is based on the assumption that the way to bring about change is to build a power base and manipulate that power strategically. The *attitude*

change strategy is based on the notion that the desired behavior change will be best produced through attitude change, based on a growth of trust and goodwill.

In an approach to develop strategies for social action, Philip Kotler (1972:183–184) identifies three basic ways in which a change agent can attempt to influence a change target: by coercion (power), persuasion, or education.

The *power* strategy attempts to bring about change in the target through the use of agent-controlled sanctions. In such situations, change agents are primarily concerned with changing the behavior rather than the beliefs or values of the change target. They seek changes through sanctions such as authority, force, or payment. Change agents in a position of authority (managers over workers, army officers over draftees, judges over defendants) attempt to bring about change by withholding rewards or administering punishment. If the change agent has no authority over the change target, two possibilities exist. If the agent views the target as an enemy, the power strategy may take the form of force or threat of force—demonstration, noncooperation, or violence. The second option entails the use of payment (gifts or bribes) to bring about the desired behavior.

Kotler's second way of bringing about change is through a *persuasion* strategy, which attempts to induce the desired behavior in the target through identifying the social object with the change agent's existing beliefs or values. The change agent seeks to find arguments that indicate that the desired behavior serves the natural interests of the change targets. Based on the Aristotelian approach, three persuasive arguments are possible: *logos*, or appeals to logic; *pathos*, or appeals to emotions; and *ethos*, or appeals to values. For example, in television campaigns to discourage smoking all three appeals have been used. "*Logic-laden* commercials attempted to prove that cigarette smoking was harmful to health, *affect-laden* commercials sought to activate smokers' fears of death, and *value-laden* commercials implied that the smoker was immoral or irresponsible to his family because his death would hurt them" (Kotler, 1972:184).

Kotler's *reeducative* strategy attempts to induce the desired behavior in the change target through the internalization of new beliefs or values. In such a situation, the change agent seeks a deep and lasting change in the behavior of the change target that he believes cannot be produced through power or persuasive approaches. It is used by psychotherapists in individual situations or milieu therapists in group situations.

By now, it is obvious that there are many ways to categorize the strategies of planned change. In an influential book, *Strategies for Planned Change*, Gerald Zaltman and Robert Duncan (1977) recapitulate and combine many of the previously discussed approaches. They then suggest that the various strategies can be depicted on a continuum by degree of external pressure exerted on the targets. They identify four general strategies: facilitative,





reeducative, persuasive, and power—that range from minimum to maximum outside pressure.

Facilitative strategies are the ones that make easier the implementation of changes by and/or among the target group. It is based on the assumption that the target group: (1) already recognizes a problem; (2) is in general agreement that remedial action is necessary; and (3) is open to external assistance and willing to engage in self-help (Zaltman & Duncan, 1977:90). The effectiveness of the strategy is enhanced when the target groups are aware of the availability of assistance, committed to seek and accept assistance, and willing to remedy a situation. For example, on native American reservations, children do poorly in school and have a high dropout rate. The problem is recognized, and funds are made available to rectify the situation by trying to create an environment more conducive to learning.

Reeducative strategies are used when time is not a pressing factor. In such a strategy, the relatively objective presentation is intended to provide a rational justification for action. It is based on the assumption that humans are rational beings and capable of modifying their behavior when information is presented to them. Reeducation, rather than education, is used because the strategy involves the unlearning, or “unfreezing,” of something that was internalized before the change target learned the new attitude and behavior. Such reeducation strategies have been found very effective in third-world countries in a number of areas such as sanitation, increased use of hygiene facilities, and in various public health campaigns.

Persuasive strategies try to bring about change through bias in the way in which a message is structured and presented. Attempts to create change may be based on reasoning, or on rational or emotional appeals. Most advertisers and many nonprofit organizations rely on these strategies. In planned change efforts, persuasive strategies are used frequently in family planning programs and in marketing.

Power strategies involve the use of coercion to secure the target’s compliance. Zaltman and Duncan suggest that the ability to exercise power is founded on an obligatory relationship between the change agent and change target. It is indicative of a situation in which the target is dependent on the change agent for satisfaction of its goals. “The strength of power is related to the degree of dependency, which in turn is a function of several factors: (1) the goals controlled by the change agent and the target’s motivational investment in those goals, (2) the availability of alternatives to satisfy the target’s goals, and (3) the cost of alternative modes of goal attainment” (Zaltman & Duncan, 1977:153). In some instances, the exercise of power has a cost to its user. There may be a cost involved in rewarding the target for compliance or punishing the target for noncompliance. Cost may also incur in the form of retaliation on the part of the target. An illustration of the use of the power strategies would be the various regulatory

agencies in the domain of the environment, energy use, advertising, and auto safety. In general, power strategies are desirable when the change sought must be immediate and when the commitment by the target is low to a particular change.

On occasion, the use of *multiple* strategies is desirable. A good illustration of the use of multiple strategies is the case of a massive vasectomy campaign in Kerala, India, in 1970. It lasted for one month, and over 150,000 sterilizations were performed. Various persuasive strategies were used in the form of house-to-house visits by family-planning educators, public meetings, press releases, special newspaper supplements, and variety entertainments and cultural performances with particular reference to the campaign. The use of incentives (payment or bribe) can be called a form of power strategy according to Kotler (1972:183). Finally, the location and the physical layout of the camp and the transportation system established to bring in persons for the operation reflect considerable concern with facilitative strategies (Zaltman & Duncan, 1977:179).

VIOLENCE

In the previous section, references were made to the various power strategies of change in the context of legitimate authority manifested through institutional channels. The intent of this section is to examine the use of violence and coercion as extralegal strategies to effect change. Violence is conceptualized as direct or indirect action applied to restrain, injure, or destroy persons or property. The discussion in this section will be limited to those change efforts in which violent methods are deliberately used in the formulation and implementation of social change.

The use of violent strategies of social change is as old as humankind. Samuel P. Huntington (1972:282) points out that in no society do significant social, economic, or political changes take place without violence or the imminent likelihood of violence. At times, as H. L. Nieburg (1972:161) asserts, "The threat of violence and the occasional outbreak of real violence—which gives the threat credibility—are essential elements in peaceful social change not only in international, but also in national communities."

Violent strategies of change include ghetto riots, university confrontations, guerrilla warfare, oppressive measures by the state, various forms of insurrection, terrorism, and, in its ultimate form, revolution. Decentralized and spontaneous violence is a common means through which disadvantaged groups call attention to their grievances and their demands for social change (Alder, 1992). There appear to be some periods or situations in which violence succeeds more often than nonviolence. As it was noted previously, William A. Gamson (1990) studied fifty-three

American groups and movements that promoted various social changes between 1800 and 1945. He claims that those that gained their goals were generally the ones that used violence (or, more correctly, had violence thrust upon them through police or mob attack), while all the nonviolent victims of attack failed to achieve their goals.

At times, the use of violence is a necessary stimulus for change. For example, "The history of reform in the United States—from the Jeffersonians down through abolitionists, populists, the labor movement, and the civil rights movement—is studded with instances of violence and other forms of disorder which helped to trigger changes in governmental policy" (Huntington, 1972:282). The riots of the early 1830s and other violence in England played an important role in consolidating Whig support for the Reform Act of 1832. Similarly, in India, middle-class groups in the mid-1950s used violence on occasions to wrest concessions from the government. In the United States, following the Birmingham riots in 1963, President Kennedy declared that passage of his civil rights bill was necessary "to get the struggle off the streets and into the courts." Failure to pass the bill, Kennedy warned, would lead to "continued, if not increased, racial strife—causing the leadership on both sides to pass from the hands of reasonable and responsible men to the purveyors of hate and violence" (Huntington, 1972:283).

The effectiveness of violence as a strategy of social change lies in the willingness of certain segments of the population to go beyond the accepted patterns of action to promote change. The use of violent strategies represents a threat to existing political organization and procedures. However, it should be noted that the repeated use of violent strategies depreciates their value. "In 1963 racial riots in the United States and monkish self-immolation in Vietnam helped to produce significant changes in governmental policy and political leadership. Three years later similar events failed to produce similar consequences" (Huntington, 1972:284).

There are certain common elements in the use of violent strategies for effecting social change. Ted Gurr (1967) outlines the principal strategic steps that are used to induce violent social change. As the first step, the change agent must increase the perception of relative deprivation among the potentially violent group. This can be done by minimizing the group's perceptions of the rewards and benefits to be gained at its current social position while enhancing the perceived discrepancy between the group and other segments of society. This perceived discrepancy, in turn, would lead to feelings of frustration and anger.

The second step entails the maximization of the intensity of anger of the group. The change agent, according to Gurr, should argue that: (1) the social goals are desirable; for example, economic benefits, improved well-being, and increased status; (2) the deprivation to which the group is subjected is indeed illegitimate; for example, by underscoring instances of



social discrimination; (3) the deprivation is severe; for example, by pointing to the discrepancies between the group and its desired state while minimizing the similarities; and (4) by emphasizing the occurrence of continuous and unjust deprivation.

In the third step, the change agent must emphasize the social facilitation variables and minimize the social control variables that transform anger into violence. The accentuation of social facilitation variables entails: (1) giving examples that society is violent in other spheres; for example, violence is as American as apple pie; (2) amplifying racial, communal, and other in-group ties by emphasizing shared states of deprivation and indicating harassment by other groups; and (3) giving critical incidents that will trigger violence at optimal points in time. Gurr points to two ways for the change agent to minimize social control variables: (1) create conditions that will evoke either no retribution or an overreaction; and (2) create conditions that cut off the availability of mechanisms that discharge anger nonviolently. The first instance is illustrated by overreaction by the police to ghetto and campus violence, thus helping to increase violence. The second might entail the creation of certain incidents that bring about curfews, a temporary cessation of mass gatherings, and similar events.

Obviously, not all of these steps were present in the more than 300 outbursts of collective racial violence that occurred in major central cities between 1963 and 1969 in the United States (Downes, 1970). Many of the participants of these racial riots saw their grievances rooted in the existing arrangements of power and authority in contemporary society, and their action was—on a direct or symbolic level—an attempt at altering these arrangements (Skolnick, 1969:7). However, not all violent activities are aimed at achieving either specific or symbolic objectives. Many individuals participated because food, liquor, clothing, appliances, and other goods could be procured through looting, or they participated to vent their anger against specific merchants and police who had harassed or exploited them.

During the initial stages of the riots of the 1960s, racial violence was relatively spontaneous and unorganized. The riots were black-dominated and property-oriented. By 1968, however, the police were becoming more effective in controlling or repressing violent events. The development of improved control capabilities led to more organized small-scale terrorism or guerrilla warfare by black extremist groups such as the Revolutionary Action Movement and the Black Panthers. This violence took the form of arson and attempts to kill police, firefighters, and merchants in the ghetto. This new pattern of violence was black-dominated but person-oriented, and it also involved more systematic attacks on whites. In many instances, the violent outbursts were precipitated by specific incidents that involved the police, and on other occasions were linked to a variety of urban grievances (Wilson, 1968:23).



Martin Oppenheimer (1969) points out that violence can be a successful change strategy in the long run only if those using it have mass support or majority neutrality. After the violent outbursts and turmoil of the 1960s, blacks had neither. This is not to say, however, that their efforts were in vain. The unrest contributed to a series of efforts to improve the plight of blacks and the underprivileged, including model city programs, the "war against poverty," black studies programs in universities, and so on.

In addition to riots, there are other forms of violence aimed at bringing about change. They include the various types of revolutions discussed in Chapter 3, such as civil wars, wars of national liberation, *putsch*, and coup d'états. Regarding the latter, Edward Luttwak (1979) notes that in the twentieth century, coups are more common than elections as a means of changing governments in many countries. There are many more military governments in existence than parliamentary democracies, and, since the end of World War II, there have been hundreds of coups worldwide. The major sources of coups include ethnic antagonisms stemming from cultural plurality and political competition, and the presence of strong militaries with factionalized office corps (Kposowa & Jenkins, 1993).

Terrorism is a special form of violence that is used to effect radical change. In 1996, 311 people died in terrorist attacks, countless injured, with incalculable social, psychological and economic costs (Weiner, 1997). Scholarly interest in terrorists and terrorism has been expanding ever since the late 1960s, when a wave of dramatic incidents—hijackings, kidnappings, bombings, and hostage taking—began (see, for example, Clutterback, 1994; Ross, 1993). Terrorism is a politically charged concept, and scholars trying to define it encounter practical and theoretical dilemmas, perhaps best reflected by the oft-cited adage, "One person's terrorist is another person's freedom fighter." In essence, there is a conflict of different ideologies, and what constitutes terrorism depends on one's political views. To illustrate: former President Reagan referred to the U.S.-backed Contra rebels who were trying to overthrow the Nicaraguan government as "freedom fighters." Others, in particular the Sandinistas, called the rebels terrorists, arguing that Contra violence against civilian population constitutes terrorism. Similarly, Ilich Ramirez Sanchez, the elusive terrorist known to the world as "Carlos the Jackal," who was captured and tried in France in late 1994, is considered a hero to be emulated by Islamic fundamentalists (Riding, 1994).

Part of the lack of consensus also stems from the vast differences among "terrorist" groups themselves. They range from the Irish Republican Army to Hamas and the various other factions of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, and from the Basque nationalists in Spain to the Baader-Meinhof gang in Germany and the Red Brigades in Italy. The Sunnis, Shiites, Sikhs, Serbs, and Salvadorans, among many others, have their own peculiar causes and terrorist groups. As a tactic, terrorism has been





used by groups on the far right and on the far left. Terrorist acts have been committed by groups that have been vindicated by history, as well as by those that have been condemned by it.

But what is *terrorism*? It may be defined as a type of surreptitious warfare based on the indiscriminate use or threat of violence, a warfare in which the most important result is not the physical or mental damage of the victims, but the psychological effects produced for the purpose of altering the state of mind or policy of a nation or group whose members are directly assaulted or intimidated (Grosscup, 1991:13; Turner & Killian, 1987:319).

Indiscriminate violence against innocent people is used for a variety of objectives. One is to coerce a nation into taking some specific action to carry out the terrorists' goal. As an example, the Arab "skyjackers" of a TWA plane in 1985 killed one passenger and held thirty-nine American tourists hostage in Lebanon for seventeen days while demanding that Israel release over 700 Shiite Muslims. Almost a decade later, an Islamic militant on a suicide mission blew up a bus in Tel Aviv, killing twenty-two and wounding forty-six others in an attempt to call attention to detained Hamas supporters (Haberma, 1994:1). Another objective is to demoralize and intimidate the opposition. For example, Arab terrorist incidents in the Vienna and Rome airports in 1985 and terrorist acts against the United States in 1986 adversely affected the willingness of Americans to live and work in Lebanon, created unrest among Americans working abroad, and discouraged many American tourists from going to Europe. A third objective is to call attention to the terrorist cause. Terrorists create newsworthy events; they mobilize the news media to disseminate a message that otherwise would not capture public attention. This manipulation of the media is often successful. It gives the terrorists publicity and the power to instill fear that is out of proportion to their real numbers and strength (Turner & Killian, 1987:321-322). It can have also some unintended consequences: the atmosphere surrounding terrorist incidents decreases the rates of luggage theft in mass transit stations. This may have to do both with the fear of possible thieves of picking up an item of luggage containing an explosive and with heightened police vigilance after such an event (Trivizas & Smith, 1997).

In many parts of the world, terrorist activities are highly organized and well financed (Grosscup, 1991). Manuals on terrorist strategies and tactics abound (Marighella, 1985) and can even be found on the Internet. In a cookbook-like fashion, among other things, they spell out techniques of raids and infiltrations, ambushes, street operations, bomb making, executions, kidnappings, sabotage, conducting a war of nerves, obtaining weapons, and negotiating for hostages. Terrorists are also getting technologically more sophisticated, and the threat from terrorist groups could escalate dramatically were they to use nuclear weapons or chemical or bio-



logical warfare agents. Ironically, advances in science and technology could turn the whole of modern society into a potential victim of terrorism, creating a state of the world in which there is no immunity for the non-combatant segment of the population or for those who have no direct connection to particular conflicts or grievances that instigate acts of violence. The bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995, killing 165 people, is a telling example of this point.

The Internet itself can become the target for terrorists. Today's society is becoming more dependent on electronic storage, retrieval, analysis, and transmission of information, giving the new generation of terrorists a very attractive target. With vital national activities such as banking, defense, trade, transportation, and scientific research, all carried out online, mischief or sabotage by any hacker with a keyboard and a cause could create major problems (Laqueur, 1997).

In most of the literature on planned social change, the use of violent strategies is not considered a desirable means for inducing social change. For example, after examining numerous violent attempts to bring about change, Oppenheimer concludes that the use of violence tends to subvert or inhibit the emergence of a truly democratic and humanistic regime (1969:55-68). The use of violence, Oppenheimer argues, tends to foster the worship of action. Rational thought is denigrated. Moreover, in spite of Franz Fanon's (1968) arguments about the liberating effects of oppressed people engaging in violent acts, Oppenheimer asserts that violence negatively affects individual mental health and personality. The survivors of successful attempts to bring about change are usually incapable of creating a humanistic order because they are conditioned to use violence both to solve problems and against enemies of the new order. This, in turn, further subverts democratic processes and humanistic values. To change society, Oppenheimer argues that the only appropriate strategy is a "protracted nonviolent struggle."

Before examining nonviolent and direct action strategies of change, one should note that violence need not be directed toward other groups. Nieburg (1972:170) describes the Dukhobor Sons of Freedom (of Vancouver, B.C.), who have adopted a novel technique of displaying violence as they conduct their inmemorial campaign against compulsory public education. They set fire to their own homes and barns, standing by and watching the blaze. They also parade naked in the middle of city streets. The unusual nature of these demonstrations is plain. Their religion forbids them to threaten or use violence against others. Instead, they demonstrate symbolically their discipline and passionate commitment of their own way of life by inflicting violence upon their own property. The naked marches result in arrests and imprisonment, and the house burnings force welfare authorities to provide temporary shelter. In the process, however, the demonstrations invoke public attention and sympathy for the believers.

This may well give the local authorities incentive to ignore their defiance of school attendance laws. As a matter of fact, this is what has happened during the past two generations. The law has been circumvented and there have been no concentrated efforts on the part of authorities to enforce it.

NONVIOLENCE AND DIRECT ACTION

There are many contemporary images of nonviolence as a strategy for social change: consumer boycotts, rent strikes, civil rights demonstrations, labor pickets, sitting in front of abortion clinics to prevent entrance, or pouring of blood as a symbolic act (MacQueen, 1992). This strategy has a long history. Socrates practiced civil disobedience as a form of nonviolent resistance over 2,000 years ago. Centuries ago, in the Far East creditors fasted on a debtor's doorstep until they were paid. Christ and his disciples embraced many nonviolent practices. Americans threw English tea into Boston Harbor to protest British taxes. In the nineteenth-century United States, Henry David Thoreau stated his philosophy of civil disobedience, which still serves as an inspiration for nonviolent action (Hornstein et al., 1971:533-534).

Chin and Benne (1985:41) consider nonviolence one of the power-coercive strategies. It is a way of forcing the change target to give in, to make concessions, and, occasionally, to cooperate with the change effort. Nonviolence is based on "moral power," and "Part of the ingredients of the power of the civilly disobedient is in the guilt which their demonstration of injustice, unfairness, or cruelty of the existing system of control arouses in those exercising control or in others previously committed to the present system of control" (Chin & Benne, 1985:41). The strategy of nonviolence is likely to be effective, other things being equal, according to the value orientation of the change target and of the pertinent third parties. When the change target, in the form of established authority, is relatively immune to the moral appeal involved, the reaction to nonviolence may be brutal repression. "Unless there are third parties with power to intervene and who are deeply impressed by the moral issues and the brutal repression, the efforts may be ruthlessly squelched" (Warren, 1977:156). On the other hand, in situations in which the target and third parties are susceptible to the moral appeal of the nonviolent action, it may be highly effective.

Hornstein and his associates (1971:537-542) suggest that the choice of nonviolent strategy and tactics can reflect either an indirect or a direct approach to the opponent's power. The indirect approach is based on the decision to meet the violent style of the opponent with nonviolence. The direct approach is based on attempts to upset the opponent's power base, attitudes, availability of resources, public image, and opinion of third parties. In such instances, the conflict is external to the opponent, not internal.



The Indirect Approach

In the indirect approach, an important assumption shared by nonviolent change agents is that the amount, duration, and intensity of violence is minimized by nonviolent change tactics. It is based on the notion that "using nonviolence against a violent attacker acts like a 'moral jujitsu'; the nonviolent behavior throws the attacker off guard, and exhausts him through an internal conflict between his needs to vent aggressive behavior and the situational inappropriateness of attacking a passive other" (Hornstein et al., 1971:538). However, the reality of the situation does not always support this assumption. For example, in many instances, physical harm is present; witness the beatings of student demonstrators by police at Berkeley, Columbia, and other campuses as they protested the war in Vietnam in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

From a related perspective, Gene Sharpe (quoted by Hornstein et al., 1971:538–539) shows that nonviolence is selected as a strategy because it technically disconfirms the opponent's expectations of violence. "The opponent, in his disconfirmed state, will now be responsive to a nonviolent strategy and agree to play the game 'in kind.'" In reality, whether or not the opponent will respond this way, however, depends on a number of factors. Some of these are as follows:

1. If the nonviolent behavior is seen as appropriate.
2. If the nonviolent tactic is new.
3. If the nonviolent action is seen as resulting from a strategy or a way of life.
4. If the opponent can trust the nonviolent actor.
5. If the nonviolent actor is valued as a human being.

It is obvious that the outcome of an indirect approach is highly speculative, particularly in view of the number of factors that could make it fail.

The Direct Approach

In the direct approach, there are two factors involved: techniques of attitude change and the use of *third parties*. Hornstein and his colleagues suggest that both are used to manipulate the political position of the opponents as well as to change their behavior and/or attitudes toward the issues.

Gene Sharpe (1971:546–577) advocates three mechanisms of *attitude change*: conversion, accommodation, and nonviolent coercion. *Conversion* takes place when the opponents change both their attitudes and their behavior toward the nonviolent actor. It takes place in situations in which the opponents are persuaded by a variety of messages as well as situations of identification with the nonviolent actor. Illustrations of tactics in this category of nonviolent protest would include petitions, pickets, declarations, teach-ins, and marches. *Accommodation*, according to Sharpe, is a mild form of coercion involving a willingness to go along with the nonviolent demonstrators with-





out measurably changing one's attitude. An illustration of this would be the hunger strike, a tactic that is successful when the suffering of the participants becomes intolerable to the opponent or to third-party witnesses. *Nonviolent coercion* is present in situations in which opponents have no choice about their compliance. It is used to force opponents to behave in a certain fashion by the change agent whether or not they like it. However, it will sustain change only when the threat of continued or renewed action is present or when there are new laws to support the change. Strikes, boycotts, occupations, and sit-downs are illustrative tactics of nonviolent coercion.

In the direct approach, third parties often have an effect on the success of a nonviolent strategy. Their impact is based on "(1) their own attitudinal position and its correspondence to the attitudes of demonstrators or the opponent; (2) their communication to the opponent about his behavior; and (3) their availability to maintain surveillance over agreed-upon changes by either party" (Hornstein et al., 1971:541). Third parties with high prestige who support the demonstrators are likely to increase the perceived pressures on the opponent to change. By contrast, if they support the opponent's position, it will probably decrease the likelihood of change. Regarding the second point, communication that supports the nonviolent demonstrators is particularly effective when an opponent has responded violently to the nonviolence. The presence of the mass media is especially important here, as witnessed by the events at the 1968 Chicago Democratic Convention. Finally, surveillance is particularly effective in accommodation and coercion strategies. The changes brought about by these approaches require impartial third parties to monitor the future course of events of both sides in the conflict.

After this overview of nonviolent strategies of change, it is appropriate to consider some of the tactics that are used. Incredible as it may seem, there are at least 146 tactics used in nonviolence (Sharpe, 1971:546). Prior to discussing some of the tactics, it should be noted that a change agent should not expect to achieve success with nonviolent tactics unless he or she has made provisions for sufficient training in their use, and planning in their application and execution. An understanding of the tactics alone is not sufficient, they need to be rehearsed extensively with those who will be involved in the action (Hornstein et al., 1971:542).

Direct-Action Tactics

Martin Oppenheimer and George Lakey (1972) discuss some of the more important direct-action tactics used in the civil rights struggle in the United States. They list them under three headings: demonstrations, non-cooperation, and direct intervention.

Demonstrations are used primarily to express a position, a point of view. They are not so effective as noncooperation or direct intervention. The tactics used here include: marches and parades; picketing and vigils; frater-

nization; "hounding" (following and reminding officials of the immorality of their behavior); publishing leaflets, and renouncing honors.

Noncooperation entails methods of direct action in which campaigners withdraw their usual degree of cooperation with the opponents. Depending on local laws, the tactics may be legal or illegal and include strikes; hartal (staying home for a day or so, leaving factories and places of business empty); consumer boycotts or selective buying; rent strikes; school boycotts; and refusal to pay taxes.

Direct, nonviolent intervention consists of physical confrontation rather than withdrawal of cooperation or demonstrating. It carries the conflict into the opponent's camp and often alters the status quo abruptly. There are several tactics involved, such as sit-ins; pray-ins in churches; wade-ins on beaches; fasting; reverse strikes (working longer hours than called for in support of certain demands); and nonviolent interjection and obstruction (such as lying down on sidewalks or in front of bulldozers, or physically occupying a site). At times, proponents of a change effort resort to shock tactics to get their message across. For example, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals has taken its antifur campaign beyond nudes on billboards and models of various agencies created a living PETA billboard in New York in 1996 for their "fur free" cause (Luscombe, 1996).

The nonviolent strategy of *satyagraha* involves many of the tactics outlined by Oppenheimer and Lakey. "It is characterized by adherence to a stated truth by means of behavior which is not violent but which includes self-suffering" (Bondurant, 1972:303). This strategy was used during the Nationalist movement in India and involved the various methods of noncooperation and civil disobedience. Joan V. Bondurant (1972:305) outlines the various steps involved in a *satyagraha* campaign.

1. Attempt to resolve the conflict or grievance by negotiation and arbitration.
2. Prepare the group for direct action.
3. Engage in demonstrations and propaganda campaigns.
4. Try to appeal to the opponent for a final time; if there are no concessions, issue an ultimatum.
5. Engage in economic boycott and strikes of various forms.
6. Initiate actions of noncooperation with established authorities and institutions.
7. Engage in civil disobedience, but exercise care in selecting the laws to be violated.
8. Assume some of the functions of the government.
9. Establish a parallel government to handle those functions.

The *satyagraha* strategy is progressive in nature, and it can stop at any stage at which the opponents concede to the demands. In India, various groups have used this strategy, and many of the steps were incorporated in civil rights and related activities in the United States.



No discussion of nonviolent tactics (or violent tactics) of social change would be complete without some reference to Saul Alinsky (1972:138–139), a master tactician in community organization. In his words:

I have emphasized and re-emphasized that tactics means you do what you can with what you've got, and that power in the main has always gravitated towards those who have money and those whom people follow. The resources of the Have-Nots are (1) no money and (2) lots of people. All right, let's start from there. People can show their power by voting. What else? Well, they have physical bodies. How can they use them? Now a melange of ideas begins to appear. Use the power of the law by making the establishment obey its rules. Go outside the experience of the enemy, stay inside the experience of your people. Emphasize tactics that your people will enjoy. The threat is usually more terrifying than the tactic itself. Once all these rules and principles are festering in your imagination they grow into a synthesis . . . [for example] . . . I suggested that we might buy one hundred seats for one of Rochester's symphony concerts. We would select a concert in which the music was relatively quiet. The hundred blacks who would be given the tickets would first be treated to a three-hour pre-concert dinner in the community, in which they would be fed nothing but baked beans, and lots of them; then the people would go to the symphony hall—with obvious consequences. Imagine the scene when the action began! The concert would be over before the first movement! (If this be a Freudian slip—so be it.)

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Social movements generally develop among the less powerful segments in society and act outside of institutional channels (McAdam & Snow, 1997:326). Many of the strategies and tactics discussed thus far are often deployed by social movements. In Chapter 5, social movements were discussed in a different context, and they were defined as collectivities acting with some continuity to promote or resist change. Several types were identified such as revolutionary, reactionary, reform, and expressive movements. These various types of social movements often constitute “social early warning systems” signaling dysfunction (Henderson, 1993) and they have a number of common characteristics. Luther P. Gerlach and Virginia H. Hine elaborated on five such characteristics: type of organization structure, patterns of recruitment, ideology, personal commitment, and opposition, as follows:

1. The *organizational structure* of social movements is segmentary, composed of semiautonomous cells or segments. The movement organization is decentralized and polycephalous, or “many headed.” Movements generally do not have a single paramount leader who controls through a coordinated organization; instead, each cell or unit has its own leader or leaders. The various organizational units are regulated by personal, structural, and ideological ties.



2. *Patterns of recruitment* follow lines of preexisting personal relationships and are based on face-to-face contact with friends, neighbors, associates, or colleagues.
3. Every movement has its *ideology*, which codifies values and goals, provides a conceptual framework for interpreting relevant experiences and events relative to these goals, motivates and provides rationale for the changes sought, defines the opposition, and conceptually unites the fragmented groups in the movement.
4. A *commitment* is brought about by an act or experience that differentiates a participant in some important way from the established order, or his place in it, identifies him with a new set of values, and commits him to change patterns of behavior.
5. *Opposition*, which may be real or perceived, is essential to promote a movement and to offer a basis for its commitment process. It is a force against which participants of a movement can be united. (1973:169-190)

A common strategy in a social movement is usually adopted by the numerous coalitions of various organizations formed within the movement. Because movements are multicentered, coordination of the various activities is typically problematic, which is a weakness of social movements. Lack of coordination results in duplication, wasted effort, inability to carry out concerted action, inconsistent pursuit of intermediate objectives, conflicting loyalties, and internal strife (Chong, 1993). On the other hand, a movement's strengths are "in its variability, lack of rigidity, action through mutual adjustment and feedback providing resilience and flexibility, difficulty of hostile parties in finding a specific target for recrimination, and in the very redundancy of many of the efforts. These attributes make it difficult to direct and difficult to control, but also difficult to destroy" (Warren, 1977:268).

With these clarifications in mind concerning the composition of a social movement, let us consider the change strategies used by the various organizations within the social movement. The strategies used in social movements have two fundamental objectives: One is to promote the growth of a social movement as a change-promoting system, and the other is to engage the change target. For the present purpose, the emphasis will be on the strategies used to engage the target.

Change Strategies

Several principal strategies are used by social movements in their attempt to influence the actions of their target systems. The main ones include bargaining, coercion, and persuasion (Turner & Killian, 1987: 297-299). *Bargaining* "takes place when the movement has control over some exchangeable value that the target group wants and offers some of that value in return for compliance with its demands." Bargaining may entail the offer of votes or other support to the target group in return for support of the movement. *Coercion* is "the manipulation of the target group's situation in such fashion that the pursuit of any course of action





other than that sought by the movement will be met by considerable cost or punishment." It is a form of negative bargaining in which the threat of harm rather than actual harm is considered. When harmful action is used, it is a way of demonstrating tactically that the movement has the real potential of inflicting harm. The extreme form of coercion is the threat of total destruction when the movement has the power to do so. Lesser forms include terrorism, civil disobedience, and assassination. *Persuasion* involves the use of symbolic manipulation without substantial rewards or punishments under the control of the movement. The procedure is to identify the proposed course of action with values held by the target group. It always includes calling attention to rewards and penalties that will ensue for the target group on the basis of various courses of action. Persuasion can be *deliberative*, which encourages thought, reflection, and critical analysis, or *propaganda*, which truncates thought through the use of simplistic symbols and images that play on prejudices and emotions (Pratkanis & Turner, 1996). It should be noted that these three general types of strategies are not mutually exclusive, and various combinations of the elements in all three may be used by any given movement to engage a target system.

John Wilson (1973:226–227) notes that many social movements are often remembered more for the tactics they used than for their objectives. For example, student movements such as the Free Speech Movement and Students for a Democratic Society have achieved their notoriety through the use of disruptive and violent tactics and not through the enunciated goals and objectives, which were poorly formulated by the leaders and dimly understood by the public at large. There are two reasons, Wilson points out, why tactics contribute to the establishment of the identity of a movement. First, social movements use methods of persuasion and coercion that are, more often than not, novel, dramatic, unorthodox, and of questionable legitimacy. Second, "tactics may be all there is to 'see' in the movement. Many social movements are not much more than tactical machines, having little substance beyond their efforts to bring some cause to the attention of the public or coerce some agent of authority" (1973:227). Again, for example, the Free Speech Movement defined its priorities in terms of tactical actions, and demonstrations of disruptive nature were given priority over other "projects such as building up a loyal following or establishing an organization" (p. 227).

Social movements employ a repertoire of strategies and tactics to influence change targets to help build up memberships, raise money, or influence politicians (Oberschall, 1993). At this point, it should be noted again that there is a distinction between strategy, which refers to a general design or plan of action, and tactics, which refers to specific means or methods of carrying out that plan or design. *Tactics* are specific techniques such as strikes, boycotts, and teach-ins that are deployed to implement strategies.

Change Tactics

The tactics used predominantly by social movements are called the "politics of disorder" by Wilson to "distinguish them from the 'politics of order,' in which reliance is placed on the courtroom, the legislature, and the mass media, and from the 'politics of violence,' in which the accepted rules of bringing about social change are rejected and resort is made to mob demonstrations, bombing, and physical assault" (1973:229). The tactics used in the politics of disorder fall under the heading of "direct action" and involve, among other things, demonstrations, economic boycotts, rent strikes, and sit-ins. It should be noted, however, that social movements also use the politics of order, such as petitions, lobbies, and selective voting, as well as violence. This is evidenced by the actions of some members of the antibusing movement who tried to physically prevent the passage of school buses, and by the tactics of some members of the antiabortion movement, who firebombed abortion clinics.

There are two reasons social movements might select the politics of disorder. First, movements advocate ideas that are not supported by mainstream groups, and movement participants lack authority and access to the media to disseminate their views; therefore, they believe they have to engage in attention-getting activities. Second, the politics of order has been tried and found wanting.

Not all tactics used by social movements are effective in advancing the movement toward its objective and maintaining, at the same time, followers as a united group. But there is no way of telling in advance which tactic will be successful, since a great deal depends on the movement's circumstances and resources and the opposition it encounters. Still, it is possible to make some general observations about the attributes of tactics. Wilson (1973:236) points out that a tactical program needs to meet three requirements: It must have breadth, simplicity, and flexibility. With regard to *breadth*, activities in which pressure is brought to bear on the target group from a number of fronts simultaneously would tend to be more effective than reliance merely on economic, political, or other measures. *Simplicity* means that the tactics should be manageable, and not too inconvenient and time-consuming for the members. *Flexibility* means avoiding total and irrevocable commitment to any given set of tactics, and it means foresight and planning for the reactions which a given set of tactics is likely to provoke" (pp. 237-238). A movement should avoid employing all the power at its disposal in any given tactical campaign. In general, the tactics used by social movements work only so long as they contain an element of surprise.

The choice of tactics by a social movement is determined by three factors: opposition, ideology, and public opinion. With regard to *opposition*, Wilson (1973:239-241) suggests that social movements are in a subordinate position of power in facing the group they are trying to defeat or win over. He



distinguishes three degrees of subordination: partial inequality, dependency, and subjugation. In a situation of *partial inequality*, a movement is composed of minorities who are granted equal status on some grounds but not on others (homosexuals), or of those agitating on behalf of a deprived group (students in California for migrant workers), or of people acting as guardians of the national conscience, trying to reverse social policies considered immoral (nuclear pacifists). In these instances, movements are reluctant to resort to tactics of "questionable legitimacy." In a *dependency* situation, the movement is made up of minority people "who feel at the mercy of the target group." They want to improve their position, but they believe they cannot do so without the help of the target group. The object is to win over the target group rather than to defeat it. The movement must use patience to educate, persuade, and set an example. The women's suffrage movement would be indicative of this situation. In the situation of *subjugation*, the minority group members are completely dominated by the majority to the extent of economic exploitation and the deprivation of civil rights. There is no value consensus with the target group, and there is no likelihood of enlisting its help. Any progress to be made will be through the group's own efforts and by means of its own resources. The object of the movement here is to defeat the opponent, and the tactics that are used include harassment, obstruction, personal assault, destruction of property, and so on. The use of illegal tactics is justified because the system itself is considered illegal. An illustration of such a movement would be the Black Panthers.

The second determinant of the choice of tactics is *ideology*. In general, the specific tactics selected will be in accord with the values a movement espouses. Most movements have a set of statements about which means are appropriate for the realization of a given set of objectives. As a result, tactics will display symbolic consistency with the movement's values even if it results in burdens on members or further difficulties in attaining objective. Ideological factors are also pronounced when issues of alliances become important.

The final determinant of the selection of tactics is *public opinion*. Movements need to establish their credentials with the public and gain the support of sympathetic public opinion. Without favorable public opinion and public sympathy, a movement is unlikely to attain its objectives fully.

For favorable public opinion, the choice of violent tactics is generally detrimental to movements. The public may feel threatened by the use of violent tactics, and at the same time, may also be alienated by movements using them. Public opinion can also be a factor in deciding which movements should be politically active. In such instances, care should be exercised by movements not to use tactics that might confirm the public notion that the group is socially unfit to make political or economic judgments. For example, the feminist movement suffered during the early stages because the tactics used by many groups were contrary to the popular image of ladylike conduct.



In brief, the rationale for choosing a set of tactics is not necessarily reflected in the movement's objectives. The choice of tactics is conditioned by a number of social forces including the action of the opposition, the movement's ideology, and the predominant attitudes toward social protest. The combination of these factors provides a number of options and configurations.

Accomplishments of Social Movements

Thus far, the discussion has centered on the types of social movements, the principal strategies they employ, and the conditions that determine the use of specific tactics. The remainder of this section will address the question: What are some of the specific accomplishments of social movements and their impacts on policy outcomes (Goldberg, 1991; Rochon & Mazmanian, 1993)? As Lewis Killian notes (1964), the significance of any social movement must be found in the consequences that the movement has had for the larger society or for the social order from which it emerged. That is, has the movement led to any significant social or cultural change? Unless this question can be answered affirmatively, Killian asserts that the movement is little more than a passing curiosity or a sidelight of history. In one study of fifty-three movements between 1800 and 1945, about half of the movements were unsuccessful in bringing about any of the changes they sought (Garnson, 1990). In many other cases, Killian's question can be answered affirmatively. Early labor movements, for example, eventually brought an end to child labor in American factories. Labor movements were also responsible for gaining shorter working hours, safer working conditions, and the right for collective bargaining. Legislation that protects the environment is another area in which social movements have been successful. As a result of these efforts, more and more people are aware of environmental issues and consider themselves environmentally active through recycling and other efforts (Stisser, 1994). The product-safety movement resulted in a variety of safety devices, including the installation of automobile seat belts (Turner & Killian, 1987:397). Let us consider briefly two other movements, the civil rights and women's movements, that have attempted to overcome social inequities that existed in the recent past.

Civil rights movements have contributed to a series of legal reforms of considerable importance and impact (Oberschall, 1993:213–238). Some of the most notable of these reforms were *Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas*, a Supreme Court case in 1954; the Civil Rights Acts of 1957, 1960, 1964, and 1968; the Voting Rights Act of 1965; and President Nixon's Executive Order 11478, issued in 1969 (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 1975).

In the 1954 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the *Plessy v. Ferguson* decision of 1896 (which had allowed separate-but-equal education facilities for blacks and whites to be imposed by the states), saying that "segregation, with the sanction of the law, therefore has the tendency to retard the educa-



tion and mental development of Negro children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in a racially integrated system" (Marden, Meyer, & Engel, 1991).

The Civil Rights Act of 1957 followed on the heels of the early victories of the civil rights movement and constituted a countermeasure to the strong opposition in the South to the *Brown v. Board of Education* decision of the Supreme Court. It was the first civil rights legislation to be enacted since 1875. Its accomplishments were to establish a Civil Rights Commission, to gather data on voting violations, to empower the Justice Department to initiate action where voting violations occurred in federal elections, and to require nondiscriminatory qualifications for the selection of juries in federal courts. This relatively innocuous legislation was topped by the Civil Rights Act of 1960, which was designed to impede interracial violence without eroding the power and authority of state officials (Blaustein & Zangrando, 1968).

In 1964 and 1968, Congress enacted Civil Rights Acts that were far more extensive than any such preceding laws in American history. They included detailed provisions to ensure equality in the areas of voting, public accommodations and facilities, education, and employment. Desegregation problems of school districts were to be aided by funds, and training was to be handled by the then-Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.

The 1965 march from Selma to Montgomery led to another piece of legislation: the Voting Rights Act of 1965. This assigned federal examiners to register voters and to observe elections in states or counties where discrimination existed. Literacy tests and other discriminatory means of limiting voter participation were outlawed. The act was constructed so as to help the poor, uneducated, or other minority groups as well as blacks. In Executive Order 11478, Nixon went beyond the former, more or less passive federal support of equality of opportunity and employment and ordered that federal agencies develop affirmative programs in which minority applicants would be actively sought out and specifically trained to perform at their highest potential. The Civil Service Commission was given the power to enforce the executive order and, in particular, to consider all complaints of discrimination in federal employment based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 1975). These are just some of many legislative changes in which civil rights movements played an important role.

In the context of civil rights movements, the women's movement has made important strides against a series of discriminatory practices in legal, financial, political, and educational domains (Costain & Majstorovic, 1994; Goldberg, 1991:193-217). The best known advocacy organization in the women's movement is the National Organization for Women, formed by Betty Friedan in 1966 "to bring women into full participation in the mainstream of the American society now" (Gruberg, 1968:105). Others include the



American Association of University Women and a series of professional groups and caucuses such as Sociologists for Women in Society.

To meet the demands of feminist advocates for equal access of women to all political and economic opportunities, Congress has passed civil rights legislation that covers women as well as ethnic minorities, and at least two executive orders (Nos. 11246 and 11375) have been issued intended to prevent discrimination on the basis of sex in government and industry. For the record, it should be pointed out that when Title VII of the proposed Civil Rights Act of 1964 was initially reported out of the House Judiciary Committee, it included prohibitions of employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, or national origin—but not sex. It was only one day before the passage of the act that an amendment was offered to include a ban on sex discrimination in an apparent attempt to kill the bill. But it passed the House and the Senate, and the sex discrimination provisions in Title VII remained as a milestone for women seeking equal employment opportunities with men (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 1975:20).

In addition to employment and political participation, the women's movement was instrumental in advancing a concentration of reforms in state and federal laws (Oberschall, 1993:325–338). They include remedial measures to overcome injustice and discrimination in the provisions on marriage, property, support, divorce, health, birth control, abortion, sterilization, finances, taxes, consumer credit, housing, and welfare.

In the realm of sexual behavior, there have been some movements aimed at bringing about reform. For prostitutes, there is a nationwide movement and an organization named "Call Off Your Old Tired Ethics" (COYOTE), which had its first national convention in San Francisco in June 1974 at the Glide Memorial Methodist Church. Described by its "founding mother," retired prostitute Margo St. James, as a "loose woman's organization," COYOTE works for the legalization of prostitution and for the protection of prostitutes' civil liberties. Until prostitution is legalized in a given area, however, COYOTE advocates the arrest of the customer as well as the prostitutes, not only in the interest of equal justice, but also because, as Ms. St. James has put it, "men won't change the laws unless they get their nuts caught in the cracker, too." Feminist groups such as NOW also regard the antiprostitution laws and ordinances as highly discriminatory against women, and they would prefer the abolition of such laws on the grounds that a person's sexual behavior is, properly, her own private affair; they insist that as long as there are laws, they should be made to apply to male customers as well as to female prostitutes (Berman, 1974).

It is still a far stride to NOW's Bill of Rights, but the changes wrought by the women's movement are evident in many areas of life and had a profound impact on American society (Blaser, 1996). This may have been a reason for the decline in NOW membership: In 1982, it had 250,000 members, but, by 1987, it was down to 150,000 (Peirce, 1987:3B). Another reason for the



decline is that the women's agenda has ballooned far past the feminist causes that NOW traditionally stressed. Since 1982, women have moved day care, welfare reform, child-support payments, and maternal and child care into the political mainstream of state legislatures. The years of efforts are paying off in more and more legislation that ensures equality for women on every front, from insurance to taxes, to salary and pensions. At the same time, there is a growing belief that women's rights are being abandoned in today's conservative climate, and this belief is most pronounced among younger women to whom feminist struggles are seen as past history (Leslie & Korman, 1985:73). The next section will consider law as an instrument of social change.

LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE

The relationship between law and social change is reciprocal, and law can be seen as both an effect and cause of social change (Champagne & Nagel, 1983:187; Vago, 1997:285–313). In this section, law will be considered only as an active instrument for guiding and shaping future behavior and social forms—that is, as a strategy of social change.

There are many examples in which laws have been used to create changes in society (see, for example, Schissel, 1996). Since Roman times, laws have been instrumental in effecting changes at all levels in society. There are several illustrations of the idea that law, far from being simply a reflection of social reality, is a powerful means of *accomplishing* reality—that is, fashioning it or making it. In spite of the ideas of Marx, Engels, and Lenin that law is an epiphenomenon of bourgeois class society doomed to vanish with the advent of the Revolution, the former Soviet Union had succeeded in making enormous changes in society by the use of laws (Dror, 1968). More recently, the attempts by Nazi Germany, and later on, by Eastern European countries to make wholesale social changes through the use of laws—such as income redistribution, nationalization of industry, land reform and introduction of collective farms, provision of free education and health care, and the restructuring of the stratification system—are examples of the effectiveness of law to induce change (Eorsi & Harmathy, 1971). When the Communists seized power in China in 1949, virtually all vices ubiquitous in Western countries—pornography, prostitution, gambling, and usury—were eliminated by government decree along with business operations that were dependent on profits from such activities (Vago, 1997).

Recognition of the role of law as a strategy of change is becoming more pronounced in contemporary society (Lempert & Sanders, 1986:352–427). It is now generally accepted that the "law . . . increasingly not only articulates but sets the course for major social changes" (W. Friedmann, 1972:513) and "attempted social change through law is a basic trait of the modern world"



(L. Friedman, 1975:277). An almost identical observation is made by Yehezkel Dror (1968:673) in stating: "the growing use of law as a device of organized social action directed toward achieving social change seems to be one of the characteristics of modern society. . . ." In an influential article entitled "Law and Social Change," Dror (1968) distinguishes between the indirect and direct aspects of law in social change.

Dror (1968:673) argues that "law plays an important indirect role in social change by shaping various social institutions, which, in turn, have a direct impact on society." He uses the illustration of the compulsory education system, which performed an important indirect role in regard to change by fostering the operation of educational institutions, which, in turn, play a direct role in social change. He points out in the discussion that law interacts, in many cases, directly with basic social institutions, constituting a direct relationship between law and social change. For example, a law enacted to prohibit polygamy has a great direct influence on social change, having as its main purpose alterations in important patterns of behavior. He warns, however, that "The distinction is not an absolute but a relative one: in some cases the emphasis is more on the direct and less on the indirect impact of social change, while in other cases the opposite is true" (Dror, 1968:674).

Dror contends that law exerts an indirect influence on social change in general by influencing the possibilities of change in various social institutions. For example, the existence of a patent law protecting the rights of inventors encourages inventions and furthers change in the technological institutions that, in turn, may bring about other types of social change.

For all modern societies, every collection of statutes and delegated legislation is "full of illustrations of the direct use of law as a device for directed social change" (Dror, 1968:676). A good example to induce social change by law directly was the enactment of Prohibition in the United States to shape social behavior. (It was also one of the most conspicuous failures, showing that there are limits to the effective use of law to bring about social change.) Others would include the use of legislative powers to bring about extensive changes in social structure and culture, as evidenced in Japan and Turkey, where large segments of Western law were received with the intention of advancing the Westernization process of these countries.

Another way of looking at the role of law in social change is in terms of Mayhew's (1971:195) notion of the possibility of either redefining the normative order or creating new procedural opportunities within the legal apparatus. He calls the first an "extension of formal rights," illustrated by the pronouncement of the Supreme Court that the defendant accused of serious crimes has the right to professional representation. The second is termed the "extension of formal facilities" and is illustrated by the establishment of a system of public defenders who provide the required professional representation. The extension of formal rights and of formal facilities has definite implications.





A rather different perspective on law in social change is presented by Lawrence Friedman. He refers to change through law in terms of two types: "planning" and "disruption." *Planning* "refers to architectural construction of new forms of social order and social interaction. *Disruption* refers to the blocking or amelioration of existing social forms and relations" (L. Friedman, 1973:25). Both operated within the existing legal system and can bring about "positive" or "negative" social change, depending on one's perspective.

Lawrence Friedman (1975:277) infers that revolution is the most distinct and obvious form of disruption. But

milder forms are everywhere. Judicial review is frequently disruptive. American courts have smashed programs and institutions from the Missouri Compromise to the Alaska pipeline. Activist reformers have played a sensational role in American life in the last decade. Ralph Nader is the most well-known example. . . . He stimulates use of legal processes as a lever of social change.

Much of his work is technically disruptive; it focuses on litigation and injunctions, on stopping government dead in its tracks, when it fails to meet his ethical and policy standards. Legal disruption can . . . include lawsuits; particularly after *Brown v. Board of Education*, reformers have frequently gone to court to upset many old and established arrangements.

Social change through litigation has always been an important feature in the United States. Whether or not the change brought about by such action is destructive or constructive depends on one's interpretation. The fact remains that law can be highly effective in producing social change. For example, when the California Supreme Court destroyed the legal basis for the system of financing schools in the state, Friedman (1973:27) succinctly observed: "Many a coup d'état in small countries have achieved less social change than this quiet coup d'état in the courts."

Friedman refers to this as an American phenomenon and raises the question: Will this spread to other countries? His response is that creative disruption of the judicial type presupposes a number of conditions that rarely coincide and are apparently not present in other countries to the same degree. These conditions include an activist legal profession, financial resources, activist judges, a genuine social movement, and what he describes as "the strongest condition," the fact that in the United States, "Elites—the power holders—must accept the results of disruptive litigation, like it or not" (L. Friedman, 1975:278). Clearly, no socialist or authoritarian country will tolerate anything like the American form of judicial review. Their legal structures are not designed to accommodate these patterns.

In the context of litigation, the role of the Supreme Court in social change invites attention. While discussing the Supreme Court's ability to influence social change, Grossman (1970:545) suggested that the Court can "offer some limited support to social change by not deciding a case where its

refusal to decide upholds or reinforces a lower court decision which itself favors change by legitimizing a governmental change policy, and also by refusing to decide a case in which a lower court decision has gone against forces seeking to preserve the status quo." There are, however, several momentous ways in which the Court, indeed, can influence social change such as: (1) by a conscious and explicit program of innovation that may specify particular behavior changes; (2) by reinforcement of prior policy decisions seeking change against challenges to their authority or legitimacy; (3) by reinforcement or legitimization of the change-oriented policies of other governmental agencies or of important groups in society; (4) by specific invalidation of symbolic challenges to social change processes or policies (Grossman, 1970:545).

A good illustration of the role of the U.S. Supreme Court in social change is its 1973 decision on abortion, striking down most state laws prohibiting abortion and providing specific guidelines regulating lawmaking in this area. This decision is an important one, not only because of the sweeping consequences it has for most states, and despite the reputed conservatism of some of the newer appointees to the Court, but also because of the role the Court continues to play in social change. The Court is able to act on controversial questions of law when the legislatures cannot or will not act on controversial social issues. In this manner, it relieves one kind of build-up of political and social pressure through changes in the interpretation of law at precisely the times when most legislatures prefer to ignore the problems or heed them much more slowly.

Few sociologists and legal scholars today would accept the notion of Sumner (1906) that folkways and mores change slowly in response to modifications in conditions of social existence and in the interests of various groups. A body of research is accumulating, and theoretical perspectives have been presented that attempt to establish when and under what conditions law can "not only codify existing customs, morals, or mores, but also . . . modify the behavior and values presently existing in a particular society" (Evan, 1965:286). As William M. Evan (1965:286-287) lucidly articulates this position:

As an instrument of social change, law entails two interrelated processes: the institutionalization and the internalization of patterns of behavior. In this context, institutionalization of a pattern of behavior means the establishment of a norm with provisions for its enforcement, and internalization of a pattern of behavior means the incorporation of the value or values implicit in a law. . . . Law can affect behavior directly only through the process of institutionalization; if, however, the institutionalization process is successful, it, in turn, facilitates the internalization of attitudes or beliefs.

However, the extent to which the impact of law is felt and the degree to which it can be efficient vary according to the conditions present in a particular situation. The following stipulations can have great bearing on the

rationale in terms that are understandable to the community; (3) the advocates of the change should make reference to other communities or countries with which the population identifies and where the law is already in effect; (4) the enforcement of the law must be aimed toward making the change in a relatively short time; (5) those enforcing the law must themselves be very much committed to the change intended by the law; (6) the implementation of the law should include positive as well as negative sanctions; and (7) the enforcement of the law should be reasonable not only in terms of the sanctions used but also the protection of the rights of those who stand to lose by violation of the law (Evan, 1965:288-291).

Chin and Benne (1985:41-42) justly include law under the power-coercive approaches to effecting social change. Law in society is backed by legitimate authority, which has the mechanisms to enforce compliance in several ways. For example, in the context of analyzing incentives for compliance with environmental law, Stuart S. Nagel (1975:341-356) discussed the following methods: (1) sliding fees that go down as a reward for high compliance and go up for low compliance; (2) contingent injunctions that enjoin certain activities subject to the possibility of jailing for contempt if the non-complying behavior is not changed; (3) the use of tax deductions, credits, exemptions, and subsidies to encourage compliance; (4) civil penalties, whereby private persons can bring lawsuits for damages caused by noncompliance; (5) adversely publicizing wrongdoers; (6) the use of selective government buying power to reward high compliers and thereby punish some noncompliers; (7) fines and jail sentences; and (8) conference persuasion.

Thus far, the discussion highlighted some of the general conditions in which law can be considered as a strategy of social change. Perhaps the best way to illustrate how law can be used as an instrument of change is to turn to a concrete case.

In the mid-1960s, the author had undertaken a study of wage garnishment (a process that enables a creditor upon a debtor's default to seize his wages in the hands of his employer before they were paid to the debtor) on low-income families. The findings indicated that existing wage garnishment laws at that time in Missouri were more counterproductive than functional as a collection device. It was shown, among other things, that a number of employers had immediately dismissed employees upon the receipt of the first garnishment suit and that such an action was detrimental not only to the debtor but also to the creditor, the employer, and society at large. Moreover, in many cases, the judgment debtors were often "judgment-proof," in the sense that they had few, if any, tangible assets. Under the former system, garnishment proceedings may be instituted to attach wages due to the debtor by an employer and have the employer pay these



wages to the creditor through the court. The objective of the proposed reform was to present a procedure to provide the judgment debtor who is being garnished protection from possible dismissal from his job or from bankruptcy and, at the same time, to enable creditors to maintain an effective collection method.

On the basis of the author's data and recommendations, House Bill 279 was designed and introduced in the 74th General Assembly of the State of Missouri. Under the proposed bill, the service of the writ would be made upon the defendant only, and the employer of the defendant would not be involved in the litigation process. Upon entry of the judgment, the court may order the judgment debtor to make payments to the clerk of the court. The payments would be dispersed in turn by the clerk. In settling the amount of these payments, the court would take into consideration the circumstances of the defendant, including his or her income and other obligations or considerations bearing on the issue. If the judgment debtor fails to obey the order of the court, then and only then may the creditor summon the employer as a garnishee. The primary intention of the bill was to prohibit employers from discharging employees upon the receipt of the first garnishment suit, thus saving thousands of jobs for low-income individuals annually in Missouri. It was estimated that on the national level, approximately 500,000 individuals are fired each year as a direct result of the practice of wage garnishment. The societal implications of the proposed change are obvious (Vago, 1968:7-20). Today, wage garnishment is regulated nationally. This is the result of the Consumer Credit Protection Act (P.L. 90-321), passed in 1968. The act protects consumers from being driven into bankruptcy by excessive garnishment of wages by limiting the amount of wages subject to garnishment to 25 percent of the employee's weekly disposable income. It also prohibits an employer from firing an employee solely because of wage garnishment (Vago, 1997:175-176).

SUMMARY

This chapter considered several social change strategies and tactics used in a variety of change efforts. Three aspects of planned social change were discussed—targets, agents, and methods. The target for planned change may be conceptualized on several levels, and, for the present purposes, individual, intermediate, and macrolevel target systems were discussed. Change agents are usually professionals who influence the change effort in a direction deemed desirable by a change agency. There are two broad categories of change agents: leaders and supporters. There are many categorizations in the typologies of planned-change strategies, and the principal methods can be subsumed under facilitative, reeducative, persuasive, and power strategies.





The use of violent strategies of social change is as old as human history. Their effectiveness is based on the willingness of certain segments of a society to go beyond the accepted patterns of action to promote change. The use of such a strategy entails the perception of relative deprivation among a potentially violent group, the maximization of the intensity of anger, and the emphasis of social facilitation variables. In most instances in the literature, violent strategies are not considered as desirable means for including social change.

Nonviolent strategies of change also have a long history. They are based, to a great extent, on "moral power," and they are likely to be effective when they are in accord with the value orientation of the change target and pertinent third parties. The choice of nonviolent strategy can reflect either an indirect or direct approach to the opponent's power. The former is based on the decision to meet the violent style of the opponent with nonviolence. The latter is founded on attempts to upset the opponent's power base, alter the opponent's attitudes and public image, and the opinion of third parties. The tactics of nonviolence can be classified under the headings of demonstration, noncooperation, and direct intervention. The nonviolent strategy of *satyagraha* involves many of these tactics.

The various types of social movements discussed have a number of characteristics in common, including an organizational structure, patterns of recruitment, ideology, personal commitment, and an opposition or target system. A common strategy in a social movement is generally adopted by the numerous coalitions of various organizations formed within the movement. The principal strategies used by movements in their attempts to influence the actions of their target systems are bargaining, coercion, and persuasion. Many of the movements are remembered more for the tactics they have deployed rather than for their objectives. The tactics used by social movements have been referred to as the "politics of disorder." A tactical program should have breadth, simplicity, and flexibility. The tactics used in a social movement are determined, to a great extent, by three factors: opposition, ideology, and public opinion.

There is a growing recognition of the role of law as a strategy of social change in contemporary society. Law can play an indirect role in social change by altering various social institutions, which, in turn, have a direct impact on society. Law can also exert a direct influence by legitimizing certain programs or procedures and delegitimizing traditional practices. In the United States, change through law may originate in one of four arenas: the judiciary, the legislature, the executive branch, and administrative agencies. Law is categorized under power-coercive approaches to social change, and it is backed by legitimate authority, which has the mechanisms to enforce compliance. The chapter concluded with a concrete illustration of how law was used to induce change in the context of wage garnishment. In the final chapter, the assessment of change will be considered.

SUGGESTED FURTHER READINGS

- BENNIS, WARREN G., KENNETH D. BENNE, AND ROBERT CHIN, (eds). *The Planning of Change*, 4th ed. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1985. A good collection of articles on the various aspects of planned social change.
- HORNSTEIN, HARVEY A., BARBARA BENEDICT BUNKER, W. WARNER BURKE, MARION GINDES, and ROY J. LEWICKI, (eds.). *Social Intervention, A Behavioral Science Approach*. New York: Free Press, 1971. An anthology of articles on diverse change strategies which are still being used today. The introduction to the various selections and the discussions are all highly comprehensive, and the sections on violent and nonviolent strategies are particularly recommended.
- KETTNER, PETER M., JOHN M. DALEY, AND ANN WEAVER NICHOLS. *Initiating Change in Organizations and Communities: A Macro Practice Model*. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole, 1985. A presentation of an integrated model for initiating and carrying out changes in organizations and communities.
- OBERSCHALL, ANTHONY. *Social Movements: Ideologies, Interests, and Identities*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1993. A comprehensive discussion of social movements and collective behavior and the strategies and tactics they deploy.
- SEIDMAN, EDWARD, (ed.). *Handbook of Social Intervention*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1983. A compendium on the ways of creating change in a variety of settings.
- TURNER, RALPH H., AND LEWIS M. KILLIAN. *Collective Behavior*, 3rd ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1987. See Part Four for an up-to-date comprehensive review of social movements and their change strategies and tactics.
- VAGO, STEVEN. *Law and Society*, 5th ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1997. See, in particular, Chapter 8, on the role of law in social change.

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