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Democratization in the Third World

Introduction: the 'third wave' and the Third World

Recent reforms in the direction of pluralist democracy and away from authoritarianism in the form of military rule, one-party systems, personal dictatorships and racial oligarchy (Huntington, 1991, pp. 110–11) have revived interest in how to identify the prerequisites of stable democracy. Identifying the necessary conditions for the survival of democratic regimes has long been a preoccupation of political science, but is particularly relevant today when so many attempts are being made to establish or restore Western liberal democracy in so many parts of the world (Pinkney, 1993, ch. 2). Developing countries have been caught up in the so-called 'third wave' of democratization, starting in Portugal in 1974 and sweeping across southern and eastern Europe and, to varying degrees, most regions of the Third World.

The latest wave of democratization that increased the proportion of countries in the world with some form of democratic government from 28 per cent in 1974 to 61 per cent in 1998 has included remarkable changes in the Third World. However, since 1980 the strength of democratization here has varied, with the strongest felt in Latin America. Asia too has experienced significant democratization. Sub-Saharan Africa has lagged behind with relatively weak attempts to democratize. The Middle East has seen very little effort to democratize (see Table 11.1). There are no true democracies or free societies in the Arab region and few free or democratic countries among states with a Muslim majority (Keratyky, 2002, p. 102).

The process of democratization has not been one of smooth progression. When new countries enter the ranks of newly democratizing states (for example, Mexico and Ghana in 2000), others suffer reversals in the form of *coups* (Ecuador and Fiji), or ethnic violence leading to the collapse of government

Table 11.1 *Freedom: regional variations, 2000*

	Number of states rated:		
	Free	Partly free	Not free
Africa	9 (17%)	25 (47%)	19 (36%)
Asia	18 (46%)	10 (26%)	11 (28%)
The Americas	23 (66%)	10 (28%)	2 (6%)
Middle East	1 (7%)	3 (21%)	10 (71%)

SOURCE: Freedom House (2001), pp. 7–8.

NOTE: Freedom House divides countries into three broad categories on the basis of indicators of political rights (such as the right of all adults to vote) and civil liberties (such as freedom of assembly and demonstration): ‘free’, ‘partly free’ and ‘not free’.

(The Solomon Islands). While some countries register improvements in political rights and civil liberties, such as media freedoms in Peru, free and fair elections in Taiwan, and greater economic opportunities for women in Oman, others experience set-backs, of which there were 18 in 2001, all but one in the Third World and including Trinidad and Tobago, Ethiopia and Zimbabwe.

To account for the process of democratization and its set-backs, political science has drawn a broad distinction between the *transition* to democracy, or a particular kind of change and its historical antecedents and causes; and *consolidation*, or the conditions necessary for democratic regimes, especially those following a period of authoritarianism, to survive. Before examining attempts to generalize and theorize about these phases of democratization, a cautionary reference to the concept of democracy must be made.

Meanings of ‘democracy’

In the study of Third World democratization, ‘democracy’ is defined in Western liberal terms (Pinkney, 1993, ch. 1). For example, Diamond *et al.* (1990) require a system of government to provide meaningful and extensive competition between individuals and groups, highly inclusive levels of political participation in the selection of leaders and policies, and civil and political liberties sufficient to ensure such competition and participation, before it is classified as democratic, though they acknowledge that countries satisfy such criteria to differing degrees, and that rules and principles may

be contaminated by practice (pp. 6–8). Rueschmeyer *et al.* (1992) look for realistic possibilities rather than philosophical ideals: ‘modest’ popular participation in government through representative parliaments, the responsibility of government to parliament, regular free and fair elections, freedom of expression and association, and an extensive suffrage (pp. 10, 41–4).

One of the reasons why understanding democratization is so difficult is the variability of regimes that are labelled democratic, and the nature of the democratic deficit found in so many. Regimes may be classified as new or restored democracies despite the circumvention by parliaments of presidential decrees (for example, Argentina), disregard of constitutional boundaries by the executive branch (for example, Taiwan), the award of veto powers to non-elected bodies such as the military (Chile and Thailand) and other deviations from the democratic ideal. Such variations make it problematic to relate democratization as a dependent variable to factors believed hypothetically to explain the process, especially consolidation (O’Donnell, 1998; Merkel, 1999).

Another problem with the analysis of democratization arises from the contested nature of the concept of democracy. Definitions often refer to the presence of different phenomena: procedures (such as the holding of free and fair elections), recognized human rights (such as freedom of association and speech), extensive participation, and material equality (because economic deprivation leads to political disempowerment). There are both formal and substantive conceptions of democracy. For some, democracy means ‘meaningful political citizenship’ (Grugel, 2002, p. 5). Analysis of democratization is affected by whatever view of democracy is held by the investigator.

The transition to democracy

Transitions from authoritarianism to democracy have been extremely varied, making it difficult to discern patterns that aid explanation. This complexity is sometimes compounded by confusion between the causes of authoritarian breakdown and the processes by which democratic replacements are introduced. For example, the three ‘routes’ to democracy are categorized in Potter *et al.* (1997) as ‘modernization’, which stresses the economic prerequisites of democracy; the ‘structural’, which focuses on the effects on authoritarianism of changes in class and power; and ‘transition’, which focuses on the bargaining between élites which negotiate the transition to democracy. Such confusions make it difficult to distinguish between the definition of a phase such as transition, and its causes. Furthermore,

transition and consolidation are not always kept conceptually distinct, as when explanations of transition are used to test whether a democracy has become consolidated (see for example, Chadda, 2000). It has also proved difficult to distinguish between the causes of authoritarian breakdown and the form taken by the negotiation of change.

It helps to consider first what 'triggers' the end of authoritarianism and a movement towards a democratic alternative, though 'trigger' is perhaps not the best term when the causes of democratization may be long-term (such as a programme of industrialization), medium-term (an economic liberalization programme) or short-term (the calculations of political élites or popular struggles) (Luckham and White, 1996). Here the main debate has been between explanations that emphasize the importance of conflict within the authoritarian élite, and those which stress pressure from below or within the opposition to authoritarianism. It depends on the nature of the authoritarian regime as to whether the democratic challenge comes from the mobilization of civil society or conflict within the regime (Diamond, 1997a).

Disunity within authoritarian regimes has characterized all breakdowns, as coalitions begin to disintegrate under pressure from differences over aims, policies and survival strategies which have no means for consensual conflict resolution: 'the danger for authoritarian regimes is that the weakness of institutional procedures for resolving disputes creates significant potential for instability' (Gill, 2000, p. 32). *Élite conflict* has preceded many transitions to democracy (O'Donnell *et al.*, 1986), alerting opposition movements to the possibility of reform. Transition is then initiated from above. Authoritarian regimes disintegrate rather than being overthrown. Authoritarianism is ended by popular protest or revolutionary action in only a minority of cases. Transitions from above have been most likely to lead to democracy. Revolutions may overthrow authoritarian regimes, but rarely lead to democracy (Nicaragua being one exception to this rule). Reform efforts launched by mass movements usually encounter anti-democratic resistance from established élites. It has even been argued that mass participation and popular mobilization can harm the democratization process (Huntington, 1984; Weiner, 1987). In Latin America at least, democratization means the creation of 'pacts' between representatives of regime and opposition which guarantee some measure of protection for the interests involved, such as the military on the government side and trade unions among the opposition.

Those who stress the importance of human agency, and the role of élites in negotiating the transition from authoritarianism have been faulted for holding too narrow a view of democracy, ignoring the role of mass movements, and

paying insufficient attention to structural factors, such as levels of economic development, which may account for both the decay of authoritarianism and subsequent obstacles to democratic consolidation (Grugel, 2002, pp. 60–2). Other scholars have argued that authoritarian regimes are destabilized by pressures from public protest, and industrial and political action by trade unions, even if the subsequent negotiations which design the new democratic regimes are dominated by members of different political and economic élites. Peru, Argentina, the Philippines and South Korea are cases in point, as well as some African states, where transitions have been predominantly brought about by mass protest in which church leaders, trade unions, professional groups, human rights campaigners, student and youth organizations and old guard politicians have been involved (Wiseman, 1996).

Authoritarian regimes, single party more than military, mobilize the public through closely controlled activities – in trade unions, youth groups, business associations, cultural bodies and political parties. Political mobilization becomes a threat to the regime when it is organized through political parties, trade unions and mass movements that secure a degree of autonomy from the regime. Such popular mobilization is usually stimulated by economic development or economic crisis (Gill, 2000, pp. 13–18). Popular participation through social movements such as women's groups (for example, the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo in Argentina), labour unions (for example, the copper miners in Chile), community organizations and indigenous associations (such as the Zapatista movement in Chiapas, southern Mexico) were important in the struggle against authoritarianism (Grugel, 2002, pp. 99–112). The case of South Korea and some of the other 'Asian Tigers' also show how economic success can generate new élites and social groups demanding more access to power and resources (Rueschmeyer *et al.*, 1986; Haggard, 1990).

Popular mobilization has, then, accompanied some successful transitions, and 'moderation' on the part of the working class has not proved essential for democratization which has occurred despite political extremism and violence (in Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Peru, South Korea and the Philippines). This may be because authoritarian élites realize they have a choice between democratic reform and revolution, rather than between democracy and further repression. Similarly, moderate opposition leaders may be unified by the threatening presence of extremism (Bermeo, 1997).

So it should not be inferred from élite domination of negotiations during transition that the causes of authoritarian breakdown had nothing to do with popular pressure or civil society. Popular resistance to authoritarian regimes is common. And while élites may dominate the process of bargaining and pact-making, they represent non-élites – peasants, workers, campaigners,

professionals – whose interests cannot be ignored and whose political activity is the subject of the bargaining process. There is also a danger when stressing the role of élites in the negotiation of political change that the process will be made to appear voluntaristic and unpredictable, making it very difficult to formulate a theory of transition: ‘If individual actors are omnipotent, then not only does this render attention to others than these actors irrelevant, but it also makes the task of theorizing change well nigh impossible’ (Gill, 2000, p. 82).

Another problem with the explanation of democratic transition in terms of power struggles within the ruling bloc or alliance is that it is insufficiently dynamic to explain the *shifting* alliances between bureaucrats, the military, representatives of the property owning classes, labour, and other social entities. Such shifts arise from the inevitable uncertainty about the implications of the retreat from authoritarianism for different socioeconomic interests (Przeworski, 1986, p. 59).

Internal crisis is another factor that often triggers the transition to democracy, such as economic recession or military failure (for example, Argentina’s defeat in the Falklands/Malvinas war in 1983). The breakdown of authoritarian regimes has often followed economic crises brought about by poor economic management and international pressures (such as a steep rise in oil prices or a reduction in the availability of foreign loans). Policy adjustments, such as devaluation, to deal with the crisis then have adverse consequences for groups supporting the regime that have already been disadvantaged by the crisis itself (Gill, 2000, pp. 10–13). Declining domestic legitimacy then increases the cost of authoritarian power. Alternatively, the costs of democracy or the threat of revolution may be perceived by authoritarian governments to have receded. Mainwaring (1992) distinguishes between types of élite motivations in Latin America in terms of ‘collapse’, ‘transaction’, and ‘extrication’.

External pressures may begin the demise of an authoritarian regime, such as the need to acquire international legitimacy or satisfy international expectations of political reform which may be made a condition of further development assistance from multilateral and bilateral aid agencies. Alternatively a foreign power may enforce democratization, as in Panama. The current wave of democratization is very much a response to intensified economic internationalization, the dominance of neo-liberal ideology and the disintegration of the USSR (Pinkney, 1993, pp. 108–10; Przeworski, 1995, pp. 5–9). International pressures can act in support of domestic factors to cause the breakdown of an authoritarian regime – economic sanctions, trade embargoes, international ideological pressures, global recessions,

'contagion' (as in Latin America) and, rarely, military force. However, how such international factor affect democratizing regimes has depended on how domestic economic and political actors, institutions and structures were linked to global geopolitical forces (Gill, 2000, pp. 18–25).

The dissolution of authoritarian regimes is commonly marked by liberalization, whereby repression is eased and the right of political association is recognized. Civil society is gradually 'resurrected'. Parties re-emerge (Mainwaring, 1992, p. 301). But mainly transition is characterized by negotiations between representatives of the current regime and opposition forces to design the new system of government. Dominant élites may judge that a move towards democracy will be in their own interest, as in Mexico, leading them to concede democratic reform. Alternatively they might have to retreat in the face of opposition pressure, a factor in Argentina's end to military rule. Opposition groups then take the lead in negotiating the end of authoritarianism. In most cases negotiation between representatives of the old regime and its opponents characterize transition (Huntington, 1991; Little, 1997, pp. 179–80). Latin American experience shows that successful transitions were usually negotiated by moderates on both sides who were willing to compromise in accommodating each other's interests (Peeler, 1998).

Negotiations and pacts have implications for the quality of the democracy created. For example, when transition requires pacts that protect the interests of groups and classes represented by authoritarian élites, the interests of those supporting greater participation, accountability and equity are unlikely to be dominant in the transition phase (Karl, 1996).

When the capacity for mass involvement in transition is understood it becomes evident that many of the political leaders involved in negotiating transition to democracy have popular power bases, and that their role cannot be understood in isolation from the sections of the populace they represent and to which they owe their position. However, the precise contribution which social forces and their leaders make towards the transition to democracy depends on the nature of the authoritarian regime to be changed, and the nature of the society within which it is located. By distinguishing between different types of regime and different types of political society, Gill has developed a theory of transition which combines information about both regime and non-regime élites, the latter owing their power to their position in civil society.

Regimes are either 'unitary' in the face of challenges, or 'segmentary', with different interests supporting the regime in conflict. Society is either 'atomized' (without independent groups and movements) or 'civil' – with independent organizations enabling interests to be articulated and a degree of popular control to be exercised. A political system's position in relation

to these two dimensions determines its prospects for transition to democracy and the path that will be taken. A combination of unitary regime and atomized society makes democratization less likely, because the regime is better placed to deal with challenges to its power and society is unable to produce effective opposition. Conversely, a combination of segmentary regime and civil society offers better prospects for democratization. If a unitary regime confronts a strong civil society there is a likelihood of violence. Finally, the prospects for democracy are poor when a segmentary regime exists within an atomized society. Here authoritarian collapse is likely to be followed by further authoritarianism (Gill, 2000, pp. 120–3).

Negotiating the end of authoritarianism means attending to three main issues: the construction of a constitutional settlement, the dismantling of authoritarian government agencies, and the abolition of laws unsuitable for democratic politics. The possibility of successful negotiation on these institutional reforms depends on five sets of factors (Pinkney, 1993). First, there is the type of authoritarian regime to be dismantled. For example, a caretaker military regime will be easier to remove than a radical or reforming one. One-party regimes present obstacles according to the level of integration of party, state and civil society. Secondly, negotiations will be affected by the ability of opposition groups to plan for democracy rather than just oppose authoritarianism. A third set of factors is the configuration of institutions and political structures under authoritarianism and the extent to which parties, legislatures, constitutions and traditional political authority have survived during authoritarian rule.

Fourthly, transition depends on the changing orientations towards reform by key élites – cabinets, juntas, bureaucrats, military officers, and opposition leaders – and organizations representing sections within civil society (church leaders, trade unions, social movements). Such orientations determine whether democratization will be government élite-led, or driven by pressures from below and originating at grass-roots level or within the middle class. Finally, there is the process of conflict resolution. Patterns have been found in the relationships between process and outcomes. The viability of new democratic regimes has been found to be strengthened by a process of transition characterized by gradual rather than rapid change, moderation rather than radicalism on the part of protagonists, consensus rather than conflict over the objectives of democratization, and a balance of power between negotiating groups. Such patterns, however, are far from fixed, and only tentative conclusions have been generated by observations of their detailed operation in specific cases.

Negotiations eventually lead to some form of provisional government while the institutional basis of democracy is put in place (especially a new

constitution) and élites adjust their political behaviour to liberal democratic practices. Uncertainty inevitably surrounds the location of the boundary between the end of transition and the start of consolidation, not least because different analysts have different conceptions of democracy's key characteristics, and change is not always marked by some 'focal event' (Schedler, 2001).

Transitions have been highly variable processes, in terms of the sources of tension within authoritarian regimes, responses to pressures for political change by authoritarian leaders, the speed of transition, and the behaviour of élites, parties and civil society bodies. The structural conditions inherited by the transitional government also vary, providing the process of consolidation with 'structured contingencies' in the form of political institutions, informal interest groups, social polarization, and relations between states and classes (Haynes, 2001, pp. 18–34).

The assumptions behind the idea of there being a 'transition' to democracy have been critically questioned. It is not safe to assume that transition is necessarily towards democracy. The majority of 'third wave' countries have not achieved 'well functioning' democracy, suffer from severe democratic deficits, and are not 'clearly headed toward democracy'. These defects should not be forced into the 'transition' model by the addition of adjectives like semi, formal, façade, pseudo, weak, partial, illiberal and virtual, because politics in these countries calls the whole paradigm into question. Voting has not deepened participation or strengthened accountability. In many cases democratization has been attempted in states which are weak and where state building has not been compatible with democratization. The extent to which civil and political rights are protected varies greatly. The rule of law is frequently undermined. The scale of poverty is such that it must be doubted whether large sections of the population in newly democratizing states enjoy full citizenship (Anglade, 1994; Carothers, 2002). In Africa elections have had little impact on the political order, pro-democracy movements are weak, and economic and political crises block change. In Latin America and Africa, participative democracy and political equality have been negated by persistent poverty, marginalization and exclusion of large sections of society. In Asia authoritarianism has become 'softened' rather than displaced by democracy (Grugel, 2002).

Thus while electoral democracy might be widely established (with the possibility of alternating governments based on electoral choices), it has not always been accompanied by 'liberal' democracy and the protection of individual and group freedoms, pluralism, civilian control of the military, accountability, the rule of law, and judicial independence. In fact, while the

number of electoral democracies has grown, levels of political and civil freedom have declined, leaving democracy that is 'shallow, illiberal and poorly institutionalized' (Diamond, 1997b, p. xv). More than one type of democracy can emerge from transition (Schmitter, 1992, pp. 162–3).

These are perhaps harsh judgements on the transition model which mainly tries to specify what undermines authoritarianism and what political action takes place as a new regime is negotiated. But the critiques do serve to show that part of the problem of democratic consolidation is that what is being consolidated in many cases is a regime that falls short of having full democratic credentials, and that this is likely to be the case so long as the state has to prevent political freedoms from encroaching on the economic interests of privileged groups.

The consolidation of democracy

The process of consolidating democracy entails strengthening democratic institutions (especially the rule of law and protection of civil rights), extending democratic processes and preventing authoritarian reversals. Political institutions and civil society need to be infused with democratic practices, for example, by the empowerment of associations in civil society to increase popular participation and make it more difficult for élites to manipulate democratic institutions. Authoritarian political discourses need to be rejected, and authoritarian political actors need to be neutralized. 'Perverse institutions' should be abolished, such as tutelage by non-democratic élites (especially the military), restrictions on the scope of policy-making powers (for example, exclusion of the Chilean parliament from the defence budget), and forms of political recruitment which give some minority interest a disproportionate presence on law making bodies (O'Donnell, 1992; Valenzuela, 1992; Luckham and White, 1996, p. 7).

Consolidation means that democracy has become routinized and internalized in political behaviour. No significant groups pursue unconstitutional, illegal, or undemocratic means to achieve their aims. Élites and the wider public accept democracy as the preferred means of governing and deciding on political succession. A democratic political culture has emerged in which trust, tolerance and compromise are the dominant political norms (Diamond, 1997b, p. xvii; Leftwich, 2000, p. 135).

What, then, are the prerequisites of such beliefs and behaviour? Explanations have variously stressed socio-economic variables, or political factors, including foreign intervention. The remaining sections deal with

explanations of consolidation in terms of these different sets of factors, recognizing that there are difficulties in applying predictions about consolidation derived from one region, such as Latin America, to another, such as Africa (Wiseman, 1996, pp. 157–9).

The economic preconditions of democratic consolidation

There is much evidence to support the conclusion that economic affluence and related social change are needed to improve the chance of democratic consolidation. Lipset (1959, 1960) was the first to demonstrate this statistically, showing that the stability of democratic government is positively correlated with measures of affluence and economic modernization. Indicators of wealth such as per capita income, the percentage of the population owning motor cars, and the number of doctors, radios and telephones per thousand population, were combined with measures of industrialization such as the proportion of the population still engaged in agriculture, and measures of social development such as literacy rates, educational enrolments and levels of urbanization. Correlations were found with democratic stability in Latin America, Europe and the English-speaking countries.

Lipset's interpretation of the correlations was in terms of affluence reducing lower-class discontent. He argued that his data confirmed the age-old view (traceable back to Aristotle) that:

only in a wealthy society in which relatively few citizens lived in real poverty could a situation exist in which the mass of the population could intelligently participate in politics and could develop the self-restraint necessary to avoid succumbing to the appeals of irresponsible demagogues. (Lipset, 1959, p. 71)

Levels of industrialization, urbanization and education were also found to be higher the more democratic the country. Lipset argued that economic development led to greater economic security and better education, both of which allow 'longer time perspectives and more complex and gradualist views of politics'. Increased wealth and education also contribute to pluralism 'by increasing the extent to which the lower strata are exposed to cross pressures which will reduce the intensity of their commitment to given ideologies and make them less receptive to supporting extremist ones'.

Economic development also enlarges the middle class, whose interest is in moderating conflict – which it is able to do by rewarding moderate political parties and penalizing extremist ones. Economic development affects other

classes, too. The greater the wealth of the lower class, the less opportunity there is for the upper class to deny them their political rights. The wealthier a country, the less important it becomes if some redistribution takes place; losing political office becomes less significant and, therefore, non-democratic means of holding on to power become redundant, as does nepotism. Lipset also argued that wealth proliferates countervailing sources of power and opportunities for political participation, communication and recruitment, all of which are supportive of democracy.

However, Europe's unstable democracies and authoritarian regimes were shown to have had higher levels of development than Lipset's group of Latin American democracies. The problem with Lipset's analysis was that it revealed correlation without accurately indicating the direction of causality. It did not use multivariate analysis which allowed the causal weight of variables to be estimated by controlling for other causal factors. All that Lipset's data showed was a causal tendency (Diamond, 1992, pp. 94–5). So Lipset's explanation, despite the superficial attractiveness of the idea that as a society gets richer there will be fewer discontented people and greater consensus in favour of a democratic status quo, has problems associated with it.

Nevertheless, almost all of the large number of quantitative studies using multivariate analysis as well as cross-tabulations published since Lipset's original paper find a positive relationship between democracy and various indicators of socio-economic development. The finding of greatest significance for an understanding of political stability is that 'high levels of socio-economic development are associated with not only the presence but the stability of democracy'. Considering the different quantitative methods, time-spans and indicators used 'this must rank as one of the most powerful and robust relationships in the study of comparative national development' (Diamond, 1992, p. 108). There are, inevitably, some exceptions to the rule but, after an extensive review of the literature and a new cross-tabulation of per capita GNP with type of regime, Diamond felt it safe to theorize that 'the more well-to-do the people of a country, on average, the more likely they will favour, achieve and maintain a democratic system'. (Diamond, 1992, pp. 109–10; see also Rueschmeyer, 1991 and Rueschmeyer *et al.*, 1992, pp. 13–20.)

The egalitarian aspect of Lipset's theory has also been supported by subsequent investigation. The study by Przeworski and colleagues of 135 countries between 1950 and 1990 confirmed that democracy is more stable in more egalitarian societies. Having selected their own indicators of equality they showed that political instability was associated with increasing inequality in household incomes and a falling share of value added in manufacturing

(Przeworski *et al.*, 2000, p. 120). Other comparative evidence, such as Muller's study of 33 countries between 1961 and 1980, also confirms the relationship between equality and stable democracy. He found that the relationship between inequality of income and the *level* of democracy at a given point in time showed no causal effect. But when measures of democratic *stability* rather than level were correlated with income inequality, and the effect of economic development controlled, less-developed countries with democratic regimes and relatively low income inequality were found to experience regime stability (although countries with a relatively egalitarian distribution of income are not more likely to *inaugurate* democracy). So while income inequality is not incompatible with transition to democracy, it is with the stability of democracy. Continuing high inequality following the inauguration of democracy is likely to lead to a loss of legitimacy and breakdown of the regime (Muller, 1988). Furthermore, although not incompatible with the emergence of democracy, inequalities in land distribution are also less conducive to democracy than a more egalitarian social structure (Diamond and Linz, 1989, p. 39).

There are some problems with this type of analysis, however. First, there is the role in supporting democracy ascribed to the new class structure of a developed economy. The middle classes might be expected to support democracy, but mainly because it legitimizes private property, and because they can 'manage' the democratic process to protect themselves against radicalism and redistribution through ideological control, state apparatuses, financial power and the threat of capital 'flight'. The managerial middle class also supports democracy because through it they can protect their interests and become 'included' in politics (Moore, 1996).

In developing countries this class analysis may exaggerate the interest which the lower classes will have in democracy. As well as weakening the power of the landed classes and giving rise to a new middle class, capitalist development also increases the power of the working class by creating the capacity for self-organization through urbanization, factory production, transportation and new forms of communication (Huber *et al.*, 1993). But for democracy to be compatible with capitalism it may have to be limited and not founded on economic equality, social autonomy and citizenship. It will have to be designed to protect the rights of property-owning classes, not the rights of those with conflicting economic interests. Demands for the economic betterment of the working class are a threat to business interests. Procedural democracy is the most that can be expected under a capitalist economic system, not political reforms that would protect the social and economic interests of workers. The consolidation of democracy actually

requires low levels of political participation, restricted rights of citizenship, a docile working class, and an absence of many of the rights on which full democracy operates. This is why democracy is likely to exist alongside clientelism, state repression and electoral manipulation (Cammack, 1994, 1997, pp. 253–6).

Secondly, quantitative studies of development and democracy actually tell little about the reasons why democracy breaks down, other than that there is likely to have been a drop in the level of some statistically significant socio-economic indicators. Such a mode of analysis cannot explain why a fall in, say, per capita income is likely to reduce the chances of democratic survival. For this a more qualitative and historical approach to individual countries needs to be taken (Potter, 1992).

Case studies, most notably by theorists of Latin American dependency, have often challenged the relationships which quantitative analysis purports to establish. Latin America shows no simple correlation between socio-economic development and democracy, with some relatively rich countries losing democracy (Argentina in 1930) and some relatively poor countries developing democratic institutions (for example, Chile in the first half of the nineteenth century). Often it has seemed that economic performance (that is, broadly distributed growth) has been more important for democracy than high levels of socio-economic development (per capita income or structure of production). Other case studies have, however, confirmed many of the hypotheses generated by quantitative analysis: that education strengthens commitment to democracy; that political violence is greatest in poor countries; and that the growth of a middle class is conducive to democracy (Diamond, 1992, pp. 117–25).

Asia also reveals that the relationship between development and democracy is by no means simple. The case of India shows that democracy is not necessarily incompatible with a low level of development. A high level of development might increase the demands and supports for democracy through increases in income, education, participation, the political consciousness of the middle class, pluralism or foreign contacts. Alternatively, it might be destabilizing by loosening traditional forms of authority, generating political demands from newly created political interests, and deepening ideological cleavages. Such developments can push authoritarian regimes in the direction of democracy, or present democracies with unmanageable problems. The consequences of development for democracy are very ambivalent (Diamond, 1989, pp. 33–4).

An explanation of how a relatively rich country might resist democratization is provided by Moore's 'revenue bargaining' theory of democracy which

divides states into 'coercion intensive' or 'capital intensive', depending on their sources of revenue. Where the state has no need to bargain with income earning classes and wealth creators in order to extract revenues, as in poor agricultural societies, oil-rich countries, or aid dependent states, it has no need of democracy: states freed from dependence on their subjects for revenue need not take too seriously any relationship of accountability with these subjects (Moore, M., 1996, p. 59).

Political mediation

Despite the evidence suggesting democracy will only be sustained when the economic conditions and their associated structural changes in society are right, it would be wrong to think that socio-economic structures are all that matter. The 'autonomy of political factors' has to be recognized. How else can India's remarkable democratic history be explained, or authoritarianism in countries such as Argentina and Uruguay in the 1960s despite having the highest levels of GNP per capita and literacy in Latin America (Mainwaring, 1992, p. 326)? In 2001 the Freedom House survey of political rights and civil liberties confirmed that higher levels of political freedom are correlated with economic prosperity. But it is still possible for a state to be poor and free (for example, Benin and Bolivia) or prosperous and repressive (for example, Brunei and Libya). Politics are important to consolidation in many ways.

The process of socio-economic development may be supportive of democracy, but depending on how élites respond to the new political demands generated by increased urbanization, industrialization, education and communications. After all, the middle class has not always opposed authoritarianism. Whether new groups are included in the political process through institutional developments, especially political parties and interest groups, and given access to economic opportunities and rewards (such as land, jobs, health care and consumer goods) are also relevant mediating factors. So democracy has fared better in countries such as Venezuela and Costa Rica, where the new social forces unleashed by development are accommodated within the political system, than in Brazil and Peru where too often they have been excluded: 'the contribution of socio-economic development to democracy illustrates again the powerful and indeed inescapable mediating role of political leadership, choice and institutionalization'. It has also been shown that the centrality of politics to economic opportunity has been a fundamental cause of democratic breakdown (Diamond and Linz, 1989, p. 44).

Other intervening political variables include the speed at which democracy has been introduced. Thus in Latin America the abrupt and violent

seizure of independence followed by civil and foreign wars produced political turmoil in the nineteenth century that made progress towards any kind of stable government very difficult to achieve. A long history of élite competition is another political factor, significant in some Latin American countries, and supporting Dahl's (1971) thesis that democracy is most likely to be successful when political competition becomes institutionalized before the expansion of the suffrage and other forms of political participation. Latin American history supports the hypothesis that democracy is likely to be more stable if based on a historical sequence that establishes national identity first, followed by the creation of legitimate state structures, followed by the extension of rights to political participation to all members of society (Diamond and Linz, 1989, pp. 5–9).

Inadequate preparation for constitutional democracy by colonial powers has been seen as another factor contributing to the difficulties in coping with change experienced by many newly independent regimes (Brecher, 1963, p. 624; Diamond, 1988, pp. 6–9; 1989, p. 13; Pinkney, 1993, ch. 3), though it has to be recognized that a common colonial legacy can be followed by very different experiences of political stability, as the cases of India and Pakistan confirm.

The political culture

Following an attitudes survey carried out in the early 1960s by Almond and Verba it was posited that there is a pattern of political attitudes that supports democracy – a 'civic' or balanced culture 'in which political activity, involvement and rationality exist but are balanced by passivity, traditionalism, and commitment to parochial values' (Almond and Verba, 1963, p. 30). Democratic consolidation also requires attitudes which recognize the legitimacy of territorial and constitutional arrangements and a willingness to accept the outcomes when the rules of political life (especially electoral rules) have been adhered to (Leftwich, 2000, pp. 136–7).

The values and orientations found to be associated with the stability of democracy are moderation, co-operation, bargaining and accommodation. 'Moderation' and 'accommodation' imply toleration, pragmatism, willingness to compromise, and civility in political discourse. Time is often seen as a critical variable here, producing (for example) a contrast between the time available for India to acquire democratic values and have them disseminated from élites to the masses, and the limited opportunity to develop democratic values in Africa before independence (Diamond *et al.*, 1990, pp. 16–17; Diamond, 1993b, pp. 10–27).

There is much convincing evidence that a 'low' level of political culture can undermine democracy. A lack of commitment to democratic principles, procedures and beliefs on the part of African political élites, for example, has made it difficult to sustain democracy – even though some traditional values support consensus, moderation, consultation, the rule of law and controlled political authority. Similarly in Latin America democratic cultures have helped to maintain democracy and make it more difficult to consolidate and perpetuate authoritarian government, as in Uruguay in 1980 and Chile in 1988 where 'both the fact of the plebiscites and the ultimate popular rejections of the military at the polls reflected the continuing vitality of democratic culture' (Diamond, 1988, pp. 14–15; Diamond and Linz, 1989, p. 13).

However, there is no simple, deterministic link between political culture and democratic stability because experience of democracy is itself a powerful socializing influence. In Latin America democratic political cultures have been strengthened by the successful performance of democratic government in accommodating new interests, expanding the economy, developing education and securing the welfare of the lower classes. The legitimacy created by governmental success helps explain the strong correlation between the economic performance of democratic regimes in Latin America and their stability. Furthermore, studies of Asian society show that political cultures are often mixed, with countries having 'some significant values and orientations that press in a democratic direction and others that press in an authoritarian one' (Diamond, 1989, p. 17; Diamond and Linz, 1989, pp. 11, 44).

The relationship between the 'civic' culture and democracy implies that a set of values about the rightness of certain political structures, a high level of political competence on the part of individuals, and a sense of trust in other individuals and groups lead to stable democracy. But it could equally be argued that all such values could be a consequence of the experience of democratic government. When attitude surveys are carried out to determine what the predominant political culture is, all that may be revealed are the expectations that people have as the result of their experience of a political system. If there is the possibility that the political culture is not cause but consequence, it ceases to have theoretical significance for understanding change or the loss of critical levels of support for democracy.

The secret is knowing what creates the critical level of consensus. Following de Tocqueville, Lipset argued that democratic values are more likely to be preserved at a time of great social change (such as when democracy is first introduced) if all major social groups are given some access to the political system early on, and the status of major pre-democratic institutions

(for example, monarchy) is not threatened during the transition period. Legitimacy is also preserved by governmental effectiveness: efficient political and administrative decision-making which enable governments to meet the needs of the population. In many African states the squandering of resources by mismanagement, corruption, waste and greed has alienated support for democratically constituted regimes. It is no coincidence that Botswana is the most stable African democracy and has moved from being one of the poorest African countries to one of the richest in a decade and a half. A problem for many Third World countries is that they are locked into a vicious circle of low legitimacy and ineffective performance (Diamond, 1988, p. 16; Diamond *et al.*, 1990, p. 10).

The economic performance of democratic governments may be less important in deepening democratic values than political performance, or the level and quality of the democracy practiced. Feelings about corruption, political freedoms, and the trustworthiness of leaders have an impact on attitudes about the way democracy works, and the greater the level of satisfaction with this, the stronger the democracy (Diamond, 1998).

Research has also revealed strong statistical relationships between per capita GNP and personal beliefs and values supportive of democracy, suggesting that the political culture may be an important intervening variable in the relationship between development and democracy. As countries become richer and improvements in education and communications are felt, people have been observed to become politically more aware, effective, and defensive of their political and civil liberties. Evidence from Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey and Brazil has been adduced to support this hypothesis (Diamond, 1993a, pp. 419–20; 1993b, pp. 1–2).

Again, the causal relationship is not necessarily in a single direction. The political culture influences behaviour and the operation of institutions, but is itself influenced by the development of new social forces, modes of socialization, leadership and international influences. Hence the political culture can sustain democracy despite relatively low levels of economic development. For example, both India and Costa Rica show ‘surprising democratic persistence despite low or moderate economic development’ because ‘political culture at both the élite and mass levels clearly plays a strong supporting role’ (Diamond, 1993a, p. 425).

Civil society and democratization

While stable and effective democracy is in part a function of the institutions negotiated and supported by political élites, it is also dependent on the way

civil society is organized to influence policy makers, mobilize public opinion, hold governments at all levels to account, and make governments responsive to the expression of demands and needs (Diamond, 1996, 1997a). Such responsiveness and accountability require a civil society consisting of organizations that are autonomous, voluntary and protected by the rule of law. What is being referred to here is the civic community of neighbourhood associations, political parties, non-governmental organizations, associations, private voluntary bodies, grass-roots support organizations, and social movements which complement state and market and form 'the informal sector of the polity' (Reilly, 1995, p. 7). Such bodies often proliferate in transitions to democracy, having, as in Brazil and the Philippines, originally been formed during the authoritarian regime when more overt forms of political participation were banned.

Civil society promotes the consolidation of democracy by monitoring the exercise of state power, stimulating political participation, educating people in democracy, representing interests, and providing an alternative to clientelism. It creates cross-cutting allegiances, throws up political leaders and disseminates political information. Associational autonomy entails a move away from clientelism, allowing people, especially the poor, to articulate their interests and so move from being clients to being citizens (Fox, 1994, pp. 151–3; Diamond, 1997a, pp. 29–42).

Parts of civil society are undoubtedly supportive of democracy and of the interests of groups hitherto excluded from political power, such as women, different categories of the urban and rural poor, and ethnic minorities. The development of civil society thus provides opportunities for the poor and disadvantaged to redress injustices as well as to practice democracy within their own associations (Diamond, 1992, p. 123). Sustainable democracy requires 'democratic deepening', or the infusion of institutions with democratic practices. This requires the empowerment of associations in civil society to increase popular participation, making it more difficult for élites to manipulate democratic institutions (Luckham and White, 1996, p. 7). A civil society supportive of democracy has to be embedded in a 'civic community' in which relations between civic associations are founded on trust, co-operation and reciprocity. Putnam has shown how the effectiveness of democratic government increases with the strength of 'civic community' (1993). If effective democratic government in turn increases support for democracy, then the 'civicness' of the community is crucial.

However, some elements of civil society are distinctly un-civil, reactionary, authoritarian and in other ways uninterested in or opposed to democracy (White, 1996). Civil society may reflect the inequalities of resources,

knowledge and mobilization that typically distinguish class and other interests in capitalist society (Grugel, 2002, pp. 94–5). The strength of civil society differs greatly between different regions of the Third World. In Africa, for example, civil society is ‘male dominated and gerontocratic’, and includes ethnic and fundamentalist religious associations unlikely to sponsor democratization (Kasfir, 1998, p. 136). In newly democratizing countries civil society may include groups that openly and freely co-operated with the previous authoritarian regime as well as criminal elements, drug mafias and para military groups. Resistance to democratization may also come from a leadership of non-governmental organization that has been incorporated into political clientelism. In Latin America, while there has been some collective empowerment through credit unions, self-help housing and other community initiatives, new social movements have sometimes been subject to ‘capture’ by government and clientelist politics (Little, 1997, pp. 192–4).

Even when elements in civil society are pro-democratic it may not be easy for them to move from protest and political confrontation to constructive dialogue with governments (Hernandez and Fox, 1995, pp. 202–3). A contribution to democracy may be difficult when authoritarianism is deeply rooted, political representation a novel phenomenon, and political organizations traditionally monopolized by parties (Reilly, 1995, pp. 257–9). For example, the ‘democratization of social life’ creates a counterpoint to the state in Vietnam, when in the past social organizations (trade unions, youth movements and women’s organizations) have been integrated into government and party. New social organizations are emerging to support the urban poor in their quest for housing, work and health care. But such participation is still limited because ‘the constraints of the old centralized planning system still exist; the elements of civil society are still underdeveloped; and ways to attract and operationalize people’s participation are as yet unreliable and ineffective’ (Luan, 1996, p. 1890).

The balance of power

Theorizing about the conditions necessary for the survival of democracy includes using the methodology of comparative history to develop a ‘balance of power’ approach (Rueschmeyer *et al.*, 1992). A balance of power between classes (and coalitions of classes), between the state and civil society, and between international and national pressures is seen as the crucial determinant of whether democracies survive even under adverse conditions. The stability of democracy has been found to vary according to different historical contexts, depending on the overall balance of power.

In South and Central America the relative *power of social classes* was found to be dependent upon the reaction of the new middle class, emerging with the development of capitalist economies, to the rising power of the working class. The working class had supported democracy and the landed upper class had consistently opposed it, especially when controlling a large supply of cheap labour and forming a significant part of the economic élite, as was the case in South and Central America throughout the first half of the twentieth century. The relative weakness of the working class in Latin America has always been a contributory factor in the instability of democracy in the region (Rueschmeyer *et al.*, 1992, p. 282).

The middle class supported representative government, but opposed the inclusion of the working class. Middle-class support for democracy was apt to disappear when its interests were threatened by lower-class pressures, the middle class often supporting military intervention which curtailed civil rights and parliamentary government even though it found its own access to the state restricted. Political parties were found to be crucial in consolidating a balance of power between classes, in mobilizing the working class, and in protecting the interests of economically dominant classes so that they had no need to resort to authoritarianism (Rueschmeyer *et al.*, 1992, p. 9).

As we have already seen, a balance between *state power and civil society* is also necessary for the stability of democracy and the avoidance of authoritarianism. In developing countries the state's autonomy at the time of the emergence of mass pressure for democratization was greater than in the history of European democracy, tilting the balance in favour of the state. Autonomous social organizations, perhaps supported by religion, act as a counterbalance to the state, but their class content is important for democratic outcomes, as they have sometimes served as the repositories of authoritarian ideologies.

The importance of a countervailing power to that of the state is confirmed by post-colonial African history. Here the state has been 'the primary arena of class formation' and the 'primary means for the accumulation of personal wealth', leading to corruption, the concentration of power, the emergence of a parasitic bureaucratic bourgeoisie, and the absence of a middle class to demand 'the expansion of democratic rights and limitation of state power'. With a few exceptions, the state has not been balanced by a plurality of autonomous associations – intellectuals, traditional leaders, professionals, trade unions, business associations, religious groups, students, journalists and so on – that are necessary for stable, responsive and accountable government. In Asia, similarly, wherever bureaucratic and military dominance has restricted the autonomy of interest groups, voluntary bodies and political

parties, a foundation of democracy has been removed with authoritarian consequences (Huntington, 1984; Diamond, 1988, pp. 21–7; 1989, p. 22; Diamond *et al.*, 1990, pp. 22–4).

The concept of a balance between *international and national power* refers to the varying impact which foreign influences can have on the internal balance of power. Economic dependence on agrarian exports strengthens the power of large landholders. Capital-intensive industrialization using imported technology blocks the development of a working class. Foreign-owned mineral extraction for export, and import-substituting industrialization, weakens landowners, and strengthens urban classes, both the working class and the domestic bourgeoisie. When the repressive apparatus of the state is reinforced by foreign powers concerned about their strategic and economic interests, the balance between state and civil society is further altered (Rueschmeyer *et al.*, 1992, pp. 69–75).

Institutional development

Recent research has confirmed that political institutions and leadership have implications for democratic stability. Institutions are seen as crucial to the key attributes of democracy – the rule of law, freedom, order, accountability, representation and administrative capacity (Diamond, 1997b). Institutions are also needed that can cope with ethnic demands for special treatment, including consociational democracy. State institutions are required to guarantee the effective exercise of citizenship.

Institutional weaknesses have impeded attempts to sustain democracy in most regions of the Third World. Democracy in Asia has been threatened by the willingness of rulers to abuse their constitutional powers to strengthen their position. Military intervention in the region has often been preceded by the severe erosion of democratic constitutionalism by civil politicians seeking to perpetuate their power. A willingness to accept the consequences of democratic practices has been exceptional among Asian political leaders. In Latin America democratic instability has followed ‘shifts in political leadership strategies and styles from consensus to confrontation, from accommodation to polarization’. In Africa the values and skills of political leaders have been crucial in undermining or sustaining democracy. Democracy in all regions of the Third World requires commitment to democratic values and an accommodating, compromising and consensual style on the part of political leaders (Diamond, 1989, pp. 6–11; Diamond and Linz, 1989, p. 15; Diamond *et al.*, 1990, pp. 14–15).

Other institutional weaknesses have been reflected in political parties that are internally divided, unable to articulate interests clearly and unable to mobilize a significant mass base. In Latin America stable democracy has been associated with parties that satisfy Huntington's (1968) criteria of coherence (in policy), complexity (of organization), autonomy (from the state) and adaptability (to social change). There is evidence that a party system with only a small number of parties is most conducive to democratic stability. Conversely in Thailand the military and bureaucracy have dominated politics because,

with 143 parties crossing the Thai political stage between 1946 and 1981, political élites have been unable to build strong bases of popular support, to articulate, aggregate and mobilize political interests, to incorporate emerging interests into the political process, and to cooperate with one another in achieving policy innovations. (Diamond *et al.*, 1990, p. 27)

In Africa weak 'input' institutions, and especially political parties, have excluded the mass of the population from constitutional politics, encouraging élitism and clientelism, and forcing people into 'non-formal' modes of participation (Diamond, 1988, pp. 19–20).

Other institutional prerequisites of democracy that have been proposed include executive accountability to the legislature, a proportional electoral system, a bicameral legislature and judicial review. Vigorous legislative and judicial institutions capable of controlling an excessively zealous executive are also important: 'the strength and autonomy of the judiciary is roughly proportional to the condition of democracy' (Diamond, 1988, p. 31). Party systems and civil–military relations have been examined in earlier chapters.

Considerable attention has also been paid to the form of executive, that is, whether democracy is best served by a presidential or parliamentary form. A strong case has been made in favour of an executive recruited from among parliamentarians. Presidential executives, especially when combined with the personalistic and autocratic political traditions found in Latin America, allow directly elected presidents to claim mandates from the people entitling them to bypass elected representatives, organized interests and other mechanisms of accountability. The parliamentary system avoids conflicting executive and legislative mandates, gives greater flexibility of response when the executive loses the confidence of the legislature, provides a stronger opposition and incentives for dialogue between government and opposition, and avoids fusing head of state with chief executive which enables the incumbent to claim representation of the national interest rather than a partisan position. It is also more compatible with a multi-party system, compared with the

tendency for presidential systems to produce deadlock in executive–legislative relations, ideological polarization, and difficulties in coalition building (Mainwaring, 1993; Linz, 1994; Haufman, 1997). So a parliamentary system might have helped Brazil and Peru in the late 1980s ‘where presidents whose programmes had failed catastrophically and whose political support had evaporated were forced to limp through their remaining terms with virtually no capacity to respond effectively to the deepening economic and political crises’ (Diamond *et al.*, 1990, p. 28).

However, comparative evidence is inconclusive. On the one hand, Przeworski *et al.* (2000) found that ‘the expected life of democracy under presidentialism is approximately 21 years, whereas under parliamentarianism it is 73 years’ (p. 129). But from a comparison of 56 transitions to democracy in the Third World between 1930 and 1995 Power and Gasiorowski (1997) could find no evidence that constitutional type ‘had any significant bearing on the success of Third World experiments in democracy’ (p. 144). Nor did they find that a multi-party system gave presidential executives particular problems. They were forced to conclude that institutional variables generally might be less important for democratic consolidation than had been thought.

Foreign influence

Finally, interventions from abroad are clearly relevant to the consolidation of democracy. Such influence is currently supportive in the main, with regional and global trends towards democracy, and with powerful external actors making the promotion of democracy and human rights explicit foreign policy goals. Demonstration effects from neighbouring states have been significant, as has international governmental and non-governmental assistance with democratic reforms (Diamond, 1989, p. 42; Diamond *et al.*, 1990, p. 33).

However, foreign powers can also work to undermine democracy (Haynes, 2001, p. 50). For example, in 2001 US politicians and officials sought to influence the election in Nicaragua with money, propaganda and food aid. While the foreign policy of the USA is officially in favour of democratization, it has ‘correlated poorly’ with its other actions in international relations (Whitehead, 1986). In 2002 it was widely suspected of instigating an unsuccessful *coup* attempt against the democratically elected President of Venezuela. Not surprisingly, international effects on democracy (positive and negative) tend to be greater the smaller and more vulnerable the country.

Conclusion

With the dominant ideology in the world prescribing a free-market economy, there are very powerful pressures being applied to Third World countries to liberalize their economies and transform their polities in the direction of pluralism. Hence the current interest in what is needed to restore democracy as well as how to make it function effectively so that its legitimacy becomes firmly established. The significance of economic development to democracy shows how important it is to recognize that political reform cannot sensibly be pursued in isolation from measures designed to strengthen the performance of Third World economies. It is right to assert the importance of political prerequisites of democracy and the status of economic factors as necessary but not sufficient conditions for consolidation. But it is important that political preconditions should not be part of one's definition of democracy, lest theorizing becomes merely tautological.

It is also important to understand that democracy is a contested concept. The choice of a particular definition – electoral competition, decision-making procedures, civil and political rights, or the distribution of power within society – may reflect an ideological or normative position on the part of the user that should be acknowledged.