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# **INTERNATIONAL POLITICS**

**Volume I: Global political system**

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# **INTERNATIONAL POLITICS**

**Volume I: Global political system**

**Volume II: Political process**

**Volume III: War and Peace**

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## Introduction

*Considerations about international politics represent a discussion beyond personal experience for most people as well as a bit of an exclusive topic for chosen ones. Even the mediated contact can be illusive: watching war on TV resembles a movie, a purchase of imported goods looks like a purchase of domestic products, customs officers follow regulations and the same is done by policemen in native towns; however this means something different. Pompous summits or banquets of diplomats do not explain a puzzling dissimilarity, which exists. International politics is specific due to something else; it is a special functioning of power in the world political system.*

*The understanding of international politics in this study is not out of line of its traditional concept. First of all, this statement means that it is not a policy of nations, but mainly the policy of countries in the world policy system. However, today, this does not only relate to the policy among countries, though this part of international politics with the help of which sovereign governments try to ensure their security and to fulfil many and sometimes conflicting objectives, is the most important. If the collocation “policy among countries” is too narrow on one hand, – the term “international affairs” is too wide for this study on the other hand – as the book is focused on those parts of international affairs that are of natural political character, whereby economic, social, cultural, and ecological relations are put aside. According to this meaning, it neither means “inter-national” politics, nor international affairs, but world politics. However, the term “world politics” is often understood in the Czech surrounding as the policy in the world, e.g. the interior policy of another country, the policy related to the world as a whole, etc. Therefore we use a traditional, though semantically inaccurate, but in general understandable term – international politics.*

*Prague, July 2006*

## *A. System equilibrium*

### **1/ NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS**


A modern human being learns to perceive his position in the universe without a biblical concept of the master and ruler of nature; knowledge of ecology leads us to the point that any misuse of nature is self-destructive. The overall history of humans is, in many points of views, the self-destructive revolt against ourselves. Apart from the others, it is typical of the administration of public affairs by means of politics that “mankind drinks nectar of life from skulls of individuals”. Politics can only be perceived as a rational activity until the moment when we start to calculate how many lives political conflicts cost us. The geological history of the Earth began 4 milliard years. Homo sapiens took only the last 200 or 300 thousand years from this time, and homo sapiens sapiens only 90 thousand years. And only the last five thousand years from those 4 milliard years of the Earth age can be considered a drama of mankind history – with hundreds of millions dead in various wars. The human being, as a natural and historic person, cultivates nature and himself – and at the same time, the human being destroys nature and himself during a tiny fraction of cosmic time. The hundreds of millions killed in the wars of human history prove that politics is not only a sphere of reason, but also a sphere of very violent passions. What are the aims that are worth undertaking a risk of our own and others deaths?

It is a specific feature of man that he lives a social life. The human being not only lives as a cultural creature in the conditions of cooperation and division of labour with other individuals, but also among groups and institutions. Thus a network of relations is created which is getting continuously thicker due to demographic growth and technological development. Part of this network represents political relations. Political relations are created during the process of society structuring according to an axis power. In this respect, the word “power” is understood as intellectual and physical abilities of policy actors to achieve required effects, to act freely. Thus power is an ability to overcome resistance and to control other political actors or to influence their acting at least if necessary. Power as a social phenomenon supports the so-

ciety functioning: it ensures the stability of basic relations among individuals, groups, and classes in the society and furthermore, it sometimes adds consciously aimed changes to these relations. Politics is also a source of stability and dynamics – fulfilling common aims, including providing for conditions for the life of individuals. Power helps to achieve a necessary social harmony, cooperation, or a balance of pressures in practical activities of individuals and groups.

Power as a possibility to achieve a specific goal is connected with a social status – the possibility in this case includes a set of circumstances under which it is possible to realize this acting. The power capacities of individuals and groups are not only unequal, but very often opposed to each other: they are the tools that are used for the execution of different, very often conflicting interests. The real power of individuals and groups is therefore a vector result of the pressure of power ambitions from various centres. In order to overcome anarchy, that originated due to the continuous clash of power potentials various centres, there was an institution established, whose potential allows it to gain a controlling status in these conflicts, giving them a form allowing the collectiveness of people not only to survive, but also to develop – the state. Its position with regard to the power desire of people is so exceptional that a real extent of the power possibilities of individuals and groups is connected with their positions in the state apparatus. Apart from others, the state is an institution of organized, sovereign, and legalized violence on a specific inhabited territory. However, the state authority can be also used creatively to fulfil social needs. In any case, the state has so central a position in the society that a contest for power has first of all a form of the contest for power in the state.

Chart No. 1: INTERNAL POLITICAL SYSTEM



Modern political theory has familiarized an idea that the state is the most important part of a political system. The term “system” is defined variously. According to this study, the system is a set of components and elements linked with special relations into structural units of new quality. All the terms used – components and elements, relations and structure – are of great significance and their changes mean a change of the system. It is a specific feature of the components and elements that the system can exist as a whole under the condition that the elements are balanced. Any loss of balance means that the system is disintegrated or changed with respect to its quality. Any considerations about such an important task of balance – of course without any use of current terms – can also be found in ancient times, e.g. Chinese

philosophers discussing jin and jang or Hippocratic ideas about harmony of body juices in human organism as a necessary condition of physical and mental health.

The formation of state on a specific territory means that two social and political surroundings were born: internal and international. The social and political existence is mainly realized inside a geographically determined surrounding of state itself. The internal political life is in general determined by the existence of one decisive political centre in the political system – the top of state power pyramid. This one power centre determines the nature of balance in the interior political system purposively (however, this does not mean that correctly). The above mentioned statement is only applicable at the level of policy social role; the balance can be also disturbed from other sources. The internal political system itself is not identical with the state system and it includes for example such non-state institutions as political parties or lobbies; however, the state is the most powerful part of this internal system. The significance of the state power centre is shown by the fact that in general it has a competence – if necessary, to use physical forces – to activate or to enforce a required behaviour of individuals, groups, and institutions in the political system on the territory of state. However, not all the individuals, groups, and institutions are equally significant with regard to this point of view. Chart No. 1 shows the nature of power relations inside a state.

The state power in internal political system is shown in its absolute form. It determinates a legal framework of the use of power and at the same time, it is a monopoly holder of legitimate law to use power. However, there are well known examples from history and present, when some institution, group, or individual gets out of the above mentioned scheme of power relations and claims all the functions that are fulfilled by the power centre under normal conditions. However, it is not a substantial feature of the internal political system, but a demonstration of crisis. In theory, this crisis has three results, but in practice just two possible results. Two or several power centres can be created temporarily. This situation is temporary and can result in one of two solutions. The first possible result is that one power centre in the state will again start to exist, either due to a liquidation of opposition to the power potentials by an original power centre, or an oppositional group or institution will assume the role of original state power centre. The second possible result is that the internal political system will disintegrate and two or more new states will originate.

Social and political life is not only realized inside the state, but also outside its borders, powers, and sovereign possibilities. With regard to international affairs, the state meets the phenomena and processes that are out of its control and jurisdiction. As from the political point of view, the state externally represents individuals, groups, and internal institutions; the majority of political relations in this internal surrounding is a relation of states. The modern European political theory, that also resumes the ideas of ancient world, has been connected with emphasizing and recognizing differences of power position in internal and world political systems since the times of Humanists, Renaissance and Enlightenment.

The basic difference of internal and world political systems resides in the fact that the world political system lacks one central power authority that would be superior to individual components, i.e. first of all to states that would consciously determine the form of world political system. The power in the world political system is concentrated in the states – and it is dispersed accordingly. If the existence of several independent power centres only means a temporary anomaly in the internal political system, it represents a basic feature in the world political system. With regard to the international sphere, the political interest is first of all the state interest. In this sense to speak about the state interest as a partial interest in the world society is not very accurate, because the state interest is not a part of any wide political interest subordinated to it and restricted by it either from the point of view of context, or from the point of view of means; with regard to a concrete power potential of state, the state interest is de facto superior to general or abstract interests of mankind.



The state power acts in its relative form in the world political system. As the bearers of power are individual sovereign states, the power loses its integration function that is fulfilled inside the state. On the contrary, it is just a state power in the world political system that stimulates competition, conflict, anarchy – it becomes a source of imbalance. The inevitable consequence of such power distribution into individual components is its relatively small cohesion in comparison with the internal system. Under the conditions of power diffusion into many centres, the stability of world political system is only acquired by spontaneous creation of balance among the power potentials of individual states. Such a power balance, or a more frequently used term balance of power, is a basic characteristic of world political system; therefore, Kenneth Waltz states in the book *Theory of International Politics*, *if there is any specific theory of international politics, it is a theory of the balance of power*<sup>1</sup>.

The theory of the balance of power is old. In his essay *Of the Balance of Power*, English philosopher David Hume extracts this idea from Thucydides's book *History of the Peloponnesian War* from the second half of the 5<sup>th</sup> century B.C. Thucydides's explication of the cause of the war between Sparta and Athens is especially interesting. However, the Confucius and Indian essay *Arthashastra* by Kautilya, is also rather noteworthy in this connection.

Modern theories of the balance of power came from Italian Renaissance. According to some historians first modern reflection on the balance of power originated in 1439, and its author is Venetian Francesco Barbaro. He claimed that Venice was the main force to keep order and maintain balance of power on the Italian peninsula. Sometimes the phrase "balance of power" is associated with the book *History of Italy* by Francesco Guicciardini written approximately in 1537. In the 17<sup>th</sup> century the first notes that the preservation of the balance of power is the presumption for steadiness and peace appeared in the international treaties.

The balance in the world political system originates in a different way compared with the internal system. The international political system is not regulated by a conscious activity of one power centre, some subject. The balance of the world political system is an actual expression of states power confrontation process, a temporary status in the chain of unbalanced statuses. At the same time, this balance is still thrilling and full of attempts to disrupt its status. The system exists in the conditions of homeostatic or dynamic equilibrium. This continuous disrupting of equilibrium results from an unbalanced development of the states – especially from a different growth of their power.

The balance in the world political system is achieved during a continuous process of balancing the power potentials of individual states. The acquired balance is expressed according to a ratio of various state actors activities, i.e. the efforts of independent states and their coalitions – it is a vector result of the states power aspirations acting in various directions. Therefore the balance in the world political system is achieved spontaneously; it is not a result of decisions, the world political system has not a goal-seeking behaviour. The world balance is a by-product of the power interests of individual states that above all seek their own security or supremacy. This balance of power as a way of world political system existence is shown in chart No. 2.


Most misunderstandings in regards to the relation of the balance of power relation and the world political system result from a different extent of generalization when defining basic terms. The balance of power is very often understood as a current status, whereby its change is perceived as a repudiation of the balance of power existence. In this book, we understand the balance of power in more general terms – as a regularity of the world political system. The system cannot exist without a certain form of the balance of power. More specifically: the change of the balance of power that will result in a change of world political system structure will not eliminate the system itself. The system has been changed, it has a new quality, but it

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<sup>1</sup> WALTZ, Kenneth N.: *Theory of International Politics*. Reading etc.: Addison–Wesley Publishing Company 1979, p. 117.

still exists. It is here in its new form and among other things, because it is in the status of certain new internal balance.

Chart No. 2: WORLD POLITICAL SYSTEM



The differences of international policy and internal policy are not absolute, substantive. Their congruent nature results from their concentration upon the questions of power and their difference from various nature and roles of power. Both policies aim at keeping development or change of current power status and then social relations. However, the nature of these changes has a different form with regard to a different surrounding in which the internal and the international policies are realized:

- In the internal policy, the basic method of evolutionary change is the negotiating among classes, – groups, and individuals; then the principal aim of this change is the adjustment of this system. In the international policy, the basic method of evolution change is the negotiating among states; then the principal aim of this change is the adjustment of international system.
- In the internal policy, the basic method of qualitative change is a revolution or a civil war and the aim is to change a regime or a social structure. In the international policy, the basic method of qualitative change is a hegemonic war and the aim is to change a political structure in the sense of getting supremacy.

The internal policy of state is first of all the sphere of authority, administration procedure, and law. It can be described as hierarchically structured, vertical, centralized, with various specialized actors. On the other hand, the international policy is a sphere of power, battle, and adaptation. The international policy is anarchic, horizontal, decentralized, and homogenous. Therefore, the state in the world political system acts as the institution that can and must rely on its own strength. Only the power of state guarantees its survival. The state, like a company operating in a free market, must in the first place try to control conditions of its own sovereign existence. The foreign policy of state, in the conditions of relying on its own strength and self-help, is focused on self-preservation in its minimum dimension and on acquiring the position of hegemonic leader – on ensuring a universal supremacy in its maximum dimension.

### *System anarchy*

The main topic of statesman socialization in the international surrounding relates to the problems of power movement in anarchistic structured political system. The term “anarchy”

is often understood variously and very often inaccurately with regard to international politics. In general, the word “anarchy” is used as a synonym of disorder, violence, and destruction. In essence, the anarchy represent an absence of central government, which does not necessarily mean the absence of power and order. The fact that the potentials of states and other actors of world policy move in the anarchic surrounding does not mean that the world policy is an arena of chaos.

Contrary to an entire chaos, there are three basic factors operating under the conditions of anarchy. The first one is represented by the rightfulness of the balance of power. The second that results from these circumstances is represented by the structure of system, i.e. the arrangement of relations according to the axis of power. The third factor that prevents chaos in international politics are international institutions in the form of expectations, customs, norms, international treaties, and international organizations.

The world political system is in its rightfulness adapted to the surrounding in which it is situated. Capitalism has been a social surrounding of the political system since the 16<sup>th</sup> century. Immanuel Wallerstein states, *the political superstructure of capitalist world economy is represented by the interstate system, in which and through which the political structures named “sovereign states” are made legitimate and forced*<sup>1</sup>. More specifically, capitalism gives basic and concrete forms to social and political system. Today, the world political system is not governed by anarchy in general, but by real capitalistic anarchy. All the main institutions of Westphalian system – national states, concept of sovereignty, world economy, etc. – came into existence within the framework of capitalist social-economic formation. The world political system can be compared to a primitive society, but the modern international policy is first of all determined by the achieved degree of socialization process. Anarchy is not necessarily uncivilized; at present, it has a form of so far achieved civilization apex – however, from a humanistic political philosophy point of view, it is too far from perfectiveness. It is possible to consider this apex as imperfect, but it is pointless to evaluate it according to the category of abstract moral.

The statement that the world policy is realized in the surrounding of anarchy only predicates that in this system, there is no central power or authority that would knowingly and independently decide about positions of individual actors and would determinate standards of their behaviour and would be able to enforce its decisions. However, the world policy is not only a surrounding of competition, conflicts, and hate. The world political system is also a sphere of cooperation and mutual dependence, sometimes also solidarity. It is more a surrounding of specific relations, uncertainty, and potential violence than a sphere of violent disorder. According to the traditional theory of international relations, anarchy and order are not a priori excluding each other. There are theoretical arguments, whether a sovereignty of states is a cause or a consequence of this status.

Though the most frequent characteristic of concrete system has a form of static structure, the most typical characteristic of international system is its dynamics. As it was mentioned above, it also grows under peace conditions from the fact of the coexistence of independent power centres – states and their uneven development. As there is no outside guarantee for a state survival, the international surrounding is a sphere of uncertainty. The primary condition for states survival is sufficient power, whereby the existence of any state itself is related to socio-economic changes, i.e. to the change of power potential. With regard to the fact that power is relative in politics, it is a relational category, the increase in one state real power is not possible without a decrease in power of the other state.

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<sup>1</sup> WALLERSTEIN, Immanuel: *Patterns and Perspectives of the Capitalist World–Economy*. In: VIOTTI, Paul R., KAUPPI, Mark V.: *International Relations Theory. Realism, Pluralism, Globalism*. New York: Macmillan 1987, p. 508.

Anarchy supports that decisions about foreign policy are realized under the conditions of security dilemma which increases uncertainty and insecurity. The term, security dilemma, labels the fact that the statesman, while deciding about a state security, only decides on the alternatives that necessarily also have undesired negative consequences: if he is increasing strength to provide for interests, he will elicit a reciprocal activity of enemies or possible opponents; if he is not increasing strength, his relative power will decrease compared to a changing power of other politicians – states. According to this meaning, this is one of the major problems of the balance of power in the world political system. Being attached to the cooperation strategy in accordance with this logic means to trust the other state – but the trust is not a category of rationality and politics.

### *Critique of the balance of power*

The attacks against the idea of the balance of power move in two lines: on one hand the fact of its existence itself is rejected, on the other hand the consequences of its existence are subject of its critique. In the European cultural surrounding, the modern idea of the balance of power resulted in counter-pressure at the moment of its origination, in the 15<sup>th</sup> century. The ideal of Christian universalism opposed the idea of the balance of power. The idea of Europe as a system of independent states with a spontaneous balance is absolutely contrary to the image known as *Respublica Christiana*, i.e. the vision of integrated political unit controlled either by a pope or an emperor of the Roman Empire. The secularization of political life that was in the background of acknowledging the spontaneous balance of power in the European system was ideologically unacceptable from this point of view. Not only Dante, Savonarola, or Giovanni Ammirat, but many other authors spoke in favour of integrated world monarchy – on regular basis lead by the Spanish Habsburgs. At the end of the 16<sup>th</sup> and the beginning of the 17<sup>th</sup> century, Thomasso Campanella wished to see the Spanish catholic majesty at the head of great anti-Turkish alliance that would also include Persia, Russia, and Georgian kingdom. In the year 1633, the same author asked to unite world power and divine power in the hands of the pope in association of rulers of Europe united again by religion. The idea of the balance of power was not only refused by catholic conservatism, but also by the humanistic philosophy of peace, by such men as Erasmus Rotterdam, John Colet, and Thomas More in England, and Joan Lluís Vives in Spain. Later also the representative of the Enlightenment, Jacques Lemercier, and the radicals, William Godwin and then Richard Cobden, were attacking the balance of power as a source of mankind division into states and conflicts among them. It was just Richard Cobden, who understood the balance of power as a chimera. The liberals calling for free trade as a keystone of the change of international relations were followed by the socialists with their idea of world political system transformation by means of social revolution inside a state.

The critique of the balance of power law, with its subsequent requirements to change the system, is linked to the idea that this system is a source of evil in international relations. Basic arguments supporting this approach point out:

- The balance of power is nothing else than a chain of unbalanced statuses that finally result in war;
- The balance of power produces the blocs that make war even more possible;
- The balance of power prefers great powers, and suppresses the small and the poor.

On the other hand, the defenders of the policy of the balance of power emphasize its strengths, among which first of all are mentioned the following:

- Due to the acting of balance power law, the interstate system was not changed into the universal empire that would suppress the interests of various minorities. With regard to the relativity of this fact it should be added that there were large regional empires in this

situation, and imperialistic efforts to establish an universal empire are not excluded by the balance of power itself

- Due to the law of the balance of power, the conditions for sovereignty of small states were preserved or created. Contrary to this general fact, there were such events as the division of Poland three times or the Munich Diktat that resulted from the conscious application of the balance of power law to a large extent
- Due to the law of the balance of power, there were created conditions for the origination and development of the institutions of international order, such as diplomacy, rules for prosecution of war, international law, and superpower responsibility to administer the system. However, the system of the balance of power also preserved war – factual or possible – as the phenomenon according to which all other political relations are compared.

The answer, whether the balance of power prevents wars or initiates them is inconsistent – yes and no. First of all, it is necessary to emphasize again that it is not a role of the balance of power to prevent wars. It is its system function to arrange relations of states in the conditions of anarchy. Sometimes it fulfils its role with the help of wars, or it prevents them. It neither does it in consideration of morality, nor with respect to human life. It itself does not guarantee rational behaviour of politicians – according to some calculations, 150 years after the Congress of Vienna, countries stronger than an attacker were attacked in five out of nine wars.<sup>1</sup> The balance of power, as a way of the world political system existence in the conditions of power diffusion among many states, is a law of this system existence; the balance, in the form of structure rigid stability, is for a moment one of the possible power division by-products in the planetary civilization.

\* \* \*

History demonstrates that the balance of power is not a rigidity, but a continuous fight – and a permanent danger. This danger results from the fact that there is no upper limit of power for which a state might long for, only in the form of world empire. Only a talent of statesman looks for a degree of power to use in this situation. However, the necessity to rely on statesmen to ensure the peace and not on a system, is just that risk that is hidden in the balance of power.

## 2/ CONFLICT AND CRISIS

From all possible types of relations among states, particular attention has been devoted to war. It is due to its destructivity and its final amount of character of power. The scale of possible state relations is very large and it extends from a total war up to a harmony of interests and voluntary integration. Conflict and cooperation, discrepancy and partnership, a zero sum game and consensus of interests – these all represent the international policy. As the continuous change and the unpredictability of state behaviour is typical for the world political system, the system stability or instability is rightly associated with a possibility of origination or elimination of war danger.

States must especially rely on their own power in the conditions of anarchy. The principle of self help impose behaviour on a state resulting in the following:

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<sup>1</sup> According to KEGLEY, Charles W., Jr., WITKOPF, Eugene R.: *World Politics. Trends and Transformation*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993, p. 474.

1. The world political system is only stable if none of the states believe that it is advantageous for it to change the system;
2. The state will try to change the world political system if it expects that its profit will be bigger than its expenses for the change, i.e. it will achieve a net profit.

### *Characterization of conflict*

The term conflict is understood as a situation when a specific group – for example a tribe or an ethnic group, an ideological formation, or a state – or an individual is in a purposeful controversy with one or more groups or individuals. The conflict is a fight for values related to the keeping or increasing of social certainties, status, or power. Opponents try to neutralize, injure or remove a rival or rivals through a conflict. It is a conflict of human beings – inconsistent relations of human being with nature are not considered to be a conflict. The conflict is not identical with a competition – contrary to the competition, the rivals in conflict try to secure their positions to the detriment of others, they try to remove the rival from the sphere of conflict or even to destroy the rival. The conflict also differentiates from a tension – the tension meaning a hidden hostility, fear, suspicion, perception of interest divergence and also a wish for superiority or independence; but the fear in principle does not pass from attitudes and perception to actual mutual hostile acts.<sup>1</sup>

The politics as an arena of interest conflicts and power potentials, is a process of conflict solutions. The conflicts can be divided according to various criteria – fundamental and accidental, controlled and uncontrolled, soluble and insoluble, etc. the most frequent division is in conflicts with the use of violence and without any use of violence. The pervasive conflict has one special feature that deserves our attention as an indication of war solution regarding the conflict of interests and power. It is a political crisis. The word “crisis” is one of the most used words of post-modern period, which devalues its value to a large extent. A certain form of crisis is an unavoidable expression of functioning in the conditions of the anarchic arrangement of world political system, self-help of states, the formation of balance through power pressure and counter pressure. Thus the word crisis has become frequently used as a word symbol for unrest, confusion in the international policy, a universal term determining the disorder and the conflicts in the global sphere. This study will understand the crisis as a type of conflict whose specific feature is a sudden explosion of unexpected events and hostile acts due to the existing conflict. From the viewpoint of statesman, the international crisis is an unpredictable, surprising act of opponent or opponents that is accompanied by a feeling of great danger, a restricted time to accept resolutions and answers, and a feeling of ominous consequences resulting from inactivity.<sup>2</sup>

According to Michael Brecher, the crisis is *bigger than a normal tension, unrest or disintegration in international relations*.<sup>3</sup> This more quantitative than qualitative definition is important with regard to the fact of the continuous presence of anarchic disarrangement and uncertainty in the world political system. It does not mean that there is no sharp boundary that could distinguish the crisis from tension and conflict qualitatively. In principle, the international crisis starts with an act or event having the character of threatening declaration, oral or written; or it is a political act as a severance of diplomatic relations; or an economic act as economic sanctions; or a non-violent military act as a movement of military forces; or the

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<sup>1</sup> See DOUGHERTY, James E., PFALTZGRAFF, Robert L., Jr.: *Contending Theories of International Relations. A Comprehensive Survey*. – Third edition. – New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1990, p. 187 – 188.

<sup>2</sup> HERMAN, CH. F.: *International Crisis as a Situational Variable. In: International Politics and Foreign Policy. A Reader in Research and Theory*. – Revised edition. – Edited by J. N. Rosenau. New York, Free Press and Collier-Macmillan Ltd., London 1969, p. 414.

<sup>3</sup> BRECHER, Michael: *Crises in World Politicp. Theory and Reality*. Pergamon Press, Oxford etc. 1993, p. 3.

start of crisis can be determined by an indirect violent act as acts against an ally; the crises can of course start with a direct military attack.

### *Transformation of conflict*

The international conflicts of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, e.g. according to Kalevi Holsti, can be defined with the help of four components: actors, a sphere of questionable values, attitudes, and activities.

- **ACTORS OF CONFLICTS.** The most frequent actors of crisis in the international politics are states, but also international organizations or non-state organizations as revolutionary groups or an ethnic group.
- **SPHERE OF VALUES.** It is a subject of actors conflict and it relates to the position they would like to achieve. The states as actors in conflicts seek the values that either decrease or increase power – e.g. a territory in general, a secure territory, a control of sources, a world revolution, or a disintegration of state, etc. The conflict behaviour that includes attitudes and activities is a result of the fact that the actor A holds the position that is contradictory to the wishes, ideas, or interest of the actor B.
- **ATTITUDES.** The attitudes are the conditions of state conflict behaviour that are related to hostility, suspicion, stereotypes, a feeling of injustice, etc. They are a source of tension and they allow decision makers and inhabitants to resolve actively.
- **ACTIONS.** The conflict includes such diplomatic, propagandistic, commercial, or other threats and punishments that the fighting actors throw against each other.<sup>1</sup>

The activity of state during a crisis can be studied from various angles – to analyze opinions, attitudes and abilities of statesmen, to evaluate the effectiveness of acting, etc. From the point of view of concrete activity and with regard to the relations in the system, it is possible to work out a hypothetical escalation scale for states possible acts at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century that change the intensity of conflict. Table No. 1 shows how the scale of international conflict escalation can look like, starting from mistrust to total war. In general it can be said, higher values are a conflict topic – i.e. the more important the interests of state at stake – the more open is the space for escalation. However, this does not mean that a probability of escalation is increasing automatically – it can be only estimated that states will not escalate the conflict up to the level of war due to less significant values.

Table No. 1: ESCALATION OF CONFLICT

ESCALATION DEGREE	SPHERE OF ACTION	TYPE OF ACTIVITY
0	peace position	conflicts not having the intensity of crisis
<b>CRISIS</b>		
1	diplomacy	protest note
2	propaganda	semi-official accusations and threats
3	diplomacy	calling of ambassador for home consultations
4	diplomacy	recall of ambassador
5	diplomacy	threat of serious consequences
6	diplomacy	threat of limited economic boycott
7	economic relations	limited economic boycott
8	diplomacy	threat of total economic blockade
9	economic relations	economic blockade
10	propaganda	serious accusation and denunciation
11	military	demonstration of strength without confrontation
12	military	partial mobilization

<sup>1</sup> See HOLSTI, Kalevi J.: *International Politicp. A Framework for Analysip.* – Seventh edition. – Englewood Cliffs: Prentice – Hall International, Inc., 1995, p. 328–339.

13	military	restricted confrontation of military forces
14	military	total mobilization
<b>DEEP CRISIS</b>		
15	diplomacy	formal severance of diplomatic relations
16	public	break of transport and other communication among citizens
17	military, economy	formal blockade
18	public	limited evacuation
19	military	ostensible limited demonstration of strength
<b>WAR</b>		
20	military	controlled local war
21	military	limited worldwide war
22	public	“total” evacuation
23	military	local nuclear war
24	military	total war all over the world

\* \* \*

The above mentioned research confirms the thesis about the existence of the objective system, sources of conflict, crises and wars. However, it should be mentioned that the theory does not provide us with a clear answer to this fundamental question of international politics. By contrast, only a few topics of social sciences have so many schools willing to explain this phenomenon independently. The theory of conflict is investigated at the micro level as well as the macro level. Psychologists, social psychologists, and socio-biologists specify the sources of conflict causes in human nature at the micro level. Men’s behaviour is in conflict, because either there is an assumption of his survival in a programmed fight for life, or his personal needs of ego, frustration, overcoming fear are in question. These individual impulses are then causes of such collective activities as are war among states. Contrariwise, at the macro level, sociologists, anthropologists, political scientists, and special theoreticians of organizations and communication see the causes of conflict in collective behaviour.

### **3/ STRUCTURE OF THE WORLD POLITICAL SYSTEM**

During its history, the world political system has undergone evolution, at the beginning of which there was an existence of some independent and isolated regional international systems and at the end, a global system – and maybe one day, there will be a worldwide state. The changes of world political system are manifested by changes of some of its parts, whereby the initiators of system changes are its components, in this case the states as the main actors of world policy. What is called a system transformation, does not only relate to the internal changes of actors. In general, the system transformation is understood as a basic change of the system by means of structure qualitative change – for example the transition from bipolarity to multipolarity or the replacement of polycentric anarchy by one world authority.

The structure of the world political system is a model of the states arrangement according to their uneven power potential. The structure is an abstract term, the formation of which is related to the ignorance of some mutual relations of states with a purpose to form the above mentioned model. The studies of the world political system presupposes that considerations about states will not be connected with such characteristics as tradition, ideology, and motives of statesmen and without taking into consideration that it relates to democratic, totalitarian or



autocratic states; it presupposes some abstraction from all its characteristics and attributes, apart from the power potential. At the same time, the structure is not only a simple statement about the power of state – it is an information about the proportion of power potential among individual states. Only this comparison shows, what is a real capacity of the state to achieve its aims.

The structure of the political system represents a concrete arrangement of actors in the system according to the axis of power. While the power anarchy is a general constant of the world political system, the structural distribution of power is its concrete variable. The structure of the world political system's origin is not based on specialization and differentiation and actor's functions, but on their power capacities differences. The Westphalian system assumes the legal equality of states relating to reciprocal recognition of sovereignty, though a factual arrangement of power corresponds with the proportion of power.

All the countries have one vote at the UN General Assembly, however when taking into account their power potentials, these countries differ – which is specifically reflected in the nature of votes in the UN Security Council. The countries are equal in the right to choose their objectives for foreign policy and to formulate strategies to achieve them, but they are not at all equal in the possibilities to realize their objectives and strategies. In this situation, the inequality in the political system, where power differences among actors are more apparent and more immediate than similarities, becomes essential. In general, it can be said that the above mentioned regularities of the balance of power in its global understanding do not relate to all the states, but only to great powers and superpowers.

The different positions of states in the structure of the world political system also result from the inequality of their power potentials. If each state has a certain power, some states have more power and therefore are a large power, i.e. they have status as a great power. First, the term “great power” appeared in the Italian policy of the 15<sup>th</sup> century. The great powers are the states that can ensure their security without any help of other states. In this sense, only a great power is an independent state, an actor of Westphalian system. The reason is simple: whoever requires some help to ensure security, must pay for this help with a part of its sovereignty. With regard to a concrete form of the world political system, the elimination of great power or its appearance represent a system change. However, a system change of this order is also the establishment of great power alliance, or such an alliance, which has a power to acquire a new status – a pole in the structure is the actor of world policy that need not necessarily be one state, but also be a group of states. It is similar to an oligopoly market. The oligopoly is a market, where there is no perfect competition among small entrepreneurs, their assets being so small that their development and fall cannot influence the market status; at the same time, it is a market with no monopoly control. The oligopoly is a market with an imperfect competition, where a relatively small number of bigger companies operate. In general, these companies are aware of their strategic dependency; in this situation, either a calculated conflict or an agreement follows, similarly to the events of the balance of power.

All the above mentioned basic principles of Westphalian system should always be perceived as relative ones when speaking about small states – the structure of the system is a result of main actors interactions; the general theory of international politics deals with great powers. As Thomas Hobbes mentioned in *Leviathan, with regard to small states, either plebeian or monarchist, no human wisdom will keep them longer than the jealousy of their powerful neighbours will last*.<sup>1</sup> The small state is generally defined according to the criterion of less than 15 million inhabitants, or the area less than 150 thousand km<sup>2</sup>, or the share of gross world product less than one percent – or a combination of these indicators. According to these criteria, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic are considered to be small states.

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<sup>1</sup> HOBBS, Thomas: *Leviathan neboli o podstatě zřízení a moci státu církevního a občanského*. Praha: Melantrich, 1941, p. 285.

The term superpower was largely used by political science and popular journalism after World War II. It was used for the first time by William Fox in the year 1944 in the title of his book<sup>1</sup>; in those days he believed that after World War II, the United States of America, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union would be the superpowers that were powers stronger than others. However, the situation has developed in a different way. The superpower can be defined as a power with global aims and tools to achieve them. These criteria can be specified:

1. The superpower is a state that has global (or cosmic) interests, tools to achieve them, and a will to protect them. From this point of view, there were two superpowers during the period of Cold War, the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union. Today, the only superpower is the U.S.A., because Russia has changed, due to many power capacities, from the superpower to the regional power and furthermore, Russia lacks a will for global policy.
2. The superpower is a state that after an attack of any state (even a hostile superpower) with the use of mass destruction weapons, is able to attack back with strategic weapons. Today, there are two such superpowers – the United States and the Russian Federation.

With regard to the current real use of power, not only nuclear racket characteristics of military potential are important. The real wars after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the most possible wars of the future do not have characteristics of world thermonuclear war. In the conditions of nuclear racket stalemate and nuclear weapons moral condemnation, a practical execution of the superpower role is connected with a restricted conventional war that acquired some new characteristics. Since the second half of the eighties in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the most important role in the conventional wars is played by aviation armed with missiles, cruise missiles and rockets. The execution of the power role in the world system is related to the ability to transfer a sufficient power anywhere in the world. In general, it is an ability and possibility either to have a sufficient number of classical type bases or modern aircraft carriers. From this point of view, the only superpower is just one state – the U.S.A.

### *Power pyramid*

Apart from the superpowers, in a current power structure, there are also powers of lower rank and of course weaker states. The powers of lower rank are considered to be the states that are not able to attack back (the second attack), but they have so many nuclear weapons that they discourage an enemy sufficiently. These powers – sometimes called middle powers – have only capacities to compete with superpowers in specific spheres. According to the power scale, the middle powers are followed by the states without any status of powers. Apart from the superpowers, the powers of small states, so called microstates are often mentioned. They are states that have less than one million inhabitants. As it was said earlier, the small states and the microstates must rely on outside powers and their balance while solving security questions.


The disparity of actors indicates that the structure of the world political system is hierarchical. This hierarchy is not based on specializations of actors as it is in the political structure of state, but on the difference in the power of functionally similar actors. In every world political system and also in the system of states with equal rights, some actors are more powerful than others – and just these more powerful determine fundamental relations and behaviour norms in the system. This determination is not voluntary – this is a will of one state only in exceptional cases, in principle it is a resultant of the clash of power interest and the potentials of powers. Chart No. 3 shows, how the power pyramid structure looks like in the world political system.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> FOX, William T. R.: *The Super-Powers: the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union - their Responsibility for Peace*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and company, 1944.

<sup>2</sup> ORGANSKI, A. F. K.: *The Power Transition*. In: *International Politics and Foreign Policy. A Reader in Research and Theory*. Edited by J. N. Rosenau. New York, Free Press of Glenoce 1961, p. 374 (modified).

Chart No. 3: POWER PYRAMID IN THE WORLD POLITICAL SYSTEM



The position in the power pyramid does not always exactly reflect the potentials of states. If the structure is an abstraction, then it is necessary to differentiate the objective measurable power ratio from the subjective perception of power potentials relations. For example, Spain preserved its status of great power long after its effective role in the 17<sup>th</sup> century disappeared. On the other hand, in the year 1997, China at the Kyoto Conference made efforts not to be excluded from the list of developing countries – thus China avoided more strict obligations related to the decrease in greenhouse gas emissions. It is generally applicable that not every state is satisfied with its position in the system. The statesman that decides about the state foreign policy, need not estimate the power ratio right, but also a dominant diplomatic perception of structure need not precisely correspond with the changing states power potentials.

If the state seeking a change in its position inside the structure concludes that its diplomatic prestige does not correspond with its real power, it is highly probable that the state will turn to war. Such a state will call upon war, the state will doubt the rightfulness of the status quo, and it will attack the dominance of hegemony or a leader of a great power group or the group's arrangement. All total wars in history were focused on the change of hegemony in the structure. It was very rare that the change of hegemony was realized without a bigger conflict. An example of the exceptionally peaceful change of hegemony is the leaving of this role by Great Britain and its replacement by the United States, but this exchange is related to economic and social characteristics and not to the real change of world political system: the change of power relations to this form was proceeded by two World Wars and the Cold War.

The historic scheme of world political system development points out that there are three basic models of power dispersion in the system, three basic forms of power structure: multipolarity, bipolarity, and hegemony. According to this scheme it is clear that there is a tendency towards the cyclic variation of structure change from multipolarity to bipolarity and then to hegemony and then again to multipolarity or bipolarity. At the same time, it is pointed out that these three forms of the balance of power arrangement need not to be a result of great power intentions. The aim of great powers is the most advantageous position, and with regard

to the placement in the pyramid, it is and it will be a position of hegemony holder. Therefore, bipolarity is a result of efforts to hold the position of hegemony in the multipolar system.

As all the arrangements of the structure comprise elements of instability, the movement from multipolarity to bipolarity and hegemony cannot be considered as the end of development – it is rather, as the example of A. Toynbee points out, the closing of one cycle in the development system and the start of another cycle. The erosion of structure is realized under the pressure of law on states with uneven development, i.e. uneven growth of their power. More specifically, the law of uneven growth continuously distributes the power and undermines the status quo set up by the last hegemonic fight.

### ***Multipolarity***

In the conditions of multipolarity, the world political system is arranged around three or more main great powers that are, in this form or that form, relatively powerful to the same extent. Approximately the same power of individual power centres can be either given by the potential of individual states or their coalitions. Regardless the significance of coalition, in this model, every state follows its own objectives as well as warily respecting the existence of other power centres and their sphere of influence.

The so called “European Concert” between the Napoleonic Wars and World War I. is often considered to be an ideal model of the arrangement of multipolarity. The special status of Great Britain in the period of European concert diverts some theoreticians to the idea that the existence of a balancer is a specific feature of the balance of power in the multipolar system. However, the fact itself that the balancer cannot exist in the bipolar system does not mean that it must exist in the multipolar structure. The multipolar structure is based on an existence of more than two power centres – either with the balancer or without it. On the other hand, the balancer is a specific feature of multipolarity that rightly draws the attention of theory. The balancer can only be the state that complies with three prerequisites: the balancer does not consider the values that are the main subject of power conflict to be its vital interest, the balancer has such a power that allows it to decide about the result of conflict based on its support to that party of conflict according to its own consideration, and the balancer does not enter power conflicts as a legal or moral arbiter – it is the state that follows its own interests of the balance of power based on its own policy.

As the balancer alone is not able to absorb the whole political system, it fulfils its role on regular basis in such a way that it joins the weaker party – and thus it makes up or renews the equilibrium in the form that is advantageous for it. As early as in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, Jonathan Swift says that the balancer does not need for the fulfilment of its role the division of power between two participants, and therefore the weakest state can be a balancer as well. The status of balancer nears the role of hegemony holder, but it is more subjective – more dependent on qualified policy.

### ***Bipolarity***

In the conditions of bipolarity, the world political system is arranged around two power centres – similarly to the period of Belligerent States in China, during the Peloponnesian War, or during the World Wars in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. These two poles are relatively equally strong. The structure is quite simple, whereby the poles can be either formed by two states – great powers or superpowers – or by stabile coalitions. According to some authors, “while multipolarity remains multipolarity thanks to the effect of the balance of power mechanism, the bipolar stability works by means of fear balance”. At the same time, in the multipolar system “the relations of allies are flexible and are established among the states that are almost equally strong, whereby none of the countries is able to govern such a an alliance”. Conversely, in the bipolar arrangement of system structure, the ally relations “are held together by an ideological

adhesive, whereby these relations are hierarchic and each of them is dominated by one super-power".<sup>1</sup> Sometimes these bipolar as well as hegemonic arrangements of world system structure, are thanks to Morton Kaplan, considered to be something absolutely different from the balance of power. This approach to bipolarity results from the assumption that the balance of power requires three or more actors – which is actually the unreasoned axiom that contradicts the general concept of balance in the system as well as the idea of the nature and role of power anarchy in the world system specifically.

History knows a period of absolute bipolarity (for example during the period of Chinese Belligerent States), when all the states of system were involved in the conflict, and the period of free bipolarity (for example during the period of Peloponnesian War), when neutrals and additional conflicts occurred. In this structure, there either can be a certain hierarchic arrangement of blocs or the bipolarity can be supplemented by a group of neutral states or inter-governmental organizations.

According to the concept of clear bipolarity, the world did not know peripheries during the period of Cold War – vital interests of superpowers were meeting everywhere. Not only the extensity, but also the intensity of competition was increasing – cosmic competition, race in economic growth, military readiness, and the appearance of propagandistic war. Insecurity and wrong calculations, that are causes of the wars in the multipolar system, disappeared. There was almost a constant pressure and repeated crises – whereby the crises were perceived as natural and almost desirable. In general *the simplicity of relations in the bipolar world and the strong pressure that is developing makes two great powers conservative*.<sup>2</sup> The defenders of these about the peacemaking bipolarity are of the opinion that what is substantial is that it is easier to coordinate activities during peaceful conditions, i.e. also the calculations of crises, their moderating, and solution. Possible partial changes of balance are not considered to be important for a change of the system.

The free bipolar arrangements sometimes leads to the fact that the central bipolar system is connected with complex subsystems arrangement with various polarity or additional systems of secondary importance. This resulted in the idea of Richard Rosecrance according to which it is necessary to seek "relevant utopia" that would include advantages of the both models and reject their disadvantages. Bipolarity offers automatic equilibrium, multipolarity reduces the significance of conflict among main powers – alternative relevant utopia combines advantages of both structural arrangements. Bi-multipolarity can be such an alternative.

The interests of states in the bi-multipolar structure should be "partially conflicting, partially harmonious". However, this model does not correspond with the zero sum game or constant total at all. The confrontation in this system is indirect, multipolar powers does not evoke irrevocable antagonism. Conflict interest and harmonious interests meet in the balance, the changes in the state position are difficult to be estimated. However, the need of balance is supported by the existence of harmonious interests themselves. The probability of war is smaller – multipolar battlefield is a prevention of nuclear conflict among superpowers, bipolarity is a prevention of multipolar conflict. Bi-multipolar system does not reduce violence, but it reduces the probability of consequences of war.

### ***Hegemony***

The hegemonic arrangement of the world political system presupposes the existence of one power centre that is significantly stronger than other states or a combination of the states. The hegemony holder solves its questions of security independently, other great powers and states must first of all respect its interests when providing for their security. The power pyramid has

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<sup>1</sup> HOLLIS, Martin, SMITH, Steve: *Teorie mezinárodních vztahů. Interpretace a porozumění. Interpretace a porozumění*. Brno: Centrum demokracie a kultury, 2000, p. 119.

<sup>2</sup> WALTZ, Kenneth N.: *Theory of International Politics*. Reading etc.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979, p. 174.

its peak in the form of one state. There exists a certain form to the hegemonic arrangement of the world system with regard to the whole world state. However, the hegemonic stability bears against the concrete form of power balance in the system of many sovereign states – which is a different balance than in the political system within the framework of one state.

The word “hegemony” in old Greek meant power, supremacy, and superiority. The resolution of the UN General Assembly on Inadmissibility of the policy of hegemonism in international relations, approved in December 1979, defines hegemonism as a “manifestation of the policy of a State, or a group of States, to control, dominate and subjugate, politically, economically, ideologically or militarily, other States, peoples or regions of the world”. From the structural point of view, the hegemony holder is such a state that has some authority and competences to determine basic rules of world policy and to influence the will of other states to respect these rules. The hegemony holder is militarily and economically the most powerful state that uses its unbeatable power to create and to enforce the world order advantageously for it as well as to strengthen its own top positions in the system structure, in the power hierarchy. Its exceptional position is not only fulfilled with regard to a balancer in the conflict, but also with the arrangement of the whole system.

It can be said quite surely, that overall modern history battles to prevent the origination of hegemony and efforts to create hegemony. At the beginning, there were efforts to realize the Habsburg supremacy, then efforts of French kings and Napoleon. At the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, France was considered to be a chronically aggressive state, as Germany was considered during most of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. During the period of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union aspired to acquire the hegemony position. According to this concept, the multipolar and bipolar arrangements merge into one – as a period without any hegemony holder. Bipolarity then, is not a full-value arrangement, but an inter-stage in the plural world that comes into existence during the process of acquiring the hegemony position.

The hegemony holder in the system cannot be understood as an absolute ruler. In a sense, the world political system with a hegemony holder remains an oligopoly with a dominant company. It is no wonder that economists consider, for example if any company controls 60 % of the market, the most profitable such behaviour if the company behaves as a monopoly in the specific part of market and they leave the rest for free competition. The hegemony position is a permanent fight in the relatively structured anarchy – the position on the top of pyramid is constantly doubted and endangered, either by the ambitions of other powers, or by the changes of socio-economic principles of power.

Under specific conditions, hegemony can be a source of system stability. In other conditions, especially during the period of hegemony holder backdown from top positions in the power pyramid, the hegemony arrangement can be destabilizing for the system. If the formation of hegemonic structure in the world system means the closing of a cycle, then the subversion of hegemony holder from its sovereign position means a radical change of the system. If the liquidation of the hegemony holder results from the activity of its power rival, the fall of the hegemony holder itself from the top of power pyramid does not mean that a winner is able to create and to keep a new order – that the old hegemony holder is immediately replaced by a new one – the destruction of the Roman Empire was preceded by a long period of chaos; the end of Pax Britanica did not mean the immediate Pax Americana.

There are many ways how to prevent the fall of state from its power position – and not only a position of the hegemony holder. There are various techniques to keep the position in the power pyramid and they can be combined (or it is better to combine them):

- 1) On a long-term basis, it is necessary to keep or to create the surroundings for economic and technical innovations, and of course military innovations. That policy did not enable the Soviet Union to realize during the second half of the eighties and the efforts to start it by means of “perestroika” had adverse effects.

- 2) To eliminate a competitive power centre. This objective can be achieved by two ways:
  - a) Appeasement of the rival. The Munich Diktat is an example of an unsuccessful appeasement, the more successful were agreements from Camp David.
  - b) Preventive war. The classical example is the Peloponnesian War as well as American activities with regards to Cuba in 1962, or Israel bombing the nuclear reactor in Iraq in 1981.
- 3) Withdrawal to more advantageous strategic position. The East Roman Empire held its position, apart from others, due to its withdrawal from badly defensible west provinces and thus it created balance with regard to the size of the empire and resources.
- 4) Restriction of dominant position in the structure. For example the Nixon's doctrine that resulted not only in decreased expenses, but also in redistribution of expenses for allies.

The privileged position of Great Britain as a hegemony holder before World War I, was based on its economic advantage, supremacy on sea, and its role of balancer in Europe. This position of "relative hegemony holder" is not so stable, but very important for the system. The Great Britain dominance in the system was not based on the empire, but on production: Great Britain's population was half of the population in France, but it mined two thirds of world coal production and produced half of iron and textile in the world.

Similarly to Great Britain in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, today the hegemonic position is held by the United States. However, the economic dominance is accompanied by military dominance and by efforts to apply the values of liberal democracy all over the world. Their dominant position has been developing since the world recession in 1873. It is remarkable, how many authors with regards to the end of the free convertibility of dollar into gold in the year 1967, the strain from the war in Indo-China, and the growth of economic potential in Japan and Europe, started to write about the end of the U.S.A. hegemony – the theories of complex mutual dependence appeared, the adapted variants of realism, etc..

After the decline of bipolarity at the end of the Cold War, there appeared new theories of the United States hegemony, specifically with regard to their military dominance and technology advance. These concepts were also followed by new foreign policy doctrines of the White House. Theoreticians, especially American ones, have been intensively discussing how long the U.S.A. will keep its hegemony position. Opinions vary. As an example, we can state the thesis that was formulated by the neo-conservative theoretician, Robert Kagan: *The only successful arrangement that the Americans can imagine is a system in which the U.S.A. has a dominant position. The Americans cannot imagine the international order that is not protected by forces, first of all by American forces.*<sup>1</sup> On the other side of the opinion scale, the neo-Marxist, Immanuel Wallerstein states that *the real question is not whether the U.S.A., as a hegemonic power is on the decline, but whether it is able to find a way to do it elegantly, with minimum harm to the world and itself.* And he formulates a rule that can be applied to the current policy of the U.S.A. and China: *Thus we return to the oldest story in the history of hegemonic powers. The dominant power is focused on military, the candidate to succession on economy. This second approach has always been worthy; and considerably.*<sup>2</sup>

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The dispute, whether the bipolar, multipolar, or hegemonic structure of the world political system is a source of stability and peace is held in such a way that the only conclusion possible is: all the parties to the dispute can be right. All the opinions are backed by historic evidences – which result in the fact that none of the concepts is true in its absolutistic conclusions. History points out that wars knew periods of multipolarity and bipolarity as well as

<sup>1</sup> KAGAN, Robert: *Labyrint síly a ráj slabosti. Amerika, Evropa a nový řád světa.* Praha: NLN, Nakladatelství Lidové noviny, 2003, p. 118.

<sup>2</sup> WALLERSTEIN, Immanuel: *Úpadek americké moci. USA v chaotickém světě.* Praha: Slon, 2005, p. 29 and 28.

a period of world political system hegemonic arrangement. The fact itself that none of the structures was final, that the multipolarity of European concert changed into bipolarity, points out that there is another, off-structural source of instability. Concededly, the structure of the system has a monopoly impact upon instability. The primary source of instability in the system is not a number of actors, but an uneven development of power potentials and an ignorance of possible adept aspirations to hold a leading position in the structure – all these in the surrounding of capitalist anarchy.

#### **4/ COLLECTIVE SECURITY**

The idea of collective security is very often presented as an alternative to the power balance system. It is a great merit of the American president, Woodrow Wilson, who expected a qualitative change of the world political system from the results of the World War II, just with the help of collective security principles. In general, it can be said that the idea of collective security presupposes:

- When ensuring the security interests of states, the spontaneous balance of power is replaced by the system of their cooperation;
- Power relations are in principle controlled from one power centre, whereby force potentials remain in the hands of individual states governments;
- Any attack against one state is considered to be the attack against all.


The principle of collective security “jointly and severally” was also included in the first European proposal to secure peace that had a legal form – the draft of proposal, the Agreement on establishment of peace in all the Christian world submitted by the Czech king, Jiří z Poděbrad (George of Podebrady), in the year 1464. The modern concept of collective security is on regular basis deduced from the agreement from Osnabrück signed in the year 1648 that was a component of Peace of Westphalia. The Fabian Society was a great promoter of the idea of collective security (but also a confederative arrangement of the world), and from which the name of the United Nations is derived as well. The theory of Fabian Society was also a source for Wilson. After World War I., the idea of collective security was implemented into the 11<sup>th</sup> Article of The Covenant of the League of Nations: “Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League, and the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations.”

The principles of collective security were also implemented in the Charter of the United Nations, in Articles 39 – 51. According to Articles 39, 41, and 42 “The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken... to maintain or restore international peace and security”. The Security Council can first of all “decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.” If the Security Council resolves that these measures are not sufficient, “it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations



by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.” Chart No. 4 shows the arrangement of power relations according to the principle of collective security.

Chart No. 4: IDEA OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY



The ethical concept of the idea of collective security is really great. Its extraordinary prestige results from the fact that the term “collective” indicates the overcoming of states selfish behaviour that is perceived as the real cause of wars. The term “security” is then connected with the idea of peace and social security. Furthermore, the idea of collective security can be not only understood as the elimination negative features of the balance of power, but also as a preservation of state and national specifications. It was just this feature that allowed Woodrow Wilson to connect the idea of collective security with the idea of nations self-determination and democracy.

**Mutual actions**

The definition of ethical concept with regard to the idea of collective security points out some moral and political problems. First of all, the practical realization of collective security principles presupposes the formation of collective military forces. The Charter of the United Nations mentions this problem in the Article 43: “In order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.” An ostensible democracy of this formulation neglects the fact that great powers have a special responsibility for world peace. The collective security has its military and technical aspects: from 192 member states of the UN, only approx. 20 have capacities to send their armies across a continent or an ocean. Furthermore, the position of the United States (also the Soviet Union during the period of the Cold War) is so exceptional that no other combinations of forces, not including the U.S.A, can ensure full security. And there is always a technical problem related to the existence of strategic weapons owned by the United States and the Russian Federation: no collective diplomatic negotiations can lead to so fast to a decision that might prevent an impact of fired rockets if one of those states decides for a preventive strike.

Originally, the UN peace forces served the purpose of separating hostile parties, only from time to time to stop fights. According to the concept of the former Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjöld, forces should keep peace with four restrictions: (a) they are understood as a temporary measure taken without any support to any hostile parties; (b) peace operations can be only realized with an approval from all the participants to a conflict; (c) forces used to

keep peace may only use arms for self-defence; (d) soldiers of the USSR and the U.S.A. are not to be invited the UN forces. However, the development of the UN peace activities was different.

The UN has realized a total 60 operations since 1948 to half of 2006. From 1948 to June 2006, total of 2, 264 UN soldiers and personnel died. The total value of peace operations from 1948 to June 2006 is calculated as 41.04 milliard dollars. In half of 2006, 15 such UN operations were realized with 72, 983 soldiers and policemen from 109 countries.<sup>1</sup>

At the beginning of the UN peace forces activities, its purpose was only to separate hostile parties – the first peace operation was the monitoring of fire-cease among Israel, Great Britain, France, and Egypt in 1956. Gradually, this function was extended. There occurred the necessity to ensure security and stability in a specific region (e.g. south Lebanon, the Balkans), to monitor elections (Namibia, Haiti), to disarm rebels (Nicaragua), etc. Two types of aims started to be distinguished functionally and thus two concepts of military forces:

- ❖ PEACE-KEEPING and peacekeeping force. The fulfilment of this task presupposes the approval of UN operations by all the participants to the conflict. First of all, non-combat interventions of forces used are expected (with the exemption of self-defence). The following are considered to be main institutions and objectives for peace keeping:
  - Observing mission. Generally, it is an unarmed monitoring of peacekeeping, a determined demarcation line, a confirmation of the departure of military forces from the region of conflict, a monitoring of possible conflict upsurge, a keeping of human rights, a preparation of election and its supervision, etc..
  - Mediating forces. The aim of these missions is to isolate hostile forces after a temporary cease-fire or after signing an agreement on cease-fire. The missions tasks also include the establishment of observation places, the monitoring of cease-fire, the supervision of main roads and the terrain that might be used by conflicting parties to achieve additional advantages, the inspection of the demarcation line, the opening of corridors for humanitarian aid, the accompanying of convoys with humanitarian aid, the building up of “buffer zones”, and the control of demilitarization, etc..
  - Mission to ensure a transfer from an armed conflict to peaceful solution. After the fulfilment of military tasks with regard to a cease-fire, civil tasks of these missions prevail: the creation of conditions to return to peaceful life. The mission tasks also include the supervision of departure, relocation, demobilization and the disarmament of military and paramilitary groups, the supervision of cease-fire or demarcation line, the confiscation of arms, munitions and reserves, the mapping and eliminating of mine fields, the assistance to the establishment of civil administration, the construction of infrastructure, the assistance to returning refugees, etc..
  - Control of armament. It is a scale of activities from inspections, checks on the keeping of agreements, up to military forces dislocations, forced demobilizations, disarmaments and destructions of arms, etc.
- ❖ PEACE-ENFORCEMENT and peacemaking force. This relates to the pressure military intervention that is realized after the failure of efforts to keep peace. The realization of the action must be only resolved by the UN Security Council. The objective of the operation is not a military victory, but the coercion of opponent to fulfil the requirements of UN approved resolutions, mandates, or sanctions.<sup>2</sup>

This practice points out that there are at least the same problems with leaving these forces as with the approval of these operations, their ensuring and executing. The peace operations with their limited military aims and their unsuitability to administration performance and police services cannot ensure that no conflicts or new fights will break out after their departure.

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<sup>1</sup> See United Nation – <http://www.un.org>.


<sup>2</sup> See NOVOTNÝ, Adolf: *Slovník medzinárodných vzťahov*. Bratislava: Magnet Prees, 2004, 276–277 and 297.

The idea of linear development in the direction of collective security does not correspond with the nature of international relations after the end of the Cold War: after romantic concepts from the beginning of the 90's about new order and harmony, the development resulted in interest differentiation and individual activities. The reason is simple – the UN Security Council would not approve the use of forces in Iraq or in the Balkans, but nobody can face independent military activities of the U.S.A. in the present world; this fact also expresses the hegemonic position of the U.S.A. Thus the ideals expressed in the UN Charter come into conflict with the reality of the balance of power.

**Definition of collective**

With regards to an ideal type, the collective security differentiates from the policy of the balance of power, it is not an alliance focused on a specific state, but generally focused on any violator of the status quo. However, the disintegration of the idea of collective security in the current regime of world policy is also apparent from Article 51 of the UN Charter. According to this Article “nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security”. This sentence also includes the stratification of the idea of collective security to universal assurance and partial, group guarantees of security. This aspect is especially important in the world of Westphalian system, where states are the bearers of different interests and the different concepts of justice– as it happened in the Korea war and in the current conflict in the region of former Yugoslavia. According to some interested parties, the attacker does not need to be a state acting in accordance with the principle “alone against everybody”, but a coalition of states. This points out the fundamental problem of collective security: with regard to a different understanding of interests and justice, the identical understanding of collective cannot be presupposed.

Chart No. 5: “COLLECTIVE SECURITY” AS A CONFLICT OF ALLIANCES



When practically realizing the ideas of collective security, states easily slip from the universal understanding of all the states collective to a particular vision of the group chosen according to specific – for example ideological or geographical – criteria. It was also done by Woodrow Wilson, when he connected his idea of collective security with the group interest of states and with liberal and democratic regimes. This shift changes the agreement on collective security to the agreement on military block or another bloc. This is also one of the dimensions of the above mentioned initiative of Jiřík z Poděbrad (George of Pdebrady) who bid not only for peace, but also in the name of the unity of the Christians against the Muslims – his “universalism” was based on religious and cultural exclusivity. Similarly, during the period of the Cold War, both the NATO and the Warsaw Pact called to the idea of collective security with regards to the UN Charter. The European federation or confederation can operate in this way as well: it could be changed into a protectionist bloc under specific conditions, into the “fortress of Europe” separated from the United States or Russia, but also from the problems of the South – or it can even be directed against them contrastively. Chart No. 5 shows how easily can the ideal of collective security, as a tool of the balance of power control, turn into the conflict of coalitions within the framework of spontaneous balance of power – and also including the fact that in case of a conflict, many states very often take a neutral standpoint.

\* \* \*

Not only practice, but also theory relativizes the ethical context and accordingly the function of collective security. It is clear that the idea of collective security does not need to be – at least according to the vision of some theoreticians and practitioners – absolutely contradictory to the principles of the balance of power.


## **5/ WORLD STATE**

The idea of collective security is not the only prescribed medicine for the world political system “fallen ill” with anarchy. The other change is recommended as the most radical method removing the defects of the balance of power: to establish a world state. The world state is understood as the united all-planet state institution that should or might to replace the system of state sand their relations. Based on the concentration of power in the hands of one worldwide government, the power would lose its disintegration, it would stop to be an attribute of individual sovereign states.

The theory also presumes the possibility of a world federation or confederation establishment; chart No. 6 shows the possible arrangement of power relations in the federative or confederative world state as well as it points out differences between them. The federative and confederative arrangements presumes the establishment of one power centre. The confederation is based on the concept that a new power authority will only have powers related to the state security, or some other functions delegated by the states. The others, especially the interstate problems would be the authority of the individual states that will not have all the characteristics of Westphalian system’s sovereign state. Contrariwise, the more integrated federative arrangement presupposes that the authority of one power body – its legislative, executive, and judicial powers – would be directly related to an individual and thus the interstate political system would acquire the features of the interstate system. Despite all the Union’s achieve-

ments, federalism is the only empirically verified theory of integration that combines unity with diversity – but only at the regional level.

Chart No. 6: WORLD STATE



### *Variants of routes to change*

The idea of the federative exchange of the Hobbes' anarchy of world political system was drawing the attention of so many politicians and theoreticians that it gradually acquired several main forms within the framework of two streams that differ either by the stress put on a statesman or by the socio-economic dimension of the overall task:

- ❖ First of all, the **POLITICAL WILL OF STATESMEN** is considered to be an initial moment of world integration. Actually, based on subjective decisions of the head of states, the individual political authorities with judicial, executive, and legislative powers might originate. This concept is state-centrist and revolutionary and it exists in three of the most important forms:
  - Humanistic concept. It is just this concept that began the idea of eternal peace. It emphasizes the morality of peace, the importance of the ban of arms and wars, as well as the necessity to institutionalize ethics. As an example, we can state the names of Erasmus Rotterdam, Jan Amos Komenský (Comenius) and many others, whereby the specific role was played by utopian socialists and pacifists.
  - Pragmatic concept. This approach emphasizes the idea of power integration and proves its usefulness. In principle, this approach points out that none of the states can prevail others under the conditions of the balance of power. It warns that any attempt to acquire a dominance is risky and it reminds us of material and human losses during such experiments. As an example, we can mention the works of Charles-Irénée de Saint-Pierre, Emerich de Vattel, but also William Penn who connects the vision of confederation with a homogenous moral and mutual advantages.
  - Institutional concept. It is a mixture of pragmatism and spontaneity. It can be associated with the early liberal vision that saw the main source of peace in the international trade and the involvement of politicians in it. Today, some world globalization defenders, consciously or unconsciously, head towards this stream of thinking. This concept can be also found in various proposals of worldwide bodies, in projects working

out regulations of world system or in regulations of cooperation as a prerequisite of the establishment of supranational institutions. In general, concepts of this type are classified according to an idealistic paradigm.

- ❖ SOCIAL-ECONOMIC INTEGRATION processes of the world society are considered to be a different route. The political initiative of statesmen is not a base of integration, but a semi-spontaneous economic and social process of global capitalism. This concept is not state-centric, but conversely it presupposes a decrease of state role in the most important moments of the world political system transformation; and it is evolutionary. It also exists in three main forms:
  - Concept of spontaneity. According to this variant, eternal peace and its institution are seen as a side product of natural and historical rules. It was exactly how Immanuel Kant understood the road to external peace, where laws would rule, not the people. According to this concept, the cosmopolitan civil society assumes the role of the balance of power in the world political system.
  - Economic concept. The other variant of the establishment of world society is represented by the early liberal vision of peace as a result of individualism or international trade – for example in the works written by Baruch de Spinoza or Richard Cobden.
  - Functionalistic concept. Today, the early liberal and spontaneous variants are complemented by an activist vision, mainly known from the works of David Mitrany and his students. This is based on the idea of the increasing significance of such non-state actors as supranational corporations, international non-governmental and governmental organizations, but also a regime; they transform and decrease the role of state. At the same time, it presupposes that a successful integration in some apolitical technical sectors inter-grows into other sectors; and even from apolitical spheres to the sphere of power.

\* \* \*

The linking of European intellectual tradition with the idea of world state has one important turning point: until the Russo-Japanese war at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the European balance was rightfully considered to be more than just a core of the world balance, – actually, it was the world balance; but later this characteristics was less and less valid. It is quite natural that all the considerations regarding the arrangement of the world were first of all focused on Europe. According to many enlightenment, liberal, and socialist authors, the focus on European problems did not exclude the worldwide dimension of consideration about the establishment of federation or confederation. However, it is not always like this: the idea of Pan-Europe according to Count Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi includes many elements that links the unification of (west) Europe with the preservation of the balance of power as a basic relation among Europe, the British empire and the Soviet Union. This fact must be emphasized, because a frequent omission of the idea of world state when considering the European union, confederation, or federation can have as a consequence that this regional change of international relations will not remove the system of spontaneous balance of power from the world political system. The creation of “fortress Europe” would only mean the restructuring of the world political system with the keeping of rules of the balance of power. Thus, first the idea of collective security might grow from the ideals of European or Atlantic alliance to a new confrontationally oriented coalition bloc.

## ***B. Actors of world policy***

### **6/ STATE**

The world political system cannot be separated from actors – institutions and people that create and modify the system by their acting. The qualitative changes of the world political system after the World War II. are very often related not only to the change of structure, but also to the change of specific importance of some non-state actors. These actors not only differ by their quality, but with regards to their power potential, also by their quantity.

Indisputably, the state is the most important actor of the world political system. From the systemic point of view, the states are components whose arrangements and relations form the basic characteristics of the international political system. At the same time, the state is a political institution that is typical for three main attributes: inhabitants, a defined territory, and a government that is able to enforce its sovereignty. Sometimes, as in regards to the Montevideo Convention on The Rights and Duties of States from the year 1933 – these characteristics are supplemented by the ability of a government to ensure formal diplomatic relations with other states, i.e. the recognition of state by other states. There are states that have restricted financial means to establish relations with the majority of other states. And at the same time, there were and there are states without any international recognition or states that are only acknowledged by their allies or protectors. It seems that the understanding of diplomatic acknowledgment by the world community or powers, as an attribute of the state, mixes legitimacy and facts.

#### ***Power and force***

As it is also possible to speak about other actors of world policy, the capacity of state to enforce chosen objectives has been matchless in the world political system. The power and strength of state gives the state a unique status in the international scene. Therefore, the functional and organizational characteristics of the state makes the other actors of world policy dependent on the state. First of all, it is the state that, during the process of its development, produces sets of rules and behaviour models that have the most significant impact upon the behaviour of other actors.

The power potential of the state determines its exceptional and significant position among the actors of world policy. The position of concrete state in the structure of the world political

system depends on its power potential. It is like this because the political power represents a possibility to achieve a required shape of balance and harmony in the political and practical activities of individuals and groups; it is a possibility ensuring a required behaviour of people – individuals and groups. In this sense, the term “possibility” indicates the circumstance under which such a situation may occur, i.e. the nature of the balance of power or the balance of forces. The extent of this possibility is first of all given by the state capacity that also defines the position in the structure of the system, in the power pyramid.

The power potential of the state is not only represented by its capacity, but it is also a real or possible vector result of the confrontation with other states capacities. However, law or such factors of political culture as moral, tradition and stereotypes, socio-psychological factors, ideological, doctrine factors, but also public opinion can serve as a limit of power and force, though not to the same extent and in every situation. These factors can increase or decrease the quality of power holders decision making and a will and a willingness to use force in the end.

The nature of objective power, estimated power, and realized power is a source of the state influence upon other states and the world political system in general. The influence represents that part of power that allows regulating the behaviour of other political subjects without any use of force. It is based on state prestige. However, prestige as well as power in general cannot be weighed and counted. Prestige and power cannot be entirely known based on a priori process of calculation. The insecurity resulting from it can be overcome based on one confrontation of the state powers – in the battlefield. In such conflicts in history is force the final arbiter. Force is part political power, and is able to bring off the intention of the power center by physical violence. Force is the heart of the power potential, namely to a great extent a measurable pivot.

The power introduced in international policy is internally structured social energy. With respect to the performance of state policy, a politician must take into account two main groups of state power factors: objective ones that are typical for such attributes as a territory and number of inhabitants, and subjective ones that relate to the quality of government.

### *Territory of state*

The state territory is a demarcated part of the Earth surface, including dry land and water. This definition also relates to the space below the surface of land and water level as well as above the surface of land and water level. It includes not only continents and their rivers and lakes, but also parts of some sea areas. Such a territory is subordinated to a sovereign power of government. The inviolability and indivisibility of state territory belong to the most sensitive dimensions of the ideas about state sovereignty. The Declaration on Principles concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States, approved by the General Assembly of the UN in the year 1970, states that a state territory cannot be a subject of an acquisition by another state due to a threat of force or a use of force and any such a territorial gain cannot be acknowledged as legal.

The territory of state is separated from another state or open sea by the line that is called state border. The borders of states developed as a result of the movement of people, either by migration or by demographic increase, in combination with the economic use of territory, but also was based on the strength of these groups and the quality of their ruling elite. This movement faced, in a specific sphere, natural obstacles: mountains, forests, rivers, sea, swamps. From the other side of these natural obstacles, there was some influence from other populations and other state ideas. Thus the border line – *res nulus*, a thing (or a territory) of no one – came into existence between two states. This line was became narrow because of colonization from both sides; both movements collided and a linear border came into existence according to today’s meaning, “simple abstraction”. In areas without natural obstacles, the



borders came into existence as a result of contact, and very often as a result of conflicts, between growing states. These results of border formation are confirmed by international treaties on regular basis.<sup>1</sup>

The decision on the border conflict between the Sumerian states, Lagas and Umma, approximately in the year 2600 B.C. is considered to be the oldest border treaty (the records are on two clay cylinders). With regards to the European core of the world political system, the turn of the 15<sup>th</sup> and the 16<sup>th</sup> centuries is very important for the formation of borders. It was just in those days, when the process of linear European borders was completed. Thus after the completion of the colonization of border lines, the real history of the whole of Europe could start in the 16<sup>th</sup> century. The medieval process of states disintegration, that started with the disintegration of the Roman Empire and later the Frankish Empire, was stopped or even turned.

At the turn of the 15<sup>th</sup> and the 16<sup>th</sup> centuries, together with the formation of linear borders, the idea of national states closed in geographically united, (i.e. natural), borders started to be emphasized. The natural borders of a state are sometimes called orographic and they follow the relief of site, (i.e. hills, mountains, river beds); it is possible to distinguish a dry border crossing a continent and a wet border going along a boundary of waters. In the mountains, the border is determined either at the highest peak, or along the line of dividing range. The border in navigable rivers is demarcated in the middle, whereby this demarcation also relates to bridges; if rivers are not navigable, the border is in the middle of river or its main river arm. If there are boundary lakes, the middle line connecting the points of the contact of lake and border and following the same distance from opposite banks, is considered to be a border.

The sea border of states still represents a specific problem. The demarcation of this border was a subject of coastal state internal legislation. The tradition resulted in the fact that states demarcated their territorial waters from three to twelve nautical miles; some states, especially Latin American ones, claimed more. Cornelius van Bynkershoek, the founder of positivistic line of international law, who wrote in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, proposed that the width of territorial waters should be according to the range of cannon shots from the coast – it was three nautical miles in those days. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, from the year 1982, allows every coastal state to execute the administration of territorial waters up to the extent of 12 nautical miles, i.e. 22,224 km. The basic line, from which these distances are measured, is created by the lowest line of low tide. The sovereignty of state relates to and is determined by the coastal sea like this, including the air area, sea bottom, and the mid-earth below this sea bottom. Free, peaceful crossing of ships is allowed in coastal seas. At the same time, the Convention determines an adjacent zone that cannot exceed 24 nautical miles and where the state can check foreign ships. The purpose of this measure is to prevent the violation of customs, fiscal, immigration, or health regulations. According to the Convention, also the jurisdiction of states regarding resources (resources are understood as fish and mineral resources), exploration, and ecological protection, exclusively in the economic zone within the distance of 200 nautical miles from the shore, (i.e. 370.4 km), was agreed on.

The problem of the sea-border points out that a “natural border” is only one of the possibilities of how the border can be formed and demarcated. The formation of states within natural borders is an ideal possibility known in the example of the history of Spain and France; however it was not the only way of border formation. For example, the present-day border between Croatia and Bosnia is demarcated according to the so called “peace from Karlovec” in 1699, the treaty that demarcated the border according to the actual position of Habsburg and Ottoman armies. And thus, beside the term “orographic border” there is also the geometric border of a state that is demarcated regardless the terrain and it leads from one specific

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<sup>1</sup> See also IŠTOK, Robert: *Štát na politickej mape sveta. Politickogeografické a geopolitické aspekty*. Prešov: Fakulta humanitných a prírodných vied Prešovskej univerzity, 1997.

chosen point to another point. Apart from these two basic types of borders, the world also knows the combined borders that mix orographic and geometric principles. There is also an astronomic border that is determined by meridians of longitude and parallels of latitude. It is best known in regards to the map of Africa, where the borders of states are very often the remnants of treaties concluded between former colonial metropolises. The method of Arctic division can be considered to be an odd expression of astronomic borders: the polar sectors of five states were created there – Denmark, Canada, Norway, Russian, and the U.S.A. The above mentioned sectors are of triangular shape, whereby the north pole represents their top, the north border of relevant state represents the base-line and meridians that lead through edge points of the border represent sides.

In general, it is true that all the borders of the states result from the acting of social-political powers in space and time and thus as a consequence, some politicians conclude that *all political borders are not natural, because they result from politics, compromise, and temporary power relations*.<sup>1</sup> At present, the borders of most countries are “anchored” in international treaties. This fact contains a technical problem regarding the preciseness of the imaginary line, called a state border, in a terrain. As a rule, this complication can be solved in two stages – first, in the form of delimitation and then the demarcation of border.

#### *Kinds of states*

There are several forces that affect an unrestricted territorial expansion of state – also, an instability of borders. First of all, as it was said, natural barriers are a natural obstacle of demographic, economic, and military expansions. The activity of opposing power centres-states that share the formation of the balance of power in the system and determine political principles of territory division, represents another barrier. Third, not less significant factors that operate against the territorial expansion of the state are represented by such factors as demography, economy, technical and administrative possibilities, etc. that in their total, determine optimal size of political units in a relevant historical period.

The extent of the state territory can be connected with various kinds of state formations. History offers three basic types:

- **EMPIRE.** With regard to the extent of territory, it is the largest historically known state formation in the anarchically arranged world political system that has been accompanying human history since Assyrian times. The empire concentrates larger number of territories under one rule (in European past, under the rule of one ruler, called emperor or tsar), and larger number of territorial, political, or national-cultural units in the centre that can be dependent on various extents. The economy of ancient and medieval empires was accompanied by the stagnation of work productivity in agriculture and the shortage of innovations. If a ruler or ruling elite, wished to increase wealth, power, and prestige, first of all it would mean to extend the territory – more subjects meant more taxes for the ruler. The territorial control and the spheres of influence represented the basic mechanism of order in the empire.

The control of interior and exterior communications was a prerequisite for the keeping of empire existence. Thus in the past, the natural obstacles that were impeding communication, and which made the political unification extremely difficult, were the main barriers of Europe integration into one empire. The eastern shore of the Mediterranean Sea was very important for the stability of the empires arising in the part of Europe since the times of the Greek war against Troy. The eastern part of Mediterranean Sea and the Middle East also represented the economic centre during the Roman period; only Caesar’s Gallic wars provided the history of Roman empire with the dimension of continental Europe and they transformed the whole culture of Rome. According to some theoreticians, the Byzantine empire survived one thousand

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<sup>1</sup> WILKINSON, D.: *Spykman and Geopoliticp*. In: *On Geopolitics: Classical and Nuclear*. Edited by C. E. Zoppo and Ch. Zorgbibe. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985, p. 79.

years after the fall of the West Roman Empire until “barbarism”, just because they kept control over trade routes until the period of the Ottoman Turks expansion. It was the economic growth in the west of Europe, the discovery of the New World, and the journeys to Asia that decreased the significance of the Middle East and the Mediterranean Sea.

- **CITY-STATE.** City-states represent the smallest state formation. They represent a culturally homogenous political unit that is also compact politically in the sense of the nonexistence of any internal political formations with peculiar legal exterior political relations.

In general, the city states were leaning on economic autarchy. It was just economic autarchy and independence that allowed them to isolate themselves from others. Several tens of city-states formed Mesopotamia civilization at the beginning of the 3<sup>rd</sup> millennium B.C. These Sumerian towns were built up on the tops of hills, they were surrounded by walls and they consisted of “quarters” – individual settlements that originated from former commons, and whom city states based their origins on their union, apart from main cities, subject villages were also a part of the city state, they represented something like outskirts, probably with smaller rights. These Sumerian towns had seldom more than 40 or up to 50 thousand inhabitants. Antique city states were also city agglomerations with craft and trade as well as with suburban agriculture. The classical city state’s area was approximately 250 square kilometers (i.e. approx. half of today’s Prague). The political homogeneity of a city state was achieved to the detriment of economic and military capacities. Its survival depended on the ability to conclude relations with other states and to colonize other territories. Thus communications were also crucial for the city state survival, though these were not internal communications, but exterior ones.

- **NATIONAL STATE.** The national state is the most prevalent formation of state in Modern Times. It is a relatively cultural homogenous unit with “natural” borders in touch with political and demographic pressure from other units. The national state is the most effective political organization in the surroundings of the modern world. It originated in Europe as a consequence of demographic growth, economic and military development; these social pressures resulted in the fact that during the years 900 – 1700 the size of an optimum political unit was changed. The revolution of military technique as well as the origination of a professional army produced not only a radical change in the destructive force of weapons – but it also made these weapons very expensive. The traditional way of feudal social and political organization found itself in financial crisis. The national state represented, under the conditions of new weapons and economy operation, an optimum size and organization. Therefore, at the end of the 15<sup>th</sup> and the beginning of the 16<sup>th</sup> century, the idea of national states was enforced – and it was not enforced based on a discussion, but based on military force.


Some dynastic states of medieval Europe did not have a form of the empires or city states – they had many features typical for the present day national state. Their dissimilarity resulted from interior political incongruity due to the status of church and nobility privileges, but also due to the fact that governing aristocratic elites very often were felt to be indifferent to the national characteristics of population, which they ruled. In medieval dynastic states, there the difference between public and private laws, between internal and foreign policies, but also between state and private estates, was disappearing – a large owner of land was a ruler and the state was an inheritable estate that could be divided, bequeathed, or given as a dowry. Many feudalists were holders of manor in various states and vassals of various rulers. The right of private war also became naturalized in the west of Europe in those days.

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It was a speciality of the world political system development that political and economic globalization was linked with the process of particularization – globalization was accompa-

nied by the formation of new states. It is stated that from current 193 states, only approximately a dozen can boast of lineage that is longer than two centuries. In this sense, the current world political system is a young system. Chart No. 7 shows how the number of states increased from half of the 18<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>1</sup> However, such historical calculations should be understood just for orientation purposes, because there are no unified criteria to specify when the state originated and how to calculate it if the state existed just temporarily. In general, historical statistics define a state as a political unit with at least 500 thousand inhabitants that was acknowledged by England (Great Britain) and France diplomatically, or after 1919 it was included into the League of Nations or the United Nations. Nevertheless, there were and there are states whose existence need not be associated with such criteria.

Chart No. 7: NUMBER OF STATES



The increase in the number of states indicates that with regard to the disintegration of empires, the formation of national states and the extending of Westphalian system principles, the area of states was rather decreasing than increasing. This has been applicable to Europe so far, because the World Wars and the Cold War were also followed by a division – there were 21 sovereign states in the year 1910, 30 states in the year 1930 and at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, there are 44 independent states in Europe. But the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, and the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, is typical of efforts to reverse the development by means of regional integration, the EU enlargement. It is possible to notice similar efforts in other parts of the world. Thus supranational formations, in some features similar to previous empires, could come into existence. New power centres would assume some functions of classical national state. The renewal of a tendency towards centralization and decrease in the number of states, might occur. These new formations do not mean the negation of the state role because of the

<sup>1</sup> According to ROURKE, John T.: *International Politics of the World Stage*. (U.S.A.): Dushkin/McGraw-Hill, 1997, p. 143. Aktualizováno.

origination of new type of institutions – only a new type of state and new relations among states come into existence. However, it is still valid that the states represent the most important components of modern the world political system, in which power and authority remain divided and decentralized. The states were, and still remain, the main subject and object of international policy.

## 7/ NATIONAL STATE

The stormy process of new states origination cannot be separated from the unprecedented increase in the number of the population. At the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, only one milliard of people lived in the world, at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, it was 1.6 milliard, and in the year 2007 it is almost seven milliard inhabitants of the Earth. Almost 80 % of the increase in the 20<sup>th</sup> century falls under the period after the year 1950. Only 12 years were needed – from 1987 to 1999 – and a new milliard of people accrued. Some calculations estimate that 9.1 milliard of people will live on Earth in the year 2050.

It can be said according to humanistic tradition that the division of world into national states is, following the vision of world state, the second best from possible alternatives. Nevertheless, this preposition hides a problem of working definition: the term of national state has been developing in the modern age and for some authors, it has gradually become the nexus of inhabitants and state, a certain political institutionalization of civil society. It was not always like this. Indeed, from the beginning of the use of this term, the idea of national state was a direct result of the association of two words of different meaning, whereby each of them can result in misunderstanding and if together, they are directly misleading. What is today called as a “national state”, very often is a state of several nations or a state without any ruling nation. Therefore, it is necessary to start to define the national state with operative definitions of nation and state.

### *Nation*

For the Romans, who specified themselves as “populus”, “natio“ was understood as other national tribes. Similarly, the term “natio” was used to label tribes; but this term acquired a wider meaning during the period of feudalism boom – the term “nation” designated beings or institutions of the same kind or lineage. In the Middle Ages, “nations” were distinguished as “languages” in Czech. Gradually, up to the beginning of humanism, a modern nation was considered to be a historically formed collective of people having the same ethnical characteristics in common, but different from other ethnic groups – origin, psyche, language, relatively individual material, and spiritual cultures. The nation is one of the types of ethnical groups; i.e. historically originating and really existing people – groups of common origin, language, common material, and spiritual cultures. Contrary to other social groups, ethnic groups are stable and unique, with characteristic anthropologic features. The nation differs from family or tribe ethnic groups, because it is determined by a territory and not by blood relations.

However, the separation of the terms, nation and state, need not result in the solution of all problems related to looking for relations between state and nation – by contrast, new and new questions appear. Probably, the most interesting is the question, whether the existence of state

was a cause of nation existence or vice versa. The answers can be divided into three main groups:

- **ALL THE NATIONS SEEK SELF-EXPRESSION BASED ON A STATE FORMATION.** Every nation has its own state or tries to form it. This thesis is mainly known from the works by Johann Gottfried Herder. According to him, the formation of a national state is an expression of natural law or natural right: “Nature brings up families; therefore, the most natural state is *one* nation with one national character... Because, the nation is as a natural plant and as a family: but, it is a plant with many twigs.”<sup>1</sup> It is the highest form of national life for many theoreticians and politicians. And not only this – mankind is objectively divided into cultural groups – nations and therefore a passage should be given to their identities and they should express them in their own political community, statehood. At the same time and according to original hopes, the national state should have created more fair and stable international order.
- **STATE IS A CREATOR OF NATION.** There is no nation that would not be created by a state – or based on a remembrance of it. It surely is not by chance that it was just a British theoretician in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, Lord Acton, who formulated the thesis “a state can create nationality during times; but it would be contradictory to the nature of modern civilization if nationality would constitute the state.”<sup>2</sup> Giuseppe Mazzini, Benjamin Disraeli or John Stuart Mill were very close to the ideas that the nation can be created by suitable formation of political institutions.
- **STATE AND NATION RESULT FROM DIFFERENT CAUSES.** This idea can have many forms. We can mention geographical determinism as the most known example.

### *State nation*

Contrary to the ethnic nature of nation, the state is a political institution. This idea is related to the definition of the state that emphasizes the power sovereignty of the state as an inseparable characteristic of the state. The state gets closer to the term of nation with its other attributes – territory and inhabitants. The national state originally came into existence as a socio-political structure based on the fusion of these two different components – nation and state. The national state is such a state that is controlled by the members of one nation, sometimes it is called a “state nation”. According to this meaning, the idea of modern national state comprises *convergence between a territorial state and a psychological identification of people with it*.<sup>3</sup>

The modern “democratic” concept of politics is, apart from others, based on the principle that every nation – or ethnic/language/religious group – can be (and according to some theoreticians and politicians, it should be) a base of an independent state. The right to self-determination of nations in their own states became an expression of humanism – it is associated with the idea of freedom and justice. However, also the revolutionary and democratic concept of national principle has its disputed boundaries: it is only related to the nations of certain size. “The self-determination of nations was only applicable if they were considered to be viable: culturally and surely economically (regardless what it was meant by this viability”, Eric Hobsbawm reminds us. Some small nations and languages had no independent future – it was an attitude that was in general also accepted by people who were not absolutely hostile to national liberation. Therefore, Giuseppe Mazzini, the apostle of the principle of ethical and language homogenous, territorial national state – “a state for every nation – only one state for every nation”, did not consider the independence of Ireland and Friedrich Engels even men-

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<sup>1</sup> HERDER, Johann G.: *Vývoj lidskosti*. Praha: J. Laichter, 1941, p. 183–184.

<sup>2</sup> According to KOŘALKA, Jiří: *Co je národ?* Praha: Svoboda, 1969, p. 18.

<sup>3</sup> KEGLEY, Charles W., Jr., WITTKOPF, Eugene R.: *World Politics. Trends and Transformation*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993, p. 44.

tions the “unhistorical” Czech nation. Only after the year 1945, and even more after the period of the last wave of decolonization, did the United Nations give place to entities such as Dominica, the Maldiv Islands, or Andorra.<sup>1</sup>

The idea of national state, as a category unifying the terms of nation and state, becomes very problematic at the moment when such a state is declared to be the only stabile base of today’s world political system. Only a few states – for example Hungary, Japan, Iceland, or Denmark – are situated in territory with one ethnic group. The inhabitants of most states consists of members of several nations or nationalities. Contrary to the above mentioned, there are many states with regards to which it is very questionable to speak about the national base. Many states in Africa or Asia were created by colonial powers and their existence as independent states was confirmed by diplomatic acknowledgment from the side of European or world communities – for example by the admission to the UN. It happened prior to the emergence of a strong feeling of national unity – the feeling of national identity was defined in terms of exterior threat by imperial powers.

It is difficult to speak about national differences with regard to the states of Latin America – maybe only about the differences of Brazil and the other states of the Ibero-American continent. The uncompromising application of the right to national self-determination in the state itself could mean a threat to the stability of the whole world political system. It is very simple: ethnographers state that there are at about 300 nations and almost double the number of nationalities. This means that the full application of a nation’s right to self-determination would mean approximately one hundred more states. Table No. 2 shows how many states are nationally homogenous in general and how many hide a certain national tension. The data is calculated according to the national characteristic of 190 states and dependant territories. Many states with more than ninety percent national homogeneity are small island states; the largest number, represented by the states in which none of national groups reaches 50 % of inhabitants, falls to Africa. The criteria of the table puts aside such states as Yugoslavia (60 % Serbs, 17 % Albanians, 5 % Montenegrins), Lithuania (80 % Lithuanians, 8 % Russians, 7 % Poles), Moldavia (64 % Moldavians, 14 % Ukrainians, 13 % Russians), Cyprus (80 % Greeks-Cyprians, 19 % Turks-Cyprians), and the question of united Arabic nations, etc.<sup>2</sup>

Table No. 2: NATIONS IN CURRENT STATES

one group with more than 90 % inhabitants	53 states
one group with more than 80 up to 90 % inhabitants	32 states
two big groups to the extent of 20 up to 80 % inhabitants	28 states
the states with no group bigger than 50 % inhabitants	32 states

### *Nationalism*

Nationalism, as an idea of national state, relates to the change of the legitimacy of state power in a state. In the Middle Ages, the states were inseparable from monarchs who ruled them – Luis XIV. says: “I am the state!” Then a period followed, during which the idea of the unity of the state and the feoff system was dying. The idea of dynastic interest as a leading line of foreign policy was replaced by the idea of state interest. During the 16<sup>th</sup> and the 17<sup>th</sup> centuries, scientists from various countries of west Europe – Niccolò Machiavelli in Italy, Jean Bodin in France, Hugo Grotius in Holland, and Thomss Hobbes in England – were proving that the idea of the state interest should be a leading principle in politics. The new terms of political theory, as the balance of power, natural borders of state, law of war and peace,

<sup>1</sup> HOBSBAWM, Eric J.: *Národy a nacionalismus od roku 1780. Národy a nacionalismus od roku 1780. Program, mýtus, realita*. Brno: Centrum demokracie a kultury, 2000, p. 34–37 and 165.

<sup>2</sup> SKOKAN, Ladislav, BURSA, Milan, PEŠTOVÁ, Jana: *Geografické tabulky*. Praha: Scientia 1994, p. 59–64.

inviolability of international treaties, freedom of sea, etc. appeared. Thus state-centrism was formed, which replaces the monarch by *raison d'état*. Then, during the third development stage, patriotism comes to the scene – first, with the democratic idea of people interest, later with the nationalistic idea of nation interest.

In general, it can be said that there is an apparent tendency towards the humanistic connection of nation and state so that the state as a tool, not as an objective in itself, might be understood. At the same time, the possibility of a decrease in the nation's significance with regard to the formation of civil society, is thus created and the primary political value is seen in human rights. There is a different situation in case of victory of chauvinistic ideologies. In a situation like this, but also under conditions of national political disintegration or oppression, there is an apparent tendency to perceive the state as the most important national value, moral and political norms of overall existence and activities. However, there is a fundamental difference between patriotism and chauvinism. The patriotism's primary objective is the self-determination of nation in its own state; chauvinism declares the superiority of one nation over other nations, on a regular basis, with the help of biological terms and not social sciences. The idea of nations self-determination in a state can be also understood as a manifestation of group selfishness, as a question of ethnical superiority or even as only the cultural characteristic of a undemocratic ruling group. And it is exactly understood like this – it is noteworthy to note how fast nationalism succeeded to replace religion as an ideological supplement of state conflicts and wars.

Nationalism is an ideology that is naturally focused on the state. With regards to the above mentioned, the most dangerous was such nationalism that overgrew into the chauvinistic requirements of expansibility and which joined with militarism – as the world knew it in the 19<sup>th</sup> century in the colonial ideology of “white man” superiority and in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, with regard to fascism. However, nationalism as a special aspect of the philosophy of history can penetrate into other ideologies. Enlightenment as a source of national awareness is associated just with the interfusion of terms “people” and “nation”. The “Nationalism” of Johann Gottfried Herder, Giuseppe Mazzini, as well as Simon Bolivar, follows and develops the ideas of radical enlightenment philosophers. Nationalism was international according to radical enlightenment philosophers: the freedom of nations linked with their state-determination is a prerequisite of internal democratic arrangement and peaceful and friendly relations of state without a governing aristocracy. This concept of “nationalism” is apparent with Sun Yat-Sen, the leader of Chinese revolution in the year 1911, that indicated the ideological nature of many anti-colonial movements of the 20<sup>th</sup> century – and is also a possibility of their symbiosis with socialistic doctrine.

In the 20<sup>th</sup> century, nationalism functioned as one of the main ideological causes of wars and one the most significant barriers of the development of international institutions and integrated world political system. Patriotism, nationalism, and chauvinism, are ideologies that still provide legitimacy to the existence of national state, defined as a part of world population and world space. At the same time, it also specifies the relations of individuals to state. It results in six basic forms of national-ethnic conflicts threatening the given form of states:

1. The frontier ethnical conflicts with national minorities living next to the borders with other states, in which the members of the same nationality represent the “state nation”, i.e. a dominant majority. As an example we can mention the position of the Hungarians in Slovakia, the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, etc.;
2. The sub-state ethnical conflict of the nation that has a position of minority in several states. For example, the situation of Kurds in Turkey (according to some estimates, more than 20,000 people died in fights of Kurdish separatists against Turkish forces from half of the 80's to the year 1996), Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Armenia;



3. The “Hyperstate” nationalism making efforts to join several states and minorities into one state. For example, German nationalism with Pan-Germanism, the “Anschluß” of Austria, and the grabbing of Czechoslovak borderland.
4. The “Pan-nationalistic” policy trying to unify akin nations into one state unit. For example: Pan-Germanism, Pan-Slavism, Pan-Turkism, Arabic nationalism;
5. The “sub-state” nationalism of nation in the state, where there is a different ruling nation. For example: the efforts of Slavonic nations in Austria-Hungary monarchy;
6. The “sub-state” nationalism of equal, but otherwise different nations. For example, the position of the Czech and the Slovaks in their common state, or the Flemings and the Wal-lons in Belgium.

After the end of the Cold War, the question of civilization and culture conflicts has become a new topic for politicians and theoreticians. According to this consideration, civilization is understood as a cultural entity, whereby most authors emphasizes religious values more than ethnic aspects. This problem becomes also more crucial in the globalizing world with regards to the general approach of theoreticians and politicians in relations to differences among people: Does globalization mean Westernization or Americanization; or can it be tolerant towards cultural differences? Is a new religious fundamentalism an inevitable consequence of resistance against a violent globalization of culture? Should the same technical and economic base bring the same political values and institutions in China, Saudi Arabia and in the U.S.A?

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Nationalism and patriotism help to integrate a national state as a modern institution with the traits of the optimal form of a component political organization in the world political system. Today, the concept of nation sovereignty has also its legal expression in the principle of nation self-determination. This is embodied in the UN Charter that according to Article 1, paragraph 2 ordains “develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace”. The idea of nation sovereignty is stipulated in Article 1 of both international pacts on human rights from the year 1966 and in the above mentioned Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations from the year 1970.

Thus, according to international law, nations can realize their right to self-determination either in the form of independent state or based on a free decision or a union with other sovereign states, or based on a decision on a different political status. However, such a decision must be made by a relevant nation freely, without restraint of dominant state. According to international law, the principles of self-determination only relate to individual nations, not to various national, ethnical, or religious minorities – they can only ask for a cultural or administrative autonomy, but cannot be annexed to a neighbouring state, where all inhabitants or the majority of them are identical to the foreign minority. The persisting disunity of states and the nature of the significant problems of the globalizing world indicate that the idea of the fulfilment of nation self-determination in its own state seems to be a risky program for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. This approach does not also correspond with today’s ideals of humanism. It is possible to imagine a more suitable – only hypothetical so far – form of an organization that might offer less conflict political surroundings for people on this planet. Such an organization can be represented by the unified world state that would have a form of free nations federation, whereby self-government of various national regions and groups would be ensured.

## 8/ INTERSTATE ORGANIZATIONS

International organizations are independent actors of the world political system – they are the institutions whose structure and interest exceeds state borders. International organizations represent an institutionalized form of cooperation in various spheres. They are typical for a relatively stable legal base in the form of charter (status), own legal capacity, and permanent and regular activities. These organizations – agencies, associations, boards, entities – operate internationally, either at global or regional levels. The international organizations are established to ensure and represent the interests of the two types of social groups:

- States. These organizations originated based on international treaties and they have some attributes of international legal capacity. Therefore, these organizations are often called “international”, though they are interstate organizations.
- Non-state or non-governmental organizations. These originated in accordance with the agreement of social organizations or individuals.

The evolution of modern world political system infrastructure gradually led to the fact that today, international organizations include into themselves almost all the states actors. According to some authors, there were almost 50 interstate and more than 170 non-governmental organizations at the beginning of World War I, whereby until the year 1940, their number increased to more than 80 interstate and almost 500 non-governmental organizations. The Union of International Associations, in its yearbook for the years 2000 / 2003 states, that in the year 2001, there were 232 intergovernmental organizations and 6,398 nongovernmental organizations of traditional type.<sup>1</sup> According to this report, at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, there are 25,860 international organizations of various type operating actively in the world.

The international organization is an institution that is established based on a treaty in accordance with international law, between two or more states, in order that cooperation in a specific sphere of state activities might be ensured. We can find three bodies in their structure on regular basis: (a) some variant of the general assembly of member states representatives, (b) elected board or committee, (c) technical and executive secretariat headed by a director, a secretary or a general director or secretary, and (d) various commissions, boards or associated institutions can be auxiliary bodies.

The international organizations can be divided according to various criteria. According to the Union of International Association, in the year 2001, the traditional international organizations included 38 federations of international organizations, 504 organizations with universal membership, 1,086 organizations with intercontinental membership and 5,002 regionally focused organizations; according to the criteria of the Union of International Associations, the other international institutions included 3,118 organization with changing places, personnel structure, etc., 4,271 organizations, special with regards to financing, network, etc., and 5,907 internationally focused national organizations.<sup>2</sup>

With regards to the world political system, the most important are those criteria that are most related to politics. Therefore, for example, the geographical extent of international organizations competences represent a rewarding tool of differentiation – (i.e. the division into global and local organizations), in which we can then differentiate interregional, regional, and sub-regional organizations. Another criterion, and from a political point of view the important one, is the differentiation of the types of international organization objectives; with the help of this criterion and for the purpose of most basic differentiation, it is possible to divide the in-

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<sup>1</sup> *Yearbook of International Organizations. Guide to Global Civil Society Networks. 2002 –2003. Edition 39. Volume 5.* München: K. G. Saur, 2002, p. 35.


<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 35.

terstate organizations into universal organizations following state's all main objectives and specialized organizations.

The first international organizations established by governments were so called administration unions, e.g. the Central Commission for Navigation on the Rhine set up by Congress of Vienna in 1815 (in the year 1865, it was replaced by the International Commission for Navigation on the Rhine). The International Telegraph Union is considered to be the oldest inter-governmental organization with one program objective (1865), which has been operating until today – from the year 1906, under the name of International Telecommunication Union – as a specialized body of the UN. The Inter-Parliamentary Union is considered to be the first, and until the present time, still operating international forum for multilateral political negotiations.

After World War II., the number of international organizations have been increasing markedly, whereby their number partially decreased after the Cold War. Nevertheless, the number of international organizations is large and their tasks very often overlap, which is especially problematic with military alliances. Chart No. 8 shows interstate political security organizations, and their members, operating in Europe at the beginning of the middle of 2007. The quite confusing structure of these organizations results from the diversity of individual country opinion and from the development of political situations. This network of organization could be simplified by interests approximation.

Chart No. 8: POLITICAL – SECURITY ARCHITECTURE OF EUROPE



OSCE = the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe; EU = the European Union, EAPC = the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, SCO = Shanghai Cooperation Organization; OSTO = Collective Security Treaty Organization; NATO = the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; CIS = Commonwealth of Independent States; GUAM = Organization for Democracy and Economic Development; CE = the Council of Europe

\*) NATO – Russia Council has been existing since the year 2002;

\*\*) observers in Shanghai Cooperation Organization

Most of the attention from the interstate international organizations is devoted to two of them, that according to some theoreticians, represent a possible source of overall change of the world political system: the United Nations as a global institution with universal aims, and the European Union originally as an economic regional organization, that achieved a lot of success in political integration as well. Most of the attention from economic – political or-

ganizations is devoted to the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization.

### *The United Nations*

The United Nations is not an organization of nations, but states – political actors– that partly represent nations, partly citizens. The aim of the United Nations, as a global universalistic interstate institution, is according to Article 1 of the United Nations Charter, the following:

1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;
3. To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and
4. To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.

Therefore, the United Nations formed many working principles. The following can be considered as fundamental principles: a) member states are equal legally; b) the United Nations does not interfere in the matters that are in general the internal jurisdiction of member states; c) member states and organizations as a whole are willing to fulfil obligations presupposed by the Charter; d) member states are willing to settle disputes by peaceful means and to repudiate the threat or the use of force; e) member states are willing to provide assistance to the UN and to reject any help to belligerent states without any approval from the UN. It is obvious from the above mentioned list of aims and working principles that primary tasks of the UN are in the sphere of providing for international security, that is understood widely – up to taking care of the development of economic, social and cultural activities, and protecting human rights.

The United Nations were established at the end of World War II, on June 1945 by 51 states, whereby all peaceful states that accept the obligations stipulated in the Charter can become members based on the resolution of the General Assembly and based on the recommendation of the Security Council. Graph No. 1 shows how the number of the UN member states has increased.<sup>1</sup> Members of the United Nations, that break the principles of this Charter permanently, can be expelled by the General Assembly based on the recommendation of the Security Council.


Various bodies of the United Nations were established in accordance with the Charter. Firstly is the UN General Assembly and Security Council. The General Assembly of the United Nations consists of all members of the UN. It is entitled to deal with all questions that fall within the competence of the United Nations Charter or that relate to authority and competences of other UN bodies, apart from the cases that belong to the competence of the Security Council. They meet on a regular basis annually or they hold extraordinary meetings. The resolutions of the UN General Assembly are recommendations of none binding character; the exception is represented by the resolutions on internal issues of the UN, which are binding. Each member state has one vote. The General Assembly of the United Nations meet annually.

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<sup>1</sup> United Nations – <http://www.un.org/Overview/growth.htm>.

The meeting is chaired by the chairman, who – as well as 17 vice-chairmen – is elected by the UN General Assembly. If required, the UN Secretary General calls, at the request of the Security Council, an extraordinary meeting of the UN General Assembly. The General Meeting accepts resolutions by a majority of the votes of present and voting members. In the event of serious questions – (e.g. a recommendation related to keeping international peace and security), election of Security Council non-permanent members, election of Economic and Social Council members, Trusteeship Council members, acceptance of UN new members, suspension of membership rights and privileges, expulsion of members, or questions related to the competences of trusteeship arrangement and budget issues – approval by two thirds present and voting members is required. With regards to a large agenda, the General Assembly established many auxiliary bodies.

Graph No. 1: INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF THE UN MEMBER STATES



The United Nations Security Council consists of 15 members. Five of them, five great powers – China, France, Russia (the USSR originally), the U.S.A., and Great Britain – are permanent members, non-permanent members are elected by the UN General Assembly according to geographical position and always for two years. According to the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council is in principle responsible for keeping international peace and security. Despite negative experience with the work of United Nations and the fact that the Security Council is small, relatively effective and a prompt body that has extensive powers, it ensures the fast and effective action of the United Nations. They can investigate disputable questions which it decides, whether there is a threat to peace, and it recommends or decides what measures should be taken – an also about the use of force. While executing these functions, they act in the name of the UN all members. Important decisions of the UN General Assembly, as acceptance of new members, the election of the General Secretary, or any amendment of the United Nations Charter, require Security Council approval.


The Security Council of the United Nations executes its functions continuously. Its meetings are called by a chairman that is altered monthly in alphabetical order and according to its own decision and at a request of any member of the Security Council, General Secretary, General Meeting, or based on a notice of any state regarding the situation that might threaten international peace. The unanimity rule is applicable for the Security Council permanent members resolutions; they are accepted by majority of votes – the permanent members have the right to veto. Procedure matters are resolved by positive votes of the Security Council's

nine members, any other matters are resolved by nine positive votes including permanent members. There are three committees functioning within its framework, Security Council Committee on Council meetings away from Headquarters, Security Council Committee of Experts, and Security Council Committee on Admission of New Members. Furthermore, there are also other committees or commissions appointed ad hoc.

The International Court of Justice is, according to Article 92 of the Charter, the main judicial body of the United Nations. Its main activity is deciding about disputes of legal nature between sovereign states as well as submitting opinions to the United Nations General Assembly, the Security Council and other bodies. The International Court of Justice only deals with such disputes that are submitted by states themselves and voluntarily. It consists of 15 judges elected by the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council for a period of nine years and a possibility of re-election.

The General Secretary represents an important part of the United Nations system. The General Secretary is the main administration official, who chairs the Secretariat of the United Nations, but he also fulfils various political functions. The General Secretary is elected based on the recommendation of the UN Security Council for a period of five years. He functions in all main bodies of the United Nations, he fulfils all tasks set by them, he submits an Annual Report to the General Assembly, and he calls Extraordinary General Meetings at the request of the Security Council or majority of its members. The United Nations Secretariat is divided into several offices, departments, and various administrative departments that are chaired by vice-secretaries, the General Secretary, managers, and directors. Chart No. 9 shows the basic structure of the United Nations bodies. The international organizations that are included into it – economic-financial, scientific-technical, social, medical, and cultural – remain independent, but they voluntarily accepted the status of the United Nations professional organizations. This partnership results in the coordination of roles of the UN Economic and Social Council with regard to them, and in reporting by the organizations about activities as well as recommendations to the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly.

Chart No. 9: MAIN BODIES OF THE UN



However, optimistic ideas of this type have not been fulfilled. In the mid-90s, the United Nations found itself in crises resulting from different concepts of its reform. Many proposals of the UN reorganization were prepared, but none of them reached required support. At the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the decision making system seems to be inflexible. The reason is simple: the UN is an institution emerging from World War II. It is reflected by the concept of law that results from hegemonic war; it is a child of power balance in the middle of 40s. Therefore, permanent members of Security Council with the right to veto are victorious states;

and for example India, Brazil, Japan, or Germany, that may claim the right to the status of powers due to many reasons, are not permanent members. Furthermore, between the years 1945 and 1999, there was another hegemonic war – the Cold War – that had its winners and losers.

The new hegemonic status of the U.S.A. makes the impression, especially with politicians and theoreticians of conservative and neo-conservative orientation, that the United States can act regardless of the interests of others as well as regardless of previous obligations. The bombing of Yugoslavia by NATO planes in the year 1999 and the intervention of the U.S.A. together with the “coalition of willing” in Iraq in the year 2003, without the approval of the Security Council represented a result of just such ideas that in a new situation, it is possible to solve security issues without the UN.

However, the inherent laws of the balance of power are undisputable: if there is any decision about the changes of norms contrary to the interest of some great power, it is followed by a power conflict. The unilateral start of military operations against Yugoslavia resulted in the disapproval of the great powers that were not members of NATO. Then the road to peace was ensured by the negotiations at G 8, Japan participated, but not all members of NATO did. Then the final decision was made by the United Nations Security Council, where not all members of G 8 were present, but China had the right to veto. Thus in the year 1999, the great powers were looking for solutions in such a complicated way, from diplomacy to war and back to diplomacy – with increasing understanding of the balance of power nature and respecting the actual balance of power– they returned to the United Nations floor in the end. After the intervention in Iraq and the removal of Saddam Husain, there occurred difficulties with security and economic stabilization, but also with international isolation of new Iraq administration – which in the year 2004 forced the U.S.A. to address the UN officially with the request to legitimize the situation in Iraq.

It seems that the shortcomings of the UN structure and work have been persisting, but any better universal political interstate organization does not exist. The elimination of the United Nations problems can only be achieved based on an agreement and not on an unilateral renunciation of principles.

### ***The European Union***

The start of the process of the European Union (EU) was preceded by an interesting ideological-political dispute between the federalists and the functionalists. The federalists, who requested the unification of Europe based on a single constitutional act, followed the thesis, “the worst way how to overcome a gorge is to take small steps”. They considered a gradual strategy of the formation of a united Europe to be untrustworthy, which was manifested in various organizations, e.g. the United Europe Movement, the Union of European Federalists, or the European League for Economic Cooperation; in the year 1947, the federalists were organized under the roof of the International Committee for European Unity and in May 1948 in Haag, the Congress of Europe was set up. This pressure was followed by preventive steps taken by governments: the Council of Europe was set up in the year 1949 and its status *was a clear victory of indirect and incremental functionalistic approach to a united Europe over a federalist approach from conceptual and institutional points of view*<sup>1</sup>.


The history of the EU is attractive for theorists of international politics by what can be called an expansive logic of sector integration. Relevant analyses points out that there were no insurmountable objective reasons to start the European integration. At the beginning of the European Union, there were fundamental decisions of an experienced group of politicians, especially from France and Germany, who tried to learn a lecture from the horrors of the

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<sup>1</sup> KIM, P. S: *Regional Association: Political*. In: *Encyclopedia of Government and Politicp*. Edited by M. Hawkesworth and M. Kogan. Vol. 2. London and New York, Routledge, 1992, p. 986.

World Wars. As they saw a danger of militarism specifically in a possibility of military production with the use of coal and steel, and in nuclear energy in the future, they tried to get just these sectors under control in Germany and France. It is noteworthy that such persons as Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman, who were convinced federalists, were at the forefront of this decision – actually, they followed a different line too far from a political ideal. They did not try to create a united European state by a single political decision. According to the concept of functionalism, they decided to unite certain economic and social sectors. The achievements in this sphere became a model for other sectors. However, not only this: the strengthening of achieved results required the development of unity, the implication of integration into other spheres. Thus from the ground, slowly and automatically, the west European integration was deepening and separated integration programs became the European Community, which was later followed by the European Union. These processes resulted in an institution with a questionable legal capacity, with many asymmetric internal relations and with a deficit of democracy.

Map No. 1: ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION



The originality of the EU dwells in the fact that this interstate organization is a supranational entity that has authority to decide without any approval by individual members. It is not only an organization of the states or among the states, (i.e. a classical international organization), but to a certain extent, a new political unit, a relatively independent actor. In accordance with agreements, the Union is understood as a so called Maastricht Temple, a structure of three pillars:

- THE FIRST PILLAR. It consist of three original communities – Euratom, ECSC and EEC – and all institutions as Commission, Council, Parliament, Court of Justice, etc. Its task is



to ensure economic and monetary union, common market, unified industrial, tax and cultural policies, work of regional and social funds, and research and technological development. The tools to achieve these aims are represented by legal acts, directives, recommendations, and resolutions.

- **THE SECOND PILLAR.** Its function is a common foreign policy, common defensive policy and common security. The aim is to ensure security, human rights, democracy, and peace. The means are common attitudes and common activities.
- **THE THIRD PILLAR.** It is a support of the Temple in the sphere of justice and internal policy. The aim is to ensure free movement of persons, co-operation in asylum policy and migration policy, customs policy, law, anti-drug policy, international criminality and terrorism, as well as cooperation in civil and criminal issues. The means are common attitudes, international treaties, Europol – the European police office.

The aim of establishing the EU as an independent political unit was declared in the year 1972. In February 1992, 12 representatives of member countries of EEC signed the Treaty on the European Union in Maastricht. This included economic and monetary union, foreign, security and defensive policies, internal policy and law and so far, it has represented the peak of integration efforts in Western Europe. Today, the EU has twenty five members, which are also shown in map No. 1.

Discussions held about European institutions very often put into the shade the question: what is the European political system like – whether democratic procedures of Europe as a whole can replace diplomacy among states. At present the European Union is functionally based on many treaties that are confusing. This problem should have been solved after adopting the EU Constitution, the document, whose intention was to provide the Union with legal capacity, to remove chaos in basic documents, to decrease a so called democracy deficit, and to make up the institutional framework of integration.

The EU assumed basic bodies of the European Communities – decision making in the EU is divided among five main institutions: European Council, European Commission, Council of the European Union, European Parliament, and European Court of Justice. Great importance is also attributed to European Court of Auditors, European Economic and Social Committee, Committee of the Regions, and the European Investment Bank or European Ombudsman. The reform of some main EU bodies was prepared by the intergovernmental conference in Nice in the year 2000.

- **EUROPEAN COUNCIL.** It is a board consisting of the heads of states and the prime ministers of governments from the EU member countries and the chairman of European Commission. They meet at minimum of once per six months in the country presiding the Council of Ministers.
- **EUROPEAN COMMISSION.** It is a board of 25 commissioners – including the chairman of Commission that is understood as *primus inter pares* – that are appointed after an approval by the European Parliament for the period of five years. It is a legislative and executive body of the EU: it works out bills, checks the fulfilment of treaties, and provides for the proper implementation of legislation; it operates as a manager and an executor of policy and EU international business relations. The mandate of commissioners is understood as free, independent of the states they come from. The European Parliament can dissolve this board based on the vote of censure. The discussion, whether the Commission will be understood as a “factory” producing ideas or a government of the Union, whether the Commission will be a “secretariat of Europe, fatherland” (Charles de Gaulle, Margaret Thatcher, John Major) or some kind of the federal government of European federal state (Walter Hallstein, Jacques Delors) or a “technocracy” of prosperous and cooperating European states (Jean Monet, Ralf Dahrendorf), has not been finished yet.

- **COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION**, sometimes called the Council of Ministers. It was set up in accordance with the Treaty of the European Union from the original Council of Ministers of the EEC. It ensures the coordination of EU activities. Individual sector ministers of member countries work there – if solving more complex tasks, the Council occasionally acts with the participation of two or more ministers from every member state. Each of the states has a certain number of votes according to the proportional size of state – as shown in map No. 1.
- **EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT**. It is the only body of the EU, whose members have been directly elected by citizens of member states since 1979. It is the largest multinational parliament in the world. At present, it has 732 representatives, that are elected for the period of five years according to the number of inhabitants, from almost one hundred political parties. In the effort to provide the EU with democratic legitimacy, the Parliament original advisory function has been extended up to working out and amending the EU acts, budget and check supervisions, as well as supervision of executive bodies. However, the European Parliament has not achieved powers of states law-making bodies so far.
- **EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE**. It is the highest judicial body of the EU and it has been operating since the year 1958. It deals with issues that occur among the member countries governments, governments and the EU institutions and among the EU institutions. At the same time, the tasks that do not belong to the competence of court decision regarding legal disputes, are transferred to it, as it represents the only legal controlling body of the EU. The European Court of Justice operates as a constitutional court with regards to the above mentioned explanation of the EU bodies rights and obligations; it checks legal rules – it examines compatibility of secondary law and Contract Law and general legal principles, it operates as an administrative court with regards to actions of natural persons and legal entities against the EU measures as well as actions of the EU employees related to disputes arising from services; at the same time it operates as a civil court to ensure other obligations, apart from contractual obligations, and it also operates as an arbitration court.

### *Foreign policy of European Union*

The unification of member country's foreign and security policies, that create the core of state sovereignty, would represent a qualitative change in the process of European integration. After the year 1992, based on the Maastricht Treaty, the principle of common foreign and security policies was determined and thus the formation of its context and institutional assurance started.

The Amsterdam Treaty determined general aims of this policy: protection of common values, basic interests, independence, and the EU integrity in accordance with the UN Charter principles; strengthening of the EU security in all directions; keeping peace and strengthening of international security in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and Helsinki Process; support of international cooperation; development of democracy and legal state and respecting of human rights and fundamental freedoms. At that time, the position of high representative for the EU common foreign and security policies was set up, which is a role that today partly overlaps with the tasks of commissioner for external relations and European neighbourly policy.

However, not only the specification of general aims seem to be a problem with regard to the integration of the EU foreign policy. At the military-political level, there are broad discussions about the overlapping of interests, tasks, and powers of the EU and NATO and the Western European Union (WEU). The Amsterdam Treaty accepted the idea of WEU about so called Petersburg Missions, the fulfilment of which should become a primary task of European security and defence policies. The EU summit in Helsinki in the year 1999 resolved

gradually the inclusion of the WEU relevant functions into the Union. It was resolved that until the year 2003, the member countries of the EU must be able to deploy, during 60 days and to keep during one year, military forces comprising from 50 thousand up to 60 thousand soldiers. Despite real efforts to join the EU and the WEU (e.g. the highest representative for the EU common foreign and security policies is also a general secretary of the WEU), members of the both international organizations differ.

With regards to the different aims of the EU and NATO, it would be a mistake to double military institutions of Alliance in such a way that the European Union would create its own forces to the whole extent of military power. However, it is obvious that the connection of institutions and the EU policy will never be of clean form, without overlapping functions and without any contradictions. The fact that there is no ideal solution does not mean that the EU and NATO are competitors or rivals. At the same time, the document, Secure Europe in a Better World – European Security Strategy, that was approved at the EU summit in Brussels in December 2003, differs from the strategy of NATO from the year 1999 in many principles.

It can be said that the integration of EU in the spheres of common foreign and security policies is not going to stop in the nearest future. Though, the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe presupposed the position of the EU minister of foreign affairs, the EU foreign policy should have remained an issue of coordination and not of decision by the centre. It is still applicable for common foreign and security policies that their determination requires unanimity. The foreign policy of the EU only remains a common denominator of member countries common policies: it is unified if there is a consensus; it does not exist if there are differences. Thus, the unified policy is practised, for example in economic relations with African states, but there was none during the intervention in Iraq when Great Britain together with some other states supporting the U.S.A. opposed France, Germany, and Belgium.

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The idea of establishing new international political actors by means of the EU type integration shows an extraordinary importance of economic surrounding in the political system. It is possible to estimate the peculiarities of this technique application in the regions that are not so markedly homogenous economically. Cultural and national differences will not be less of a problem. However, not everything has been decided in the EU. The EU need not necessarily be oriented to more multilateral unification, to a unified state in the form of confederation or federation. As soon as the integration is transferred from economic and social spheres and interferes a state sovereignty, it also touches powers and the prestige of political elites; thus a feeling of national identity threat and personal interests threat originates. It is not by chance that the bearers of federative initiatives in the west of Europe are always those states that with regard to a unity are looking for an acknowledgement or a final power status, a fulfilment of central position.

## **9/ NON-GOVERNMENTAL INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS**

Non-governmental organizations represent the largest group of international organizations. Non-governmental international institutions are institutions whose structure, activities, and interests exceed a state border and whose members are not states, but social organizations, associations, or individuals. Therefore, non-governmental organizations are not regulated by international legal relations – these organizations are not international legal subjects in classi-

cal concept. The Rosicrucian Order, that was established in the year 1694, is considered to be the oldest non-governmental organization. In the broadest sense, the international institutionalized non-governmental actors can be divided into three main types:

- ◆ The non-governmental organizations of political focus, as revolutionary movements, political international organizations of various ideological orientations, and national-liberation movements of nations or ethnic group located in several states, etc.;
- ◆ Non-governmental organizations of apolitical and non-commercial orientation, as trade unions, professional association, churches, etc.;
- ◆ Multinational or supra-national corporations focused on commercial activities that have become a specific phenomenon of international relations and world policy after World War II.

The increasing importance of non-governmental organizations with political aims is related to increasing tendencies of individuals refusing to identify themselves with a national state and looking for some kind of separate political status. These international organizations can exist in very different forms. The revolutionary organizations of the International I. and II. types, International Workers Associations, established in the 19<sup>th</sup> century by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels with an objective to change interstate arrangement of world actors and thus also the whole world political system. Peace congresses in the 19<sup>th</sup> century pursued an immediate cultivation of international relations either by looking for norms of behaviour or by a change of the world political system structure. Organization types as The National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam, up until the reunion of Vietnam in the year 1976, or the Palestine Liberation Organization, up until the formation of autonomous territories in Israel in the year 1995, represented non-governmental organizations with an international status – either because they were accepted by some states or because they were acknowledged with a special status in interstate organizations. The other organizations, as for example Amnesty International, have no reformatory aims with regards to the world political system, but they are focused on political behaviour of individual states in the sphere of their internal political behaviour. To a certain extent, international non-governmental organizations with the support of some states that focus on a change of the political status quo – for example terrorist organizations, can be considered as a special type of international actor. According to the Charter of the United Nations, Article 71, the United Nations Economic and Social Council is awarded the right “make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence. Such arrangements may be made with international organizations and, where appropriate, with national organizations after consultation with the Member of the United Nations concerned.”

### *Supranational corporations*

Today, supranational corporations are by right considered to be a main tool of world economy internalization, the most important channel of direct investments abroad. The political, social, and cultural consequences of this process have been a subject of research and disputes; their importance is also confirmed by the fact that such different institutions as the UN, the International Labour Organization, the World Council of Churches or the Senate of the U.S.A., and many others were doing extensive research of supranational corporations activities. The efforts to create a codex of their behaviour confirms their great role in the current world. The efforts of this type were started by the International Chamber of Commerce in the year 1972 and OECD in the year 1976; the International Labour Organization joined one year later and UNICTAD in the year 1980. However, these efforts were rather doubted by further OECD activities when preparing the agreement on investments (MAI). Its originally guarded wording was made public in the year 1997 and was sharply criticized by many as well as by

the EU bodies because of the efforts to transfer obligations to states unequally and the rights to supranational organizations.

The definitions of supranational corporation vary, but in general they include qualitative and quantitative features. The general qualitative definition emphasizes that the supranational corporation:

- runs organized activities in several states at the same time;
- its objectives cannot be realized on one state territory;
- it operates in economic sector and majority of its activities are apolitical.

Table No. 3: THE BIGGEST SUPRANATIONAL CORPORATIONS  
AND SELECTED STATES  
YEAR 2005  
(data in milliards of USD)

COMPANY	REVENUES	STATE	GNP
Exxon Mobil	339.9	U.S.A.	11 750
Wal-Mart Stores	315.7	China	7 262
General Motors	192.6	Japan	3 745
Chevron	189.5	India	3 319
Ford Motor	177.2	Germany	2 362
ConocoPhillips	166.7	Great Britain	1 782
General Electric	157.2	France	1 737
Citigroup	131.0	Italy	1 609
American Intl. Group	108.9	Brazil	1 492
Intl. Business Machines	91.1	Russia	1 408
Hewlett-Packard	86.7	Canada	1 023
Bank of America Corp.	84.0	Mexico	1 006
Berkshire Hathaway	81.7	Spain	938
Home Depot	81.5	South Korea	925
Valero Energy	81.4	Indonesia	827
McKesson	80.5	Australia	612
J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.	79.9	Thai-wan	576
Verizon Communications	75.1	Thailand	525
Cardinal Health	74.9	Iran	517
Altria Group	69.1	Turkey	509
Kroger	60.6	South Africa	491
State Farm Insurance Cos	59.2	Poland	463
Marathon Oil	59.0	Ukraine	299
Procter & Gamble	56.7	Austria	256
Dell	55.9	Czech Republic	172
Boeing	54.8	Hungary	149
AmerisourceBergen	54.6	Israel	129
Costco Wholesale	52.9	Nigeria	126
Target	52.6	Slovakia	79
Morgan Stanley	52.5	North Korea	40

Many specialists distinguish supranational corporations and companies operating abroad with the help of quantification criteria. Criteria can be vary: for example, according to the research of Harvard Business School, activities in a minimum of six countries are required for a status of supranational corporation; or a company, whose activities, sales, gains, production, and employment comes – at least one fourth – from abroad. The broadest and untypical definitions understand the supranational corporations as all companies that operate abroad. Only

four or five percent of all the supranational corporations can really be called global corporations.<sup>1</sup> Just to illustrate economic powers of supranational corporations, table No. 3 compares revenues of the biggest ones to the gross national product of selected countries.<sup>2</sup>

According to some authors, the first supranational corporation was the Templar Order that started to carry out supranational banking in the year 1135. According to other authors, the first one was the Holland East India Company that operated from the year 1602. In any case, the Fugger company with a seat in Augsburg, was doing business in all parts of Europe in the 15<sup>th</sup> century. Supranational corporations did not catch the attention of today's theoreticians because of their past, but because of the changes they have undergone. First of all, their number have increased. At the same time, the number of domestic states from which they come from has also increased – most supranational corporations originated in North America and Europe until the end of the 60's and then the lead was taken by Japan's supranational corporations in the following decades. During the period from the 50's to the half of the 60's, American companies realized from 40 % up to 50 % of all the world's direct investments abroad; in the middle of the 80's the common American-British share of the world's direct investments abroad decreased below 50 %, as the German share increased from 1.2 to 8.4 % and the Japanese share from 0.7 to 11.7 %.<sup>3</sup> At the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the activities of Chinese, Russian, as well as Indian supranational companies have increased. With regards to these changes, the proportion of supranational corporations in the volume of the world production has increased. Supranational corporations also draw attention by the fact that they are the main institutions mediating import of oil and gas under conditions of dramatic politization of energy.

Table No. 4: SOURCES OF POWER DURING NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN A HOST STATE AND A SUPRANATIONAL CORPORATION

HOST STATE	SUPRANATIONAL CORPORATION
control of factors that a supranational corporation requires (natural resources, labour, market)	control of resources that a state requires (capital, employment, technology, management, etc.)
legislative power	international advantages replaceable with difficulties (unified production, international distribution network)
power of bureaucracy to delay and to deny police and military powers	possible pressure from a parent state negative dealings by a host state will discourage other investments and loans
competition of supranational corporations in access to local resources	competition of host states regarding supranational corporations investments
ability to gain advantages of supranational corporation from different resources	refusal to extend business
nationalization of foreign investments	final power to close business

### *Economic and political functions*

Today, the governments of almost all states seek investments of supranational corporations for their countries. However, they also feel that supranational corporations also present a danger to the state sovereignty, which evokes discrepant reactions of theoreticians, politicians,

<sup>1</sup> DICKEN, Peter: *Global Shift. The Internationalization of Economic Activity*. – Second edition. – New York and London: The Guilford Press, 1992, p. 49.

<sup>2</sup> Data about the firms are from the journal *Fortune* – [http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500/full\\_list/](http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500/full_list/), data about the states are from *The World Almanac and Book of Facts 2006*. Mahwah: St. Martin's Press, 2006, p. 750–853 and 854.

<sup>3</sup> DICKEN, Peter: *Global Shift. The Internationalization of Economic Activity*. – Second edition. – New York and London: The Guilford Press, 1992, p. 52.

and the public. However, host states have many tools that can knowingly be used to restrict or to encourage the activities of supranational corporations in their territories. Table No. 4 compares advantages of host states and supranational corporation during mutual negotiations.<sup>1</sup>

Despite similar economic objectives, needs and interests of states and supranational corporations are not identical. If the aim of supranational corporations is to achieve maximum (or at least satisfactory) profit, then the aim of the modern state in economic policy is to also ensure maximal wealth for its inhabitants or the highest possible quality of life. These aims can become contradictory – and in fact, they have become already. Debates regarding the topic of whether a supranational corporation is “beauty or the beast”, are not only ideological arguments based on a different concept of justice, specifically made to distinguish the significance of supranational corporations for host countries and for the country of the origin of concrete supranational corporations. At the same time, contradictions, resulting from a differently perceived role of the state, especially its sovereignty, are also important. Arguments of these disputes can be divided into two blocks that will differentiate pros and cons of supranational corporations:

- **STRENGTHS OF SUPRANATIONAL CORPORATIONS.** The supranational corporations support peaceful relations among states in their efforts to increase profit. They eliminate barriers among states, accelerate globalization of international economy and assist in determination of rules for their administration. Due to activities of supranational corporations, the volume of international trade has been increasing. The supranational corporations help to gather investment capital that can become a base of host countries development as well as they stimulate research and development in general. They finance international loans and services. They decrease prices of goods by increasing its production according to the principle of comparative advantage. They enforce principles of free trade and assist in removing such obstacles as customs duties. As they pay taxes to the host country, they increase state budget income. They increase employment and qualification of labour. They ensure markets for the goods produced in the host country, they bring market experience and also advertising campaigns. They increase profit and wealth.
- **WEAKNESSES OF SUPRANATIONAL CORPORATIONS.** The supranational corporations threaten the sovereignty and autonomy of national state. They support and excuse repressive regimes in the name of stability and order. They make the third world countries dependant upon technologies, capital, and the first world know how. They dictate the character of country economic orientation and its development. They destroy local culture and national specifications, they homogenize world culture to the level of western consumable orientation. They create non-colonial commitments, they bring “cultural pollution” and models of consumption by means of advertising. They restrict wages of workers. They increase profit and capital in the host country, but they export it to home countries. They destroy local businesses. They increase wealth of domestic elite cooperating with supranational corporations and they deepen poverty of others. The supranational corporations assist in increasing oligopolistic arrangement of world economy to the detriment of competition and free business. They restrict the availability of commodities by monopolizing production and by control of distribution. They create debtors and make poor countries dependable upon loans. They export technically and ecologically risky technologies into undeveloped countries. They secretly establish cartels and assist in inflation.

The concept of supranational corporation as an institution focused on business in developing world is not exact. As during the period after the World War II., there was a change in geographical orientation of direct investments. In the year 1938, the share of investments into developing countries comprised 66 % of all these investments in the world, this share was

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<sup>1</sup> *World Investment Report 2005. Transnational Corporations and the Internationalization of R&D.* New York and Geneva: United Nations, 2005, p. 303–307.

smaller than one fourth in the middle of the eighties and in the year 2004, a little more than one third. The share as well as volume of cross direct investments among developed countries have increased, which is mainly due to the fact that the United States is at present not only a large domestic country, but also a significantly important host country for supranational corporations. The above mentioned processes are closely related to the change of supranational corporations sector orientation: originally, raw material and foodstuff were of dominant interest for the supranational corporations, but today, the supranational corporations do business in manufacture and services to the same extent. The method of supranational corporation infiltration has also changed: from investments on green grass in the fifties and sixties up to big international fusions and acquisitions from the second half, the ninetieth year, of the previous century.

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However, historians and journalists specifically remind us of supranational corporations abilities to interfere with internal issues of host states, mainly American supranational corporations in favour of U.S. foreign policy. The United Fruit Company even succeeded in naming some countries in Central America: “banana republics”. In Guatemala in the year 1952, it assisted in bringing down the Arbenz’s regime that was hostile to the interest of the above mentioned supranational company as well as to the U.S.A. government of those days – and thus the company incited the civil war that has been lasting up today. Similarly, in the year 1970, the International Telephone and Telegraph Company assisted in murdering Salvador Allende in Chile in the name of the same objectives. After overthrowing the Mossadegh regime in Iran with the support of American government, American companies acquired further privileges in this country. The European oil companies supported French-British- Israeli intervention in the area of Sues Canal in 1956. The direct participation of the Union Minière Company, supported by the Belgian government, in the separatist activities of Katanga in Congo at the beginning of the sixties is well known. The pressure of American monopolies on the government “to do something” after Castro nationalized their property in Cuba represented one factor regarding the preparations of the invasion to Cuba in the year 1961. Likewise, the supranational corporation Shell, was associated with violation of human rights by the government of Nigeria in the nineties.

These events – and several other examples – are mentioned so often that the question arises, whether these are exceptions or not. The problem is not only that there is little evidence that supranational corporations were involved in various conspiracies: such activities are always hidden and thus evidence only accidental. With regard to the world political systems, more important is the question, which of the following was an initiator of the activities disintegrating sovereignty or requiring the change of foreign policy orientation – the policy of home state or the policy of supranational corporation?

## **10/ SOVEREIGNTY OF STATE**

If the globalization in general, and the activities of supranational corporations especially, meant fundamental violation of the classical understanding of sovereignty, this would also mean the qualitative change of the world political system. The whole theory of the balance of power is only a set of the hypotheses about the result of sovereign states uncoordinated activities. This balance in the world political system, its position and dynamics, is linked with un-



even growth of individual states power and with the changes of statesmen ambitions. However, the growth of state power is significant with regard to balance only if it interferes with the sovereign position of other states; i.e. with its sovereignty. Similarly, the activities of non-state actors to decrease the specific importance of state in the world political system can be considered to be a cause of the state sovereignty corrosion. Therefore, also the problems of state sovereignty, its defence and criticism, represent one of principal the discussion topics about the arrangement of the world political system.

From the historic point of view, three different regimes of sovereignty created by governments and accepted as well as codified by international law, have developed on Earth:

- Laws of state terrestrial and aerial sovereignty including territorial water that close this area against foreigners and foreign power. At present, apart from Antarctica, there is no terra nullius on Earth, the country of nobody – which also means that any change of terrestrial and territorial arrangements must be to the detriment of others.
- Sea law, that apart from others, determines principles of the free use of sea and ocean beyond the border of territorial water. In general, it comprises the complex principles and norms regulating the legal regime of the sea (i.e. coastal water), continuous belt, terrestrial shallow, free sea, sea floor, and underlying rock of free sea. The idea of free sea, specifically means freedom of navigation, fishing, flights, long-distance cables and pipes laying, freedom of building up artificial islands and other equipment, and freedom of research. This sea law was codified in four international treaties from the year 1958. The third conference of the United Nations on sea law, after complicated discussions lasting almost ten years, approved a new United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea in the year 1982 that after some small modifications became effective in the year 1994. It regulates the issues of sea law, including the issues of navigation, fishing, research, raw material mining from the sea floor, and protection of sea ecology. The area of sea and ocean floors beyond the two hundred miles zone from state jurisdiction and the floor below, is considered to be the common heritage of mankind. The rights to these resources are regulated by the International Seabed Authority, its seat located in Jamaica.<sup>1</sup>
- The law of cosmic and especially geostational space is being formulated. The U.S.A. advocates the principle “it serves that one who is first”. Contrary to this, the former Soviet Union demands a clear demarcation of universe and atmosphere with specific regimes, whereby similar principles as for territorial water should be applicable. Today, cosmic space is understood as the space that is more than 100 km distant from the Earth’s surface – this boundary is the lowest possible orbit for satellites.

The state sovereignty represents the limit of all these regimes and controversies. According to Thomas Aquinas, the sovereignty is an ability to enforce its will without any obstacles or permission. Jean Bodin in its work *Six Books of the Republic* (1576), presented the first modern definition about sovereignty, whereby sovereignty is understood by him as the “inalienable absolute and permanent power” of the state that is continuous, irremovable, unconditional, and independent. He defended mundane power and he declared that “it is a specific feature of sovereign that he cannot be subordinated to orders of others in any way, because that is him who stipulates acts for subjects, cancels acts that has already been approved and modifies old law“. At the same time he was of the opinion that no rulers can be considered to be in full sovereign, because “all dukes on Earth are subordinated to the Lord’s law and nature law”.<sup>2</sup>

The current more general approach defines sovereignty similarly: political unit – if international policy is taken into account – is sovereign only if not restricted by any obstacles and if

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<sup>1</sup> See POTOČNÝ, Miroslav: *Mezinárodní právo veřejné. Zvláštní část*. Praha: C. H. Beck, 1996, p. 101–112.

<sup>2</sup> According to KNUTSEN, Torbjørn L.: *Dějiny teorie mezinárodních vztahů*. Brno: Centrum strategických studií, 2005, p. 85 and 86.

the state need not ask anybody for permission to do something. Though the state acts under pressure of internal and exterior forces, it is acting first of all, according to its own interests and according to the ideas about these problems. The principle of sovereignty means a ban of interfering internal issues of the state from outside, it is a legal barrier, opposite of intervention. The bearer of sovereignty is a state power, a government. According to legal concept, sovereignty means that a government does not recognize the legitimacy of any other government in “its own state” and refuses unjustified outside pressure upon its acting. According to political concept, sovereignty equals autonomy – the government has sufficient strength to refuse outside pressure.

Two contradictory conclusions are deduced from the above mentioned principles:

- Stability and peace in the world political system can only be based upon the principles of the acknowledgment of sovereignty, independency, and territorial unity of all states; peace and stability require acknowledgement of the equality of states – sovereignty holders. However, these states are only equal legally, not by their power potentials.
- Conflicts and wars among states result from the fact that states are sovereign judges in their own disputes. The idea and practice of state’s sovereignty that controverts any higher authority over the state, is a source of anarchy in the world political system – that is, instability and wars.

### *Universality of states sovereignty*

The medieval disputes about sovereignty and relevant authority of religious and civil powers, its superiority and subordination resulted in the Peace of Westphalia. God – i.e. the pope as its representative on the Earth – has not been any more than one who anoints rulers, and grants his power a legitimacy. The Westphalian system presupposes that any authority – for example the pope or the Holy Roman Empire – has no legal jurisdiction inside the state. The Westphalia’s agreement formally confirmed the basic principles, in accordance with the state system, that is operating today. The sovereignty of the state, which has been factual for a long time, has become the subject of international treaties, customs, and then legislation. However, this shift does not mean the shift to democracy – during the first period following the Peace of Westphalia, sovereignty passed to the state feudal ruler fully. Indeed, two basic dimensions of sovereignty started to be differentiated in those days:

- ❖ **INTERNAL SOVEREIGNTY.** The sovereignty inside the state presupposes that the state (or its representative) is a sovereign administrator of the inhabitants and the territory in which it is situated, not restricted by anyone. It is understood as the right of the state to decide upon and to develop political, social, economic, and cultural arrangement freely. This means that:
  - Nobody is allowed to interfere with its interior matters. The state has an absolute freedom of internal political behaviour;
  - No subject (for example a noble subordinated to a ruler or a free town) that is a part of the state, is not a subject of international law and has no right to independent foreign policy activities.
- ❖ **EXTERNAL SOVEREIGNTY.** The external sovereignty of state means that the state is equal with regard to other states legally; the sovereignty is reciprocal. The sovereignty ensures the state has an equal membership in the international community. This means that the state itself has the right to foreign policy behaviour, but its free behaviour is restricted or regulated by the same right of other states. In this sense, territorial unity and political independency can be understood as inviolable; the state is obliged to respect the individuality of other states.

The globalization of the Westphalian system underwent two stages. The first one was represented by the world unification by means of European colonial empires. The second one is

represented by the united world political system without colonies. The legal conclusion of the second stage (i.e. the implication of the Westphalian system principles to the whole planet without any restricting conditions), was established with the approval of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples that was determined by the General Assembly of the UN in December 1960. The principles of nation self-determination and the principle of equal rights for small and big nations, have been already included into the Charter of the United Nations and it represents the first international legal document focused on this aim. However, only the above mentioned resolution from the year 1960 made the Westphalian system legally universal by its declaration that insufficient political, economic, and social preparedness cannot be an excuse for the postponing of independence; and by proclaiming colonialism to be an illegal principle of administration. Today, the political formations under foreign administration, compared to the period prior to the last decolonization wave, represent the real minimum either from the point of view of territory extent or from the point of view of the number of inhabitants. Thus decolonization fulfilled the humanistic potential of the Westphalia's principles. However, this liberating element does not represent the only context of contradictory Westphalia principles.

### ***Changes of Internal Sovereignty***

Sovereignty makes any interference in interior issues of states illegal, which means that any intervention is an illegitimate act. Nevertheless, the very often emphasized idea that sovereignty is a topical issue of the Westphalia's arrangement of the world political system is relative in a certain sense: states have always been sovereign with regard to some issues and not fully sovereign with regard to others – sovereignty has never been realized according to its ideal concept. Not only the classical monarchist understanding of state sovereignty, but also the theoretical concept of sovereignty, had to face several challenges that labelled the concept of sovereignty as an unrestricted ruler's right. It should be mentioned that Jean Bodin has already been of the opinion that a ruler cannot be considered to be a sovereignty, because "all dukes on the Earth are subordinated to the Lord's law and nature law"<sup>1</sup>. At the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the margins of sovereignty are mostly understood secularly, but sovereignty is understood more relatively. Thus the understanding of sovereignty has changed and it is perceived as an expression of non-intervention principle.

- ❖ **CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY BEARER.** This process underwent two phases.
  - Sovereignty was transferred from the dynastic ruler as a sovereign owner of the state to the state as an institution – the dynastic interest as a centre of policy was replaced by the interest of the state. We can see an apparent transfer of sovereignty bearer from a monarch to an abstract government or state in Machiavelli or Hobbes.
  - This was followed by the "nationalization" of state that transferred sovereignty to people – people were, at least formally, declared to be a source of power. The government is derived from it, because this government as a group or power elite is a bearer of sovereignty from the international policy point of view.
- ❖ **SELF-DETERMINATION OF NATIONS.** The people as a state forming factor is too universal of a category. In the conditions of the battle of dynasties or other power groups, the division of people as a world population with the help of another cultural-political unit- the nation- has become the base of individuals or cultural group's freedom. The thesis of the right to a nation's self-determination, that can only be fulfilled by establishing own state, has appeared. According to the original theoretical concept of Enlightenment philosophers, e.g. Johann Gottfried Herder, it should be a tool of cultural plurality preservation as well as the assurance of people's government – which together, should have

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid., p. 86.

guaranteed the general planetary harmony. However, it was the “nationalization” of people, in fact, the uniting of a nation with the particular interests of state power. In accordance with this concept, the category of the people – nation is fully compatible with the Westphalian system.

- ❖ **RIGHTS OF MINORITIES.** The political and technical barriers preclude the fulfilment of the right to nation’s self-determination in its ideal form. This fact resulted in the determination of requirements to protect minority rights – national and cultural – inside sovereign national states by interstate agreements and political guarantees. Thus the governing nation is restricted in the performance of its sovereignty. This infringement into state internal affairs is not only a dictate towards a nation, it is also perceived as a problem in civil societies focused on individual rights protection, because the right of minorities are group rights.
- ❖ **HUMAN RIGHTS.** The liberalization and also partially the democratization of absolute state acknowledged some human rights; i.e. the selected social and political rights of citizen. Thus the powers of the state to interfere with an individual’s privacy have been restricted. On the other hand, it means that some rights of man towards the state were recognized. Thus, some space for wider contacts between citizens and society regardless of the state, was opened. The higher level of this change is represented by the international treaties that specified the principles of human rights and provided the space to interfere with state internal affairs if there was a need to protect citizen’s rights. Such documents as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights represent the legal base for such an erosion of classical sovereignty.
- ❖ **INTERSTATE INSTITUTIONS.** The signing of interstate treaties and the establishment of institutions relates to the transfer of some sovereign rights of states into supranational institutions.
- ❖ **SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL REVOLUTION.** Many inventions and technological changes in the sphere of communication and information flow exceed borders of states by their natural dimensions. In modern times, the state is not able to regulate the information flow spread by mass media as well as by telephone, fax, and computer networks across its own borders from abroad. The state lost its absolute sovereignty over culture, education, and information for citizens.
- ❖ **ECONOMIC INTEGRATION.** The industrial and scientific-technical revolution resulted in revolutionary changes of ownership and manufacture organization. The supranational corporations, cut from the classical concept of state sovereignty by their activities which are not always economic and apolitical, have become new actors of international policy. They do not do it evenly with regard to all states and they differentiate home states and host states.

### *Limits of exterior sovereignty*

Under the conditions of supranational authority absence, self-help is one of the main principles of the world political system. First of all, the state must rely on its own strengths to ensure its own existence. This is realized under the conditions of incomplete knowledge about power changes and aims of other states – sovereign powers. Thus the state in dynamic surrounding must behave as an enlightened egoist: to define own interests and to gather sufficient means to realize them. The maximizing of freedom during political manoeuvring has been a desired ideal of states in such a surrounding. If this principle is applied to all states, it will result in nothing else than general insecurity. Thus a classical problem of the balance of power has been strengthening and it is represented by the so called security dilemma.

The rational statesman should decide according to the worst possible alternative based on other state’s behaviour. Consequently, he increases the power potential of his state, whereby

he is aware at the same time that such behaviour provokes the other side to a similar response. *Si vis pacem, para bellum* (if you want peace, prepare war), have already been asserted by Vegetius, Cicero, and Nepos. It is possible to prevent war by discouraging your opponents due to the increase in your power – you arm, which the other side need not (and must not indeed) only consider as a defensive act, and they arm as well. It is exceptional that the arms determined for defence cannot be used for attack. The state should take into account that an opportunity in the form of power superiority, originally created to strengthen the defence in good faith in the competitive surroundings of the world political system, will be used for an attack. According to Robert Jervis, if states look for an ability to protect themselves, they acquire too much and too less – *too much because they acquire the potential of aggression, too less because the others that are threatened will increase the number of their own weapons and thus they will reduce the original security of state.*<sup>1</sup> Therefore, the security of the state is a relative value and it results from the proportion of possible competitors – states power potentials, from the reciprocal behaviour of states. The result is a spiral model of security, when the balance of power is stabilized at higher levels of military power. The idea that security is a function of power and power is a function of military potential becomes the logic of international policy.

The security dilemma results in the fact that the state often devotes more attention to its relative power with regard to other states than to its own absolute advantages. In the system where the crucial guarantee of existence is self-help, the state urgently devotes a large part of its efforts to ensure the means of defence. The problems of economic and social development can become secondary with regard to competitive interests in the world. At first sight, it is a psycho-intellectual issue that can be eliminated by an agreement or in a more complicated case, based on education. In fact, the security dilemma is a structural problem of the system that is based on an absence of supranational power and state's sovereignty, and its real elimination is only possible by a radical change of this system. Jervis said, *evil is not the central topic of international relations, but a tragedy. The states often share common interests, but the structure of the situation prevent them from bringing about a mutually desired situation*<sup>2</sup>.

Theory and practice knows four basic tools to regulate states behaviour externally, in which competition and socialization are manifested, i.e. in the surroundings of world policy:

- **RULES OF THE BALANCE OF POWER.** The behaviour of states is regulated spontaneously by vector pressure and counter pressure from other states. In case of statesmen behaviour, as enlightened egoists, this regulation is half-spontaneous. The results of interests defence and state aims execution are always dependable on the parity and the dynamic of power and forces.
- **STRUCTURE OF SYSTEM.** The structure of the world political system neither comes from the legal equality of states – sovereigns, nor from arbitrary agreements – the concrete shape of structure comes from the power of states. The real position of states in the hierarchical structure of political system, conditions state's behaviour possibilities.
- **INTERNATIONAL LAW AND REGIME.** If international law is a source of sovereignty recognition, then the term of sovereignty is conditioned by the existence of international law. The international law is a political instrument through which states codify some rules to regulate the behaviour of international actors. The continuously compiled collections of regulations, norms, and procedures that determine the behaviour of states or the other actors of international relations, create the regime of the world political system. However,

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<sup>1</sup> JERVIS, R.: *Perception and Misperception: The Spiritual of International Insecurity*. In: *The Theory and Practice of International Relationp*. Edited by W. C. Olson, D. P. McLellan and F. A. Sondermann. – Sixth edition. – Englewood Cliffs: Prentice–Hall, 1983, p. 201.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

the existence of these regulations, norms, and procedures does not mean that the states follow them – or that all great powers follow them and always do so.

- **NON-STATE ACTORS.** Today, balance, structure, and regime in the world political system are linked with the increase in the specific importance of the non-state actors of the world policy, i.e. interstate and non-governmental organizations. The sovereignty of states becomes more restricted and permeable due to their presence – under the pressure of non-state actors, sovereignty does not prevent interference so resolutely and as a matter of fact, it defines non-interference more specifically.

### ***Globalization***

The activities of supranational corporations and international corporations are considered to be the parts of a wider process – globalization. Globalization is mostly understood as a process of worldwide informational, technological, and economic manifestation. These visions emphasize the free movement of money, especially capital, services, goods, labour, and the establishment of supranational institutions. The American economist, Jeffrey Sachs, characterized globalization as reforms *whose core is created by six common points (1) free international trade, (2) convertibility of currency, (3) private ownership as the main mechanism of economic growth, (4) corporate ownership as a dominant organization form of big corporations...*<sup>1</sup> The above mentioned features of economic globalization are also remarkable due to the fact that one of the liberal principles is omitted purposively: free movement of labour. Free movement of labour is not only included into the concept of globalization by the majority of theoreticians, but also in the programs of the international institutions that tried to manage or at least to minimize its risk at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. This fact points out that the advantages of globalization have not been allocated equally so far.

Some authors point out during discussions about economic aspects of globalization, that the phenomena that are considered to be an evidence of qualitative change at the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> and the 21<sup>st</sup> centuries are not new at all.

For example Robert Gilpin says that from the beginning of the eightieth year in the 19<sup>th</sup> century up to the year 1914, free market in the world and economies laissez-faire were flourishing. The British, who dominated the world in those days, in the year 1846, backed commercial liberalization and in the year 1846 they enforced it purposively by bilateral agreements. In those days, the international monetary system was based on classical gold standards and resulted in price and monetary stability. This was lost at the battlefields of World War I. A new era of efforts to liberalize world economy followed after World War II. In other words, *the world only experienced two bigger periods of liberalized trade and increasing prosperity of global dimension. Both these eras Pax Britanika prior to World War I and Pax Americana following after World War II, resulted from firm political basis.*<sup>2</sup> It should also be added that the second period of economic globalization is related to the incommensurable increase in the significance of international institutions.

The establishment of international economic institutions can be understood as a response to the new needs of the global economy. The most important are three of them: the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization.

- ❖ **INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF).** It was established at the conference in Bretton Woods and it has been operating since 1946. In the middle of 2006, it had 185 member states. The Board of Governors is the administrative body of IMF. All member countries have their representatives there; they meet once per year. The Executive

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<sup>1</sup> SACHS, J. D.: *Consolidating Capitalism*. In: *Foreign Policy*, Spring 1995, No. 98, p. 51.

<sup>2</sup> GILPIN, Robert: *The Challenge of Global Capitalism. e World Economy in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000, p. 46–47 and 357.

Board, with 24 members, runs individual activities and it is assisted by the Interim Board. Its financial resources specifically come from membership contributions (so called quotas) that reached the amount of SDR 213.5 milliards, which is a special basket of currencies that are used in international trade – at present, it consists of euro, British pound, Japanese yen, and American dollar. The amount of quotas is determined according to the relative economic strength of individual member states and it determines the number of votes.

- ❖ **WORLD BANK.** It is the common, but not the exact name, of two institutions – the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Development Association, which have approximately ten thousand employees together. Together, along with three other institutions, constitute the World Bank Group:
  - International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) was established in 1945 and it had 184 members in the year 2006;
  - International Development Association (IDA) was established in 1960 and it had 165 members in the year 2006;
  - International Finance Corporation (IFC) was established in the year 1956 and it had 178 members in the year 2006;
  - Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) was established in the year 1988 and it had 167 members in the year 2006. They guaranteed a total of 14.7 milliard dollars;
  - International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) was established in the year 1966 and it had 143 members in the year 2006.

The administrative body of the Group is the Board of Governors and all member states are represented there. The common agenda is dealt by Executive Directors, the chairman of which is the president of the World Bank. The program objective of these four institutions is to decrease poverty in the world with the help of the strengthening of economies of poor states. The World Bank, as well as the International Monetary Fund, are more traditional organizations than independent entrepreneurial subjects.

- ❖ **WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (WTO).** It was established in the year 1995 and as the main organization supervising international trade, it superseded the former General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) that was operating from the year 1948. At the beginning of the year 2006, WTO comprised 149 member states and 32 observer states. The status of observers oblige all governments – apart from the Vatican – to start negotiations on accession during a period of five years; at present this is being done by Russia. The managing body of WTO is the Ministerial Conference that meets once per two years. The General Council is responsible for everyday work of organizations. The program objectives of WTO are stipulated in the final document of Uruguay Round and it includes: (a) elimination of economic discrimination, (b) free trade, (c) support of competition, and (d) especial measures for less developed countries.

All these institutions are international, but Zbigniew Brzezinski says *in fact, they are all controlled by the United States and their establishment is derived from American initiative, specifically the conference in Bretten Woods in the year 1944.*<sup>1</sup> The portion of American economy and financial contributions for the work of these institutions provided the U.S.A. with the position of hegemonic leader. Therefore, any criticism and protests on streets specifically against the work of IMF and the World Bank are focused on the United States as well. The above mentioned criticism is not justified, but for example the failure in loan policy during the seventieth and the eightieth year of the twentieth century resulted in the increased in-

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<sup>1</sup> BRZEZINSKI, Zbignev: *Velká šachovnice. K čemu Ameriku zavazuje její globální převaha.* Praha: Mladá fronta, 1999, p. 34.

debtedness of developing countries. The activities of IMF and the World Bank helped only some of the poorest countries to develop economically.<sup>1</sup>

All what has been mentioned indicates that economic definitions of globalization are too narrow – they omit the persisting role of the state, the importance of the world political system transformation, the globalization of mass culture, and the role of global problems. In general, it can be said that within the framework of globalization, there is arising the following: (a) the new economic order and division of labour, (b) the new political order with a new structure and regime of the world political system, and (c) the cosmopolitan culture. It is a contradicting process on the scale of “solidarity – cooperation – conflict” that is based on economic advantages and necessity:

- **CONFLICTING COMPONENTS OF GLOBALIZATION** relate to two main phenomena:
  - ❖ Asymmetry of economic integration. The advantage resulting from mutual cooperation is not equally divided in the process of economic integration. The international corporations that are a tool of the world capital integration, distinguish parent countries and host countries, they create rentier states and nations, getting much more from free flow of capital, goods, and services than they contribute. And not only supranational corporations, but also international organizations have their parent countries.
  - ❖ Hegemonic stability of the world political system. Such a world political system is structured asymmetrically because today only the United States has global power interests, will, and the ability to enforce them. The U.S.A. determined main rules of the world political system regime and economic globalization. However, the prevailing concept of liberal freedoms is not linked with prosperity democratization and there is still a danger that an authoritative regime can be perceived by supranational corporations as an advantageous one in order to increase profit.
- **COOPERATIVE DEALING** is a positive feature of an increase in supranational monopolies, capital transfer, and mutual complex dependence. It is strengthened by knowledge of necessity to face worldwide problems together. However, key reforms of such institutions as the IMF and the World Bank are necessary in order so that they might become more effective. The United Nations executes an extraordinary important role with regard to cooperation (as well as to solidarity development), not only by its everyday agenda, but also by such projects as the Millennium Development Goals or the work of thematic conferences resulting, for example, in the acceptance of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, etc. The activities of G8 have a distinguished coordinating role.
- **SOLIDARITY** is based on possibilities offered by economic growth under cooperative conditions and it helps (due to various motives) to solve some contradictions of globalization (e.g. the extreme poverty or indebtedness of poor countries), and also to react to natural disasters.

Thus, at the level of cooperation and solidarity, the beginnings of what the representatives of English school call an “international society” are formed. This relates to the international community that is more than a state system: it is a global alliance of the states that are aware of their mutual goals. The cooperation and the solidarity are tools that allow them to solve global problems. The global problems are considered to be such that can seriously endanger many people in many countries, they are relatively persistent, they dramatize the mutual dependence and they are very often interconnected. With regard to these general characteristics, this relates mainly to the contradictions between wealth and poverty of the nations, population explosion, food deficit, energy and raw material resources depletion, and environmental crisis. Specifically, the preservation of physical and biological systems start to be perceived as a necessary condition of existence. This thesis is associated with not only a vision to keep

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<sup>1</sup> *Global Economic Prospect. Economic Implications of Remittances and Migration* 2006. Washington: The World Bank, 2006, p. 9.



a productive ecosystem, but also the idea to renew the ozone layer, to stop soil degeneration, sea pollution, climate warming, etc.

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The legal ideal of all states sovereignty very often conflicts with the reality of the state's different power potentials. The power is not always the support for law, but the law without the power is only an unenforceable moral obligation. The risks included into the term of sovereignty can only be overcome in connection with international law. The most complex vision of sovereign states obligations is comprised by the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. It was approved by the UN General Assembly in October 1970 based on the Czechoslovak initiative from the year 1962. The declaration consists of seven principles: (a) the obligation of states to refrain in international relations from the threat or use of force (e.g. against the territorial integrity or political independence), (b) the duty of states to settle their disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security are not endangered, (c) the duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any other state, (d) the duty of states to cooperate with one another, (e) the principle of equal rights and the self-determination of peoples, (f) the principle of sovereign equality of states, and (g) the principle to fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by states. The rules regulating relations among states were also accepted by the Organization of American States in the year 1973 and the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe in the year 1975. However, the enforcement of these declarations is very low. Thus it is still valid that the sovereignty of small states is only given by international law, for great powers not only by law, but also by their ability to protect their security interests by force.

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