

# Spheres of Change

To say that the modern world is in the throes of dramatic changes is an obvious understatement. The sense and feeling of change permeates social arrangements at all levels of society. This chapter will examine some of the more important changes in society and show the context in which they are taking place. The specific changes occurring in such spheres as the family, population, stratification, power relations, education, and the economy will be considered. Changes in these spheres are interrelated; they influence each other as well as the course of society; they often occur more or less simultaneously; and they are set in motion by the social forces discussed in previous chapters.

### THE FAMILY

The major changes in the structure and functions of the family can be traced to the Industrial Revolution and to the resulting urbanization, modernization, and economic development of society (Gelles, 1995; Goode, 1968; Janssens, 1993; Leslie & Korman, 1989; and Ruggles, 1994). Industrialization was instrumental in transforming the traditional large, authoritarian, relatively stable rural family system into a more egalitarian, emotionally freer, and less sexually stratified nuclear family. This is not to say that industrialization had the same immediate effect on family systems in every society (see for example, Thornton & Lin (1995) on the family in Taiwan). Cultural and social forces determine the rate of family changes under the impact of industrialization, and there is substantial variation from society to society concerning the direction and magnitude of changes in specific family attributes such as the incidence of divorce or age at marriage.



Although at varying rates, there are a number of specific changes occurring worldwide in family patterns (Goode, 1968:59; Leslie & Korman, 1989:61–75; Zarnowska, 1997). These include an increased freedom of marital choice, in which marital bargaining is taken from the hands of elders. Both the dowry and bride price are disappearing in most parts of the world, the former being replaced by, among other things, an increase in the proportion of working wives.\* Young couples are more economically independent; the age of females at first marriage is increasing; and great discrepancies between the ages of spouses are becoming rarer. There is also a decrease of marriage between close kin, such as between cousins. Illegitimacy rates are on the increase. There is a significant decline in infanticide. The institutions of concubinage and polygamy are on the decline. Although the divorce rate is on the increase, the trend in any given society depends on its prior level (see, for example, Jones, 1997). Remarriage after divorce or after the death of one's spouse is becoming more common in areas where it was once rare. Let us now consider some of the specific changes in the American family.

### **The Changing Functions of the American Family**

In a classic essay written more than six decades ago, William F. Ogburn (1934) contended that the American family is ill-adapted to modern industrial society, as evidenced by the loss of many of its traditional functions to other agencies such as the school, church, and the state. More recently, historian John Demos (1970:193) reached a similar conclusion.

Broadly speaking, the history of the family in America has been a history of contraction and withdrawal; its central theme is the gradual surrender to other institutions of its functions that once lay very much within the realm of family responsibility.

In the early days of the United States, the family functioned in several spheres—economic, productive, religious, recreational, educational, status conferring, and reproductive. With industrialization, production was taken out of the home, and the economic function of the family declined. Prior to

\*Although it is outlawed in India, the practice of dowry payment is still widespread among Hindus who account for about 80 percent of the country's over 900 million people. Beides are increasingly being killed for providing dowries deemed inadequate by their husbands' families. Between 1990 and 1994, close to 21,000 brides were put to death, often by being set on fire. (*The Wall Street Journal*, 1994:A8). In addition, wife-beating is widely accepted as an integral part of the patriarchal social structure in India, under which women are still considered inferior and dependent. In a recent study of 1,862 Indian women in 1993–94, about 40 percent had been beaten by their husbands, and three out of four women in the survey considered wife-beating necessary for punishment and discipline (Jejeebhoy & Cook, 1997).

industrialization, the family, according to Demos (1970:183), "was first of all a business agency of economic production and exchange. Each household was more or less self-sufficient; and its various members were inextricably united in the work of providing for their fundamental material wants. Work, indeed, was a wholly natural extension of family life and merged imperceptibly with all of its activities." Children were economic assets, and marriage was a kind of business relationship. With the advent of the factory system, the woman's traditional economic contribution declined, her status as wife and mother diminished, and children became liabilities rather than assets. Today, the consumption of goods and services has replaced production, and all members are encouraged to participate. Once they worked together; now they shop together—for food, clothing, sporting goods, TV sets, and the like.

Traditionally, the family was the principal source of protection for the individual. In addition to physical protection, it provided medical care and economic security. These functions have been largely transferred to the state through the operation of such agencies as the police, welfare departments, the medical profession, and insurance companies.

The religious function of the family is also on the decline. Religion once served as an integrating force, one that complemented other institutional controls in the maintenance of a cohesive family system. The home was the center of religious activities. Today, the church is often taking over many of these functions, and even marriage is becoming a secular matter devoid of religious overtones.

In the early American family, education was considered to be a function of the home. Children were likely to follow the footsteps of their parents, and education was usually of short duration and vocational in nature. Now the education of children, both academic and vocational, is more formal and has passed on to the hands of professionals.

The status-conferring function of the family has also declined, and individuals are evaluated on the basis of their own performance rather than on the basis of ascribed status. A family's status is more often than not ascertained in terms of the husband's occupation, and usually the man leaves his status when he leaves his job. Finally, even the reproductive function of the family has not remained a sole exclusivity of the family, as evidenced by illegitimacy rates.

"In the past, stability has been the great value exemplified by the family and that expected of it by society. This was true because the family was the basic institution in a static society" (Burgess, 1973:195). Today, the American society is not static but dynamic, and the family is characterized not by its stability but by its adaptability to a rapid tempo of social change. It is becoming a more specialized structure, but the loss of functions should not be construed as signs of deterioration. They are only indicative of changes that have taken place.





### Current Trends

In addition to the disappearance of traditional family functions, other changes have occurred in the American family. There is a pronounced trend among young people to delay marriage (Russell, 1997; Witwer, 1993). The median age at first marriage in the United States has risen from 20.2 for women in the mid-1950s to 24.5 and from 22.6 for men in 1955 to 26.5 in 1994. The figures represent the highest median age for both men and women since 1890. In part, this is prompted by the desire among some, particularly women, to finish their education and start careers prior to marriage. The delay in marriage is greatest among blacks, with 22 percent of black women age 40–44 never having been married, compared with 7 percent of white and 9 percent of Hispanic women. There is also a growing preference among many people to forgo marriage altogether, and the percentage of men and women who have never married nearly doubled between 1970 and 1993, to 72.6 million from 37.5 million (Holmes, 1994). During the same time, one-person households as a percent of all households increased from 13 to 25 percent (one in nine adults lives alone in the United States), and the number of unmarried couples living together increased from about one-half million to over 3.5 million (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1997:56).

Over time, family size has also decreased. The number of live births for an average American woman declined from 8 at the end of the eighteenth century to 3 in 1970 (Winch, 1970), and to 1.8 in 1994. This was accompanied by a drop in the size of the average household to 3.1 in 1970 (Eshleman, 1974:6) and to 2.6 persons in 1994. There is also a growing tendency among American women to postpone childbearing because of their concern with careers, economic security, and personal freedom (Leslie & Korman, 1989:463). The decline in family size and delayed parenthood are accompanied by what may be called “the streamlined family”—that is, the nuclear family without children. Planned childlessness is on the increase. The percentage of couples without children has doubled in the last few decades. Today, motherhood is just one of the many options for married women. In 1994, one out of four married women between the ages of 25 and 34 had never had a child—a total of nearly 3.3 million women—compared to one out of ten in 1960. Economic factors play a crucial role in the decision to forgo parenthood, and there is also a desire to avoid being part of the “sandwich generation”—those that must take care of elderly parents and raise children at the same time (Nemeth, 1994). Childlessness has increased as women have moved in record numbers into well-paying careers. Faced with new options, many wives have decided that motherhood is not an essential, or even desirable, role. And, in the absence of widespread governmental or corporate support for working parents, many feel compelled to choose between children and jobs (Campbell, 1986). The fact that childless couples are happier and more satisfied with their lives than are couples with children



may also play a role in the decision to forsake parenthood (Leslie & Korman, 1989:463). At the same time, the number of unmarried mothers in the United States increased 60 percent between 1983 and 1993 (Seligmann, 1993). In the early 1990s, more than 30 percent of children were born out of wedlock. The growth of illegitimacy is most severe in the inner city, but the phenomenon is not exclusive to any race or sector of society. More white children than black are born and raised out of wedlock, and it is among whites, college graduates, and women with high-paying jobs that illegitimacy is rising most rapidly (Murray, 1994). Some of the reasons contributing to the increase in this sector is due to a shift in values and an increase in earning power among women. In 1993, 6.3 million children, or 27 percent of all children under the age of eighteen, lived with a single parent who had never been married, up from 243,000 in 1960, and from 3.7 million in 1983 (Holmes, 1994). Another 9.8 million children lived in "blended families"—that is, with stepparents and half-brothers and half-sisters.

The increased work responsibility of women has also tended to bring about changes in the structure of the family. The percentage of working women has almost doubled since 1940. In the mid-1980s, more than half of all adult women were working, and six out of ten of these were married (Williams, 1987:367). In addition, there has been a substantial increase in the number and types of occupations in which women are employed and greater involvement on their part in high-paying, prestigious occupations and professions. Changes in career patterns and employment opportunities for women bring about such adaptations as the commuter, or long-distance, marriage, in which the spouses live some distance from one another. In such families, either the wife or husband assumes primary responsibility for the children. In the early 1990s, approximately 1 million couples had commuter marriages (Maines, 1993).

### Divorce

Until very recently, the long-term trend in divorce in the United States has been upward. The divorce rate is usually expressed as the number of divorces per 1,000 population. In 1867, the divorce rate was 0.3 per 1,000 population. By the turn of the century, it had reached 0.7, and by 1950, 2.6. There was a small drop to 2.2 in 1960, then it started to climb again, reaching 4.8 in 1975, and hit its peak of 5.3 in 1981. The figure of 4.8 is the lowest since 1975 and represents only the second time in twelve years that the rate edged below 5 per 1,000. It should be noted, however, that the numbers are based on per 1,000 population, not just married couples, so the figures do not reflect the pool of couples actually at risk for divorce. And that risk is quite high, particularly among twenty-five- to twenty-nine-year-olds. In 1992, there were 1.3 million divorces in this cohort, up from 253,000 in 1962—a fivefold increase—while the size of that age group did not even double for





that time period. The high incidence of divorce in this age group is explained in the context of "starter" marriage. In most cases, these couples have no children and much joint property, and while they do not wed with the intention of divorcing, their temporary stay in marriage is similar to the starter home a generation ago, shed as the family outgrows it (Schupack, 1994).

The high incidence of divorce is not limited to "starter" marriages. About one out of every two marriages continues to end in divorce in the United States (Powers, 1997:4; Williams, 1987:357). Sociologists generally attribute the high divorce rates to changing family functions, casual marriages, shorter courtship, prevalence of premarital sex, increases in teenage pregnancies with subsequent "shotgun" weddings, increased job opportunities with economic and sexual freedom for women, a decline in moral and religious sanctions, the prevailing philosophy of "happiness," and, of course, more liberal divorce laws. The high rate of divorce in the United States has spawned a new industry for lawyers, counselors, divorce psychologists, accountants, and other experts along with an assortment of new conservative anti-divorce writers (DeWitt, 1992; Talbot, 1997). Among the many consequences of divorce on children, it is interesting to note that students with divorced parents are less likely to apply to, be accepted by, and attend the fifty most selective universities and colleges in the country. The researchers argue that children of divorced parents have fewer resources for higher education because neither parent assumes sufficient financial responsibility for the offspring (Powers, 1997).

### The Sexual Revolution

The much publicized "sexual revolution" of the 1960s and 1970s has important ramifications for the structure of the family. The term has multiple meanings. It refers to a shift toward a higher incidence of all kinds of heterosexual activity and more permissive attitudes toward homosexuality and variety in the sexual act. Same-sex marriages are legal and unremarkable in countries such as Denmark (Ingrassia, 1994), and although homosexual marriages are not recognized in the United States, there are already legal problems of "gay divorce," that is, dissolving fairly and equitably in court messy property issues at the end of a turbulent relationship (Johnson, 1994).

Although there are only two sexes, there are numerous genders, and as society changes so do the numbers and nuances of gender (Gray, 1996). Gender transgressions allow for an infinite variety of role-play scenarios from night clubs to advertisement campaigns. The concept of sexual revolution also alludes to sexual liberation, greater freedom for women, alternatives to marriage, and, at the same time, to trivialized sex, diminished intimacy, and fewer lasting commitments among partners (Williams, 1987:249-253). There is no doubt that major changes in sexual mores and behavior have occurred. But to call these changes "revolutionary" is ques-



tionable. Regardless of how it is described, sex today is no longer tied to reproduction or marriage, nor domestic life to a large family of children. Sex is increasingly liberated from the bonds of matrimony and even heterosexuality. For a contemporary young woman, for example, the choices are

Have sex or don't. Have it with a man, or a woman. Use the pill, the IUD, the diaphragm. Have an abortion. Marry, or don't. Do have children. Don't have children. Have a career. Have a career and a child. Have a husband, but no child. Have a child, but no husband. (Rivers, 1975:144)

Among unmarried young people, sexual activity is on the increase, and they start at younger ages today than in earlier times. Surveys show that about half of the women aged fifteen to nineteen have had intercourse, and about one-fifth, at age fifteen, had already experienced coitus. Close to one-half in this age group had more than one sexual partner (Jones et al., 1986:46–49). In 1994, the median age for first intercourse was 16.6 years for boys and 17.4 for girls. Approximately 20 percent of both sexes remain virgins throughout their teenage years (Laumann et al., 1994), but about 10 percent of those who are still virgins engage in oral sex—and both girls and boys are equally likely to be the receiving partner (Lewin, 1997). More girls are experimenting sexually today than a generation ago, and young women's sexual experiences are increasingly becoming like young men's in both homosexual and heterosexual situations (Marano, 1997). A recent study suggests that geographic mobility is positively related to premarital sex and that weakened community bonding, parental supervision, and increased loneliness play a role in the high incidence of sexual activity in the fifteen-to-nineteen-year-old age group (Stack, 1994).

Although there is a decline in births among teens, more than 1 million teenagers get pregnant annually, and slightly more than half of these give birth. About eight in ten pregnancies among teenagers (and 60 percent of all pregnancies in the United States) are unintended. America's yearly teen-pregnancy rate—one teenage girl in every ten—remains the highest of any developed country (and so is the legal abortion rate of about 1.6 million per year), mostly as a result of lack of knowledge about effective contraceptive use and technologies (World Population News Service, 1997). By age twenty, nearly 40 percent of young white women and 63 percent of young black women become pregnant.

There are other derivatives of the changes of sexual mores and behavior. They include alternatives to family living such as group marriage and communal living. *Group marriage* is based on the principle of sharing, variety in sexual experience and partners, and interpersonal intimacy. Group marriage involves three or more people. The most common pattern involves four adults, usually the members of two former couples (Leslie & Korman, 1989:129). Members are motivated by personal growth opportunity and by





an interest in having multiple sex partners. Because of its egalitarian structure, sex roles are much less differentiated in group marriage than in the average nuclear family (Williams, 1987:363). Communal living arrangements are characterized by lack of private property, financial self-sufficiency, and open sharing of sexual partners. *Communal living* may involve up to 200 or more people (Leslie & Korman, 1989:131). Although their numbers have diminished drastically since the mid-1970s, group marriages and communal living arrangements still exist in the United States.

Another alternative to family life is *cohabitation*. The number of couples sharing a household increased from about 500,000 in 1970 to over 3.5 million in 1997 (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1997). Cohabitation is gaining legitimacy as a family form in the United States, as evidenced by recent court decisions stating that long-term, unmarried partners may have a claim on each other's property. Such decisions make the legal distinction between cohabitation and marriage somewhat blurred.

But the so-called sexual revolution may be over—if it really existed outside of Hollywood and popular publications. Despite living in a culture that seems saturated in sex, Americans lead fairly conventional sex lives, with people who are married and monogamous the most satisfied, according to a major study on sexual attitudes and behavior. Based on interviews with 3,432 randomly selected subjects between the ages of eighteen and fifty-nine, the study found, among other things, that more than 80 percent of Americans had only one sex partner or no partner in 1993, while only 3 percent had five partners or more. Among married couples, 75 percent of men and 85 percent of women have remained faithful (Laumann et al., 1994). Similarly, several campus surveys reported a renewed interest in the value of virginity. A 1984 study showed a drop to 38 percent of undergraduate women who engage in sexual intercourse at least once a month. Five years earlier, the figure was 50 percent (Williams, 1987:253). The decrease could be attributable to a more conservative campus mood; an increase in women's assertiveness in saying no; a wariness to commitment and to pair off, resulting in pack dating; and the fear of sexually transmitted diseases (Gabriel 1997). The growing incidence of herpes in the early 1980s was instrumental in changing sexual patterns. The concern that casual sex may lead to incurable genital herpes prompted many people to be more cautious about their sexual behavior. Shortly after the herpes scare, a far more serious disease appeared: AIDS (McCoy & Inciardi, 1994). First diagnosed in the United States in 1981, by the mid-1990s, an estimated 15 to 23 million people have been infected worldwide, with half of its victims already dead (by contrast, malaria kills roughly twice as many people each year worldwide than AIDS (Shell, 1997:48). HIV is now spreading more rapidly than ever, resulting in an estimated 2.4 million new infections each year among adults (Bongaarts, 1996). It is quite likely that 1 of every 100 people in the world will be HIV positive by the end of the decade (Brown, Kane, & Roodman, 1997:102). It





has reached pandemic proportions, and the fear of catching this incurable, dreaded disease has altered sexual norms and restricted sexual activities among both heterosexuals and homosexuals in most parts of the world, but more so in developed than in underdeveloped countries.

In sum, the options have indeed increased for the family. Family life is no longer confined to a traditional, approved form of family in the conjugal type. In the real world, a wide range of family patterns can be observed, from homosexual unions to mothers living with their illegitimate children, from open sex communes to the Shakers' total rejection of sexuality, from living together without any ceremony to living separately in spite of a ceremony; the list is nearly endless. It is too early to tell whether or not these changes now occurring within the family will inaugurate a totally new system of family. Regardless, changes in the sphere of the family have been and are dramatic. In the next section, changes in population will be examined.

## POPULATION

Assuming that the first human being appeared between 1 million and 2 million years ago, it is estimated that between 60 billion and 100 billion representatives of *Homo sapiens* have lived on planet Earth. It is estimated that the world population in 1650 was one-half billion, and it took approximately 200 years for it to double. In 1850, it was 1 billion, with a doubling time of 80 years. By 1930, it reached 2 billion, with a doubling time of 45 years (Ehrlich & Ehrlich, 1972:5-6). In 1997, the world's population had a doubling time of 47 years (Population Reference Bureau, 1997). In only eleven years, from 1987 to 1998, world population grew from 5 billion to 6 billion, adding more bodies to feed, house, clothe, and educate than the present combined populations of Europe and Latin America. To put these numbers in some kind of perspective, in 1997, the world population increased 3.1 people every second. Globally, this translates to 186 people per minute, 11,160 per hour, 267,840 per day, and well over 8 million per month, for a total of close to 98 million new people annually. By the time you finish reading this page, 160 additional people have been added to the world population. The daily increase equals roughly the size of Dayton, Ohio.

The world population growth is the result of natural increase—the excess of births over deaths. For individual countries, net migration—the difference between out-migration and in-migration—is also a factor. Rapid population growth is the result of great declines in death rates along with continuing high birthrates. Mortality rates in Europe began to decline in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The great reductions in mortality did not reach two-thirds of humankind in the developing nations in Asia, Latin America, and Africa until after World War II, primarily as a consequence of the rise in the general level of nutrition, improvements in sanitation, and



health care delivery. Today, more than 90 percent of the growth is in developing countries, much of it in the poorest nations of South Asia and Africa. The developing countries add 1 million people every five days to lands that are often already overcrowded and depleted of water and cheap sources of energy (Crossette, 1994:4). In 1997, China had a population of 1.22 billion; its population is growing at a steady rate of just over 1 percent or 13 million annually. As a result of the relaxation of the "one child" rule, this number is expected to increase (Faison, 1997).

By contrast, the United States, Canada, and many European countries are experiencing a decline in fertility that began in the 1960s (Teitelbaum & Winter, 1985:81-87; Wattenberg, 1989). Six European countries (Denmark, Sweden, Austria, Germany, Luxembourg, and Hungary), about 4 percent of the world population, are actually experiencing a zero or negative population growth (Population Reference Bureau, 1997).

### Consequences of Rapid Growth Rates

In many developing countries the rate of population growth is at least half the rate of economic growth and, in some cases, almost equal to the latter. Because of the high birthrate, the ratios of children to adults are very high when compared with industrialized countries, and the number of young people reaching the ages of labor-force participation are rapidly increasing. These factors can produce serious economic consequences. Rapid population growth slows down the growth of per-capita income in developing countries and tends to perpetuate inequalities of income distribution. Income and wealth inequality actually harms economic growth (Weismann, 1996). Food supplies and agricultural production must be increased to meet the needs of rapidly growing populations, which affects resource allocation to other economic and social sectors. Because of the rapid increase in the size of the labor force, unemployment and underemployment are becoming increasingly serious and challenging problems (see, for example, Lassonde, 1997). Large supplies of cheap labor tend to hold back technological improvements, and industrialization is slowed by mass poverty, which, in turn, reduces the demand for manufactured goods. It is important to note that population growth at a given level tends to require economic growth at some higher level just to maintain a constant per-capita income. This is because additional population requires additional production, each production addition being, after the point of diminishing returns is reached, more costly than the previous one.

Rapid population growth is also associated with internal migration and urbanization. It places increased demands for government services in the areas of health, education, and welfare, among others. It also places heavy burdens on resources and the environment (Brown, 1997; Harf & Trout, 1986; Kuznets, 1973).





### Demographic Transition

In stark contrast to trends in developing countries today, over the past 200 years, the now-industrialized nations have experienced what demographers refer to as *demographic transition*, moving from high fertility rates to low mortality rates and low fertility rates. Death rates started to drop before birthrates did, causing population growth rates to rise rapidly for a time. Gradually, however, birthrates also began to fall, and rates of growth in most industrialized nations seem to be stabilizing at relatively low levels. For example, at the end of the twentieth century, the United States had a growth rate of 0.7 percent, whereas western European countries had a growth rate of 0.1 percent, compared with 2.3 percent in Latin American countries, and 2.8 in Africa and western Asia. Demographic transition essentially predicts the patterns of change that occur over a long time (Szreter, 1993).

Let us now consider the major variables in population dynamics. They are *mortality*, or death rate; that is, the number of deaths per 1,000 population; *fertility*, which refers to the number of births in a population relative to every thousand women of childbearing age (usually between the ages of fifteen and forty-five); *migration*, which indicates the movement of segments of the population from one geographic area to another; and *age-sex composition*, or population composition—that is, a proportion of males and females in various age groups in a given population.

**Mortality** In the United States, accidental injury is the leading cause of death for people from age one to age forty-four, and over half of these are the result of motor vehicle accidents. Since 1968, however, the number of deaths from firearms has increased 60 percent, while vehicle deaths have fallen 21 percent. If the current trend continues, firearms will be the leading cause of injury-related deaths by 2003 (*Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report*, 1994).

Turning to other indicators, in any given group of 1,000 infants, mortality rates are relatively high in the first year of life, rapidly decline in early childhood, reach their minimum around the ages of four to ten, and then rise gradually but steadily until they reach their maximum at old age. In all countries of the world, mortality rates through the life cycle are declining, though at different rates, as evidenced by a decrease in infant mortality and an increase in life expectancy. Since World War II, health programs involving the use of antibiotics, vaccines, and insecticides have contributed to the decline of mortality rates in developing countries. The most noticeable is the drop in infant mortality rates—that is, the number of deaths per thousand during the first year of life. The decline in infant mortality is most rapid in industrialized countries. In the United States, for example, it declined from 99.9 in 1915 to 20 in 1970 and to 8.1 per 1,000 births in 1997 (*JAMA*, 1994; Population Reference Bureau, 1997). The rates are even lower for other



developed nations; for example, 4.4 for Japan, 4.8 for Sweden, and 4.4 for Finland. In developing countries, the decline in infant mortality rates is much slower. In Afghanistan, the rate is 168, and it is not unusual to see rates between 110 and 120 per 1,000 births in African countries such as Mali and Chad. Even in certain industrialized countries, such as Brazil, the rate is about 66 per 1,000 births. For the world, the rate is 64 (Population Reference Bureau, 1997). Life expectancy is increasing, but much more rapidly in the developing countries. For the United States, it increased from 47.3 years at the turn of the century to over 78 years in 1997. In the developing countries, an extremely rapid rise in life expectancy occurred during the first two decades after World War II and is still continuing, though probably at a slower rate. However, in Russia, mortality levels have climbed since the fall of Communism in 1989, with the average life expectancy declining to levels lower than those in many developing countries with high mortality rates. This decline is attributed to factors that include environmental hazards, deterioration of medical care, economic decline, fiscal insecurity, social inequality, political instability, and earlier risk exposure (Chen et al., 1996).

There are several changes associated with the decline in mortality rates (Heer & Grigsby, 1992; Pritchett & Summers, 1996; Teitelbaum & Winter, 1985:88-89). In general, wealthier nations are healthier nations with lower mortality rates. Per-capita income reflects both on infant mortality and life expectancy. In societies in which there is a high mortality rate, the family is more likely to be dependent on some larger kin group. By contrast, in low-mortality societies, such as Western countries, the nuclear family often lives at a great distance from other relatives as there is a smaller likelihood for children to become orphaned and require the support of extended kin. In high-mortality societies, individuals are more likely to have a stronger present orientation than when mortality is low. It may have an effect on the achievement motivation, for achievement is usually associated with a sacrifice of present values for future goals. There is also a decline in the emphasis placed on how religion will benefit one in the next world with the decline in mortality. The concern with afterlife is waning, and the accent is on how religion will help one in this world (Schneider & Dornbusch, 1958). Finally, there are also changes in the institutions of mourning as a result of the decrease in mortality. Geoffrey Gorer (1965) points out that at the turn of the century, there were strict rules of etiquette that the bereaved must observe, as well as rules that dictated what others must show toward them. Today, people are unsure of how to confront bereavement, and the general tendency is to try to deny its very existence.

**Fertility** There is an extensive body of literature describing fertility among nations at a given time, within a single nation over time, among geographic areas within a single nation, and among such social categories as educational attainment, income, occupation, religion, or ethnic group. In





general, the nations with the lowest per-capita income have the highest fertility, and vice versa. In developed countries, the level of fertility is lower than it was a hundred years ago, but the change leading to a decreased demand for children has not been a regular process (Starke, 1994). In most nations, fertility in general is higher in rural than in urban areas, and, in some countries, including the United States, unmarried women exhibited a higher fertility level than married women in recent years (Althaus, 1994). In developed nations, it is usually highest among persons of the lower socio-economic classes and lowest in the middle and upper classes.

In addition to these variations, there is a general downward trend in fertility in most countries, primarily as a result of the confluence of a series of economic and social factors. They include

- An overall increase in the educational attainment of women and the concomitant changes in their values and roles.
- An increase in the proportion of women in the nonagricultural labor force.
- Continued decline in infant mortality.
- Increasing cost of raising and educating children.
- Decline in traditional religious beliefs in favor of high fertility.
- Decline in the economic utility of children.
- The weakening of the extended family system.
- Widespread availability of contraceptive technology and abortion.
- Development of welfare and old-age systems outside of the home.
- Increased mobility opportunities.
- Lack of faith in the future.

Obviously, this is only a partial list, even though it indicates many of the changes that have been associated with the decrease in fertility. This list could be supplemented by questions of individual motives, such as, "Why do you want to have  $x$  number of children?" or "Why do you use (or not use) a certain contraceptive method?" In that case, one would be led to conclude that the reasons for a given fertility level are as many as the number of individuals who have borne children. Still, on a worldwide basis, literacy, increased wealth, urbanization, economic development, and industrialization have all contributed to the decrease in fertility. Some demographers and social commentators are even complaining that the United States and other Western countries are not reproducing fast enough to replace themselves (Teitelbaum & Winter, 1985; Wattenberg, 1989). In his rather alarmist book, *The Birth Dearth*, Ben J. Wattenberg (1989) fears that the decline in fertility in the West will bring about economic problems, a weakening of the military might of the West, a decline in the productivity of the aging labor force, and an inevitable bankruptcy of social security systems. He also alludes to the eventual overtake of the West by "inferior" races. Time will tell whether Western civilization is endangered by the "birth dearth."



In addition to the decline in actual fertility rates, there are also changes in the *preference system* that affects the decision to have children (Spengler, 1966). The preference system simply describes the value a couple puts on an additional child relative to the value of all other goals they might achieve without having that child. The changes affecting the preference system include the reduction in infant mortality, the decrease in the productive labor of children, changes in the institutions that provide support for the elderly, the decline in rewards that could be expected from society at large for bearing large numbers of children, and the shift from allocation of status by ascription to allocation by achievement.

**Migration** It is much easier to discuss general trends in mortality and fertility than in migration. Relevant data for migration often are not available. Furthermore, trends in migration vary from nation to nation, and there has been no generalized change such as those occurring in mortality and fertility. For the sake of brevity, the discussion will be confined to trends in the United States.

Americans migrate more often than people of other developed, industrialized countries, with many moving several times in their lives. Since World War II, approximately one-fifth of the total population has moved every year, about 6 percent have changed their country of residence, and roughly 3 percent have moved to a new state (Gober, 1993).

Based on various census estimates, some 52.5 million immigrants entered the country since the turn of the century (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1997:10). In 1996, there were more than 24 million legal immigrants in the United States, and they made up 9.3 percent of the population. If current trends persist, some 45 million immigrants will have arrived by 2050, and post-1970 immigrants and their descendants will then make up about a third of the population.

The period up to about the turn of the century corresponds to the wave of "old immigrants," predominantly composed of Irish leaving their native land because of the potato famine. The second large wave of "new immigrants," made up of individuals from southern Europe and eastern Europe, occurred roughly between 1900 and 1921, when restrictive legislation greatly reduced the flow of immigrants to the United States. World War II and its aftermath brought some 20 million refugees from eastern and central Europe (Harf & Trout, 1986:102). In recent years, some 1 million immigrants entered the country annually. Contrasted with the older waves of immigration, they came primarily from Latin American and Asian countries. In addition to legal immigration, there has been a substantial growth in illegal immigration since the 1970s. It is estimated that there are anywhere from 4 million to 8 million illegal aliens residing in the United States. In 1987, Congress passed legislation authorizing those who entered the country illegally prior to 1982 to remain and obtain citizenship should they so desire. Still, the flow of illegal immigrants continues, fueled by, among other things, an anticipation of



comparable legislation in the future. It is worth noting that immigration and children born to immigrants after their arrival in the United States predominantly from developing countries account for 50 percent of the population growth, and this share is projected to increase steadily (Abernethy, 1994). The changes in immigration origins are expected to alter the country's racial makeup. In 1995, the American population was 74 percent white, 12 percent black, 10 percent Hispanic, and 3 percent Asian. If the countries of origin remain the same, in 2050 it will be 51 percent white, 14 percent black, 26 percent Hispanic, and 8 percent Asian (Cassidy, 1997:41). There is already a growing sense of xenophobia, as evidenced by, for example, the passing by a large majority of Proposition 187 in California in November 1994, a measure that denies non-emergency health care, education, and social services to illegal immigrants (Newsweek, 1994a:57).

**Age-Sex Composition** The final variable of population dynamics is the age-sex composition, which is determined by the population's sex ratio at birth (sex ratio is the number of males divided by the number of females times 100) and the population's past history of births, deaths, and migrations. As a result of the decline in birthrates, the proportion of the population less than fifteen years of age has been steadily declining in industrialized countries. In the United States, it declined from 41.6 percent in 1850, to 34.4 percent in 1900, and to 22 percent in 1997 (Smith & Zopf, 1976:182; Population Reference Bureau, 1997). By contrast, the world population under fifteen years of age is 33 percent; Latin America's population under fifteen years of age is 36 percent, and it exceeds 49 percent in eastern African countries such as Kenya and Zimbabwe.

The current "aging" of the population has been widely publicized in recent years (Menken, 1986; Wattenberg, 1989). This refers to the increase both in the median age and in the number and proportion of those sixty-five years of age and over, which is another characteristic of developed countries. In 1994, the median age in the United States was close to thirty-four years (half the population older, half younger); and, for Canada, one study predicts that the median age in 2036 will be 49.9 years (McKie, 1993). About 13 percent of the population was over the age of sixty-five. In Latin American countries, the figure was 4 percent, and, in a number of countries in Asia and Africa it ranged between 1 and 2 percent.

Changes in the sex ratio in the United States are usually attributed to immigration, as more males than females tend to immigrate. Changes in both the age and the sex structures tend to bring about changes in other domains.

Changes in the age structure alter the *dependency ratio*, which is the ratio of persons in dependent ages (that is, ages under fifteen and over sixty-five). In general, the lower the ratio, the easier it is for persons in the economically productive ages to support those in the dependent age category. Age structure changes also relate to the age of persons in the labor force, and



developed countries generally have an older labor force as compared to underdeveloped countries. This, in turn, is reflected on patterns of consumption and money allotted to education.

Changes in age-sex structure also affect marriage rates. Assuming that men usually marry women a few years younger than themselves, then females in any population in which the age structure has a downward slope will have more difficulty in finding mates than will men. Rapid change in the rate of population growth can also affect the sex ratio at marriageable ages. In the United States, there were somewhat more boys born between 1941 and 1943 than girls born between 1944 and 1946. In contrast, the number of girls born between 1947 and 1949 was 14 percent greater than the number of boys born between 1944 and 1946. Thus, girls born right after World War II and reaching marriageable age in the later 1960s had substantially poorer prospects for marriage than girls born during World War II who reached that age in the mid-decade. To conclude on a more cheerful note, women born in the late 1960s and in the 1970s will have an excellent chance to marry (statistically) in the 1990s and about the year 2000.

In sum, the principal changes in the population include a general upward trend in terms of absolute numbers, accompanied by a slow decline in fertility and a rapid decrease in mortality. This is particularly evident in developing countries. Worldwide, the gap between birthrates and death rates is still wide enough to cause some alarm. In the next section, changes in the sphere of stratification will be examined.

## STRATIFICATION

*Stratification* refers to a system of ranking individuals and families into levels (strata or class) that share unequally in the distribution of status, wealth, and power or other scarce, highly valued and cherished objects in communities and societies (Gilbert, 1998; Gilbert & Kahl, 1993; Rossides, 1997; Spector, 1995). In all societies, differences exist between some individuals and others in terms of a number of factors. For example, the chief of a tribal society may be differentiated from tribesmen by receiving a greater degree of deference, living in a larger house, and having more wives. The president of a large university in a modern society is also likely to be differentiated in a number of ways from other members of the academic community—for example, a larger office, a larger income, more secretaries, and a reserved parking place.

### Types of Stratification Systems

There are three general types of stratification systems. At one extreme is the *caste system*, in which the strata are hereditary, endogamous (marriage partners must be chosen within the group), and permanent. An individual is born



into a caste, marries in it, and dies in it. The best-known caste system is that of traditional India. However, with the introduction of modern forms of technology and economic organization, together with the diffusion of ideologies favorable to social change and the integration of village life with the outside world, the traditionally rigid status system has been greatly undermined, although not necessarily abandoned (Mendelsohn, 1993). Much of this change has occurred in cities, not in rural villages, but the values and lifestyles associated with a more flexible status system have filtered into the rural sectors, planting the seeds of a "revolution of rising expectations" (Mandelbaum, 1970).

At the other extreme is the *open class system*, in which only individual achievement matters, and one rises or falls in social class according to his or her own accomplishment. Class frees individuals from the accident of birth more than any other ranking system. The class system does not remove the disadvantages or advantages of birth but does allow more room for achievement. Class is a relatively open system that allows for maximum social mobility in either direction (Berger, 1996). The United States is considered to have the most open and mobile class system in the world. In the third, the estate system, strata are defined by law and are relatively rigid and permanent. But there is some opportunity to shift one's status. Feudal Europe is the most notable example of an *estate system*. Changes from estate and caste stratification systems to open systems are indicative of changes of type, whereas changes in the open class system are changes *within* the stratification system (Barber, 1973:199–209).

### Toward Greater Equality

The economic difference between the top and bottom strata of society is greater in underdeveloped and developing countries than in developed nations. The richest 358 people in the world—the global billionaire club—possess assets which exceed the combined income of countries accounting for 45 percent of the world's population (Weismann, 1996). Gerhard Lenski's (1966:309) observation of over three decades ago is still correct: the top 1 or 2 percent of the population in nonindustrial societies as a whole usually receives not less than half of the total income of the country. In industrial societies the comparative figure is much less.

In developed countries, the gap between the rich and the poor narrowed between 1930 and 1960. Because of changing economic realities, this trend has been reversed, income inequalities are growing, and they are greater than any time in the past fifty years (*Economist*, 1994:19–21). However, *wealth inequalities* (a less frequently used indicator of inequality defined as assets owned at a given time, such as land, stocks, retirement benefits, homes, and cars) have remained relatively unchanged (Weicher, 1997), and the median family wealth in the United States has stayed around \$52,000 for the last fifteen years.



The biggest increases in income inequalities occurred in the United States, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand, where free market policies have been pursued most zealously. For example, the average salary of a chief executive officer of a major American firm is over \$3 million per year, not including stock options and special benefits—about 149 times as much as an ordinary production worker (Sanders, 1997). (In 1980, the average CEO earned 42 times what the average factory workers did.) In the United States, for example, in the mid-1990s, the top 20 percent of households received eleven times as much income as the bottom 20 percent. The effect is to give the richest 20 percent of the households a 45-percent share of the country's net income—the highest since World War II—and the poorest 20 percent of households a mere 4-percent share. Slightly more than 10 percent of American households had incomes of \$100,000 or more in 1995, and the number of those with incomes in excess of \$1 million has increased fourfold over the past fifteen years. In the same year, the median income from wages was \$25,480.

The bottom 80 percent of the population receives a smaller share of the nation's total income than it did twenty years ago, when the median earning of men began dropping. Adjusted for inflation, the average pay for four-fifths of American workers plummeted by 16 percent between 1973 and 1993 (Sanders, 1997). Middle-income households avoided downward mobility only by sending wives to work by postponing both marriage and children and by taking on part-time jobs. At the same time, the poor have become poorer (Hacker, 1997). Income inequalities are likely to remain with us in the same proportions in the foreseeable future (see, for example, Nielsen & Alderson, 1997).

The recent publication of a controversial book, *The Bell Curve*, by Charles Murray and the late Richard Herrnstein (Herrnstein & Murray, 1994) has highlighted the concern with income inequality by renewing a claim that intelligence as measured by IQ tests plays a major role in deciding society's winners and losers, and that genetic inheritance may be a main determinant of IQ. As may be expected, critics were not very kind to their thesis (see, for example, Reese, 1996; Schwartz, 1997).

Aside from income gaps, in many industrialized societies, the long-term trend is toward equalization of rights and privileges for all classes and toward the reduction of the power of the elite. Voting rights were extended to all levels, minimum-wage laws were enacted to improve the economic position of the working classes, and graduated income taxes were utilized in an attempt to moderate glaring inequities in wealth. Other attempts to equalize opportunities included social security for the unemployed, children, and the physically handicapped; education for the masses; free public recreational facilities; and a judicial system to protect the rights of individuals regardless of their class position.

Industrialization and urbanization have profoundly altered the economic basis of stratification. As a result of economic and technological changes, many Western countries have experienced a general improvement



in the overall income for the masses, both urban and rural, and a significant increase in the standard of living. The emphasis shifted to consumption, and there is considerable preoccupation with both what and how to consume and under what circumstances. In the United States, large-scale changes in major patterns of stratification have been associated with industrialization, creating a large, urban working class. Well into the twentieth century, the urban proletariat was generally underpaid and overworked, and the lifestyle imposed upon it reflected its underprivileged position in the economy. In recent decades, however, a substantial proportion of the urban working class have adopted a middle-class lifestyle. The basic change making this possible has been the rise in their relative incomes and the shorter workweek. With higher incomes and more leisure time, many workers acquired consumer "needs" of the middle class, such as modern homes and household equipment, an annual vacation and travel, leisure-time activities, and so on. For a while, the American dream became a reality. Workers got used to a rapidly growing standard of living in the 1960s and most of the 1970s, but the gains took a turn in the opposite direction starting in about 1978 (Koten, 1987). With a concomitant increase in the length of the workweek, the average American is working longer for less income (Sanders, 1997). Suddenly, a generation raised with great material expectations has discovered there is a big gap between its reach for more satisfaction and what is within its grasp. In view of current trends, it is doubtful that the new urban working class can maintain the highly cherished middle-class style of life. And, it is little consolation for them that their "real" middle-class counterparts are not faring much better.

Rising income inequality and the concomitant class segregation is creating geographical localization of affluence and poverty across the world. The localization will likely cause an increase in the density of poverty and expose the disadvantaged to increased disease, crime, violence, and family disorganization. On the other hand, the affluence concentration will improve the privileges of the rich and, we are likely to see further polarization, more gated communities, and increased class segregation through ecological mechanisms (see, for example, Massey, 1996).

### Social Mobility

The United States is frequently described as a "mobile society." Because stratification really involves a series of steps, one can consider mobility with regard to a number of variables such as income, educational achievement, housing, neighborhood status, occupational prestige, and so forth. There is consensus in the stratification literature that occupation is the best single indicator of one's overall stratification position. Changes in a stratification position are brought about by vertical mobility—that is, either the upward or downward movement on an occupational scale. Moreover,



mobility can be plotted across various periods of time, which would include two possible forms: intergenerational and intragenerational. *Intergenerational mobility* concerns changes in occupational prestige between generations and specifically involves the mobility of the offspring relative to the parent. *Intragenerational mobility* has to do with mobility within a single generation or movement following the individual's first major job (Blau & Duncan, 1967). Such mobility patterns may involve changes from manual to nonmanual occupations or movements into and out of the occupational elite at the top of some kind of occupational scale. Several studies claim that patterns of social mobility have not changed in recent decades (Rose, 1996).

As the economy changed in the United States in the nineteenth century, so did the nature of the occupational roles to be filled. The rise of industrialization and the increasing technological development of the society had an enormous impact in creating not only "room at the top" but actual "demand at the top," requiring a new supply. The greatly increased need for business executives, research scientists, lawyers, and financial managers exerted a demand on the education system that led, in turn, to a need for more teachers at every level. This change considerably altered the ratio of nonfarm to farm jobs and even the ratio of elite to nonelite jobs.

During the same period, American society was playing host to waves of immigrants who entered the American stratification system near the bottom and had the effect of pushing those already in the system toward the top. Irish, Italian, and Eastern European immigrants were all initially restricted to the less prestigious slots on the occupational ladder, whereas those workers already on the ladder were encouraged and even prodded to move up the rungs and fill the new occupational opportunities that were developing. Widening educational opportunity acted as the crucial mechanism for the transformation. The rise of public universities with low tuition made possible a massive surge of occupational mobility on the part of ethnic immigrants previously at the bottom of the stratification ladder.

Urbanization also contributes to changes in stratification patterns and to an increase in social mobility. Urbanized societies, or even those moving in this direction, commonly have expanding economies and thus increased job opportunities and rising income. Growing cities—in particular, large cities—have a complex division of labor, which involves the creation of new occupations or more jobs and a need for personnel to fill these positions. Thus, there are opportunities for upward occupational mobility—or prospects for downward mobility. For the United States and other highly industrialized societies, however, data indicate that in recent decades the rates of total mobility have not changed all that much (Gilbert & Kahl, 1993).

Patterns of social mobility vary from one society to another, with perhaps the most marked differentiation to be made between industrial and non-industrial societies. Moreover, variations among nations in mobility rates can be interpreted in different ways, depending on which aspect of mobility one



examines. S. M. Miller (1960) suggests that chances for long-term upward mobility from blue-collar to elite appear to be greater in the United States and Japan. To illustrate, in America, children of high school graduates are almost as likely to get a college degree as children of college graduates (Mandel, 1996). When all possibilities of entry into the elite from other levels are considered, Sweden and the Netherlands may be more open than the United States or Japan. Australia has a very low inheritance of occupational status and hence the highest general mobility figures. Blue-collar to white-collar moves seem to be most prevalent in France, Switzerland, and Great Britain.

Regardless of the prevalence, frequency, and type of social mobility, movement through the class system, either up or down, is an experience that profoundly affects many aspects of an individual's life (Tumin, 1985). For many, upward social mobility may be a disruptive experience. Through education or other forms of achievement, they realize occupational attainments that place them into lifestyles substantially different from those of their parents. In certain situations, lifestyle differences that stem from occupational factors may be accentuated by considerations of ethnic culture. To illustrate, the upwardly mobile children of immigrant parents may be under considerable pressure to reject or abandon parental beliefs, values, and way of life in order to become assimilated into their new social class. In some cases, upward mobility is associated with guilt and anxiety and may result in the breakdown of relations with the parents. It has also been suggested that those who are upwardly mobile into the middle class are generally more politically conservative than those born into middle-class circumstances (Tumin, 1985:93-95).

## POWER RELATIONS

Few people would disagree with Olsen (1970) that, like "energy in the physical world, power pervades all dynamic social phenomena." Although power has been variously defined, most sociologists would agree with Max Weber's definition of power as "the chance of a man or a number of men to realize their own will in a communal action even against the resistance of others who are participating in that action" (Gerth & Mills, 1946:180). Implicit in this definition is the notion that power cannot be considered an attribute of any individual or group. Rather, it is defined as a relationship between individuals or groups. Invariably, power has at least three components: force, authority, and influence (Bierstedt, 1974:220-241).

*Force* means the application of sanctions to, or the elimination of alternatives from, one group or individual by another. "Surrender or die," "Your money or your life," "Publish or perish," "Behave or get spanked"; all of these are examples of the elimination of possibilities. In earlier days, for example, force used to be an inherent part of the student-teacher power relation. In one instance, a schoolteacher tells that during his fifty-one years of



teaching, he administered "911,527 blows with a cane; 124,010 with a rod; 20,989 with a ruler; 136,715 with the hand; 10,295 over the mouth; 7,095 boxes on the ear; [and] 1,115,800 slaps on the head. . . ." (Coleman, quoted by Rogers & Skinner, 1968:335).

*Authority* is a legitimate power, an established right to make decisions and order the actions of others. Weber (Gerth & Mills, 1946:196–252) identifies three main types of authority:

1. Charismatic authority, or the authority of an extraordinary person who is obeyed because of charisma—his image of wisdom, saintliness, or invincibility—such as Christ, Napoleon, or Hitler.
2. Traditional authority, resting on a belief of sacred norms and traditions that one must obey; for example, prince, priest, or chief.
3. Bureaucratic or rational legal authority, resting on formal office or rank; for example, a general or a president of a university.

Finally, *influence* is the ability to affect the decisions and actions of others beyond any authority to do so. For example, professors have authority to command certain work assignments and to assign grades, but they do not have the authority to compel students to accept their opinions, even though they can influence students to do so. In brief, power is implied because when challenged, it becomes force; when legalized, it becomes authority; and influence rests on some combination of personality attributes and authority.

Power is a universal phenomenon in human societies, and there is an infinite number of power relations—the power of the parent over the child, the master over the slave, the teacher over the student, the warden over the prisoner, the employer over the employee, the general over the lieutenant. In short, it pervades all social relationships.

### The Dynamics of Power Relations

In *Power and Privilege*, Gerhard Lenski (1966) contends that the variety of inequality a society exhibits depends upon the existing power relations and upon how the power system distributes material surplus, especially food. Focusing his analysis on the basic techniques of subsistence, he develops a typology of societies, each type having a distinguishable degree of inequality and different power relations. The five types of societies are as follows:

1. *Hunting and gathering societies* are characterized by pronounced equality as a result of universally shared economic scarcity. Any superiority that exists is based on personal skills and abilities, a form of superiority that cannot be transmitted socially to children.

2. In *simple horticultural societies*, institutionalized inequality first emerges with farming based on the digging stick, a fundamental tool of a





gardening economy. Domestication of plants results in a more dependable supply of food, which, in turn, is related to the emergence of a division of labor, wherein specialized economic occupations and full-time occupations in politics and religion develop. As a result of functional specialization, new social statuses and power relations emerge.

3. In *advanced horticultural societies*, there is a noticeable increase in inequality, which accompanies the development of the hoe, permitting a greater utilization of the soil, and of terracing, irrigation, fertilizers, or metallurgy. The higher level of technology leads to an increase in economic specialization and to the development of political power. There is an elaboration of formal statuses, accompanied by an increase in property rights (including rights over human beings, or slavery) and the availability of transferable assets such as money, cattle, and slaves. From the perspective of power relations, this level of technological and social development sees the emergence of well-defined hereditary strata.

4. In *agrarian societies*, there is a significant increase in food production and food surplus that leads to advances in transport, communication, engineering, and military technology. New forms of power relations emerge in the form of a city-state, a bureaucratic empire, or feudalism. In such a society there is a well-developed, superior, hereditary social group, and the causes of inequality are primarily economic.

5. In *industrial societies*, the development of an industrial technology represents a significant change in the means of subsistence available to society. As a result, sharp increases take place in production and in specialized economic activity. But the subsequent material surplus, according to Lenski, does not lead, as in the past, to increases in inequality but to a reversal of this historic trend. Although economic prestige and political inequality is still substantial, it is less marked than in agrarian societies. Economic resources are more equitably distributed, and there is an emergence of universal suffrage, representing a diffusion and popularization of political power. The major reason for this trend toward increased equality is that industrial society is too complex to be run personally or arbitrarily. The ruling groups find it in their interests to involve the lower and intermediate groups in economic and political processes.

The contention that industrial society is characterized by a decrease in economic and political inequality as compared to agrarian society is a major theme in Lenski's work. It is important to note that the economic elite in industrial society claims a smaller portion of the economic pie than the economic elite of agrarian society, and there is a greater willingness of the political elite to involve the masses in political processes. Moreover, unlike in agricultural societies, in industrial societies, at least in the West, ownership



in corporations has more or less become separated from control: Power has passed into the hands of managers (Zeitlin, 1982).

A similar point is made by Gaetano Mosca, who suggests that while wealth may still facilitate recruitment to the ruling class or political elite, in modern industrial societies, access to the political or ruling elite has become open to wider and wider strata of the population. Mosca came to this conclusion by tracing the changes in the relations between the ruling minority and the majority that is being ruled. He pointed out that the structure of the ruling class and the criteria of recruitment into it change with the changes in its predominant societal function. Historically, one change was the shift from military skills, first to land ownership and then to wealth, as a criterion of access to the ruling class. At first, the ruling warrior classes acquired ownership of the land, which is the principal source of production and wealth in premodern societies. As revenue from the land increases, accompanied by the growth of population and the development of urban centers of consumption, an important societal transformation occurs: "Wealth rather than military valor comes to be the characteristic feature of the dominant class: the people who rule are the rich rather than the brave" (Mosca, 1973:214).

He further suggests that "If a new source of wealth develops in a society, if the practical importance of knowledge grows, if an old religion declines or a new one is born, if a new current of ideas spreads, then, simultaneously, far-reaching dislocations occur in the ruling class" (Mosca, 1973:215). The ruling classes inevitably decline when they can no longer render the services they once rendered and when their talents lose in importance in the environment in which they live. This is further facilitated when scattered smaller units become integrated into large-scale tightly knit political entities. This brings an ever-increasing concentration of power in the hands of a state that carries out and regulates more and more functions. This is related to a change in the mode of organization of the political structure, the transition from feudalism to bureaucracy. Political bureaucracy first came into being in seventeenth-century France under the reign of Louis XIV, and then, according to Mosca, evolved into the democratic and totalitarian bureaucratic state where the potential political power of nonpoliticians has increased significantly.

Suzanne Keller (1963) contends that industrialization brought about the development of many "strategic elites" defined as "a minority of individuals designated to serve a collectivity in a socially valued way" (1963:4). In addition to a political elite, an economic elite, and a military elite, Keller discusses cultural, moral, intellectual, scientific, religious, and diplomatic elites among others. She writes (1963:277-278):

In highly industrialized societies . . . power has become less arbitrary and personal and is increasingly shared among various groups and institutions. . . . The current strategic elites are not as free to exercise their powers as were the aristocracies and ruling classes of the past because in being functionally specialized





they are themselves subordinate in spheres not relating to their specialty, and because they are now far more dependent on the good will of the public. . . . Today, no single strategic elite has absolute power or priority . . . and none determines the patterns of selection and recruitment of the rest . . . their more varied skills and experiences result in the formation of a more complex and many-sided social core, one in which a number of personalities must coexist.

### Decentralization of Power

In addition to changes in power relations at the societal level, changes are taking place at the level of community. In most American communities, power is diffused to a considerable degree. Thomas R. Dye (1986:49) contends that the community's most important resource is land, and those who control land use are the community's power elite. They include mortgage bankers, real estate developers, builders, and landowners. Community elites, Dye argues, are different from national elites in their economic function. At the local level, the elites' function is to prepare land for capital investment. But their power is limited, for they cannot control the destinies of their communities. Their power is limited to economic development decisions, and they secure mass support for their policies by emphasizing prospects for more jobs and small business opportunities. There is no single center of power, and Paul E. Mott (1970:85-86) cites the factors or conditions that favor an increase in the number of local centers of power and in the number of power relations. "The number of centers of power is to increase as (1) the population (of the community) increases, (2) the ethnic composition becomes more heterogeneous, (3) functional specialization increases, (4) the number of self-conscious social classes increases, (5) as immigration increases."

### Law and Power

Changes in power relations are also brought about by law. As J. O. Hertzler (1961:421) points out, ". . . the law in effect structures the power (superordinate-subordinate) relationships in the society; it maintains the status quo and protects the various strata against each other, both in governmental and non-governmental organizations and relationships." The law affects power relations by stating who may do what to whom. For example, prior to the passing of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, employers were legally entitled to fire employees who joined unions. This law established workers' legal right to join unions and prohibited employers from penalizing workers for union activity. Civil rights legislation also changed the power relations between blacks and whites by enabling the former to obtain goals more efficiently, pursue goals that otherwise they would not pursue, and act out values more effectively. It resulted in the acquisition of



new opportunities and in the formation of new attitudes such as increased self-esteem, courage, and political awareness (McClusky, 1976:393).

In sum, it should be noted that when talking about political power relations, an organized minority generally can control an unorganized majority. Even though there have been important changes in power relations, indicating a trend toward a more egalitarian distribution of power, it is probably true, contrary to popular myth, that "the people" neither possess nor dispense power. It should also be remembered that "it is quite impossible for the government of a society to be in the hands of any but a few . . . there is government for the people; there is no government by the people" (Aron, quoted by Bottomore, 1993:120).

## EDUCATION

In traditional societies, individuals can acquire the knowledge and skills necessary for the successful performance of adult roles without formal education. In more complex societies, parents are unable to pass on to their children the knowledge and skills they will need as adults. As a society becomes more industrialized, there is an ever-increasing demand for general skills—reading, writing, and arithmetic—and for specialized vocational and technical training for specific occupational roles. Nowadays, an increasing supply of highly educated people has become the absolute prerequisite of social and economic development.

Schools were invented several thousand years ago to prepare a select few for leadership. They educated only an elite class, which was supposed to "carry" the culture for the whole society. The education provided was theoretical, consisting of the *trivium* (grammar, rhetoric, and logic) and the *quadrivium* (arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music). While describing education in medieval Europe, Phillippe Ariès (1962) points out that schools lacked a gradation of subjects according to difficulty. There was a very broad age dispersion of students, ranging from age nine to age twenty-four in the same class; an absence of standard age for beginning school; instruction from a few to several hundred students by one teacher; and the maintenance of control by corporal punishment, humiliation, and reliance on informers. The notion of schooling as preparation for adulthood was foreign to the medieval tradition. Schooling of this nature, largely consistent with training a clerical elite, endured for a long time.

A century or more ago, public schools were created to teach the three Rs to the masses. Today, education is a dominant institution that touches almost every member of a society at some time, consumes a large portion of a society's financial resources, and is one of the largest employers of the workforce. Universal education became a right, if not a mandate, at least up to age fifteen in most countries of the world.





During this century, school enrollments at the primary, secondary, and college levels have increased dramatically. In 1992, more than 62 million Americans between the ages of three and thirty-four were enrolled in education institutions. Some examples of changes: Of those aged twenty-five years and over in 1940, 24.5 percent had completed high school and 4.6 percent college. The median school years completed was 8.6. By 1993, 80.2 percent had completed high school and 21.9 percent college, and the median school years completed grew to 12.6. Between 1960 and 1993, school expenditures rose almost fourfold to \$438 billion for all levels (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1997:154, 157, 151). This figure represents around 7 percent of the total value of the nation's annual output of goods and services. Public elementary and secondary schools spend about \$4,700 per student, public colleges \$13,200, and private institutions \$22,000. Full-time tuition income covers between one-half and three-fourths of the per-pupil expenditures of colleges. For example, one top college, Swarthmore in Pennsylvania, estimates that in 1994, it spent more than \$40,000 per student, which is far more than the \$29,900 fee it received for actual tuition and room and board (Passell, 1994). The difference is made up from gifts and endowment income. At this point, it should be noted that perennial "soaring tuition" image of higher education has little to do with reality. In 1997, of the more than 2,200 four-year colleges in the United States, only 36 charged more than \$20,000 in tuition and fees. More than a quarter of all colleges are public colleges; their average annual tuition is \$2,860, and two-thirds of all students, around 6 million, attend them. Another 5.3 million attend two-year junior colleges, which charge an average annual tuition of \$1,387. Public colleges and universities enroll more than 80 percent of all students, who pay, on the average, around \$2,000 per year for their education. Those who attend private colleges pay an average of \$12,432 annually in tuition and fees, and less than 1 percent of all students pay more than \$20,000 (Menand, 1997). These figures do not take scholarships into account: 41 percent of all students at public and 60 percent at private four-year colleges receive financial aid. A related point is that the nation's public four-year colleges and universities are increasingly serving the economic elite, who, as a group, no longer place a high premium on private education. The proportion of students from affluent families increased sharply at public institutions over the past fifteen years—38 percent of the freshmen come from families earning more than \$200,000 (Passell, 1997).

Several reasons account for these phenomenal increases both in the number of students and in expenditures. One explanation is the high birthrate following World War II. Another factor is the lengthening of the educational time span, as communities add kindergarten at one end and community colleges at the other. A third explanation is the rising popularity of a college education. But beyond these, the average cost per pupil at every level has been rising faster than either the price or level of the gross national product. In part, this is because of a national drive to improve education, with the customary pre-



scription being a generous diffusion of money, although there is little empirical evidence that spending more money makes for better students (*Economist*, 1997a), and the debate on the issue of whether public spending is related to school performance continues (Burtless, 1996). Let us now consider some specific changes in elementary, secondary, and higher education.

### Elementary and Secondary Education

Since about the turn of the century, the main change in American elementary and secondary education has been from curriculum-oriented subject matter to an emphasis on the child as a growing personality. Under the former, more weight was given to content and to the capacity to reproduce what had been read or heard. Today, schools are more and more child-centered, with emphasis on self- and social development. This change has been accompanied by a shift from a rather severe authoritarianism to a more permissive practice in teaching methods in which the child has a larger degree of participation. There is greater emphasis on matters of motivation, cooperative learning, mental hygiene, and the like.

The number of public and private school students reached 52.2 million in 1997, and current demographic trends suggest that enrollment will peak at 54.3 million in 2007. During this period, high school enrollment is projected to increase by 13 percent (an additional 1.7 million students), while elementary enrollment is projected to increase by less than 1 percent. This continued enrollment spiral reflects the "echo boom" of the children of the baby boom generation, increased immigration, more children in prekindergarten and kindergarten, and more students staying in school longer. The shift from elementary to high schools has spatial and fiscal implications—some 6,000 new schools will be needed along with some 2 million new teachers to accommodate the growing number of high school students; there is a cost estimate of \$112 billion for just the repair and maintenance of existing buildings (Applebome, 1997).

The rapid rise in high school population over the years also led to a proliferation of separate courses, and to such varied courses of study as liberal or college preparatory, commercial, vocational, and fine arts. The trend has been away from the courses designed to prepare the pupil for higher education and toward those that have more practical use in jobs or in the home and that give the future citizen some orientation to his or her public and political rights and duties. Ancient languages, algebra, geometry, trigonometry, and formal political history have tended to give way to modern languages, simplified or "new" mathematics, and social studies that emphasize current issues. These changes have been accompanied by a series of educational innovations, such as the use of teaching machines and closed-circuit television, the creation of open classroom environments, and a widespread reliance on computers both as a teaching and learning aid.



As increasingly large proportions of young people attend schools at all levels, concern has grown that the quality of education has been declining. A number of shortcomings have captured the public's attention. Examples of these would include the relatively high rate of functional illiteracy among young adults (as high as 40 percent among minority youths); inadequacies in the teaching of science, mathematics, and foreign languages; and the general decline on tests performances (Ravitch, 1985). Studies indicate that American high school students average lower test scores in mathematics, science, and other subjects when compared to their counterparts in Japan, Germany, Russia, Singapore, and other industrialized nations. For example, in a 1997 survey of math achievement scores of students from forty-one countries, the United States ranked twenty-eighth. Top on the list were students from Singapore, South Korea, Japan, and Hong Kong (*Economist*, 1997b). It is interesting to note that second-ranked South Korea and sixth-ranked Czechs spend only a third as much per pupil as the United States. Once again, teaching methods are more crucial than education spending. In teaching mathematics, both countries spend more time on basic arithmetic than on deeper mathematical ideas, emphasize mental arithmetic, rely on standard teaching manuals, and favor whole-class (as opposed to group) teaching.

Further, some of the differences are also due to greater emphasis on the hard sciences and languages and to the length of the school year. For example, German students routinely study physics and algebra for five years, chemistry and biology for four years, and calculus for two years. Most American high school students do not take even a year of either physics or chemistry. Only 6 percent study calculus. With a 180-day school schedule, the United States is one of the few countries with classrooms idle over half the year. Japanese schools operate more than 240 days, including half-days on Saturdays. Most Japanese high school students do not date, drive cars, hold part-time jobs, or even do household chores. In the United States, 76 percent of high school seniors spend fewer than five hours per week on homework; in Japan, less than 35 percent do. In 1994, one-third of high school seniors reported that they were not required to do daily homework in all school subjects, and over half of them could not write a narrative essay (Manegold, 1994). This is reflected in the SAT (Scholastic Achievement Test) scores, which have declined from their postwar high in 1956. In 1997, math scores showed some overall improvements while the verbal scores remained relatively unchanged (Honan, 1997). Asian Americans continued to have the highest averages in mathematics, and whites scored highest in the verbal test. Blacks had the lowest average in both the verbal and mathematics parts. But low test scores are not limited to students. In a well-publicized case in 1997, school officials in the Connetquot school district on Long Island were not surprised when they received hundreds of applications for thirty-five teaching positions. What surprised them, however, was the number of candidates who could not pass a new test—fifty multiple-choice reading comprehension questions from old Regents exams in



English given to *high school juniors*. Of the 758 applicants, only about a quarter passed: just 202 correctly answered at least forty questions (*The New York Times*, 1997:A12). It should be noted that all applicants had at least a baccalaureate, and several a master's degree and New York State certification to teach.

There are several reasons for the long-term decline of SAT scores. They include the fact that more lower-scoring minorities and disadvantaged students have been taking the tests since the mid-1960s; that learning standards in schools are down, as evidenced by an increase in absenteeism, grade inflation, and easier textbooks; that changing family structures, notably the increase in one-parent homes, have hurt the children's learning ability; and that easier access to colleges, along with a growing lack of motivation, may have resulted in less preparation by students for college entrance examinations. The decline in scores are further attributed to an increase in disciplinary problems in schools, high rates of truancy, and the substantial amount of time spent viewing television on school days.

Generally, these are the reasons given for the school systems' incapability of teaching the fundamentals to America's poor children. It is interesting to note that "The same school system that had taught the fundamentals to the children of immigrants from provinces in southern Italy where from 67 percent to 79 percent of the adult populations could not read or write Italian, now presumably could not do the same for the children of native-born Americans, all of whom spoke English and most of whom were at least literate" (Armbruster, 1977:11).

Armbruster (1977:54) further points out that the lack of academic climate in high schools, the proliferation of elective courses, less homework, and lax attendance requirements, in many instances, have resulted in a discouraging situation in which

many schools have tended to educate children for a nonexistent world. Certain things in life simply cannot be avoided or blamed on someone else; actions have personal consequences; outside the school environment one normally has to produce to be promoted; work must satisfy the needs of the economy to be profitable to the worker; many trades and professions require work that gives no credit for good intentions or for being nearly accurate—much work, and advanced study, must be explicit, meticulous and correct every time; it is important to be well informed and logical, not just spontaneous and talkative. To let students believe otherwise is to mislead them dangerously—especially if they are underprivileged.

### Higher Education

Today's universities have their origins in the institutions that developed in eleventh- and twelfth-century Europe. They began in Italy, spread to Spain and France, from there to Germany and Scandinavia, then to England, Scotland, and finally to America. The contemporary American university is



an amalgam borrowed from Western Europe, particularly England and Germany. The assumptions underlying the undergraduate curriculum originally came from England, whereas graduate education is grounded in German scholarship and science. The English influence can be dated from the founding of the first college, Harvard, in 1636. The German influence did not take hold until more than two centuries later. The curriculum was designed to produce a learned clergy and cultivated gentlemen and to impart an aristocratic lifestyle to the wellborn. In the seventeenth century, more than half of the college graduates became ministers, and most college professors were clergymen, or at least were trained in theology. Before the Civil War, almost all the college presidents were ministers.

In the early American college, the principal method of instruction was *recitation*. This is a process in which students repeat from memory, often verbatim, textbook assignments. (Remnants of this method are still found in Eastern European and Russian universities.) For *disputation*, students defended or attacked a proposition in Latin, the required language of instruction. Later on, the *lecture* by teachers supplemented student recitations. Because of the limited number of books, students often copied down word for word what the instructor said. As the size of classes increased, the lecture method slowly replaced recitation and disputation. The blackboard was first used at Bowdoin College around 1823. The *seminar* method was imported from Germany in the mid-nineteenth century. Finally, the *discussion* class, designed to supplement lectures, was introduced at Harvard in 1904 (Boyer, 1987:149).

The early colleges were for male students only, and higher education did not become a reality for women until the early 1800s. (Now women make up over 55 percent of the undergraduate student body.) By 1860, there were 246 colleges and universities in the United States and 17 state universities. In 1862, higher education gained support from the passage of the Morrill Act by Congress. This act granted each state a large area of land for the purpose of endowing at least one agricultural college. These "land-grant colleges" contributed greatly to the expansion of agricultural and engineering education. Further support for higher education came from the passage of the GI Bill by Congress in 1944, and its extension in 1952. The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 authorized grants for college work-study programs, and, in 1972, the Higher Education Act authorized, for the first time, direct all-purpose aid to colleges and universities. The greater financial support by the government resulted in the greater involvement of the government in higher education.

As college education has become more central to society, higher education has grown into a \$180 billion industry, to nearly 3 percent of the gross national product, from \$2.4 billion, which was less than 1 percent, fifty years ago (Arenson, 1997). By 1997, there were 3,706 institutions of higher education in the United States: 2,244 were classified as four-year (which includes 159 universities), and the remaining 1,462 as junior colleges (*Chronicle of*



*Higher Education Almanac*, 1997:5). The number of two- and four-year colleges almost doubled during the last generation. A similar increase took place among the number of college students. By the fall of 1997, total college enrollment in institutions of higher learning was close to 14.5 million, and college students today can choose from a list of more than 6,000 different majors (Boyer, 1987:102) and take courses on a huge variety of subjects such as democracy and gender, introduction to herbs and spices, even including the fundamentals of circus skills, the "Madonna phenomenon," and the theory and techniques of windsurfing—all for credit (Frank, 1994). The percentage of U.S. high school graduates who enrolled in college or completed at least one year of college also grew steadily over the years, reaching almost 69 percent in 1997, the highest in the world.

A phenomenal increase has occurred in the number of junior colleges. In 1960, there were 521 such institutions; by 1997, there were 1,462. In 1960, there were 451,000 junior college students; today there are more than 5.5 million. From 1965 to 1970, there were 194 new junior colleges that opened in America, about one every nine days for half a decade. The junior college diploma is rapidly replacing the high school diploma as a minimum credential for entrance into the "educated" middle class.

Concomitant with the growth in the number of colleges has been the steady increase in the number of types of degrees conferred. The number of bachelor's degree recipients increased from 839,730 in 1971 to 1,160,134 in 1997 (*Chronicle of Higher Education Almanac*, 1997:5). But there were some major changes in the field of study. The number of business majors more than doubled. There were significant increases in the number of students majoring in psychology, communications, nursing, and education. Fields with notable declines included communications technologies, computer and information sciences, library science, and theology.

Between 1971 and 1978, the number of M.A. degrees conferred increased from 230,509 to 311,620. From 1978, however, there was a gradual decline to 286,251 in 1985, followed by a pronounced increase to 352,838 in 1992 that reflected generally poor employment prospects for college graduates. This trend continued, and in 1997, 397,629 M.A. degrees were awarded. There is an uneven trend among doctoral recipients; their number rose in 1975 to 34,083, declined in 1985 to 32,943, and increased again to 44,446 in 1997 (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1997:190; *Chronicle of Higher Education Almanac*, 1997:5). In 1997, over half of all M.A. degrees were earned by those majoring in business and education, and close to one-fifth of Ph.D. recipients were in education, closely followed by engineering. In the late 1990s, over 60 percent of the doctorates were granted to foreign-born students, mainly Asian students. The figures are comparable in mathematics, computer science, and the physical sciences (*Chronicle of Higher Education Almanac*, 1997:22). In the field of economics, 40 percent of doctorates went to foreign-born students (Bhagwati & Rao, 1994).





As the population of the United States became increasingly well educated, women made significant gains (Blanchi & Spain, 1986:137). In terms of enrollment, women represent 55.5 percent of the college population. In 1997, more women than men earned both bachelor's and master's degrees. But women represented slightly more than a third of Ph.D. recipients. Differences still exist between men and women in their major fields of study. More than two-thirds of students in majors such as architecture, engineering, physical sciences, and religion are men. Those fields in which over two-thirds are female include education, foreign languages, library sciences, and health professions. But women made significant inroads in traditionally "male" areas of study. For example, female recipients of medical and law degrees have more than tripled since the 1970s, and the number of women has increased substantially in fields such as mathematics and engineering.

Data show that overall minority enrollment has also continued to grow. Between 1984 and 1997, the total enrollment in higher education increased by about 2.5 million. Not one of the students contributing to this rise was a white American male. Seventy-one percent were students classified as African American, native American, Asian American, and Hispanic American. The remaining 29 percent were nonresident aliens and white women. The number of "white men" actually declined. By 1997, the number of minority students in two- and four-year colleges had risen to over 23 percent of the total college enrollment. The patterns, however, vary widely by race. Black enrollment is up to 10 percent of the college population, which reflects a gradual upward trend, but is still lower than the proportion of blacks in the population. Hispanic students gradually increased from 3.5 percent, in 1976, to about 5 percent of the college population in 1997. Enrollment of native American students increased slightly in that same period. The one ethnic minority to show substantial gains was Asian Americans. Their representation increased to 7.1 percent of all students in 1997, up from 1.8 percent in 1976 (*Chronicle of Higher Education Almanac*, 1997:18).

Traditionally, the objectives of higher education were to make available to students the tools of learning, to open up new horizons for them to explore, and to assist them to understand their cultural heritage. Today, by contrast, as a 1987 Carnegie Foundation report foresaw more than a decade ago, "careerism dominates the campus" (Boyer, 1987:102). Students view general education as an irritating interruption—an annoying detour on their way to their degree. The report finds that most students go to college to pursue a special field of study that leads to a career, comfortable living, and security from unemployment. For example, in 1994, 45,000 students applied for the approximately 16,000 spots in the nation's 125 medical schools, partly as a response to the decline in career opportunities in the high-paying fields of law and investment banking (Thomson, 1994). One-third of undergraduates would drop out if college did not increase their prospects of employment.



Most students (and parents) want to translate their educational dollars into marketable skills. As a result, career-related education continues its dramatic increase, which began about a generation ago. Almost all colleges, in response to the demand and competition for students, added new vocational majors and split up old ones into smaller pieces. New programs were created such as medical technology, computer programming, and police science. Colleges, which in the past had one major in business administration, now have, in response to marketplace demands, a dozen or so business-related majors such as fashion merchandising, foods and nutrition in business, and health services administration. Gerontology, which hardly existed as an academic subject in the early 1970s, has become one of higher education's fastest-growing disciplines, and colleges and universities offer more than 1,300 different programs as growing numbers of elderly people create demands for practitioners and retraining opportunities as happened, for example, in the recently oversubscribed nursing profession (Henneberger, 1994). The vocationalization of higher education is being promoted both in two- and four-year colleges and universities. The emphasis seems to be on technically competent workers, not on a corps of free-thinking liberal arts graduates. The shift away from liberal arts and toward career-oriented vocational majors is not limited to American campuses. A similar trend prevails in European universities. It has even reached China, where there are "three ways"—black, gold, and red—for students to pursue a career. The "black way" is to leave China to study abroad, to earn a black graduation cap and gown. "Gold" involves going into business in the hope of becoming rich. And, "red" refers to joining the Communist party and becoming a government official. In all three cases, students are driven by "blatant opportunism instead of devotion to the socialist ideals" in their academic work (Gargan, 1987).

### The Great Training Robbery

Most Americans believe college is a necessity and a right and that the more education a person has, the better he or she will do in life (Arenson, 1997). Education seems to be the most popular solution for the individual's desire for success and social mobility. This idea is reflected in the growing trend toward "credentialism." The more society relies on formal education as its basic training device, the more individuals find that educational credentials are essential if they are to have access to jobs and opportunities for promotion. As these credentials become more and more important, mere experience in the labor market is downgraded. An emphasis on educational credentials has been said to be justified in that, because the economy has become more technical and complex, a more highly educated work force is necessary. Ivar Berg (1970) attacks this notion and argues that on every occupational level Americans tend to overestimate the value of education, deny-





ing employment opportunities to those with less education and demanding more education than most jobs require. Berg finds no relation between formal education and work productivity, turnover rates, work satisfaction, promotion, and success in business. Berg's observations are well documented in the literature. For example, a 1994 study concludes that although a college degree has become a virtual prerequisite for getting ahead in the corporate world or the professions, only 46 percent of the wealthy business owners surveyed completed their college education; 29 percent never went to college, and 25 percent started but did not finish. Even those who can boast academic achievements do not put much faith in them, and only 33 percent said that educational background was important to their financial success (Bowers, 1994). This feeling is perhaps most pronounced among college professors. A 1995 Carnegie Foundation international survey of 20,000 faculty members in fourteen countries concluded that most professors were unhappy about their salaries—as well as with the lack of student preparation (Altbach & Lewis, 1995).

If anything, there is an inverse relation between amount of formal education and occupational performance. Berg notes that formal education plays one single role for blue-collar, white-collar, and engineer-scientist workers: It determines where one enters the occupational system. What is important, in other words, is that employers believe that formal education makes better workers and therefore use it as a criterion for hiring. But once hired, workers with more or less formal education exhibit no significant difference in work performance. The only apparent difference is in income because workers with more formal education enter the labor force at higher levels and change jobs more often. There are questions being raised both at the marketplace and in the literature regarding the importance placed on credentials by both colleges and employers especially when it can be shown that the educational requirements for entry into an occupation have little bearing on the activities of that occupation (see, for example, Ray & Mickelson, 1993).

### **Publish or Perish**

Traditionally, the emphasis in colleges was quite clearly on teaching. The goal was to preserve and transmit existing truths rather than to advance knowledge. "Even as late as 1857, a committee of the Columbia College board of trustees attributed the poor quality of the college to the fact that three professors 'wrote books' " (Lewis, 1975:3). However, with the spread of graduate education modeled after German universities, faculty advancement and promotion soon became dependent on scholarly research rather than on teaching. A number of universities advocated "productive" work in an attempt to establish a "national reputation" (Lewis, 1975:7). By the turn of the century, many academics in universities lived by the code of "publish or



perish," and they were judged only according to the merit of their research, rather than on their teaching. Today this trend is becoming even more pronounced. Evidence of publication and research is a crucial factor both in hiring as well as in retention and promotion even though it is getting harder and harder to get one's ideas in print (Shapiro, 1996). Today, it seems that when the chips are down, it's published research, not classroom skills, that is likely to determine one's professional fate. An important preoccupation on campus is the attempt to determine the proper balance between research and teaching. Ideally, good teaching and quality research should flourish side by side (Boyer, 1987:127).

### **Publish and Perish**

For several decades, the shift from unskilled labor to skilled, technical, and professional employment appeared to have created an inexhaustible demand for education. But by the 1970s, higher education caught up with the demand, and competent college graduates in many fields were unhappily scanning the help-wanted ads. For example, in 1965, there were two teaching vacancies for each new Ph.D. In 1972, graduates and vacancies were about equal. Two years later, the bottom fell out of the academic job market for newly minted Ph.D.s. Those in the humanities and the social sciences were particularly affected by it, and many graduates were unable to find jobs in academia. It was commonplace to have hundreds of qualified applicants for an assistant professorship at a small college in English, history, or even in sociology. Many departments were closed, and M.A. and Ph.D. programs were phased out, with a concomitant reduction in the number of tenured positions. For the few lucky ones who obtained an academic appointment, it was more often than not for a specified short time period, ranging from one to five years. At many colleges, it became very difficult (if not impossible) to get tenure. Many qualified graduates became frustrated by the shortage of academic jobs and sought placement outside of academia or kept seeking postdoctoral or part-time appointments. This is not the best of times in academe—many, indeed, would argue that it is the worst of times (see, for example, Altbach & Lewis, 1995). But despite poor job prospects and fiscal problems, the number of Ph.D.s kept rising (Newsweek, 1994b:63).

By the late 1990s, the days of glut in a growing number of academic fields were slowly drawing to a close as professors hired in the 1950s and 1960s began to retire. A major portion of academia's 526,000 full-time faculty members were hired during that period to teach the baby-boom generation. They have now started to retire in droves—right at the time that the baby boom's boomlet begins to pour into colleges. It is estimated that between now and 2010, institutions of higher education will have to hire between 450,000 and 500,000 new faculty members. But many of them will



be part of the "invisible faculty" (Gappa & Leslie, 1993) and can look forward to only part-time work. Currently almost half of four-year faculty and 65 percent of two-year faculty are part-timers.

Many are the campus equivalent of migrant workers, with no stake at all in the institutions for which they work. They earn about \$1,500 per course, with no benefits or pension, and are considered higher education's working poor (Merik, 1996). Many of them hold several jobs at once and spend the week rushing from one campus to the next. The growth in part-time faculty is, to a degree, a response to the tenure system, which had grown cumbersome and expensive, particularly for colleges with small endowments and shrinking revenues. Even though early retirement incentives have substantially lightened college payrolls, many institutions continue to replace retirees with adjunct faculty. Increasingly, undergraduates can expect to be taught by part-timers and adjuncts leading to what some educators call "faceless departments" (Leatherman, 1997). In some instances, they may even end up with graduate students from other departments who lack formal training and experience in the discipline they are assigned to teach.

In sum, education over the years has undergone drastic changes. Universities have been transformed into huge complexes with enormous power, college students now far outnumber farmers in the United States, and there are some 1.8 million full-time employees in colleges and universities. The education level of the American population is steadily growing; more and more people graduate from high school; there is a steady decline in the proportion of dropouts; more and more high school graduates go on to college and professional schools; and, ironically, more and more people find it harder and harder to find a job after graduation. While the level of education goes up in the United States (not necessarily the quality), there are still over 1 billion people worldwide who cannot read or write, which represents an estimated illiteracy rate of 18.5 percent. The growth of population in the world still outpaces the advance in literacy rates.

## THE ECONOMY

The structure of an economic system is based on production, distribution, and consumption. *Production* involves the assembling and applying of resources, and it requires land, capital, and labor. *Land* refers to physical territory and resources; *capital* consists of the means of production—of money, equipment, and tools; and *labor* pertains to people who produce goods and services. *Distribution* entails some system of exchange in which goods and services have some equivalent values. Finally, *consumption* refers to the utilization of goods and services produced by the economy.



### Production

In traditional societies, production is located in family units. Subsistence farming is predominant, and other industry is supplementary—but still attached to the family and village. Neil J. Smelser (1976:151) points out that as the economy develops, many of the production activities are removed from the family-community complex. In agriculture, the introduction of money crops differentiates between the social contexts of production and consumption. The use of agricultural wage labor separates work roles from what previously might have been a family productive unit. In industry, there are several levels of differentiation. In the simplest form, household industry, only the workers' own needs are supplied, and there is no surplus to enter the market. "Handicraft production" differentiates between production and consumption, even though the latter may take place in the local community. On the other hand, "cottage industry" usually involves a differentiation between consumption and community because production is for unknown consumers in the market, usually through wholesalers. In manufacturing and factory systems, the worker is segregated from capital and frequently from his or her family. It brings about a structural differentiation in the labor force as a response to the exigencies of production and marketing. More specialized and efficient roles and organizations are required than the one found in traditional family and community structures. Changes in the production process bring about an increase in the division of labor, with concomitant alterations in the composition, size, and variety of the labor force.

Most economies today, whether fully industrialized or not, contain three basic sectors, with the proportion of labor force in each sector depending on society's technological development. The *primary sector* refers to that part of the economy that directly generates raw materials from the natural environment, such as fishing, mining, or agriculture. The primary sector dominates the economies of preindustrial societies where virtually the entire population is engaged in hunting, gathering, or agricultural activities. The *secondary sector* refers to that part of the economy that transforms raw materials into manufactured goods. Examples of this sector would include the refining of petroleum, the manufacture of wood into furniture, and metals into tools, building materials, and automobiles. Most of the labor force is engaged in "blue-collar" occupations in this sector. The *tertiary sector* refers to that part of the economy that generates services rather than goods. The United States became the first country in the 1950s to have more than half of its labor force engaged in the tertiary sector—providing services and processing information (Naisbitt, 1982:14–15) in locations such as offices, hospitals, universities, and restaurants. After considering some changes in the labor force of the United States, I will return to this point.



The civilian labor force has grown from 22 million in 1890 to over 128 million in 1997 (U.S. Department of Labor, 1987:9; U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1997:396). Although the proportion of the population represented in the labor force remained relatively constant at about 66 percent of the civilian noninstitutional population over sixteen years of age, there have been significant changes in its composition over the years.

The percentage of manual blue-collar workers was a close second to those employed on farms at the turn of the century. Between World War I and World War II, because of the growth of industrialization and the accelerated decline of farm employment, blue-collar workers comprised almost 40 percent of the labor force. But by the mid-1950s, the percentage of white-collar workers exceeded those in blue-collar occupations, and this gap has increased greatly between 1960 and 1987. Technological advances that increased production also contributed to reducing the number of manual workers. The decline in steel and automobile industries, due primarily by competition from abroad, cost the country hundreds of thousands of blue-collar jobs. The shift from producing goods to service industries, to be discussed shortly, also played a significant role in the long-term decline in the number of blue-collar workers. In 1997, there were some gains as more and more people with higher education filled traditional blue-collar jobs which reached 32.8 million (Hershey, 1997)

Those in clerical and related occupations represented 3 percent of the labor force in 1900. By the mid-1990s, they represented over 20 percent. This category includes such occupations as word processors, clerks, typists, proofreaders, and office machine operators. Some are in entirely new fields. For example, in 1960, there were approximately 12,000 "computer specialists" in America. By 1970, the number had grown to 260,000, and today it is close to 2 million. Contrary to popular belief, the introduction of new technology, such as, for example, computers for office data application, does not necessarily result in the reduction of employees. When computers were introduced in the mid-1950s, some experts predicted that large numbers of clerical and kindred workers would be displaced and that job opportunities for millions of people, in one of the largest occupational employment categories, would be curtailed. Yet, over the last three decades, employment of clerical workers has continued to increase, and between 1972 and 1986, the number of such workers grew by 40 percent (Mark, 1987:27). Office computerization made possible work that previously had been impractical because it would have been too costly and time-consuming. It gave rise to new kinds of data analyses, extending the scope of activities for many industries, thus creating new jobs. In addition, it created new occupations such as tape and disk librarian and console operator. New industries were also created to manufacture computers and related paraphernalia. As a result, thousands are employed in manufacturing microelectronics devices, advanced communication equipment, and other technologies that are gaining prominence (Perrolle, 1987).



The percentage of people in the professions and related occupations also quadrupled since the turn of the century. One reason for the growth in the number of professionals is the greater sophistication in knowledge, techniques, and machinery, resulting in a growing demand for technically trained people (Adler, 1992). There is also a growing demand for services from such diverse occupations as accounting, divorce law, and psychiatry. Many occupations are also becoming professionalized (Ritzer & Walczak, 1986). Their members are changing their names to something more prestigious; for example, "beautician" becomes "hairstylist," and "mortician" becomes "funeral director." They are also developing codes of ethics and rights of passage whereby members may gain access to the occupation as professionals. This trend is accompanied by an increase in licensing requirements for many occupations.

There was also a dramatic increase in the number of women in the labor force since 1900—from about 5 million then to over 59 million today. Around the turn of the century, few married women entered the work force because their wages were much lower than those of single women (Bianchi & Spain, 1986:166). As the wage differential started to narrow, more and more married women increased their participation in the workplace. Rising educational attainment of women, along with economic growth during the 1950s, the increasing divorce rate, the women's movement, changing attitudes about the desirability (and necessity) of working outside the home, and the rising consumption aspirations are among the main factors bringing about the current high level of labor-force participation among women.

Another major trend is the aging of the labor force. After rising less than 3 percent between 1979 and 1992, the number of U.S. workers fifty-five and over is expected to increase 38 percent by 2005—more than either blacks or women (Shellenbarger & Hymowitz, 1994:1). As America ages, older workers are increasingly perceived as a management problem—rigid, hard to retrain, and expensive. Gray hair may be a fixture of executive suites, but is becoming unfashionable in middle management and lower down in the ranks. Instead of a fifty-year-old, employers often want younger people who cost much less and who are considered more flexible and less demanding. The current corporate downsizings have greatly affected workers aged fifty and over, with many companies making heavy use of early retirement offers or outright terminations. As a result, a new class of permanently unemployed or underemployed middle-aged workers is emerging. There is also a surge in age-bias lawsuits as more and more older workers are being laid off.

### Distribution

In traditional societies, goods and services are exchanged on a noneconomic basis without the use of money or a clearly delineated market system. In such a society, one does not necessarily exchange scarce goods or labor in





order to get what one needs. A self-regulating price market for the exchange of goods and services is brought about by the advent of economic surplus and the introduction of money as a means of exchange. It should be noted, however, that not all exchanges of goods and services take place in a market situation. For example, the redistribution of wealth through charity or progressive taxation is an exchange of potentially marketable commodities outside of the market. Furthermore, "The mobilization of economic resources for public goals—through eminent domain, taxation, direct appropriation, and selective service—involves the transfer of economic goods and services without the intrusion of an economic market" (Smelser, 1976:119).

The economist Karl Polanyi and his associates (1957) suggest that economic activities fall into three main patterns of exchange. The first pattern is *reciprocative*, which is illustrated by the ritualized gift giving among families, clans, and tribes. Farmers in many societies help each other at harvest. Goods and services are given because it is traditional to do so. The only principle of calculation is the loose principle that the giving and receiving of goods or services should "balance out" in the long run.

The second form of exchange is *redistributive*. This involves bringing economic goods and services to a central source—usually governmental—and then redistributing them throughout the populace. Several examples of this form occurred in ancient Asian and African civilizations. Modern examples are organized charity or progressive taxation. Like reciprocal exchange, redistributive forms are characterized by an absence of economic calculation and price payment. In this situation, the principle of calculation seems to be one of justice or equity based on a traditional notion of what the recipients deserve.

The third form of exchange, the one that is most common in the Western world, is simply referred to as *exchange*. In this type of distribution, economic goods and services are brought into a market context. Prices are not standardized on the basis of tradition but result from bargaining for economic advantage. Formal economic analysis is equipped to handle only this type of exchange. In modern societies, distribution can also be seen as a one-way exchange, whereby goods and services are given to individuals without receiving in return an exchangeable market value. Examples of this one-way exchange would include redistribution through taxation, donations, public support of children, welfare, Medicaid, and legal aid (Boulding, 1973).

### Consumption

"Production not only supplies the need with an object," wrote Marx, "but also supplies the object with the need" (quoted by Anderson, 1976:164). In traditional societies, the limited production obviously does not supply the object with too many needs for consumption. By contrast, modern economic systems depend on the sustaining and creating of needs. Growth in the



economic domain is based upon the continuous expanding of consumption and, . . . "consumption, rather than being the *privilege of the elite*, is becoming the *duty of the masses*" in modern societies (Kando, 1975:14). In a fascinating book entitled *Land of Desire*, William Leach (1993) contends that 1880 was probably the last year one could live in America without trying to be persuaded to want more things. By the end of the nineteenth century, merchants had developed a sophisticated system of enticement to turn their fellow citizens into shoppers, and a new consumer culture was developed—supported by hundreds of magazines with full-page ads aimed at turning the country into a "land of desire," awash in consumer goods.

Traditional societies often have sumptuary laws, or laws that lend the power of the "state" to moral and religious norms governing consumption. Such laws establish differential consumption by, for example, stipulating that only aristocrats can wear fur or silk or carry a sword. In caste, multi-religious, or multiethnic societies there are strong normative traditions that define appropriate forms of consumption for each level or segment of society, especially in the areas of food, drink, and clothing.

In the United States, a unique feature of consumption is that a large proportion of the American population consumes the same items and services. A tendency of industrial economy is to create a national or international market for products and services and to transform all citizens into equivalent consumers. A mass-production economy obviously does not seek to restrict consumption according to social position or religious or ethnic factors. The only restriction on consumption is income.

Of course, the various economic classes spend different amounts in their overall consumption. Differences in consumption, and the resulting sharp distinctions in prestige, do not exist in the United States to the same degree as in other developed countries. The primary reason is that the majority of the population consumes a wide range of similar products, often brand-name goods with national prestige: food (staples as well as non-staples); beverages (milk, beer, soft drinks); household products (soap, waxes); household appliances (refrigerators, vacuum cleaners); clothes; and such items as computers, entertainment products, and sporting goods. The important point is that a vast portion of the public consumes these goods in common, regardless of income and often on credit, since only 64 percent of American households have any income left after paying for the necessities of life such as food, clothing, housing, and taxes (McLaughlin, 1994).

Personal consumption expenditures (food, clothing, household operation, medical care, transportation, etc.) more than doubled in the United States in the past ten years, from \$1,748 billion to more than \$4,300 billion (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1997:452). In addition to inflation, this increase in expenditure is associated with an increase in per-capita disposable income; continued improvement of technology generating new products available to be demanded; and an increase in leisure time, which is partly as





a result of the availability of various labor-saving devices, which, of course, increases the capacity to consume various leisure-related products such as travel, TV, and entertainment.

While personal consumption expenditures doubled, personal disposable income increased from \$2,254 billion to \$5,388 billion for the same time period. The average adult in the United States has 2,650 leisure hours per year. This comes to over 110 days per year. Much of the increase in leisure time is spent on consumption. Needs and desires for new products are constantly being created by advertisements and reinforced by an increased time spent watching television. In the United States, 99 percent of all households have TV sets, almost all in color. The average American between the ages of three and sixteen spends more time in front of the television set than in school. An average adult woman spends more than thirty hours a week, and an average adult man some twenty-five hours per week watching TV. This is in contrast to the roughly two hours a week spent reading books (which explains why many of the 62,000 or so new titles published annually remain unread) and 3.5 hours a week devoted to newspapers and magazines (Carvajal, 1997).

John Kenneth Galbraith (1973:33–37) points out that the ideal consumers are nonworking middle- and upper-class women, a group with day-long TV exposure. He sees these women as serving a crypto-servant function in household administration and maintenance that involves goods, food, child care, social enjoyment, and social displays. He observes that “The servant role of women is critical for the expansion of consumption in modern economy. . . . In few matters has the economic system been so successful in establishing values and moulding resulting behaviour to its needs as in the shaping of a womanly attitude and behaviour. . . . Thus it is women in their crypto-servant role of administrators who make an indefinitely increasing consumption possible.” The role of youth and women in maintaining consumption is evident in the manner in which advertising promotion and TV content are fixed. Youth and women are more likely than men to have the time to consume, and consumption does require large amounts of time. For many, consumption becomes an entire way of life.

Adjusting for inflation, the percentage of American households with annual incomes of \$75,000 or more rose to 18.6 percent in 1995, the latest for which data are available, from 13 percent in 1982. About 39 percent of all the households have incomes of \$50,000 or more, up from 32.8 percent in 1982. And, the upper 40 percent of households account for 60 percent of the nation’s consumer spending (Uchitelle, 1997). This segment of the population is increasingly becoming the target for marketers who push the sale of higher-profit and higher-priced luxury or gadget-laden merchandise, such as electric toothbrushes with a timer—for an extra \$20. This process is called *product differentiation* and has been around for some time in different versions. For example, blue-collar workers moved up from Chevrolets to



Pontiacs, while middle-level managers made the jump from Pontiacs to Oldsmobiles, and upper-echelon executives from Oldsmobiles to Cadillacs.

As disposable income increases in society, consumption patterns undergo drastic alterations. The proportion of income spent on food, housing, and religious and welfare activities diminishes, while there is an important increase in expenditures on foreign travel, tourism, pets, recreation, private education, and personal care. For example, expenditures for overseas travel increased from \$3.9 billion in 1970 to more than \$35 billion in 1994, and Americans spend over \$15 billion (more than the GNP of many small countries) on pet supplies. The bare-bones costs of owning a pet are, for example, \$8,665 and \$11,580, respectively, during the average life span of a cat and dog (Eaton, 1994). Health insurance around \$100 per year for pet HMO's; grooming; special diets; and spas are additional—and, for many, necessary—expenses (Kelley, 1997). In 1993, 42 percent of U.S. households had at least one pet to keep them company (Crispell, 1994). Finally, while the way Americans dissolve their unions has become cheaper and easier with no-fault divorces and prenuptial agreements, wedding costs are escalating and the average is around \$16,000. In New York City, a wedding can cost \$1 million, and nuptials costing \$100,000 are common enough that caterers consider them mid-range; the lower end is around \$25,000. Bridal gowns are extra (White, 1997).

In addition to the general increase in expenditures by consumers, there seems to be a moderate decline of ostentatious display by the rich in the United States (but not by the *nouveaux riches* in sports and entertainment) and an increase in what David Caplovitz (1963:13) calls compensatory consumption. *Compensatory consumption* refers to the purchase of selected items of the standard middle-class package by the poor, such as an expensive pair of shoes, an expensive hat, or a color TV. This is their way of compensating for lack of other symbols of success and status.

Changes in consumption patterns are accompanied by the growth of consumer-based activities. In the public sphere, Alan Gartner and Frank Riessman (1974:76–78) point out that in 1960 no state had consumer affairs offices. However, thirty-three did by 1970; and by mid-1973, all fifty states had such offices. Nationally, a number of consumer protection laws have been passed, and 138 public interest groups with over 400,000 dues-paying members were formed to work on consumer issues. Membership in consumer credit unions more than doubled during the course of the late 1980s and mid-1990s.

In sum, these are some of the changes that occurred in the triad of production, consumption, and distribution in the economic sphere. The general trend in developed countries seems to be the continuous increase in production, accompanied by a growing general level of income and an increase in consumption expenditures. There is also a trend toward the reduction of extremes in consumption among the various segments in society.



**SUMMARY**

This chapter examined changes that have occurred in several specific spheres. It should be recalled that social change may originate in any institutional area, bringing about changes in other areas, which, in turn, make for further adaptations in the initial sphere of change. Changes that have taken place in the various spheres are interrelated; they influence each other as well as the course of society.

Many of the dramatic trends have slowed down or halted in some areas, while in others, new currents have set in. The decline in the functions of the American family has been compensated for by an ascent of its "companionship" function. The trend is toward a nuclear family with egalitarian conjugal roles. The size of the family is decreasing, and there is an increase in childless families. The divorce rates are up and the new morality seems to reverberate in the family structure.

The population of the world is expected to double in forty-three years at the 1994 rate of annual, natural increase of 1.6 percent. In developing countries, the consequences of this rapid growth rate are felt in economic, social, and political institutions. Mortality rates are declining, and life expectancy is on the increase. The trend in fertility is downward, but with little effect on growth rates as a result of more rapid declines in mortality rates. As a result of the demographic transition, modern societies have both low mortality and fertility rates, and six European countries are experiencing a zero or negative population growth. There is an increase in migration and a change in the place of origin of immigrants into the United States. There has been a pronounced increase in the dependency ratio in developed countries in recent years.

In the sphere of stratification, an important change is the opening of opportunities for much higher rates of mobility. The trend is toward equality, but it is questionable whether absolute equality can ever be attained.

In power relations, important changes have occurred in the ruling elite over time. Access to the political elite has become open to wider and wider strata of the population, and there is a proliferation of "power elites." The political power of nonpoliticians has increased enormously, and it has been accompanied by the decentralization of power. The scope of political participation has been widened, but there is still room for expansion for minorities and ethnic groups.

Education is now separated from the family and, to a great extent, from community life. The development of schools and universities spread education from a monopoly of a few to the property of the masses. This trend was associated with changes in curriculum and the lengthening of the education process for more and more students. Today there seems to be too much emphasis on credentials by employers. Test scores are declining in high schools, and college education is becoming increasingly vocationalized. The marketability of a liberal arts degree is on the decline, and the market for



Ph.D.s remains tight. For some younger faculty members, the credo of "publish or perish" is slowly changing to "publish and perish."

In the economic sphere, changes in production have been associated with alterations in the size and composition of the labor force. Farming has declined dramatically, but there have been important increases in the categories of crafts-people and kindred workers and in professional and technical jobs. The number of women in the labor force is rapidly increasing, and the composition of the labor force changed from predominantly goods-producing to predominantly service-producing workers. With the advent of economic surplus and money, forms of distribution have changed from reciprocative to redistributive and exchange. The trend in consumption is toward more leisure and recreational goods, accompanied by a decline in the proportion of expenditures for the basics such as food or housing. There is an increased concern with the protection of consumers, as evidenced by the number of recent laws and organizations. In the next chapter, the duration of change will be examined.

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